
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(Prepared by N. N. Kulkaṇi, B.A., LL.B., Buldhaṇa)

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UṢṆĪṢA AND CHATRA

TURBAN AND UMBRELLA

(Ananda K. Coomaraswamy)

I have discussed the Buddhist *uṇhīso-sīso* in JRAS. 1928, Pp. 829–838.[1] It was found that *uṣṇīṣa* in Brahmanical and *uṇhīso* in canonical Pali literature means invariably "turban".[2] For example, AV. XV. 2 where, in the description of the costume provided for the Vrātya, "day is the turban (*uṣṇīṣa*), night the hair";[3] VS. XVI. 22 where Rudra is "turbaned" (*uṣṇīṣin*),[4] and XXXVIII. 33, where "Aditi's girdle (*rāsnā*, probably=*raśanā*, cf. *raśmi*) is a turban (*uṣṇīṣa*) for Indrāṇi"; and M. II. 119 where King Pasenadi lays down his turban (*uṇhīsan*) before approaching the Buddha, thereby acknowledging a greater king than himself. In D. III. 145 (Lakkhaṇa Suttanta) the Tathāgata as Mahāpurisa is *uṇhīso-sīso*=uṣṇīṣa-śīrṣā ; and whatever this may mean, this *lakkhaṇa* has all the force of an iconographic prescription in the

1. With further references. See also *Technical Studies*, III. 76, note : and cf. Mus, P., "Le Buddha paré" in B'EFEO, 1928, pp. 153-278 and "note additionalle."

With reference to the *lakkhaṇas* generally, T. W. Rhys Davis justly remarks that "Most of the marks...are probably mythological in origin, and three or four seem to be solar." (*Dialogues*..., 3, p.)

2. As we know from inscriptions, *uṇhīso* can also mean the "coping" of a railing.

3. We take this to imply that the Vrātya comes forth as Varuṇa (*para* Brahman) and assumes the character of Mitra (*apara* Brahman), i. e. that of Agni and/or the Sun, in the same way that Agni is "Varuṇa at birth, Mitra when kindled" (RV. V. 3. 1. cf. AV. XIII. 3. 13. "This Agni becomes Varuṇa in the evening, in the morning he becomes Mitra"). For the Vrātya as the inoperative (*avrata*) Godhead now proceeding to operation (*vrata*) see my "Janaka and Yājñavalkya" in IHQ. XIII, 1937, pp. 274-277.

4. This description is realised in the turbaned Śiva of JRAS. 1928. Pl. V, fig. 6, facing p. 840.

later Buddhist art. It is not easy to see why this should have been taken to mean " with a head *like* a turban "; such analogous words as *vajra-bāhu* and *padma-pāṇi* meaning "an arm bearing a *vajra*" and "hand holding a lotus". We should, therefore, expect in art a realisation of the prescriptive *uṇhiso-sīso* in the form of a " head provided with a turban ", or possibly " crown ". We meet in fact with turbaned Bodhisattvas (JRAS, 1928, Pl. V, fig. 5, facing p. 840) and with early references to the adornment of Buddha figures with jewels (*Mahāvaṁsa*, XXXVIII, 62–64) ; and finally with a well-developed "Crowned Buddha" type, that of the Buddha as Cakravartin in the sense of the King of the World, the significance of which has been so admirably analysed by M. Mus (BE'FEO, 1928). It is, however, the monastic type of the Buddha, for which as such the insignia of royalty would be inappropriate, that forms the basis of the iconography. From this point of view, if the *uṇhīso* was to be represented, it had to be in some other way than as a turban or crown. What we actually find is that the earliest images are provided with a spiral hair-lock of the Kapardin type, and that a little later on, in the second century A.D., there comes into use a type with many short curls, corresponding to the tonsure described in J. 1. 64–65 where the Buddha cuts off and casts into the air the "Jewel-crested turban" (*cūḷā-maṇi-veṭhanam*) that had been bound on his head by Vissakamma, and with it his hair, leaving only the short locks, curling to the right, which remained unchanged throughout the Buddha's life. In the *Buddhacarita*, VI. 57 the headdress is a "bright crown" (*citram mukuṭam*), but the description of the trailing strands (when it is cast up into the air) shows that a turban is thought of. In the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, text p. 467 it is asked "by reason of what gnosis is it that the Tathâgata's[1] *mūrdhny-uṣṇīṣa* shines" (*vibhāti*). The turban or crown cast into the air was received by Sakka (Indra) and kept in the "Shrine of the Jewel-crest (-ed Turban)" called the Cūḷāmaṇi-cetiya, in the Tāvatiṁsa heaven. Numerous representations occur of the "Enshrinement of the Turban-relic", showing the turban tself upon its altar (cf. JRAS. 1928, Pl. IV, figs. 2, 3, facing p. 840).

1. Viz. Jaladhara-garjita-ghoṣa-susvara-nakṣatra-rāja-saṁkusitâbhijña, a name that combines the characteristics both of Cloud and Sun.

In the established iconography, the short curling locks are represented as covering, not merely a normal skull, but also a rounded protuberance which surmounts the skull; and it was understood that this protuberance represented what had been intended by the words *uṇhīso-sīso* and at a later date, we meet with references to a cult of the *uṇhīso* relic, represented by pieces of bone.[1] The interpretation was a mistaken one. I naturally dislike to say this, as much as I should dislike to emend a text; in general, Indian iconography is meticulously "correct", by which I mean consistent with itself and with the metaphysics on which it rests. In the present case, however, we have the ineluctable fact that *uṣṇīsa* and *uṇhīso* had always been a headdress and not a part of the head;[2] and we can also see why and how, once the Buddha had been thought of as "a man" amongst men, rather than as the Universal Man and Sun of Men and Gods, and once, therefore, the monastic type of the figure had been established, it was not convenient to represent a turban or crown upon his head. Difficulties of this sort are always created by the humanistic interpretation of myths; considered as a man, for example, the only crown that could be worn by Christ was a crown of thorns (which thorns are analogically rays of solar light). On the other hand, once it had been, so to speak, decided to interpret the prescriptive *uṇhīso-sīso* in some manner consistent with the monastic type, and, therefore, as a peculiarity of the skull itself, the further development of which this protuberance became the source and seat of a flame of light was perfectly logical; and this aspect of the symbolism has been admirably studied by Dr. Kramrisch,—the *brahma-randhra* is now raised from its position in a normal cranium to a slightly higher position in the protuberance.[3] At the same time, that the Bodhi-

1. To judge from the Mahākapi Jatāka (No. 407), in which the Bodhisattva receives royal obsequies, and a shrine (*cetiya*) is built for his skull, which receives honour (*pūjā*), the Buddha's skull-relic should have been called the *sīsa-kapāla dhātu*.

2. The head had indeed been thought of as "like an umbrella":—but we must emphasize that the terms *uṣṇīṣa-śīrsā* and *chattrākāra-śīrṣā* are not grammatically comparable, and that we nowhere meet with any such expression as *uṣṇīṣākāra-śīrṣā* which would mean "with a head like a turban".

3. Kramrich, S., "Emblems of the Universal Being" in *Journ. Indian. Soc. Or. Art*, III. pp. 148–165, Dec. 1935.

sattva, who might have been "either" a teacher or a king, rejected the temporal power (offered to him by Māra,[1] as the kingdom of this world was offered by Satan to Christ) did not and could not alter the fact that as the Sun of Men and Eye in the World, he was essentially (and like every other Messiah and Avatar) "prophet, priest *and* king" : and M. Mus has admirably shown that a cult of the royal Buddha as Cakravartin in this sense restored to the monastic figure those attributes of royalty which were inconsistent only with a historical interpretation of the myth. In this restoration of royal attributes, the original turban becomes, for the most part, a crown, without change of significance.

The word *uṣṇīṣa* is derived, according to Pāṇini VI. 1. 94, Vārtt. (*uṣṇam īṣate hinasti*) from *uṣṇa*, "heat" and *īṣ* in the sense of *hiṁs*, to "strike". Supposing a turban worn by the Sun as a protection, as implied in RV. X. 27. 13 discussed below, this could mean either "that which radiates heat", or "that which repels heat".[2] It may be that both meanings inhere : a turban

1. Similarly by Mṛtyu to Naciketas in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad.

2. We assume that the first is the primary meaning. *Īṣ* is a transitive desiderative from *i* to "go" and closely related to *iṣ* "let fly", whence *iṣu*, "arrow" : the sun's rays are often thought of as arrows. Cf. RV. IX. 71. 6 *āsadaṁ deva eṣati*, "the God hurries to his seat" (the strewn altar). *Hinasti* is not necessarily "injures", but rather "strikes" in the sense "sends forth", as for example, in Chaucer, *Boke of the Duchesse*, 1312, "they gan to strake forth", but transitive, governing *uṣṇam*. It is often overlooked that Skr. *hiṁs* is not merely to "injure", etc., but embraces also most of the connotations that belong to English "strike" and also "streak" in obsolete or dialectic use : a "stroke' not necessarily being destructive of, but in some cases actually productive of, the things "struck", as for example when one "strikes a circle". *Hinasti* is certainly in this sense "sends forth" or "projects" in Sāyaṇa's gloss. on RV. X. 27. 13, where he has *svadiptim...hinasti*, i.e. "emits his own light". Similarly where Śaṅkara comments on KU. IV. I. *khāni vyatṛṇat* paraphrasing *hiṁsitavān hananaṁ kṛtavān ity-arthaḥ* : where *hiṁsitavan* is no more "injuring" the openings through which the sense-powers are to pass forth to their objects than Latin *secare viam* means "to cut a road to pieces". Hence we hold that *uṣṇīṣa* is primarily that which sends forth heat ; and such an "ornament" is appropriate to the Sun who needs no shelter from any heat above him, but himself is *uṣṇa-kara, uṣṇa-bhās, uṣṇa-bhṛt, uṣṇa-ruci, uṣṇa-raśmi*, etc. *Uṣṇīṣa* is properly, or usually, a turban, but can be also a crown ; and interpreted as above is, in effect, a "crown of glory". When, as in

as worn by the Sun being that which radiates heat, and a turban as worn here below being that which protects against heat. In the same way a distinction can be made between an umbrella representing the sky, with its ribs as rays of light, and the umbrella of which a practical use is made, as a protection against the light, a "sunshade" or "parasol". Turban and umbrella alike are primarily the attributes and prerogatives of royalty, and will be considered here as such, rather than as utilities subsequently appropriated by the commons. A turban is worn indoors as much as out. An umbrella is rather carried behind or held beside a king than held over his head as a protection against anything above him; it pertains to occasions of state, when the king may be indoors or otherwise not in need of any protection from the sun (he is much rather himself the "Sun"). To this day a Raja does not permit the use of an umbrella by his subjects when in his vicinity. Turban (or crown) and umbrella do not supply a need on the king's part, but pertain to the character of kingship.

In the *Divyāvadāna*, pp. 2, 58, 99 etc., we meet with the expression *chatrākāra-śirāḥ*, which seems to mean "with head (*i.e.* crown or cranium) like an umbrella," in a stereotyped list of the beauties recognizable at birth, in the case of the distinguished persons referred to. The formula running *abhirūpo darśanīyaḥ prasādiko gauraḥ kanaka-varṇa chattrākāraśirāḥ pralamba-bāhur vistīrṇa-lalāṭaḥ saṁgata-bhrus tuṅga-nāsaḥ* includes several of the Buddha's actual *lakkhaṇas*, and others implied or appropriate, and it would seem as though *chattrākāra-śirāh* takes the place of *uṣṇīṣa-śīrṣā*, with like application but somewhat different meaning. In the cosmic application which really underlies the *Divyāvadāna* descriptions, the expression "with a head, or rather, cranium, *like* an umbrella" has a definite meaning: it is an assimilation of the top of the head to the Sky or Roof of the Universe, "with its rays" (*raśmīvatīm* in VS. XV. 63, cited below), repre-

Buddhist contexts, the turban is a *cūḷā-maṇi-vethana*, it is the bright "crest-jewel" that sparkles as would be the gold of a metal crown.

When, on the other hand, a turban is worn by an ordinary mortal, its function is, so to speak, reversed, its folds protecting against, rather than emitting light or heat. The analogous term *uṣṇa-ghna* and *uṣṇa-vāraṇa* denoting an umbrella, *chattra* = *chāyā-mitra*, appear in the same way to refer to the practical use of the parasol as a defence against the heat or light (or rain); but even these words are not altogether unambiguous.

sented by the "ribs" of the umbrella, of which the stick is the spine of the Universal Man and the Axis of the Universe.[1] But we can only think of this in actual iconographic effect either as amounting to "with an umbrella overhead", or "provided, with an aureola, glory, or nimbus".[2] And this corresponds to the facts of the iconography, where we find an umbrella in connection with the earliest Yakṣa figures, the Bodhi-tree, and many images of Bodhisattvas and Buddhas; or also in early Indian representations of the Sun, or the Buddha, a circular nimbus.[3] An earlier history of both umbrella and nimbus can be followed in Western Asia.

While, then, *uṣṇīṣa-śirṣā* seems to mean logically a "turbaned head", there can be no doubt the *chattrākāra-śiraḥ* and related expressions must be rendered by "with a head like an umbrella". Some other examples may be noted.[4] In the *Saundarānanda*, V.

1. In the *Daśakumāracarita*, invocatory verse, *brahmâṇḍa-chatra-daṇḍa* "Staff of the umbrella of the Brahma-egg" i. e. of the universe, of which the roof is called the "skull" (*brahmâṇḍa-kapala*). it is precisely to this *kapāla* that the designation *chattrâkāra* is appropriate. For the *brahmâṇḍa* see Cu. III. 19.

2. The word "nimbus", cognate with "nebula", is the etymological equivalent of Skr. *nabhas* (mist, cloud, sky) and Hittite *nebis* (sky). Cf. Sāyaṇa's interpretation of *varūtham* in RV. X. 27. 13 cited below. *Chāyā* is etymologically "sky" as well as "shade".

3. How closely related are the ideas of the umbrella and the nimbus will be realised if we reflect (1) how conspicuously an umbrella held just behind the head suggests a nimbus (*śiraś-cakra*), and (2) that while the Sun's "umbrella", the Sky, is above and about his Disc or "Eye", we think of him as looking, not sideways from under, but as it were down away from his "umbrella", the Sky, which is thus behind his "face". as is an umbrella when held as suggested.

With *cakra* in *śiraś-cakra* = nimbus, compare the wheel (*cakra*) on which the sacrificer seats himself, symbolically in the Enpyrean *beyond* the Sun, TS. I. 7. 8 and SB. V. 1. 5. 1. The wheel is here placed on a pole, and is manifestly like an umbrella; in effect, the sacrificer takes his seat on the top of the solar umbrella, and that is to say beyond the cosmos.

4. I am indebted to the kindness of Professor Walter Eugene Clark; and also for the following references: *Divyāvadāna*, 23, 3; 330, 19; 441, 8; 523, 18; and 588, 2. Cf. Foucher, *L'Art Gréco-Bouddhique du Gandhāra*, II, 291–4; Burnouf, *Lotus* .., pp. 588–605; Fr. Weller, *Chinesische Dharmasaṁgraha*, p. 46; and references in my "The Buddha's *cūḍā*, Hair, *uṣṇīṣa*, and Crown" in JRAS. 1928, and Mus, P, "Le Buddha paré" in BEFEO. 1928.

51, xv, p. 72), where the tonsure of Nanda is described, we find *vyojayat...keśa-śriyaṁ chatranibhasya mūrdhnaḥ*, "He (Buddha) caused to be separated the glorious-beauty of the hair from the umbrella-like head". In the *Jātakamālā*, X. 32, where the Bodhisattva is a *dīkṣitaḥ*, and the Bodhisattva's hair when dressed accordingly is as beautiful as it had been when he had been arrayed as king, we find *mūrdhnaś-chatranibhasya keśaracanā-śobhā tathaiva*, which can only mean "the beauty of the dressed hair was exactly equal to that of the head itself that was like an umbrella".[1] In several other texts the royal head appears to be directly likened to an umbrella: e.g. *Garuḍa-Purāṇa*, XXV. 77 *chatrākāraiḥ śirobhis tu nṛpaḥ*: *Mahābhārata*, XII. 333. 11 *chattrākṛti-śīrṣā*. *Mahābhārata* XIII. 343. 58 *ātapatreṇa sadṛśe śirasi* recalls the *hiraṇmayena pātreṇa* of Īśā. Up. 15. Our conclusion so far is that the Sun, or king as the Sun of Men, is both *uṣṇīṣa-śīrṣā*, and in some sense *chatrākāra-śiraḥ*=*chatranibha-mūrdhā*; that the wearing of a turban and the use of an umbrella, in other words, are alternative rather than identical attributes of royalty.

That the Buddha's head was "like an umbrella" has a far more interesting significance than has hitherto been realised. For in the early Buddhist aniconic iconography (e.g. Cunningham, *Bharhut*, pl. XVI, centre), an iconography that is far more abstract than the corresponding literature, it is not merely a worship of the *vestigia pedium* (*pāduka*, footprints) that is represented, but of the whole Person. The *pāduka* are the symbols, not of the whole Person, but only of his "feet". What is depicted by the whole icon consisting of footprints, alter, and umbrella, is the whole cosmic or "mystical" body of the Great Person in a likeness, in the same sense that the cosmic body of Prajāpati is described in Maitri Up. VI. 6. The parts of this "mystical" body corresponding to Earth, Air and Sky are represented by the footprints, alter, and umbrella (as in *Divyāvadāna*, passim, *chattrākāra-'śirāḥ*). The altar is the "body" in the same sense that the Vedic altar is the "body" of Agni; and also because it is the "navel of the earth" and as in Maitri Up. VI. 6 "the navel is

1. Speyer's rendering is "embellished with the splendour of the royal umbrella", but this is scarcely literal. We agree with Speyer in reading *keśaracanaśobhā* as one word.

the air". The umbrella is as much the head of the Great Person in a likeness as in the Vedic ritual the Mahāvīra vessel is the "head of the Sacrifice."

We shall now attempt to analyse the problem of turbans and umbrellas by a consideration of the underlying ideas that may be expressed in these symbols of the royal power. We take as our point of departure RV. X. 27. 13 *śīrṣṇā śiraḥ prati dadhau varūtham*, literally "he (the Sun) with a head-gear put on his head a defence", with this may be compared VS. XVI. 22 where Rudra is addressed as *uṣṇīṣin*, and XVI. 35 where he is addressed as *varūthin*, and RV. IX. 71. 1 where Soma (described with solar qualities) "makes the cloud his fillet" (*opaṣam*).[1] It may be inferred that *varūtha*, *uṣṇīṣa* and *opaśa* are all types of solar head-gear, with related, if not necessarily identical values. In explanation of RV. X. 27. 13 Sāyaṇa contributes: *śīrṣṇā*=*śiraḥ-sthāniyena raśmi-jālena*, "with a network of rays about the head-region.;[2] *śiraḥ*=*sarvasya lokasya mastakam*; the skull of the universe"; and *varūtham*=*varṇīyaṁ vṛṣṭi-lakṣaṇam udakam*, "a covering, or defence, of water in the form of rain". The last is suggestive of IX. 71. 1 *opaśam...nabhas*; Sāyaṇa contributing *nabhas*=*nabhasa ādityasya svabhūtam udakam*. "the water of the cloud, produced by the Sun" (it is well-known that the Sun is

1. Sāyaṇa, derives *opaśa* from *ā-upa-śī*, to "rest against"; Grassmann, from *ava-paś*, to "tie down". Sāyaṇa explains *opaśam*=*ā samantād upaśeta ity opaśaḥ*, "enclosing on all sides". In RV. I. 173. 6 "Indra wears the Sky as his fillet" (*bharti...opaśam-iva dyām*); Sāyaṇa seems to infer rather that *opaśa* here alludes to the "horn" (s.) of the Bull (Indra), with which he "supports the Sky", and while this does not seem especially plausible, it does bring to mind the wearing of a horned headdress, either by a king, or in ritual.

2. *Śīrṣṇā* seems to have an adjectival value, with some such word as "gear" implied, and qualified by *sīrṣṇā*=*sīrṣṇya*. Cf. RV. I. 162. 8 where *śīrṣṇyā raśanā* is the "bridle" of the sacrificial Sunhorse (which "bridle", ogether with the rest of the harness, is to be taken up into heaven when the sacrifice has been consummated). Bearing in mind that *raśanā* implies both "strap" and "ray", it might not be too far-fetched to think of the Sun's head-gear as in some sense a "bridle", with which the Sun is "yoked" (*yukta*): it is actually by his rays that the Sun is c onnected with (*samyukta* in the sense of BG. XIII. 26, cf. Svet. V. 10) all things. The word *śiras* itself derives either from *śrī* (Grassmann, "insbesondere Licht verbreiten, über etwas") or from *śrī*, to "be glorious".

thought of as the source both of light or heat, and moisture ; cf. Indra as Parjanya). *Varūtha* (like *chāyā*) is common in RV. in the sense of "protection" or "shelter" (*śarma*). For example, I. 58. 9 "Be a defence, a shelter, unto the singer ; O radiant Agni, protect the singer from distress" (*bhava varūthaṁ ...ṛṇate vibhāvo bhava...śarma, uruṣyāgne aṅhaso gṛṇantam*) ; I. 23. 21 "O waters, teem with medicinal defence (*bheṣījaṁ varūtham*) unto my body, that I may long behold the Sun" (*jyok ca sūryaṁ dṛśe*); V. 49. 4 "Sending the defence (*varūtham*) for which we ask, Savitṛ", which amounts to "Shine upon us, O Savitṛ", or "Rain upon us, O Savitṛ". The latter meaning agrees with Sāyaṇa's interpretation of X. 27. 13. So far it would seem as though the turban is as it were an ornament of cloud, and the umbrella an ornament of light ; the two together amounting to the expression "Clouds and lightning were round about him".

Returning now to RV. X. 27. 13, we find in the second line "Seated in the lap (of Aditi), what is above he striketh downward (*ūrdhvām......kṣiṇāti nyaṅ*), and follows outspread earth". Sāyaṇa contributes : *ūrdhvām=udgatāṁ svadīptim* ; *kṣiṇāti=hinasti*; *āloka-karaṇāya*[1] *pratikṣipatīty-arthaḥ* ("he casteth forth his own

1. I. e. "that He may see" in us ; this ray passing outwards through the eye being "God's eye wherewith He sees in Me" (Eckhart) ; "Other than Him there is no seer" (BU. III. 7. 23). Hence the traditional concept of intelligent vision as dependent, not upon a light reflected from the object seen, but on a light projected from the eye. In the same way for other senses ; the objects of the senses are prior to the senses themselves, which latter come into being for the sake of the former (KU. III. 10 *indrebhyaḥ parā hy arthāḥ* and IV. 1 *parāñci khāni vyatṛṇat svayambhūḥ*). In BU. III. 2. 5 accordingly "The eye is indeed a grasper (of forms. But how ?) Inasmuch as one sees forms (*species, exemplata*) with the eye when it is grasped (i. e. controlled) by form (*intentio, exemplar*) as super-grasper"; cf. St. Thomas, on *De anima*, II lect. 14, *Species recipitur in organo sensus... per modum intentionis et non per modum naturalis formae*. Similarly in the much debated BU. III. 2. 2 (rightly translated by Hume) "it is by the expiration (*apānena*) that one smells a scent" (all that inspiration effects being to bring the physical support of scent into contact with the nostrils, whereas it is that sense-power which goes forth through the nostrils which recognizes "scent"; apart from this sense-power nothing but a chemical reaction would have taken place ; and as implied in BU. III. 7. 33 "Other than Him there is no smeller").

Closely related to BU. III. 2. 3–9 (on the *atigrahas*) is BU. I. 5. 3. They say : 'My mind was elsewhere ; I did not see. My mind was

light that is above, that is, projects for the sake of seeing"), and *nyaṅ=raśmi-sammūha-rūpeṇa nīcair-añcitā gantā san*[1] (downwards, i.e. descending in the form of a downwardly directed sheaf of rays"), This extension of a sheaf of rays, which is also a spiration and an utterance (Light, Breath, and Sound coinciding *in divinis*) is the act of Divine Procession, whereby "dividing himself, He fills these worlds" (*ātmānaṁ vibhajya pūrayaty imāṅ lokāṅ*. MU. VI. 26), and at the same time the generation of all beings, Children of the Sun, for "Many are these rays of the Sun ; they are his sons" (JUB. II. 9. 10, cf. II. 5).[2] Conversely, when these

elswehere ; I did not hear'. It is with the mind, truly, that one sees. It is with the mind that one hears...Even if one is touched on the back, he discerns (*vijānāti*, French 'il constate') it with the mind," (the mere sensation being devoid of any mental content). Eckhart's "subtract the mind, and the eye is opened to no purpose" implies in the same way that the eye of the fleah is an *automaton* as defined by Aristotle, *Phys*. II. 6, ("in itself to no purpose"). Cf. also from Professor Cornford's Introduction to Aristotle, *Physics* Vol. I (Loeb Librarv, 1929, p. lvii), "Neither the eye nor the visual sense can see or visualise its vision, nor can the hearing ear hear its hearing ; but the thinking mind can think upon its thought." Further, *atigraheṇa* in BU. III. 2. 6=*grahaṇena* in II. 4. 9 "It is as when a harp is being played, one could not grasp the external sounds, but by grasping the harp or the harpist the sound is grasped"; i. e. the ear alone, apart from the exemplars, ideas, or intentions of the notes inherent in the intellect before the notes are heard, and for the sake of which the ear exists, would receive vibrations only mechanically, without being *aware* of them, there would be sensation, but *no perception*. Hence the saying already cited, "It is with the mind (*manas*=*nous*) that one *hears*". Similarly Kauś. Up. VII. 2. To resume, the sense organs apprehend (*grah*) : it is another power that comprehends (*atigrah*). The distinction is of observation from experience, or, in the Platonic sense, "reollection". For example, in so far as the scholar merely observes and records ("objectively"), and does not experience ("subjectively"), we can say of him that he apprehends (*gṛhṇāti*) and is alive (*lebt*), but cannot say that he comprehends (*atigṛhṇāti*) or is really living (*erlebt*). Cf. "Witelo", *De intelligentiis*, XVIII-XIX, *delectatio, in quae est vita cognoscitiva...in substantia simplici operatur vitam, in aliis autem non* : and Math. XIII, 15.

1. RV. I. 34. 7 *nīcīnāḥ sthur upari budhna, eṣām asme antarhitāḥ ketavaḥ syuḥ* : JUB. I. 6. 1 *dūrādvā eṣa etat tapati nyaṇ*.

2. SB. II. 3. 3. 7, VIII. 7. 1. 16-17, X. 5. 2. 13 and 16. *Nirukta* IV. 26, MU. IV. 26 and VI. 30, etc. Plotinus, *Enneads*, VI. 4. 3. "souls are described as rays : "Witelo", *Lib. de intelligentiis*, VI-IX (with IX. 1 *unumquodque quantum habet de luce, tantum retinet esse divini* cf. SB. X. 2. 6. 5 where

"rays" or "feet" or "breaths" of the Sun, who is also Death, are withdrawn, the being is "cut off" and dies (SB. X. 5-2-13 etc.). So that as formulated in AA. III. 2. 4, "When these two are opened up (*vihīyete*)[1] the Sun looks like the Moon, and the rays are becoming invisible (*na raśmayaḥ prādur bhavanti*)...a man should know that his spirit (self-same with the solar Spirit, as has just been stated) is passing over (*samparetyasātmā*)[2] and that he has not long to live...Then when the Sun is seen like a hole (*yatra chidra ivādityo dṛśyate*) and looks like the nave of a chariot wheel (*ratha-nābhir iva*)[3] or he sees the Shadow[4] cloven (*chidrāṁ vā chāyām paśyet*), he should know the very same". In the same way BU. V. 5. 2 "He sees the Orb clear; those rays reach him no more" (*nainam ete raśmayaḥ pratyāyanti*), and V. 10 "He goes to the Sun, it opens out (*vijihīte*) there for him, like the hole (*kham*) of a drum, through it he ascends".

What the dying man expects and hopes for is that he may be able to pass through the midst of the Sun to an immortality above

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Savitr distributes the immortal light amongest separated beings, to some more and to some less i. e. according to their powers of reception); Bonaventura, *De scientia Christi*, 3 c, *Ipsa divina veritas est lux* (JUB. I. 5. 3 *satyam haiṣā devatā*), *et ipsius expressiones respectu rerum sunt quasi luminosae irradiationes*.

1. *Tau yatra vihīyete* evidently corresponds to *sa tatra vijihīte* (repeated for Sun and Moon) in BU. V. 10; this disposes of Keith's difficulty involved in his rendering "Where these two are separated", which as he admits "is not very logical". It is curious that Keith should have thought of the exact formulae of AA. as "old folklore ideas pressed into service." For the symbolism of the Sundoor is not even merely Vedic, but quite universal, for example old Egyptian, Christian, and Islamic.

2. With *samparetaḥ* here (Ānandatīrtha, *saṁnikṛṣta-nigamaḥ*; Sāyaṇa, *mṛtaḥ*) cf. *sāmparāya* in KU. I. 29. and *upasamharati* in BU. IV. 4. 3. The Spirit withdraws itself, together, when the man "expires", or "gives up the ghost." (*apānati, ucchvasati*).

3. Cf. RV. VIII. 91. 7 *khe rathasya*, etc.

4. Keith has "his shadow", but no word in the original text corresponds to "his". The "shadow" is the light of the Sun, "for under his shadow is all this universe" (SB. VIII. 7. 3. 13 citing VS. XV. 63); (the *chāyā* here is (as also etymologically) "Sky"; what the dying man sees is the *divaśchidram* of JUB. I. 3. 5. The man's own shadow does not enter into the question at all; in the first place, the Sun is no longer shining for him, and secondly, it is to be presumed that the dying man is recumbent.

(JUB. I. 6. 1, etc.).[1] If it be so, if he is qualified (*arhat*), then "when he has reached the full term of life (*sarvam āyus eti*)... ascending these worlds...he escapes through the midst of the Sun (*ādityaṁ samayātimucyate*); that is the hole of the sky (*divaś chidram*); verily like the hole in a cart or chariot-wheel, even so is the hole of the sky; it is all covered up by rays (*raśmibhiḥ saṁchannam*). There he should place both himself and the sacrificer" JUB. 1. 3·7 : "he", i.e., the priest; the text referring to the ritual ascent of the sacrificer, in which the ascent at death is anticipated, cf. SB. I. 9. 3, and V. 2. 1, AB. IV. 20. f. etc., with JUB. as cited above, *chidram...raśmibhiḥ saṁchannam...tad...dadhyād...yajamānam*, cf. VS. XV. 63 *āyos tvā sadane sadayāmy, avatas chāyāyam...raśmīvatīm*, "I set thee (the Svayamatṛṇṇā brick) in the seat of Life, in the shadow of the helper (SB. VIII. 7. 3. 13 adding

1. The Judgment takes place at Death; "As quickly as one could direct the mind to him, he (the deceased) comes to the Sun...the world-door", i. e. door of the heavenly world (*loka-dvāram*) here like *svargasya lokasya dvāra* in AB. III. 42 and JUB. IV. 15. 2). The deceased is measured by the Truth of the Sun, and can enter only as like to like (JUB. I. 3 etc.). In the same way in Egyptian eschatology, the "soul" of the deceased arrived at the Sun-door is weighed in scales against the Truth (this Psychostasis survived in Christian literature and iconography, cf. Male, *Religious Art in France of the Thirteenth century*, p. 376). The Egyptian books provide us with remarkable representations of the Sundoor, both open and closed, and with the Sun on guard as its keeper (see Schäfer, *Ägyptische und heutiger Kunst und Weltgebäude der alten Ägypter*, 1928, p. 101, figs. 22–24, alter Naville).

2. *Chidra* etymologically, "chine": the equivalent *kha* is etymologically "chaos" (see my "Kha and other words denoting Zero" in BSOS. VII, pp. 487–497, and "A study of the Kaṭha Upanisad" in IHQ. XI, pp. 570–584). The condition of entry is a perfect self-naughting (JUB. III. 14. 3–5; AA. II. 2. 4; *Acts of John*, 100; *Hermes*, Lib. V. 11; Rūmī, *Mathnawī* I. 3062–3; Tauler. *Following......*, 16–17; Cusa, *De fil. Dei.*, *ablatio omnis alteritatis et diversitatis*, etc.): "This is the sign, of liberation, this is the opening of the door there (*etat mokṣalakṣaṇam...eṣo'tra-dvāra-vivaraḥ*)...breaking open the Sundoor, he departs on high (*sauraṁ dvarām bhitvā ūrdhvena vinirgataḥ*, MU. VI. 30). That is, as Hermes expresses it, "breaks out of the cosmos" (*Lib.* XI. ii. 19). In case, that is, he "is qualified to pass through the midst of the Sun" (*ādityam arhati ṣamayaitum*, JUB. I. 6. 1). It is just inasmuch as they are in fact *arhats* that so many Buddhist saints are described as "breaking through" the roof or roof-plate of the palace, analogically the cosmos, as for example DhA. III. 66, *kaṇṇikā-maṇḍalam bhitvā ākāṣe uppatitvā*. That the Buddha himself had broken down the roof is stated in

"For in his shadow is all this universe'), thee full-of-rays": according to the comment on VS., *chāyāyam*=*āśraye*, "in the shelter of". This "naturally perforated brick" (Svayamātṛṇṇā)[1]

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the *gahakuṭaṁ visankhitam* of J. I. 76 and often referred to by the epithet *vivaṭa-chado.* The Buddha (*Parinibutto*="Deus absconditus") has gone before, "the doors of immortality are open" (*aparutā...amatassa dvāra,* D. II. 39, etc.). RV. IV. 11. 2 calls upon Agni to "open the gate" (*vi sāhy agne...kham*; Sāyaṇa *puṇyalokasya dvāram...vimuñca*) ; who indeed ascended up to Sky and opened the door of the heavenly world, Agni indeed is the lord of the heavenly world" (*divispṛg udasrayat sa svargasya lokasya dvāram avṛnod, agnir vai svargasya lokasyādhipatiḥ,* AB. III. 42). Similarly Micah, II. 13 *ascendet enim pandens iter ante eos : divident, et transibunt portam, et ingrediuntur per eam* (=Muṇḍ. I. 2. 11 *sūrya-dvārena prayānti*) with St. Thomas on this text, "Christ by his Passion...removed the obstacle ; but by his Ascension he, as it were, brought us to the possession of the heavenly kingdom" (*Sum. Theol.* III. 49. 5 and 4 and see the whole article). To those who think that Agni, Buddha, Christ, are the names of persons of entirely different nature (for example, physical, human, and divine respectively) we may remark with Eckhart that "He to whom God is different in one thing from another and to whom God is dearer in one thing than another" (e.g. by one name rather than another), "that man is a barbarian, still in the wilds, a child".

1. There are three such "bricks", one representing the Earth, one the Air, and one the Sky ; and these are set centrally in the lowest, third, and fifth (uppermost) layers of the Fire-altar, and thus with their openings one above the other, through which opening ; the Golden Person is thought of as moving up and down these worlds (SB. VII. 4. 1. 18), and likewise the Devas, for whom the Ṛtavyā and Viśvajyotis "bricks" are "stepping-stones" (*samānyayaḥ* SB. VIII. 7. 1. 13 and 23, cf. SBE. XLI, p. 155, note 8). It is in the same way that one ascends these worlds "as one would keep climbing up a tree by steps" (JUB. I. 3. 2), or descends in the same way (AB. IV. 21). It is thus also that the Kāmâcārin "goes up and down these worlds, eating what he desires, and assuming what aspect he will" (TU. III. 10. 5). The symbolism of Jacob's ladder is unmistakeable. Otherwise stated, the holes in the "bricks" are for the upward passage of the breaths, and for the vision of heaven ; what is said of the lowest Svayamā amātṛṇṇā (representing Earth on which Agni is kindled, the kindling being his Passion) applying to all (TS. V. 2. 8. 1 *svayamātṛṇṇā bhavati prāṇānām utsṛṣṭyai atho svargasya lokasyānukhyātyai,* cf. CU. 2. 24 *loka-dvāram apavārṇu tvā vayam,* and Īśā Up. 15 *dṛṣṭaye*).

Eggeling (SBE. XLI, p. 155, note 8) speaks of the bricks as "porous", but there can be no doubt that single perforations are meant, as in AA. III. 2. 4 *ratha-nābhir iva* and JUB. I. 3. 6. *yathā khaṁ vānasaḥ.* The "bricks are "naturally perforated", *svayamātṛṇṇā,* for Indra, indeed, *vajreṇa khāny*

is set (SB. VIII. 7. 3. 13 with VS. XV. 63 ; cf. TS. V. 3. 7) above the uppermost Viśvajyotis brick which represents the Sun, "for the uppermost (*uttarā*) Svayamātṛṇṇā is the Sky (***dyaus***)[1] and the uppermost Viśvajyotis is the Sun...So that the Sun glows only... and generation takes place only on this side of the Sky" (SB. VIII. 7. 1. 17).[2] The uppermost Svayamātṛṇṇā is at the same time the head (*śiras*) or rather skull of Agni-Prajāpati, whose cosmic body has been completely integrated ritually when it has been set in place (SB. VIII. 7. 3. 15–17), the Sun in relation to this "head" or "skull" being the Eye.[3] The prayer is addressed to the Sun, "May Sūrya guard thee with the safest roof" (*chardiṣā*). The two bricks in close contact thus represent the Sun in the Sky, just as in the former piling the Gold Plate and Gold Man represented the Sun and the Person within the Sun. And this skull or roof of the world is perforated, but thought of

atṛṇan nadīnām (RV. II. 15. 3), ***khāni*** *vyatṛṇat svayambhūḥ* (KU. IV. 1). The bricks are not necessarily made of baked clay (SB. VI. 1. 2. 30); in the present context the "bricks" are assuredly "naturally perforated" stones (*Śarkarāḥ,* SB. VIII. 7. 4. 1), i.e. such "ring-stones" as are significantly called ***mukti-dvāra*** (see my *Darker side of Dawn*, Washington, 1935, note 21) and with which we are familiar in India from prehistoric times onward.

1. CU. III. 15 ***dyaur asyōttaram bilam***, "The Sky is its (the cosmic cist's) uppermost outlet". In both passages ***uttara*** is "uppermost" and/or "northern".

2. Thus "on the back of the Sky" (*divas-pṛṣthe*, VS. XV. 58 and 64, SB. VIII. 7. 1. 21 and VIII. 7. 3. 18), i.e. on what we should think of as the "face" of the Sky. In the same way AV. X. 7. 38 *salilasya pṛṣṭhe*, is then "on the face of the waters" of Genesis. In Indian cosmology, both heaven above and the waters below are thus thought of as back to the intervening cosmos. The Sun is the Janus of the sky, and faces both ways : as is explicit in SB. VII. 4. 1. 17–18 where the gold plate is the Sun's disk, and the Golden Person in the Sun is laid down backwards upon the plate, so that "the Golden Disk glows hitherward with its rays (*sa eṣa* ***raśmibhir*** *arvāñc* ***tapati rukmaḥ***) and that Person (tendeth) upward his breaths")***prāṇair*** *eṣa* ***ūrdhvaḥ puruṣaḥ***).

3. "The head is the skull of the universe" (*śiraḥ sarvasya lokasya* ***mastakam***, Sāyaṇa on RV. X. 27. 13). "The skull (*mūrdhā*) of that Universally-human-spiritual-self (*ātmana vaiśvānarasya*, i.e. of the Cosmic Man, of Agni) is the Most-fiery (*sutejāh*), i.e. the Sky); the Omniform (***viśvarūpaḥ***. i.e. the Sun) is his Eye" (CU. V. 18. 2, cf. RV. X. 90. 3). Cf. Edda, ***Vafthrudhnismāl*** 21, ***himinn ór hausi.***

as seen from below, and from within the worlds, its opening would be invisible, because of the intervening Viśvajyotis: in other words, the "hole" by which one is "altogether liberated" (*atimucyate*) and which is commonly called the "Sun-door" (Muṇḍ. I. 2. 11; MU. VI. 30; SB. XI. 4. 4. 7), or "World-door", i.e., Gate of Heaven (CU. VI. 8. 5. *loka-dvāra=svargasya lokasya dvāra.* AB. III. 42 and JUB. IV. 15. 2), through which none can pass into the solar Paradise, but those who are qualified to enter into the Sun, who is the Truth and Light *satyam*, (JUB. I. 5. 3, *svar*, JUB. III. 14. 3), as like to like, as truth to Truth and light to Light (JUB. *ib.*)

Thus the way-in is all covered over and concealed by the rays of the Sun; the brilliance of the manifested truths concealing the darkness of their source beyond the Sun, "where no Sun shines" (KU. v. 15; BG. xv. 6; Rev. xxi. 23). The Sun, the Angel with the Flaming Sword, stands on guard at the Gate (JUB. I, 3), and this is a stopping place for the Ignorant, but a forwarding for the Comprehensor (CU. xv, 8. 5, where *nirodhaḥ* corresponds to *avarodhanaṁ divaḥ* in RV. ix, 113. 8). The Pilgrim, before the Gate, makes his prayer accordingly, "Do thou, O Pūṣan, open for me, in whom is truth (*satyadharmāya*),[1] that door (*mukham*) that is closed by the golden disc:[2] O Pūṣan, one and only Prophet, Yama, Sun, Kinsman of Prajāpati, disperse thy rays (*vyūha*[3] *raśmīn*), gather up thy fiery-energy (*sammūha tejas*),

1. Hiraṇyagarbha, Prajāpati, is *satyadharmā* in RV. I. 121. 9.

2. I. e. by the manifested, and intelligible, truth, or actuality: cf. BU. I. 6. 3 "That Immortality (within, or beyond the solar orb) is covered over by the Truth (*tam amṛtaṁ satyena cchannam*, where *satyena* corresponds to *raśmibhiḥ* and *hiraṇyena pātreṇa* in our texts); the Breath is the Immortal (*prāṇo va amṛtam*), form and aspect are the truth (*nāma-rūpe satyam*), by them this breath is hidden (*channam*)". This truth of the revealed Brahman (who descended into these worlds by means of form and aspect, SB. XI. 2. 3. 3 *pratyavaid rūpeṇa caiva nāmnā ca*) is a truth, not simply to be envisaged, but to be penetrated (*veddhavyam*, Muṇḍ. II. 2. 2): cf. I John V. 20 20 "him that is true...Jesus Christ, with John X. 9 "I am the door" and XIV. 6 "No man cometh to the Father but by (*per*) me".

3. Hume reverses the meaning of *vyūha*, which he renders by "spread forth". For the sense "disperse" or "dissipate" required in the present context, cf. JB. III. 7 where Prajāpati *pāpmānaṁ vyūhate*, "disperses evil" or "dispels evil"; and Gaṇḍa-vyūha, the title of a well-known Buddhist Sūtra, with somewhat the sense of "Bursting the Bubble" or "Cutting the Knot"; Sukhāvatī-vyūha, "opening up of the Land of Bliss".

that I may see that fairest form of thine.[1] He who is yonder, Person, He am I!" (Īśā. Up. 15–16). The Sun, indeed, has no power to reject him who thus invokes the Truth (JUB. I. 5.3 *neśe yad enam apasedhet*) but "disperses the rays for him" (*raśmīn ...etasmai vyūhati*, JUB. I. 6.2).

As we have already seen, the Sun is besought to protect us "with the safest roof" *chardiṣā* VS. XV. 64, SB. VIII. 7. 3. 19). It is in fact "by the Sun that the Sky is upheld" (*sūryeṇotthabitā dyauḥ*, RV. X. 85. 1) which Sky is the roof of the universal Chariot his vehicle (*dyaur āsīd uta chadiḥ*, *ib.* 10). The analogy of roof (*chadis*, *chardis*, *chadana*) to umbrella (*chattra*), alike in form (both being ribbed) and function (both affording shade and shelter, *chāyā* = *śarma*), is conspicuous, nor is it without sufficient reason that these terms derive from a common root, *chad*, to "cover". It may be safely assumed that the floor (*budhna*, R. V. x 135. 6) of the solar chariot is thought of as square (or possibly rectangular) and its roof as domed (or barrel-vaulted); the box[2] (*kosa*, R. V. VIII, 20. 8; 25. 7) of the chariot corresponding exactly to the cosmic box (*kośa*, CU. III. 15) of which the floor is Earth, the enclosure Air, and the lid (significantly called a *bila*, which implies an "outlet") the Sky. In other words, the symbolism of the umbrella is precisely that of a domed roof, constructed of ribs meeting in a central *karṇikā* by which they are supported and without which they would fall, and which is, furthermore, a "perforated" (*vijihitvā* J. I. 201) orb (*maṇḍala*).[3] In the case

1. "Fairest form" (*rūpaṁ kalyāṇatamam*); the "pleasing form" (*ramyāṁ tanūṁ*), or rather "golden form" (*hiraṇyaṁ tanūm*), viz. the Breath (*prāṇam*), of SB. VII. 4. 1. 16. Gold is the recognized symbol of light and immortality (TS. V. 2. 7; SB. III. 2. 4. 9, V. 1. 5. 28, IX. 4. 4. 8, etc.).

2. Cf. our expression "box-seat" of a coach. The Sun or Agni is the driver of the cosmic chariot, and occupies this seat.

3. For further details see my "Pali *kaṇṇikā* = circular roof-plate" in JAOS. 50, pp. 238–243, and "Symbolism of the dome" to appear in IHQ. Guy le Strange's description of the structural supports of the domes of the Gur-i-Amir in Samarkand ("The ribs converge above and unite in a centre-piece of wood", quoted by Chaghtai in IAL. XI, p. 90) might have been said in the same words of the old Indian domes described in the Pali texts the "centre-piece of wood" being the *kaṇṇikā*. The form of the roof is almost exactly that of an umbrella; and Havell was on the right track when he compared such roofs to wheels, Chaghtai's argument for Central Asian

of the umbrella its central axis penetrates (as in Mund. II. 2. 3-4 the arrow "penetrates", *vidhyati*, its mark) meeting-point of the ribs, radii or rays of the wheel-like sun-"shade"; the extension of the handle beyond the fabric corresponding to the finial above a domed roof and to the mast of a stūpa. In the case of a hypaethral temple (a *bodhighara* for example) the trunk of the Tree (emerging from an opening which, however large, is strictly speaking the "eye" of the dome) branches above.[1] In the case of a square or circular hut with a domed roof there is no visible interior pillar[2] supporting the roof-plate and rafters or beams,[3]

influence fails at this point: it does not, however, follow that an Indian influence must be presumed in Central Asia, for in all probability such a form of construction must have been widespread even in prehistoric times, and certainly long before the period with which he deals.

1. See my "Early Indian Architecture, II Bodhigharas" in *Eastern Art*, II, 1930. Cf. *Volsunga Saga* "So says the story that King Volsung let build a noble hall in such a wise, that a big oak-tree stood therein, and that the limbs of the tree blossomed fair out over the roof of the hall, while below stood the trunk within it, and the said trunk did men call the Branstock", i. e. "Burning Bush" (version by Magnusson and Morris, 1870, p. 5). In the case of the Siberian Shaman shrines, the tree is a birch, and "Its crown of branches, projects from the luffer in the roof. This birch symbolises the 'Door-God' *udeśi-burchan*) who opens for the Shaman the way into Heaven...The trunk itself is treated as holy, as if it were a god. Below the trunk a primitive stone altar is erected...The luffer...seems to have its prototype in Heaven. The Ostajaks speak of the 'House of Heaven' adorned with a golden luffer" (Holmberg, U., "Der Baum des Lebens" in *Ann. Acad. Scient. Fenn.*, B. XVI. Helsinki, 1922-23, pp. 28, 30; cf. p. 142). The Shamans furthermore employ as an earth-symbol a perforated annular disk (*ib.* p. 31, fig. 13) corresponding to the lower Svayamātṛṇṇā of the Vedic rite. The Chinese jade *pi*, also a perforated annular disk, is the symbol of heaven, and corresponds to the uppermost Svayamātṛṇṇa of the Vedic rite (cf. Schlosser, R., "China's Münzen as Kunstwerke", in OZ. NF. II, 1925, pp. 283. 305, interpreting "ring-money" accordingly). The whole symbolism of rings, and even of finger-rings, has to be interpreted on these lines. Cf. Marshall, *Mohenjodaro*, Vol. 1, p. 62.

2. There may in some cases have been a central pillar; this seems to be suggested by the *śālā-vāṁśa* of SA. VIII = AA. III. 2. 1 where "Just as other beams rest againsts the hall-beam, so the whole self rests upon this Breath". (In JAOS. 50. 243, note 7, I erroneously thought of this "hall-beam" as a ridge-pole.)

3. The hononymy of "beam" as ray of light, and "beam" as transom or rafter represents one of the many cases of the survival, in modern English, of expressions based upon the ancient metaphysics of light.

just as in the case of the stūpa, the mast is not extended downwards to the ground level; but in each case, nevertheless, the form of the whole structure depends upon the vertical axis which is only theoretically present; just as the Sun in the Sky is thought of as supported by a pillar which is none the less adamantine and "exemplary" because it is invisible,—it is in the same way that RV. X. 85. 12, the axle-tree (*akṣa*) of the cosmic chariot is but a Separating-breath" (*vyāna*)[1] and in JUB. I. 20 "Air" (*antarikṣa*, explained as *antary-akṣa*). "No visible pillar", we said: but supposing our hut is a Fire-temple (*agny-āgāra*), or the house of the universe, the hearth in either case being at the centre of navel of the Earth and immediately below the "eye" or luffer of the vault above, it is Agni himself whose "pillar of smoke" ascending supports the Sky (RV. I. 59. 1. *nābhir asi kṣitīnāṁ sthūṇeva janān upamid yayantha*; IV. 6. 2 *metā iva dhumaṁ stabhāyad upa dyām*).[2]

We have said enough, perhaps, to establish the general character of the values that are represented by the turban and the umbrella or nimbus. The distinction of *uṣṇīṣa* from *chatra* is important; the former corresponds to the cranium and hair, the latter is that which envelopes these. The turban (*uṣṇīṣa*, *varūtha*, *opaṣa*) is primarily a wreath or cloud that conceals or moderates the dazzling glory of the head, and the umbrella or roof (*cehatra*, *chardis*, etc.) primarily a scapular canopy[3] of rays of light,

1. *Vi* is disjunctive, as in the *vidharaṇa* and *vidhṛti* of BU. IV. 22 (*ātmā...setur vidharana eṣāṁ lokānāṁ sambhedāya*, "The Spirit the separating bridge to hold the worlds apart") and CU. VIII. 4. 4 (*ātmā sa setur vidhṛtih*, etc.), where the bridge (*setu*) = Axis (*akṣa*) = Greek Gnostic *stauros*, cf. Apocryphal *Acts of John*, 99 "This cross then is that which fixed all things apart". At the same time, like the cosmic Axle-*tree*, the Bridge is that which connects the worlds with one another, and the way of crossing over from the higher to the farther shore; and He, who is the Keeper of the Gate is also the Bridge across the moat (RV. X. 61. 16 *apas ca vipras tarati svasetuḥ*: Sāyaṇa, "*svasetuḥ*, inasmuch as *yasya svabhūta raśmayo jagadbandhakā santi*" cf. CU. VIII. 6. 2).

2. And thus holds Heaven and Earth apart (TS. V. 1. 5. 8 *yad agnir agn'ā yāhi vītaye iti, vai imau lokau vi etām*, cf. RV. I. 140. 3 *kṛṣṇaprutāu vevije*).

3. What has been said about umbrellas will apply for the most part also to canopies and baldachins, and partly to arches, especially *arcs de triomphe*.

provided with a central opening through which the supporting shaft (*daṇḍa*) passes, which shaft is analogically the Axis of the Universe and central column of the cosmic "house", while the opening is analogically that of the *brahma-randhra*, *sīmā* or *vidṛti*. *In divinis*, turban and umbrella denote His Majesty who wears them, and protect the privacy of the interior operation, but are not so much a protection and a shelter for himself as they are for those on whom he rains or shines. In the case of an earthly Sun of Men, the functions are primarily the same, but also of practical utility, since the king is also a man. In the case of his subjects, if they are also permitted to make use of turbans or umbrellas, to which they have no more "right" than they have to be addressed politely as "Mahārāja", their function is primarily self-protective and sheltering, and secondarily honorific. Finally, inasmuch as turban and umbrella are both of the nature of insignia, and at the same time are protections from rain or sun, we recognize in them what can always be seen in the artefacts of normal men, an indivisible linking together of use and meaning, physical structure and metaphysical reference.

SOME UNPUBLISHED INSCRIPTIONS OF THE CHAULUKYAS OF GUJARĀT

(D. B. Diskalkar)

(*Continued from the fourth issue*)

(15)

RAV (CUTCH) INSCRIPTION OF ARJUNADEVA OF V. S. 1328

This inscription was published by the late Mr. Zalpatram Pranjivan Khakhar in 1879 in the *Archaeological Survey of Western India-Report on Architectural and Archaeological Remains in the Province of Kach.* But as the book has become completely out of print I make the inscription accessible to scholars by this. As Khakhar did not publish its facsimile and I find it almost impossible to procure an impression of it I have to remain content by merely reproducing the text given by Khakhar.

The inscription is dated Friday, the second day of the bright half of Śrāvaṇa of the [Vikrama] year 1328 and refers itself to the reign of Mahārājādhirāja Arjunadeva ruling at Aṇahillapāṭaka and to the regime of his prime minister Māladeva. The object of the inscription is to record that one Ravisiṁha built a well at a cost of 1600 *drammas* in front of the temple of the goddess Ravechi in the village of Rav.

This inscription was evidently inscribed on a slab built in the well at Rav, which is about sixty miles east of Bhuj.

TEXT

१. ॥ संवत् १३२८ वर्षे श्राव
२. ण सुदि २ शुक्रेऽद्येह श्रीम
३. दणहिल्लपाटकाधिष्ठित समस्तरा
४. जावलीसमलंकृत महाराजाधिराजश्री
५. मदर्ज्जुनदेवकल्याणविजय
६. राज्ये तन्नियुक्तमहामात्यश्रीमाल
७. देवे श्रीश्रीकरणादिसमस्तमु
८. द्राव्यापारान् परिपंथयति सती
९. त्येवं काले प्रवर्त्तमाने घृतप
१०. द्यां मंडलकरणप्रतिबद्धरव

११. ग्रामे देवी श्रीरबेचीपादानां पु
१२. रतो घाघर्णाया क्षत्रीय बाई
१३. थरीया सुत रविसिंहेन आत्म
१४. श्रेयोर्थं वापी कारापिता का
१५. रापने दत्ता द्र० १६०० शुभं भवतु ॥

(16)

GIRNĀR INSCRIPTION OF ARJUNADEVA OF V. S. 1330

This inscription[1] is found engraved on a slab of stone fixed in a wall to the north of the Gaṇadhara Maṇḍapa situated in the west of the Nēminātha temple on the famous Girnār hill in Kāthiawar. The engraved portion measuring 9 inches in length and 3¾ inches in breadth is in a good state of preservation. The inscription is in *Sanskrit* prose engraved in beautiful *Nāgarī* characters. In respect of orthography the only point that deserves to be noted is the doubling of a consonant in conjunction with a preceding *r* (see ll. 2, 5, 6).

The inscription is dated on the 15th day of the bright fortnight of Vaiśākha in the [Vikrama] year 1330 and refers itself to the reign of (the Chaulukya sovereign) Arjunadēva and to the regime of his viceroy Pālha over Saurāṣṭra. It is very interesting as it records an unusual secular grant of the right of engraving inscriptions in all the temples including that of Nēminātha on the sacred hill Ujjayanta (i.e. Girnār) to an engraver named Haripāla, son of Gōga belonging to the Mēvāḍā community, by the (Jain) Āchāryas, Udayaprabhasūri and others and by the *Pañchakula* headed by Mēhētā Dhāndhā. The right was given not only to Haripāla but it was to be enjoyed by his lineal descendants, as is stated in the usual copper-plate grants.

With a view to see how far the privilege of engraving inscriptions on Girnār given by this grant was enjoyed by the grantee when I began to examine the inscriptions on Girnār I found only one inscription that was engraved by Haripāla.[2]

Pālha seems to have been appointed viceroy over Saurāshṭra some time after V. S. 1320, for in an inscription of Arjunadēva from Kāṇṭelā (No. XIII above) the viceroy is mentioned as

1. See *Quarterly Journ. Mythic Sec.* XIV. 242.
2. Revised List of Antiquarian Remains in Bombay Presidency, p. 351.

miles to the east of Jāmnagar and 18 miles from the Morvi Railway Station.

The inscribed portion containing five lines of writing measures 3 feet in length and 6 inches in breadth, and is comparatively in a good state of preservation. A few letters at the beginning of each line are lost but they can mostly be filled up by reference to the context. The only serious loss is at the beginning of the fifth line of the name of the person who made a grant by this inscription. The inscription is in *Sanskrit* prose. The *characters* are *Nāgari*. As regards orthography no special remarks are necessary.

The record opens with the date, Sunday, the 5th of the bright half of Jyeshṭha in the year 1333 of King Vikrama and refers itself to the reign of Mahārājā Śri Sārangadēva, who bears the following epithets—a comet to the Mālava country, a boar (incarnation) in upholding the earth of Gujarāt, the seventh emperor, and a gymnast by the power of his arms. It further tells us that during the *regime* of the *Pañchakula*, headed by Pālha, who was appointed governor over Saurāshṭra, the son of Rānā Bhojadeva of the Chapotkaṭa family granted for the religious merits of his mother सोयना (?) a garden near the river Dadhimatī for the worship of Sumatisvāmi.

As regards Sārangadēva's first epithet given above expressive of his enmity towards the ruler of Mālav it can be said that the hereditary fight between the Chaulukaya rulers of Gujarāta and the Paramāra rulers of Mālava begun since the time of the Chaulukya Mularāja, and the Paramāra Siyaka (or Muñja) was regularly continued upto the reign[1] of Sāraṅgadēva.

The epithet *Saptama Chakravartti*, a seventh emperor as it were, was many times used by some kings in old times.[2] As used with Sāraṅgadēva it is, as far as I know, found in this inscription only. It was used many times with another Chaulukya sovereign Bhīma II.[3]

1. His Chintra-praśasti dated 1287 A. D. also speaks of his defeat of the Mālva king (E. I. I. 281, v. 13). See also No. 18 below.

2. For its meaning see above Vol. VIII p.

3. See Ind. Ant. Vol. VI pp. 199, 201, 203, 205, 207 and 208.

The governor Pālha is, it may be noted, mentioned in another inscription of Arjunadēva of V. S. 1330 published above (No. XV).

The fact that there was still a petty holding of a Chāvaḍā family in the north of Kāthiāwār requires to be noted.

Sumatisvāmi is the 5th Tīrthaṅkara of the Jains. Chāvaḍā Bhōjaraja's son seems to have become a Jain or was inclined towards that faith. No trace is now left in Āmaraṇa of this Jain temple. It may possibly have been destroyed by the Muhammedans in the time of Dāvar-ul-mulk (about 1510 A.D.) who was a very bigoted Muhommedan and was appointed Fauzdar at Āmaraṇa by Sultān Mahmud Begḍā[1] of Gujarat.

As regards the places mentioned in the inscription it can be said that Āmaraṇa where the inscription is found is more than 600 years old as it is mentioned in the present inscription but it can be supposed to be older than that if a place named Ambarēṇu mentioned in a Valabhī grant[2] of G. S. 252 can be identified with the present Āmaraṇa. The river Dadhimatī is no doubt the modern Dēmai which flows at a distance of 1 mile to the west of Āmaraṇa.

The equivalent Christian date is Sunday the 9th May of 1277 A.D.

TEXT[3]

१. [स्वी]स्त श्रीनृपविक्रमसंवत् १३३३ वर्षे ज्येष्ट शुदि ५ रवौ मालवधरा-
धूमकेतुगूर्ज्जरधरणोसमु ॥[4]

२. [द्धरण] वराहसप्तमचक्रवर्तिभुजबलमल्लमहाराजश्रीसारंगदेवकल्याणविजय

३. [राज्ये तन्नि]युक्त सौराष्ट्रदेशाधिकारि मह० श्रीपाल्हप्रभृति पंचकुलप्रभृति
प्रतिपत्तौ अद्येह श्री आं .

४. [बरणे]चापोत्कटवंशसरोवरराजहंसचापोत्कटप्रजापरिपालकराणकश्रीभोजदेव-
सुतराज०

५. [...तेंन मातृसोयना (?)]श्र (श्रे) योऽर्थं श्रीसुमतिस्वामिदेवपूजनाय
दधिमतीनदीसमीपे वाटिका प्रदत्ता ॥

1. See Kathiawad Gazetteer p. 356.
2. Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute Vol. V, Part I.
3. From an impression in the Watson Museum.
4. These strokes are engraved by the mason only to fill up the space.
5. Omit this word repeated through mistake.

(19)

VANTHALI INSCRIPTION OF SĀRANGADEVA OF V. S. 1346

The subjoined inscription engraved on a yellowish stone was found along with five memorial stones[1] of V. S. 1469, in Vanthali, a mahāl of Junāgadh State. The inscription is very finely and correctly executed. It is tolerably in a good state of preservation. The inscribed portion measures 10½" in length and 6½" in height. As regards the *orthography* no remarks are necessary beyond that the Pṛshṭhamātrās are throughout used in the inscription.

The inscription opens with an obeissance to the God Rēvanta followed by the date, Monday, the 6th of the dark half of Vaiśākha in the (Vikrama) year 1346 and refers itself to the reign of *Mahārājādhirāja S'rī* Sāraṅgadēva. *Mahāmaṇḍalēśvara* Vijayānandadēva was a governor at Vāmana Sthalî. He was, as the seventh line tells us the son of Kshēmānanda. Two verses containing beautiful poetry give an account of a Rāsṭrakūta family in which Haripāla, son of Malla was born. When Vijayānanda wishing to fight with Bhānu invaded Bhūbhṛit Pallī, Haripāla accompanied him there. Seeing wicked men striking the son of Kēdāra (?) he fought with them and lost his lief. His brother thereupon prepared this (battle) pillar containing his brother's image, and built a canopy in front of Rēvanta, the son of the sun. A Brāhmaṇa named Mādhava, son of Muñjiga, and belonging to Chamatkārpura prepared this poem containing seven verses. It was written by Rāvala, son of Arisiṁha and was engraved by Vīraka son of Sāntala.

Bhānu whom Vijayāmanda attacked was most probably the well known warrior Bhāṇa Jēṭhavā. Bhūbhṛitpallī was equivalent to Bhumalikā or modern Ghumali, the ancient capital of the Jēṭhavās, which is now in ruins in the Baradā hills. Vāmanasthalī, at which the viceroy of the Chaulukya sovereign was ruling, is the old or rather Sanskritic name of the present Vanthalī where the inscription was found. Chamatkārapura was the old name of present Vaḍanagar in North Gujarāt, the home of the famous class of Nāgara Brāhmans. The following is stated

1. All these inscriptions refer to the reign of a Chūdāsomā king called Meligadeva, and are soon to be published in my edition of 'The miscellaneous inscriptions of Kathiawad.'

on p. 6 of the history of Gujarat (Bombay Gaz.. Vol. 1 P. 1). "According to the popular story in each of the four cycles or Yugas Ānandapur or Vaḍanagar had four different names, Chamatkārapura in the first or Satya Yuga, Ānartapura in the second or Treta Yuga, Ānandapura in the third or Dvāpāra Yuga and Vriddhanagara or Vaḍanagar in the fourth or Kaliyuga. The first name is fabulous. The city does not seem to have ever been known by so strange a title." Now the present inscription is at least one instance though of not very old time, which gives the first name Chamatkārapura. We have again reason to suppose that Mādhava, the Brāhmaṇa from Chamatkārapura, belonged to the Nāgar Brāhmaṇa community with whom it is a general custom to give along with their names that of the town they formerly belonged to and hence expressions like आनन्दपुरद्विज, आनर्त्तपुरद्विज etc. are frequently found.

Mādhava was no doubt a good poet as is seen from even the one verse, the second in the present inscription.

From another inscription[1] from Vanthalī preserved in the Watson Museum, Rājkot, we know that Vijayānanda the viceroy over Sōrath of the Chaulukya sovereign Sāraṅgadēva was the son of the daughter named Prīmaladēvī of Vīradhavala, son of the Vāghelā king Lavaṇaprasāda. It is thus clear that the Gujarāt sovereign and his Sōrath viceroy were related to each other. In the inscription I speak of the name of Vijayānanda's father is given as Kshemānanda as in the present inscription and that of his grand-father as Arisiṁha. Now we are told that Vīradhavala's wife's brothers were Sāngan and Chāmunḍa who were ruling at Vanthali but for refusing to pay tribute were slain in a fight by Vīradhavala. We have to suppose therefore that Vīradhavala after killing his wife's brothers appointed Kshemānanda (or perhaps his father) to rule at Vāmanasthalī and gave his daughter to Kshemānanda in marriage. Unfortunatley neither of the two inscriptions gives us the name of the family to which Vijayānanda belonged.

The mention of a Rāshṭrakūṭa family ruling in Kāthiāwār is interesting. We have no other record showing the existence of the Rāshṭrakūṭas in the peninsula. They were of sufficient importance

1. **Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute Vol. VI, Part II, p.**

to have marriage connections with the family of Vijayānanda and even with the sovereign family of the Chaulukyas of Gujarāt, as the other Vanthalī inscription shows.

The Christian date corresponding to the one given in the inscription viz. Vaiśākha Vadi 6 of V. S. 1346 is 2nd May 1290 A.D. But the week day differs. The inscription gives Monday but on the 2nd May the week day was Tuesday. It may, however, be supposed that the tithi may have actually commenced astronomically on Monday.

TEXT[1]

१. ओं[2] नमः श्रीरेवंताय ॥ सं १३४६ वर्षे वैशाख वदि॰ ६ सोमे महाराजा-
धिराज[श्री]

२. स[ारंग]देवकल्याणविजयराज्ये श्रीवामनस्थ[ल्यां महा]मंडलेश्वरश्री विजयानं

३. ददेवप्रतिप[त्तौ] ॥ श्रीराष्ट्रकूटान्वयमौलिरत्नं श्रीमल्लनामाजनि शौर्यसिंधुः ।
तस्या

४. त्मजः श्रीहरिपालनामा [धन्यो म]हासाधनिको बभूव ॥ १[3] श्रृंगार–
भंगिसुभग[ा : शु]भ

५. गानवंचिवाचालकंठकुहरा [मुहु]रात्तवीणाः । [गायन्ति]...[गि]-नगराजश्रृं

६. गमारुह्य गुह्यकचकोरदृशो यशोस्य ॥ २[4] वीरः[श्री]विजयानंदः क्षेमानंदस्य

७. नंदनः । विग्रहीतुमना भा[नुं]भूभृत्पल्लीमगात्किल॥ ३ नृपकार्याहृतस्तत्र ह॥

८. रिपालः कृपालयः । केदारपुत्रं पिशुनैर्हन्यमानमुदैक्षत ॥ ४ तैः स[मं]
[त]न्व ॥

९. तस्तस्य समीकमसवो ययुः । तन्मूर्त्तियुक्तं तद्भ्राता [रण]स्तंभमिदं व्यधात्

१०. ॥ ५ सहस्रधाम्नस्तनुजन्मनः श्री[रे]वंतनाम्नः पुरतो नवीनं । अचीकर
[न्मं]डपम

११. द्वितीयमहो महासाधनिक[:]स एष[5]:॥६ श्रीमुंजिगसुतः श्रीमच्चमत्कारपुर॥

१२. द्विजः सप्तश्लोकीमिमां चक्रे माधवो विश्व[मा]धवः ॥ ७ ॥ लिखित

१३. मिदं महं अरिसिंहसुत महं राउलेन ॥ उत्कीर्णं सूत्र सांतलसुतसूत्र वीराकेन

(*To be continued*)

1. From an impression in the Watson Museum.
2. Expressed by a symbol.
3. Indravajrā.
4. Vasantatilakā.
5. Upajāti.

FURTHER LIGHT ON THE DATE OF THE YOGAVĀSIṢṬHA

(Prahlad C. Divanji)

The above title itself indicates that this paper is a sequel to the one previously written by the present writer on the same subject. That paper was the one entitled "The Date and Place of Origin of the Yogavāsiṣṭha" read before the seventh session of the All-India Oriental Conference held at Baroda in December 1933 and published in the proceedings of that session of the Conference. In the earlier part of that paper I propounded the view that the most probable date of composition of the Yogavāsiṣṭha in two volumes as printed by the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press of Bombay in 1918 on collating a Ms. obtained from the collection of Pandit Jyestharam Mukundji and the edition printed by the G. K. Press must be the second or third or at the latest the fourth quarter of the tenth century A. D., that this did not mean that there was no work of that name in existence prior to that period but meant that there was an old work of that name containing a philosophical disquisition in the form of a dialogue between Rāma, the eldest son of King Daśaratha of Ayodhyā and the sage Vasiṣṭha and that it had been recast and considerably enlarged by a subsequent writer of the tenth century by adding other interlaced dialogues beginning with that between Sutīkṣṇa and the sage Agasti, the whole of the Uttarārdha of the Nirvāṇa-prakaraṇa and certain intermediate episodes and minute philosophical discussions. That view had been based upon two grounds namely (1) that the great Vedāntin Śankara's views on several important topics had been referred to and criticised in that work and some others which had not been discussed by him and his predecessors had been discussed therein and (2) that there were distinct and unmistakeable references to a King of Kāśmīr named Yaśaskaradeva who ruled over that province from 939 to 948 A.D., to his minister Nṛsiṁha, to a story composed by the latter &c. I considered therein all the *pros* and *cons* of the issue and showed that all the *cons* were not entitled to be given a preponderating weight as against the *pros* except one namely that this work has

been found to have been abridged by Gauḍa Abhinanda, who according to the view of Sten Konow expressed in his Introduction to the Karpūramañjarī, had been living in the middle of the ninth century A. D. With regard to that objection I reserved my judgment as I had not till then read Gauḍa Abhinanda's work and had not seen the grounds on which Konow's said view had been based. I have since then not only read a printed edition of the Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha but also compared it word for word with the N. S. P. edition of the Yogavāsiṣṭha and examined 16 Mss. of the Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra from the collection at the Sanskrit Library at Baroda and compared four of them, which satisfied my requirements, with the printed edition. I have also read Sten Konow's "Essay on Rājaśekhara's Life and Writings" forming Part III of his edition of the Karpūramañjarī translated by Charles Rockwell Lanman in Harward Oriental Series No. 4 on which the said objection had been based. Lastly, I have compared certain philosophical passages occurring in the Rāmacarita of Abhinanda with the Yogavāsiṣṭha and the Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha and carefully and critically studied some of the works on Kāśmīr Śaivism published in the Kāśmīr Series of Texts and Studies. I am, therefore, now confident enough to express an opinion as to the date of the said work and am glad to announce that the fact of the Yogavāsiṣṭha having been abridged by Gauḍa Abhinanda does not come in the way of the conclusion that the work in the form in which it has been printed by the N. S. Press must have been composed in the second or third or at the latest the fourth quarter of the tenth century A. D. That announcement is supported by the following reasons :—

The author of the Yogavāsiṣṭha has stated in Book II Sarga 17 that this is a work containing 32000 stanzas distributed as follows :—Vairāgya 1500, Mumukṣu 1000, Utpatti 7000, Sthiti 3000, Upaśama 5000 and Nirvāṇa the remaining 14500, but as already stated in my previous paper the book as printed by the N. S. Press contains 29289 stanzas only including prose passages, out of which the Vairāgya has 1146, Mumukṣu 807, Utpatti 6304, Sthiti 2414, Upaśama 4322 and Nirvāṇa 14296, of which there are 5331 in the earlier and 8965 in the latter part. Each of these Prakaraṇas is made up of several Sargas separately numbered.

Thus the Vairāgya consists of Sargas 1 to 33, Mumukśu. 1 to 20, Utpatti 1 to 122, Sthiti 1 to 46, Upaśama 1 to 93, Nirvāṇa Pūrvārdha 1 to 128 and Nirvāṇa Uttarārdha 1 to 216. The total number of Sargas in the work upto the end of Nirvāṇa Pūrvārdha is 442 and that upto the end of Nirvāṇa Uttarārdha is 658.

Turning to the Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha, the edition thereof perused by me was that published by the Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay, in Saṁvat 1944 corresponding with Śake 1810 and with A.D. 1888, at the request of Paṇḍit Pitāmbar Mahārāj and Śarīf Saleh Mahomed on getting a press copy thereof prepared on collating a Ms. in the possession of Śrī Trilokirāmji Swāmi and another in that of Śrī Jaykṛṣṇa Jīwanrām. It too consists of six chapters bearing the same names as the Yogavasiṣṭha with this difference that the Nirvāṇa-prakaraṇa is not sub-divided therein into the Pūrvārdha and Uttarārdha. As regards the sub-division of the Prakaraṇas into Sargas there is this major difference that the Sargas therein have been continuously numbered irrespective of the division into Prakaraṇas. There is also some confusion in their numbering in the colophons as four Sargas succeeding the 37th have not been assigned any numbers, the next nine have been numbered 37th to 45th and the tenth which should have been numbered 46th according to the latter calculation has been numbered 48th and there is a remark at the end of the last that the work ends there. If the Sargas had been numbered consecutively, the four unnumbered ones would have been 38th to 41st, the next nine 42nd to 50th and the last 51st. Cut of these 51 Sargas Nos. 1 to 3 are comprised in the Vairāgya-prakaraṇa, 4 only in the Mumukśu, 5 to 13 in the Utpatti, 14 to 18 in the Sthiti, 19 to 28 in the Upaśama, 29 to 51 in the Nirvāṇa. The total number of stanzas therein is not 6000 as stated by the commentator Ātmasukha in his introductory remark but only 5013, distributed as follows :—Vairāgya 359, Mumukśu 110, Utpatti 1008, Sthiti 541, Upaśama 1123 and Nirvāṇa 1872. One further anomaly noticeable in the book as printed is that there are two more Sargas after the 49th, which is entitled Phalanirdeśa [Statement of the Fruit (of studying the work)]. Lastly, it is remarkable that the commentary of Atmasukha ends at the 48th Sarga, which has been entitled Yogasaptabhūmikopākhyānam (The Episode of the Seven Stages of Yoga). Such was the edition of

the work of Gauḍa Abhinanda which was available to me for comparison with the big work of Vālmīki.

I, therefore, examined all the Mss. having any connection with the Yogavāsiṣṭha which were found in the Mss. collection at the Sanskrit Library, Baroda. They were in all 16 in the Itihāsa and Purāṇa Section marked Ic. One of them numbered 10747 was in the Telugu characters. With the help of a Tamil Pandit at the Library I could gather that it was a Ms. of the first 16 Sargas and a portion of the 17th of the Vairāgya-prakaraṇa of the big work together with the commentary of Ānandabodha Yati. No. 6615 a Ms. in Grantha characters was found to contain the Sthiti and Upaśama Prakaraṇas with the commentary of somebody whose name could not be gathered. Of the remaining 14 Mss., 10 were found to be the Mss. of a Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra or Vāsiṣṭhasāra extracted by somebody whose name was not mentioned in any of them. 9 of them were also found to contain the commentary of one Mahīdhara. It was a small work in ten chapters only containing stanzas varying in number from 208 to 229 only. Out of them No. 10192 was in the Bengali characters while the remaining 9 were in the Nāgarī. From amongst the remaining four which were Mss. of the Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra or Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha of Gauḍa Abhinanda, No. 6394 was found to be an incomplete and damaged Ms. in Grantha characters. The first 12 folios thereof were found missing also. But the colophon at the end of the 43rd Sarga showed that the work ended there. No. 9809 was another Ms. in Grantha characters of a commentary on Gauḍa Abhinanda's Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra called Saṁsārataraṇī composed by one Vedavidācārya and incised on 252 palm leaves. It too showed that the work ended at the 43rd Sarga. No. 12810 was a Ms. of the work of Abhinanda in the Devanāgarī characters containing 204 folios out of which folios 21, 22, 159, and 189 to 199 were missing. The Colophon at the end of the 44th Sarga therein contained a remark that the work ended there. The scribe's remarks on the last folio showed that the Ms. had been written as early as Saṁwat 1656 (A. D. 1600). Lastly, No 10561 was another complete Ms. of the work with the commentary of Ātmasukha named Vāsiṣṭhacandrikā extending upto the end of the Sarga marked 43rd in the printed edition which would be the 48th according to the serial order if properly observed. This Ms.

had only one more Sarga thereafter corresponding to that marked 44th in the printed edition but which would be the 49th if the proper serial order were followed.

The facts that emerge from a consideration of the contents of the last four Mss. bearing Nos. Ic 6394, 9809, 12810 and 10561 are that the said work had found two commentators namely Ātmasukha and Vedavidācārya, that their commentaries bore the names Vāsiṣṭhacandrikā and Saṁsārataraṇī respectively and that each of them ended at the 43rd Sarga and inasmuch as the former commentary as printed in the N. S. Press edition also ends there it can be inferred that the work as it came into the hands of the said two commentators did not contain more than 43 Sargas. Further as none of the Mss. contained more than 44 Sargas and as only one out of them contained the 44th relating to Phalanirdeśa it can be inferred that the work must originally have only the 43 Sargas which were commented upon by the commentators and that consequently there are 8 spurious Sargas in the printed edition. Which those 8 are it is somewhat difficult to say. However this much is certain that the 44th (49th according to the serial order) which is found in one Ms. only and the 45th and 48th (50th and 51st according to the said order) must at least be three of them.

Comparing the work with the N. S. Press edition of the big work I find that there are the same six Prakaraṇas having the same titles in both of them but that the last namely the Nirvāṇa has not been sub-divided into two parts in the Laghu. This would not matter if there were some extracts in the Laghu from any of the 216 Sargas in the Uttarārdha which contains the largest number of stanzas. There is not, however, a single one therein out of the 8965 stanzas in that part of the big work. Not only that but there is not even a single line therein which can be deemed to have been taken from that part and there is not a single episode therein out of those contained in that part of the big work.[1] *Secondly*, on a close

1. Under the title "Yogavasiṣṭhasaṁkśepa or Mokśopāyasāra or Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha" in his Catalogus Catalogorum Pt. I Aufrecht too has made a note that there are no extracts from the second part of Nirvāṇaprakaraṇa.

comparison of the stanzas in the two works it is found that whereas the stanzas in every one of the Prakaraṇas in the Laghu have been extracted from the Sargas occurring in the corresponding Prakaraṇas of the big work., it is not so in one case and that is that extracts from the 1st and 2nd Sargas of the Mumukśu in the Yoga:are found to have been incorporated in the 3rd Sarga of the Laghu which is included in the Vairāgya in that smaller work. '*Thirdly*, whereas it is generally true that the Ākhyānas or Upākhyānas which form the titles of the different Sargas in the Laghu except in one case are all found and found narrated in same order in the yoga, it is not true that the stanzas occurring in every Ākhyāna or Upākhyāna in the latter are invariably found incorporated in the Sargas forming parts of the same Ākhyāna or Upākhyāna in the former. Thus, for instance, Sarga 84 of Yoga. III forms part of the episode of Sūci therein and yet extracts therefrom are found to have been embodied in the 8th Sarga of the Laghu which bears the title Aindavopākhyāna. Similarly Sargas 56 and 57 of the Upaśama chapter of the Yoga form part of the Episode of Uddālaka but in the Laghu there are extracts taken from them in Sarga 25 which is entitled Suraghūpākhyāna which begins in the Yoga from Sarga 58, not before that. In the same manner V. 64 forms part of the latter episode in the Yoga, and yet extracts therefrom are found to have been embodied in Sarga 26 of the Laghu which has been given the title Bhāsavilāsasaṁvāda. In the same way there are extracts from Yoga. V. 73 forming part of the Vetālopākhyāna therein, embodied in Sarga 36 of the Laghu which relates to the Episode of Bhagīratha. Then there is the Bilvopākhyāna in Yoga. VI 45. Extracts therefrom are found in Laghu 31. The next Sarga in the Yoga is entitled Śilākośopadeśa. Still extracts therefrom are found incorporated in the said Sarga of the Laghu though its title is the same as that of Yoga. VI. 45. Sarga 37 in the serial order in the Laghu is named Kirātopākhyāna. It contains extracts from Sargas 77 to 83 of the Nirvāṇa Purvārdha of the Yoga which form part of the episode of Cūḍālā therein. True, there is a subsidiary episode of the Kirāta in the 83rd Sarga thereout but Sargas 77 to 82 form part of the main episode not the subsidiary one. Again Sargas 85 to 88 of the same book in the Yoga form part of the same episode and in the 89th Sarga

thereof there is another subsidary episode called ·Hastikopākhyāna. Still extracts from Sargas 85 to 88 are to be found in Sarga 38 of the Laghu, which has been given the title Cintāmaṇyupākhyāna and extracts from Sarga 89 are found in Sarga 39 of the Laghu which bears the synonymous title Gajendropākhyāna. *Fourthly*, the titles of the same Upākhyānas differ in the two works. Thus besides the remarkable fact above-noted as to the title of the episode of the elephant there are the other remarkable ones that although there is only an illustration of a Bhiksu's aberrations in Bhikśusaṁsārodaharaṇam in Swapnaśatarudrīya in the course of an episode of one Jīvaṭā in Yoga VI. 62 and the title of the 63rd Sarga is Swapnaśatarudrīyakathanam still Sarga 34 of the Laghu which contains extracts from Yoga VI. 62 to 64 has been named Śatarudropākhyānam. Similarly there is no separate episode of Śikhidhvaja in the Yoga but as he is the husband of Cūḍālā, whose episode extends from Yoga VI. 77 to 110, his narrative is found in that episode. In fact one of the aims of the author in inserting that episode seems to be to impress upon the readers that there are cases of husbands and wives in which the latter are more qualified spiritually than the former and that therefore in order that there may be harmony between them the wives allow their husbands their own way for a time but afterwards skilfully manage to bring them round to their own level. That being the case the heroine is more important in the episode than the hero and therefore the title thereof taken from the name of the heroine is the appropriate one. However the title of the 42nd Sarga in the Laghu, misnumbered 37th over again in the printed edition thereof is found to have been taken from the name of the husband. *Fifthly*, there are different versions of the same episodes in the two works. Thus, for instance, there is the episode of Bhīma and others in Yoga IV. Corresponding to it there is the same episode in Laghu 16 but there are so many variations of readings and other discrepancies between the two that the two versions of the episode differ materially. The same is the case with the Siddhagītā occurring in Yoga V and revealed to Janaka, extracts from which are found in Laghu 19, the Puṇya-Pāvana episode, the Bali episode and the Gādhi episode occurring in the same book of the Yoga which are found summarized in Laghu 20, 21 and 28 respectively. *Sixthly*,

the narrators of the same portions of the same episodes in the two works also differ in several cases. Thus Sarga 7 of the Laghu contains extracts from the Suci episode occurring in Book III Sargas 60 to 82 of the Yoga. Wherein the narrator is Brahmā. But in the Laghu the narrator is Vasiṣṭha throughout. Then again the narrator's names differ in the following cases also, namely :—

भानुरुवाच	before Yoga	III. 89. 1	but वशिष्ठ उवाच	before Laghu 9·1
ब्रह्मोवाच	,, ,,	,, ,, 6	,, राम उवाच	,, ,, ,, 5
भानुरुवाच	,, ,,	,, ,, 7	,, वशिष्ठ उवाच	,, ,, ,, 6
वशिष्ठ उवाच	,, ,,	V. 33. 2	,, भगवानुवाच	,, ,, ,, 22-26
No introductory remark	,, ,,	IV. 1·1	"ॐ नमः परमात्मने । वशिष्ठ उवाच"	14·1–7 which have no corresponding stanzas in the Yoga.
,,	,, ,,	V. 33·9	,, वशिष्ठ उवाच	, 22·31
,,	,, ,,	VII. 126·74–75	,, ,,	,, 48·86
काल उवाच	,, ,,	IV. 11·2	,, No intro. remark	,, 14·64
वशिष्ठ उवाच	,, ,,	,, 4	,, ,,	,, ,, 66
No question from Rāma in	,, ,,	V. 89·41	as in	,, 28–10—15

Seventhly although it is a fact that there are numerous stanzas in the Laghu which agree word for word with those in the corresponding portions of the Yoga, it is also true that there are several entire stanzas in the Laghu not a word out of which is to be found in the big work, let alone those hundreds of stanzas one of whose lines or portions of whose both lines differ from those in the corresponding stanzas of the latter. There are also several one-line stanzas in the Laghu as against two or three-line stanzas in the parent-work and again several two-line stanzas in the parent work the order of whose lines is found reversed in the abridgment. *Eighthly*, there are other large numbers of stanzas in which owing to a difference in the position of their lines the second line in the Yoga of one stanza

becomes the first of one stanza in the Laghu and the first of the succeeding one in the Yoga becomes the second of the same in the Laghu and *vice versa*. The instances of all these kinds of variations will be found collected in the foot-note below.[2]

2. I'he following stanzas in the Laghu do not correspond to any in the Yoga, namely :—(I) 3 to 5, 41 to 43, 82, 86, 87, 93 ; (II) 17, 31, 34, 36, 53, 77, 82, 130, 174 ; (III) 4, 7, 10, 21, 38, 39 ; (IV) 27, 33, 53, 54, 85, 91, 104, 106, 108 ; (V) 1 to 10, 15, 16, 19, 21, 55, 57, 65, 88, 96, 101, 110 ; (VI) 3, 5, 50, 51, 88, 101, 151, 154 to 158, 173, 222, 248, 253, 254, 268, 272, 276, 280, 300, 319, 322 ; (VII) 39, 41, 44 to 55, 81, 85, 104, 111 to 114, 130 ; (VIII) 1, 3, 9, 10 to 14, 32, 34, 36, 37, 39 to 41 ; (IX) 5, 6, 9, 10 to 17, 24, 25, 26 ; (X) 1, 2, 7, 22, 23, 35, 37, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 57 to 59 ; (XI) 4, 7, 14, 15, 21, 22, 24 to 27 ; (XII) 3, 4, 33, 71, 72, 77 ; (XIII) 4 to 6, 8, 33, 42, 45, 70, 73, 91, 94, 120, 130, 131 to 133, 148, 151, 156, 159, 164, 166 ; (XIV) 2, 7, 61, 70, 76, 87, 99, 100 ; (XV) 13, 16, 27, 32, 48, 60 to 62, 71, 72, 78, 83 ; (XVI) 31, 32, 44 ; (XVII) 6, 12, 19, 40, 46, 53, 64, 74, 79, 80, 86, 89, 91, 92, 113, 117, 123, 139, 140, 144, 168, 189, 205, 216, 221, 224, 246, 248 ; (XVIII) 41, 42, 47, 49 ; (XIX) 19, 33, 35, 43, 47, 55, 60 ; (XX) 45, 48, 52, 73, 81, 88 ; (XXI) 54, 57, 66 ; (XXII) 2, 25, 32, 52, 54, 58, 104 ; (XXIII) 18, 26, 31, 41, 42, 49, 53, 66, 67, 69, 72 to 74, 81, 82, 83, 87, 89, 90, 95 ; (XXIV) 11, 39, 40, 52, 58, 59, 70, 79, 91, 113, 128, 141 ; (XXV) 8, 10, 45, 48, 51, 52, 62, 70, 74, 75, 77, 90 ; (XXVII) 14, 19, 44, 47, 52, 53, 60, 78, 85, 92, 94, 97, 100, 105, 111, 116, 122, 128 to 130, 136, 138, 169, 180 ; (XXVIII) 10 to 16, 50, 75 to 78, 80 to 82, 87, 92, 115, 118, 124, 142, 155, 159 ; (XXIX) 25, 28, 42 to 44, 49, 61, 62, 71, 95, 114, 119, 121, 124, 132, 133, 155, 203, 208, 250, 251 ; (XXX) 12, 43, 61, 70, 73, 127, 136, 140, 152 ; (XXXI) 1, 13, 28 ; (XXXII) 9, 11, 18 ; (XXXIII) 8, 23, 45, 46 ; (XXXIV) 7, 18, 27, 43, 44, 56, 58, 59, 61 ; (XXXV) 13, 14, 46, 48, 52 ; (XXXVI) 55, 60, 61 ; (XXXVII) 5, 25, 66, 131 ; (XXXVIII) 22, 25, 38, 42, 49, 59, 92, 94, 107, 119, 121, 122, 126 ; (XXXIX) 9, 13 ; (XL) 6 ; (XLI) 4, 14 ; (XLII) 15, 21, 32 to 34, 55, 64 to 68, 70, 71, 107, 122, 128, 141, 163, 173, 202, 229, 231, 246, 251, 273, 277, 278, 282, 301, 305, 313 ; (XLIII) 15, 22, 27, 28 ; (XLIV) 26 ; ((XLV) 7 ; (XLVI) 44, 63 ; (XLVII) 13, 17 ; (XLVIII) 26, 31, 38, 55, 66, 83, 101, 109, 110 ; The whole of Sarga XLIX which contains 35 stanzas ; (L) 17, 36, 37, 49 ; (LI) 22, 44, 74, 84.

These instances of unparallel stanzas exclude those in whose case there was found one corresponding line if the stanzas were of two lines, or two such lines if the stanzas were of four lines but include those which were not found to have even one or two entire parallel lines but only fragments thereof in the same or different stanzas.

The following stanzas in the Laghu have each one line only namely : — (IV) 42 ; (VI) 245 ; (VIII) 30 ; (IX) 21 ; (X) 17 ; (XIII) 146 ; (XVI) 40 ; (XXIII) 58, 96 ; (XXIV) 130, 157, 161 ; (XXV) 42 ; (XXVII) 137, 144, 147, 151 ; (XXVIII) 108, 127 ; (XXIX) 153 ; (XXXVII) 14 ; (XLII) 160, 200 (XLVI) 80, 108 ; (XLVIII) 35 ; (L) 6.

Ninthly, there are no extracts in Laghu 15 which bears the title Dāmādyupākhyāna from the whole of Yoga IV. 30., a considerable portion of Yoga IV. 31 and from Yoga IV. 32. 1 to 35 in which a connection has been established between Dāma, Vyāla and Kaṭa and a sparrow on the Pradyumna Peak in Adhiṣṭhāna, the capital of Kāśmīr, a mosquito in the royal palace there and a partridge in the Ratnāvali Vihāra there, by a story of the rebirths of those demons and of their being resurrected on hearing the story of their previous lives from Nṛsiṁha, a minister of King Yaśaskaradeva of Kāśmīr who ruled over Kāśmīr between 939 and 948 A.D. There are none also from Yoga III. 41 to 45, in Sarga 41 out of which there occurs the pedigree of Vidūratha for 11 generations. *Lastly*, there are no extracts in that abridgment from any of the prose passages occurring in the bigger work at the places mentioned in the footnote below.[3]

These points of divergence lead unmistakeably to the inference that the Gauḍa Abhinanda had before him a recension of the Yogavāsiṣṭha other than that which formed the basis of the

The order of lines is found reversed in the following cases viz :—
Laghu XXV 48 which corresponds to Yoga V. 58, 41.
,, XXIX, 94/1 = Yoga V. 17, 1 but Laghu XXIX. 94/2 = Yoga V. 16. 12.

Stanzas or lines corresponding to Laghu XXVII. 68 to 88 are found between Yoga V. 78. 2 to 46. Those corresponding to Laghu XXVII. 89-90 in Yoga V. 79 and yet that corresponding to Laghu XXVII. 91 is Yoga V. 78, 41, Laghu XXVII. 114 to 116 are found with slight variations to be the same as Yoga V. 82. 26 to 29, Laghu XXVII 117 to 119 are found to be extracts from Yoga V. 8332 to 44 and again Laghu XXVII. 118 to 122 are found to contain lines taken from Yoga V, 82. 21 to 80. Laghu XXVII 130 is again the same as Yoga VI/I. 81. 8, and Laghu XXVII. 133 to 136 tally with Yoga VI/I. 81. 11, 12, 13 and 15, Laghu XXVII 131 is quite different, 132 again corresponds to Yoga VI/I. 81. 10, Laghu XLI. 9/I is the same as Yoga VI/I. 91. 13/1, Laghu XLI 9/2, 10/1 the same as Yoga V. 91. 12/1-2, Laghu XLII. 72, 73 the same as Yoga VI/I. 95. 3 and 5 but Laghu XLII 74 the same as VI/I. 94. 70 Laghu XXIX. 232 corresponds to a stanza interpolated between Yoga VI/I. 25. 67, and 68 and therefore not numbered.

3. There are long prose passages in the Yogavāsiṣṭha at the following places, namely :—(II) 12. 11 to 19, 13. 8 to 11 ; (III) 63. 67 to 77, 82, 93, 1 to 7, 9 to 16 ; 116, 8, 10 to 23, 122. 1 to 13 ; (IV) 3. 7, 10, 11 ; 38. 1 to 3, 5 to 9, 11 to 21 ; 39. 1 to 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 29 to 45, 49, 50, (VI/2), 61. 4, 6, 10, 12, 16 to 18.

text of the Nirṇaya Sāgar Press edition, when he sat down to select passages therefrom for his Laghuyogavasistha. They also lead to the further inferences that though that recension too contained a division of the work into the same six books, Vairāgya, Mumukśu, Utpatti, Sthiti, Upaśama and Nirvāṇa, the first book therein was of a greater length and the second of a smaller length than in the present printed edition, that the sixth book therein was of a considerably smaller length than that in the latter and was not sub-divided into the Pūrvārdha and Uttarārdha, that it contained somewhat different versions of several episodes and did not at all contain some of those contained in Books I to V and the first part of Book VI of the printed edition and all those contained in the latter part of Book VI of that edition and that it did not most probably contain in the episode of the demons Dāma, Vyāla and Kaṭa a mention of their rebirths as a sparrow residing on the Pradyumna Peak in the town of Adhiṣṭhāna in Kāśmīr, a mosquito in the royal palace there and a partridge in a Buddhist Vihāra there going by the name of Ratnāvali and an account of their restoration to their former state on hearing the story of their original births from a minister of King Yaśaskaradeva who ruled over Kāśmīr between 939 and 948 A.D. Whether the last inference is correct or incorrect can be stated with confidence only after several old Mss. of the entire work gathered from different parts of India are compared. I have not yet had the facility to do that. Still as the editor of the recension which is printed by the Nirṇaya Sāgar Press says that his is the twelfth edition of the work,[4] this much is certain that the work must have passed through several editions before his time and it is highly probable that Gauda Abhinanda had made his selections from one of those earlier editions which varied in several respects as stated above from the one which was utilized by the learned Sāstri who prepared the press copy of the work for the N. S. P. edition. If that was so, even if Gauḍa Abhinanda had abridged the work earlier than the 3rd or 4th quarter of the tenth century, which he must have done if he had lived about the end of the 9th century, the date of the Nirṇaya Sāgar Press recension which I had fixed in 1933 remains unaffected.

4. Yoga VI/I. 22. 25.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the recension utilized by Gauḍa Abhinanda did contain in Book IV the passage containing the reference to Yaśaskaradeva of Kāśmīr and his minister Nṛsiṁha although it was a different recension than that published by the N. S. Press, I proceed to consider whether that fact comes in the way of the above conclusion. It would if Gauḍa Abhinanda had lived about the middle of the ninth century as opined by Sten Konow and subsequently taken for granted by other orientalists like Winternitz. It is, therefore, necessary to determine first when could the author of the Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha or Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra have flourished.

Now the printed edition of that book supplies no information about its compiler except that in the colophon to the last Sarga thereof it is said that the said Sāra (essence) had been extracted by "Śrī Tarkavādīśvara Sāhityācārya, Gauḍa Maṇḍalālaṁkāra Śrīmad Abhinanda Paṇḍita." This merely informs us that Abhinanda, the extractor of that essence, was a great philosopher and literary man and was an ornament of the province of Gauḍa : Ātmasukha, however, calls him in the introduction to his commentary on that work "the Kāśmīra Paṇḍita Abhinanda." He does not mention therein the ground on which he believed the extractor to be an inhabitant of Kāśmīr. At page 24 of his Catalogus Catalogorum Pt. I Aufrecht states that Abhinanda called Gauḍa Abhinanda was the son of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (Vṛttikāra), the great-grandson of one Śaktiswāmin who was the minister of Muktāpīḍa of the Karkoṭa dynasty of Kāśmīr, who in turn was the grandson of one Śakti, who was an original inhabitant of Gauḍa and that Abhinanda was the author of two works, Kādambarīkathāsāra and Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra. Aufrecht also takes notice of another Abhinanda who was the son of the Śatānanda and the author of the Rāmacarita, a Mahākāvya. That the two Abhinandas were distinct is also the view expressed by Dr. F. W. Thomas in his Introduction to the Kavīndravacanasamuccaya (Bibliotheca Indica, New Series No. 1309) and by the editor of the Kādambarīkathāsāra of the N. S. Press. Sten Konow too in his "Essay on The Life and Writings of Rājaśekhara" in his edition of the Karpūramañjarī distinguishes between the two Abhinandas. Lastly, Rāmaswāmi Sāstri, the learned editor of the Rāmacarita in

the G. O. Series (Vol. XLVI) has in his Introduction to that work examined all the *pros* and *cons* of the issue arising from the autobiographical references in the first twelve verses of the Kādam. and in the Rāma., from the anthologies entitled Kavīndravacanasamuccaya, Saduktikarṇāmṛta, Sūktimuktāvalī and Śāraṅgadharapaddhati, from the creative poems and Alaṁkāra works entitled Udayasundarīkathā, Kīrtikaumudī and Suvṛttatilaka, a scholastic work named Uṇādivṛtti and two Bengali commentaries on the Amarakośa and recorded his conclusion in the following terms namely :—"On the strength of these materials we have to consider the observations of Dr. Bühler as early as 1873 in the second volume of the Indian Antiquary to establish the identity of these two authors as premature and unreliable."[5] Further on he records the definite conclusion that "the identity of the two authors cannot be established though obviously there are many points common to them which may be accounted for by their being connected with the same country which is Bengal."[6] His examination was so far confined to the determination of the question whether Abhinanda, the author of the Kādambarīkathāsāra and Abhinanda, the author of the Rāmacarita Mahākāvya were or were not identical personages and his conclusion was that they were not. It seems from this that scholars are agreed that there were two Abhinandas, one the son of Jayanta, the Vṛttikāra of Kāśmīr called Gauḍa Abhinanda because of his ancestor having come from the Gauḍa province and the other, the son of Śatānanda and an inhabitant of that province itself at the time of his literary activity. Thereout we are concerned with the former only because though the name of the father of the author of the Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra does not appear from that work he was according to all accounts the same as the author of the Kādambarīkathasāra, not the same as that of the Rāmacarita.

Even if he had been identical with the latter, it matters little for our purpose as I shall presently show. The result of Mr. Rāmaswami's further investigation as to the date of the author of the Rāmacarita was that he was patronized by Yuvarāja Hāravarṣa of the Pala dynasty of Bengal who must have ruled

5. Introduction to the Ramacarita (G. O. Series No. XLVI) p. X.
6. Ibid, p. XII.

over that province later than Dharmapāla (i. e. later than the first quarter of the 9th century) according to Abhinanda himself and that by the first half of the 11th century he had acquired so much fame as an eminent poet as to be thought fit to be compared by Soḍḍhala, author of Udayasundarīkathā, with Kālidās, Bāṇa and Vākpatirāja. Thus the *terminus a quo* for his date was found by him to be the second quarter of the 9th century and the *terminus ad quem* to be the first quarter of the 11th century. According to him then this Abhinanda must have lived under the patronage of Yuvarāja Hāravarṣa somewhere between 826 and 1025 A.D. But since Soḍḍhala is the earliest writer known to him who has mentioned this Abhinanda as an eminent poet, Mr. Rāmaswami concludes further that he must have lived about 900 A.D. The more reasonable conclusion from that fact would, in my opinion, have been that the author must have flourished somewhere between 9C0 and 950 A.D.

As for the other Abhinanda, known as Gauḍa Abhinanda, son of Jayanta the Vṛttikāra and great great-grandson of Śaktiswāmi, minister of Lalitāditya Muktāpīḍa, it was Sten Konow, editor of Rājaśekhara's Karpūramañjarī, who in his "Essay on the Life and Writings of Rājaśekhara" (translated by Lanman in Harward Oriental Series No. IV) expresssed the opinion that "The said Abhinanda, author of the Kādambarīkathāsāra and Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra must have lived about the middle of the ninth century." This opinion seems to have been based on the facts about the author's lineage appearing from verses 1 to 12 of Kādambarīkathāsāra which as gathered from the Cata. Cata. Pt. I. are that he was the son of Jayanta the Vṛttikāra, son of Kānta, son of Kalyāṇaswāmi, son of Śaktiswāmi (minister of Muktāpīḍa of the Karkoṭaka dynasty), son of Mitra, son of Śakti, a Gauda by birth, on the view of Dr. Bühler expressed in the Indian Antiquary Vol. II, pp. 102 ff., that the accession of Muktāpīḍa Latitāditya of the Karkoṭaka dynasty could not have taken place prior to 724 A.D. and on the calculation that there must be a difference of about 120 years between the times of Śaktiswāmi, minister of Lalitāditya and his great great-grandson Gauḍa Abhinanda. As to that there is so much in favour of the earlier date that instead of a date later than 724 A.D. Kalhaṇa has recorded that Latitāditya Muktāpīḍa, the youngest son of Pratā-

pāditya and the successor of Tārāpīḍa ruled over Kāśmīr from 699 to 736 A.D. Stein, the learned translator of Kalhaṇa's Rājataraṅgiṇī states in Chapter V of his Introduction thereto at page 88 that he had sent an embassy to China during the reign of Emperor Hiuen-tsung (A.D. 713–755). That fact too in the absence of a definite year of that event does not make it necessary to revise the date of Abhinanda as based on Dr. Bühler's view that the said King could not have ascended the throne of Kāśmīr earlier than 724 A.D. But there is another great event in the reign and a great exploit of that king which Stein records at the same page and that is that the said King's first enterprise was directed against Yaśovarman of Kanouj whom he dethroned after 736 A.D. If that was so and if it was also true that he had "extended his powers beyond Kāśmīr and in the adjacent territories" as recorded by Kalhaṇa and believed by the same learned translator, his reign must have extended at least upto the end of the first half of the 8th century, if not beyond it, in order that he could have got sufficient time to make other expeditions. Morever we do not know from which year to which year of the reign of that monarch Śaktiswāmim, the great great-grand father of Gauḍa Abhinanda served him as a minister. 724 A.D. is not therefore an immutable starting point for the calculation of the date of the author. Lastly 30 years for a generation is a sound rule for the fixation of dates. But it is after all a conventional rule involving a presumption that every succeeding generation commenced after 30 years of the just preceding one, a presumption which is liable to be rebutted by other reliable data. Such data in this case are that the earliest writers of Kāśmīr itself, where Gauḍa Abhenanda is held to have lived about the middle of the ninth century, who have referred to Gauḍa Abhinanda are Abhinavagupta and Kśemendra.[7] The former in his Dhvanilocana and the latter in his Suvṛttatilaka refer to Gauḍa Abhinanda's Kādambarīkathāsāra.[8] Abhinavagupta was the pupil of Laxmaṇgupta, pupil of Utpala, who was a pupil of Bhaṭṭa or

7. The references to Gauda Abhinanda in the Saduktikarṇāmṛta of Śrīdharadāsa and Sūktimuktāvalī of Ārohaka Bhagadatta Jalhaṇa have no importance in this connection as the said authors are not known to be inhabitants of Kāśmīr.

8. Introduction to Rāmacarita (G. O. Series No. XLVI), p. xi.

Siddha Somānanda who is famous in the literature of the Śaivism of Kāśmīr as the founder of the Pratyabhijñā i.e. the Manana or Vicāra Śāstra of the Trika system and according to his own statements he lived towards the end of tenth and the first quarter of the 11th century. Kśemarāja or Kśemendra was his pupil and had carried on his literary activity in the middle of 11th century.[9] In Saduktikarṇāmṛta 3,52, which is a quotation from Abhinanda's work the author praises Rājaśekhara as a contemporary.[10] Therefore the presumptive rule of thirty years for a generation on which as calculated from 724 A.D. the date of Abhinanda was fixed about the middle of the 9th century by Sten Konow cannot hold good in this case and the only possible and reasonable date of Gauḍa Abhinanda, author of Kādambarīkathāsāra and Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra must be held to be the same as that of Rājaśekhara, the teacher of King Mahendrapāla of Kanouj i.e. somewhere between 900 and 950 A.D.

It thus appears that Abhinanda, the author of the Rāmacarita and protegé of Yuvarāja Hāravarṣa of Bengal and Gauḍa Abhinanda, the author of the Kādambarīkathāsāra and Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra were, not identical personages but almost contemporaries, though the first lived in Bengal and the latter in Kāśmīr between 900 and 950 A.D. It is possible that one of them may be the senior of the other in age.

The fact that the Yogavāsiṣṭha even in the form in which it is printed in the N, S. Press edition containing the distinct reference to Yaśaskaradeva of Kāśmīr who ruled there from 939 A.D. to 948 A.D. and his minister Nṛsimha, may have been availed of by any of them does not thus come in the way of fixing the date of the recension availed of for that edition in the fourth quarter of the tenth century. And so long as we do not know that Gauḍa Abhinanda was born in a particular year of that century and lived upto a particular year only therein it is not unreasonable to assume that though born earlier he may have lived until he attained a ripe old age in the third or fourth quarter of that century and therefore even if the revised edition of the Yogavāsiṣṭha containing the reference to the King of Kāśmīr above-mentioned may have been prepared in the third or fourth quarter of that century, the fact of Gauḍa Abhinanda having utilized it for his abridgment cannot come in the way of fixing the date of the said recension somewhere between the second and the fourth quarter of the said century.

9. Kāśmīr Saivism Part I (Kāśmīr Texts and Studies published by the Research Department, Kāśmīr), History and Literature, pp. 17 to 26.

10. Catalogus Catalogorum, Part I, p. 24.

THE EXEGESIS OF THE VEDAS

WITH A SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 33rd CHAPTER OF THE

AITAREYA BRĀHMAṆAM

(R. N. Sūryanārāyaṇa)

(*Continued from the second issue*)

(v) *Human sacrifices.*

At any rate Ātmanivedana or ātma yajña in honour of the deities or self is advocated in this upākhyāna. The same thing has been dwelt upon as puruṣa yajña in the puruṣa sūkta. The question whether there once existed at all the human sacrifice is not based on discriminative grounds. Such absurd notions are alien to Brāhmaṇas following the Brāhmaṇāchāra. It can be proved that such human sacrifices are being conducted even to-day. (Śri Śankaracarya's offering his life for the sake of a devotee is one of the many glorious examples.) By human sacrifice, one should not mean simply beheading or butchering a person on the altar. There are so many considerations and limitations with which we have to tackle the problem. To us, Brāhmaṇas, human sacrifice does not look horrible as we attach to it the divine purpose and service. Moreover, the growth of psychology and anatomy demand such dissections of the living body. The minute examination of particular parts of the body may enlighten us on the fact that the infinite is quite apart from the finite one. The mystery of the soul is experienced personally by a sacrificer through perception. Human sacrifices may be performed provided the environments are favourable. The Vedas never advocate brutality and force. We can see in the episode how it is difficult to find out a man who could come forward voluntarily, to bind the victim to the post. And at the same time we find a practical philosopher and a karma yogi in an ajigartha man who sets an example of not hesitating to discharge a piece of divine duty. The nature and qualifications of the victim vary in accordance with the object of the human sacrifice.* Yajurveda gives us the details of this sacrifice. If one's own life or any man's life on his

behalf were to be offered, the effect (wisdom) will be immediately realised. For, life is the highest thing that one can offer to the deity. This principle holds equally good in all religious functions. To get one's head shaved fully is said to be similar to sacrificing one's life. At Nanjangud, as well as in other religiously sacred places, pilgrims undergo unbearable ordeals. In this age, the grave and horrible bodily tortures are practised by pilgrims who willingly and gladly sacrifice themselves and that too, sometimes, after they realise their desired objects. Leprosy, the hideous skin-disease has been cured by such religious functions. The successful remedy may subsequently be explained in vain by the finite psychology, physiology and the science of medicine that have kept themselves dreadfully silent about the cure prior to the function. Asceticism is also a yajña through which an individual sacrifices his self in the form of his material comforts. To fight with villains and vices is also a sacrifice. Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa aptly brings in the sacrifice as analogy to war where Udhisthira is the sacrificer, his four brothers, the four priests, kauravas the victims and Kriṣṇa the deity of the sacrifice. Practising penance is in no way inferior to puruṣa yajña or human sacrifice, the glorious merits of which lift up one above mortality. Passive resistance or Satyagraha, suffering for the cause of one's own country, fasting to death, giving one's blood to inject into the body of another are all different phases of human sacrifice. The distinguishing feature of all the various sacrifices can be vividly dilated upon by means of the religion of psychology, the religion of natural sciences, the religion of philosophy etc.

(vi) *The Vedic deities.*

The episode introduces to us Varuṇa in the beginning. A sacrifice is to be celebrated in His honour. A human being happens to be the victim. When the victim is bound to the yūpa, and when his life is about to be offered, the learned young boy begins to offer his last prayers to the Almighty. He may pray in his enthusiasm, to Prājapati forgetting that he should do so through the proper channel as he is not independent now. Unless the deity to whom he is bound permits him to do so he must not offer his prayers. (cf. A Sumangali cannot undertake any religious ceremony without the permission of her lord.)—It is clear to all

those who have realised the principle of subordination.—Therefore, he is directed by each deity to approach the proper authority until he is directed to Varuṇa whom he praises reciting a great many Vedic mantras.

Being gratified not only with the devoted prayers of the victim but also with the whole sacrifice, Varuṇa is inclined to put a stop to the sacrifice and liberate the blissful young sage as well as the sacrificer. But the devotee is required to appease some other deities before he is set free from the bondages. The divinities such as Prajāpati, Agni, Savitṛ, Varuṇa, Viśwedevas, Indra, Aświnī and Uṣas are prayed in order, as he is directed or as it strikes to his mind. Here the hierarchy of deities may be observed. It is through Agni, a man has to approach any of the divinities. Though Prajāpati is the Supreme Being, still, He cannot interfere with the functions assigned to other divine beings. Agni directs the man to Savitṛ through whom he approaches Varuṇa the chief ruler of this particular sacrifice. Varuṇa exercises his authorities through Indra who in his turn instructs the devotee to go to Agni again who is Devānām Mukham. Agni wants again that Viśwedevas should be appeased. After it is accomplished, Indra who happens to be the chairman, is to be prayed for. Indra favours the devotee and tells him to approach Aświns and Uṣas, who are immediately connected as it is were with mortals on particular occasions. Agni is only a messenger of Gods. It is energy or heat that brings about contact between things and purifies the impure ones. Prajāpati is simply a jada which is characteristic of Brahman. As it is with divine beings, so is with mortals. As it is in the universe considered as a whole, so it is with the body created after the same manner as the universe. Therefore one may realise the presence of all these deities in one's own body and self. The devotee's procedure may be explained psychologically and biologically. Mr. V. G. Rele has already given his interpretation of the Vedic Gods. Physics too is indispensable to theology. With the aid of several sciences like this we will be able to say that the devotee praises first the universal soul who is immanent in the body or matter, and then realises the purification of other things presided over by several deities and connected with the self in his own body. As soon as he becomes

pure and he is able to get rid of the three debts in the form of bondages, the purity and divinity of the Spirit can be extended over other beings around him.

Coming to the question of the plurality of deities ennumerated in the Veda, we must bear in mind some sacred sayings, which explain the matter intelligibly removing all doubts. No doubt, the mention of a great number of deities has been the source of illusion to the followers of other Ācāryas, who wish to know the truth of the Vedas. Unity in diversity cannot be realised by persons of certain presuppositions. To the Brāhmaṇas it is no problem at all. At every step, we remember the doctrine of unity in diversity. The 'one and the many', 'one in many' and 'many in one' are the keynote of Brāhmaṇācāra. As the universe is pervaded by one "That" (तत्) or God who is Omnipresent, no one fails to understand the fact that there are not only some prominent deities mentioned in the Veda but also as many deities as there are manifestations both animate and inanimate, of the Supreme Being in the Universe. Brahma satyam jaganmithyā does not mean that the world is false and devoid of divinity. The knowledge of the apparent world is false but the knowledge of the world characterised as Brahman is true. It is not only theoretically right but it is practically so too. A religiously perfect devotee can always and in all places see only the Absolute and nothing else. The world is no world to him. With him everything is divine. Therefore the Vedic Texts demand a knowledge of the whole before an attempt is made to understand a part of them. Studying and understanding the Veda piece by piece, part by part, sentence by sentence will be a great blunder and injustice on the part of the commentator and translator.

(vii) *Vyavahāranīti (civilisation).*

The popular saying that "āchāra vyavahārau" makes us believe that āchāra and vyavahāra are the two different entities. Though the compound is dvandva here, we are to learn that ācāra and vyavahāra are the two species of the genus Brāhmaṇa-Dharma. Therefore they may be taken to have been associated with each other. The vyavahāra can be understood only through āchāra and it may be defined in terms of Brāhmaṇa Dharma. It is, therefore, correct to say that in a man's life the vyavahāra takes its

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Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names by G. P. Malalasekera. Vol. II N to H. London 1938. Cloth. Roy. Pp. 11,1370 Rs. 23–10.

Viṣṇu and Śiva, the Śankha (conch-shell), the Cakra (wheel), the Gada (mace) and Padma (lotus) of the former and the Triśūla (Trident) of the latter. Further evidences show that in addition to Brahmanical religion Buddhism had also made its influence felt there. The inscriptions prove that Sanskrit language and literature were highly cultivated. The images show a thorough-going influence of Indian art.

Book second is devoted entirely to the Śailendra Empire. In the eighth century A.D. most of the small states in Malayasia formed part of a mighty empire. The rulers of this vast empire belonged for the first four ceturies to the Śailendra dynasty. Three long chapters are devoted to a critical enumeration of the Śailendra Empire. In the Eleventh century the one outstanding fact in the history of the Śailendras was a long drawn-out struggle with the powerful Cola rulers of Southern India. The Colas were a great naval power and this naturally brought them in contact with Malayasia. The long drawn out struggle with the Colas, which continued throughout the Eleventh century A.D. and the subsequent decline and fall of the Śailendras have been treated with dramatic intensity by the great writer. A long appendix sums up the recent views on the Śailendra Empire. Light is thrown on many hitherto dark corners in the history of the Śailendras.

Book third deals with the rise and fall of the Indo-Javanese Empire. Book fourth deals with the downfall of the Hindu Kingdoms in *Suvarṇadvipa*. The disintegration of the Śailendra Empire loosened the bonds which had united the petty states of Malayasia. This paved the way for the gradual establishment of Islam as a political power which was destined in the long run to overwhelm the whole of Malayasia.

Dr. Majumdar has placed the students of Indian history under a great debt of obligation by his remarkable publication. The book is thoroughly documented from original sources and references are indicated. Printing and publishing are upto the mark. The book is complete with two maps and an index.

B. N. MITRA.

अथायमर्थबहुत्वादर्थैकदेश उदाह्रियते—

लक्षितेष्वलक्षणलक्षितत्वादलक्षितानां तत्प्रमेयसिद्धिः ॥ ८ ॥

तस्याभावस्य सिध्यति प्रमेयम् । कथम्? लक्षितेषु वासःसु अनुपादेयेषु उपादेयानामलक्षितानामलक्षणलक्षितत्वाल्लक्षणाभावेन लक्षितत्वादिति । उभयसन्निधावलक्षितानि वासांस्यानयेति प्रयुक्तो येषु वासस्सु लक्षणानि न भवन्ति तानि लक्षणाभावेन प्रतिपद्यते, प्रतिपद्य चानयति । प्रतिपत्तिहेतुश्च प्रमाणमिति ॥ ८ ॥

"असत्यर्थे नाभाव इति" चेन्नान्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः ॥ ९ ॥

"यत्र भूत्वा किञ्चिन्न भवति तत्र तस्याभाव उपपद्यते । अलक्षितेषु च वासस्सु लक्षणानि भूत्वा न न भवन्ति, तस्मात्तेषु लक्षणाभावोऽनुपपन्न इति"।

नान्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः । यथाऽयमन्येषु वासस्सु लक्षणानामुपपत्तिं पश्यति नैवमलक्षितेषु । सोऽयं लक्षणाभावं पश्यन्नभावेनार्थं प्रतिपद्यत इति ॥ ९ ॥

"तत्सिद्धेरलक्षितेष्वहेतुः" ॥ १० ॥

"तेषु वासस्सु लक्षितेषु सिद्धिर्विद्यमानता येषां भवति न तेषामभावो लक्षणानाम्। यानि च लक्षितेषु विद्यन्ते लक्षणानि तेषामलक्षितेष्वभाव इत्यहेतुः । यानि खलु भवन्ति तेषामभावो व्याहत इति" ॥ १० ॥

न लक्षणावस्थितापेक्षसिद्धेः ॥ ११ ॥

१ लक्षितेष्विति सिद्धान्तसूत्रमनेकधा भिन्नप्रपञ्चस्योदाहरणार्थम् ।

२ प्रमाणमिति । लक्षणस्याभाव एव च प्रतिपत्तेर्हेतुरिति । लक्षणाभावज्ञानं विशिष्टे वाससि प्रत्ययं जनयत् साधकतमत्वात्प्रमाणं भवतीत्याशयः ।

३ असत्यर्थ इति पूर्वपक्षानुस्यूतं सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् । प्रध्वंस एवाभावः, तस्य भावाधीननिरूपणत्वात्प्राप्तिपूर्वकत्वाद् भावपूर्वकत्वान्नान्योऽस्त्यभाव इति मन्वानस्य वैपक्षः ।

तत्र समाधानम् प्रत्यक्षं हि प्रमाणं प्रमेयाभावं व्यवस्थापयति । तच्च प्रध्वंसवत् प्रागभावेऽपि तुल्यम् । प्रतियन्ति हि लौकिकाः दध्नि क्षीराभावं प्रध्वंसरूपं, क्षीरे च दध्यभावं प्रागभावरूपमिति ।

४ तत्सिद्धेरिति पूर्वपक्षिसूत्रम् । यत्र लक्षणानि सन्ति तत्र तेषामभावो व्याहतः । यत्र च न सन्ति तत्राप्यभावोऽनुपपन्नः, तस्य भावाधीननिरूपणस्य तदभावेऽशक्यनिरूपणत्वादित्यर्थः ।

५ न लक्षणेति सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ।

न ब्रूमो—यानि लक्षणानि भवन्ति तेषामभाव इति। किन्तु केषु चिल्लक्षणान्यवस्थितानि अनवस्थितानि केषु चित्। अपेक्षमाणो येषु लक्षणानां भावं न पश्यति तानि लक्षणाभावेन प्रतिपद्यत[1] इति ॥ ११ ॥

[2]प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावोपपत्तेश्च ॥ १२ ॥

अभावद्वैतं खलु भवति,—प्राक् चोत्पत्तेरविद्यमानता, उत्पन्नस्य चात्मनो हानादविद्यमानता। तत्रालक्षितेषु वासस्सु प्रागुत्पत्तेरविद्यमानतालक्षणो लक्षणानामभावो नेतर इति ॥ १२ ॥

(२) शब्दानित्यताप्रकरणम्[3]।

'आप्तोपदेशः शब्द[4]' इति प्रमाणभावे विशेषणं ब्रुवता नानाप्रकारः शब्द इति ज्ञाप्यते। तस्मिन् सामान्येन विचारः—किं नित्योऽथानित्य इति।

विमर्शहेत्वनुयोगे च विप्रतिपत्तेश्च संशयः।

आकाशगुणः[5] शब्दो विभुर्नित्योऽभिव्यक्तिधर्मक इत्येके। गन्धादिसह[6]-

१ प्रतिपद्यत इतीति। अभावो हि भावज्ञानाधीननिरूपणो न भावमात्राधीननिरूपणः। प्रागभावोऽपि च शक्यो भविष्यद्भावज्ञानेनान्यत्रावस्थितभावज्ञानेन वा निरूपयितुमिति न प्रागभावाभाव इत्यर्थः।

२ प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति सिद्धान्तिसूत्रम्।

३ अस्य प्रकरणस्य प्रयोजनं यथा। पदवाक्यकोटस्थ्यशङ्काव्युदासेन निष्प्रत्यूहमाप्तोक्तसिद्धौ वेदप्रामाण्यसिद्धिः। अन्यथा ह्यपौरुषेयत्वे दोषप्रवृत्तौ यथाऽप्रामाण्यं तथा तदर्थोपलम्भप्रतिपिपादयिषालक्षणगुणनिवृत्तावप्यप्रामाण्यमाशङ्क्येत——अनेवंमूलानां लोकेऽप्रामाण्यदर्शनात्। अपि च शब्दस्यानित्यत्वसिद्धावाकाशगुणत्वं सिध्येत, तथा चेन्द्रियनियम उपपद्यतेत्येतदपि प्रयोजनम्। अन्यथा गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दाः पृथिव्यादिगुणास्तदर्था इति भज्येत।

४ अत्र च शब्दसामान्यस्यैव विचारः। वर्णात्मकस्य तु तस्य विचारोऽग्रिमे तृतीये प्रकरणे वर्तिष्यते।

५ आकाशगुण इति जरन्मीमांसकमतमाह। अवघातप्रेरितेन वायुना यावद्वेगमभिप्रतिष्ठमानेन कर्णशष्कुल्यवच्छिन्ननभोभागसमवेतो नित्यः शब्दो व्यज्यत इति तन्मतसङ्क्षेपः।

६ गन्धादीति साङ्ख्यमतमाह। पञ्चतन्मात्रोत्पन्नभूतसूक्ष्मसमुदायारब्धपृथिव्यादिविकारो गोघटादिवृत्तिः शब्दो योग्यदेशस्थ आहङ्कारिकतया व्यापकं विषयदेशस्थं श्रोत्रेन्द्रियं विकुर्वन्नवस्थित एव गृह्यत इति तत्सङ्क्षेपः।

वृत्तिर्द्रव्येषु सन्निविष्टो गन्धादिवदवस्थितोऽभिव्यक्तिधर्मक इत्यपरे । आकाश[1]-गुणः शब्द उत्पत्तिनिरोधधर्मको बुद्धिवदित्यपरे । महाभूत[2]सङ्क्षोभजः शब्दोऽनाश्रित उत्पत्तिधर्मको निरोधधर्मक इत्यन्ये[3] । अतः संशयः,—किमत्र तत्त्वमिति ।

अनित्यः शब्द इत्युत्तरम् । कथम् ?—

आदिम[4]त्त्वादैन्द्रियकत्वात् कृतकवदुपचाराच्च ॥ १३ ॥

आदिर्योनिः कारणम्,—आदीयते अस्मादिति । कारणवदनित्यं दृष्टम् । संयोगविभागजश्च शब्दः कारणवत्त्वादनित्य इति । "का पुनरियमर्थदेशना ?" कारणवत्त्वादिति उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात् । अनित्यः शब्द इति भूत्वा न भवति, विनाशधर्मक इति ।

" सांशयिकमेतत्—किमुत्पत्तिकारणं संयोगविभागौ शब्दस्य, आहोस्विदभिव्यक्तिकारणम्—" इत्यत आह—ऐन्द्रियकत्वात् । इन्द्रियप्रत्यासत्तिग्राह्य ऐन्द्रियकः ।

" किमयं व्यञ्जकेन समानदेशोऽभिव्यज्यते रूपादिवत् ? अथ संयोगजाच्छब्दाच्छब्दसन्ताने सति श्रोत्रप्रत्यासन्नो गृह्यत इति " ?

संयोगनिवृत्तौ शब्दग्रहणान्न व्यञ्जकेन समानदेशस्य ग्रहणम् । दारुव्रश्चने दारुपरशुसंयोगनिवृत्तौ दूरस्थेन शब्दो गृह्यते । न च व्यञ्जकाभावे व्यङ्ग्यग्रहणं भवति । तस्मान्न व्यञ्जकः संयोगः ।

उत्पादके तु संयोगे संयोगजाच्छब्दाच्छब्दसन्ताने सति श्रोत्रप्रत्यासन्नस्य ग्रहणमिति युक्तं संयोगनिवृत्तौ शब्दस्य ग्रहणमिति ।

इतश्च शब्द उत्पद्यते नाभिव्यज्यते—कृतकवदुपचारात् । तीव्रं[5] मन्दमिति

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१ आकाशेति तृतीयं वैशेषिकमतमाह ।

२ महाभूतेति बौद्धराद्धान्तमाह ।

३ केचिदन्ये एवं मन्यन्ते—"प्रत्यभिज्ञैव भगवती शब्दस्थेमसाधिनी । तदानुगुण्याय व्यापिनः शब्दस्य गुणस्य द्रव्यस्य वा प्रयत्नप्रेरिता वायवो यावद्वेगं प्रतिष्ठमानाः श्रोत्रं श्रोत्रावच्छिन्नशब्दविशेषं संस्कुर्वन्तो व्यञ्जका इति कल्प्यते । न च 'समानदेशानां समानेन्द्रियग्राह्याणां नियतव्यञ्जकव्यङ्ग्यत्वन्न दृष्टमिति ' इमं प्रसङ्गं प्रत्यभिज्ञा मृष्यति । सोऽयमनया बाधितविषयो विलीयत" इति ।

४ आदिमत्त्वादित्यादि सिद्धान्तसूत्रं पूर्वोक्तं प्रत्याह ।

५ तीव्रत्वमन्दत्वानुनासिकत्वादयो धर्माः शब्दस्यौपाधिका उत नेति संशये

कृतकमुपचर्यते । तीव्रं सुखं मन्दं सुखं, तीव्रं दुःखं मन्दं दुःखमिति । उपचर्यते च तीव्रः शब्दो मन्दः शब्द इति ।

"व्यञ्जकस्य तथाभावाद् ग्रहणस्य तीव्रमन्दता रूपवदिति" चेद्—न, अभिभवोपपत्तेः । "संयोगस्य व्यञ्जकस्य तीव्रमन्दतया शब्दग्रहणस्य तीव्रमन्दता भवति, न तु शब्दो भिद्यते । यथा प्रकाशस्य तीव्रमन्दतया रूपग्रहणस्येति" । तच्च नैवम्, अभिभवोपपत्तेः । तीव्रो भेरीशब्दो मन्दं तन्त्रीशब्दमभिभवति, न मन्दः । न च शब्दग्रहणमभिभावकम् । शब्दश्च न भिद्यते । शब्दे तु भिद्यमाने युक्तोऽभिभवः । तस्मादुत्पद्यते शब्दो नाभिव्यज्यत इति ।

अभिभवानुपपत्तिश्च, व्यञ्जकसमानदेशस्याभिव्यक्तौ प्राप्त्यभावात् । व्यञ्जकेन समानदेशोऽभिव्यज्यते शब्द इत्येतस्मिन्पक्षे नोपपद्यतेऽभिभवः । न हि भेरीशब्देन तन्त्रीस्वनः प्राप्त इति ।

"अप्राप्तेऽभिभव इति" चेत्—शब्दमात्राभिभवप्रसङ्गः । अथ मन्येत —"असत्यां प्राप्तावभिभवो भवतीति" । एवं सति यथा भेरीशब्दः कश्चित्तन्त्रीस्वनमभिभवति एवमन्तिकस्थोपादानमिव दवीयःस्थोपादानानपि तन्त्रीस्वनानभिभवेद्, अप्राप्तेरविशेषात् । तत्र क्वचिदेव भेर्यां प्रणादितायां सर्वलोकेषु समानकालास्तन्त्रीस्वना न श्रूयेरन् इति । नानाभूतेषु शब्दसन्तानेषु सत्सु श्रोत्रप्रत्यासत्तिभावेन कस्यचिच्छब्दस्य तीव्रेण मन्दस्याभिभवो युक्त इति । "कः पुनरयमभिभवो नाम ?" ग्राह्यसमानजातीयग्रहणकृतमग्रहणम् अभिभवः, यथोल्का[1]प्रकाशस्य ग्रहणार्हस्यादित्यप्रकाशेनेति ॥ १३ ॥

"न[2] घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वान्नित्येष्वप्यनित्यवदुपचाराच्च" ॥१४॥

सिद्धान्तः । वर्णसमवेतोऽनुनासिकत्वादिः प्रतीयमानो वर्णधर्म एव भवति नौपाधिक इति । तथा च युगपद्विरुद्धधर्मयोगात्परस्परमन्यत्वङ्गकारादीनामिति युक्तम् ।

१ यथोल्केति । अन्यत् खल्वन्येन समानजातीयेनाभिभूयते न तु तदेव तेन । नहि मध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशसम्बन्धी पटः पटुना सावित्रेण प्रकाशेन प्रकाशमानमात्मानमात्मनाऽभिभवति । एवं गकारोऽपि तीव्रध्वनिप्रकाश्यं गकारमात्मानमभिभवेद्यदि स्वयं मन्दध्वनिप्रकाश्यो गकारस्तीव्रध्वनिप्रकाश्याद्गकारादन्यो भवति । मध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशस्तु सवितृप्रकाशेनात्मनोऽन्येनाल्पत्वादभिभूयते ।

२ न घटेत्यादि सिद्धान्ताक्षेपसूत्रं सिद्धान्तहेतूनामनैकान्तिकत्वज्ञापनार्थम् । घटाभावस्य नित्यत्वात्, सामान्यस्य नित्यत्वात्, नित्येष्वनित्यवदुपचाराच्चेत्यन्वयः ।

न खल्वादिमत्त्वादनित्यः शब्दः । कस्मात्? व्यभिचारात् । आदिमतः खलु घटाभावस्य दृष्टं नित्यत्वम् । कथमादिमान्? कारणविभागेभ्यो हि घटो न भवति । कथमस्य नित्यत्वम्? योऽसौ कारणविभागेभ्यो न भवति न तस्याभावो भावेन कदाचिन्निवर्त्यत इति । यदप्यैन्द्रियकत्वादिति—तदपि व्यभिचरति । ऐन्द्रियकं च सामान्यं नित्यं चेति । यदपि कृतकवदुपचारादिति—एतदपि व्यभिचरति । नित्येष्वनित्यवदुपचारो दृष्टः । यथा हि भवति वृक्षस्य प्रदेशः, कम्बलस्य प्रदेशः, एवमाकाशस्य[1] प्रदेशः, आत्मनः प्रदेश इति भवतीति "॥ १४ ॥

[2]तत्त्वभाक्तयोर्नानात्वविभागादव्यभिचारः ॥ १५ ॥

नित्यमित्यत्र किं तावत्तत्त्वम्? अर्थान्तरस्यानुत्पत्तिधर्मकस्यात्महानानुपत्तिर्नित्यत्वम् । त[3]च्चाभावे नोपपद्यते ।

भाक्तं तु भवति । यत्तत्रात्मानमहासीत्, यद् भूत्वा न भवति, न जातु तत्पुनर्भवति, तत्र नित्य इव नित्यो घटाभाव इत्ययं पदार्थ इति । तत्र यथाजातीयकः शब्दो न तथाजातीयकं कार्यं किंचिन्नित्यं दृश्यत इत्यव्यभिचारः ॥ १५ ॥

[4]यदपि—"सामान्यनित्यत्वादिति", "इन्द्रियप्रत्यासत्तिग्राह्यमैन्द्रियकमिति"—

[5]सन्तानानुमानविशेषणात् ॥ १६ ॥

नित्येष्वप्यव्यभिचार इति प्रकृतम् । नेन्द्रिय[6]ग्रहणसामर्थ्याच्छब्दस्यानित्य-

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१ आकाशस्येति । 'आकाशस्य प्रदेश' इत्यत्र यथा प्रदेशरहित आकाशे प्रदेशोक्तिर्नित्यस्यापि तस्यानित्यत्वं व्यनक्ति, तादृश्येव नित्येऽपि शब्देऽनित्यत्वोक्तिरिति सम्भाव्यते ।

२ तत्त्वभाक्तयोरित्याक्षेपपरिहारसूत्रम् ।

३ तच्चेति । सत्तासम्बन्ध उभयान्तावच्छिन्नत्वं चेत्येतदुभयमित्यर्थः ।

४ यदपीति चतुर्दशसूत्रोक्तमाक्षेपं परामृशति ।

५ सन्तानेत्यादि सिद्धान्तिसूत्रम् ।

६ न वयमैन्द्रियकत्वेनानित्यत्वं प्रतिपादयामोऽपि तु शब्दस्याभिव्यक्तिं प्रतिषेधामः । नहि व्यज्यमानस्यैन्द्रियकत्वं युक्तमिति वार्त्तिककाराः ।

त्वम् । किं तर्हि ? इन्द्रियप्रत्यासत्तिग्राह्यत्वात्[1] सन्तानानुमानम्, तेनानित्यत्वमिति ॥ १६ ॥

यदपि[2] "नित्येष्वप्यनित्यवदुपचाराद् इति" । न—

कारणद्रव्यस्य[3] प्रदेशशब्देनाभिधानात् ॥ १७ ॥

नित्येष्वप्यव्यभिचार इति । एवमाकाशप्रदेशः आत्मप्रदेश इति नात्राकाशात्मनोः कारणद्रव्यमभिधीयते, यथा कृतकस्य । कथं ह्यविद्यमानमभिधीयते ? अविद्यमानता च प्रमाणतोऽनुपलब्धेः । किन्तर्हि तत्राभिधीयते ? संयोगस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वम्[4] । परिच्छिन्नेन द्रव्येणाकाशस्य संयोगो नाकाशं व्याप्नोति—अव्याप्य वर्तत इति । तदस्य कृतकेन द्रव्येण सामान्यम् । न ह्यामलकयोः संयोग आश्रयं व्याप्नोति । सामान्यकृता च भक्तिराकाशस्य प्रदेश इति ।

अनेनात्मप्रदेशो व्याख्यातः । संयोगवच्च शब्दबुद्ध्यादीनामव्याप्यवृत्तित्वमिति । परीक्षिता च तीव्रमन्दता शब्दतत्त्वं न भक्तिकृतेति ।

"कस्मात्[5]पुनः सूत्रकारस्यास्मिन्नर्थे सूत्रं न श्रूयत इति ?" शीलमिदं भगवतः सूत्रकारस्य बहुष्वधिकरणेषु द्वौ पक्षौ न व्यवस्थापयति । तत्र शास्त्रसिद्धान्ततत्त्वावधारणं प्रतिपत्तुमर्हतीति मन्यते । शास्त्रसिद्धान्तस्तु न्यायसमाख्यातमनुमतं बहुशाखमनुमानमिति ॥ १७ ॥

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१ ऐन्द्रियकत्वं चात्र इन्द्रियप्रत्यासत्तिग्राह्यत्वम् । तेन शब्दस्य सन्तानोऽनुमीयते, सन्तानवृत्तित्वेन चास्य नित्यत्वमिति सूत्रार्थः ।

२ यदपीति चतुर्दशसूत्रोक्तमाक्षेपान्तरं परामृशति ।

३ कारणद्रव्यस्येत्यादि अभिधानादित्यन्तमेव सूत्रम् । नित्येष्वप्यव्यभिचार इति तु भाष्यग्रन्थ एव सूत्रेणान्वितः । वृक्षकम्बलादिषु कार्यद्रव्यविषयेषु प्रदेशशब्देन कारणद्रव्यमेवोच्यते । तस्य चाकाशादावसम्भवान्न तादृगुक्तिसंभवः ।

४ अव्याप्येति । शब्द आकाशेऽव्याप्यवृत्तिः, आत्मनि च बुद्ध्यादिरिति ।

५ कस्मादिति । निष्प्रदेशमाकाशं निष्प्रदेशश्चात्मेत्येतदर्थबोधकं सूत्रन्नास्तीति प्राश्निकस्य हृदयम् ।

सप्तदशसूत्र उक्तयोरर्थयोः प्रतिपादितत्वान्नायं प्रश्नः सङ्गच्छत इति केचित् । परन्तु 'कारणद्रव्यस्य प्रदेशशब्देनाभिधानात्' इतिसूत्रमाकाशादीनां निष्प्रदेशत्वं साक्षान्न ब्रूत इति कृत्वैव प्रश्नस्य सङ्गतिः । उक्तामेवासङ्गतिमरुचिबीजं मनसि कृत्वा वार्तिककारः प्रश्नमन्यथावर्णयाञ्चकार—शब्दसन्तानप्रतिपादने वा न सूत्रमिति प्राश्निकस्य भाव इति ।

अथापि[1] खल्विदमस्ति इदं नास्तीति कुत एतत्प्रतिपत्तव्यमिति? प्रमाणत उपलब्धेरनुपलब्धेश्चेति। अविद्यमानस्तर्हि शब्दः—

प्रागुच्चारणादनुपलब्धेरावरणाद्यनुपलब्धेश्च ॥ १८ ॥

प्रागुच्चारणान्नास्ति शब्दः। कस्मात्? अनुपलब्धेः। "सतोऽनुपलब्धिरावरणादिभ्यः।" एतन्नोपपद्यते। कस्मात्? आवरणादीनामनुपलब्धिकारणानामग्रहणात्। अनेनावृतः शब्दो नोपलभ्यते असन्निकृष्टश्चेन्द्रियव्यवधानादित्येवमादि अनुपलब्धिकारणं न गृह्यत इति। सोऽयमनुच्चारितो नास्तीति।

"उच्चारणमस्य व्यञ्जकम्। तदभावात्प्रागुच्चारणादनुपलब्धिरिति" ॥

किमिदमुच्चारणं नामेति? विवक्षाजनितेन प्रयत्नेन कोष्ठ्यस्य वायोः प्रेरितस्य कण्ठताल्वादिप्रतिघातः, यथास्थानं प्रतिघाताद्वर्णाभिव्यक्तिरिति। संयोगविशेषो वै प्रतिघातः। प्रतिषिद्धं च संयोगस्य व्यञ्जकत्वम्। तस्मान्न व्यञ्जकाभावादग्रहणम्, अपि त्वभावादेवेति। सोऽयमुच्चार्यमाणः श्रूयते, श्रूयमाणश्चाभूत्वा भवतीत्यनुमीयते। ऊर्ध्वं चोच्चारणान्न श्रूयते, स भूत्वा न भवति, अभावान्न श्रूयत इति। कथम्? आवरणाद्यनुपलब्धेरित्युक्तम्। तस्मादुत्पत्तितिरोभावधर्मकः शब्द इति ॥ १८ ॥

एवं च सति तत्त्वं[2] पांशुभिरिवावाकिरन्निदमाह—

"तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादावरणोपपत्तिः ॥ १९ ॥

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१ अथापीति–अस्य पर्यनुयोगस्य को विषयः। अनुपलभ्यमानास्तित्वम्। ये शब्दं नित्यङ्कल्पयन्ति त इदम्पर्यनुयोज्याः–इदमस्तीदन्नास्तीति एतद्भवन्तः कथं प्रतिपद्यन्त इति। एवमनुयुक्तास्सन्तः प्रतिब्रुवते–प्रमाणत उपलब्धेरनुपलब्धेश्चेति। ततश्चानिष्टप्रसङ्ग इति सूचनाय सूत्रम्-प्रागुच्चारणादित्यादि।

अन्यथाऽपि सूत्रावतरणिकां वार्तिककार आह।

यच्चोभयपक्षसम्प्रतिपन्नं घटाद्यनित्यत्वेन-तेन चानुयोज्याः–यदिदमनित्यं घटादि भवद्भिः प्रतिपद्यते तत्कथमनित्यमिति। एवमनुयुक्ता यदि घटाद्यनित्यत्वे न्यायं प्रतिपद्यन्ते स शब्देऽपीति सूचनार्थं सूत्रम्।

२ तत्त्वे उक्ते पूर्वपक्षी जात्या प्रत्यवतिष्ठते तदनुपलब्धेरिति सूत्रेण।

"यद्यनुपलम्भादावरणं नास्ति, आवरणानुपलब्धिरपि तर्ह्यनुपलम्भान्नास्तीति–तस्या अभावादप्रतिषिद्धमावरणमिति"।

कथं पुनर्जानीते भवान्नावरणानुपलब्धिरुपलभ्यत इति? किमत्र ज्ञेयम्। प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयत्वात् समानम्। अयं खल्वावरणमनुपलभमानः प्रत्यात्ममेव संवेदयते नावरणमुपलभ इति,–यथा कुड्येनावृतस्यावरणमुपलभमानः प्रत्यात्ममेव संवेदयते।

सेयमावरणोपलब्धिवदावरणानुपलब्धिरपि संवेद्यैवेति।

एवं च सत्यपहृतविषयमुत्तरवाक्यमस्तीति ॥ १९ ॥

अभ्यनुज्ञावादेन तूच्यते जातिवादिना—

"अनुपलम्भादप्यनुपलब्धिसद्भावान्नावरणानुपपत्तिरनुपलम्भात्" ॥ २० ॥

"यथाऽनुपलभ्यमानाऽप्यावरणानुपलब्धिरस्ति एवमनुपलभ्यमानमप्यावरणमस्तीति। यद्यभ्यनुजानाति भवान्, अनुपलभ्यमानाप्यावरणानुपलब्धिरस्तीति, अभ्यनुज्ञाय च वदति–नास्त्यावरणमनुपलम्भादिति, एतस्मिन्नप्यभ्यनुज्ञावादे प्रतिपत्तिनियमो नोपपद्यत इति" ॥ २० ॥

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ २१ ॥

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१ यथा आवरणाद्यनुपलब्धिरनुपलभ्यमानाऽप्यस्ति, तथाऽऽवरणमप्यनुपलभ्यमानमप्यस्तीत्यर्थः। आवरणानुपलब्धेस्तावदुपलब्धिर्न सम्भवति, अनुपलब्धिस्वरूपविरोधात्। तस्मादावरणानुपलब्धिरेव वक्तव्या। तथा चावरणानुपलब्धेरभावे सत्यावरणोपलब्धिः। तया त्वावरणसद्भावः ज्ञानस्य निरालम्बनत्वायोगादिति हृदयम्।

२ तस्या इति। आवरणानुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः।

३ एवञ्चेति सिद्धान्तिन उक्तिः। यद्यावरणानुपलब्धिरुपलभ्यते मानसेन प्रत्यक्षेण तदा नानैकान्तिकत्वं न चावरणसद्भाव इति पूर्वपक्षिण ऊनविंशसूत्रोक्तं जात्युत्तरवाक्यमपहृतविषयम्भवतीत्यर्थः।

४ अभ्यनुज्ञेति। सिद्धान्तिन उक्तिमनुज्ञायापि जातिवादी प्रत्यवतिष्ठतेऽग्रिमेण सूत्रेणेत्यर्थः।

५ अनुपलम्भादिति जातिवादिनो द्वितीयं सूत्रम्। यदि पूर्वोक्तदोषभयादनुपलभ्यमानाऽप्यावरणानुपलब्धिरस्ति तथासत्यनुपलब्धेरनैकान्तिकत्वं प्रसज्यत इति भावः।

६ अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादिति सिद्धान्तिसूत्रम्। अस्यार्थः। 'अनुपलब्धेः' आवरणानुपलब्धेः 'अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वात्' आवरणोपलब्धिनिषेधात्मकत्वात्—'तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादिति' ऊनविंशसूत्रोक्तः 'अहेतुः'—आवरणोपपत्ताविति शेषः–असिद्धत्वात् इति।

यदुपलभ्यते[1] तदस्ति, यन्नोपलभ्यते तन्नास्ति, इति अनुपलम्भात्मकम-सदिति व्यवस्थितम्। उपलब्ध्यभावश्चानुपलब्धिरिति। सेयमभावत्वान्नो-पलभ्यते[2]। सच्च खल्वावरणम्। तस्योपलब्ध्या भवितव्यम्। न चोपलभ्यते। तस्मान्नास्तीति। तत्र यदुक्तं–"नावरणानुपपत्तिरनुपलम्भादिति" अयुक्त-मिति ॥ २१ ॥

अथ शब्दस्य नित्यत्वं प्रतिजानानः कस्माद्धेतोः प्रतीजानीते ?—

"**अस्पर्शत्वात्[3]**" ॥ २२ ॥

"अस्पर्शमाकाशं नित्यं दृष्टमिति। तथा च शब्द इति" ॥ २२ ॥

सोयमुभयतः सव्यभिचारः। स्पर्शवांश्चाणुर्नित्यः, अस्पर्शं च कर्मानित्यं दृष्टम्। अस्पर्शत्वादित्येतस्य साध्यसाधर्म्येणोदाहरणम्—

न[4], कर्मानित्यत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

साध्यवैधर्म्येणोदाहरणम्—

नाणुनित्यत्वात्[5] ॥ २४ ॥

उभयस्मिन्नुदाहरणे व्यभिचारान्न हेतुः ॥ २४ ॥

"अयं तर्हि हेतुः"—

"**सम्प्रदानात्[6]**" ॥ २५ ॥

"सम्प्रदीयमानमवस्थितं दृष्टम्। सम्प्रदीयते च शब्द आचार्येणान्ते-वासिने। तस्मादवस्थित इति" ॥ २५ ॥

अतथाजातीयेन प्रत्यवस्थानादनुत्तरमिति सूत्रार्थः। यथाजातीयकः शब्दो नित्यस्तथाजातीयकं किञ्चिन्नित्यन्न दृष्टमित्याशयः।

१ 'उपलभ्यत' इति विधिविषयेण प्रमाणेनेति भावः। 'न उपलभ्यते'–निषेध-विषयेण प्रमाणेनेति भावः। तस्मादनुपलम्भात्मकं निषेधविषयप्रमाणमिदं असत्— इति स्थितम्।

२ नोपलभ्यते—विधिविषयेण प्रमाणेनेत्यर्थः।

३ अस्पर्शत्वादिति विप्रतिपत्तेः प्रमाणमूलत्वाद्धेतोः परिप्रश्नसूत्रम्।

४ न कर्मेति तस्य व्यभिचारप्रदर्शनार्थं सूत्रम्।

५ नाण्विति सिद्धान्तिसूत्रं व्यभिचारान्तरप्रदर्शनार्थम्। अस्पर्शेन कर्मणैवोभयतो व्यभिचारे लब्धे नित्येनाणुना व्यभिचारोद्भावनं कृतकत्वानित्यत्ववत्समव्याप्तिकत्व-निराकरणार्थं द्रष्टव्यम्।

६ सम्प्रदानादिति पूर्वपक्षिसूत्रम्। सम्प्रदीयमानत्वादित्यर्थः।

तदन्तरालानुपलब्धेरहेतुः[1] **॥ २६ ॥**

येन सम्प्रदीयते यस्मै च, तयोरन्तरालेऽवस्थानमस्य केन लिङ्गेनोपलभ्यते ?

सम्प्रदीयमानो ह्यवस्थितः सम्प्रदातुरपैति सम्प्रदानं च प्राप्नोति–इत्यवर्जनीयमेतत् ॥ २६ ॥

"अध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः"[2] **॥ २७ ॥**

"अध्यापनं लिङ्गम् । असति सम्प्रदानेऽध्यापनं न स्यादिति" ॥२७॥

उभयोः[3] **पक्षयोरन्यतरस्याध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः ॥ २८ ॥**

समानमध्यापनमुभयोः पक्षयोः, संशयानिवृत्तेः[4] । किमाचार्यस्थः शब्दोऽन्तेवासिनमापद्यते तदध्यापनम्, आहोस्विन्नृत्योपदेशवद् गृहीतस्यानुकरणमध्यापनमिति ? एवमध्यापनमलिङ्गं[5] सम्प्रदानस्येति ॥ २८ ॥

"अयं तर्हि हेतुः"—

"अभ्यासात्"[6] **॥ २९ ॥**

"अभ्यस्यमानमवस्थितं दृष्टम् । पञ्चकृत्वः पश्यतीति रूपमवस्थितं पुनः पुनर्दृश्यते । भवति च शब्देऽभ्यासः,–दशकृत्वोऽधीतोऽनुवाको विंशतिकृत्वोऽधीत इति । तस्मादवस्थितस्य पुनः पुनरुच्चारणमभ्यास इति" ॥ २९ ॥

नान्यत्वेऽप्यभासस्योपचारात्[7] **॥ ३० ॥**

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१ तदन्तरालेति परिहारसूत्रम् ।

२ पञ्चविंशसूत्रोक्तं हेतुं पूर्वपक्षी विशदयति–अध्यापनादिति सूत्रेण ।

अयमत्र प्रयोगः—दातृप्रतिग्रहीत्रोरन्तराले शब्दोऽस्ति, अध्यापनात्, गुरुणा शिष्याय दीयमानत्वात्, धनुर्वेदविदा आचार्येण शिष्याय दीयमानेष्वादिवत्—इति ।

३ उभयोरिति सिद्धान्तिसूत्रम् ।

४ सांशयिकत्वादहेतुः पूर्वपक्षोक्तो हेतुरिति सूत्रार्थः ।

५ अलिङ्गमिति । सिद्धसाधनत्वात् । वयमपि ब्रूमः दात्रोच्चरितः शब्दः सन्तानवृत्त्या सम्प्रदानमेतीत्यवस्थाने न हेतुः ।

६ पूर्वपक्षी हेत्वन्तरमुपन्यस्यति–अभ्यासादिति सूत्रम् ।

७ अनित्येष्वेवाभ्यास इत्यनेकान्तः, अभ्यासस्वरूपानवधारणादसिद्धश्च । अभ्यासो ह्येकविषयोऽनेकज्ञानोत्पाद एकाकारविषयो वा । तत्रायमभ्यास एकविषय एकाकारविषयो वेति सन्दिग्धासिद्धिरित्यादिभिः उक्तं हेतुं दूषयति–नान्यत्व इति सूत्रेण ।

अनवस्थानेऽप्यभ्यासस्याभिधानं भवति–द्विर्नृत्यतु भवान्, त्रिर्नृत्यतु भवानिति, द्विरनृत्यन्, त्रिरनृत्यत्, द्विरग्निहोत्रं जुहोति, द्विर्भुङ्क्ते। एवं, व्यभिचारात् ॥ ३० ॥

" प्रतिषिद्धहेतावन्यशब्दस्य प्रयोगः प्रतिषिध्यते[1] "—

" अन्यदन्यस्मादनन्यत्वादनन्यदित्यन्यताऽभावः[2] " ॥ ३१ ॥

" यदिदमन्यदिति मन्यसे तत् स्वात्मनोऽनन्यत्वादन्यन्न भवति। एवमन्यताया अभावः। तत्र यदुक्तम्–'अन्यत्वेऽप्यभ्यासोपचारात्'–इत्येतदयुक्तमिति " ॥ ३१ ॥

शब्दप्रयोगं प्रतिषेधतः शब्दान्तरप्रयोगः प्रतिषिध्यते—

तदभावे[3] नास्त्यनन्यता तयोरितरेतरापेक्षसिद्धेः ॥ ३२ ॥

अन्यस्मादनन्यतामुपपादयति भवान, उपपाद्य चान्यत् प्रत्याचष्टे—अनन्यदिति च शब्दमनुजानाति–प्रयुङ्क्ते चानन्यदिति। एतत् समासपदम्। अन्यशब्दोऽयं प्रतिषेधेन सह समस्यते। यदि चात्रोत्तरं पदं नास्ति कस्यायं प्रतिषेधेन सह समासः? तस्मात्तयोरन्यानन्यशब्दयोरितरोऽनन्यशब्द इतरमन्यशब्दमपेक्षमाणः सिद्ध्यतीति। तत्र यदुक्तमन्यताया अभाव इत्येतदयुक्तमिति[4] ॥ ३२ ॥

" अस्तु तर्हीदानीं शब्दस्य नित्यत्वम् "—

" विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्च[5] " ॥ ३३ ॥

" यदनित्यं तस्य विनाशः कारणाद्भवति। यथा लोष्टस्य कारणद्रव्यविभागात्। शब्दश्चेदनित्यस्तस्य विनाशो यस्मात्कारणाद्भवति तदुपलभ्येत। न चोपलभ्यते। तस्मान्नित्य इति " ॥ ३३ ॥

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१ प्रतिषिध्यत इति–पूर्वपक्षिणेति शेषः।

२ यदि 'अन्यत्' नाम जगति भवेत् ततः 'अन्यत्वेऽप्यभ्यासोपचारात्' इत्यनेनानैकान्तिकत्वमुद्भाव्येत। तदेव तु नास्तीति वाक्छलेन प्रत्यवतिष्ठते पूर्वपक्षी–अन्यदिति सूत्रम्।

३ परिहरति सिद्धान्ती–तदभाव इति सूत्रम्। यदि 'अन्यत्' इति प्रयोगो न सम्भवति तर्हि 'अनन्यत्' इत्यपि न सम्भवत्येवेत्यर्थः।

४ अयुक्तमिति। न च स्वस्मात् 'अनन्यत्' परस्मादपि 'अनन्यत्' भवितुमर्हति। नहि नीलमात्मनः 'अनन्यत्' इति पीतादपि 'अनन्यत्' भवति। अन्यदेव हि नीलम्पीतादिति परमार्थः।

५ पूर्वहेतौ निरस्ते पूर्वपक्षी शब्दनित्यतायां हेत्वन्तरमुपन्यस्यति–विनाशेति सूत्रम्।

अश्रवणकारणानुपलब्धेः सततश्रवणप्रसङ्गः ॥ ३४ ॥[1]

यथा विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेरविनाशप्रसङ्ग एवमश्रवणकारणानुपलब्धेः सततं श्रवणप्रसङ्गः। "व्यञ्जकाभावादश्रवणमिति"—चेत्? प्रतिषिद्धं व्यञ्जकम्।

"अथ विद्यमानस्य निर्निमित्तमश्रवणमिति"—विद्यमानस्य निर्निमित्तो विनाश इति—समानश्च दृष्टविरोधो निमित्तमन्तरेण विनाशे चाश्रवणे चेति ॥३४॥

उपलभ्यमाने चानुपलब्धेरसत्त्वादनपदेशः ॥ ३५ ॥[2]

अनुमानाच्चोपलभ्यमाने शब्दस्य विनाशकारणे विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेरसत्त्वादित्यनपदेशः,—यथा यस्माद्विषाणी तस्मादश्व इति। किमनुमानमिति चेत्—सन्तानोपपत्तिः। उपपादितः शब्दसन्तानः—संयोगविभागजाच्छब्दाच्छब्दान्तरं ततोऽप्यन्यत्ततोऽप्यन्यदिति। तत्र कार्यः शब्दः कारणशब्दं निरुणद्धि। प्रतिघातिद्रव्यसंयोगस्त्वन्त्यस्य[3] शब्दस्य निरोधकः। दृष्टं हि तिरःप्रतिकुड्यमन्तिकस्थेनाप्यश्रवणं शब्दस्य, श्रवणं दूरस्थेनाप्यसति व्यवधान इति।

घण्टायामभिहन्यमानायां तारस्तारतरो मन्दो मन्दतर इति श्रुतिभेदान्नानाशब्दसन्तानोऽविच्छेदेन श्रूयते। तत्र नित्ये शब्दे घण्टास्थमन्यगतं वाऽवस्थितं सन्तानवृत्ति वाऽभिव्यक्तिकारणं वाच्यं, येन श्रुतिसन्तानो भवतीति। शब्दभेदे[4] चासति श्रुतिभेद उपपादयितव्य इति।

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१ अश्रवणेति सिद्धान्तिसूत्रम्।

२ उपलभ्यमान इति सिद्धान्तसूत्रम्। 'अनपदेश' इति अहेतुरित्यर्थः।

३ प्रतिघातीति। शब्दस्य गुणत्वाद्गुणे च गुणान्तरासम्भवात् तस्य संयोगो वैशेषिकराद्धान्तविरुद्ध इति कृत्वा प्रतिघातिद्रव्यमत्र आकाशमेवेति तात्पर्यकाराः। तथा चोक्तम्—एतदुक्तम्भवति। घनतरद्रव्यसंयुक्तं नभो न शब्दसमवायिकारणताम्प्रतिपद्यते। ततश्च सन्नप्यसमवायिकारणं शब्दो न शब्दान्तरमारभत इति। प्रतिघातिद्रव्यमत्र शब्दनिमित्तकारणीभूतो वायुरेवेति न्यायकन्दलीकाराः।

४ शब्दभेद इति। नित्यस्य शब्दस्य न स्वाभाविको भेदो नाप्यौपाधिक इत्युपपादितम्। तथाच सति यदि घण्टास्थेन व्यञ्जकेनान्यवृत्तिना वाऽवस्थितेन सन्तानवृत्तिना वा नित्यः शब्दो व्यज्येत तर्हि तार—तारतर—तारतम—मन्द—मन्दतर—मन्दतमादिश्रुतिभेदो न स्यादेवेत्याशयः। यदि च तारतमादयस्तावन्त एव शब्दा नित्यास्ततस्तावन्त एव युगपदेव गम्येरन् विशेषाभावात्। एको हि व्यञ्जक एषां स्थिर इति। घण्टास्थस्य सन्तानवृत्तेः कारणत्वे युक्तं यत् तारतमादिभेदेन कारणभेदात्कार्यभेद इति।

अनित्ये तु शब्दे घण्टास्थं सन्तानवृत्ति संयोगसहकारि निमित्तान्तरं संस्कारभूतं पटु मन्दमनुवर्तते । तस्यानुवृत्त्या शब्दसन्तानानुवृत्तिः । पटुमन्दभावाच्च तीव्रमन्दता शब्दस्य । तत्कृतश्च श्रुतिभेद इति ॥ ३५ ॥

" न वै निमित्तान्तरं संस्कार उपलभ्यते । अनुपलब्धेर्नास्तीति "।

[1]पाणिनिमित्तप्रश्लेषाच्छब्दाभावे नानुपलब्धिः ॥ ३६ ॥

पाणिकर्मणा पाणिघण्टाप्रश्लेषो भवति । तस्मिंश्च सति शब्दसन्तानो नोपलभ्यते । अतः श्रवणानुपपत्तिः । तत्र प्रतिघातिद्रव्यसंयोगः शब्दस्य निमित्तान्तरं संस्कारभूतं निरुणद्धीत्यनुमीयते । तस्य च निरोधाच्छब्दसन्तानो नोत्पद्यते । अनुत्पत्तौ श्रुतिविच्छेदः । यथा—प्रतिघातिद्रव्यसंयोगादिषोः क्रियाहेतौ संस्कारे निरुद्धे गमनाभाव इति । कम्पसन्तानस्य स्पर्शनेन्द्रियग्राह्यस्य चोपरमः । कांस्यपात्रादिषु पाणिसंश्लेषो[2] लिङ्गं संस्कारसन्तानस्येति । तस्मान्निमित्तान्तरस्य संस्कारभूतस्य नानुपलब्धिरिति ॥ ३६ ॥

[3]विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥ ३७ ॥

यदि यस्य विनाशकारणं नोपलभ्यते तदवतिष्ठते, अवस्थानाच्च तस्य नित्यत्वं प्रसज्यते, एवं यानि खल्विमानि शब्दश्रवणानि शब्दाभिव्यक्तय इति मतम्, न तेषां विनाशकारणं भवतोपपाद्यते, अनुपपादनादवस्थानमवस्थानात्

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१ पाणीति सिद्धान्तिसूत्रम् । अत्र सूत्रार्थे मतभेदः । पाणिरूपस्य शब्दाभावनिमित्तस्य 'प्रश्लेषात्' संयोगात् 'शब्दाभावे' उपलभ्यमाने शब्दाभावकारणस्य 'नानुपलब्धिः' इति केचित् । अन्ये तु 'पाणि'—'रूपनिमित्तस्य' 'प्रश्लेषः' कार्यत्वरूपसम्बन्धो यत्र स शब्द उत्तरशब्दः, तस्मात् 'शब्दाभावे' शब्दध्वंसे सति —विनाशकारणस्य 'नानुपलब्धिः' इति । प्रथममेव भाष्यसम्मतम्प्रतिभाति । तत्र च 'नानुपलब्धिः' इत्यस्य 'संस्कारस्यानुपलब्धिरिति न' इत्येवमन्वयः कार्यः ।

२ 'पाणिसंश्लेपः' इति सर्वत्र पाठः । कांस्यपात्रादिषु (१) स्पर्शनेन्द्रियग्राह्यस्य कम्पसन्तानस्य उपरमः, तथाच (२) पाणिसंश्लेषः—इत्येतदुभयमेव संस्कारसन्तानस्य लिङ्गमिति सम्बन्धः ।

'पाणिसंश्लेषे' इति पाठे तु—'कांस्यपात्रादिषु पाणिसंश्लेषे सति स्पर्शनेन्द्रियग्राह्यस्य कम्पसन्तानस्य उपरमः संस्कारसन्तानस्य लिङ्गं सूचकं भवतीत्येवं' सम्बन्धः कार्यः ।

३ विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेरिति त्रयस्त्रिंशसूत्रोक्तं पूर्वपक्षहेतुम्प्रत्याचष्टे ।

तेषां नित्यत्वं प्रसज्यत इति। अथ नैवं, न तर्हि विनाशकारणादुपलब्धेः शब्दस्यावस्थानान्नित्यत्वमिति ॥ ३७ ॥

"कम्पसमानाश्रयस्य[1] चानुनादस्य[2] पाणिप्रश्लेषात् कम्पवत् कारणोपरमादभावः। वैयधिकरण्ये[3] हि प्रतिघातिद्रव्यप्रश्लेषात् समानाधिकरणस्यैवोपरमः स्यादिति"।

अस्पर्शत्वादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३८ ॥

यदिदमाकाशगुणः शब्द इति प्रतिषिद्ध्यते, अयमनुपपन्नः—अस्पर्शत्वाच्छब्दाश्रयस्य। रूपादिसमानदेशस्याग्रहणे[4] शब्दसन्तानोपपत्तेरस्पर्शव्यापिद्रव्याश्रयः शब्द इति ज्ञायते,[5] न कम्पसमानाश्रय इति ॥ ३८ ॥

प्रतिद्रव्यं रूपादिभिः सह सन्निविष्टः शब्दः समानदेशो व्यज्यत इति नोपपद्यते। कथम्?—

विभक्त्यन्तरोपपत्तेश्च[6] समासे ॥ ३९ ॥

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१ साङ्ख्यः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते—कम्पसमानाश्रयस्येत्यादि स्यादित्यन्तम्।

२ अनुवृत्तो नादः शब्दोऽनुनादः।

३ वैयधिकरण्ये हीति। द्रव्यप्रश्लेषसमानाधिकरणस्यैव संस्कारस्योच्छेदः स्यात्, न व्यधिकरणस्य शब्दस्य। व्यधिकरणस्य तूच्छेदाभ्युपगमेऽतिप्रसङ्गः स्यात्। तस्मात्कम्पसन्तानसंस्कारसमानाश्रयः शब्दोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः। तदनेनाकाशाश्रयत्वं शब्दस्य प्रतिषिद्धमिति हृदयम्।

४ रूपादिसमानदेशस्य—शब्दस्येत्यर्थः।

५ ज्ञायत इति। प्राप्यकारित्वमिन्द्रियाणां व्यवस्थितम्। घण्टाद्याश्रयः शब्दो न श्रोत्रमप्राप्नोति। एवं हि प्राप्नुयाद् यदि घण्टा कर्णशष्कुलीमागच्छेत्—कर्णशष्कुली वा घण्टाम्। न चैतदुभयमस्ति। न चाहङ्कारिकमिन्द्रियं व्यापीत्युक्तमेव। तस्माच्छब्दाधारो निःस्पर्शो व्यापी वा आकाशः, तदाधारः शब्दः श्रोत्रमायाति सन्तानवृत्त्येति युक्तम्। तथैव च श्रवणमस्योपपद्यते नान्यथेत्याशयः।

६ विभक्तीति सिद्धान्तिसूत्रम्। रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शशब्दसमुदायो वीणावेणुशङ्खादिद्रव्यम्। तत्र 'समासे' समुदाये स्थित एव शब्दो व्यज्यत इति साङ्ख्यदर्शनम्। तस्मिन् समुदाये साङ्ख्याभिमते 'विभक्त्यन्तरोपपत्तेश्च' न व्यज्यते शब्द इति सूत्रार्थः। विभक्तिश्च विभक्त्यन्तरं चेति 'विभक्त्यन्तरम्'। यदि समुदाये व्यज्येत शब्दः 'विभक्तिः' षड्जधैवतगान्धारादिभेदेन—'विभक्त्यन्तरं च'—षड्जजातीयस्यैव तारमन्द्राद्यवान्तरभेदेननोपपद्येत। तस्माद् 'विभक्त्यन्तरोपपत्तेः' न समासे व्यज्यते शब्दः, अपि त्वाकाशगुणः क्रियत इत्येव साम्प्रतम्।

सन्तानोपपत्तेश्चेति चार्थः। तद्व्याख्यातम् । यदि रूपादयः शब्दश्च प्रतिद्रव्यं समस्ताः समुदितास्तस्मिन् समासे समुदाये यो यथाजातीयकः सन्निविष्टस्तस्य यथाजातीयस्यैव ग्रहणेन भवितव्यं, शब्दे रूपादिवत् । तत्र योऽयं विभागः–एकद्रव्ये नानारूपा भिन्नश्रुतयो[1] विधर्माणः शब्दा अभिव्यज्यमानाः श्रूयन्ते, यच्च विभागान्तरं[2]–सरूपाः समानश्रुतयः सधर्माणः शब्दास्तीव्रमन्दधर्मतया भिन्नाः श्रूयन्ते,–तदुभयं नोपपद्यते। नानाभूतानामुत्पद्यमानानामयं धर्मो नैकस्य व्यज्यमानस्येति। अस्ति चायं विभागो विभागान्तरं च। तेन विभागोपपत्तेर्मन्यामहे न प्रतिद्रव्यं रूपादिभिः सह शब्दः सन्निविष्टो व्यज्यत इति ॥ ३९ ॥

(३) शब्दपरिणामप्रकरणम्।

द्विविधश्चायं[3] शब्दो वर्णात्मको ध्वनिमात्रश्च। तत्र वर्णात्मनि तावत्–

विकारादेशोपदेशात्संशयः[4] ॥ ४० ॥

"दध्यत्रेति" केचिद् इकार इत्वं हित्वा यत्वमापद्यत इति विकारं मन्यन्ते। केचिदिकारस्य प्रयोगे विषयकृते यदिकारः स्थानं जहाति तत्र यकारस्य प्रयोगं ब्रुवते । संहितायां विषये इकारो न प्रयुज्यते, तस्य स्थाने यकारः प्रयुज्यते, स आदेश इति। उभयमिदमुपदिश्यते। तत्र न ज्ञायते[5] किं तत्त्वमिति ?

१ भिन्नश्रुतय इति। षड्जादिरूपा इत्यर्थः।

२ विभागान्तरमिति–षड्जस्यैव तारमन्दाद्यवान्तरभेदेनेत्याशयः।

३ तदेवं रूपादिसन्निविष्टः शब्दो व्यज्यत इति साङ्ख्यमते दूषिते स एव साङ्ख्यो वर्णेषु प्रकृतिविकारभावश्रुतेः मृत्सुवर्णादिवत् परिणामि नित्या वर्णा इति यदि प्रत्यवतिष्ठते तत्र परीक्षामारभते–द्विविध इति। 'वर्णात्मक' अकारादिः, 'ध्वनिमात्रः' शङ्खादिनिमित्तः।

४ विकार इति। विकारो हि नाम न बौद्धनयवत् पूर्वस्य निरन्वयनिवृत्तावुत्तरस्य प्रादुर्भावः साङ्ख्यस्य विवक्षितः–किन्त्ववस्थितस्यैव धर्मिणः पूर्वधर्मतिरोभावे धर्मान्तरस्याविर्भावः। न चेकारस्य धर्मस्य धर्मी कश्चिदुपलम्भगोचरो य इकारधर्मनिवृत्तावप्यनुवृत्ताकारतया परिणमेत।

५ न ज्ञायत इति। इको यणचीत्यत्र उक्तव्याख्यातृविप्रतिपत्तेः संशयः। तन्नापरीक्ष्य शक्यमवधारयितुम्।

आदेशोपदेशस्तत्त्वम्[1]।

विकारोपदेशे ह्यन्वयस्याग्रहणाद्विकाराननुमानम्। सत्यन्वये किञ्चिन्नि-वर्तते किञ्चिदुपजायत इति शक्येत विकारोऽनुमातुम्। न चान्वयो गृह्यते। तस्माद्विकारो नास्तीति।

भिन्नकरणयोश्च[2] वर्णयोरप्रयोगे प्रयोगोपपत्तिः। विवृतकरण इकार ईष-त्स्पृष्टकरणो यकारः। ताविमौ पृथक्करणाख्येन प्रयत्नेनोच्चारणीयौ। तयोरेकस्या-प्रयोगेऽन्यस्य प्रयोग उपपन्न इति।

अविकारे[3] चाविशेषः। यत्रेमाविकारयकारौ न विकारभूतौ–यतते, यच्छति, प्रायंस्त इति, इकार, इदमिति च, यत्र च विकारभूतौ–इष्ट्या, दध्या-हरेति,–उभयत्र प्रयोक्तुरविशेषो यत्नः, श्रोतुश्च श्रुतिरित्यादेशोपपत्तिः।

प्रयुज्यमाना[4]ग्रहणाच्च। न खलु इकारः प्रयुज्यमानो यकारतामापद्यमानो गृह्यते। किं तर्हि? इकारस्य प्रयोगे यकारः प्रयुज्यते। तस्मादविकार इति।

अविकारे च[5] न शब्दान्वाख्यानलोपः। न विक्रियन्ते वर्णा इति–न[6] चैतस्मिन्पक्षे शब्दान्वाख्यानस्यासम्भवो येन वर्णविकारं प्रतिपद्येमहीति।

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१ आदेशोपश इति। सुवर्णजातीयाः खल्ववयवा अन्यतमव्यूहपरित्यागेनान्य-तमव्यूहमापद्यमानाः 'रुचक' इति वा 'वर्धमान' इति वा परिणमन्ते। अस्ति हि तेषु सर्वेषु सुवर्णजातीयानामवयवानामनुगमः। न तु यकारे इकारस्य वा तदा-रम्भकस्य वाऽवयवस्यानुगममीक्षामहे। तस्माद्विकाराभावादादेशत्वमस्य निश्चिनुमः।

२ उपपत्त्यन्तरं चाविकारे दर्शयति–भिन्नकरणयोरिति। यदि हि इकारविकारो यकारः स्याद् यकारप्रयोगाय इकारमुपाददानास्तत्कारणं विवृतकरणं पूर्वमुपाददीरन्। तन्निरपेक्षास्तु यकारम्प्रयोक्ष्यमाणाः ईषत्स्पृष्टकरणमुपाददते। तस्मान्नेकारविकारो यकार इति युक्तमुत्पश्यामः।

३ उपपत्त्यन्तरमाह–अविकार इति।

४ प्रयुज्यमानेति। यथा हि क्षीरं कालविपाकापेक्षं दधि भवत दृश्यते, न तथा इकारो यकारो भवन्नित्यर्थः।

५ यदि न विकारः कथन्तर्हि शब्दान्वाख्यानम्–इकोयणचीत्यत आह— अविकारे चेति।

६ न चैतस्मिन्निति। इकः प्रयोगप्रसङ्गे संहितायां यणः प्रयोगमाह तत्सूत्रे, न पुनरिग्विकारं यणमित्यर्थः।

BHĀṢYA

The weighing balance is called '*Pramāṇa*' when it is the *means* of bringing about the cognition of the exact weight (of the thing weighed),—in which case the object of cognition is the weighty substance, gold and the like (which is weighed), which therefore is called '*Prameya*';—but when the gold thus weighed is made the means of testing (ascertaining the accuracy of) another balance, then in the cognition (of the accuracy) of this other balance, it becomes the '*Pramāṇa*', and the other balance becomes the '*Prameya*'.*

What we have just said (in regard to the application of the names '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Prameya*' depending on circumstances) applies to all topics of the *S'āstra*.† For instance, the *Soul* has been prominently mentioned among '*Prameyas*', because it is an object of cognition; but it is '*Pramātṛ*', 'Cogniser', also, inasmuch as (in regard to the action of *cognising*) it is the independent agent;—similarly *Buddhi*, 'Apprehension', (of Invariable Concomitance, for instance) is '*Pramāṇa*', inasmuch as it is the means of cognising things; and yet it becomes '*Prameya*', when it is itself *cognised*; and it comes to be called mere '*Pramiti*', 'apprehension', when it is neither the *means* nor the *object* of any cognition. Similarly, the conditions governing the application of the names in question may be applied to other particular catigories (of Doubt etc.) also.

As a matter of fact, the names of the several case-relations or active agencies (*Kārakas*) are applied (promiscuously) through varying causes (depending on the character of the things concerned). For instance, when we say 'the tree stands',§ (*vṛkṣaḥ*

* When we are weighing gold, the Balance is a pure '*Pramāṇa*', being the *means* whereby we know the weight of the gold. But when doubts arise as to the accuracy of a balance, then what is done is that a piece of gold, whose weight has been already ascertained by means of a reliable balance, is weighed again in the balance of doubtful accuracy; and if the weights tally, the balance is proved 'accurate'; so that in regard to its accuracy, the balance becomes an 'object of cognition', 'Prameya', the resultant cognition in this case being in the form, 'this balance is accurate'.

† In this passage the Author reminds us of what he has already said in the *Bhāṣya* or Sū. 1-1-1'—says *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* takes *tiṣṭhati* as 'lives'.

tiṣṭhati '),·the *tree*, (*vṛkṣa*) is called the 'nominative', because in regard to its own action of *standing*, it is 'independent' [thus fulfilling the conditon of Pāṇini's definition of the Nominative as that which is *svatantra*, 'independent agent'] ;—when we say 'he secs the tree' ('*vṛkṣam paśyati*'), the same tree comes to be called the 'objective', because it is that which is 'most desired' to be got at by the action of 'seeing' [thus fulfilling the condition of Pāṇini's definition of the Objective as that which is 'the most desired to be got at' by the Agent] ;--when we say 'he indicates the Moon by (*i.e.* with the help of, *through*) the tree', the same tree is called an 'Instrument', because it is the 'principal means of accomplishment' employed by the person doing the indicating [and thus fulfills the condition of Pāṇini's definition as that which is the 'principal means of accomplishment'] ;—when we say 'he is pouring water for the tree ' ('*vṛkṣāya udakam āsiñcati*'), the tree is called the 'Dative', as it is that which is 'intended to be benefited' by the water that is poured [thus fulfilling the condition of Pāṇini's definition of the Dative as what is intended to be benefited by the action] ; —when we say 'the leaf falls from the tree', ('*vṛkṣāt parṇam patati*'), the tree is the 'Ablative,' as it is ' what remains fixed while there is movement of the other thing',- such being the definition of the Ablative ; - lastly when we say ' birds are on the tree ' ('*vṛkṣe vayāṁsi santi*'), the tree is the 'Locative, being the receptacle (of the birds),—and the 'Locative' has been defined as 'receptacle.'

* From all this it is clear that '*Kāraka*', 'case-relation' (or 'active agency') is a name given, not to the mere *substance* (as held by the *Mādhyamika*), nor to the mere *action*, but to that which, while being endowed with a particular action of its own, becomes the means of the accomplishment of the other (principal) action ; *e. g.* the name 'Nominative' applies, neither to the substance alone, nor to the action alone, but to that which, independently by itself

* According to the *Bhāṣyacandra*, we have a Pūrvapakṣa argument from here down to 1. 5 on P. 85 ; and the Siddhāntin's answer begins on 1. 5, p. 85 with *'Asti bhoḥ'*;—and then the *Pūrvapakṣa*-argument again with '*Se-yamupalabdhiḥ &c.*' (1. 4, p. 85);-while according to the *Vārtika* and the we have here, in the passage beginning with p. 84, 1. 13, to p. 85, 1. 5, a *Tātparya*, statement from the Siddhanta stand-point, applying the general principle of '*Kārakas*' to the case of 'Pramāṇa and Prameya'.

(*i.e.* by its own action), becomes the means of accomplishing the other act;—similarly the name 'objective' applies to that which is the most desired to be got at by the action, and not to mere substance or to action; and so with what is the 'principal means of accomplishing', and so on. In these cases we have found that, just as *in point of fact* the names of the active agencies (*Kārakas*) are applied, neither to the mere substance, nor to the mere action, but to that which, being endowed with a particular action of its own, helps in the bringing about of some other action,—so also the same follows from the definitions of the 'active agencies'; and as the words '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Prameya*' also are expressive of active agency (case-relation; '*Pramāṇa*' being the *Instrument* and '*Prameya*' the *Object*, of cognition), they cannot renounce what is in the very nature of 'active agencies.'

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Pūrvapakṣin urges the following argument:—

"Well, Sir, we admit that the *Kāraka*-names are used according to their capacity; so that Perception and the rest are '*Pramāṇa*', 'Instruments of Cognition' as they are the cause of the action of cognising, and they are also '*Prameya*', 'object of cognition', as they are the objects of the action of *cognising*; thus then Perception and the rest are *objects* of cognition as well as *instruments* of cognition;* as is vouched for by such specific assertions (met with in common parlance) as—(*a*) 'I know this *by* Perception', 'I know this *by* Inference', 'I know these *by* Analogy', 'I know this *by* Word', [where Perception etc. figure as the *means*],—or (*b*) 'My cognition (which is apprehended) is Perceptional', 'My Cognition is Inferential', 'My Cognition is Verbal', [where they are apprehended as the Object of Cognition]. So also when these same, Perception and the rest, are described by their definitions—e.g., 'the cognition produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ' and so forth—they come to be specifically *known* [in which case they themselves form the *objects* of cognition]. Now the question arises—Is this *Cognition*

* According to the *Bhāṣyacandra*, the term '*pramāṇāni*' here stands for (1) *Instruments of Cognition*, and (2) *Cognition*;—reading the passage as संवद्यानि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि च.

of Perception etc. brought about by the instrumentality of another set of Pramāṇas? Or without other Pramāṇas, independently of all instruments? 'What difference would that make?' [The Pūrvapakṣin explains this in the following Sūtra] :—

Sūtra 17

" If the Instruments of Cognition are cognised by means of Instruments of Cognition,—then this involves the possibility of other Instruments of Cognition. "

BHĀṢYA

"If Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition are apprehended by means of Instruments of Cognition, then this means that the Instruments by whose means they are apprehended are distinct from Perception and the rest; and this involves the postulating of other Instruments of Cognition (distinct from Perception etc., enumerated in Sū. 1·1·4); and this means that there would be an infinite regress, one Instrument of Cognition being apprehended by means of another, this latter again by means of another, and so on and on, *ad infinitum*. And it is not right to admit of such an infinite regress, when there is no justification for it."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

"In order to avoid this it might be urged that the cognition of the Instruments of Cognition is brought about without other Pramāṇas or Instruments of Cognition, independently of all instrumentality. But in that case—

Sūtra 18

" If (in the cognition of the Instrument of Cognition) another Instrument of Cognition is not operative, then, just as the cognition of the Instrument of Cognition would be accomplished (without the operation of an Instrument of Cognition), so would the cognition of the Object of Cognition also."

" If another Instrument of Cognition is not operative in the cognition of Perception etc., then there should be no operation of any Instrument of Cognition in the cognition of the Soul and other Objects of Cognition;* as the two cases are exactly alike."

The answer to this is that this would mean the total abolition of all Instruments of Cognition;—this is what is explained in the following Sūtra:—

* आत्माद्युपलब्धावपि is the correct reading as found in the Puri Mss.

Sūtra 19

Not so; as the apprehension of the Instruments of Cognition is similar to that of lamp-light.

BHĀṢYA

Lamp-light, being an aid to the act of Perception, is a *Pramāṇa*, an Instrument of Cognition, in the seeing of the visible object: [when *f.i.*, the object is seen with the help of the lamp-light]; and yet it is itself also cognised by the instrumentality of another *Perception*, through its contact with the Eye [when, *f.i.*, the lamp-light is itself seen];—similarly, knowing the fact that the presence and absence of *seeing* is in accordance with the presence and absence of the lamp, this lamp is *inferred* as the cause of the seeing (of itself as also of other objects) [where the lamp-light is cognised by means of *Inference**]; similarly, when we hear the words 'fetch a lamp in the dark,' we cognise the *lamp* by means of Words. [Just as in the case of lamplight, we find that though it is itself an Instrument of Cognition, it is yet cognised by means of Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition],—in the same manner Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition also would be cognised by means of Perception, etc. [and not by other Instruments of Cognition]. For instance, in the case of Perception [in which there are the following factors—(*a*) the sense-organs, (*b*) the objects perceived, (*c*) the sense-object contact, and (*d*) the cognition produced by this sense-object contact] we find,—(*a*) that the sense-organs are cognised by means of Inference based on the fact of their respective objects being duly apprehended [the inference being in the form—'the sense-organ of the Eye exists, because we have cognition of *Colour*, which could not be possible except by means of the Visual Organ, and so on];—(*b*) that the Objects are cognised by the Perception itself,—(*c*) that the sense-object contacts are cognised by means of Inference based upon obstruction.† [This

* That is, the fact of the Lamp-light being the cause of the seeing is inferred.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The reading of this passage is doubtful; the Viz. text reads सन्निकर्षास्त्वावरणेन; the Puri MS. A reads सन्निकर्षात्स्वावरणेन; and Puri MS. B reads सन्निकर्षात्स्यावरणेन. The two latter do not give any sense. We have therefore adopted the reading of the Viz. text.

inference being in the form, 'the Perception must be due to actual contact of the object with the sense-organ, because we find that there is absence of Perception whenever sense-object contact is absent by reason of obstructions to such contact']; *—(*d*) that the Cognition is produced by the sense-object contact is apprehended,† just like pleasure, etc., through its inherence in the Soul as accompanied by a peculiar contact of the Mind with the cognising Soul (as encased in the bodily membrane).§ Similarly may every other Instrument of Cognition be analysed [and found to have several factors apprehended by means of one or the other of the four ordinary Instruments of Cognition].

Thus then, [the meaning of the Sūtra is that] in the case of the lamp-light it is found that while it is itself visible (*object* of vision), it is also the *means* of the seeing of other visible things, and thus it comes to be called the 'object,' or the 'means' of *Cognition*, according to circumstances; similarly any other thing, though an *object* of Cognition, may also be the *means* of the Cognition (of something else), and thus come to be called the 'object' or the 'means' of Cognition, according to circumstances. So that the Cognition of Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition also is actually found to be brought about, *not* by a

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* The Eye and all its auxiliaries being present, if it is found that there is no *seeing*, and it is also found that the range of vision is obstructed by a wall which is actually seen to intervene between the Eye and the Object sought to be seen, and again it is found that when the wall is not there the Object is seen all right,—these facts lead to the conclusion that in every case of *seeing* there is actual contact of the Object with the sense-organ. The *Bhāṣyacandra* formulates the *inferences* as follows:—(1) 'The Wall is actually in contact with the Eye, because it is *seen*,—what is not in contact with the Eye is not seen, as we find in the case of things hidden behind the wall';—(2) 'the Eye is in contact with the wall, because it is the instrument bringing about the perception of the wall,—whenever an organ is instrumental in bringing about the perception of a thing, it is in contact with the thing, as we find in the case of the organ of Touch;—(3) 'Sense-organs must be in contact with the Object because they are instruments, like the Axe', and so on.

† That is *perceived*—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* takes संयोगविशेषात् as meaning संयोगविशिष्टात् and as qualifying आत्मसमवायात्; and the last च in the sense of emphasis only.

different set of Instruments of Cognition, nor entirely without the aid of all instrumentality.

The Opponent might urge that—"there can be no apprehension of a thing by itself"; but our answer to this will be that the argument is not right, as the things are really different from one another, and they are only similar in character. What the Opponent means to urge is that—"it is not right to hold that Perception etc. are apprehended by means of Perception etc. themselves, for a thing is always apprehended by means of something other than itself";—but this argument is not right: as in reality there *is* difference among the individual things, which however are possessed of a similar character (by virtue of which they have a common name); so that (in the case in question, it is found that) the character of 'Perception' belongs to, and includes, several individuals (i.e. particular perceptions); and among these one individual (Perception) could well be apprehended by means of another individual (Perception); and in this there could be no incongruity;—similarly in the case of Inference and the other Instruments of Cognition;—(to take a homely instance) we find that by means of the water brought out (of the well) we have the cognition (inferential) of water in the well itself [where we have the apprehension of *water* by means of *water* itself]. The same we find to be the case with the Cognising Soul and Mind: When we have such cognitions as 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy', we find that the cogniser (the Soul) is apprehended by himself; and in the case of Mind also we find that it has been declared that 'the non-simultaneity of cognitions is an indicative of the Mind' (Sū. 1-1-16), which means that the inference of the Mind is brought about by means of the Mind itself;—so that there is non-difference between the *cogniser* and the *cognised* (in the case of the Soul), and between the *means* of apprehension and *object** of apprehension (in the case of the Mind).

* The Viz. text reads ग्राहकस्य which is evidently wrong; the Puri MSS. read ग्राह्यस्य; and this has the support of the *Tātparya* also; which has the following observations on this paragraph of the *Bhāṣya*—It is not quite right to speak of the Soul as the *objective* of the action of *cognition*; for the *objective* is that which bears on itself the action of something other than itself; the real objective of the cognition 'I am happy' is the *happi-*

The Opponent might urge that in the cases cited the auxiliary conditions are different; but our answer to this will be that so it is also in the case of Perception etc. It is true that in the case of the cognising Soul, the Soul does not cognise itself (i.e. becomes the *object* of cognition) except under conditions different (from those under which it is the *cogniser*),—similarly the Mind also is apprehended by means of the Mind under entirely different conditions; but precisely the same is the case with Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition; for when Perception etc. are apprehended by means of Perception etc. themselves, we are cognisant of total difference between the two* individual perceptions (the Perception cognised and the Perception by means of which it is cognised).

Then again, there is no possibility of there being anything that cannot be apprehended by Perception etc. If there were any such thing as is not apprehended by Perception and the other three Instruments of Cognition, then there might be some ground for the postulating of additional Instruments of Cognition; but as a matter of fact no one can point out any such thing; for the simple reason that everything, existing as well as non-existing,† is actually found to be apprehended by Perception etc.,—as we find to be the case in ordinary experience.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Some people have taken up the example (cited in the preceding Sūtra) by itself, quite detached from any reasonings,—*i.e.* as proving the conclusion (that Pramāṇas are self-illumined) by itself, without reference to any particular reasoning; and they have interpreted the Sūtra to mean that—'just as the lamp-light is seen without the light of any other lamp, so also are the

ness, and the Soul only figures in the cognition as the illumining factor. The Mind is certainly an *instrument* in the cognition of itself and is also the *object*; yet this does not involve the incongruity of a thing operating upon itself; because it is by its own *existence* that the Mind is the *instrument* of its own *cognition*; and certainly the *existence* of the Mind is something entirely different from the *Cognition* of the Mind.

* The Viz. text wrongly retains the न; all MSS. including the two Puri MSS. have dropped it. The *Bhāṣyacandra* also has no न.

† How the non-existent thing forms the object of Pramāṇas has been shown in the introductory *Bhāṣya*.

Pramāṇas apprehended without other Pramāṇas'.* But such an argument—

Sūtra 20

Cannot be conclusive ; as in the case of certain things we find that other instruments are inoperative, while in others it is found that they are not inoperative.

BHĀṢYA

(A) The said fact (of independence of other Pramāṇas), which is deduced from the absence of operation (of other lamps in the case of the lamp illumining things by its light), has been urged (by the writers referred to) with a view to prove similar independence in the case of the Instruments of Cognition ;—but the same fact might be urged (with equal reasonableness) to prove similar independence in the case of the Objects of Cognition also ; as there is nothing to distinguish this latter case from the former [*i.e.* just as it is argued, from the case of the lamp being independent of another lamp, that Pramāṇas are independent of other Pramāṇas, so may it also be argued, that Prameyas also are independent of Pramāṇas,—which would mean that Pramāṇas are not necessary for anything].—(B) Further, it may be argued that so far as the cognition of the *objects of cognition* is concerned, it is found that for the apprehension of such things as the colour of a Dish and the like, one does require the operation of such aids as the light of a lamp [so that the example of the *lamp* proves the necessity of such aids in the case of the cognition of *objects of cognition*] : and the same might be said in regard to the cognition of the Pramāṇas also, whose case does not differ from the former case. [The argument would be that, just as in the case of the apprehension of *objects of cognition* such aids as lamp-light &c. are necessary, so in the case of the apprehension of the Pramāṇas also, such other aids would be necessary]—.† [Thus then, the example of the Lamp as interpreted by the said writers being

* This is the argument propounded by those who regard all Pramāṇas to be *self-illumined*—*i.e.* the Vedāntins and *Mīmāṁsakas*.

† According to the *Bhāṣyacandra* the meaning of this passage is as follows :—The *colour of the Dish* is perceptible by itself, and yet for being *illumined* it requires the aid of the Lamp-light ; so the Pramāṇas also, even though they may be self-illuminated, may stand in need of other Pramāṇas.

found to support both views—unless the said example is taken in reference to a particular reasoning (as we have taken it), there could be no justification for accepting its force in one case and not in the other; as there is no reason why the force of the Example should be admitted in one case and not in the other.

*On the other hand, if the Example (of the lamp) is taken in reference to a particular reasoning (as we have taken it), it is found to point to a single conclusion, and as such it is not open to the objection just mentioned.** That is to say, when the example is taken as bearing upon a particular reasoning, it is found to point to a single conclusion (that one Instrument of Cognition is independent of other Instruments of Cognition); and under the circumstances, the Opponent cannot very well refuse to accept its force.† Such being the case, this interpretation is not open to the objection that the Example is not conclusive.

"But if Perception &c. were apprehended by other Perception &c., then there would be an infinite regress." Not so, we reply; as all usage could be rightly explained on the basis of the distinction that the said Perception &c., are apprehended (in one case) as the *objects* cognised and (in another case) as the *instruments* of the cognition. For instance, when we have such notions as 'I cognise the thing *by means of Perception*', 'I cognise the thing *by means of Inference*', Perception &c. are cognised as the *instruments* of cognition; and when we have such notions as 'this cognition of mine (which I now cognise) is perceptional', 'this cognition is inferential', 'this cognition is verbal', Perception &c., appear as the *objects* of cognition;—so that when we actually recognise them thus (differently in the two cases), it becomes possible for us to carry on all business for the purpose of acquiring merit, prosperity, happiness and Final Release, and also for the purpose avoiding the contraries of these. And as all business and usage can be explained on the basis of the said distinction, there is nothing to be accomplished by the infinite regress, for the accomplishment of which it would be necessary to postulate the said infinite regress (of Perception &c.).

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* reads this as Sūtra.

† 'ज्ञातुम्' of the Viz. text is wrong. The Puri MSS. and the *Bhāṣyacandra* support the reading अननुज्ञातुम्.

SECTION (3)

Detailed Examination of Perception.

Sūtras 21–33

BHĀṢYA

The Pramāṇas have been examined in a general way: They are now going to be examined in detail.

Sūtra 21

Pūrvapakṣa :—"**The statement of the Cause (in Sū. 1.1.4) of Sense-Perception is untenable, as it is an incomplete Statement.**"

BHĀṢYA

"That is to say, another cause (of Perception)—the contact of the Mind with the Soul—has not been mentioned."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Pūrvapakṣa (continued)—" As a general rule, unless an object is in contact with something, there cannot be produced in it any such quality as can be produced by contact;—and we know that the quality of 'Cognition' is produced in the Soul;—so the conclusion is that the contact of this Soul with the Mind is a cause of that Cognition. Then as regards the Sense-Mind contact, if the cause of Cognition consisted in Sense-object contact, independently of the Sense-Mind contact, it would be possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously; and (since this is impossible: vide Sū. 1 1–15) therefore Sense-Mind contact also should be regarded as a cause of Perception."

What has been just said constitutes the anticipated Bhāṣya on the next Sūtra.

Sūtra 22

"**Perception cannot be brought about unless there is contact of the Soul and of the Mind. (Hence of the contact of these should have been mentioned in the Sūtra 1.1.4)**.

" Just as no Perception is brought about until there is contact of the Sense and the Object, so also no Perception is brought about unless there is contact of the Soul and of the Sense-organ. (Hence this latter also should be mentioned among the 'Cause of Perception')."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Pūrvapakṣa having been stated, and the trend of the Siddhānta having been already indicated in Sū. 1–1–4, an interested outsider, listening to the discussion, says]—"These people assert that because Cognition is found to appear when there is sense-object contact, this latter should be regard as the *cause* of that Cognition; but if this reasoning were true—

Sūtra 23

"The same might be said of Space, Place, Time and Ākās'a also"—

BHĀṢYA

"As a matter of fact, Cognition appears only when Space, &c. are present; so that these also should be *causes* of Perception. [If not, then the contact of the Mind and Soul, Mind and Sense, or Sense and Object, need not be regarded as the 'cause' of Perception]."

(The answer to the above reasoning of the Outsider is as follows)—

Even if Space &c., are not regarded as the 'cause' of Perception, Cognition would appear during their existence, for the simple reason that the proximity or duration of Space &c., is unavoidable. That is to say, even though Space &c., may not be regarded as 'cause' in the appearance of Cognition yet it need not be denied that whenever the Cognition appears it must appear while Space &c., are present; as the duration of Space &c. can never be avoided (being as they are eternal and omnipresent). [But their existence at the time does not make them causes]. Such being the case, it would behove you to point out the reason by virtue of which you could say—'for this reason Space &c. should be regarded as causes of Cognition'.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The side-objection of the Outsider having been disposed of the Pūrvapakṣin turns towards the Siddhāntin)—"Under the circumstances (there being reasons for regarding the Contact of the embodied Soul, the Mind, the Sense-organ and the Object, as the cause of Perception), the Mind-Soul Contact should be mentioned (under Sū. 1–1–4)."

In answer to this, we have the following Sūtra—

Sūtra 24

Cognition forming the characteristic feature of the Soul, there can be no non-inclusion of it.

BHĀṢYA

Cognition is a characteristic feature of the Soul, because it is its quality; and (as has been said above, unless an object is in contact with something, there cannot be produced in it any such quality as can be produced by Contact. (Which shows that Soul-Contact is essential).

Sūtra 25

Nor (is there a non-inclusion) of the Mind, as the non-simultaneity of Cognitions is indicative of it.

BHĀṢYA

The 'non-inclusion' of the preceding Sūtra is to be construed here also. It having been already declared (under Sū. 1-1-16) that the non-simultaneity of cognitions is indicative of the Mind, it follows from this that when cognition is brought about by *Sense-object contact*, the latter is dependent upon (and helped by) the *contact of Mind.*

Sūtra 26

(The Final Siddhānta)

Inasmuch as it is only the contact of the Sense-organ and the Object that forms the (distinctive) Cause (or feature) of Perception, it has been mentioned (in the Sūtra) by means of words directly expressing it.

BHĀṢYA

(The question now arises—"Just as Mind-contact is not mentioned directly because it is indirectly implied, in the same manner, the Sense-object contact is also implied; and as such why should this be mentioned?"—The answer is given in the Sūtra, as follows)—The contact of the Mind and of the Soul is the (common) cause of Perception, as well as Inferential, Analogical and Verbal Cognitions; while the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object is the distinctive cause of *Perception only*; thus the two do not stand on the same footing; and being thus differently circumstanced from the other contacts, the Sense-object contact has been directly mentioned in the Sūtra.

Sūtra 27

Also because, in the case of persons whose Mind is asleep or preoccupied, (Perception is held to be) brought about by means of the contact of the Sense-organ and Object (only).

BHĀṢYA

We have (in the definition of 'Perception') the mention of the Sense-object contact, and not that of Mind-Soul contact, also because &c. &c. (A) Sometimes a man goes to sleep after having determined that he would wake up at a certain time,--and by force of this determination (which gives rise to the effort necessary for bringing about the requisite Mind-Soul Contact) he wakes up at that time; but sometimes it happens that during sleep he is awakened either by a very loud sound or by a forcible shaking; and in these cases the waking Cognition (of Sound and Touch) by the sleeping man is brought about (primarily) by the Contact of the Sense-organ: so that predominance belongs, not to the contact of either the Cognising Soul or the Mind, but to the Contact of the Object with the Sense-organ; because in such cases there is no *desire to know* on the part of the Soul, to give rise to its effort which could urge the Mind and bring it into Contact with it (and it is only when this happens that Mind-Soul contact is possible).

(B) In other cases what ordinarily happens is that when the man, though having his Mind entirely occupied with the Cognition of one thing, *desires* to cognise (think of) another thing, there appears his effort, which brings about the contact of his Mind with that thing, of which he then becomes duly cognisant (and in this case we have the Contact of the Mind and of the Soul also). Now in the case in which the man having his Mind entirely preoccupied, there appears in him a Cognition brought about by the forcible, sudden impact of the Object, without any *desire to cognise* or *mental effort* on his part,—the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object is the principal cause of the Cognition; as in this case there is no *desire to cognise* on the part of the man, and hence no *effort*, which could urge the Mind (into Contact with the undesirable object). And because it is the principal cause, it is the Sense-object contact that should be mentioned (in the definition of

Perception), and not the Mind-Soul contact, which is only a subordinate factor.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

There is another reason for regarding the Sense-object contact as the predominant factor.

Sūtra 28

And also because Individual Cognitions are named after these.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact we find that individual cognitions are named after the Sense-organs and the Objects concerned. "How so?"

For instance (*a*) when one smells with the olfactory organ, his Cognition is called '*olfactory* Cognition' and 'Cognition of *smell*;' (*b*) when he sees with the Visual-organ the Cognition is called '*visual* Cognition' and Cognition of '*colour*'; (*c*) when he tastes with the Gestatory organ, the Cognition is called '*gestatory* Cognition' and 'Cognition of *taste*.' Further, Perception is held to be of five kinds, simply because of the number of Sense-organs and that of perceptible objects being each five-fold. And all this goes to prove that in the bringing about of Perception, the Sense-object contact is the principal cause.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Opponent says:—"It has been urged by the Siddhāntin (in Sū. 26) that the mention of *Sense-object Contact* is necessary, not that of the Mind-soul Contact, because in the case of the man whose mind is asleep or pre-occupied, Perception is brought about by the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object (only). But this—

Sūtra 29

"Is not a sound reasoning, as it involves self-contradiction."

BHĀṢYA

"If you do not accept Mind-soul contact to be the cause of any Perception, this would be contradictory to what has been said before (in Sū. 1-1-16) to the effect that *the non-simultaneity of*

cognitions is indicative of the Mind; as in accordance with this latter statement, it is clear that Sense-object contact stands in need of Mind-contact; for if Mind-contact were not necessary, it would be possible for (all five) cognitions to appear simultaneously. If, on the other hand, with a view to avoid this self-contradiction, it be held that of all cognitions the contact of the Mind and the Soul is the cause, then our objection remains in force,—that being the cause of cognitions, the Mind-Soul contact should be mentioned (in the definition of Perception)."

Sūtra 30

There is no self-contradiction; as the case we have cited is due to the special force of a particular object.

BHĀṢYA

The answer to the Pūrvapakṣa argument (in Sū. 28, is as follows)—Our view does not involve a self-contradiction; for we do not deny that Mind-Soul contact is *a cause* of perception;—all that we mean is that Sense-object contact is *the principal cause*. (As for the instance that has been cited by us in Sū. 26)—in the case of the man whose Mind is asleep or preoccupied, the cognition that appears sometimes is entirely 'due to the force of the particular object'; the term 'particular object' denotes a certain object of sense-perception; its 'force' stands for '*tīvratā*', *intensity*, and '*paṭutā*', its vigour; and this 'force of the object' affects the Sense-object contact, and not the Mind-soul contact; which shows that Sense-object contact is the more important of the two.

(An objection is raised)—"In the case where the Mind of the man being asleep or pre-occupied, though there is no effort and no desire on his part, the cognition that arises from the Sense-object contact, must also have Mind-contact for its cause (even though a subordinate one);—now it behoves you to explain to what this action of the Mind is due?"

(The answer to the above is as follows)—Just as (in a case of ordinary cognition) what urges the Mind forward (to contact) is only that particular quality of the Soul which is called 'effort', and which is brought about by that cognitive Soul's Desire,—so, in all cases, what brings about the experience of the Soul is that

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THE DATE OF UMĀPATI'S PAUṢKARA-BHĀṢYA

(B. N. Krishnamurti Śarma)

On p. 77 of his *S'ivādvaita of S'rīkaṇṭha* (University of Madras, 1930), Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri has the following, on the question of the date of Umāpati S'ivācārya, author of the *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya*[1] :—

"The introductory verses and the colophon to the *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya* make out that the commentary is the work of Umāpati S'ivācārya, presumably the one who wrote the *Samkarpanirākaraṇam* in 1313 A.D. ... ..." (p. 77) " Śrīkanṭha is unambiguously referred to by (this) Umāpati " (p. 32). Prof. Sastri inclines to the view that Śrīkaṇṭha was a close contemporary of Rāmānuja (1019–1139) and relies *inter alia* upon the references to Śrīkaṇṭha in Umāpatı's work for his rather early date for Śrīkaṇṭha.

Unfortunately, however, the evidence of the *Pauṣkara-Bhāṣya* does not seem to be capable of carrying us very far in settling the date of Śrīkaṇṭha. The commentary itself is *not* in the first place, a dated one. The identity of its author with "the one who wrote the *Samkarpanirākaraṇam* in 1313 A.D. " is at best a pious assumption for which there is not sufficient warrant. It is disproved by the fact that the *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya* quotes (as pointed out by Prof. Sastri himself), from the *Nyāyāmṛta* of Vyāsarāya (1478–1539).

Now as regards this "reference to a Mādhva work named *Nyāyāmṛta* " in the *P. B.*, Prof. Sastri has envisaged three possibilities :—that (1) " there *may* have been a different and earlier Mādhva work of the same name" ; (2) or " the reference to the *Nyāyāmṛta may have been a later interpolation*" ;

1. Grantha Edn. 1925 (Chidambaram).

or (3) that "the *P.B.* may not be (*that* ?) Umāpati's work at all.'' [Italics mine.]

It does *not* at all seem "difficult to decide among these (alternative) at present." There is only *one* *Nyāyāmṛta* in the whole of Dvaita Vedānta literature, and that is by Vyāsarāya. No other work of the same name has come down to us nor is known to have been written. No useful purpose would be served by identifying the work mentioned by the *P. B.* with the *Nyāyasudhā* of Jayatīrtha (1365–88) as the chronological difficulty would still be there and the verse quoted by Umāpati is nowhere to be found in the NS. Nor could any Mādhva work of the name of *Nyāyāmṛta*, have been written before 1313 (the date of the author of the *Saṃkarpanirākaraṇam* who is believed by Prof. Sastri, to be identical with the author of the *P. B.*), for the very simple reason that Madhva himself was alive at the time and among all his 37 works there is none named *Nyāyāmṛta* ; nor is any one of that name known to have been composed by his immediate disciples.

Prof. Sastri does not seem to have taken the trouble to verify the 'reference to the *Nyāyāmṛta*' in the *P. B.* Had he done so, he would have lighted upon a more interesting and at the same time intriguing fact that the *P.B.* is by no means exact in its quotation from the *Nym.* The passage is actually misquoted[1] :—

इदमेव ह्यसत्त्वमिति माध्वाः । तदुक्तं न्यायामृते–
'त्रिकालसर्वदेशीयनिषेधप्रतियोगिता ।
असत्ता प्रोच्यतेऽध्यस्ते; तुच्छे तु प्रतियोगिनि' ।। इति

It would appear from the above that the passage in the *Nym.* is concerned primarily with the definition of Asat (असत्) propounded by the Dvaitin. But the context in which the passage corresponding to the one quoted in the *P.B.* occurs in the original *Nym.* of Vyāsarāya is that of (स्वपक्षे सत्त्वनिरुक्ति) (Par. i, 9). Naturally then, the Kārikā given by Vyāsarāya, first sums up what on the Dvaitin's view constitutes सत्ता (reality) and incidentally hints at the nature of unreality in अध्यस्त and तुच्छ । सौहार्दं तु :—

1. We cannot say that the author of the *Nym.* himself is adapting his verse from an earlier source ; for he gives it as his own Kārikā—"सौहार्दं तु ....".

'त्रिकालसर्वदेशीयनिषेधाप्रतियोगिता ।
सत्त्वोच्यते; अध्यस्ततुच्छे तं प्रति प्रतियोगिनी ।। '

This kārikā is explained by Vyāsarāya himself as follows :—

(1) सर्वदेशकालसम्बन्धिनिषेधाप्रतियोगित्वं सत्त्वम् ।

(2) तुच्छमध्यस्तं च, उक्तप्रतिषेधप्रतियोगि ।। (P. 96, Bby. Edn.)

It would be obvious from the above that the only correct reading of the passage from the *Nym.* is as immediately above, and that either the author of the *P. B.* has misquoted from the *Nym.* or some corruption has crept into his text, due to ignorance. In any case the last quarter : "तुच्छे तु प्रतियोगिनि" in the *P.B.* makes no sense. That there is no variant reading of the verse : "त्रिकालसवदेशीय" ... is clear not only from the evidence of Mss. of the *Nym.* but also of the explanation given by Vyāsarāya himself and his commentators.

One may save the reputation of the author of the *P. B.* by dismissing the entire quotation. "त्रिकाल सर्वदेशीय......" as a later interpolation ; but such a procedure does not seem to be justifiable. For, the author of the P. B. is clearly interested in examining the Doctrine of Error propounded by the various schools of philosophy current in his times and in *that* connection reviews the position taken up by the Naiyāyikas, the Advaitins, the Rāmānujīyas and the Mādhvas (pp. 518–19). And in the course of such an examination, he states and refutes the position of Madhva also :—

" ननु, "अस्त्वेवं शुक्तौ रजतविशिष्टज्ञानम् । तथापि, तत्र प्रतीयमानं रजतमत्यन्तासदेव । असदेव रजतमिति प्रतीतेः । तत्र नासीद्रजतं, नास्ति, न भविष्यति च" इति त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वावगमाच्च । इदमेवह्यसत्त्वम् इति माध्वाः ।

तदुक्तं न्यायामृते:—

* त्रिकालसर्वदेशीयनिषेधप्रतियोगिता ।
असत्ता प्रोच्यतेऽध्यस्ते तुच्छे तु प्रतियोगिनि ।। इति*
तन्न । असतः अपरोक्षतया प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः ...... ।
.... ।।" (P. 519).

It would be absurd to say that in this lengthy statement of the पूर्वपक्ष, *only* the reference to and quotation from the *Nyāyāmṛta* is an interpolation. Such a view is clearly one-sided and flimsy.

The polemical style also of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, is that of the 15th and 16th century Dialectics, and the reference to the views of "the Rāmānujīyas" and more notably of "the Mādhvas" (p. 519), is a further corroboration of the comparative lateness of the *P. B.* (probably 1600 A.D.)

The terms रामानुजीयाः and माध्वाः could not have become current coin in philosophical writings so early as 1313 when the author of the *P. B.* is supposed to have flourished. This impossibility is still greater in the case of Madhva, who himself lived between 1238-1317[1] and the term "माध्व" could not have found currency in the writings of his compeers within the Ācārya's own lifetime. Even Mādhavācārya who wrote his *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha* with less than a century after Ānandatirtha, has not used it.

For these reasons we are forced to conclude that the *Pauṣkara-Bhāṣya* is the work of a later Umāpati Śivācārya, (*different* from the author of the *Sankarpanirākaraṇa*) who came *after* Vyāsa-rāya of *Nyāyāmṛta* fame, and lived probably about the close of the XVI century which explains why the *P.B.* has *not* been cited by the commentator on the *Aghora S'iva Paddhati*. There would thus appear to be *a mistake of nearly three centuries* in Prof. Sastri's dating of the *Pauṣkara-Bhāsya*.

1. See my papers on the Date of Madhva in the Annamali University Journal.

SOME UNPUBLISHED INSCRIPTIONS OF THE CHAULUKYAS OF GUJARĀT

(D. B. Diskalkar)

(*Continued from the fifth issue*)

(20)

ABU VIMALA-VASAHI INSCRIPTION OF SĀRANGADEVA OF V. S. 1350

This inscripcion[1] is engraved on a stone slab fixed in one of the walls of the Vimala-vasahi temple on the Mount Abu. The inscribed portion measures 2′ in length and 1′. 2½″ in height and contains 24 lines of writing, which is very well preserved. The *language* is *Sanskrit* but there are a number of words of local use used in the record, the meaning of which is difficult to be understood. The *characters* are *Nāgarī*. The writing is full of mistakes, both the writer and the engraver having done their work very carelessly. Except the three usual imprecatory verses in ll. 18-20 the record is in prose throughout. As regards *orthography* the following are some of the points that require to be noted : The letters *v* and *b* are generally expressed in the same way. A consonant is doubled in a few places after *r*. The letter *d* has its half circular part turned to the right as in ancient times instead of to the left as is the practice of to-day. Thus the letter *drā* exactly resembles our modern letter ś (श). The forms *dya* and *dva* cannot be always distinguished.

The record opens with the date, Tuesday, the 1st of the bright half of Māgha of (Vikrama) Saṁvat 1350 and refers itself to the reign of Sāraṅgadēva, the Chaulukya sovereign ruling at *Aṇahillapāṭaka*. He bears here a number of epithets expressive of his imperial power, one of which signifies that he had a successful war against the ruler of Mālava. His defeat of the Mālavas is referred to in many of his inscriptions. An interesting epithet Abhinava Siddharāja meaning that he was a new or second Siddharāja, a powerful ancestor of his, is found as used with Sāraṅgadēva[2] only in this inscription, though eight more

1. See *Asiatic Researches* Vol. XVI 311.

2. With the Chaulukya sovereign, Vīsaladēva, however, this epithet is at least twice used. See Ind. Ant. Vol. VI, p. 210 and Vol. XI, p. 102, and once with Jayantasiṁha, *ibid*, Vol. VI, p. 197.

inscriptions of his have been discovered. The name of Sāraṅgadēva's prime minister Vādhūya is next given. The name Mahārājakula Śrī Vīsaladēva is mentioned next who was ruling at Chandrāvatī, as a feudatory of Sāraṅgadēva over the province of 1800 villages (अष्टादशशतमंडले). Then the object of the inscription viz. the issuing of a grant by Vīsaladēva is mentioned, with the repetition of the above mentioned date. At the request of Hēmachandra and several other gentlemen (*Mahājanas*) Vīsaladēva issued a grant by which several traders and merchants were to pay a certain number of *Drammas* for the expenses of the two (Jain) temples Vimalavasahi and Tejapalavasahi on the Abu hill and of the fairs like Kalyāṇaka. This rule was obligatory to the subjects of Abu and Chandrāvatī. The State officers of Abu and Chandrāvatī, (on the other hand,) were in no case to demand any tax from the pilgrims to the temples. If any article of a pilgrim getting up or down the hill is stolen away the loss should be made up by the Thākurs of Abu.[1] These conditions it is stated should be observed by the descendants of the king and by other kings ruling over the place. Then the usual imprecatory verses are given. The grant was written by Parikha *Pēthaka* son of *Jayatasiṁha*. In the last two lines, engraved rather separately from the main inscription, the names of representatives of the Achalēśvara temple, Vaśishṭha temple, Ambāji's temple and of several leading gentlemen of the town are given who bore witness to the deed. The figure of a dagger significant of that is engraved in the left-hand corner.

Vīsaladēva, the Maṇḍalēśvara of Chandrāvatī may be a scion of the Chaulukya family of Gujarat. The latest ruler of the Paramāra family of Chandrāvati we know of was Pratāpasiṁha, whose inscription dated V. S. 1344 is found in the temple of Pāṭanārāyaṇa at Girvāḍ in the Sirohi State[2] and who is said there to be ruling as a subordinate of Vīsaladeva, son of Bhādadeva. It seems that Vīsaladeva, who was a governor of the Chaulukya sovereign Sārangadeva over the province ended the Paramāra family and began to rule in the place as a feudatory of the

1. With this compare the obligatory rule laid down by Kautalya in his Arthaśāstra, on a ruler to compensate the cost of an article stolen away in his kingdom and which cannot be traced by the police officers of his state.

2. Ind. Ant. Vol. XLV, p. 77.

Chaulukyas. An unpublished inscription[1] of V. S. 1356 from the village Varmāṇa, in the same State, speaks of a ruler named Mahārājakula Vikramasiṁha, who may have been the successor of Mahārājakula Vīsaladēva of our record.

The Christian date corresponding to the one given in our record is Wednesday, the 30th December 1293 A.D. The week-day given in our record is Tuesday while by calculation we find that on the tithi given the week-day was Wednesday. This discrepancy can be explained as in No. VII above.

TEXT[2]

१. ओं[3] ॥ संवत् १३५० वर्षे माघ सुदि १ भौमेऽद्येह श्रीमदणहिल्लपाटकाधिष्टि
(ष्ठि)तपरमेस्व(श्व)रपरमभट्टारकउमापतिवरलब्धप्रौढप्रतावा(पा)क्रांतदि

२. क्चक्रपा(वा)लक्ष्मापालमालवेशविरुथ[4]नीगजघटाकुंभस्थलविदारणैकपंचानन
समत्त(स्त)राजावलीसमलंकृत अभिनवसिद्धराजमहारा

३. जाधिराजश्रीश्रीमत्सारंगदेवकल्याणविजयराज्ये तत्पादपद्मोपजीव(वि)नि
महामात्यश्रीवाधूये=श्रीश्रीकरणादिसमस्तमुद्राव्यापारान् परि

४. पंथयति सतीत्येवं काले प्रवत्त(र्त्त)माने अस्यैव परमप्रभो[:*]प्रसादपत्तलायां
भुज्यमानअप्टा(ष्टा)दशशतमंडले महाराजकुलश्रीवीसलदेव[: *]शा

५. सनपत्रं प्रयच्छति यथा ॥ स एव महाराजकुलश्रीवीसलदेवः संवत् १३५०
वर्षे म[ा *]घ शुदि १ भौमेऽद्येह श्रीचंद्रावत्यां ऊ(ओ)सवालज्ञातीय सा

६. धु श्रीवरदेवसुत साधु श्रीहेमचंद्रेण तथा महा० भीमा महा० सिरधर श्रे०
जगसीह श्रे० सिरपाल श्रे० गोहन श्रे० वस्ता महं० वीरपाल प्रभृति स

७. मस्तमहाजनेन भक्त्याराध्य विज्ञप्तेन श्रीअर्बुदस्योपरिसंतिष्ट(ष्ठ)मान-
वसहिकाद्वये निश्रयमाणघनतरकरं मुक्ता(क्त्वा)उद्य(?)कृतकरस्य शासनपत्रं

८. प्रयच्छति यथा ॥ यत् श्रीविमलवसहिकायां श्रीआदिनाथदेवेन श्रीमाता-
देव्या(वी)सत्क तलहडाप्रत्ययउद्यदेय द्र २८ अष्टवि(विं)शति द्रम्माः तथा
श्रीअर्बुदे

९. ष्यठकुरसेलहथतलारप्रभृतीनां कापडां प्रत्ययं उद्य (?) देय द्र १६ षोडश
द्रम्माः तथा कल्याणके अमीषां दिनद्वये दिनं प्रति देय कणह(हृ)त
१० दश दा

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1. R. B. Gaurishankar Ojha's History of Sirohi, p. 155.
2. From an impression supplied by the Supdt. Archl. Sur. W. C. Poona
3. Exprssed by a symbol.
4. Read वरूथिनी.

१०. तव्यानि। तथा महं० श्रीतेजपालवसहिकायां श्रीनेमिनाथदेवेन श्रीमातादेव्या सत्क (त्क) वर्षं प्रति=देय द्र १४ चतुर्दश द्रम्मा[:*]तथा दिनैकेन=कणहृतां
११. देय १० दश तथा श्रीअर्बुदेत्य ठकुर सेलहथतलारत्र(प्र)भृतीनां कापडां प(प्र)त्ययं देय द्र ८ अष्टौ द्रम्मा[:*]तथा प्रमदाकुलसत्क(त्क) नामां ६ षट् नामकं प्रति
१२. मल प्रत्ययं द्र ५ पंच द्रम्मा [:]...[वस्वरुद्य ?] वर्षं प्रति दातव्या[:]तथा वसहिकाद्वये पूजारकानां पार्श्वात् निस(श्र)यमाणकरो मुक्तो भणित्वा श्रीअर्बुदेत्य ठ
१३. कुरेण सेलहयतलारप्रभृतिभि[: *]किमपि न याचनीयं। न गृहीतव्यं च। अद्य दिनपूर्वं वसहिकाद्वयपार्श्वात् उपरिलिखितविधे ऊर्द्ध श्रीअर्बुदे
१४. त्य ठकुरेण सेलहथतलारप्रभृतिभिः तथा चंद्रावत्या[:*]श्रीपु(म)द्राजकुलेन महंतकसेलहथतलारडोकराप्रभृतिभि[:*] द्य (यत्) किमपि न याचनीयं न
१५. गृहीतव्यं च। अनया परयितविधिना प्रतिवर्षं वसहिकाद्वयपार्व्व(श्वा)त ग्रामठकुरप्रभृतिभि[:] गृह्यमानैः कल्याणकप्रभृतिमहोच्छवेषु समाया
१६. त समस्तसंघस्य प्रहरकतलारकप्रभृतिकं रूढ्य[।*]सर्वं करणीयं। कारापनीयं च। उपरिचटितउत्तीर्यमानसमस्तसंघमध्यात् यस्य कस्यापि कि(किं)
१७. चित् गच्छति तत्सर्वं श्रीअर्बुदेत्य ठकुरेण लोहमयं रूढ्या समार्च्चनीयं। अस्मत् वंशजैरपि अन्यैश्च भाव(वि)भोक्तृभि[:*]राजभि[:*]वसहिकाद्वये उ
१८. द्यकृतकरोयं आचंद्रार्कं यावत् अन्मं (अनुमं) तव्य[:*]पालनीयश्च। उक्तं च। भगवता व्यासेन[। *]बहुभिर्वसुधा भुक्ता राजाभिः सगराद(दि)भिः [।*]यस्य यस्य यदा
१९. भूमी(मि)स्तस्य तस्य तदा फलं। [। ११ *] वंध्याड(?) वीव्णतोया[1]षु शुष्ककोटरवाशि(सि)नः[।*]कृष्णसर्पा प्रजायंते देवदायोपहरिणः। [१२*] न विषं विषमत्याह
२०. देवस्वविषमुच्यते[।*] विषमेकाकिनं हंति देवस्वं पुत्रपौत्रकं। [१३*] एतानि स्मृतिवाक्यानि अवलोक्य अस्मुतवंशैःअन्यवंशैरपि भाविभो
२१. कृभिः अस्मत्कृत उद्यकरस्यास्य प्रतिबंद्यः(धः) कदापि न करणीव(यः)। न कारापनी[यः। *] यथा दत्वा च इदमुक्तवान् मद्वंस्या अन्यवंस्या वा थे भ
२२. विस्यंति पार्थिवा तेषामहं करलग्नो मि मम दत्तं न लुप्यता ॥ ठः जयतसीहसुत० पारि० पेथाकेन लिखित ॥ हीनाक्षरं प्रमाणमिति ॥

1. Read विंध्याटवीष्वतोयासु.

२३. महाराजकुल श्रीवीसलद्देव डू० महं सागण ॥ अत्र साक्षिण श्रीअचलेश्वरदेवीय राउ=नंदि श्रीवसिष्टदेवीय तपोध

२४. न......अंबादेवासक्त अबो० नीलकंठः । पमाणग्रामीयपंड्या० राजाप्रभृति-समस्तपञ्चार ॥ सूत्र नर......

(21)

MANGROL INSCRIPTION OF KARNA (II) OF V. S. 135+

This fragmentary inscription is found engraved on one of the four stone-pillars lying outside the Jumma Masjid, situated near the gate of the Bandar Road in Mangrol in Kāthiāwār. It has lost its lower portion, which deals with the object of the inscription.[1] Fortunately the first five lines containing important information are preserved. Above the inscribed portion is engraved the figure of a wheel with the diameter of 4¼″ of the outer circle like this. ⊕ The length of the inscribed portion is about 6½ inches and the present height is 3½ inches.

The language of the record is *Sanskrit* and the characters *Nāgarī*. The only orthographical peculiarity is that the *i* (in *iha* l. 5) is expressed by three zeroes, the lower one being stretched to the left as in older inscriptions.

The record opens with the date, Sunday (?) the seventh of the bright half of Chaitra of the year 135+ of king Vikrama. The unit figure in the date is lost. We can, however, suppose that it must be one of the figures from 3 to 9. For we have 1353 Bhādrapada Su 13 as the latest date[2] for the reign ot Karṇa's predecessor, Sāraṅgadēva and Karṇa is said in all records to have reigned upto V. S. 1360, when Gujarāt went permanently into the hands of the Muhammedans. Mr. M. P. Khareghat of Bombay has kindly calculated the date of the incription for me and he finds that the unit figure, which is lost, must be 3 and thus the Samvat of the inscription is 1353. The corresponding English date is Sunday, 31st March 1297 A.D. In none of the other years from 1354 to 1359 does Chaitra Sud 7 fall on a Sunday which is almost certain. The fifth line of the inscription mentions the viceroy of Karṇa over Saurāṣṭra but unfortunately his name which may have been given in the sixth line which is lost is not known.

1. But there even the last few letters in each line have been completely effaced, the serious loss thereby being that of the unit figure in the date.

2. In a M. S. of Naishadha Kāvya.

The present inscription coming from Mangrol speaks that Karṇa had kept on his hold over the distant part of his Gujarāt empire which is another reason for assigning it an earlier date than that of the Muhammedan invasion. Only one more inscription of the king of V. S. 1354 from the Idar State is known to us.

We know that a large number of masjids in India have been built by the victorious Muhammedans either by demolishing Hindu temples and utilizing the material for their use or by partially destroying them and transforming them into masjids. The Jumma Masjid of Mangrol where the present inscription was found is no doubt built by the materials of the Hindu temple to which the inscription in question was attached.

TEXT[1]

१. ओं[2] ॥ [स्वस्ति]श्रीनृपविक्रमसं १३५+
२. वर्षे चैत्र शुदि ७ [रवाव]द्येह श्री[मद]
३. णहिलपत्तनाधिष्टि(ष्ठि)त [अभिनव ?]
४. श्रीकर्णदेवकल्याणविज[य राज्ये]
५. इह श्रीसुराष्ट्रां[3]मंडले क......
६. ....श्री...............

[*To be continued*]

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1. From an impression in the possession of Mr. A. B. Jani of the Gujarati Press, Bombay.

2. Expressed by a symbol.

3. Read सुराष्ट्रमंडले.

OTHER INSUFFICIENTLY KNOWN OR UNDATABLE AUTHORS AND ANONYMOUS WORKS IN DVAITA LITERATURE

(B. N. Krishnamurti Śarma, M.A.)

1. Vedagarbha Padmanābhācārya (c. 18th century)

To Vedagarbha Padmanābhācārya, we owe an excellent manual of Dvaita Theology and Metaphysics[1] in 5000 granthas. The work together with the author's own commentary[2] is a veritable encyclopædia of doctrine and theology, written in the traditional manner of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Schoolmen, giving numerous quotations from the standard works of the system including the originals used by Madhva as well as his own and those of his commentators like Jayatīrtha and Vyāsarāya. It is a very good and reliable reference-book and could safely be recommended to students approaching the subject of Madhva's system from without. It is in many ways analogous to the *Yatīndramatadīpikā* of Rāmānuja's system and deserves to be translated into English.

It opens with the enumeration of the ten categories recognised in the system of Madhva and these are expounded in the course of the following sections :—

1. पदार्थनिरूपणम्	4. सृष्टिस्थित्यादिनिरूपणम्
2. द्रव्यनिरूपणम्	5. मोक्षसाधनप्रकरणम्
3. गुणनिरूपणम्	6. मोक्षस्वरूपप्रकरणम्

The *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyārthamañjari* is one of the works recently acquired by the Madras O. L. and composed by Nārāyaṇa a member of the Veda-garbha family.

2. *The Madhva-mantrārthamañjarī* (*m*[3]) (of Nārāyaṇācārya c. 1580–1630).

This is a work devoted to the exposition of such passages from the Ṛgveda as could be cited in support of the traditional belief in Madhva being an avatar of Vāyu. The work is com-

1. *Madhvasiddhāntasāra*. 2. Printed, Bombay 1893.
3. There is a Ms. of this work at the T. P. L. (No. 6132) as well as a paper transcript of the same. Page references here are to this latter.

monly, but quite erroneously attributed[1] to Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya of *Madhvavijaya*-fame. That it could not have been a work of Narāyāṇa Paṇḍita is clear not only from the obviously modern and polemical ring of the style[2] and arguments[3] employed, which are quite unlike those of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya as we know them from his other accredited works,—but also by the presence in it of quotations from not only the *Madhvavijaya* and work of *great antiquity* and authority (See pp. 16, 79 and 198), and references to the works of Jayatīrtha[4] and a quotation from the *Bhāgavatā-ṭīkā* of Vijayadhvaja.[5] The author gives absolutely no information about himself beyond mentioning his name as Nārāyaṇa :

इति नारायणेनेह गुरुपूजार्थमुद्धृता ।
श्रुतिकल्पतरोभूर्यात् मध्वमन्त्रार्थमञ्जरी ॥

There is a tradition identifying this Nārāyaṇa with an elder brother of Taraṅgiṇī-Rāmācārya.[6] The *Advaitakālānala* (Mys. O. L. C—1406) too, is presumably a work of the same author.

In the *Madhvamantrārthamañjarī* (granthas 2464), more than a score of ṛks have been brought together from the Ṛg Veda, to establish the identity of Madhva with Vāyu and refer to his three births (incarnations) as Hanumān, Bhīma and Madhva.

The author has also taken the trouble of showing how the texts cited by him admit at every step of three different inter-

1. *Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.*, p. 297 ; *Satkathā*, 1896, and G. V. L Cat.

2. The reference to Madhva by such terms as " भगवत्पाद ", सर्वज्ञाचार्य (p. 116) is unusual with Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya.

3. Cf. उपलभ्यते चाद्यापि सुवर्णमुखरीतीरे चन्द्रगिरिप्रान्तप्रदेशे मध्वाचार्यस्य तपोवनं एतद्देशप्रसिद्धया । (p. 16).

4. बळित्थेत्यादि सूक्तं च स्वयं भगवत्पादैर्व्याख्यातं; जयतीर्थाचार्यैश्च बहुषु स्थलेषु विवृतं तत्र तत्रैवावगन्तव्यम् ॥ p. 163.

5. एषा ऋक् भगवत्पादैर्दशमस्कन्धतात्पर्ये साल्वप्रसङ्गेऽप्युदाहृता । अतो विजयध्वजश्रीपादैः तत्परतयैव व्याख्याता । तद्यथा + + + + P. 168.

6. Cf. तस्मादाविरभूत् सुरद्रुमयशा आचार्य नारायणः ।
रामाचार्य इतीरितस्तदनुजो .... ॥
(*Nym-Taraṅgiṇī*, closing verse, *Pariccheda* iv).

pretations to suit the three[1] incarnations of Vāyu. The texts chosen by him are :—R. V. i, 140, 1—13 ; X, 54, 1—3, 4, 8—11 ; X, 5, 1 ; VII, 104, 3 ; i, 85, 7 ; and VII, 57, 1. Some of these have already been cited by Madhva himself in his *Mbh. T. N.* and other works. Nārāyaṇa rejects the views of "modern commentators" (आधुनिकभाष्यकार) like Sāyaṇa (who is quoted under the names of Mādhava and Vidyāraṇya on pp. 48 ; 93 ; 100 ; 136 ; 193–4 ; 224 ; 286 ; 296 and 29 (Mādhava), that these hymns really have reference to Agni and his triple manifestations and he plunges with skill and confidence into the labyrinth of grammatical and pseudo-grammatical explanations (प्रक्रिया), *a la* Yāska[2], in trying to equate each one of the texts cited by him with the three Avatars of Vāyu and with Vāyu himself in his original form (मूलरूप) :—

'वेदिषदे' (R. v. i, 140, 1 a) वेदिनो ज्ञानिनः देवानृषीन्वा स्यन्ति... वेदिषदः राक्षसाः। तान्द्यति खण्डयतीति वेदिषदाः, तस्मै। 'दोऽवखण्डने' इत्यस्माक्किप्। 'उपदेशेऽज...' इत्यात्वचतुर्थ्येकवचने आतोरित्यल्लोपः ॥ (p. 33).

It is interesting to note that he quotes passages also from the *Skānda* and *Vāmana Purāṇas* (वेङ्कटाद्रिमाहात्म्य)[3] in support of the view that Madhva is an Avatāra of Vāyu. These passages have also been cited by Vijayīndra Tīrtha in his *Madhvādhva-Kaṇṭakoddhāra.*

Commenting on R. V. i, 140, 2 ab, he works out some extremely fanciful details for placing the date of birth of Madhva in Kali 4320 = 1219 A.D.:—

अभि द्विजन्मा त्रिवृदन्नमृज्यते ।
संवत्सरे वावृधे जग्धमी पुनः ॥

मनुष्याब्दं हि देवानां दिनम्। ततश्च दिव्याब्दस्य मनुष्यमानेन षष्ठ्यधिक-त्रिशती तस्याः द्वादशगुणायां (360 × 12 = 4320) विंशत्यधिक त्रिचत्वारिंशत्या द्वादशाब्दावसानम्। तन्मध्येऽस्य जन्मेत्युक्तम्। तथा च [अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत 8 + 3 (त्रिवृत्) = 11] एकादशे द्वे अतीते सति दिव्यद्वादशवर्षमध्ये, इत्यर्थो लभ्यते। : कादश ' इति स्पष्टमनुक्त्वा वक्रनिर्देशः 'परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवा,...... इति ॥ (p. 64)

1. अथ वायुपक्षे......हनुमत्पक्षे (P. 73) भीमपक्षे, मध्वपक्षे च (P. 82) and 57.
2. Cf. अप्यक्षरसामान्यान्निर्ब्रूयात् ॥
3. सुवर्णमुखरीतीरे .... etc.

Even after all this verbal gymnastics, the date arrived at is twenty years in advance of the one given in the *Mbh. T. N.* (if literally interpreted) and nineteen years *less* than the date of birth fixed for Madhva on the basis of epigraphic and historical evidences viz : 1238 A.D.[1]

3. **Mādhavācārya.** *Pūrṇaprajña-darśana*, being a chapter in his *Sarvadarśana Saṃgraha* (*p*) contains a readable account of the system of Madhva by an outsider. Date 14th century.

4. **Vedāṅga Tīrtha** (1) A com. on the *Mbh. T. N.* referred to in verse 4 of Janārdana Bhāṭṭa's com. on the *Mbh. T. N.* :— [वेदाङ्गतीर्थसङ्ख्याख्यामाश्रित्य क्रियते मया] (2) *Kavikarṇāmṛta* a com. on the *Vāyustuti* (Madras O. L. R. no. 1434a) and (3) another on the *M. Vij.* (Madras D. C. 12160). Date c. 1500.

5. **Vis'vapati Tīrtha.** (1) *Saṃgraharāmāyaṇa-ṭīkā* (Madras R. no. 4103) ; (2) C. on the *Dvādaśastotra* (Pejawar Mutt Lib. no. 334 ; Tulu, palm-leaf) and (3) a gloss on Vedāṅga Tīrtha's C. on the *M. Vij.* (Madras XXI. 12161) (4) C. on *Vāyustuti* ; (5) *S'ivastuti* and (6) *Rāmaśandeśa.* Date C. 1520–50.

6. **Appayya Dīkṣita.** *Nyāyamuktāvalī*, a summary of the अधिकरणार्थ of the B. S. according to Madhva, being a part of his *Caturmatasaṃgraha* devoted to the exposition of the system of Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Śrīkaṇṭha.[2] Mss. of his *Nyāyamuktāvalī* are rare

आदावानन्दतीर्थीयामनुसृत्य मतस्थितिम् ।
न्यायमुक्तावलीं रम्यां विशदार्थां निरूप्यते ॥

(See Appendix to the edn. of the *S'ivārkamaṇidīpikā*, from Kumbakonam). Date latter half of the 16th century.

7. **Janārdana Bhaṭṭa.** (1) a com. on the *Mbh. T.N*, (Printed Belgaum) ; (2) and one on the *Pramāṇapaddhati* (Printed Dharwar). Date C. 17th century.

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1. See my papers on the Date of Madhvācārya in the Journal of the Annamalai University Vols. III and V Nos. 2 and 1 and also Dr. Saletore's *History of Tuluva*, 1936, p. 431 f. n. where agreement is expressed with my date.

2. Cf. आनन्दतीर्थमुनि-लक्ष्मणदेशिकेन्द्र-श्रीकण्ठ-योगिपदवीरदवीयसीर्नः ।
आचार्यपादसरणिं च विविच्य बोद्धुं संगृह्यते मतचतुष्टयसारलेशः ॥
(Appayya)

8. **Vedātma Tīrtha.** A c. on the *Vāyustuti* (Madras O. L R. No. 856). Date *uncertain.*

9. **Puruṣottama.** *Vādibhūṣaṇam.* A treatise refuting the thesis that bondage is unreal (*India Office Lib.* No. 6052). Author refers to Vidyādhīśa. Hence he must be later than 1630.

10. (**Anonymous**) *Tattvadīpīkā*—A criticism of the *Tattvakaustubha* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (Mys. O. L. C.—2371). Date 17th century.

11. **Ānandatīrtha** son of Lakṣmīnarasiṁha Sūri.—A Com. on the *M. Vij.* (Madras O. L. latest acquisition). Author a disciple of Yogīndra Tirtha (1671–79) and presumably a brother of Nārāyaṇa, the author of the *Rāghavendravijaya.*

12. **S'rīnidhi Tīrtha.** A Com. on the *Nym.* (Pejawar Mutt. Coll.) Author a Svāmi of the Puttige Mutt between C. 1637–50.

13. **Veṇīdattācārya-Tarkavāgis'a.** *Bheda-jayaśrī* (Sarasvati Bhavan Texts, No. 47, 1933). A Prakaraṇa in defence of the reality of difference and the other views of Madhva and vigorously repelling the attacks of Nrsimhāśrama (expressed in his *Bheda-dhikkāra* and *Advaitadīpikā* (See pp. 26 ; 29 ; 32 ; 39 ; 44 etc.). The author was evidently a North Indian. A Ms. of one of his works is said to be dated Sam. 1750 i.e. 1693 A.D. He was a profound Naiyāyika and wrote some tracts criticising the views of Śiromaṇi. For his other works see the Introd. to the edn. of the *Bhedajayaśrī.*

14. **S'aṁkara Mis'ra.** *Bhedaratnam* (Printed, Lahore). He is the same as the author of the gloss *Upaskāra* on the *Kaṇāda Sūtras.* Date C. 17th century. Work in defence of Realism.

15. **Vis'vanātha Pañcānana.** The well-known author of the *Muktāvalī* on the Nyāya, wrote a *Bhedasiddhi* in general defence of Dualism as against Advaita. The above three writers illustrate the influence exerted by the School of Madhvācāya on North Indian writers of the 17th century.

16. **Raghunātha.** Son of Vedāji-Bhāskara. *Bheda-taraṅgiṇī* (Madras R. no. 1298). The author was a brother of Subhānu Rau, the then Jagirdar of Ārṇi and a disciple of Satyapūrṇa Tīrtha (1707-26) of the Uttarādi Mutt. His work was evidently in defence of "Bheda".

17. **(Anonymous)** *Nyāyaratnākara*, a summary and review of the respective positions taken up by the five polemical classics beginning with the *Nym*. Author unknown.

18. **Raghunātha Yati**. *Tattvamañjarī* (Mys. C—303). An epitome of the teaching of Madhva. Nothing is known of the author. Date uncertain.

19. **Lingeri S'rīnivāsa**. Not "Śṛṅgeri-Śrīnivāsa," as he has been called on p. 318 of the *Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.* He is reputed to have been a disciple of Yadupatyācārya and a contemporary of Bidarahaḷḷi Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha. Over twenty works have been ascribed to him in the *G. V. L. Cat.* These include ṭippaṇis on (1-10) the *Daśa-Prakaraṇas*; and comm. on (11) the *Mbh.* Parvas I-X; (12) the *Bhāgavata*; (13) the NS. called *Siddhāntaprabhā*; (14) *Saṃgraharāmāyaṇa*; (15) *Aṇubhāṣya* and; (16) *Maṇimañjarī*; (17) a *Tattvavādikaṇṭhābharaṇa* alias *Bauddha-dhikkāra*; (18) a *Smṛti muktāvali* (on Dharma Śāstra); (19) *Cakramīmāṃsā*; (20) *Rukmiṇīharaṇam*; (21) *Āśaucanirṇaya*; and (22) *Padārtha-saṃgraha*.

20. **Lingeri Vyāsācārya**. Son of No. 19 above. A com. on the *Bṛndāvanākhyāna*; (2) and others on the *Praśna*. Up., (3) the *Vāyustuti*, (4) the *Pramānacandrikā*; (5) TS; (6) *M. Vij.* [*Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.*]

21. **Narasimha**. Son of No. 20. *Āhnikataraṅgiṇi* and (2) a Com. on the *Īśa* and another on (3) the *Praśna* Up. [l.c.]

22. **Kṛṣṇācārya**. *Smṛtimuktāvalī* (Printed, Udipi), a digest on domestic ritual and dharma, in four chapters. (i) *Kālanirṇaya*; (ii) *Āhnikaprakaraṇa*; (iii) *Ṣoḍaśa karma*; and (iv) *S'rāddha*. Author said to have been a disciple of Rāghavendra Svāmi (1623—71).

23. **Vibudhavarya Tīrtha**. *Subhadrāharaṇa*—a Kāvya with the author's own commentary. Printed at Udipi. Date C. 18th century.

24. **Umarji Tirumalārya**. Disciple of Yadupatyācārya. He wrote [G. V. L. Cat] Comm. on (1) the *Dvāda'sastotra*; (2) the *G. B. Prameyadīpikā* and (3) *S'ivastuti*.

25. **Umarji Prahlādācārya**. Son of no. 24. The *G. V. L. Cat.* ascribes some fourteen works to him. These include comm. on (1) the G. B; (2) the *VTN* (3) the bhāṣyas on (4) the *Taitt.*;

(5) the Bṛh. Up.; (6) *Kaṭha* and (7) *Muṇḍaka*; (8) *Vādāvalī*: (9) *NS*; (10) *Jayantīnirṇaya*: (11) *Prameyadīpikā* and (12) one on the *Muktāvali* (*Nyāya*) called *Tarkadīpāvalī*.

26. **(Anonymous)** *Sannyāyamālā*, a com. on the *Candrikā* (Pejawar Mutt Coll. 234, Tulu.)

27. Do—*Vimalabodha*—Comm. on the *Mbh. T. N.* (Pejawar Coll.).

28. **Rāmakṛṣṇa**. *Dvitvaviveka*-a Com. on the *Tattvaviveka* of Madhva. (Pejawar Coll. 295.) Date uncertain.

29. **Yādavendra.** C. on the *Bhāgavata* (Pejawar 328 Nagarī). Date uncertain.

30. **Saṁkarṣaṇa Tīrtha**. C. on *Bhāgavata* i–vi,—Do.

31. **Ādya Varadarājācārya.** Teacher of Raghūttama Tīrtha (16th century). Works:—(1) an exposition of the GB in Kannaḍa; (2) a comm. on the TP (*Subodhacandrikā*) and (3) a com. on the *Sadācārasmriti* and another on the *Viṣṇustuti*. [*G. V. L. Cat.*] His son Narahari is said [*Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.*, p. 318] to have commented upon the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* and the *Bhāgavata Tātparya*.

32. **Varada Tīrtha**. (1) A com. on the *Mbh.T.N.* (Tanjore No. 7900) and (2) on TS and (3) *Tattvaviveka* (Pejawar 268).

33. **Anantabhaṭṭa**. *Tattvaviveka* (Com.?) (*India Office* No. 6041.) Date uncertain.

34. **Ānandatīrthavara**. Son of Viṭṭhala-*Sattattvaratnamālā*. A treatise on the categories in the Dvaita System. (Tanjore 8131.) Printed Bombay 1918. Date uncertain.

35. **Mahāmahopādhyaya Vyākaraṇa Subbarāyācārya** *Sūtrārthamañjari*, printed Mys. Date 20th century.

36. **(Anonymous)** *Aṁśāvatāra nirṇaya* (Mys. C.—973) a prose tract in 112 granthas, on the aṁśas and avatāras of gods.

MUHŪRTARATNA

A RELIGIO-ASTROLOGICAL TREATISE, COMPOSED IN THE REIGN OF AURANGZEB

(M. M. Patkar)

The Indians firmly believed—and believe even to this day—that the heavenly bodies exercise immense influence on the destiny of human beings and that good or evil depends upon the particular position and combination of the planets and stars. Accordingly numerous astrological treatises were composed on the auspicious moments (*muhūrtas*) for religious ceremonies, marriages, journey and so forth. In the present note I wish to acquaint the reader with one of such works viz: the *Muhūrtaratna*, composed in the reign of emperor Aurangzeb.

The *Muhūrtaratna*, as the work is called, is a treatise which deals with the auspicious moments necessary for performing religious ceremonies. The work is divided into twenty-seven chapters, the contents of which are as follows :—

1. संवत्सरप्रकरण (foll. 1–3^b) ; 2. तिथिप्रकरण (4^a–5^a) ; 3. वारप्रकरण (5^b–6^a); 4. नक्षत्रप्रकरण (6^a–12^a) ; 5. योगप्र° (12^a) ; 6. करणप्रविष्टिप्र° (12^a–12^b) ; 7. मुहूर्तप्र° (12^b–13^b) ; 8. उपग्रहप्र° (13^b–14^a) ; 9. संक्रान्तिप्र° (14^a–16^b) ; 10. गोचरप्र° (16^b–18^b) ; 11. चन्द्रतारादिस्थलप्र° (18^b–19^a) ; 12. लग्नप्र° (19^a–21^b) ; 13. संस्कारप्र° (22^a–27^b) ; 14. समयशुद्धिप्र° (27^b–29^b) ; 15. महादोषनिरूपणप्र° (29^b–36^a) ; 16. व्रतबन्धप्र° (36^a–39^b) ; 17. समावर्त्तनप्र° (39^b–40^a) ; 18. च्छुरिकाप्र° (40^a) ; 19. विवाहप्र° (40^a–45) ; 20. वधूप्रवेशप्र° (45^a–46^b) ; 21. राज्याभिषेकप्र° (46^b–48^a) ; 22. यात्राप्र° (48^a–60^a) ; 23. वास्तुप्रकरण (60^a–66^a) ; 24. गृहप्रवेशप्र° (66^a–68^a) ; 25. देवप्रतिष्ठाप्र° (66^a–69^a) ; 26. Genealogy of Aurangzeb and 27. स्वस्थानगोत्रवर्णन or the author's own account.

Aufrecht, in his Catalogus Catalogorum, records about five Mss. of this work, of which two[1] are available in the Govt. Mss. library at the Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona. Both these Mss. give the genealogy of the three Moghul princes from Jahangir to Aurangzeb. I reproduce below the verses which contain the genealogy referred to :—

1. Nos. 177 of A 1883–84 and 842 of 1884–87.

अथ सार्वभौमजहांगीरादालमगीरवंशानुवर्णनं ।

fol. 69a वङ्गी वक्राणि शश्वत्सपदि विघटयत्कुन्तलान् गुर्जरीणां
कर्षन् कर्नाटकर्त्ता कुचकलशचलच्चारुचेलांचलानि ।
खेलत्कश्मीररामाश्रमजतकणिकामार्जयन्हेलयेर्थ-
क्रीडां चक्रे समस्तान् मलयमरुदिव श्रीजहांगीरवीरः ॥
उर्व्यां वै विषमेषु रित्यनुदिनं शृंगारवीरैकभूः
श्रीमच्छाहिजहान्महीपतिवरकैनामनस्तूयते ।
शय्यायां समरांगणे निपतिताः सीदन्ति संमूर्च्छिताः
कामिन्यः परिपन्थिनश्च शतशो येनामुना खण्डिताः ॥
तस्यात्मजश्चालमगीरभूपो धर्म्यः पृथिव्याः पतिरेष जातः ।
निर्जित्य चैनां सकलां यतोस्याः करग्रहं यो विधिवच्चकार ।[1]
केचिद्बद्धाः सहेलं स्वगृहमथगता मोचिताः केपि केचित्
स्थानात्स्थानान्तराणि क्षणमिव गमिताः केपि नीता विबद्धं ।
हत्वा हत्वा तुं केचित्प्रतिपदमदयं प्रापिता व्यर्थभावा-
नालंगीरावरंगः प्रभुभुजपरिघेनारयः सारयश्च ॥

From these verses it would be quite clear that the author composed his work in Aurangzeb's time. As Aurangzeb's hostile attitude towards the Hindus is well-known it is doubtful whether the present work was composed directly under the patronage of emperor Aurangzeb. At this stage it can be only said that the author was under the subjection of the Moghul emperor and hence he must have mentioned Aurangzeb only in a laudatory style.

The author of the present work was well acquainted with several writers of repute on astronomy, astrology and religious law. In his work he quotes not less than forty authorities, a list[2] of which is given below :—

शौनकः 1b.
वसिष्ठः 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a, 4a etc.
नारदः 2b, 3a.
मुहूर्त्तचिन्तामणि 2b, 7b, 10a, 10b, 11b, 15b.
श्रीपति 3b, 4a, 4b, 7a.
अंगिरः 3b.

1. This verse is not found in MS No. 177 of A 1883–84.
2. The folios mentioned in the list are from MS No. 177 of A 1883–84.

मुहूर्त्तचूडामणि 7^a, 9^b, 10^b, 11^a.
बृहस्पतिः 8^a.
वसिष्ठसिद्धान्त 14^b, 15^a.
अपरार्क 14^b, 36^a.
सिद्धान्तसार्वभौम 16^a.
वसिष्ठसंहिता 16^a.
वराह 20^a, 41^a.
भरद्वाज 21^b.
जातूकर्ण 23^a.
अश्वलायनः 23^b.
दीपिकायां (?) 25^b, 28^a, 36^a, 50^a.
टोडरानन्द 25^b, 48^b, 58^b.
सारसंग्रह 25^b.
राजमार्त्तण्ड 26^a, 28^a, 35^a, 62^b.
त्रिविक्रम 26^b, 29^a, 33^a, 41^b, 42^a, 43^b, 60^a.
व्यवहारप्रतिष्ठा 26^b.
व्यवहारप्रदीप 27^b.
व्यवहारप्रदीपिका 28^a, 28^b, 33^b.
स्कन्दपुराणे 28^a.
लल्लः 28^a.
ग्रन्थान्तरे 33^a, 33^b, 36^b, 37^a, 39^a, 42^a, 57^b.
मुहूर्त्तमार्त्तण्ड 39^a, 43^b.
गर्गः 40^b, 42^a.
मुक्तावलीकारः 42^b.
पराशरः 42^b.
ज्योतिर्निबन्धे 42^b, 50^a.
बालविवेके 45^b.
बादरायणः 46^a, 50^a.
याज्ञवल्क्यः 48^a.
दैवज्ञमनोहर 55^b.
मार्कण्डेयपुराणे 56^a.
विष्णुः 57^a.
वसन्तराज 58^a.
समयमयूखे 61.

In the concluding chapter Īśvaradāsa, the author of *Muhūrtaratna*, gives his own account. He calls himself the son of Keśavarāma who obtained the title ज्योतिषराय and also plenty of wealth from the emperor Jahangir on account of his profi-

ciency in the science of astrology. The family hailed from Kalinjara and were Kanauja Brāhmanas,[1] belonging to the Vatsa Gotra. The name of the author's grandfather was Kaṅharaśarmā :—

अथ स्वस्थानगोत्रादिवर्णनं ।
कालिंजरगिरौ[2] रम्ये कान्यकुब्जद्विजाग्रणीः ।
वात्स्यः कंहरशर्मासीद्यज्ञकृद्वेदपारगः ॥
तस्मात्केशवशर्माभूत् ख्याता त्रिस्कन्धविग्रमः ।
गजाश्वरथसंग्रामैर्योर्चितस्य नृपोत्तमैः ॥
सोऽयं ज्योतिषरायाख्यः ज्यहांगीरावनीपतेः ।
स्वगूढप्रश्नसंवादैर्लेभे प्रश्नविदां वरः ॥
तुलाप्रमुखदानेषु यस्त्वसंख्यवसूनि वै ।
विप्रसात्कृतवान्काले नारायणपरायणः ॥
तज्जस्त्वीश्वरदासाख्यो व्यवहारविदां मुदे ।
ग्रन्थं मुहूर्त्तरत्नाख्यं कृत्वा चक्रे शिवार्पणं ॥

Īśvaradāsa completed his work in Śaka 1585 i.e. in A. D. 1663 when emperor Aurangzeb was ruling. Before concluding his work the author gives the date of the composition of the work in the following verse :—

पञ्चाष्टबाणेन्दुगते १५८५ शकाद्बे
विष्णुप्रबोधेऽहनि सूर्यवारे ।
संपूर्णमासीत्तु मुहूर्त्तरत्नं
प्रस्थे मघोनस्त्ववरंगराज्ये ॥

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1. Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Descriptive Cat. of MSS 1925, Vol. III (Smṛti Mss), preface, p. lxi.'

2. " *Kāliñjara*—Kalinjar in Bundelkhand. The fort was built by the Chandel King Kirāt Brahma ; it contains the shrine of Mahādeva Nīlakaṇṭha and the Tīrtha called Koṭatīrtha ". (*The Geographical Dictionary of Ancient and Mediæval India* by Nundo Lal Dey, 1927, pp. 84–85.

PRATĀPAKALPADRUMA

A RARE WORK ON MEDICINE—COMPOSED BY ANANTA FOR PRATĀPSIMHA OF JAIPUR IN A. D. 1792

(M. M. Patkar)

The Govt. Mss. Collection at the Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona, contains a rare Ms.[1] of a medical treatise called *Pratāpakalpadruma.* It was composed by one Ananta for his patron Pratāpasiṁha. In the introductory verses the author gives us his own account as well as the genealogy of his patron Pratāpasiṁha. These verses are as under :—

जम्बूद्वीपमहीपमस्तकमणिः प्रत्यर्थिसंकामणि-
म्लेंच्छातंकतमिश्रपुष्करमणिर्यो बि(?)प्रचिन्तामणिः ॥
स श्रीमान् जयसिंहकः समभवद्यन्नाम दिक्कामिनी
माद्यद्दिक्करिदानलुब्धमधुपी गीतैश्चिरं गायति ॥ २ ॥
तदात्मजो भक्तसुखप्रदैको नाम्ना नृपेन्द्रो नृपमाधवेशः ।
दानप्रसादेन पराक्रमेण तिरस्कृताशेषनरेन्द्रवर्यः ॥ ३ ॥
तस्याभूत्तनयः धिया जितनयः सौन्दर्यशोभामयः ।
पूर्वातिप्रणयः स्वकेषु सदयः प्रारम्भसिद्धोदयः ।
वैरिव्यस्तभयः कृताघविलयः ख्यातिकृतार्कान्वयः
सद्विद्याजितसत्क्रियो जितनयः श्रीमत्प्रतापाह्वयः ॥ ४ ॥

....

धर्मस्तम्भैकमूलौ जलनिधिविलसत् स्कन्धयुक् तत्वशाका-
युक्तो नेक्षाक्षराली दलगुणकलितः सात्म्यपुष्पौघपूर्णः ।
नैरोग्यानन्दवृन्दः शुभफलफलितः श्रीप्रतापाख्यसिंहः
कल्पद्रुः कोप्यपूर्वो जगति विजयते सर्वतो वै प्रमोदात् ॥ ८ ॥
हारीतपारास(श)र सुश्रुतानां श्लोकान् समाहृत्य सुसारभूतान् ।
हिताय लोकस्य गदातुरस्य प्रतापकल्पद्रुम एष ग्रन्थः ॥ ९ ॥
अनन्तनामा द्विजवर्यमुख्यो दधीचिजात्युद्भवविग्रहो वै ।
महाशयः केशवरायसूनुः लिखामि शास्त्रं भिषजां सुखाय ॥१०॥
प्राप्याज्ञां नृपतेरहं प्रघटये ग्रन्थं सुरम्यं ध्रुवं
यस्नं योगकृतं महायति विदं श्रीसद्गुणोघैर्युतं ।

1. No. 1062 of 1886–92.

रोगेशादिविषान्तकृत्स्वमतिभिर्यस्मान्नृपस्तुष्यता
स श्रीपुत्रकलत्रपौत्रजसयक् सोऽयं चिरं तिष्ठतु ॥ ११ ॥

The author, as stated in verse 10 above, is one Ananta (अनन्तनामा). He calls himself foremost among Brahmins (द्विजवर्यमुख्यः). He is the son of Keśava (केशवरायसूनुः) and belongs to the dadhīcī caste (दधीचीजात्युद्भव). He wrote his work at the instance of Pratāpasimha.

In his exhaustive work, Ananta quotes numerous works and authors. The following is a list of the authorities quoted by him :—

भागवत; लक्ष्मणोत्सव; वैद्यसारग्रन्थ; ज्वरतिमिरभास्कर; भावप्रकाश; विद्वज्जनरञ्जनग्रन्थात्; वैद्यविनोद; चिकित्सामृतसागर; दामोदरग्रन्थ; सुश्रुत; वाग्भट; हारीत; चरक; आनन्दमाला; हितोपदेश; ग्रन्थान्तरे; तन्त्रान्तरे; टोडरानन्द; वृन्द, सिद्धान्तशिरोमणि; वैद्यकसारोद्धार; कुतूहलग्रन्थात्; रत्नभूषणग्रन्थ(?); वैद्यसञ्जीवनी; गारुडी(ड)संहिता; चिकित्सासार; शिराजग्रन्थ(?); वैद्यरत्न; वैद्यरहस्य; ऋतुचर्या and वैद्यपद्धतिग्रन्थ.

The work is divided into four skandhas-each skandha containing six adhyāyas and each adhyāya dealing with different kinds of bodily disorders, their diagnosis, treatment, medicine and so on.

Ananta, as we have already seen, composed his work under the patronage of Pratapasimha, who belonged to the illustrious family of Jaipur Princes and ruled from A. D. 1778 to 1803. The author has given the date of the composition as Tuesday, the 10th day of the bright-half of Aśvina (अश्वयुज्) of Samvat 1849, which corresponds to Tuesday, the 15th September 1792.[1] The verse containing the chronogram reads as under :—

fol. 178^b वर्षे विक्रमभूपतेर्नवयुगाष्टेन्दौ सिते पक्षके
मासे चाश्वयुजे शुभे श्रवणभे भौमे दशायां तिथौ ।
ग्रन्थोऽलेखि मया प्रतापयशसेऽनन्तेन कल्पद्रुमे
आप्यारोग्यमतो जना व्रजनिधेः कुर्वन्तु दास्यं सदा ॥

1. See *Indian Ephemeris*, Madras, 1922, Vol. VI, p. 387.

HISTORY OF GUṆAS IN ALAṄKĀRA*

(V. V. Sovani)

The word guṇa is derived from the root 'guṇa' of the 'Curādi' group, meaning 'to repeat' according to Mallinātha's commentary on Māghakāvya II. 75. The primary affix here added is 'ac' by P. III·3·56 'एरच्,' which causes acute accent to fall on the last syllable of the word 'guṇa' by P. VI·1·63 'चितः' as we may see from Atharvaveda X·8·43.

पुण्डरीकं नवद्वारं त्रिभिर्गुणेभिरावृतम् ।

Hence 'guṇa' means 'a factor or an equal part' in which sense Pāṇini himself has used it in संख्याया गुणस्य निमाने मयट् P. V. 2.47.

Patañjali makes the following observations with regard to the sense of the word 'guṇa' :—

गुणशब्दोऽयं बह्वर्थः । अस्त्येव समेष्ववयवेषु वर्तते । तद्यथा द्विगुणा रज्जुरिति । अस्ति द्रव्यपदार्थकः तद्यथा । गुणवानयं देश इत्युच्यते यस्मिन् गावः सस्यानि च वर्तन्ते । अस्त्यप्रधाने वर्तते । तद्यथा । यो यत्राप्रधानं भवति स आह–गुणभूता वयमत्रेति । अस्त्याचारे वर्तते । तद्यथा । गुणवानयं ब्राह्मण इत्युच्यते यः सम्यगाचारं करोति । अस्ति संस्कारे वर्तते । तद्यथा । संस्कृतमन्नं गुणवदित्युच्यते । अथवा सर्वत्रैवायं गुणशब्दः समेष्ववयवेषु वर्तते । Mahābhāṣya on तस्य भावस्त्वतलौ P. V.1.119, Chowkhambā Ed., Vol. IV, part 2, pp. 45–46. Out of these senses Alaṅkāraśāstra has countenanced the sense 'embellishment or excellence', as we see from काव्यशोभायाः कर्तारो धर्मा गुणाः । Vāmana's Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra III. 1.1. We may here compare the English word 'part', which means 'distinguished endowment' in the expression 'man of parts'.

We find the conception of 'guṇa', characteristic of Alaṅkāraśāstra, even in Ṛgvedic age as may be seen from the following verse :—

सक्तुमिव तितउना पुनन्तो यत्र धीरा मनसा वाचमक्रत
अत्रा सखायः सख्यानि जानते भद्रैषां लक्ष्मीर्निहिताऽधि वाचि ॥

Ṛg. X. 71.2.

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* This article was found in the papers of our teacher, the late Pandit Venkatesh Vaman Sovani, M.A., Professor of Sanskrit, Meerut College, Meerut.—*Editor.*

This verse is cited and explained in Nirukta IV. 9 (Roth) by Yāska and by Patañjali in the Paspaśā or Introductory portion of Mahābhāṣya (Chowkhambā Ed., Vol. I, p. 15).

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa seeks to interpret the latter half of the verse in a metaphysical sense in his Mahābhāṣya-pradīpoddyota thereon. The natural sense of the verse seems to be as follows :—"Wise men make speeches after purifying the words and ideas through the sieve of their mind, as if the words were barley flour. Thereby the wise acquire friendships. Holy felicity is enshrined in their expression." In this verse by 'purification' the Ṛgvedic poet means the eschewance of offensive ideas and words, which are barbarous, hackneyed, indecent or have repugnant suggestion in them. The mind here compared to 'a sieve' is the cultured mind of the wise. That this is the sense intended by the Ṛgvedic poet appears very probable from the idea of 'aślīla' in Alaṅkāraśāstra, expressed by Vāmana in असभ्यार्थान्तरमसभ्यस्मृतिहेतुश्चाश्लीलम् । (Sūtra II 1. 15), and in तत्त्रैविध्यं व्रीडाजुगुप्साऽमङ्गलातङ्कदायिभेदात् । (Sūtra II 1, 20). According to Kāvyapradīpa p. 210, Kāvyamālā Ed., 'aślīla' is derived from 'a-śrī' meaning 'Kāntyabhāva' or 'absence of loveliness' by adding the secondary suffix 'lac' indicating possession by the Sūtra सिध्मादिभ्यश्च P. V. 2. 97, the 'r' of 'śrī' being changed to 'l' by संज्ञाच्छंदसोर्वा कपिलकादीनामिति वक्तव्यम् (वार्त्तिक) on 'कृपो रो लः' P. VIII 2. 18. Here incidentally the sense of the word 'lakṣmī' is determined by the word 'Śrī' continued in 'aślila'. According to Kāvyapradīpa 'Śrī' here means 'Kānti' or 'loveliness', or rather 'Sabhyavaśīkaraṇasampatti' = literary charm, as Pt. Vāmanāchārya Zalkīkar happily puts it. Poetic charm is due to 'guṇas' or poetic excellences, as well as to 'alaṅkāras' or poetic ornaments, which are present in a poem, and is further due to the absence of literary flaws or blemishes (काव्यं ग्राह्यमलंकारात् । सौन्दर्यमलंकारः । स दोषगुणालंकारहानादानाभ्याम् ॥ Vāmana's Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra I. 1. 1–3). The Ṛgvedic poet emphasises the eschewance of impeachable or offensive expressions and ideas as the primary requisite of literary charm, because such single ideas and expressions quite disfigure even a beautiful poem, as held by Daṇḍin in Kāvyādarśa I. 7. On the other hand, even the mere absence of offensive expressions and ideas may contribute to slight beauty as is held by Māgha (cf.

Canto IX, verse 12) and approved of by Govinda Ṭhakkura in his Kāvyapradīpa, chapter VII, p. 199, Kāvyamālā Ed. Daṇḍin on the other hand attaches great importance to this '*purity of style*' which is 'good taste' and contributes to great delectation in spite of all the other graces due to poetic ornaments. **He says** :—

कामं सर्वोऽप्यलङ्कारो रसमर्थे निषिञ्चतु ।
तथाप्यग्राम्यतैवैनं भारं वहति भूयसा ॥ (Kāvyādarśa I. 62)

This is 'Mādhuryaguṇa' according to Daṇḍin. 'Purity' is held as a special characteristic of the poetry of Ṛgveda, which is in fact held as the standard of purity and the best means of purifying our speech and mind and sanctifying our religious acts. Hence we find the term 'pavitra' applied to Vedic passages in times anterior to Pāṇini also.

The Sūtra ' कर्तरि चर्षिदेवतयोः ' P. III. 2. 186 explains it, the word 'ṛiṣi' being used in the sense of 'Vedic passages' as in ' ऋषिः पठति शृणोत ग्रावाणः ' (Mahābhāṣya on P. III. 1.7, Chowkhambā Ed. Vol. III, part 2, p. 20).

The Vedic 'purity', however, does especially signify '*grammatical purity*' or '*Saṁskāra*', because in Ancient India they had the greatest regard for the correctness of language as is clear from the opening Vārttikas of Kātyāyana and from Patañjali's dictum ' एकः शब्दः सम्यग् ज्ञातः शास्त्रान्वितः सुप्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके कामधुग् भवति ' (Mahābhāṣya on एकः पूर्वपरयोः P. VI. 1. 84, Chowkhambā Edn. Vol. V, p. 53), which is ascribed to Śruti by Kaiyyaṭa (Mahābhāṣyapradīpa, Vol. I, p. 29 Chowkhambā Edn.) and is similar in sense to Daṇḍin's verse :—

गौर्गौः कामदुघा सम्यक् प्रयुक्ता स्मर्यते बुधैः ।
दुष्प्रयुक्ता पुनर्गोत्वं प्रयोक्तुः सैव शंसति ॥ (Kāvyādarśa I. 6)

and also from the following verse :—

दुष्टः शब्दः स्वरतो वर्णतो वा मिथ्याप्रयुक्तो न तमर्थमाह ।
स वाग्वज्रो यजमानं हिनस्ति यथेन्द्रशत्रुः स्वरतोऽपराधात् ॥
(Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 9, Chowkhambā Edn.)

Owing to its ideal of purity Veda was considered to be the sole criterion of Transcendental things as mentioned in Jaiminisūtra I. 1. 5 औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्धस्तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशोऽव्यतिरेकश्चार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् । This idea was

maintained in modern times by the French novelist Flaubert. "Flaubert believed that every thought or grace or wonder had one word or phrase exactly adapted to express it, and could be 'digested' by no other without loss of clearness or beauty. It was the passion of his life, and the despair of it to search for the unique phrase in each individual case." (Edmund Gosse on 'Style' in Encyclopædia Britannica, XI Ed., Vol. XXV, p. 1057, column 1). Grammatical purity was extremely prized by old rhetoricians, as is clear from Bhāmaha I. 14–15 and from Bhaṭṭi's Rāvaṇavadha towards the end of the sixth century, A.D., illustrating purity in the department of inflexionable words in the first nine cantos, and purity in the department of verbs in the last nine cantos of that Mahākāvya. Similarly Bhaṭṭa Bhīma composed his Mahākāvya Rāvaṇārjunīya to illustrate Pāṇinisūtras in the order of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. The old rhetorician Maṅgala held Perfection in style was due to elegant and discriminate use of inflexionable and conjugated words, which went by the name of Sauśabdya or grammatical purity ' सुपां तिङां च श्रव: (प्रि?) या व्युत्पत्तिरिति मंगल: । साशब्द्यमेतत् ।' Rājaśekhara's Kāvyamīmāṃsā, p. 20, Gaekwāḍ Oriental Series Edn.

The poetic excellences 'māḏhurya' and 'ojas' seem to be alluded to in the Veda. In the preamble to Rudrasūkta of the Yujurveda we find

मधुमतीं देवेभ्यो वाचमुद्यासं शुश्रूषेण्यां मनुष्येभ्य: ।

where the 'mādhurya' guṇa as defined by Bharata XVI 98, by Bhāmaha II 3, and by Daṇḍin I 51 may be recognised, especially owing to the word 'Śuśrūṣeṇyām', employed there. Similarly in प्र तव्यसीं नव्यसीं धीतिमग्नये । Ṛg. I. 143 there might be an allusion to the guṇa 'Ojas or sententiousness as defined by Vāmana in Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra III. 2. 2.

It will be noticed that in Ṛg. X. 71. 2 the poetic excellence that is alluded to is negative in character, while the 'mādhurya' 'ojas', just mentioned are positive in character. Mammaṭa does not accept guṇas, which are negative in character, but old rhetoricians did accept them, as we can see from Rudraṭa Kāvyālaṅkāra II. 8–9. Vidyānātha says as under :

"एषां (श्लेषादीनां चतुर्विंशतिसंख्याकानां गुणानां) मध्ये केषांचिद्दोष-परिहारकत्वेन गुणत्वम्। केषांचित्स्वत एवोत्कर्षहेतुत्वाद् गुणत्वम्। तत्र ये स्वत एव चारुत्वातिशयहेतवस्ते परमुत्कृष्टाः। दुष्टत्वपरिहारहेतूनां गुणत्वं न सर्वसंमतम्। ये तु दोषाभावतया गुणत्वमिच्छन्ति तेषामेव सौकुमार्यादयो गुणत्वेन संमताः।"

(Pratāparudrayaśobhuṣaṇa, p. 322, B. S. S.)

Rudraṭa's nine excellences mentioned in Kāvyālaṅkāra II. 8 are only negative in character, as Nami's commentary thereon has explained. As regards the positive excellences we may refer to वाचं शुश्रुवाँ अफलामपुष्पाम्। Ṛg. X. 71. 5. where 'phala' alludes to the sense, and 'puṣpa' to the excellences of speech ; Vide 'अर्थं वाचः पुष्पफलमाह' Nirukta I. 20, where Yāska further says 'puṣpa' and 'phala' respectively refer to Sacrificial lore and theological lore or to theological lore and metaphysical lore. However, if we compare यामिमां पुष्पितां वाचं प्रवदन्त्यविपश्चितः (Gītā II. 42) and the expression 'flowery speech', 'puṣpa' would more naturally mean 'embellishment of speech'.

The oldest critic of poetry who treats of 'guṇas' is Bharata, who stands at the beginning of the Christian Era and may be older [Prof. E. J. Rapson on Drama (Indian) in the Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics Vol. IV, p. 886 §§ 3–4].

Bharata's conception of poetry being dramatic, he has made 'guṇas' subsidiary to 'rasa' (Nāṭyaśāstra XVI. 104). Bharata defines 'guṇas' as the opposites of poetic blemishes (गुणा विपर्ययादेषां माधुर्यौदार्यलक्षणाः। Bharata XVI. 91) Bharata mentions ten poetic blemishes (XVI. 84) and ten poetical excellences (XVI. 92). They are shown in contrast in parallel columns below. Vide Nāṭyaśāstra XVI vv. 84–103.

GUṆAS	DOṢAS
(1) (*a*) '*S'leṣa*' or *coalescence* = interdependence and affinity of words and idea.	(1) '*Arthāntara* or *irrelevant*.
(1) (*b*) '*Sliṣṭā* or *well-knit*, where the meaning is naturally clear, though deep.	(2) *Abhiplutārtha* or *muddled in sense* owing to partial compound or sāpekṣa samāsa.
(2) '*Prasāda*' or perspicuity, where the sense *settles down* the moment the words are	(3) '*Gūḍhārtha*' or *obscure*, owing to the use of synonyms for members of a word like

uttered, though not actually expressed.

(3) '*Samatā*' or equipoise due to the use of words, which are not very crisp, nor superfluous, nor unintelligible.

'gīrvāṇa,' which has a conventional meaning; e.g. 'vacobāṇa' for 'gīrvāṇa'

(4) 'Ekārtha' or superfluous.

(4) '*Samādhi*' or *poetic imagery*.

(5) '*Arthahīna*' = *nonsensical*.

(5) '*Mādhurya*' or sweetness, which never wearies the mind, though tasted again and again.

(6) (*a*) '*Bhinnārtha*' = *indelicate* or *bad in taste*.

(6) '*Ojas*' or *weightiness*, due to the use of striking compounded expressions with dignified accents.

(7) '*Visandhi*' = jolting, due to the words not being properly fixed.

N.B.—I read अवप्रतिष्ठाशब्दम् for अनुप्रतिष्ठाशब्दं, in XVI. 90.

(7) '*Padasaukumārya*' = *delicacy of words*, due to the use of premier melodious metres well-knit together, containing delicate meaning.

(8) '*Viṣama*' = unmetrical.

(8) 'Arthavyakti' or 'vividness of sense' due to the use of words in well-recognised and popular senses.

(9) *S'abdahīna* = defective in words, owing to the words being used in ungrammatical forms or in unwarranted senses.

(9) *Udāratā* or *Sublimity* due to the presence of the Erotic and the marvellous with surging emotions, all enveloped in divine atmosphere.

(10) '*Nyāyādapeta*' = *irrational* or absurd.

(10) '*Kānti* or *Loveliness*', due to the use of expressions connoting 'līlā', e.g. 'līlākamala'; cf. Kāvyādarśa I. 79.

(6) (*b*) '*bhinnārtha*' = having undesirable or repugnant signification.

Of these ten poetic excellences of Bharata *śleṣa* is considered by him to be both a '*S'abdaguṇa*' and an '*arthaguṇa*'. As a '*S'bda-*

guṇa' it combines in itself the '*Sākāṅkṣatva*' of Bhāravi XI. 38, and the 'Śabdaguṇa' '*S'leṣa*' of Vāmana III. 1. 10. The '*S'liṣṭa*' which is an '*arthaguṇa*', corresponds to the fifth variety of '*prauḍhi*' of Vāmana III. 2. 2. The *prasāda* guṇa of Bharata is illustrated in Kāvyālaṅkāravṛtti of Vāmana V. 1. 10, and is same as the *artha-guṇa* '*prasāda*' of Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa I. § 97, p. 74 Jībānanda Ed. This *prasādaguṇa* of Bharata appears as the *arthaguṇa* '*sudharmitā*' in Keśavamiśra's Alaṅkāraśekhara, p. 22, Kāvyamālā Ed. In a poetic piece possessed of '*prasāda*' *guṇa* of Bharata, the idea of a thing flashes on the mind by virtue of characteristic epithets alone. Bharata's *Samatā* is both a *S'abdaguṇa* and an *arthaguṇa*. As a *S'abdaguṇa*, *Samatā* combines the *S'abdaguṇas* '*ojas*' and '*prasāda*' of Vāmana III. 1. 5–6, and the *S'abdaguṇa* '*mādhurya*' of Vāmana III. 1. 20. As an *arthaguṇa* '*Samatā*' of Bharata is identical with the *arthaguṇa* '*Samatā*' of Vāmana III. 2. 5 taken in the second alternative sense. Bharata's *Samādhi* is the same as the *arthaguṇa* '*Samādhi*' of Vāmana III. 2. 6. Bharata's *mādhurya*' covers Daṇḍin's *mādhurya* in Kāvyādarśa I. 51 and Vāmana's '*arthaguṇa mādhurya*' in III. 2–10. Bharata's '*Ojas*' covers Daṇḍin's '*ojas*' (Kāvyādārśa I. 80) and Vāmana's *S'abdaguṇa* '*Kānti*' (III 1. 25). Bharata's *Saukumārya* might cover Vāmana's *S'abdaguṇa* '*samādhi*' (III. 1. 12) and Bhoja's *arthaguṇa* '*Saukumārya*' in I. § 100, p. 76, Jībānanda Ed. Bharata's '*arthavyakti*' is the same as Daṇḍin's *prasāda* (Kāvyādarśa I. 45). Bharata's '*udāratva*' is the same as Vāmana's (III. 2. 14) *arthaguṇa* '*Kānti*'. The *Kāntiguṇa* of Bharata is the same as the *guṇa* '*Kānti*' of Kāvyādarśa I. 85.

Although Bharata's conception of poetry is dramatic and although he says in XVI. 92 that the ten excellences are attributes of '*Kāvyārtha*' or poetic sentiments or *rasas* ('काव्यस्यार्था: काव्यार्था:। अर्थ्यन्ते प्राधान्येनेत्यर्थ:। काव्यस्यार्था: काव्यार्था रसा:' Abhinavagupta's Nāṭyaśāstraṭīkā on chapter VII, opening passage), still Bharata's idea of *rasa* being rather crude, he makes the *guṇas* directly the attributes of word and sense, as we see from the foregoing treatment of them. Bharata's *guṇas* seem to have a wide currency for we find in the fourteenth line of the Girnār inscription of Rudradāman of 160–170 A. D. the expression स्फुटलघुमधुर-चित्रकान्तशब्दसमयोदारालंकृतगद्यपद्य (काव्यविधानप्रवीणे) न where the

poetic excellences '*mādhurya*', '*Kānti*' and '*audārya*' are expressly mentioned, and '*ojas*' is hinted (G. Bühler's 'Indian Inscriptions and the Antiquity of Indian Artificial Poetry', English Translation, pp. 24–28, Reprint from Indian Antiquary 1913). Similarly Bhāravi who is mentioned in the Aihole Inscription of 634 A.D. and therefore belongs to the Sixth century has mentioned the *guṇas* '*prasāda*', '*ojas*' in XI. 38, and '*audārya*' and indirectly '*Samādhi*' in XI. 40.

The later followers of Bharata's schools gave less importance to *guṇas* as mentioned by Bharata and considered them to be virtues of a negative character only. Rudrabhaṭṭa merely mentions '*audārya*' (Śṛingāratilaka III ibid 63), *mādhurya* (III. 53). and '*ojas*' (III. ibid 58). Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṅkāra II. 8 mentions nine *guṇas*, which are negative in character. Of these Rudrabhaṭṭa is older than Rudraṭa as appears from Nami's commentary on Kāvyālaṅkāra I. 2. Rudraṭa belongs to the middle of the 9th century A. D. (Pischel's Introduction to Śṛingāratilaka, pp. 12, 26). Pischel has wrongly identified Rudrabhaṭṭa with Rudraṭa (ibid. p. 1). However, both these writers have this much in common that they attach little importance to *guṇas* and do not distinguish between *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*. For Rudrabhaṭṭa as cited in Pratāparudriya ch. VI pp. 334–335 (B. S. S.) says as follows :—

तदुक्तं रुद्रभट्टेन– " यो हेतुः काव्यशोभायाः सोऽलंकारः प्रकीर्त्यते । गुणोऽपि तादृशो ज्ञेयो दोषः स्यात्तद्विपर्ययः" । while Rudraṭa in II. 8 has given nine *guṇas* which are of a negative character and perhaps sees no distinction between *guṇa* and *alaṅkāra* if Nami be expressing his view in commentary on XI. 36 that '*vāstava*' '*aupamya*', '*atiśaya*', and '*śleṣa*' are *arthaguṇas*, while '*vakrokti*', '*anuprāsa*', '*Yamaka*', '*S'leṣa*' and '*Citra*' are *S'abdaguṇas*, whereas they were formerly mentioned as '*arthālaṅkāras*' (VII. 9) and *S'abdālaṅkaras* (II. 13) respectively.

Rājaśekhara at the end of the ninth century A. D. in his Kāvyamīmāṅsā, p. 6, Gaekwāḍ Oriental Series Edn., mentions the five *guṇas*, '*Sāmya*', '*prasāda*', '*mādhurya*', '*audārya*' and '*ojas*' which are probably illustrated in Hemacandra 15 Alaṅkāracūḍāmaṇi on Kāvyānuśāsana, pp. 200–201, Kāvyāmalā Ed. 'Ojas' is the quality of recitation where the breaks are not observable. When recitation is attended with breaks there is '*prasāda*' *guṇa*.

The recitation which is attended with rise and fall of voice has the quality '*mādhurya*'. When there is grace in reciting some portions of a verse there is '*audārya*' *guṇa*. When there is no high or low accent in recitation, there is '*Samatā*' *guṇa*. *Ojas* occurs in *Sragdharā* and such other metres, '*prasadā*' in '*indravajrā*', '*upendravajrā*' etc., '*mādhurya*' in *mandākrānta* etc., '*Samatā*' in *S'ārdūlavikrīḍita* etc. and '*audārya*' in uneven metres like *puṣpitāgrā*.

Lastly we shall deal with *guṇas* according to Agnipurāṇa and Alaṅkāraśekharakārikās. Agnipurāṇa is certainly prior to Kavīrājamārgga of Nṛpatuṅga of circa 814 A.D., since the latter mentions Dhvani as an alaṅkāra, which is found only in Agnipurāṇa ch. 345, verses 14-18. Like Rājaśekhara, Agnipurāṇa considers '*rasa*' to be the life of poetry 'वाग्वैदग्ध्यप्रधानेऽपि रस एवास्य जीवितम्' (ch. 336, v. 33). However the *gunas* are not considered as attributes of '*rasas*' but whereas Rājaśekhara considered '*guṇas*' as attributes of '*S'abdaracanā*' Agnipurāṇa considers the *guṇas* as attributes of style in the widest sense. It enumerates 24 *guṇas* of which six are attributes of *S'abda*, six of *artha* and six of both *śabda* and *artha*.

Of the six *śabdaguṇas*, *śleṣa*, *lālitya*, *Sukumāratā* are the same as the *śabdaguṇas* *śleṣa*, *mādhurya* and *Sukumāratā* of Vāmana, while '*udāratā*' and '*ojas*' are identical with Daṇḍin's *Udāratā* II. variety and '*ojas*' respectively. *Gāmbhīrya* or *Suśabdatā* is the same as the *śabdaguṇa* *suśabdatā* of Bhojadeva's Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa 'व्युत्पत्तिः सुपिङां या तु प्रोच्यते सा सुशब्दता। (I § 84, p. 61 Jibānanda Ed.).

Of the 6 *arthaguṇas*, *mādhurya*,, *saṁvidhāna* and *Komalata* are the same as *mādhurya* (Bhoja I. § 99) *śleṣa* (Bhoja I. § 96) and *Saukumārya* (Bhoja I. § ·100) of Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa. *Udāratva* is the same as the *arthaguṇa* '*udāttava*' of Bhoja I. § 104, p. 78 Jībānanda. *Prauḍhi* is probably the fifth variety of *prauḍhi* accepted by Vāmana. The *Sāmayikatā* or conformity to derivation refers probably to such verses as Raghu. VI. 21 ; XV. 6 ; Kirāta VIII. 49 ; Māgha I. 24 ; I. 64 ; XVI. 85 and Naiṣadha III. 16 where the words 'परंतप, शत्रुघ्न, विलासिनी, पुण्डरीकाक्ष, दिग्गज, शिशुपाल and भीम are shown to be in conformity with their derivative senses.

Of the six *ubhayaguṇas*, *udāratva* and *prāśastya* are identical with Daṇḍin's *udāratā* (I. § 76) and the *arthaguṇa Suśabdatā* of Bhoja I. § 108, pp. 79–80 Jībānanda's Ed. *Prasāda* is the same as Daṇḍin's *Prasāda* (I. § 45). *Yathāsaṅkhya* is the figure called *Yathāsaṅkhya* or *Krama* of Vāmana IV.3. 17 and Bhāmha II. 89–90. *Pāka* or perfection of style is achieved when all the qualities are present vividly, the highest perfection being *sahakārapāka* according to a verse cited in Vāmana's Alaṅkāravṛtti III. 2. 14, Agnipurāṇa ch. 345, v. 23 mentions *mṛdvīkāpāka*, *nārikelapāka* and *āmrapāka*. *Rāga* is that grace of style, which is attained without effort. It is of three kinds known as *hāridra*, *kausumbha* and *nīlīrāga*. In addition to these three of vaiśeṣika *guṇas*, Agnipurāṇa mentions the fourth variety known as *vaiśeṣika guṇas* or those *guṇas* which are excellences at times but which become blemishes at other times.

As regards the *Kārikās* of Śauddhodani, which are commented on by Keśavamiśra in his Alaṅkāraśekhara, who probably belongs to the 17th century, from his having quoted Kavikalpalatākāra, we do not know much. From the *Kārikās*, however, it appears that although Śuddhodani knows the Dhvani doctrine, still his system seems to be less perfect than Mammaṭa's and appears, therefore, very likely contemporary or almost a contemporary of Bhoja. Śuddhodani's *S'abdaguṇas Saṅkṣepa*, *udāttatā*, *prasāda*, *ukti* and *samādhi* are identical with the *S'abdaguṇas* of Bhoja called by the same name. Of his four *arthaguṇas*, *bhāvika* and *Suśabdatā* are identical with the *arthaguṇas bhāvika* and *Suśabdatā* of Bhoja, while his *paryāyokti* is the *arthaguṇa* '*Rīti*' of Bhoja and his *Sudharmitā* is the same as Bharata's *prasāda*, and Bhoja's *arthaguṇa* '*prasāda*'. Hence it appears that Śauddhodani's *guṇas* are all selected from Bhoja's *guṇas*.

The Alaṅkāra school headed by Bhāmaha of the seventh century A.D. paid little attention to *guṇas* and had scant respect for the *Rītis*, which are based on *guṇas* (Bhāmahālaṅkāra I. 31–35). Bhāmaha mentions the three *guṇas mādhurya*, *prāsada*, and *ojas* only in Bhāmahālaṅkāra II. 1–3. A fourth *guṇa* '*bhāvika*' is mentioned as being the quality of the whole composition (Bhāmahālaṅkāra III. 52–53) but Bhāmaha seems to include it among Alaṅkāras. Similarly '*suśabdatā*' is mentioned

by him (Bhāmaha I. 14–15) but he would rather call it a *S'abdālaṅkāra*. Bhāmaha's *guṇas* are illustrated in Bhaṭṭikāvya: *Sauśabdya* in Cantos I–IX; and XIV–XXII, *Mādhurya* in Canto XI, and *Bhāvika* in Canto XII and *Prasāda* in Cantos X–XIII. In Canto XIII an additional *guṇa* '*Bhāṣāśleṣa*' is illustrated, which is absent in Bhāmaha but is defined in Rudraṭa IV. 10 and illustrated in the following twelve verses. Rudraṭa calls it a figure of words. Writers of the Alaṅkāra school were generally indifferent to the distinction between *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*. *Udbhaṭa*, Bhāmaha's commentator, who was the *Sabhāpati* of King Jayāpīḍa and hence belongs to the latter half of the eighth century, thus ridiculed the distinction between '*guṇas*' and '*alaṅkāras*' as held traditionally by the *Rīti* school :—

" समवायवृत्त्या शौर्यादयः संयोगवृत्त्या तु हारादयः इत्यस्तु गुणालंकाराणां भेदः । ओजःप्रभृतीनामनुप्रासोपमादीनां चोभयेषामपि समवायवृत्त्या स्थितिरिति गड्डलिकाप्रवाहेणैवेषां भेदः ।" Bhāmahavivaraṇa cited in Kāvyaprakāśa VIII, pp. 569–570, Zalkīkar's new Ed. Udbhṭa held that *guṇas* were the attributes of a composition as a whole ('संघटनाया धर्मा गुणा इति भट्टोद्भटादयः ।'—ध्वन्यालोकलोचन p. 134, काव्यमाला). The three *guṇas* mentioned by Bhāmaha (II. 1–3) *mādhurya*, *ojas*, and *prasāda* were accepted by the Dhvani school. The transitional stage of these three may be clearly seen from the following views of Udbhaṭa and Pratihārendurāja. Ruyyaka says :—

" उद्भटादिभिस्तु गुणालंकाराणां प्रायशः साम्यमेव सूचितम् । विषयभेदमात्रेण भेदप्रतिपादनाम् । संघटनाधर्मत्वेन चेष्टः ।" (अलंकारसर्वस्व, काव्यमाला, P. 7) Pratīhārendurāja in his Kāvyālaṅkārasāralaghuvivṛti, p. 75, Nirṇayasāgar Ed., says :—

गुणाः काव्यस्य माधुर्यौजःप्रसादलक्षणाः । तत्र माधुर्यमाह्लादकत्वम् । ओजो गाढता । प्रसादस्त्वव्यवधानेन रसाभिव्यक्त्यनुगुणता । तदेतेषां त्रयाणां गुणानां मध्यात्प्रसादस्य प्राधान्यम् । माधुर्यौजसोस्तु तत्तद्रसाभिव्यक्त्यानुगुण्येन तारतम्येनावस्थितयोः प्रसाद एव सोपयोगता ।" It is true that Pratihārendurāja came after Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, still he is much conservative as is clear from his own commentary on Udbhaṭa. Hence his view represents the transitional period.

Lastly we turn to the *Guṇa* school itself. The *Guṇa* school was very old and flourishing even before Bhāmaha as it is at-

tacked by him in I. 31-35. We learn from Bhāmaha I. 34 that a *Vaidarbha Kāvya* is merely melodious to the ear like singing, is naive, tender, transparent but wanting in imaginative expressions and charming ideas. That Bhāmaha was not quite misrepresenting their view is borne out by Vāmana I. 2. 21 'तदुपारोहादर्थगुणलेशोऽपि ।' and the verse 'जीवन् पदार्थपरिरंभणमन्तरेण शब्दावधिर्न भवति स्फुरणेन सत्यम् । किन्त्वस्ति काचिदपरैव पदानुपूर्वी यस्यां न किंचिदपि किंचिदिवावभाति ॥ which is cited in Alaṅkārasūtravṛtti and Kāmadhenu thereon a (Vāṇīvilāsa Ed., p. 24). The following observation of Dr. Edmund Gosse seems to throw light on the view of the old *Rīti* school :—"When full justice has been done to the necessity of thought as the basis of style, it remains true that what is visible, so to speak, to the naked eye, what can be analysed and described, is an *artistic arrangement of words*. Language is so used as to awaken impressions of touch, taste, odour, and hearing, and these are aroused in a way peculiar to the genius of the individual who brings them forth." (Enc. Brit. XI Ed., Vol. XXV, p. 1057 under 'style'.)

The oldest writer extant of the *Rīti* or *Guṇa* school is Daṇḍin, who tries to defend the *Rīti* school in Kāvyādarśa by showing that *Vaidarbhī Rīti*, which was so much extolled by the advocates of the *Rīti* school, had some real merits and was not merely meant to appeal to the ear. He distinguished two characteristics of *Vaidarbhī*, which defended it against Bhāmaha's criticism (Bhāmaha I. 34) that *Vaidarbhi* was merely melodious to the ear and these characteristics according to him are *mādhurya* or good taste in the use of poetic ornaments and sentiments (Daṇḍin I. 51 ; I. 62), and *Samādhi* or the employment of words in a metaphorical sense, which adds to the beauty of a poem to a pre-eminent degree (Daṇḍin I. 93 ; I. 95 ; I. 100). The remaining eight *Guṇas* of Daṇḍin show that *Vaidarbhī* was well-knit, intelligible, even, delicate, compact, and heightened, and they are negative in character. Daṇḍin's definitions of those eight qualities as also *mādhurya* show that according to him *excellence lies in avoiding the extremes* and illustrates the dictum अति सर्वत्र वर्जयेत् ।. His criticism of the *Gauḍīyā* shows that the Gauḍas were guilty of excesses and never cared for the golden mean. However, *Bhāvika*, which is an attribute or *guṇa* of the

whole composition, Daṇḍin (II. 363-365) still considers an *alaṅkāra*. The truth is Daṇḍin did not make any distinction between *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*. Daṇḍin expressly says :— काश्चिन्मार्गविभागार्थमुक्ताः प्रागप्यलंक्रियाः । साधारणमलङ्कारजातमद्य प्रदर्श्यते ॥ (Kāvyādarśa II. 3). The ten *guṇas* which he had explained in Kavyādarśa I. 43–100 were considered different from other *alaṅkāras* merely because they were the distinguishing features of *Vaidarbhī*.

Vāmana improved upon Daṇḍin's view by saying that the real definition of *guṇa* is काव्यशोभायाः कर्तारो धर्मा गुणाः (Vāmana III. 1. 1.) while *alaṅkāra* did not always produce the necessary minimum of poetry like *guṇas*, (पूर्वे नित्याः । वामन III. 1. 3) but only enhanced the beauty which had been already caused by the *guṇas* (तदतिशयहेतवस्त्वलंकाराः । Vāmana III. 1. 2). Hence the काव्यशोभाकरत्व which was considered to be the common attribute of *guṇa* and *alaṅkāra* by Daṇḍin (II. 1) was found to be wanting unless this reservation was accepted. Vāmana further pointed out that the ten *S'abdaguṇas* which he had defined were attributes of the whole composition (Vāmana III. 1. 4). These ten *S'abdaguṇas* produced a suitable vehicle for the corresponding attributes of sense, so that as Vāmana has already said in I. 3. 21 even slight beauty of sense appears to advantage. Further the *Bhāvikāguṇa* of the entire composition (according to Daṇḍin III. 363–365) was analysed by Vāmana into the *arthaguṇas śleṣa* (III. 2. 4), the fifth variety of 'ojas' (III. 2. 2. Vṛtti), *Samatā* (III. 2. 5), *Samādhi* (III. 2. 6–9), *Mādhurya* (III. 2. 10), and *Arthavyakti* (III. 2. 13). Here Vāmana followed Bharata in the conception of these as *arthaguṇas* as we have seen already.

Bhoja in his Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa combines the *guṇas* or qualities of both Daṇḍin and Vāmana and partially the *guṇas* of Agnipurāṇa. On p. 322 Pratāparudriya shows that the *S'abdaguṇas*, सौकुमार्य, कान्ति, अर्थव्यक्ति, संमितत्व, उदात्तता, और्जित्य, रीति, प्रसाद, उक्ति, सौशब्द्य, प्रेयस्, and समता are mere दोषाभावs, the rest are positive *guṇas*. The later works like अलंकारचिन्तामणि, मन्दारमरन्दचंपू, वाग्भटालंकार, वाग्भटकाव्यानुशासन, साहित्यरत्नाकर, प्रतापरुद्रिय, साहित्यसार and चंद्रालोक accepted Bhoja's *guṇas* or Vāmana's *guṇas* or rarely Daṇḍin's *guṇas*. Vāgbhaṭālaṅkāra and Candrāloka accepted mostly Daṇḍin's or Vāmana's *guṇas*. The definition of

poetry तददोषौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणावनलंकृती पुनः क्वापि given by Mammaṭa which is attacked by Viśvanātha at the beginning of Sāhitya-darpaṇa (p. 12 शिवदत्त Ed.) rightly shows that Mammaṭa was still under the influence of the *Guṇas* school, because Vāmana says :— काव्यशब्दोऽयं गुणालंकारसंस्कृतयोः शब्दार्थयोर्वर्तते (Vāmanavṛtti I. 1-1). In order to escape this censure, Sāhityasāra makes *guṇa* wide enough to include *alaṅkāra* and *rasa* as well (Sāhityasāra I. 20, Nirṇayasāra Ed.).

IDENTIFICATION OF BAGĀJI VAIDYA AND JAYA-ŚAṀKARA MENTIONED BY JYOTIRVID RAṄGANĀTHA IN HIS TREATISE ON PILES (1765 A.D.)

(P. K. GODE, M.A.)

In my note on the *Identification of Raṅganātha Jyotirvid*,[1] the author of a medical treatise on Piles composed by order of Peshawa Raghunathrao in A.D. 1765, I tried to prove from contemporary Maratha Records the identification of the author himself as also some other physicians mentioned by him viz. *Bābā Bhiṣagvarya*,[2] and *Balavantrāya Vaidya*. Two other physicians viz. (1) *Bagāji Vaidya* and (2) *Jaya S'aṁkara* remained then unidentified. I propose to record in this note some evidence from contemporary records which proves that Bagāji Vaidya was also a contemporary physician with whom our author had some contact and whose opinions he respected. This fact would be clear from the following extract from our author's treatise called the *Vicārasudhākara* (MS No. 307 of Vis'I) folio 14 :—

" इति शास्त्रानुभावस्वानुभूतिगुरूपदिष्टवाक्यानुसारतो जुन्नरपुरस्थित-
ज्योतिर्विद्रंगनाथ तथा वगाजीवैद्ययोः संमतमिदं समाप्तिमगमत् "

1. Vide *Poona Orientalist*, Vol. II (1937-38), pp. 31-34.

2. Further information about this physician is found in *Rajwade's Sources of Marāthā History*, Khanda VI, p. 68.--It appears Bābā Vaidya built a house in Poona in *A.D..1751* (Śaka 1673—" श्रा. शुद्ध ८ शुक्रवारी बाबा वैद्य यांणीं खंडू तेलियाच्या जागियावरी नवें घर बांधलें. त्या घरास ग्रहप्रवेश केला असे "). This reference in *1751 A.D.* to Bābā Vaidya is the earliest traced by me. Other references are later. They may be briefly recounted here :—

(1) *About A.D. 1760—Bābā Vaidya's* endorsement on Sadashiv Rao Peshwa's letter to his wife on the eve of his departure for the battle of Paniput (1760).

(2) *A.D. 1765*—Mention by Ranga Joshi in his treatise on Piles as authority.

(3) *1st November 1766*—Mention of *Bābā Vaidya's* intended visit to Miraj by Moro Ballal in his letter to Gopalrao Patwardhan.

(4) *8th March 1767*—The Peshwa asks Nana Fadnis to make inquiries regarding certain Medical preparations at *Bābā Vaidya's* house and then send them on to him.

It appears, therefore, that Bagāji Vaidya was also a resident of Junnar, in the Poona district, like our author Raṅganātha Jyotirvid or Raṅga Joshi of Junnar. We have now to prove the identity of this physician from contemporary records of the Peshwa period of the Marāthā history as Raghunatharao Peshwa was the patron of Raṅga Joshi of Junnar.

We have already proved that Raṅga Joshi was a friend of the Chandrachud family and in particular he was closely associated with the family of Gangadhar Yashavant Chandrachud popularly known as Gangoba Tatya who died in 1773 A.D. and who played an important role in some of the ambitious political campaigns[1] of the Peshwas during his life-time. Ranga Joshi appears to have acted almost as a family physician to the Chandrachud family.[2] Ranga Joshi was present at the death-bed of Subhedar Malharrao Holkar when he died at *Alampur* (prānta *Jhānsī*) on Tuesday, Vaiśākha Śuddha 11, Sâka 1688 = 13th May 1766.[3] This fact is mentioned in a letter dated *27th May 1766*[4] found in the *Chandrachud Daftar*.

Gangoba Tatya Chandrachud had two wives : viz. (1) Annapūrṇābāi and (2) Pārvatībāi, who died in the month of Āṣāḍha, Śaka 1685 (= A.D. 1763).[5] In a letter written by Annapurnabai to her son on *4th June 1763* she refers to the illness of Parvatibai and the fact of Parvatibai's being under the medical treatment of

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1. Vide preface to *Chandrachud-Daftar* published by the Bh. Iti. Mandal, Poona (Śaka 1842 = A D. 1920), pp. 1–16.

2. Ibid, p. 62—Vide letter No. 58 dated *6th December 1762* from the two sons of Gangoba Tatya viz. Sadashiva and Kṛṣṇarao to their mother. In this letter the writers refer to the medical treatment given by Ranga Joshi to Gangoba Tatya—"तीर्थरूपाचे शरीरभावनेचे......वर्तमान कलत गेले पाहिजे म्हणोन आज्ञा येसियासि आम्लपित्तास उपाये **जोसी बाबा** करीत आहेत." "आपल्या येण्याविसा **जोसीबाबांनीं** एक दोनदां पुसिले. etc. "Joshi Baba mentioned in this extract is none other than Ranga Joshi of Junnar, the author of *Vicārasudhākara* also called *Ārśoghnasudhākara*.

3. Vide *Indian Ephemeries*, Vol. VI, p. 334.

4. Vide *Chandrachud Daftar*, pp. 97–98, Letter No. 104—"येकांतीचे वर्तमान वे॥ राजश्री **रंग जोसीबाबा** यानीं समक्ष पाहिले आहे ते तिकडे आले आहेत सवीस्तरे सांगतील."

5. Ibid, p. 65, footnote 1.

a physician by name "*Bagājibāvā Vaidya*."[1] I have no doubt that "*Bagājibāvā Vaidya*" referred to in the above letter, dated *27th May 1766* is identical with "*Bagājī Vaidya*" mentioned by Ranga Joshi in his *Vicārasudhākara*, which was composed by the author about a year earlier i.e. in A.D. 1765.[2]

I shall record in this note some additional information about the family of Ranganatha Jyotirvid or Ranga Joshi of Junnar. This information is furnished by the papers of a dispute connected with the removal of Śivaliṅga from the temple of Siddheśvara at Shirgaun (paragaṇe Māhim, prānta Vasai). These papers were published as far back as 1884.[3] In these papers we find recorded in *A. D. 1808–1809* a deposition of Jagannatha Joshi, the son of Ranga Joshi Junnarkar.[4] From this deposition we know clearly the name of Ranga Joshi's father viz. "**सूर्य जोशी**", who is mentioned by Jagannatha Joshi as his grand-father. In the treatise *Vicārasudhākara* the author Ranga Joshi describes himself as follows :—

" **प्रथितसूर्यविधिज्ञसुतः सुधीर्गणितवैद्यकशास्त्रविशारदः।**
असुहृदुग्रगुदामयशातनं व्यरचयद्विविधार्त्तिहरं मुदा ॥ १ ॥[5]

In the above description Ranga Joshi calls himself "**सूर्यविधिज्ञ-सुत**" i.e. son of **सूर्यविधिज्ञ** (=**सूर्यजोशी**) and proficient in the sciences of *gaṇita* (or astrology) and *Vaidyaka* (or medicine). In the deposition of Jagannatha Joshi we are informed that *Dada-*

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1. Ibid, p. 75, Letter No. 77—" चिरंजीव सौ **पार्वतीच्या** शरीरी ज्वर अद्यापी आहे रो **बगाजीबावा** वैद्य औषध देतात परंतु अद्यापी गुणास येत नाहीं आरोग्य होईल तो सुदीन आसे."

2. Vide folio. 23 of Ms. No. 307 of Viś. I in the Govt. Mss Library, at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona—" शैलदंतिरसभूमिते शके। मार्गशुक्रविनायके तिथौ ॥ भूमिनंदनदिने व्यरीरचत्। सद्विचारणसुधासुधाकरं ॥ २ ॥" Vide also my note on the *Date of Vicārasudhākara* published in the Annals (B. O. R. Institute) Vol. XII, pp. 287-289.

3. Vide pp. 120–164 of the account of शुक्लयजुर्वेदीय ब्राह्मण by Narayan Vithal Vaidya Purandare Puntambekar, Bombay Saka 1806 = A. D. 1884 (शिरगांव येथील लिंगोत्पाटणाचा खटला).

4. Ibid, p. 152—" जगन्नाथ जोशी बिन् **रङ्गजोशी जुन्नरकर** त्र्यंबकी हल्ली वस्ती पुणें याणीं लिहून दिले कीं......आमचे घरीं पूर्वापार **सूर्यजोशी** आमचे आजे त्यांजपासी व आमचे तीर्थरूप कैलासवासी रङ्गजोशी यांजपासी येत होते......श्रीमंत **दादासाहेब** मुंबईस होते ते समयी आपणही कांहीं कार्यानिमित्त गेलो होतों...."

5. Vide folio. 23 of MS No. 307 of Viś. I (Govt. MSS Library).

saheb was at Bombay and that Jagannatha Joshi had gone there on some business. This Dadasaheb is none other than Raghobadada Peshwa at whose instance Ranga Joshi wrote his work *Vicārasudhākara.* Jagannatha Joshi was living at Poona in the year 1808–09 when he gave his deposition in the case under reference and when his father Ranga Joshi is referred to as a dead person ("आमचे तीर्थरूप कैलासवासी रङ्गजोशी"). Ranga Joshi must have died after A.D. 1780 as his signature is found on a deed dated *17th January 1780.*[1]

We have now to identify *Jaya S'aṁkara* who is referred to by Ranganatha Joshi in his treatise as follows :—

Folio 16a (of MS No. 307 of Vis'I)—

जयशंकरमतं ॥ तक्रपानं सदा कार्यं व्योषक्षारसमन्वितं ।
अथवा त्रिफलाचूर्णं चित्रकैरपि योजयेत् ॥
मंडूरतक्रपानेन तथा राजमृगांकक: ।
अरुष्करादिचूर्णस्य सेवनात्सुरणस्यच ॥
अर्शांसि नाशमायांति तिमिरं भास्करोदयात् ।
इति जयशंकरमतं ॥

I shall now record some evidence about a physician of the name *Jaya Saṁkara* to whom the Peshwa restored some confiscated revenues between 1754–55 A.D. This evidence is furnished by the Diaries of Peshwa Balaji Bajirao alias Nanasaheb, published by Messrs. Vad and Parasnis,[2] whose summary of extract No. 213 reads as follows :—

"*213.* Maloji Powar previously granted a share of revenue of a village in Nasik to the ancestors of Jaya Shankar and Deo Shankar, physicians for opening a charitable dispensary. The

1. Vide pp. 3–10 of *Chandrachud Daftar*.

2. *Selections from the Satara Rajas and the Peshwā's Diaries II*, Balaji Bajirao Peshwa—Vol. II, Bombay 1906, p. 132—The diary describes Jaya-Śaṅkara as वेदमूर्ति राजश्री जयशंकर व वेदशंकर (=देवशंकर ?) बिन भवानीशंकर वैद्य गुजरार्थी, उपनांव देव, गोत्र अवतखण, सूत्र वाजश्री". Jaya Śaṅkara's father had a share of revenue in the village called *Talegaun* Ajner, Pargaṇe Nasik. This share was granted to him by Maloji Powar. After Maloji's death, Jagajīvan Pawar the son of Maloji continued it. In 1754–55 the *Saranjām* of Jagajīvan Powar was confiscated by the Peshwa and consequently Jaya Śaṅkar and his brother lost the revenue of the village in question. The Peshwa directed the restoration of the revenue to the two physicians by the present grant.


Powar's *Saranjām* was discontinued by government and the above grant was attached. It was now restored, with some addition, to the physicians on condition that if they failed to dispense medicines to the poor the grant would be revoked."

I have no doubt that the Gujarathi physician *Jaya S'aṁkara* mentioned in the above extract is exactly identical with *Jaya S'aṁkara* whose opinion is recorded by Ranganath Joshi in his treatise on piles composed in A.D. 1765. It is possible to conclude that Jaya Śaṁkara may have been living in 1765. He appears to have died about 1779–80 A.D. because during the reign of Peshwa Savai Madhavrao an order[1] was issued by the Peshwa to the Kamāvīsdar of the Nasik paragaṇā directing him to continue the revenue of the village Talegaun Ajner in favour of the son of *Jaya S'aṁkara* by name *Vidyādhara*, who was then residing at Nasik. The summary of the extract from Savai Madhavrao's Diary as given by the editors reads as follows :—

A.D. 1779–80—"(1063) The Government *amal* of the village, of Talegaun Ajner in parganá Násik was granted to Jayshankar and Dewashankar bin Bhawani Shankar Vaidya Gujarathi in consideration of their dispensing medicines gratis to the poor. The *amal* was on their deaths continued to Jayshankar's son Vidyádhar Vaidya, to be spent on medicines for the poor."

From the two extracts from Peshwa Diaries, summaries of which have been quoted above we can reconstruct the genealogy of the family of Jaya Śaṁkara as follows :—

भवानीशंकर (देव)



It appears that this Gujarathi family of physicians was resident in the Nasik Paragaṇā long before A.D. 1754 i.e. during the life-time of Jaya Śaṅkara's father.

1. *Vad and Parasnis* : Peshwa Diaries, VIII—Savai Madhavrao Peshwa (Vol. III), Bombay, 1911, p. 222—*Extract No. 1063*.

2. This देवशंकर, physician, appears to be a different person from his namesake देवशंकर who wrote his work अलंकारमंजूषा in praise of the Peshwas Raghunathrao, Madhavarao, Narayanrao and Vishvasrav and who was the son of Nahnābhai and resident of Rāṇer (= *Rander* near Surat) (Vide my article in *Bha. Iti. Mandal Quarterly*, Vol XVIII (1938), pp. 92-95).

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Devānanda-mahākāvya (देवानन्द महाकाव्यम्) of Meghavijayopādhyāya, critically edited in the original Sanskrit from an old Ms. with Notes, Index and Hindi Intro., Summary etc., by Bechardas Doshi. Ahmedabad 1937. Sup. Roy. Boards pp. 80. Rs. 2–12.

Gaṅgālaharī (गंगालहरी) of Jagannātha with Pīyūṣalahari comm of Sadāśiva Bhaṭṭa ed. by Panśikar Sastri. Benares 1938. Pocket–size. • As. 4.

Haṁsa-sandes'a (हंससंदेशः) A Kāvya ed. by K. Samba Siva Sastri with English and Sanskrit introductions. This is a different work from the Haṁsa-sandeśa of Vedāntadeśikacārya. Trivendrum 1938 Roy. pp. 19. As. 4.

Kapphiṇābhyudaya (कप्फिणाभ्युदय) of Śivaswāmin or exhaultation of King Kapphiṇa critically edited for the first time with an introduction and appendix by Gaurī Shankara. A Buddhist legend about King Kapphiṇa in the form of a Mahakavya comprising 20 cantos. Lahore 1937. Roy. Cloth pp. 80, 165, 18. Rs. 6-8.

S'ivamahimodaya (शिवमहिमोदयः) by Pt. Ananta Nārāyaṇa Śāstri. A collection of Slokas about the greatness of Siva, culled out from Mahābhārata, with the editor's own Commentary in Sanskrit. Poona 1938. Cr. Pp. 37. As. 8.

Vṛttavārtika (वृत्तवार्त्तिक) of Sri Rāmapaṇivada ed. by K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstri with Sanskrit and English Prefaces. Trivendrum 1937. Roy. pp. 34, 26-2. Rs. 1-8.

VEDA

Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa (जैमिनीय ब्राह्मणम्) Sāmavedīya, Book 1. Critical Text with readings edited by Dr. Raghu Vir, Lahore 1937. Cloth Double Roy. pp. 95. Rs. 14. Book II and III, An extensive Introduction, a Sanskrit commentary, a rendering into English, exegetical Notes and Appendices appear as separate Volumes.

Hymns from Ṛgveda: a second selection by Peterson. Third edition completely revised and enlarged by V. G. Paranjpe. Poona 1938. Rs. 4-8.

REVIEWS

The Virāṭaparvan, being the fourth book of the Mahābhārata, The Great Epic of India, critically edited by Raghu Vira, Professor of Sanskrit, S. D. College, Lahore, under the General Editorship of Dr V. S. Sukthankar. Published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1936. Royal size; pp. lxi, 363.

The present edition of the *Virāṭaparvan* is based on the general principles as enunciated by Dr Sukthankar in the Prolegomena (pp. lxvvi ff.) to his edition of the *Ādiparvan*. Of course, those principles had to be modified according to the special circumstances of the *Virāṭaparvan*. The text is based on 32 Mss. belonging to Northern Recension (represented by North-western Group and Central Group) and Southern Recension. The most important Ms. of the North-western Group is in *śāradā* script but unfortunately, it is incomplete and fragmentary. It is a pity that no complete *śāradā* Ms. of this *parvan* could be found. The codex containing this *parvan* contains also the *Āraṇyaka*, *Karṇa* and *Bhīṣma-parvans*. At the end of the *Āraṇyakaparvan*, the date of copying the Ms. is given as *S'aka* 1630 and *V. Saṁ.* 84. Dr Raghu Vira has put a query after this *saṁvat* 84. In fact it stands for the Kashmiri or the *Saptarṣi saṁvat* which is usually given at the end of *śāradā* Mss. and which starts with 1624 A. D. If the Ms. does contain a वि before the word *Saṁ.* then it is obviously the scribe's mistake to equate *śaka* 1630 with *vikrama* 84. But I very much doubt that the letter standing before the word *Saṁ* is वि. I think that the editor ought to have clarified this anomaly.

The Central Group consists of Bengali and Devanāgarī versions. Besides these, the editor has examined eleven other Mss., two of which are "the recent copies of Nīlakaṇṭha's text, and hence of no value as *śāradā* codices". The remaining nine are Devanāgarī Mss. The editor has taken pains to consult the readings supplied by no less than 15 commentaries and Kṣemendra's *Bhāratamañjarī*. The Javanese prose version has also been consulted. The following opening verses are interesting :

(१) शाक्तेयो यस्तपस्व्यन्धकरिपु र व न ष्ट सं ला स नि ते? वै
पुंसा युक्तोपलोभे विशल पु स लि नि यें? पुनः कन्यकार्थे ?।
आपद्धर्मप्रतीकारजननकुशलो यस्तयोरात्मपुत्रः
कृष्णद्वैपायनाख्यः सजयति भगवान् श्रोत्रियाणां विशिष्टः ॥

(२) यस्मान्नमेति ? गुणशालिकादेया ?
सार्धां न वर्षा शतरोहिनास्पिते ? ।
यद्वैर्यवर्णामितकारयस्तु सा ?
श्रीधर्मवंशद्गु अनन्तविक्रम ? ॥

Dr Raghu Vira has not attempted any reconstruction of these verses. A reconstruction was attempted by Dr. C. C. Berg of Leiden, who communicated it to Dr Sukthankar in a letter of July 4, 1936. He also requested Dr Sukthankar to get some better reconstruction of these verses. Dr Sukthankar handed over these verses to me and my reconstruction of the first verse along with its English translation was communicated by him to Dr Berg in his letter of the 4th of September, 1936. At my request the second verse was reconstructed by the veteran scholar, the late Dewan Bahadur K. H. Dhruva of Ahmedabad. The emended readings, etc., are :—

(1) In this verse it is only the first two lines which are corrupt and I emended them thus :—

शाक्तेयो यस्तपस्व्यन्धकरिपुवरलब्धप्रसादान्वितो वै
पुंसा युक्तापि लेभे सुविमलपुलिने या पुनः कन्यकात्वम् ।

I would translate the verse :—"Victorious is that venerable sage, Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana by name, the best among the brahmins learned in the Vedas, skilled in finding remedies in accordance with the practices which are allowed only in times of distress (*āpaddharma*) and who was born of them (*tayoḥ ātmaputraḥ*), viz., (of) Śākteya, an ascetic who was possessed of tranquility obtained as a boon from Śiva (Andhakaripu) and of her who, though united with a man on a clear sandy bank (of Yamunā), regained her virginity."

(2) While sending the following note on the second verse Dewan Bahadur remarks at the end of his letter to me (Ahmedabad, September 6, 1936) :—"My tentative draft may serve as a step to the choice of better readings. I write this

from memory, your letter with the tiny accompaniment being misplaced and lost."

यस्संप्रदत्ते गुणशालिकाद्यं
योऽर्धोनवर्षः शतरोहणः स्थितः ।
यो धीरवर्ष्मामृतकारणोऽस्तु
श्रीधर्मवंशद्रुरनन्तविक्रमः ॥

Translation :—"May that Dharmavaṁśa-tree Anantavikrama, (the tree) which gives out *s'āli(-kā)*, etc., in the shape of *guṇas*, which has kept growing for a hundred years minus a half, (may that tree) of a strong build become immortal (by reason of *Nirvāṇa*)."

Notes :—"Here I take *Dharmavaṁśa* a proper noun denoting a person ; *druḥ* is substituted for *dguḥ* which is meaningless. Emboldened by the double meaning of *vaṁśa* I do it. Similarly, in place of *amitakārayastu*, I read *amṛtakāraṇo'stu*, where I take *amṛta* to mean *nirvāṇa*. *Dhīravarṣmā* replacing *dhairyavarṣā* signifies 'of strong build'. The second line mentions the age of *Dharmavaṁśa*. He was running the 100th year, being short only by six months (lit. half an year). Whereas a bamboo yields *vaṁśagodhūma* and *vaṁśakarpūra* the poet says that *Dharmavaṁśa* affords *śālikā*, i.e., *śāli* in the shape of *guṇa*, etc., by which I understand the *Pāramitās*."

In his critical introduction Dr Raghu Vira discusses the values of the two recensions--the Northern and the Southern--, the different versions in *Śāradā*, Bengali, Devanāgarī, Telegu, Grantha and Malayalam recensions. He has not failed to utilise the printed editions, specially that of *Virāṭaparvan* by the late Mr N. B. Utgikar. At the end the editor gives two appendices containing (1) a series of additional passages found in different Mss. which have been cited in the foregoing footnotes to the constituted text, but which, for various reasons were not quoted there in extenso ; and (2) a list of Sanskrit excerpts culled from Dr Juynboll's edition of the Javanese version.

Dr Raghu Vira is sure of only about 300 stanzas out of a total of 1834 stanzas constituting the text. This shows the amount of labour that the editor has spent over his task. The directing genius and perseverance of Dr Sukthankar is visible in every line and has been acknowledged by the editor with thanks.

We congratulate the Institute on this wonderful achievement and recommend the work to all the lovers of the Great Epic.

In the end we cannot close without admiring the self-confidence of Dr Raghu Vira who warns his critics in the following words :—"But let us warn the uninitiated that there are pitfalls and traps quite invisible to his eye, should he try to judge too hastily."

—*The Editor.*

Atti Del XIX Congresso Internazionale degli Orientalisti. Roma, 23–29 Settmbre 1935—XIII. pp. 722. Royal Size. Price 60 Lira.

The present volume is the report of the 19th International Congress of Orientalists held at Rome in 1935. The Congress was divided into ten sections, viz.—

I. Assyriology, II. Egyptology, III. Extreme Orient, and Indonesia, IV. Central Asia, Iran, etc., V. India, VI. Semetic language and people, VII. Old Testament and Judaism, VIII. Islam, IX. Christianity in the Orient and X. Oriental Arts.

The President of Indian Section was Prof. C. Formichi, and Drs. M. Falk and M. Carelli were the Secretaries. There are twenty-five papers submitted to this section. Prof. M. Singh of Lahore has two papers to his credit : (1) *A new view of Hindu Mythology* and (2) *Buddhism and Sikkhism.* In the first article Prof. M. Singh presents us with a new view which in his own words is—"........Our entire Sacred Sanskrit Literature is a big circle which circumscribes two triangles, one with the apex up and the other down, intersecting each other. That figure, as we all know is the symbol of the Theosophical Society. The ancients took a cosmic view interconnecting the Heavens, the Earth and the Man. The identity of objects, operations and events in the three, not merely the similarity between the two, macrocosm and microcosm was real, vital and sacred to them...... all knowledge, in whatever form it is presented, is the presentation of one single idea, enriching itself, by variegated observations at each unit of time. In his second paper, Prof. M. Singh develops the theme that in Sikkism Nānak took us back to the original simple teachings of Buddhism which rested

on the three pillars of the Buddha, the Sangha and the Dharma. In Sikkhism we have the Sat-Guru, the Sat-Sanga and the Satnāma.

The next paper by Prof. Betty Heimann (London School of Oriental Studies) discusses the question of meaning and importance of Indian terms (*Deutung und Bedeutung indischer Terminologie*) from philological point of view.

Prof. A. Ballini of Milan contributes a paper on Michele Kerbaker (*Inedita di Michele Kerbaker*), the *pitāmaha* of Italian Sanskritists.

Prof. Kṣetreśa Candra Caṭṭopādhyāya of Allahabad University has submitted a paper on "*Dāsa and dasyu in the Ṛgveda-Saṁhitā*", the essence of which he has given in the following Sanskrit verses composed by him and given at the beginning of his article—

नत्वा दाशरथिं रामं रक्षोगणनिषूदनम् ।
करोमि निर्णयं यत्नैरर्थस्य दस्युदासयोः ॥
ऋग्वेदसंहिताग्रन्थे शब्दावेतौ किमर्थकौ ।
विषयेऽत्र महान् भेदः प्राच्यपाश्चात्ययोर्मते ॥
असुरार्थाविति प्राहुः प्राचीनमतकोविदाः ।
पाश्चात्याः पण्डितास्त्वाहुरनार्यार्थाविमौ ध्रुवम् ॥
एतयोर्मतयोर्मध्ये कतरच्छ्रुतिसङ्गतम् ।
इत्येतन्निर्णयः कार्यः पक्षपातं विनाधुना ॥
पाश्चात्यं तु मतं तत्र कल्पनामात्रमूलकम् ।
न तथा सायणादीनां सम्मतावप्रमाणता ॥
निष्पन्नं दस्यतेर्धातोरसुरार्थं तु तद्द्वयम् ।
श्रुतिमीमांसया ह्येतत् सिद्धं सर्वं निबोधत ॥
अर्थान्तरमपार्थं स्तु न तत्र श्रुतिसङ्गतिः ।
प्रीयतामनया कृत्या भगवान् वेदपूरुषः ॥

The next paper A Yoga hymn in the Atharva-Veda ("'*Un inno Yoga nell' Atharva-Veda*") by Dott. SSA M. Falk (Rome) discusses Av. VIII. 9.

In "*La notion de temps dans les Brāhmaṇas*", Prof. SSA H. De Willman-Grabowska (Cracovia) discusses the conception of time—year—as found in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa. He arrives at the conclusion that Prajāpati is the creator of time.

Prof. L. A. Krishna Iyer of Trivandrum has discussed in a short paper the life of the Malapantārams, a small tribe in the hunting stage of civilizatisn in Central Travancore.

Prof. J. B. Durkal of Surat, in his paper "*The Indian Social System: Its Basis and Evolution*" explains that the Indian Social System is essentially a socio-religious or religio-social system, based upon the philosophical back-ground of the principle of the greatest good of the greatest number.

In "*Eine neue Version der verlorenen Bṛhatkathā des Guṇāḍhya*", ·Dr. L. Alsdorf of Hamburg expounds that apart from the two Kashmere Sanskrit versions of Guṇāḍhya's Bṛhatkathā, viz., Somadeva's Kathāsaritsāgara and Kṣemendra's Bṛhatkathā-Mañjarī, there exists another version which has so far been overlooked. And that is the Vasudevahiṇḍi by Sanghadāsa, a text in Prakrit prose, covering about 370 pages of quarto size. This Jaina version is referred to thrice in the Āvaśyaka Cūrṇi, which, therefore, leads to the conclusion that Vasudevahiṇḍi is prior to 6th century A.D. But its language is very old and it should, therefore, be much earlier. Thus, it is the oldest extant version of Guṇāḍhya's Bṛhatkathā.

Dr. R. Wagner of Berlin discusses in his article "*Sprachform und Inhalt der bengalischan Volksmaerchen in Dakṣiṇārañjan Mitra-Majumdar's Ṭhākurmā'r Jhuli*" discusses the dialect and the contents of a story-book in Bengali by Dakṣiṇārañjan Mitra-Majumdar. The author has collected in it the stories which he heard from his mother and other old ladies of the village.

Prof. M. Vallanri (Torino) discusses the composition and contents of the eighteen Purāṇas according to the Nārada-Purāṇa in his article '*Compozizione e' contenuto dei "Purāṇa" secondo il "Nāradapurāṇa"*'.

Prof. P. Mus (Hanoi) has submitted a paper on Hiuan-tsang and his stūpas of Aśoka.

Dr. G. Borsani of Milan in his paper "*Apsaras e Yakṣiṇī*" compares the Vedic idea of Apsaras with the Buddhistic conception of Yakṣiṇī.

Prof. M. V. Kibe of Indore has contributed a long article named "*Further Light on Ravana's Lanka located in Central India from Valmiki's Ramayana.*"

In his interesting article "*The Vedic Word Svadhā*", Prof. J. S. Miśra of Amritsar tries to prove that the Persian word Khuda is derived from the Vedic word Svadhā.

Prof. P. E. Dumont of Baltimore, in his article "*La doctrine me'taphysique de l'Iśvaragītā*", examines the metaphysical doctrine of Īśvaragītā.

The other articles on Indian subjects are :—

Traditions Regarding the Origin of the Order of Naked Ascetics in India—by Prof. R. P. Masani (Bombay).

Influssi indiani nella filosofia di Plotino ? by Dr. P. Marrucchi (Firenze). Discusses the question—Was Plotinus influenced by Indian philosophy ?

I Dati Secolari e Sociologici nella Letteratura Buddhistica Pali—by Prof. B. K. Sarkar (Calcutta).

The Origin of the Pallavas—by Prof. P. H. Heras (Bombay).

Rājpūts—by Prof. B. Reu (Jodhpur).

The importance of the Simhalese language in the study of Indo-Aryan linguistic—by Prof. I. De Lanerolle (Monaco di Baviera).

La physiognomonie et la chiromantie indiennes—by Prof. Stasiak (Leopoli).

Sinhalese Amulets in Leiden and London Mss.—by Prof. O. Pertold (Prag).

—*The Editor*

The Annual Report of the Mysore Archaeological Department for the year 1934, by Dr. H. Krishna, M.A., D. LITT., pp. viii and 237. Plates 20. Bangalore 1936. Price Rs. 8.

The Annual Report of the Mysore Archæological Department for the year 1935, by H. Krishna, M.A., D. LITT., pp. viii + 215. Plates 28. Bangalore 1936. Price Rs. 8.

The Reports under review are superbly produced and well-designed volumes and speak highly of the administrative as well as of the scholarly abilities of the Mysore Archaeological department. The work done by the States of Mysore and Hyderabad and a few others towards the proper conservation of the ancient monuments, is, indeed, laudable. Along with proper conservation the State authorities have also made careful arrangements

for the study and interpretation of these invaluable "sources of history."

It is a well-known fact of Indian history that with the advent of the Muhammadans, Hinduism took shelter in the South· There, protected by the Vindhyan ranges, the Hindus as usual drowned themselves in contemplation. In the course of centuries after the first blast of the foreign conquest had blown over, out arose New-Hinduism after decades of dormant existence, resplendent and rejuvenated after its contact with the invaders. Seldom in the history of mankind has the spectacle been witnessed of two civilisations, so vast and strongly developed and yet so radically dissimilar as the Muhammadan and the Hindu meeting and mingling together. Islam was the Creator's pruning-knife for Hinduism. The fields of Northern India are strewn with examples of Islamic architecture. In the South the Hindus struggled for centuries to keep themselves and their lives and arts free from the touch of the outsider. The Hindu movements of the South are the purest extant examples of the cannons of Indian art. And as such they are objects of special interest and study. But struggle as they did yet the Hindus were unable to maintain their proud independence to the last. The flood of Islamic-Sword surged over the South as it had already benumbed the North. But before their fading out of the picture the Hindus had already erected lasting memorial of their greatness in the form of temples, images and monuments etc. With the departure of Aurangzeb from Northern India in 1681, the South became the centre of the stage in the drama of Indian history. From 1681 onwards for close on two centuries the South became the battle-ground between the contending parties for the crown and throne of India. During these years of disturbance art and culture suffered. The monuments of South India were not recoverd from destructive hands before the storm of two centuries was over and the paramountcy of one single power was established. For the proper understanding of the Hindu religion and civilisation a study of the Hindu monuments is essential The Mysore Government as the leading Hindu State is doing excellent service in this direction.

The volumes under review are divided into five parts: Administrative, Monuments, Numismatics, Manuscripts and Epi-

graphs. Some of the temples, monuments and images have been described with such a wealth of detail as to evoke unstinted admiration. Indologists especially those working in the restricted field of Archæology will be deeply indebted to Dr. Krishna for this veritable "treasure-trove". The reports are complete with contents and Index.

Report for 1934

The chief items of interest in this section dealing with "Ancient Monuments" are temples and hill-forts. The descriptions of important places are illustrated with photographs and diagrams. It is not possible to deal with all the temples and monuments recorded in the report. Among the temples dealt with in this report one of the most important one is the Muktinātheśvara temple in the village of Binnamangala. "The friezes of lions and Yakshas and the roundish corner, the prevalence of rearing tiger brackets and the presence of an inscription lead us to ascribe the temple to the Chola times." Some important temples of Śiva Gaṅgā like the Gaṅgādhareśvara temple and the Honnadevi temple are objects of special and admirable studies "either because of their dates or because of their architectural merit." Other important temples dealt with in great detail are the Saumyakeśava temple in the village of Nāgamaṅgala, Śrī Mallikārjunaswami temple at Basral, Anantapadmanābha temple at Budanur, Paravāsudeva temple at Gundlupet and the Lakṣmīkānta temple at Kalkale. Among the hill forts studied evidently three are very important, namely, Madhugiri, Savandurga, and Devaranyadurga.

The next section on Numismatics contains a short but interesting account of the Chola coins from the tenth to the thirteenth century A.D. Indeed, it is very difficult to assign any coin to the Cholas before the tenth century A.D. The note on the coinage of the Kerala feudatories of the Chola Kings is of particular interest.

The object of study in part iv is a small unimportant manuscript belonging to Koppa Taluk, Kadur district, known as the "Story of the Gurus of the Bhangigade Matt."

About sixty stone and copper plate inscriptions are dealt with in part v. A summary of the inscriptions arranged according to dynasties and dates is a very useful appendix.

Report for 1935

Among the important temples dealt with in this issue are the Chennakesavaba and the Kallesvara temples at Aralaguppa Amarnārāyaṇa's temple at Kaivara and the Someśvara temple at Kolar.

Seringapatam is an object of interest separately. Its architectural treasures especially those built under the Mohammadan rulers evoke the unstinted admiration of the scholars as well as of the laymen. The places of historical and architectural interest in Seringapatam have been dealt with on pp. 53 to 65. Without doubt the most interesting building in Seringapatam is the Darya-Daulat [the wealth of the Sea] built by Tipu Sultan in 1784 A.D. An interior view of the Darya-Daulat is the fitting frontis-piece of the report under review. An interesting feature of this building is that its walls, pillars and arches are profusely painted with varied colours including a free use of gold. On the west wall are painted four large battle-scenes, noteworthy feature of which are the details of the dresses, armours, organisation etc., employed by the Sultan.

The section on Numismatics deals with coins from the extreme South of India. (Pl. xxiii).

The Manuscript section contains a short account of an eighteenth century poem called Mādhavānkana Kāvya.

The new inscriptions for the year 1935 number fifty-three. The inscriptions are summarised and arranged according to dynasties and dates.

—*B. N. Mitra.*

The Ocean of Theosophy, by W. Q. Judge, a pupil of Madame H. P. Blavatsky, Second Indian Edition (1937).

This book was first published in America in 1893 and has been widely read. The writer does not claim any originality but has simply written what has been taught and proved to him. It is a condensed presentation of the uncontroversial main principles of Theosophy and may be considered as an epitome of Madame H. P. Blavatsky's *The Secret Doctrine.*

In spite of the modesty of the writer of this small book, a great many points of theosophical philosophy have been very

clearly explained. The chapters dealing with Reincarnation, Karma, and Cycles are to be specially mentioned. As no "proof", in the ordinary sense can be given, the author has logically refuted the objections against these doctrines and one is convinced by this negative method although it is difficult to accept them whole-heartedly otherwise than as a matter of faith. That the doctrine of Reincarnation and Karma are connected has been made plain, and that they lead also to the doctrine of Cycles is understandable. Theosophy teaches also that reincarnation as a doctrine applying to the real man does not teach transmigration into kingdoms of nature below the human. Modern Psychology and Ethics may be a great deal benefited by a study of some of the theosophical doctrines. The author has dispelled the wrong idea that Theosophy spouses Spiritualism, but a modern psychologist will gain much by studying with the theosophist the phenomena of the psychic forces which was neglected by the " psychologies without soul " of the last century.

The author cherishes the hope that with a scientific knowledge of the inner psychic life of man the progress of the race will be achieved and it will be gratifying to the Indians to note that he believes "that of all the old races the Aryan Indian yet remains as the preserver of the old doctrine. It will one day rise again to its old heights of glory."

It has become out of fashion to read Theosophical books now-a-days but the small book by William Q. Judge is an interesting reading. It may be hoped that with the new psychology, Theosophical philosophy will be widely read again and "The Ocean of Theosophy" is likely to stimulate such study.

—*C. C. M.*

Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals. By Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyer, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D., Kamala lectures—Published by the Calcutta University, 230 pages. 1935.

The questions which the learned author has undertaken to consider in the course of these lectures are whether the Hindu ethical code has been rigid or flexible, whether it has been stationary and can afford to remain so or has been affected by our environment, political and economic conditions and other

factors. He has pointed out two striking features in the history of the ethical ideals of Hindus : first, they have not remained stationary but have changed in various directions from time to time ; secondly, there is no breach of continuity in the main web of Indian culture.

Incidentally a very detailed information is given of Vedic, Pauranic modern Hinduism which ought to be known by every so-called educated Indian now-a-days. The old Hindu law-books mix up the topics of law, religion and ethics and claim to deal with the whole conduct of life by man. The Dharma Śāstra is practically co-extensive with the whole sphere of the duties of man.

The author enforces his points by numerous references to parallel conceptions and practices in western countries. Ordinarily the fact that a rule is derived from supposed conformity to the law of nature, from revelation or immemorial usage or in accord with the enlightened conscience, or the practice of the wisest and most highly esteemed members of his community would be sufficient to set the seal of authority upon the rule. Such was also the nature of the early Greek thought. The rejection of reason and experience as a guide to morality is also found with the intuitional school of moralists in Europe.

According to strict theory, the rules of conduct laid down in the Dharma Śāstra are supposed to be eternal and immutable. The commentators on the Śāstras have generally endeavoured to bring them into relation and accordance with the conditions of the society in which they lived. These will be seen by reference to the variations of Yuga Dharma, to the practices allowed or forbidden in the present age (Kaliyuga), to the recognition of local usages and the usages of particular castes and classes to the rules of Āpad-dharma or Dharma during distress and adversity and principles of accommodation to the ability of a person for performance the Śāstras vary with the country, with the time and according to the ability of persons for compliance with rules.

The author surveys the changes in the moral conceptions underlying the social life of the Hindus, e.g. marriage, inheritance, the status of women, the caste system, slavery, law and justice, rights and duties of rulers and subjects. He discusses the question of moral progress, the effect of the impact of western ideas

and culture upon Hindu ideals, the drift of modern forces and tendencies and their bearing upon the future outlook of Hindu Society.

There are also the topics of *Ahiṁsā*, *Cleanliness*, *Penances*, *Foreign language and Travel*, *Doctrine of Karma* included in the thesis of the author, which are very illuminating.

Some fundamental differences between the Western and the Hindu system of Ethics are discussed. In the West the disputes relate to the theoretical foundation of the accepted rules of moral conduct. The value of such discussions consists in the satisfaction afforded by the discovery of a rational basis of conduct for our ethical judgment but the Hindu ethical thought mostly confines itself to the *ends* of human actions which are four: Dharma (duty or virtue), Artha (wealth), Kāma (pleasure, and happiness) and Mokṣa (salvation or emancipation). The *Summum bonum* of the highest end is Mokṣa. But the view of salvation entertained by the Hindus underwent a process of gradual evolution from the Vedic age to that of the Gītā and Manu. It is a characteristic feature of Hinduism that it does not prescribe the same goal and method of salvation for all persons irrespective of their capacity and their standard of spiritual development.

The author meets some of the charges against Hindu ethics. It is not pessimistic, it lays stress upon the virtues of disinterested performance of our duty, it is not anti-social and ascetic.

An overwhelming predominance of ritualism, the repression of freedom of action and individual initiative and the development to extraordinary length of the system of caste are some of the defects, according to the author, which are not possible to justify. He enumerates various morals of the Hindu ideals e. g. Hinduism has always been characterised by a spirit of toleration towards other religions, it has never persecuted people for heresy, it has been generally disposed to lay stress upon obligations rather than rights. The doctrine of *Adhikāribheda* or relativity with reference to capacity, qualifications and conditions is throughout recognised and implied in Hindu ethics as regards the moral ends and as regards the rules of conduct.

Some of the topics may not come directly under his thesis, but all the chapters are interesting study. All the references

given by the author are definite and the book as published in its present form is sure to be counted as one of important books of the time.

C. C. M.

Annual Bibliography of Indian Archæology for the year 1935. Vol. X. Kern Institute, Leyden, E. J. Brill, Ltd. 1937.

This is a well-known work and requires no introduction to students of Indology. The editorial board consists of a galaxy of scholars including such famous men as Vogel, Bimala Charan Law, Ananda K. Coomarswamy, Rene Grosseut, Hirananda Sastri, G. Yazdani etc. etc. The Editorial Board "wishes to render this Annual Bibliography as complete as possible with regard to publications in India." Considering the odds that have to be surmounted in a task like this and the comprehensive nature of the publication the Editorial Board should be congratulated on their crowning achievement. "Authors are particularly requested to supply the Kern Institute with copies of any articles dealing with Indian Archæology and allied subjects, so that they may be duly noted in further issues of the Bibliography." So, if anything has been accidentally left out the fault of the omission cannot be laid at the door of the Editorial Board. The Editorial Board has spared no pains to make the volume comprehensive. The Editorial Board also thanks profusely all those who have rendered active and sympathetic help to make the publication a success. The editors express their gratitude to the Government of India for raising the grant-in-aid in support of the Bibliography from Rs. 600 to Rs. 1000. It is also a matter of gratification that the enlightened rulers of some of the most important Indian States have continued to extend their patronage to this publication. The Government of Ceylon as well as that of Netherlands India maintained their subsidies on behalf of the Bibliography.

The present volume opens with a short summary of archaeological work in India during 1934-35 written by Rao Bahadur K. N. Dikshit. The financial conditions of the Government of India remaining unchanged, the activities of the archæological department were strictly circumscribed. The year,

however, was not lacking in important discoveries. Useful work was carried on in the Indus region, leading to the establishment of the fact that the Indus culture, better termed as the proto-Indian culture, had a much wider zone of influence. (Plate I.) The work at Taxila which has been in progress almost continuously for about two decades, under the personal supervision of Sir John Marshall, was continued after his departure revealing much useful material. Among the antiquities found in this region mention may be made of a bowl-shaped casket supported by four-elephants. (Plate IIC.) Another interesting find is the stone figure of a deity holding a parrot and a spear in his right hand. Local excavations in Bengal were carried on by Mr. N. G. Mojumdar. The excavations at Nālanda in Bihar were continued and two more monasteries were added to those already exposed. An important feature of the newly excavated monasteries is the use of stone-pillars for supporting the roof of the Verandah, in place of wood. The collection of bronze images, which is the best in Nothern India, has been further enriched. (Plate III.) In the Madras Presidency interest in pre-historic archaeology is increasing and megalithic stuctures, stone-circles, and even burials are frequently brought to light.

Excavations at Chanhu-Daro in 1935–36 :—Permission to undertake Archæological excavations in Sind was granted to Professor W. Norman Brown, President of the American School of Indic and Iranian studies and the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston. The site selected for exploration was the area round Chanhu-Daro, one of the most important pre-historic sites in Sind. Dr. Ernest Mackey the field-director of the expedition writes an interesting note on the results of the exploration. [PP. 20–24]. Chanhu-Daro is some 12 miles east of the present bed of the Indus, about 80 miles S. S. E. of Mohenjodaro. The affinity of the place with the Indus Civilisation had already been established by Mr. N. Mojumdar in 1929–30. Blade-axes, chisels, spear-heads and copper and bronze vessels of various shapes, all go to show that Chanhu-Daro was a great place of metal-working. But whether bronze or copper was the metal more commonly worked can only be ascertained by exhaustive analysis of the material obtained. Bead-making was practised even more exten-

sively at Chanhu-Daro than metal-working, for large numbers of them were unearthed in all the various stages of making.

Save in their extraordinarily skilful bead-making and also in the manufacture of weights—a subsidiary industry,—the people of Chanhu-Daro made little use of stone. Copper was evidently so plentiful that stone-implements had already been practically discarded. Stone was occasionally used for man-heads. A remarkable number of toys were found at Chanhu-Daro. It is possible that toymaking was a local industry. A number of pottery figures were found of the Mother Goddess who was also worshipped at other centres of the Indus culture. The seal or rather the seal-amulets—for they undoubtedly served both purposes-were all made of steatite. In shape, material, and the animals engraved upon them, they are identical with those found at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa and many of them were similarly given a smooth white surface to enhance their appearance. The animal most often represented on this seal amulet is an ox-like beast, always in profile with a single horn. A very interesting motif often used at Chanhu-Daro on pottery is a scene of peacocks 'en-file', drawn in a very sketchy way but nevertheless quite recognisible. Of particular importance is a bronze cosmetic jar with fluted sides.

Lahore Fort, its History and Restoration [*Pp. 24–31*]—Mr. H. L. Srivastava's contribution prepared at the instance and under the supervision of Mr. Blackistone, deals with the Lahore Fort and will convey an idea of the excellent work of conservation and restoration accomplished by the Archæological department. We need only refer the reader to Plates, which will suffice to demonstrate in the most eloquent fashion what marvellous results may be obtained by a thoroughly justified restoration.

Work in the States—The attention paid to antiquarian interests in the leading autonomous States of India is evident from the three contributions from Mr. G. Yazdani, Director of Archæology, Hyderabad-Deccan, Dr. Hirananda Sastri, Director of Archæology, Baroda State, and Mr. M. B. Garde, Superintendent of Archæology, Gwalior State.

Hyderabad-Deccan—During the year under review an extensive programme of conservation and exploration of ancient

monuments has been carried out and Rs. 97,000 were spent upon the measures adopted for the work. The cave of the monuments of Ajanta, has as usual received the greatest attention. In the field of exploration the most important discovery is a large rock-cut Brahmanical temple at Bhokardan in the Aurangabad district (Plate VI. B).

Baroda State—The Archæological department of Baroda was established at the end of the year 1934. This newly found department of the State has an extensive programme of work for the future [Plate VII].

Gwalior State—The village of Gyraspur is one of the most important centres of Archæological interest in the Gwalior State. It possesses remains of monuments of all ancient faiths—Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism. These ruins range in date from the 7th to the 11th century and show that during that period Gyraspur must have been a place of considerable importance (Plate VIII).

Numismatics: Sir Richard Burn has contributed a useful paper on Indian Numismatics in 1935. The chapter is divided into Indo-Greek coins, ancient Hindu coins, Kushans and their followers, Guptas, Sultans of Delhi, Mogul series, Muhammadan States and miscellaneous. Unfortunately there is no plate illustrating the coins.....................................Dr. Bimala Charan Law has supplied an extensive list of publications on the ancient geography of India (Pp. 12–20).

Among the countries outside India proper which are dealt with in the Bibliography, Ceylon claims a prominent place. The present issue contains an article on the epigraphy of ancient Laṅkā, from the able pen of Dr. Paranavitana. Further India is very well represented. Starting from the Indian side of the Eastern peninsula, first, there is a note on archæological research in Burma from the pen of that veteran antiquarian Mons. Charles Duroiselle. Dr. H. G. Quaritch-Wales, field-director of the Great Indian Research Committee, has supplied a valuable note regarding his explorations on the ancient site of Śrī Deva in the kingdom of Siam [Plate X]. Indo-China as usual has a very prominent place. This time Mons. George Goedé has supplied two contribu-

tions of unusual interest, one by himself on the discovery of the sacred deposit of Angkor-vat and the other by Mons. H. Maugu relating to one of the earliest temples in Cambodia [Āshram Maharoséi, Plate XI]. The latter's able paper will appeal in particular to those interested in the early relations between Indian, Cambodian, and Indo-Javanese architecture. An account of the progress of the work in Netherlands India has been included. Sir Aurel Stein has supplied the last plate (XII), photographed by himself personally, of the colossal rock-sculpture at Naksh-i-Ruśtam near Darab, commemorating the victory of Shapur I, the Sassanian, over the Roman Emperor Valerian.

The Bibliography of publications as usual is very rich and helpful to scholars. There is a list of periodicals. The general section on India is divided into Archæology and Art-history, Architecture and Sculpture, Painting, Iconography, Palaeography, Epigraphy, Chronology, Ancient history, Ancient geography and Numismatics. Separate bibliographies are supplied for Ceylon, further India, Indonesia, and adjoining teritorries like Iran, Mesopotamia, Turan, Afghanisthan, Tibet and the Far East (China, Japan and Korea).

There is a very helpful index at the end.

—*B. N. Mitra.*

न खलु वर्णस्य वर्णान्तरं कार्यम्। न हि इकाराद्यकार उत्पद्यते, यकाराद्वा इकारः। पृथक्स्थानप्रयत्नोत्पाद्या हीमे वर्णाः। तेषामन्योऽन्यस्य स्थाने प्रयुज्यत इति युक्तम्।

एतावच्चैतत्परिणामो विकारः स्यात् कार्यकारणभावो वा। उभयं च नास्ति। तस्मान्न सन्ति वर्णविकाराः।

वर्णसमुदायविकारानुपपत्तिवच्च वर्णविकारानुपपत्तिः। 'अस्तेर्भूः' 'ब्रुवो वचि'रिति यथा वर्णसमुदायस्य धातुलक्षणस्य क्वचिद्विषये वर्णान्तरसमुदायो न परिणामो न कार्यं, शब्दान्तरस्य स्थाने शब्दान्तरं प्रयुज्यते, तथा वर्णस्य वर्णान्तरमिति ॥ ४० ॥

इतश्च न सन्ति विकाराः—

प्रकृतिविवृद्धौ विकारविवृद्धेः ॥ ४१ ॥

प्रकृत्यनुविधानं विकारेषु दृष्टम्। यकारे ह्रस्वदीर्घानुविधानं नास्ति, येन विकारत्वमनुमीयते इति ॥ ४१ ॥

"न्यूनसमाधिकोपलब्धेर्विकाराणामहेतुः" ॥ ४२ ॥

"द्रव्यविकारा न्यूनाः समाः अधिकाश्च गृह्यन्ते। तद्वदयं विकारो न्यूनः स्यादिति" ॥ ४२ ॥

१ ननु मा भूद्विकारः, परिणामोऽर्थान्तरन्तु भविष्यति ततो नित्या वर्णा भविष्यन्तीत्यत आह-एतावच्चेतदिति।

२ उभयमिति। इगनपेक्षस्य यणो निष्पत्तेर्न तयोः कार्यकारणभावः। तदभावे च न परिमाणादिसम्भव इत्यर्थः।

३ इकोयणचीति सूत्रमादेशोपदेश एव न विकारोपदेश इत्यत्र हेत्वन्तरम्-वर्णसमुदायेति। एवं ह्यत्र प्रयोगः। योऽयमिकः स्थाने संहितायां यण् उपदिश्यते नासौ तस्य विकारः, ततो वर्णातिरिक्तत्वात्, 'अस्तिस्थाने प्रयुक्त'भू'र्वत्-इति।

४ अनुमीयत इति। महद्भिः खलु तूलपिण्डरारब्धः स्थूलः पिण्डः, अल्पैश्चारब्धो महानल्प इति दृष्टम्। तद्वदिहापि दीर्घेकारविकारस्य यकारस्य ह्रस्वेकारविकाराद् भवितव्यं विशेषेण। न चास्ति विशेषः। तस्मान्न प्रकृतिविकृतिभावः।

५ न्यूनेत्याक्षेपसूत्रम्। अल्पेन न्यग्रोधबीजेनारब्धो न्यग्रोधतरुर्महान्। ततोऽतिमहता वा नारिकेलबीजेनारब्धो नारिकेलतरुस्तदपेक्षयाऽल्पः। नारिकेलबीजैरेव परस्परापेक्षया समैरारब्धः सम इति।

द्विविध[1]स्यापि हेतोरभावादसाधनं दृष्टान्तः ॥ ४३ ॥

अत्र नोदाहरणसाधर्म्याद्धेतुरस्ति, न वैधर्म्यात्।

अनुपसंहृतश्च हेतुना दृष्टान्तो न साधक इति।

प्रतिदृष्टान्ते चानियमः प्रसज्येत। यथाऽनडुहः स्थानेऽश्वो वोढुं नियुक्तो न तद्विकारो भवति, एवमिवर्णस्य स्थाने यकारः प्रयुक्तो न विकार इति। न चात्र नियमहेतुरस्ति—दृष्टान्तः साधको न प्रतिदृष्टान्त इति ॥ ४३ ॥

द्रव्यविकारोदाहरणं च—

न[2], अतुल्यप्रकृतीनां विकारविकल्पात् ॥ ४४ ॥

अतुल्यानां[3] द्रव्याणां प्रकृतिभावो विकल्पते, विकाराश्च प्रकृतीरनुविधीयन्ते। न त्विवर्णमनुविधीयते यकारः। तस्मादनुदाहरणं द्रव्यविकार इति ॥ ४४ ॥

“ द्रव्य[4]विकारवैषम्यवद्वर्णविकारविकल्पः ” ॥ ४५ ॥

“ यथा द्रव्यभावेन तुल्यायाः प्रकृतेर्विकारवैषम्यम्, एवं वर्णभावेन तुल्यायाः प्रकृतेर्विकारविकल्प इति ” ॥ ४५ ॥

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१ द्विविधस्येत्यादिपरिहारसूत्रम्।

न्यूनसमाधिकोपलब्धेरिति साधनन्न भवितुमर्हति। दृष्टान्तसाधर्म्येण दृष्टान्तवैधर्म्येणेत्युभयविधस्यापि हेतोरभावात् प्रतिदृष्टान्तस्य च सम्भवात्—इति परिहाराशयः।

२ यदि च न्यूनसमाधिकोपलब्धेरिति न साधनमपि तु सिद्धान्तोक्तहेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वोद्भावनन्तदा तत्र परिहारसूत्रम्—नातुल्येत्यादि।

३ अतुल्यायाः प्रकृतेर्विकारा विकल्पन्ते, अथ च विकाराः प्रकृतिभेदमनुविधीयन्ते। तद्यथा न्यग्रोधबीजं न्यग्रोधवृक्षस्य प्रकृतिरथ च न्यग्रोधबीजान्न्यग्रोधवृक्ष एव जायते न नारिकेलवृक्षः। एतदेव च प्रकृत्यनुविधानं सिद्धान्तिनोक्तम्—न पुनः प्रकृतिवृद्धिह्रासाभ्यां विकृतिवृद्धिह्रासाविति।

४ द्रव्यविकार इत्याक्षेपसूत्रम्।

न प्रकृतिभेदमवश्यमनुविधीयन्ते विकाराः। द्रव्यत्वेन तुल्यत्वेऽपि प्रकृतीनां विकारवैषम्यदर्शनात्। एवं वर्णत्वेन तुल्यत्वेऽपि विकाराद्वैषम्यम्भवितुमर्हतीति दूषकस्य हृदयम्।

न, विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेः[1] ॥ ४६ ॥

अयं विकारधर्मो द्रव्यसामान्ये—यदात्मकं द्रव्यं, मृद्वा सुवर्णं वा, तस्यात्मनोऽन्वये पूर्वो व्यूहो निवर्तते व्यूहान्तरं चोपजायते, तं विकारमाचक्षते। न वर्णसामान्ये कश्चिच्छब्दात्माऽन्वयी य इत्वं जहाति यत्वंचापद्यते। तत्र यथा सति द्रव्यभावे विकारवैषम्ये नाऽनडुहोऽश्वो विकारो विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेः, एवमिवर्णस्य न यकारो विकारो विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेरिति ॥ ४६ ॥

इतश्च न सन्ति वर्णविकाराः—

विकार[2]प्राप्तानामपुनरापत्तेः ॥ ४७ ॥

अनुपपन्ना पुनरापत्तिः। कथम्? पुनरापत्तेरननुमानादिति[3]। इकारो यकारत्वमापन्नः पुनरिकारो भवति, न पुनरिकारस्य स्थाने यकारस्य प्रयोगोऽप्रयोगश्चेत्यत्रानुमानं नास्ति ॥ ४७ ॥

"सुवर्णादीनां[4] पुनरापत्तेरहेतुः" ॥ ४८ ॥

"अननुमानादिति न। इदं ह्यनुमानम्—

सुवर्णं कुण्डलत्वं हित्वा रुचकत्वमापद्यते रुचकत्वं हित्वा पुनः कुण्डलत्वमापद्यते। एवमिकारोऽपि यकारत्वमापन्नः पुनरिकारो भवतीति" ॥ ४८ ॥

[5]व्यभिचारादननुमानम्। यथा पयो दधिभावमापन्नं न पुनः पयो भवति, एवं वर्णानां न पुनरापत्तिः। अथ सुवर्णवत्[6] पुनरापत्तिरिति? सुवर्णोदाहरणोपपत्तिश्[7]च—

१ आक्षेपप्रत्याख्यानसूत्रम्—न विकारेति।

२ सिद्धान्तोपोद्बलकं सूत्रम्—विकारेति। नो खलु क्षीरविकारो दधि पुनः क्षीरं भवद् दृष्टमिति भावः।

३ अननुमानादिति। प्रमाणाभावादित्यर्थः।

४ आक्षेपसूत्रम्—सुवर्णादीनामिति। विकारेत्यादि सिद्धान्त्युक्तोऽसद्धेतुरित्यर्थः। कारप्राप्तानामपि पुनरापत्तिदर्शनादनेकान्त इत्याशयः।

५ पूर्वपक्ष्युक्तहेतोः साधनपक्षे तद्दूषणम्—व्यभिचारादिति।

६ तस्यैव सिद्धान्तदूषणमात्रत्वे तदुत्तरम्—अथ सुवर्णवदित्यादि।

७ ये सुवर्णजातीया अवयवा रुचकत्वमापन्नास्त एव पूर्वव्यूहपरित्यागेन वर्धमानतामापन्नाः पुना रुचकत्वमापद्यन्ते, तदवयवानान्तत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात्। न

न—तद्विकाराणां[1] सुवर्णभावाव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ४९ ॥

अवस्थितं सुवर्णं हीयमानेन धर्मेणोपजायमानेन च धर्मेण धर्मि भवति। नैवं कश्चिच्छब्दात्मा हीयमानेन इत्वेनोपजायमानेन यत्वेन धर्मी गृह्यते। तस्मात्सुवर्णोदाहरणं नोपपद्यते इति।

" वर्णत्वाव्यतिरेकाद्वर्णविकाराणामप्रतिषेधः[2]—

वर्णविकारा अपि वर्णत्वं न व्यभिचरन्ति, यथा सुवर्णविकारः सुवर्णत्वमिति " ॥

सामान्यवतो[3] धर्मयोगो न सामान्यस्य—

कुण्डलरुचकौ सुवर्णस्य धर्मौ न सुवर्णत्वस्य। एवमिकारयकारौ कस्य वर्णात्मनो धर्मौ? वर्णत्वं सामान्यं, न तस्येमौ धर्मौ भवितुमर्हतः। न च निवर्तमानो धर्म उपजायमानस्य प्रकृतिः। तत्र निवर्तमान इकारो न यकारस्योपजायमानस्य प्रकृतिरिति ॥ ४९ ॥

इतश्च वर्णविकारानुपपत्तिः—

नित्यत्वे[4]ऽविकारादनित्यत्वे चानवस्थानात् ॥ ५० ॥

नित्या वर्णा इत्येतस्मिन्पक्षे इकारयकारौ वर्णौ इत्युभयोर्नित्यत्वाद्विकारानुपपत्तिः। नित्यत्वेऽविनाशित्वात् कः कस्य विकार इति। अथानित्या वर्णा इति पक्षः, एवमप्यनवस्थानं वर्णानाम्। " किमिदमनवस्थानं वर्णानाम् " ? उत्पद्य निरोधः। उत्पद्य निरुद्धे इकारे यकार उत्पद्यते, यकारे चोत्पद्य निरुद्धे

त्विहेकारो यकारानुगत इकारयकारानुगतो वाऽन्यः कश्चिद्धर्मी दृश्यते य इत्वम्परित्यज्य यत्वमापद्यते। वर्णत्वन्त्वनुगतमपि न धर्मि किन्तु धर्म एव। वर्णत्वस्य हि धर्मित्वे इको यणचीति नियमो न स्यात्, वर्णत्वस्य पञ्चाशत्साधारणत्वात्। न च निवर्तमान इकारो यकारस्य धर्मो भवितुमर्हति, धर्मधर्मिणोः समानकालत्वादिति सङ्क्षेपार्थः।

१ न तद्विकाराणामिति सिद्धान्तिसूत्रम्।

२ वर्णत्वाव्यतिरेकादित्याक्षेपभाष्यम्।

३ सामान्यवत इति परिहारभाष्यम्।

४ नित्यत्व इति सिद्धान्तिसूत्रम्।

इकार उत्पद्यते—कः कस्य विकारः? तदेतदवगृह्य[1] सन्धाने सन्धाय चावग्रहे वेदितव्यमिति ॥ ५० ॥

" नित्यपक्षे तु तावत्समाधिः[2] "—

" नित्यानाम[3]तीन्द्रियत्वात्तद्धर्मविकल्पाच्च वर्णविकाराणामप्रतिषेधः " ॥ ५१ ॥

" नित्या वर्णा न विक्रियन्त[4] इति विप्रतिषेधः। यथा नित्यत्वे सति किञ्चिदतीन्द्रियं किञ्चिदिन्द्रियग्राह्यम्, इन्द्रियग्राह्याश्च वर्णाः, एवं नित्यत्वे सति किञ्चिन्न विक्रियते वर्णास्तु विक्रियन्त " इति।

विरोधा[5]दहेतुस्तद्धर्मविकल्पः। नित्यं नोपजायते नापैति। अनुपजनापायधर्मकं नित्यम्, अनित्यं पुनरुपजनापाययुक्तम्। न चान्तरेणोपजनापायौ विकारः सम्भवति। तद्यदि वर्णा विक्रियन्ते, नित्यत्वमेषां निवर्त्तते। अथ नित्याः, विकारधर्मत्वमेषां निवर्त्तते। सोऽयं विरुद्धो हेत्वाभासो धर्मविकल्प इति ॥ ५१ ॥

अनित्यपक्षे समाधिः—

" अनवस्थायि[6]त्वे च वर्णोपलब्धिवत्तद्विकारोपपत्तिः " ॥५२॥

" यथा[7]ऽनवस्थायिनां वर्णानां श्रवणं भवत्येवमेषां विकारो भवतीति "।

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१ ननु दध्यत्रेति प्रयोगे कदा इकारस्योत्पद्य निरोध इत्यत आह—तदेतिदिति। 'अवग्रहः' असंहिता। 'दधि—अत्र' इति उच्चार्य दध्यत्रेत्युच्चार्यते। दध्यत्रेति वा सन्धाय दधि–अत्रेत्यवगृह्यते। अयमेव चेकारस्योत्पद्य निरोध इत्याशयः।

२ समाधिरिति। शब्दनित्यतावादिन इति शेषः।

३ नित्यानामित्यादि जात्युत्तररूपं सूत्रम्।

४ विक्रियन्त इति। यथा हि सत्यपि नित्यत्वे केचिदतीन्द्रियाः—यथा परमाण्वाकाशादयः, केचिदैन्द्रियकाः—यथा गोत्वादयः, एवं सत्यपि नित्यत्वे परमाण्वाकाशादयो न प्रकृतिविकारभूताः वर्णास्तु प्रकृतिविकारभावमापत्स्यन्ते नित्या अपीति हृदयम्।

५ सेयं विकल्पसमा जातिरित्याह—विरोधादिति। न खल्वैन्द्रियकत्वानैन्द्रियकत्वाभ्यामस्ति कश्चिन्नित्यत्वस्य विरोधः। प्रकृतिविकारभावेन त्वस्ति विरोधो नित्यत्वस्य। न हि सम्भवति कार्यं च नित्यं चेत्यर्थः।

६ अनित्यपक्षे जात्युत्तरं पूर्वपक्षिणः—अनवस्थायित्व इति सूत्रम्।

७ यथेति। यथा सत्यप्यनवस्थायित्वे वर्णा इन्द्रियेण सम्बध्य स्वविषयं ज्ञानं जनयन्ति—एवं विकारमपि करिष्यन्तीति हृदयम्।

प्लुतः। लेशो[1]-लाघवम्, स्त इत्यस्तेर्विकारः। श्लेष-आगमः, प्रकृतेः प्रत्ययस्य वा। एत एव विशेषा विकारा इति, एत एवादेशाः। एते चेद्विकारा उपपद्यन्ते तर्हि वर्णविकारा इति ॥ ५७ ॥

(४) शब्दशक्तिपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्।

ते विभक्त्यन्ताः[2] पदम् ॥ ५८ ॥

यथादर्शनं[3] विकृता वर्णा विभक्त्यन्ताः पदसंज्ञा भवन्ति। विभक्तिर्द्वयी-नामिक्याख्यातिकी च। 'ब्राह्मणः' 'पचती'त्युदाहरणम्।

"उपसर्गनिपातास्तर्हि न पदसंज्ञाः। लक्षणान्तरं वाच्यम्" इति। शिष्यते च खलु नामिक्या विभक्तेरव्ययाल्लोपः तयोः पदसंज्ञार्थमिति। पदेनार्थसम्प्रत्यय इति प्रयोजनम्, नामपदं चाधिकृत्य परीक्षा। गौरिति पदं खल्विदमुदाहरणम् ॥ ५८ ॥

तदर्थे--

व्यक्त्याकृतिजातिसन्निधावुपचारात्संशयः ॥ ५९ ॥

अविनाभाववृत्तिः सन्निधिः। अविनाभावेन वर्तमानासु व्यक्त्याकृति-जातिषु गौरिति प्रयुज्यते। तत्र न ज्ञायते किमन्यतमः पदार्थ उत सर्व इति ॥ ५९ ॥

"शब्दस्य प्रयोगसामर्थ्यात् पदार्थावधारणम्। तस्मात्-

"याशब्द[4]समूहत्यागपरिग्रहसङ्ख्यावृद्ध्यपचयवर्णसमासानुबन्धानां व्यक्तावुपचाराद्व्यक्तिः" ॥ ६० ॥

"व्यक्तिः पदार्थः। कस्मात्? याशब्दप्रभृतीनां व्यक्तावुपचारात्। उपचारः प्रयोगः। या गौस्तिष्ठति, या गौर्निषण्णेति नेदं वाक्यं जातेरभिधायकम-

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१ लेश इति। यथा 'स्तः' इत्यत्र अस्तेरकारलोपे सकारमात्रस्य लेशस्यैक-देशस्य व्यवस्थापनम्।

२ तदेवं वर्णानामनित्यतां प्रतिपाद्य शब्दप्रामाण्योपयोगि पदं निरूपयति—ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदमित्यादिप्रकरणेन।

सर्वमेतत्प्रकरणं स्फोटवादं लक्षीकृत्योक्तम्। स च वादस्तस्य खण्डनञ्च सविस्तरं तात्पर्यटीकायामुक्तन्तत एवानुसन्धेयम्।

३ यथादर्शनमिति। यथाप्रमाणमित्यर्थः। गुणान्तरापत्त्यादिभिरादेशरूपेण विकृताः, नतु प्रकृतिविकारभावेन, तस्य प्रमाणबाधितत्वादित्याशयः।

४ याशब्देत्यादिसूत्रं व्यक्तिवादमुत्थापयति।

भेदात्। भेदात्तु द्रव्याभिधायकम्। गवां समूह इति भेदाद्द्रव्याभिधानम्, न जातेरभेदात्[1]! वैद्याय गां ददातीति द्रव्यस्य त्यागो, न जातेरमूर्त्तत्वात्, प्रतिक्रमानुक्रमानुपपत्तेश्च। परिग्रहः—स्वत्वेनाभिसम्बन्धः। कौण्डिन्यस्य गौर्ब्राह्मणस्य गौरिति—द्रव्याभिधाने द्रव्यभेदात् सम्बन्धभेद इति उपपन्नम्। अभिन्ना तु जातिरिति। सङ्ख्या—दश गावो विंशतिर्गाव इति—भिन्नं द्रव्यं सङ्ख्यायते, न जातिरभेदादिति। वृद्धिः—कारणवतो द्रव्यस्यावयवोपचयः, अवर्द्धत गौरिति। निरवयवा तु जातिरिति। एतेनापचयो व्याख्यातः। वर्णः—शुक्ला गौः कपिला गौरिति द्रव्यस्य गुणयोगो न सामान्यस्य। समासः—गोहितं गोसुखमिति द्रव्यस्य सुखादियोगो न जातेरिति। अनुबन्धः—सरूपप्रजननसन्तानो, गौर्गां जनयतीति। तदुत्पत्तिधर्मत्वाद् द्रव्ये युक्तं, न जातौ, विपर्ययादिति[2]। द्रव्यं व्यक्तिरिति हि नार्थान्तरम्" ॥ ६० ॥

अस्य प्रतिषेधः—

न[3], तदनवस्थानात् ॥ ६१ ॥

न व्यक्तिः पदार्थः। कस्मात्? अनवस्थानात्। याशब्दप्रभृतिभिर्यो[4] विशेष्यते स गोशब्दार्थः। या गौस्तिष्ठति या गौर्निषण्णेति न द्रव्यमात्रमविशिष्टं जात्या विनाऽभिधीयते। किं तर्हि? जातिविशिष्टम्। तस्मान्न व्यक्तिः पदार्थः। एवं समूहादिषु द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ ६१ ॥

यदि न व्यक्तिः पदार्थः कथं तर्हि व्यक्तावुपचार इति? निमित्तादतद्भावेऽपि तदुपचारः। दृश्यते खलु—

सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्यवृत्तमानधारणसामीप्ययोगसाधनाधिपत्येभ्यो ब्राह्मणमञ्चकटराजसक्तुचन्दनगङ्गाशाटकान्नपुरुषेष्वतद्भावेऽपि तदुपचारः ॥ ६२ ॥

अतद्भावेऽपि तदुपचार इति—अतच्छब्दस्य तेन शब्देनाभिधानमिति। सहचरणात्—यष्टिकां भोजयेति यष्टिकासहचरितो ब्राह्मणोऽभिधीयत इति। स्थानात्—मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीति मञ्चस्थाः पुरुषा अभिधीयन्ते। तादर्थ्यात्—कटा-

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१ अभेदादिति। एकैव जातिस्तस्या विशेषणमनर्थकमिति भावः।

२ विपर्ययादिति। अनुत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वाज्जातेरित्यर्थः।

३ न तदनवस्थानादिति सूत्रं व्यक्तिवादं दूषयति।

४ या शब्देत्याद्यपरं दूषणं व्यक्तिवादस्य।

र्थेषु वीरणेषु व्यूह्यमानेषु कटं करोतीति भवति। वृत्तात्—यमो राजा कुबेरो राजेति तद्वद्वर्त्तत इति। मानात्—आढकेन मिताः सक्तवः आढकसक्तव इति। धारणात्—तुलायां धृतं चन्दनं तुलाचन्दनमिति। सामीप्यात्—गङ्गायां गावश्चरन्तीति देशोऽभिधीयते सन्निकृष्टः। योगात्—कृष्णेन रागेण युक्तः शाटकः कृष्ण इत्यभिधीयते। साधनात्—अन्नं प्राणा इति। आधिपत्यात्—अयं पुरुषः कुलम्, अयं गोत्रमिति।

तत्रायं सहचरणाद्योगाद्वा जातिशब्दो व्यक्तौ प्रयुज्यत इति ॥ ६२ ॥

"यदि गौरित्यस्य पदस्य न व्यक्तिरर्थोऽस्तु तर्हि"—

"आकृतिस्तदपेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वव्यवस्थानसिद्धेः"[1] ॥ ६३ ॥

"आकृतिः पदार्थः। कस्मात्? तदपेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वव्यवस्थानसिद्धेः। सत्त्वावयवानां तदवयवानां च नियतो व्यूह आकृतिः। तस्यां गृह्यमाणायां सत्त्वव्यवस्थानं सिध्यति—अयं गौरयमश्व इति, नागृह्यमाणायाम्। यस्य ग्रहणात् सत्त्वव्यवस्थानं सिद्ध्यति तं शब्दोऽभिधातुमर्हति। सोऽस्यार्थ इति"।

नैतदुपपद्यते। यस्य जात्या योगस्तदत्र जातिविशिष्टमभिधीयते—गौरिति। न चावयवव्यूहस्य जात्या योगः। कस्य तर्हि? नियतावयवव्यूहस्य द्रव्यस्य। तस्मान्नाकृतिः पदार्थः ॥ ६३ ॥

"अस्तु तर्हि जातिः पदार्थः"—

"व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्तेऽप्यप्रसङ्गात्[2] प्रोक्षणादीनां मृद्गवके, जातिः" ॥ ६४ ॥

"जातिः पदार्थः। कस्मात्? व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्तेऽपि मृद्गवके प्रोक्षणादीनामप्रसङ्गादिति। गां प्रोक्षय, गामानय, गां देहीति नैतानि मृद्गवके प्रयुज्यन्ते। कस्मात्? जातेरभावात्। अस्ति हि तत्र व्यक्तिः, अस्त्याकृतिः। यदभावात्तत्रासम्प्रत्ययः स पदार्थ इति" ॥ ६४ ॥

नाकृतिव्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वाज्जात्यभिव्यक्तेः[3] ॥ ६५ ॥

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१ आकृतिरिति सूत्रमाकृतिवादमुपस्थापयति।

२ व्यक्त्याकृतीतिसूत्रं जातिवादमुपस्थापयति।

३ नाकृतीति सूत्रमाकृतिवादं निराकरोति—आकृतेरेव प्रधानत्वात्। किन्तत् प्रधानत्वम्? आकृतिविशेषणत्वं व्यक्तेः। यस्माद्व्यक्त्या विशेष्यमाणा आकृतिर्जातेर्लिङ्गम्भवति तस्मात्सैव प्रधानमिति तस्या एव प्राङ् निराकरणम्।

जातेरभिव्यक्तिराकृतिव्यक्ती अपेक्षते। नागृह्यमाणायामाकृतौ व्यक्तौ च जातिमात्रं शुद्धं गृह्यते। तस्मान्न जातिः पदार्थ इति ॥ ६५ ॥

न वै पदार्थेन न भवितुं शक्यम्। कः खल्विदानीं पदार्थ इति ?—

व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु[1] पदार्थः ॥ ६६ ॥

तुशब्दो विशेषणार्थः। किं विशिष्यते ? प्रधानाङ्गभावस्यानियमेन पदार्थत्वमिति। यदा हि भेदविवक्षा विशेषगतिश्च, तदा व्यक्तिः प्रधानमङ्गन्तु जात्याकृती। यदा तु भेदोऽविवक्षितः सामान्यगतिश्च, तदा जातिः प्रधानमङ्गं तु व्यक्त्याकृती। तदेतद्बहुलं प्रयोगेषु। आकृतेस्तु प्रधानभाव उत्प्रेक्षितव्यः[2] ॥ ६६ ॥

"कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते नाना व्यक्त्याकृतिजातय इति ?" लक्षणभेदात्। तत्र तावत्—

व्यक्तिर्गुणविशेषाश्रयो मूर्तिः ॥ ६७ ॥

व्यज्यत इति व्यक्तिरिन्द्रियग्राह्येति। न सर्वं[3] द्रव्यं व्यक्तिः। यो गुणविशेषाणां स्पर्शान्तानां गुरुत्वघनत्वद्रवत्वसंस्काराणामव्यापिनः परिमाणस्याश्रयो यथासम्भवं तद् द्रव्यं, मूर्तिः मूर्च्छितावयवत्वादिति[4] ॥ ६७ ॥

१ तदेवं व्यक्त्याकृतिजातीनामन्यतमाभिधाननियमन्निराकृत्यानियमाभिधानं सिद्धान्तमाह—व्यक्त्याकृतिजातय इति सूत्रेण। स्पष्टं सविस्तरं च प्रतिपादितोऽयं सिद्धान्तस्तात्पर्यटीकायाम्। व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तिस्र एवास्माकं पदार्थः। गुणप्रधानभावस्तु कस्यचित्क्वचिदेवेति परिस्फुटार्थः।

२ उत्प्रेक्षितव्य इति। स्वयमुत्प्रेक्षणीय इत्यर्थः। यथा पिष्टकमय्यो गावः क्रियन्तामित्यत्र।

३ न सर्वमिति। यत्र हि व्यक्त्याकृतिजातीनां समावेशस्तत्र व्यक्तिनिर्धारणायेदं सूत्रम्। तेनाकाशाद्यनवरोधेऽपि न दोषः, तत्राकृतेरभावादिति भाष्यमतम्।

४ 'मूर्च्छिताः' परस्परं संयुक्ताः 'अवयवा' यस्य तत् 'मूर्च्छितावयवम्'। मूर्च्छनं सम्बन्धः, स चेह समवाय एवेति ध्येयम्।

अस्मिन् सूत्रार्थे वार्तिककारस्यारुचिः। एवं चात्र वार्तिकव्याख्यानम्–वयं तु ब्रूमो नात्रावयवी व्यवच्छेद्योऽपि तु जात्याकृतिपदव्यतिरिक्तस्य व्यक्तिपदस्यार्थो वक्तव्य इति। सा च व्यक्तिर्या न जातिर्नाकृतिस्तस्या अनेन सूत्रेण सङ्ग्रहः। गुणाश्च विशेषाश्च तदाश्रयश्च। अत्र तच्छब्दलोपाद्गुणविशेषाश्रयशब्देन द्रव्यमुच्यते। कर्मापि गुणविशेषशब्दाल्लभ्यते–गुणेभ्यो विशेषाः व्यावृत्ताः गुणविशेषा अक्षेपणादय इति। मर्ति-

आकृतिर्जातिलिङ्गाख्या ॥ ६८ ॥

यया जातिर्जातिलिङ्गानि च प्रख्यायन्ते तामाकृतिं विद्यात्। सा च नान्या सत्त्वावयवानां तदवयवानां च नियताद् व्यूहादिति। नियतावयवव्यूहाः खलु सत्त्वावयवा जातिलिङ्गम्। शिरसा पादेन गामनुमिन्वन्ति[1]। नियते च सत्त्वावयवानां व्यूहे सति गोत्वं प्रख्यायत इति। अनाकृतिव्यङ्ग्यायां जातौ मृत्सुवर्णं रजतमित्येवमादिष्वाकृतिर्निवर्तते, जहाति पदार्थत्वमिति ॥ ६८ ॥

समानप्रसवात्मिका[2] जातिः ॥ ६९ ॥

या समानां बुद्धिं प्रसूते भिन्नेष्वधिकरणेषु, यया बहूनीतरेतरतो न व्यावर्तन्ते, योऽर्थोऽनेकत्र प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिनिमित्तं, तत्सामान्यम्। यच्च केषाञ्चिद्‌भेदं कुतश्चिद्भेदं करोति तत् सामान्यविशेषो जातिरिति ॥ ६९ ॥

इति वात्स्यायनीये न्यायभाष्ये द्वितीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम्।

समाप्तश्चायं द्वितीयाध्यायः ॥ २ ॥

शब्देनद्रव्यमुच्यते। एवं चैतल्लक्षणं रूपाद्याकाशाद्यनुगतं भवति। अथवा गुणविशेषाणामाश्रय इति गुणाश्च विशेषाश्च—तेषामाश्रयो द्रव्यम्। तत्र मूर्च्छत इति मूर्तिः—इति।

१ यद्यपि गोत्वम्प्रत्यक्षमेव नाकृतिव्यङ्ग्यम्, तथाऽपि विप्रतिपद्यमानं प्रत्युच्यते अनुमिन्वन्तीति।

२ समानेतिसूत्रम्। प्रसते इति 'प्रसवः', भिन्नेषु समानबुद्धेः प्रसोत्री या जातिः साऽवश्यं सामान्यप्रत्ययं प्रसूते न पुनर्या सामान्यप्रत्ययं प्रसूते सा सर्वा जातिः, पाचकादिषु व्यभिचारात्। व्यक्त्याकृतिभ्यां भेदकत्वमात्रेणैतल्लक्षणम्, न तु सर्वथाऽनवद्यमिति तात्पर्यकाराः।

इति खद्योते द्वितीयं प्रस्फुरणम्।

अथ तृतीयाध्यायस्याद्यमाह्निकम् ॥

(१) इन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तात्मप्रकरणम् ॥

परीक्षितानि प्रमाणानि, प्रमेयमिदानीं परीक्ष्यते[1]। तच्चात्मादीत्यात्मा[2] विविच्यते—" किं[3] देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिवेदनासङ्घातमात्रमात्मा आहोस्वित्तद्-व्यतिरिक्त इति "? । कुतः संशयः? व्यपदेशस्योभयथा[4] सिद्धेः । क्रियाकरणयोः कर्त्रा सम्बन्धस्याभिधानं व्यपदेशः । स द्विविधः अवयवेन[5] समुदायस्य, मूलै-र्वृक्षस्तिष्ठति, स्तम्भैः प्रासादो ध्रियत इति । अन्येनान्यस्य[6] व्यपदेशः—परशुना

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१ परीक्ष्यत इति । प्रमाणेन हि प्रमेयं परीक्ष्यते नान्येन । न च तदपरी-क्षितं प्रमेयपरीक्षायै प्रभवति । तस्मात्प्रमाणपरीक्षा हेतुर्हेतुमती च प्रमेयपरीक्षा ।

२ तच्चेति । आत्मैव प्रमेयेषु प्रथममुद्दिष्टो लक्षितश्चेति तदनुरोधादात्मैव प्रथम-म्परीक्ष्यते । अत्र च यद्यपि स्वरूपत आत्मन्येव परीक्षाम्प्रतिजानीते भाष्यकारस्त-थापि लक्षणपरीक्षाद्वारेण लक्ष्यपरीक्षणात् लक्षणपरीक्षैव द्रष्टव्या । यथा चेयमात्म-लक्षणपरीक्षा तथोपरिष्टाद्दर्शयिष्यते ।

३ किमिति । विचारपूर्वरूपः संशयो दर्शितः ।

४ अतो व्यपदेशस्योभयथासिद्धेः संशय इति भाष्यवाक्यमेतन्न सूत्रमिति परिशुद्धिकृतः ।

न व्यपदेशमात्रं देहाद्यव्यतिरिक्तात्मसाधनमुच्यते येन गौरोऽहमिति व्यपदेशेना-नैकान्तम्भवेत्—अपि त्वनुभवः । स चामेत्यनुभवो न शरीरादिष्विदमो विषयेष्वस्ति । असम्भिन्नेदंविषयो ह्यहम्प्रत्ययः शरीराद्यतिरिक्तविषय एवास्ति । स चात्मा । शरीरा-दयस्तु मतुब्लोपादभेदोपचाराद्वाऽहमा विषयीक्रियन्ते । ममात्मेति तु व्यपदेश-मात्रम्, न पुनः शरीरादिष्विव ममकारस्तत्र मुख्यो, भेदेनाप्रतिभासात् । राहोः शिर इतिवत्त ममकार आत्मनि द्रष्टव्यः ।

अहं जाने—अहं यते—ममात्मा—इत्येवजातीयकेषु व्यपदेशेषु प्रथमद्वितीययो-र्बाधकानुपपत्तेर्मुख्यत्वम्, तृतीयस्य त्वनवस्थालक्षणबाधकोपपत्तौ गौणत्वमवधार्यते ।

५ अवयवेनेति । यद्यपि वृक्षप्रासादयोरन्ययोरेवान्येनावयवेन समुदायिना व्यपदेशस्तथाऽप्यवयव्यभावं समुदायं च समुदाय्यनतिरिक्तं मन्वानस्य परस्योदाहरणं द्रष्टव्यमिति तात्पयकृतः

६ अन्येनेति । अत्रात्मनो शरीरेन्द्रियादिभेदाभेदविषयव विप्रतिपत्तिर्न त्वा-त्मनि धर्मिणि । यतो बाद्येवासौ न भवति यो धर्मिणि विप्रतिपद्यते । नहि धर्मिणि विप्रतिपद्यमानस्यास्ति किञ्चित्प्रमाणम्, सर्वस्य तस्याश्रयासिद्धत्वात् । तस्माद्धर्म्य-भाववादी न लौकिको न परीक्षक इत्युन्मत्तवदुपेक्ष्यः ।

वृश्चति, प्रदीपेन पश्यति । अस्ति चायं व्यपदेशः—चक्षुषा पश्यति, मनसा विजानाति, बुद्ध्या विचारयति, शरीरेण सुखदुःखमनुभवतीति । तत्र नावधार्यते किमवयवेन समुदायस्य देहादिसङ्घातस्य, अथान्येनान्यस्य तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य वेति ।

अन्येनायमन्यस्य व्यपदेशः । कस्मात्?

[1]दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात् ॥ १ ॥

दर्शनेन कश्चिदर्थो गृहीतः, स्पर्शनेनापि सोऽर्थो गृह्यते—यमहमद्राक्षं चक्षुषा तं स्पर्शनेनापि स्पृशामीति, यं चास्पार्क्षं स्पर्शनेन तं चक्षुषा पश्यामीति । एकविषयौ चेमौ प्रत्ययावेककर्तृकौ प्रतिसन्धीयेते । न च सङ्घातकर्तृकौ नेन्द्रियेणैककर्तृकौ । तद्योऽसौ चक्षुषा त्वगिन्द्रियेण चैकार्थस्य ग्रहीता [2]भिन्ननिमित्तावनन्यकर्तृकौ[3] प्रत्ययौ समानविषयौ[4] प्रतिसन्दधाति सोऽर्थान्तरभूत आत्मा ।

" कथं पुनर्नेन्द्रियेणैककर्तृकौ ? "

इन्द्रियं खलु स्वस्वविषयग्रहणमनन्यकर्तृकं प्रतिसन्धातुमर्हति नेन्द्रियान्तरस्य विषयान्तरग्रहणमिति ।

" कथं न सङ्घातकर्तृकौ ? "

एकः खल्वयं भिन्ननिमित्तौ स्वात्मकर्तृकौ प्रत्ययौ प्रतिसंहितौ वेदयते न सङ्घातः । कस्मात्? अनिवृत्तं हि सङ्घाते प्रत्येकं विषयान्तरग्रहणस्याप्रतिसन्धानमिन्द्रियान्तरेणेवेति ॥ १ ॥

" [5]न विषयव्यवस्थानात् " ॥ २ ॥

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१ दर्शनेत्यादि सूत्रम् । भावस्य भवित्रपेक्षत्वादिति तस्यार्थः । अनेकेन्द्रियकरणकोऽनेकार्थदर्शी कश्चिदेकश्चेतन इति भावः ।

२ भिन्ननिमित्ताविति । भिन्नम्—इन्द्रियं—निमित्तं ययोस्ताविल्यर्थः ।

३ अनन्यकर्तृकाविति । आत्मकर्तृकावित्यर्थः ।

४ समानविषयाविति । द्रव्यमेवैकं विषय इत्यर्थः ।

५ न विषयेत्यादि सूत्रम् । दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणादिति सत्रेण अनेकेन्द्रियकरणकोऽनेकार्थदर्शी कश्चिदेकश्चेतन इति विवक्षितम् । तत्र पूर्वपक्षी प्रतिसन्धानलक्षणं हेतुमवधार्य साध्यमात्रं विहन्तुमाह—न विषयेत्यादि । अस्यार्थः । यद्यपि

" न देहादिसङ्घातादन्यश्चेतनः । कस्मात्? विषयव्यवस्थानात् । व्यवस्थितविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि—चक्षुष्यसति रूपं न गृह्यते । यच्च[1] यस्मिन्नसति न भवति सति भवति तस्य तदिति विज्ञायते । तस्माद्रूपग्रहणं चक्षुषः,—चक्षू रूपं पश्यति । एवं घ्राणादिष्वपीति । तानीन्द्रियाणीमानि स्वस्वविषयग्रहणाच्चेतनानि, इन्द्रियाणां भावाभावयोर्विषयग्रहणस्य तथाभावात् । एवं सति किमन्येन चेतनेन " ।

सन्दिग्धत्वादहेतुः[2] । योऽयमिन्द्रियाणां भावाभावयोर्विषयग्रहणस्य तथाभावः, स किमयं चेतनत्वादाहोस्विच्चेतनोपकरणानां ग्रहणनिमित्तत्वादिति सन्दिह्यते । चेतनोपकरणत्वेऽपीन्द्रियाणां ग्रहणनिमित्तत्वाद्भवितुमर्हति ॥ २ ॥

यच्चोक्तं[3]—" विषयव्यवस्थानादिति "—

तद्व्यवस्थानादेवात्मसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ ॥

यदि खल्वेकमिन्द्रियमव्यवस्थितविषयं सर्वज्ञं सर्वविषयग्राहि[4] चेतनं स्यात् कस्ततोऽन्यं चेतनमनुमातुं शक्नुयात् । यस्मात्तु व्यवस्थितविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि तस्मात्तेभ्योऽन्यश्चेतनः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविषयग्राही विषयव्यवस्थितितोऽनुमीयते । तत्रेदमभिज्ञानमप्रत्याख्येयं[6] चेतनवृत्तमुदाह्रियते[5]—रूपदर्शी खल्वयं

चेतनान्तरं कल्पितं तदापि न सर्वः सर्वज्ञः किन्तु कश्चित् क्वचिज्ज्ञानवान् । तथा च वरमिन्द्रियाण्येव स्वस्वविषयव्यवस्थितचैतन्यानि सन्तु कृतमपरेण चेतनेनेति ।

१ यच्चेति । यद्भावाभावानुविधायिनौ ज्ञानभावाभावौ तच्चेतनम् । इन्द्रियभावाभावानुविधायिनौ च ताविति तदेव चेतनमिति भावः ।

२ सन्दिग्धत्वादहेतुरिति सिद्धान्तभाष्यम् । अनन्यथासिद्धावन्वयव्यतिरेकौ कारणत्वमात्रे प्रमाणम्—न तु ' न कर्ता चेतनश्चेतनं करणम् ' इत्यत्रेत्यर्थः । इदमुत्तरम्भाष्योद्भावितपूर्वपक्षस्य । सूत्रोद्भावितस्य तूत्तरमग्रिमसूत्रेण भविष्यति ।

३ विषयव्यवस्थानं विरुद्धम्—इन्द्रियादीनामचेतनत्वसाधनादित्याह—यच्चोक्तमिति ।

४ सर्वविषयग्राहीति । सर्वेषामिन्द्रियान्तराणां च ये विषयास्तद्ग्राही । इन्द्रियान्तराणि च पुनर्व्यवस्थितविषयाणि । तेनार्वाग्दृगपि सर्वज्ञ इत्यादि सिद्धम् ।

५ विषयव्यवस्थित इति । इन्द्रियान्तराणि प्रमाणान्तराणि च पुनः व्यवस्थितविषयाणीत्यर्थः ।

६ अभिज्ञानमिति । असाधारणं चिह्नमिति यावत् ।

७ अप्रत्याख्येयमिति । प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यमित्यर्थः । चेतनवृत्तमभिज्ञानमप्रत्याख्येयमुदाह्रियत इति सम्बन्धः ।

रसं गन्धं वा पूर्वगृहीतमनुमिनोति। गन्धप्रतिसंवेदी च रूपरसावनुमिनोति। एवं विषयशेषेऽपि वाच्यम्। रूपं दृष्ट्वा गन्धं जिघ्रति, घ्रात्वा च गन्धं रूपं पश्यति। तदेवमनियतपर्यायं[1] सर्वविषयग्रहणमेकचेतनाधिकरणमनन्यकर्तृकं प्रतिसन्धत्ते। प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमसंशयान् प्रत्ययांश्च नानाविषयान् स्वात्मकर्तृकान् प्रतिसन्दधाति प्रतिसन्धाय वेदयते। सर्वार्थविषयं च शास्त्रं प्रतिपद्यते अर्थमविषयभूतं श्रोत्रस्य। क्रमभाविनो वर्णान् श्रुत्वा पदवाक्यभावेन प्रतिसन्धाय शब्दार्थव्यवस्थां च बुध्यमानोऽनेकविषयम्[2]अर्थजातमग्रहणीयमेकैकेनेन्द्रियेण गृह्णाति। सेयं सर्वज्ञस्य ज्ञेयाऽव्यवस्थाऽनुपदं न शक्या परिक्रमितुम्। आकृतिमात्रं[3] तूदाहृतम्। तत्र यदुक्तम् "इन्द्रियचैतन्ये सति किमन्येन चेतनेन" तदयुक्तं भवति ॥ ३ ॥

(२) शरीरव्यतिरिक्तात्मप्रकरणम्।

इतश्च[4] देहादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा, न देहादिसङ्घातमात्रम्—

शरीरदाहे पातकाभावात् ॥ ४ ॥

शरीरग्रहणेन शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिवेदनासङ्घातः प्राणिभूतो गृह्यते। प्राणिभूतं शरीरं दहतः प्राणिहिंसाकृतपापं पातकमित्युच्यते। तस्याभावः—तत्फलेन

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१ अनियतपर्यायमिति—अनियतक्रममित्यर्थः।

२ अनेकविषयमिति। अनेकपदार्थो विषयो यस्य अर्थजातस्य तदित्यर्थः।

३ आकृतिमात्रमिति—सामान्यमात्रमिति यावत्।

४ इतश्चेति। एवम्प्रथमेन प्रकरणेनेन्द्रियव्यतिरेके प्रसाधिते यदि कश्चिद्देशयेत्— "ननु माभूवन्निन्द्रियाणि चेतनानि, व्यवस्थितविषयत्वात् शरीरं तु भविष्यति, अव्यवस्थितविषयं हि तत्। योऽहं गौरः पीनो युवा रूपं दृष्टवान् सोऽहं स्पर्शं स्पृशामीत्यनुभवात्। अतो दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहीतृ शरीरमेवात्मेति"— तत्रेदम्प्रकरणान्तरमुपतिष्ठते।

५ शरीरेत्यादि सूत्रम्। प्राणातिपाते पातकाभावप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः। अयं यद्यपि भूतचैतनिकानां नानिष्टप्रसङ्गस्तन्मते पातकादेरभावात्, तथापि शाक्यान् प्रति द्रष्टव्यः। ते हि प्राणातिपातकृतं पातकमभ्युपगच्छन्ति।

एवं च न बुद्धिरात्मेति वक्तव्ये देहादिग्रहणमिति। विचित्राभिसन्धित्वात्पुंसां यदि कश्चिद्भूतचैतनिकः प्राणातिपातकृतं पातकमिच्छेत् तं प्रति दूषणम्भविष्यतीत्येवमर्थमेव।

दाहशब्देनात्र नाशमुपलक्षयति। पातकाभावशब्देन च कालान्तरोपयोगिस्थायिगुणाभावम्। शरीरदाह इति शरीरदग्धरि अथवा शरीरदाहे सति तत्कर्तरि इति सम्बन्धः। यस्यात्मा नास्ति तस्यायं दोष इति प्रतिपादनार्थमेवेदं सूत्रं न पुनरात्मसाधनार्थम्।

quality of it which is produced by the defects (of **Passion** etc.) in its activity (this quality being in the shape of 'Adṛṣṭa', 'Unseen Force', Destiny); and it is by this quality that the Mind would be impelled (in cases where there is no effort or Desire) and come into contact with the Sense-organs. If the Mind were not impelled by this quality, then (as there would be nothing else that could urge it into contact) there would be no contact, no cognition would appear; so that the said quality would fail to be universally effective (in regard to all Substances, Qualities and Actions);—and yet it is essential that this particular quality of the Soul (Adṛṣṭa) should be all-effective towards Substances, Qualities and Actions; for otherwise, as there would be nothing else to give rise to the (initial) activity (motion) of the four minutely material atoms, or of the Minds (at the beginning of Creation), there would be no possibility of any such thing being produced as the Body, the Sense-organs and the Objects.

SECTION 4

Consideration of the view that Perception is the same as Inference.

Sūtra 31

Pūrvapakṣa—"Perception is only Inferential Cognition, —as it is a cognition that proceeds from the Cognition of a component part."

BHĀṢYA

(The Pūrvapakṣin says)—"The cognition—'this is a tree'—arising from the contact of the object and the sense-organ is what is called (by you) 'Perception'. But (according to us) this is only an *Inference*. How so? Because the (said) cognition of the *tree* proceeds from the apprehension of one of its parts. When the observer cognises the tree, what he actually *perceives* is only its part nearest to himself; and certainly that *one part* is not the 'tree'. So that (when the man cognises the 'tree' as a whole) what happens is that there is an inference of it (from the perception of its one part), just like the inference of *fire* from the apprehension of *Smoke*."

(The Siddhāntin meets the Pūrvapakṣa with a question)—What is that *something* different from the perceived part, which you regard as being the object of *Inference* (and *not* of *Perception*)?

(The Opponent answers)—" There are two views in regard to the constitution of Objects: By one view an Object is only an aggregate of certain component parts; while by the other it is a distinct *Composite Substance* produced out of its component parts;—now according to the former view, what are *inferred* from the apprehension of one part are the other component parts (other than the one that is perceived); while according to the other view, what are *inferred* are those other parts as well as the Composite whole made up of the parts. "

(Now the Siddhāntin: urges his real objection against the Pūrvapakṣa view)—(*a*) According to the view that the *Object* is only an aggregate of parts,—it would not be possible for any cognition of the 'tree' to proceed from the apprehension of any one part; for just as the perceived *part* is not the 'tree', so the *unperceived part* also is not the 'tree'. (So that the inference of the unperceived part cannot be regarded as the 'cognition of the *tree*', which thus becomes impossible).

" What happens is that from the apprehension of one *part* proceeds the inference of another *part*; and this is followed by a remembrance of all the conglomerated parts; which ultimately brings about the cognition of the 'tree'. "

In that case the 'cognition of the tree' cannot be called *inferential* (as it would be pure *remembrance*).

(*b*) According to the other view,—that the Object is a *composite substance* made up of component parts,—it would be impossible for the composite whole to be *inferred*; for (even according to you) if the composite *whole* is to be *inferred* from the apprehension of a part, there must be a previous *perception* of that whole as related to that part (as without the perception of such relation no inference would be possible) ;—and if the Composite Whole is *perceived*, then, being as much perceived as the *one part*, it cannot be held to be an object of *inference*.

Thus the conclusion is that the cognition of the 'tree' cannot be regarded as *inferential*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In Sū. 31, the Pūrvapakṣin has admitted the cognition of a part and then argued that Perception is only Inference; but this

Sūtra 32

—cannot be ; as even that cognition (from which the inference is held to proceed) is itself perceptional.

BHĀṢYA

Perceptional cognition cannot be regarded as Inferential. "Why ?" Because the apprehension is actually of the form of Perception ; *i. e.* the 'cognition of component part', which has been accepted by the Pūrvapakṣin (as the basis of the inferential cognition of the object) is itself a cognition of the form of Perception ; and that cognition could not be without an object ; hence that object (the part of the tree) which would be apprehended by this cognition being thus admitted (to be *perceived*) establishes the existence of Perception (as apart from Inference).

" But what else is there apart from the Object (*i.e.* the cognised component parts of the Tree) (which would be the Object of the cognition of the 'Tree')? "

Well, there is the *composite whole*, or (if you do not accept such *a whole*) the aggregate of the component parts. And you cannot escape from this difficulty by holding that the initial cognition of the component part also is *inferential* : because it is not possible to have an inferential cognition in the shape of cognition of the single component part ; for the simple reason that there is no Probans whereby such an inference could be got at. [As such a Probans could only be in the form of the cognition of another part ; and for proving this latter to be inferential, yet another cognition would be required as the Probans, and so on *ad infinitum* ; and this infinite regress makes the postulating of any such Probans impossible ; so that the cognition of the component part cannot but be regarded as pure Perception.]

There is yet another reason why Perception cannot be regarded as Inference; that is, because Inference is always preceded by (and based upon) Perception. As a matter of fact, Inference is preceded by Perception ; for instance, it is only when the observer has *percieved* fire and smoke to be related to each other, and again *perceives* smoke (in the Subject), that there is *Inference* in regard to Fire (which is not in contact with any sense-organ as the time) ;—now here we find that no Inference can follow in the absence of the *Perception* (in the *Example*)

of the Probandum and Probans as related to each other or in that of the (subsequent) *perception* (in the Subject) of the Probans by itself;—and certainly these two *perceptions* cannot be regarded as Inference; for the simple reason that they are brought about by the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object; and Inference does not proceed from any such contact of the Object of inference with the Sense-organs. This is an important point of difference in the characters of Inference and Perception; and this has to be accepted.

Sūtra 33

Nor is there the cognition of one component part, as the composite whole is also there (and this also is cognised).

BHĀṢYA

[The Author points out another weak point in the Pūrvapakṣa argument of Sū. 30]—In no case is there a cognition of any single component part only; in fact there is cognition of one component part, and of the composite which is inseparable from (composed of) that component part. "How so?" *Because there is the composite whole*; as a matter of fact there is the *composite whole*, which is something distinct from the *component parts*; and when this *composite* occupies the same point in space as the component part, it should be amenable to all the conditions of perceptibility (to which the component part is amenable); and under the circumstances, when there is *perception* of the *component* part, it is not possible that there be no *perception* of the *composite*.

" But there is no apprehension of all (the parts) ".—This is not right; as the ' one part ' (of the Composite whole) has no existence apart from its (constituent) cause. (The sense of the Pūrvapakṣa argument now put forward is as follows)—" As a matter of fact, *all* the component parts are not perceived; some parts being hidden from view by other parts; and under the circumstances, the whole of the Composite (even if such Composite were admitted) could never be perceived; specially as the Composite does not subsist in its entirety in any of those parts that *are* perceived; so that the ' cognition of one part ' still remains (as the cause of the inference of the entire Composite whole)."

But, says the Siddhāntin in answer to the above, the term 'entire' ('whole') is used only when (of several things) all are meant, and the term 'non-entire' ('partial') is used when a few of them are left out (and only a few are meant); thus then, both these terms ('entire' and 'non-entire') are applicable only to several things, which are perceived when not hidden, and are not perceived when hidden (and certainly the Composite is never hidden by its component parts).

You please answer the following question.—When the Composite is perceived, what of it is there which is not perceived, which could justify your assertion that there is cognition of only the part (and not of the *whole*)? Certainly, of the Composite whole there are no 'parts' apart from its constituent causes (its components); and it is not right to regard the *composite* as of the same nature as the component parts. The character of the *Composite* is such that it is perceived as along with those parts that are perceived, and it is not perceived as along with those that are not perceived, on account of obstruction. Certainly this (perception and non-perception) does not bring about a diversity (in the Composite).

[The Siddhāntin next takes up the view that the Composite is nothing but the aggregate of component parts]—The *composite* 'Tree' (according to this view) would consist either—(*a*) in the entirety (multiplicity) of the components, or (*b*) in the conjunction (combination) of the components;—in either case apprehension of it would not be possible. That is to say—(*a*) either the *composite* 'Tree' would consist in the entirety of the root, the trunk, the branch, the leaves and other components,—or it would consist in the conjunction of these components; in either case any apprehension of the 'Tree' as a *composite* whole would be impossible; as in the first place, certain parts (the back part, for instance) would always be hidden from view by the obstruction of other parts (for instance, the front part);—which would make it impossible for the parts to be apprehended *in their entirety*; and secondly, as for the *conjunction of the parts*, this also could not be apprehended, for the simple reason that all the conjuncts (parts) are not apprehended.

Thus then, the conclusion is that the cognition of the 'tree', accompanying (and following from) the 'cognition of one part'

can be explained only on the theory that the 'Tree' forms a distinct object (by itself, independently of the component parts),—and not on the theory (held by the Pūrvapakṣin) that it is a mere aggregate *of the parts*.

[Thus ends the Examination of the View that Perception is only a form of Inference.]

SECTION (5)

Examination of the Nature of Composite Wholes.

[Sūtras 34—37]

Sūtra 34

Pūrvapakṣa :—"**As the Composite Whole is still to be proved,* there must be a doubt with regard to it.**"—(Sū. 34).

BHĀṢYA

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* says]—"It has been said (in Sū. 32) that [there can be no cognition of one part only] *because the Composite Whole is also there* ;—but this is not a valid reason† ; as the '*Composite Whole*' is still *to be proved*; that is to say, it still remains to be proved that out of the constituent particles a distinct substance, in the shape of the 'Composite Whole', is produced ;—as a matter of fact, this has not yet been proved ; and so long as it has not been proved beyond doubt, all that can be said is that there is a *diversity of opinion* in regard to it ;

* This word '*Sādhya*' has, as we learn from the *Vārtika*, given rise to confusion. The real sense is thus explained by the *Tātparya* :—The term *Sādhya* here simply means that the Composite Whole is *a-siddha, not-admitted*, by the Opponent ; who argues thus—"Things are to be accepted exactly as they are ; an Idea can establish the existence of that only which it apprehends ; and what is apprehended by the Idea is that which imparts its form to the Idea. Such being the case, as a matter of fact, in the Idea of a certain thing, we do not find any other form apart from the continuously appearing atoms of Colour &c., and no Idea is ever found to have the form of the 'Composite Whole', or any thing apart from the said atoms. Though the atoms, each by itself, are devoid of magnitude and volume, yet when they appear in a group, they appear as having magnitude." The Opponent entertaining such notions in regard to the Composite Whole, it is only right to regard this as *not-accepted* by him; and as such open to a diversity of opinion, specially in the absence of any proofs one way or the other.

† 'For us'—says the *Pūrvapakṣin*—*Bhāṣyacandra.*

and on account of this *diversity of opinion*, there should be Doubt in regard to the subject (according to Sū. 1-1-23)."

Sūtra 35

[*Siddhānta*] **If there were no Composite, there would be non-apprehension of all things.***

BHĀṢYA

If there is no Composite, there will be non-apprehension§ of all things. "What *all things*?" Such things as Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Individuality and Inherence. "With what idea [do you say this]?"† Well, as for Substance in its atomic condition, this could never be an object of perception, as atoms are beyond the reach of the sense-organs;—as for any other form of Substance, [this could only be a composite of atoms, and] no Composite substance exists (according to the Pūrvapakṣin), which could be the object of perception; and yet as a matter of fact, all these, Substance and the rest, are found to be objects of perception, and actually apprehended as such. —But if these were without a substratum (in the form of the Composite), they could not be apprehended:—and yet there *are* such apprehensions as—(*a*) 'this is a jar—(*b*) dark in colour—(*c*) one in number—(*d*) large in size—(*e*) conjoined (to something else)—(*f*) *moving*,—(*g*) *existing* and—(*h*) made of clay'; and every one of these—the quality (of colour, number) &c.,—is a property (of some Composite substance). So that, inasmuch as we have the apprehension of all these things, we conclude that there is such a thing as the *Composite*; apart from the Components.

Sūtra 36

Also as there is possibility of holding and drawing,—

BHĀṢYA

the Composite is something actually‡ *different from the components*.||

* The *Vārtika* proposes another interpretation—'there would be non-apprehension by means of any Instrument of Cognition.'

§ 'Non-apprehension' stands for all kinds of phenomenon.'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains *Kṛtvā* as '*matvā*'.

‡ This Sūtra is an answer to the view that the conception of 'composite' is illusory. '*Bhūta*' denotes *actuality*.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

|| These words complete the sentence of the Sūtra and, according to the Vārtika, are implied by the particle च in the Sūtra; the whole sentence being—

[The Opponent objects to the reasoning as follows]—" As a matter of fact, the *Holding and Drawing* are due to *adhesion*,—this *adhesion* being a particular quality (of the components themselves) which is concomitant with (their) *conjunction*, and which is produced by viscidity and fluidity, through the contact of water, in the unbaked jar, and through the contact of fire in the baked jar. If these two (Holding and Drawing) were due to the (fact of the thing being a) Composite, then they could be perceived even in such things, as a *heap of dust* (which cannot be either *held* or *drawn*, simply because there is no *adhesion* among the dust-particles); and they could not be possible in the case of several things, like the straw, stone and wood, packed up together by means of lac,—where the packed up bundle does not become a new substance (different from the component *wood* etc.). [So that the case of this bundle is not analogous to that of the Jar composed of atoms, which is held to be something different from the component atoms; and yet the said bundle of wood etc. is capable of being *held* and *drawn*; simply because there is *adhesion* due to the lac.] "*

'The Composite must be something different, because there is possibility of its being held and drawn.' The *Pariśuddhi* remarks that in the form in which the Probans—*possibility of drawing and holding*—is put forward, it is one that does not subsist in the Subject, 'Composite'; the proper probans should be धारणाकर्षणवत्त्वात्, 'because it is possessed of the capability of being held and drawn'. This same difficulty is avoided by the *Tātparya* by formulating the reasoning in the *negative* form—"The Jar and other things that we see, which are suspected to be mere aggregates of atoms, *cannot be non-composites,—because, if they were so there would be no possibility of their being held and drawn,*—as we find that whatever is non-composite, like Cognition, is never held and drawn,—while Jar and such other things are always capable of being held and drawn,—hence these latter cannot be non-composites.'

* Thus by the two examples of *Dust-Heap* and *Straw-wood-bundle*, it is shown that what is invariably concomitant with Holding is *adhesion*, and not *Composite* character.

For अवयाविकारिते some Mss. read अवयवकारिते.

It is noteworthy that the *Bhāṣya* contents itself with this *Pūrvapakṣa* argument, and does not supply the answer to it. It would appear, from this, that the objection has the acceptance of the *Bhāṣya-kāra*. Vāchaspaṭi Misra says that this दूषणम्, objection to the reasoning of the Sutra, is

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question—" The man who denies the Composite, and, with a view to avoid the contingency of Perception becoming impossible, holds that what is perceived is the *aggregate of Atoms*,—what is there to urge against such a man ? "*

Answer †—Such a person should be asked to explain what is the object of the unitary conception that we have in the idea of ' one thing ' ; the question put to him being in the form—does the Unitary Conception refer to (*i.e.* apprehend) a *non-diverse* (single) thing, or to diverse (several) things ? If it be said to refer to a *non-diverse* thing, then, this view would admit the *non-diverse thing* to be something different (from the components, which are *diverse*) ; so that what we call the 'composite' would be admitted ;—if, on the other hand, it be held to refer to

परमतेन, from the standpoint of the Opponent ; but in that case the answer should have been given ; as it has been given in the Vārtika. The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains that the Pupil, upon hearing the aforesaid reasonings of the opponent, puts the question embodied in the next sentence of the *Bhāṣya* as to what answer should be given to these arguments of the opponent. Then comes the answer from the stand-point of the *Siddhāntin*. (See below.)

It is well worth considering whether or not we can, in some way, interpret the *Bhāṣya* as putting forward an argument in support of the *Siddhānta* view. We have a clue to this in the reading of some Mss., which read अवयवकृते for अवयविकृते. Accepting this reading we can translate the whole passage in the following manner, and thus make it an argument in support of the *Siddhānta*—' Holding and Drawing are always found to be due to *massiveness* ; this *massiveness* is a distinct quality concomitant with *conjunction*, which is produced by *viscidity* and *fluidity*, through contact of water, in the unbaked jar, and through contact of fire, in the baked jar ; if Holding and Drawing were due to the *components* themselves (and not to a *massive* substance composed of them), then they would be possible in the Dust-heap also (where the component dust-particles are present, even though there is no massive substance) ; and would not be possible in the case of straw-stone-and-wood bundled together with lac ; as in this case (even though there is a massive substance) there is no *component* [the several heterogeneous substances not constituting one homogeneous whole, and as such not entitled to the name ' component '.]

* This question is addressed by the Pupil who has heard the above arguments on behalf of the Pūrvapaksa and is anxious to learn how to meet them.

† The Teacher teaches the following answer.

diverse things (the many components), then, it would be a case of *many things* (Atoms) being perceived as *one*, which would be an absurdity (a case of pure misconception); as we never come across any such (right) notion as that of 'one' in regard to the *many*.

Sūtra 37

[In answer to what has been just urged by the Siddhāntin, the Pūrvapakṣin might urge that]—" the said conception (of 'one' in regard to the Many) would be similar to the notion that we have in regard to such (collective) things as the 'Army' and the 'Forest' ";—but even so the conception would not be possible; as Atoms are beyond the reach of the senses.

BHĀṢYA

[Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*]—"In the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest' it is found that when, on account of remoteness, the distinctness (and diversity) of the component factors is not perceived, the conception of their being 'one' becomes possible; analogously, many Atoms being massed together, when their distinctness (and diversity) fail to be perceived, the notion of these being 'one' becomes possible."

But in the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest' what actually happens is that the diversity of the component factors of these is such as is ordinarily perceptible, but it fails to be perceived on account of an extraneous cause in the shape of *remoteness*;—similarly when there are several trees, the particular species to which each belongs—such as, '*Palāśa*', '*Khadira*' &c.—is such as is ordinarily perceptible, * but it fails to be perceived on account of remoteness;— similarly again in the case of such things as have their (diverse) movements ordinary perceptible, the (diverse) movement fails to be perceived on account of remoteness; and in all these cases what happens is that the (diverse component) things themselves are perceived, but their diversity fails to be perceived on account of remoteness, which (non-perception

* Some printed texts read '*agṛhyamāṇa*'; the MSS. do not show the 'a'; and in the sentence preceding and following this, we have '*gṛhyamāna*'; the *Vārtika* also explains the term as '*upalabhyamānajatīnām*.' The translation has for these reasons adopted the reading without 'a'.

of diversity) makes it possible for the notion of 'one' to appear in regard to them, in a secondary (indirect, figurative) sense. The case of Atoms is entirely different ;—in regard to these it is not true that their diversity is ordinarily perceptible; so that it cannot be said that the figurative notion of 'one' becomes possible when, for some reason, the said diversity fails to be perceived ; —this cannot be said, for the simple reason that Atoms are 'beyond the reach of the senses' (and hence their diversity cannot be said to be ordinarily perceptible).

Further [the Opponent is not quite right in citing the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest', for] what is being discussed (by us) is just this—whether or not the unitary conception refers to the 'mass of small particles' ; and the 'Army' and the 'Forest' also are just such 'mass of small particles' [so that these are as much open to discussion as any other *Composite*] ; and certainly it is not right to put forward as an example (in proof of a Proposition) something that is itself open to discussion ; as such a thing is in the same position as what is meant to be proved (by the citing of that example). *

It might be argued that what has been put forward is what is actually seen (by all parties).—But even so it would not be right ; as what is being discussed is just what exactly forms the object of the 'seeing' or 'perception'. That is to say, the Opponent might argue as follows: "It is a fact actually perceived that in the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest', the distinction among the component parts not being perceived, the parts come to be looked upon as *non-different*,—which gives rise to the idea of these being 'one'; and certainly what is actually perceived cannot be denied." But this is not quite right ; what forms the object of perception is just what is being discussed [and has still got to be ascertained] ; the precise object of perception is what

* What the *Bhāṣya* means is that no corroborative example can be available for the Opponent who denies the 'compositeness' of all things ; so that for him, every conceivable thing has its nature and constitution entering into the subject of his reasoning ; his Proposition being that "*all things* in the world are mere masses of imperceptible small particles." When 'all things' enter into this Proposition, either no corroborative instance is available ; or if any were cited, such citing would be clearly wrong.—*Tātparya*.

is being discussed, the point at issue being the notion of 'unity' that is actually perceived ; has this notion for its object only the 'mass of small particles', or something different from the particles ? So that mere seeing or Perception could not establish any conclusion one way or the other. In fact, inasmuch as the 'small particles' or 'Atoms' are *many*, if there does arise an idea of 'unity' in regard to them, by reason of their distinctness not being perceived, and hence their being regarded as non-different,—such an idea must be regarded as being a notion of something (the *many* atoms) as what it is not (*i.e. one*), just like the notion of the *Post* as a *Man*, [and as such, it must be a clearly *wrong* cognition, a misconception] "What if it is so ?" —Well, inasmuch as the notion of something as what it is not must be dependent upon an original prototype, the appearance of such a notion establishes the existence of such a prototype ; and the basis of a misconception can consist only of a true *conception* ; so that the conception of the *many* as *one* proves the reality of the conception of the really *one* as *one*, which proves the existence of a really *single object*, apart from its *many* components.—"But what is the Prototype for the conception of the *Post* as *Man* ?"—This prototype consists in the conception of the real *Man* as *Man* ; it is only when there is such a conception that a conception of '*Man*' can arise in regard to the Post from the perception of certain points of similarity (between the real *Man* and *Post*). Similarly it is only if there were a true conception of what is the really *one* as 'one,' that there could arise the conception of 'one' in regard to the *many* atoms, from the perception of certain points of similarity* (between the *many* Atoms and what is *really* 'one'). But inasmuch as there is no possibility (for the opponent) of any *true* conception (of unity) arising in regard to anything,—as there is nothing according to the Opponent that is realy apprehended as *one*,—it follows that the idea of *non-difference* (unity) embodied in the unitary conception really arises in regard to a thing that is really *non-diverse* in its character.

The correct reading is not प्रामाण्य, but सामान्य as found in all Mss. and also in the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

"What forms the necessary Prototype is the notion of *non-diversity* (*i. e. unity*) that we have in the case of things perceived by other sense-organs."

This also cannot be right; as until special reasons are put forward, the mere citing of an example cannot establish any conclusion. What the Opponent means is as follows—"In the case of the object perceived by the other organs—e. g. Sound, perceived by the auditory organ—we find that there is unitary conception in regard to Sounds which are non-diverse in character (even according to us); *—and this unitary conception would be the Prototype of the unitary conception in regard to the *many* (atoms, for instance)." But even so, the mere citing of an example would not lead to any definite conclusion; for the simple reason that no special reason is adduced (in support of the conclusion). That is to say, the question being—the unitary conception that there is in regard to the massed atoms, is this a conception of something as what it is not, like the conception of Post as 'Man'? or is the actual state of things really as represented by the conception, and hence the conception is of something as what it actually is, like the notion of 'one Sound' in regard to Sound which is really *one*? Until special reasons are adduced (in support of one view or the other), mere Examples only tend to accentuate the uncertainty. Further, as a matter of fact, the *Odour* (Sound and the rest), which are 'things perceived by other sense-organs' adduced as examples by the Opponent, also are mere *masses* or *aggregates* of (diverse) things, like the jar, and as such cannot form correct examples (of unitary conception in regard to non-diverse things).†

* According to the Pūrvapakṣin, all sounds are one and the same and hence conceived of as *one*. This is a case of really non-diverse things conceived as one—a true unitary conception, which will supply the Prototype for the unitary conception in regard to the diverse atoms.

† The Vaiśesikas hold that Sound is produced, not only from Ākāśa, but also from such conglomerations of material substances as the Cloth for instance. So that according to them, Sound is only a conglomeration of diverse things. Thus the notion of 'one' in regard to them cannot be correct, and unitary conception in regard to Sound cannot be the prototype of such conception in regard to the *many* atoms. According to the Naiyāyika also, *unity*, which is a quality, cannot belong to Sound, which itself is a

The (well-known) conceptions of (A) Magnitude, (B) Conjuction, (C) Motion, (D) Community and (E) Specific Individuality should also be urged against the person who denies the 'composite,' as what has been urged in connection with unitary *conception* is applicable to these conceptions also. *

† The unitary conception (whenever it arises) must be regarded as arising in connection with what is really *one*, being the conception of something as what it really is; the special reason for this consisting in the fact that the said conception is co-extensive with the conception of *magnitude*. As a matter of fact, the two conceptions—'this is *one*' and 'this is large'—pertaining to the same object, become *co-extensive*; and from this it is known that 'that which is *large* is *one*'.

"But the 'conception of Magnitude' consists only in the cognising of a certain peculiarity in the *aggregate of Atoms*."§

[The answer to this is as follows]—The said 'conception of magnitude', appearing in regard to Atoms which by their very nature) have no magnitude, will only be a conception of something as what it is not (*i. e.* a *wrong* conception).—"What if it be so?" Well, the (wrong) conception of something as what it is not must be dependent upon a prototype; so that the existence of the prototype becomes established; which

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quality; as no quality can subsist in a quality. So that according to both parties the unitary conception in regard to Sound is as 'secondary' or 'indirect' as that in regard to the Atoms.—*Tātparya*.

The *Pariśuddhi* adds—The notion of 'number', wherever and whenever it appears, is regarded as *true* when it is not sublated by any subsequent conception; and when it is found to be so sublated, it is regarded as wrong. According to this principle the notion of 'one' in regard to Sound, as also in regard to Atoms, must be wrong; as in both cases, there is the subsequent notion that they are *many*, not *one*.

* If you do not admit the 'composite' thing, you cannot account for such notions as (*a*)—'this thing is large', (*b*) 'this is in contact with that', (*c*) 'the horse (the individual animal that belongs to the community 'Horse') (*d*) is running'. As none of these could ever appear in regard to mere Atoms, which are imperceptible.—*Vārtika*.

† This anticipates the following question—"According to you also, how do you account for the notion of *unity* in connection with the *many* trees—there being, as you say, no special reason in favour of one view or the other?"

§ 'And it is not a particular kind of Dimension.'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

means that there must be a right conception of 'magnitude' in regard to something really possessed of magnitude [which conception alone could be the prototype of the wrong conception of magnitude in regard to Atoms, which have no magnitude]. [And this proves that there must be some such substance as is really possessed of magnitude, and all the world does not consist of mere atoms.]

"With regard to Sound we have the conception of 'small' and 'large', and this conception of both 'smallness' and 'magnitude' (appearing in regard to the same thing, Sound) would be the prototype of the notion of 'magnitude' in regard to the small Atoms".—That cannot be; as the said conception (in regard to *Sound*) apprehends (*i. e.* pertains to) only *faintness* and *loudness*, for the simple reason that they do not pre-suppose the ascertainment of the exact dimension or extent of the Sound, as is done in the case of similar conceptions in regard to *substances.* [That is to say, when one speaks of Sound as being 'small', what is meant is that it is weak, *faint*; and when one speaks of Sound being 'large' what is meant is that it is powerful, *loud*;—and the reason why this must be the meaning lies in the fact that the said conceptions do not pre-suppose the definite cognition of the exact extent or dimension of the Sound.] For instance, when one conceives of the Sound as 'large' he does not have the idea that the Sound *extends so far*,—the idea that he has in the case of (the conception of the *largeness* of) such things as the *Badara*, the *Āmalaka* and the *Bilva* fruits (whose exact sizes are known).*

The conception that 'these two (visible) things are in contact' involves the cognition of contact having the same substratum as Duality [*i. e.* it implies the cognition of the *contact of two things*, which proves that these two things must be *composites*, and not mere *atoms*].†

* The *Tātparya* remarks that the cognition of the exact extent of a thing is possible only when the size or dimension of that thing is perceptible And certainly this is not possible in the case of either Sound or Atoms.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* formulates the argument thus :—"The conception of 'these two' must be right, because it is co-extensive with the notion of 'these are in contact,'—that which is not so co-extensive is not right notion—as the notion of 'two moons'.

" But the substratum of Contact consists of the two *masses* (of component atoms, and not of *composite substances*) ":—Now what is this 'Mass' ?

" The *Mass* (or Aggregate) may be either (*a*) the '*prāpti*', combination, of several (components),—or (*b*) the manifold combinations of a single substance."*

[As regards] (*a*) what we would urge is that, there is no cognition of the contact as subsisting in combinations ; as a matter of fact, when one has the conception that 'these two things are in contact', he has no idea of two 'combinations' being in contact.†

(*b*) " In that case we shall define *Mass* as the manifold combinations (of a single substance)."—This also cannot be

* This passage of the *Bhāṣya* is not quite in keeping with what we find in the *Vārtika*. The two alternatives as put in the *Vārtika* are—(*a*) अनेकस्य प्राप्तिः (which is the same an in the *Bhāṣya*) and (*b*) अनेकः समुदायी ; in the *Bhāṣya*, we should have something corresponding to the latter ;—now from what follows in the *Bhāṣya*, later on, it is clear that the second alternative meant by the Bhāsya is that the *Mass* is अनेकसमूहः—*i.e.*, simply the group of several components ; and this is just the second alternative as represented in the *Vārtika*. The only way in which the present passage of the *Bhāṣya* can be construed to afford the two alternatives of the *Vārtika* is as follows—कोऽयं समुदायः । (*a*) प्राप्तिरनेकस्य or (*b*) अनेका वा ।. And then the Opponent accepts the former alternative,—which statement of the opponent ends with चेत्,—to which the Siddhāntin replies with प्राप्तेरग्रहणम् &c. &c. That such are the two alternatives is shown also by the Bhāsya, under Sūtra 33. But, in this construction, a new difficulty presents itself : The words in which the Opponent accepts the first alternative are read in the text, in all Mss., as प्राप्तिरेकस्य समुदायः, while according to the explanation we have provided, they should be प्राप्तिरनेकस्य समुदायः, which is the first alternative suggested by the Siddhāntin, and which the Opponent accepts.

We have however translated the passage in accordance with the explanation provided by the *Bhāṣyacandra* ; and though this is not quite in keeping with the *Vārtika*, it is the only sense that can be deduced from the words of the *Bhāṣya* as they stand.

† If the *Mass* is only the 'combination of particles,' then, when one cognises *two masses in contact*, he should have the notion of two 'combinations' being in contact. As a matter of fact, however, no one has any such notion.

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ŚRĪ DYĀ DVIVEDA-HIS PLACE IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE

(Sitaram J. Joshi)

(To understand Dyā Dviveda well, it is necessary for one to realise the situation of Sanskrit scholarship that existed in his time and that exists now as well. So I have deemed it right to estimate here for comparison the Sanskrit scholarship itself in general.)

The Sanskrit Scholars in these days are inclined to differentiate the classical literature from the Vedic by calling the former by the name of 'Sanskrit' literature. They have their own reason for this tendency of theirs; because the word 'Sanskrit' came to be applied to the so-called classical literature at a comparatively later period, the whole language previous to it, being most probably designated as the Divine speech (**दैवी वाक्**) or Deva-vāṇī, as Daṇḍin, the great rhetorician has defined it by saying '**संस्कृतं नाम दैवी वागन्वाख्याता महर्षिभिः**' the great sages particularize the divine speech as 'Sanskrit'.[1]

It seems that this divine speech or language gradually became more refined and regulated by the grammatical rules laid down by Pāṇini and his two followers, Kātyāyana and Patañjali, and the name 'Sanskrit' i.e., 'refined' was given to it to differen-

1. In the Vedas we find that it is named simply Vāk (वाक्) as we find in the famous passage which gives its origin as follows :—

वाग्वै पराची अव्याकृताऽवदत् ।
ते देवा इन्द्रमब्रुवन् इमां नो वाचं व्याकुर्विति ।......
तामिन्द्रो मध्यतोऽवक्रम्य व्याकरोत् तस्मादियं व्याकृता वागुद्यते etc.

T. S. vi. 4. 7. 3 ;

It was Indra who first ruled it and then it was propagated among gods; so naturally it was named as 'Divine'.

tiate it from the other crude speeches that were in vogue among ordinary folk, the so-called prākrits. Thus the name 'Sanskrit' was coined to designate the literature of that particular stage which we now call classical; yet owing to its being a substitute for the whole of the divine speech—the language of the classical literature not totally differing from that of the Vedas--the epithet 'Sanskrit' can very well apply to the Vedic as well as the classical literature equally and when we proceed to determine Dyā Dviveda's place in Sanskrit literature, we mean to point out his concern with both the sections of the same language.

The Sanskrit literature, thus, falls into two broad divisions, *viz.*, Vedic and Classical. It is generally seen that the scholars who have thoroughly laboured in one, have not been able to master the other to the same extent. The scholars like Sāyaṇācārya and Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara, who were the first-grade Vedic scholars and manifested their versatility in more than one branch of the classical literature such as Vyākaraṇa, Mimāṁsā, Dharmaśāstra etc. are rarely found to have flourished in the last few centuries of the Christian era. Sāyaṇācārya, the great Vedic exponent of his age, had his predecessors too, equally renowned and competent, whom he himself has not failed to mention in his great commentary, called 'Vedārthaprakāśa'. Not only did he make mention of them, but has also followed some of them literally. It is well-known to the scholarly world that Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara flourished long before Sāyaṇācarya appeared in the field and he has been an able commentator of the Vedic texts of the Taittirīya school which are now duly published. If we carefully compare the commentaries of both the scholars, Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara and Sāyaṇācārya on the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, we shall not fail to notice that the two agree word for word in most cases. The natural inference one can draw from this coincidence is that one must have imitated the other and that the originality falls to the lot of him who flourished earlier.[1]

1. Here we do not mean that Sāyaṇa's Commentary has no originality; we find great dissertations by him on Vedic ritual which are missing in Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara's, but they are only at the beginning of each section but the comment on the mantras and other contents is literally the same in both; which fact also shows that Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara was held very highly in the opinion of Sāyaṇācārya.

We have no means to say whether Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara too had similarly imitated some one of his predecessors and further, we shall not be in a position to determine this fact unless we are able to procure and possess all the documents that existed before Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara. Similarly Durgācārya, the commentator of Yāska's Nirukta is also a predecessor of Sāyaṇa. In the whole of the Ṛgveda no less than three stanzas or Ṛcas have their commentary word to word similar in both. It is thus obvious that Sāyaṇa had purposely taken down other's commentary where he perhaps thought his own to be superfluous. We have yet to decide, as these older commentaries come to light, how far the originality of Sāyaṇa's commentary lay with him. There is not the least doubt that this great scholiast was a versatile genius, unsurpassed by anybody in his knowledge of Pāṇini and Jaimini and also in that of all the main and ancillary texts of his own Śākhā, *viz.*, the Taittirīya School.

Sayaṇācārya in his great commentary on the Ṛgveda mentions among others his predecessors Mādhava Bhaṭṭa and Skandasvāmī. Fortunately we are now in a position to form an estimate about the scholarship of Skandasvāmī as we can very well go over his able commentary on the Nirukta of Yāska and also his commentary on the Ṛgveda which is now partly available, the remaining portion being expected to come out of the press very soon.[1] We know something of Mādhava Bhaṭṭa too; there have been no less than three Mādhavas, all of them being the scholars of the Ṛgveda. We are not aware how many others of this type of Vedic and classical scholarship would have existed in ancient and mediæval India. But we can have a fair idea of the type of such scholarship from the few instances which have been already known to us and we can very well infer how the Vedic study was promulgated in ancient times in this country.

Every Sanskrit scholar formerly obeyed the great rule of Manu, which says that 'the[2] twice-born (Dvija) who without

1. The Madras University is giving publication to it.
2. Manu Smṛti II. 168, Cf.

   योऽनधीत्य द्विजो वेदमन्यत्र कुरुते श्रमम् ।
   स जीवन्नेव शूद्रत्वमाशु गच्छति सान्वयः ॥

studying the Veda, labours in other sciences, in his very life becomes a Śūdra with his succeeding generations.' Therefore, he studied the Vedas first before he laboured in the Śāstras. It is a quite different thing that the commentators of this verse interpreted the word 'Veda' by enlarging its sphere by acknowledging the study of the Vedāṅgas and the Smṛtis even without the study of the Vedas themselves as the Vedic study[1] implied here. All the Vedic commentators who have been mentioned hitherto were firstly Vedic scholars, who afterwards had laboured in Dharmaśāstra, Mīmāṁsā, Vyākaraṇa and other Vedāṅgas. Then we should not be surprised when we come to realise that the three great *savants* (मुनित्रय) of grammar, Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali too were great Vedic scholars who made the subject of their great treatises the language of both the Vedic and classical literature by distinguishing between the two by the words, **वेदे, छन्दसि, लोके, भाषायाम्** etc. The very terminology of Pāṇini and the letters inserted or appended for elision (इत्करण) indicate how particular they were in acknowledging the accent of each and every word under topic. What we now call as the Vedic accent, was once the part and parcel of the entire tongue, and the importance which was once greatly attached to the pronunciation of the words, and which seems to have been recognized even so late as in the times of Pāṇini and his two great followers, gradually came to be ignored and the accent seems to have lost its significance completely with the development of the Prakrit speeches. We can add a few more points to differentiate the Vedic from the classical literature well-known to the literary world that we need not dilate upon them here.[2]

If we leave these and other such special points out of consideration, there is hardly anything which can differentiate the language of the two literatures.

The present mode of studying the classical literature and philosophy, entirely ignoring the acquaintance with the Vedic,

1. Cf. Kulluka Bhaṭṭa's Commentary on the verse of Manusūmṛti II. 1-168.

'वेदमनधीत्यापि स्मृतिवेदाङ्गाध्ययने विरोधाभावः। अत एव शङ्खलिखितौ–न वेदमनधीत्यान्यां विद्यामधीयीतान्यत्र वेदाङ्गस्मृतिभ्यः।'

2. Pāṇini III. 4, 9, 10, 11; Apte's Guide to Sanskrit Composition, lesson XV.

is not very commendable and it has totally severed the connection of both that were once studied side by side. The present Vedic scholars who commit with great pains the entire texts of their Śākhā to memory, do not at all labour to understand the meaning implied in them. This method has its origin long, long ago as far back as in Yāska's times i.e. the 7th or 8th century B.C. and even anterior to it. In Yāska's Nirukta we find a dialogue between a typical Vedic scholar Kautsa and an expert exegetical exponent wherein the Vedic scholar maintains that the Vedic mantras bear no meaning (अनर्थका हि मन्त्राः).[1] In these days almost all the Vedic scholars studying Vedic texts on indigenous lines are not only found to ignore this side of semantics, but also the knowledge and study of grammar and literature in general, so that they are completely unaware of the meaning and significance of the mantras they utter and utilise for their daily purposes. The Mīmāṁsakas who profess to be the interpreters of the Vedas do not seem to have thoroughly laboured in the Vedic literature. The Vaiyākaraṇas or grammarians who with great efforts study and master the entire Pāṇini system, including the particularities of the words in the Vedic literature and accent, hardly care to apply them to the original Vedic texts, nay, they are not even aware of the original texts from which the quotations of words for their purpose are extracted. They possess a very poor knowledge of the Vedas themselves. The two other aṅgas or branches of the Vedic literature namely Jyotiṣa and Dharmaśāstra, the former including astronomy and astrology both and the latter called as the science of theology, have now so grown up in bulk as to become independent lores in themselves. Most of the good astronomers and astrologers of these days are seen inclined towards not having even the full command on the language in which they learn their science. The general tendency of the curriculum of the studies of the Sanskrit Pāṭhaśālās and Boards is towards making each branch of Sanskrit literature and philosophy stand quite independent of the other, preserving no mutual connection between any two of them. For instance, if we look to the syllabus of the course of Jyotiṣa, we shall see that only a poor knowledge of the language and literature that is acquired by

1. Cf. Nirukta, I. 15.

passing the first or Praveśikā examination is regarded as sufficient to serve the purpose of understanding all the books of that science ; on the contrary, if we study the life of the authors of the great astronomical works such as पञ्चसिद्धान्तिका, बृहत्संहिता, बृहज्जातक, सूर्यसिद्धान्त, सिद्धान्तशिरोमणि, ग्रहलाघव, etc., we find that they were great poets having full command over the language and literature in which they composed their works. If we omit a few exceptional cases such as M. M. Bapudeva Sastri and Sudhākara Dvivedi, we shall see that almost all the renowned astronomers of the present day have paid little attention to having the command on the language, which is the medium of their study, the result being that they have not been able to compose any original works throwing fresh light on their own science. This very rule applies to each and every branch of Sanskrit literature or philosophy that is studied at present. It is now a great problem before the Sanskritists how to make one able to grasp the essential knowledge of each and every branch of this vast lore so that he may not remain ignorant of the principal underlying truths exposed in each science connecting them with those in others. The reverse was the case of Vedic scholars who have been already mentioned and referred to such as Bhaṭṭa Bhaskara ; Skandasvāmī, Sāyaṇācārya etc., who were great typical scholars generally having a fair knowledge of every branch of the classical literature directly connected with the Vedas. We have to point out that our Dyā Dviveda was also one of them.

THE LIFE AND DATE OF 'DYĀ DVIVEDA'

It is true that Dyā Dviveda is not known to the scholarly world by writing any learned commentary on the text of any Veda as these scholars ; yet he has revealed his profound knowledge of the Vedas, placing himself in a line with these great scholars by composing a unique work known as the 'Nītimañjarī[1]'. This important work has been recently given publication to and in the introduction to it, I have tried to bring forth almost all the important points regarding the life, work, scholarship etc., of this great scholar, to the notice of the interested public, in general and Sanskrit scholars in particular.

1. Published in 1933 at the Hetachutah Press, Ramghat, Benares City, by Shalegram Sharma, Hari Hara Mandal, Kalbhairava, Benares City.

From the initial verses of his work, viz., Nītimañjarī,[1] we know something of his lineage, parents and other family matters. He tells us that his great-grandfather was a renowned scholar of his time, by name Mukunda Dvivedi. Atri was his grandfather and his parents were by name Lakṣmī and Lakṣmīdhara. He reveres his great-grandfather, Mukunda by the epithets 'वेदवेदाङ्गतत्त्वज्ञ' the knower of the principles of the Vedas and their ancillary texts called aṅgas, 'स्मृतिसन्दीक्षित' consecrated by the knowledge of the Smṛtis or Dharmaśāstra, प्रभु master of his Vedic lore, etc. We know nothing about the sholarship of his father and grandfather. As Dyā Dviveda particularly makes mention of the learning of Mukunda Dvivedi, his great-grandfather, it seems that he himself was able to acquire all the knowledge possessed by that great scholar, which fact he himself mentions by the verse immediately following it.[2] The Vedic scholars have developed a peculiar method of the recitation of the Saṁhitā, which varies in ten or eleven ways. There is a technical and scientific way of splitting up every compound word into its component parts, called Pada-pāṭha or Pada-text. The Vedic scholars are very particular about studying the Saṁhitā-text correct to every syllable and accent, always bearing in mind the rule[3] that the wrongly pronounced syllable reduces the duration of life and mispronounced accent brings affliction of diseases. As ably they can recite the Saṁhitā-text, so ably they learn to recite the Pada-text too of that Saṁhitā. The labour utilised by the present Vedic scholars in learning Pada-text without possessing the knowledge of the rules of coalescence or Sandhi can to a great extent be minimised if they are taught the rules of grammar and accent before they labour in learning their Pada-text.[4] It is

1. These verses were found in only one manuscript of the three that were available to me. i. e. Ms. (ग...) ; they are given in the introduction to the work under "Author".

2. तस्य नप्ता युवा यज्वा युवधर्मोऽल्पबुद्धिमान् ।
एकादशप्रकारैस्तु संहितापाठतत्परः ॥

3. अवाक्षरं हन्तायुष्यं विस्वरं व्याधिपीडितम् ।
अक्षताः शस्त्ररूपेण वज्रं पतति मस्तके ॥

4. The Vedic scholars study the Prātiśākhyas of their Śākhā which if understood are also of great help in learning Pada and Krama-Pāṭhas.

also true that the thorough and unobstructed recitation of the Saṁhitā-text is most helpful in reciting their padas. Then there is a Kramapāṭha in which every following pada is recited in connection with the preceding one. The following seven or eight kinds of recitation are the ingenious commingling of these three, all of them wholly depending on the thorough knowledge of the recitation of the Saṁhitā and Pada-texts.

The Saṁhitā of the Ṛgveda being the largest in extent, the Vedic scholar reciting the whole of the Ṛk-Samhitā in these ten or eleven ways is regarded the most eminent of them. Dyā Dviveda was, therefore, such a great scholar and he, besides knowing the Ṛgveda, had laboured, it seems from the epithet of a Dvivedin, in some other Veda, that most probably being the Sāman, as he adduces a good many ancillary texts of that Veda in explaining the Ṛk-stanzas in the Nīti-mañjarī.

It seems that Dyā-Dviveda was a devotee of the Sun-god, belonging to the Atri gotra and he studied the Ṛgveda, not of the Śākala school, but of the Bāṣkala[1] of which the ancillary texts are Kauṣitakī Brāhmaṇa and Śāṁkhāyana Sūtras and not the Aitareya, and Āśvalāyana texts, yet he had had a fair knowledge of this other Śākhā or school of the Ṛgveda. In his knowledge of the Ṛgveda he excelled any other Vedic scholar including the Great Sāyaṇācārya who belonged to the Taittirīya School. This inference we have drawn from the profuse parallel passages he has adduced in support of the legends depicted in his work of Nīti-mañjarī. He seems to have studied all the Vedāṅgas and the ancillary texts (परिशिष्ट-ग्रन्थ) of the Vedas very thoroughly. His knowledge of the Nighaṇṭu was so sound that he has composed in one place of his Nīti-mañjarī (pp. 249–250) a few verses out of entirely obscure words from Nighaṇṭu alone which would not have been legible to a scholar unless he had the knowledge of the meaning of those words occurring in Nighaṇṭu. Similarly he seems to have studied Pāṇini including the Mahābhāṣya of

1. It seems that the Bāṣkala Saṁhitā was available in his time and he himself had studied it, which fact can very well be confirmed by the order of the Ṛcās he has followed in his Nīti-mañjarī. Cf. Nīti-mañjarī, Footnote on pp. 55, where the Ṛk. I. 104.5 is quoted before Ṛk. I. 103.8, perhaps following the order of the Bāskala Saṁhitā which might have differed from the Śākala in having it first.

Patañjali. He possessed a thorough knowledge of both the Mīmāṁsās and Dharmaśāstra, as he bears the epithet of यज्वा i.e. a person who has sacrificed according to the Vedic rites. He says that he was a resident of Ānandapura to which place the great Vedic scholar Uvvaṭa also belonged. Uvvaṭa has written a learned commentary on the Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā of the White Yajurveda of the Mādhyandina school and his able commentary on the Ṛk-Prātiśākhya reveals his thorough knowledge of the Ṛgveda also. We are not, at present, able to say whether Dyā Dviveda had any connection with the family of Uvvaṭa or they both belonged to the same Ānandapura. Uvvaṭa is anterior to both ; and Dyā Dviveda is surely posterior to the great Sāyaṇācārya whom he reveres very highly calling him a Bhāṣyakāra.

Dyā himself gives us his date as follows :—

'बिन्दुपञ्चपञ्चकाङ्कमिते (१५५०) संवति दुन्दुभौ वत्सरे
माघशुक्लादावकरोद्द्या (१) नीथाविमाम्'

i. e. he composed his Nīti-mañjarī on the first day of the bright half of the month of Māgha in Saṁvat 1550, corresponding to the year 1494 A.D.; Sāyaṇācārya having flourished in the latter half of the fourteenth century after Christ.

The main propaganda of Dyā Dviveda in composing his work was to create a genuine interest in the mind of Sanskritists for the study of the Vedas by preaching moral and ethical axioms or maxims through the illustrations drawn upon from the Vedic legends, instead of from those of the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata which were popularly known to the public-at-large. This special scheme of Dyā Dviveda was particularly meant for those Sanskrit scholars who laboured in the classical literature ignoring the knowledge of the Vedas. He cherished a cordial desire to introduce them to the Vedic literature without much difficulty by amusing them by means of various stories pertaining to the Vedas and secondly he wanted that the Vedic scholars who do not labour to understand the meaning of the texts they commit to memory, should be tempted to be interested in it by reading these stories. Thus he had a double motive in his mind. He has been quite successful in achieving this two-fold noble object. Unfortunately this book, though known to the scholars long ago in the year 1876, when Doctor F. Kielhorn wrote

an article in the Indian Antiquary,[1] could not see the light of the day to be available to the scholarly world upto this time. The blame partly falls on the shoulders of those western orientalists, who knowing the existence of such a work could not express their valuable appreciation for it ; on the other hand, they denounced the value of the work by accusing it with false charges. Let us now in brief consider the few charges or accusations brought against Nīti-mañjarī by these eminent scholars of the Sanskrit world.

This book was first brought to the notice of the Sanskrit knowing public by Dr. F. Kielhorn by writing an article in the Indian Antiquary of 1876, where he describes the work as follows :—"The Nīti Mañjarī is a collection of moral maxims in verse which differs from similar collections in this that the maxims propounded in it are in every case illustrated by some story told or alluded to in the Ṛgveda." Then this scholar, without attaching much importance to the maxims themselves, proceeds to praise the ingenuity of Dyā Dviveda in these words :— " For illustrations of such maxims he has searched through the whole of the Ṛgveda and in making the Vedic legends serve his purpose he has shown no small amount of ingenuity." After this the learned doctor describes the contents of the work in brief and denouncing every kind of originality on behalf of the author in these words that "*the large number of works adduced as an authority give to his work at first sight some appearance of originality, but it loses as soon as one discovers that in this, as in everything else, the author has simply followed* Śāyaṇa. The only work of which he does cite long passages that are not to be found in Sāyaṇa's Commentary is the Bṛhaddevatā, a fact from which a future editor of the latter[2] may be able to derive some advantage." Then he forms a general estimate of the work itself by saying "On the whole, Nītimañjarī together with its Bhāṣya appears to me *to be of little value* and not to deserve a complete edition. " With these remarks he proceeds to give all the verses of the first Aṣṭaka of the Ṛgveda to form an idea of their nature

1. Cf. I. A. Vol. V. Pp. 116. Year 1876.

2. Dr. Macdonell has fully made use of this suggestion in his edition of Bṛhaddevatā published in H. O. S.

with reference to the Vedic passages alluded to by the author of the Nītimañjarī.

It will thus be seen how horribly the author of the Nīti-mañjarī has been wronged by the hasty judgment of this eminent scholar of Sanskrit Grammar. Had the scholar taken pains of going through the work carefully, he would have certainly noticed that the method of explaining the Ṛgvedic passages alluding to the legends is quite independent of Sāyaṇa. If he has imitated Sāyaṇa, it is only in giving the necessary meaning of the words occurring in the Ṛcās, as Sāyaṇa himself has done by imitating Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara in his commentary on the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa. Dr. Kielhorn's statement that 'his adducing all the various Vedic texts as an authority is mere imitation of Sāyaṇa, is totally wrong. The scholar says that it is only the long passages of the Bṛhaddevatā that are not found in Sāyaṇa's commentary, but we are sorry that the scholar is not alive to see that the quotations from the Ṛk–Prātiśākhya are from Dyā Dviveda's own memory, none of which are being found in Sāyaṇa's great commentary. Had the author of Nīti-mañjarī blindly imitated Sāyaṇa, he would not have been able to quote parallel passages from all the Maṇḍalas of the Ṛgveda at the end of each legend quite unknown to the Sāyana's commentary. Moveover not only this scholar, but the scholar A. B. Keith also while writing another article on the Nīti-mañjarī twenty-four years later, has failed to notice that the Śrauta Sūtra applications are always quoted in Sāyaṇa's commentary from Āśvalāyana while Dyā Dviveda quotes invariably in Śāṁkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra, which he knew by heart. Not only this much but also the adoption of Sāyaṇa's commentary for the elucidation of the Ṛcās quoted by him is not without discrimination. It is certainly a great injustice on the part of the scholars not to recognize the real merit of Dyā Dviveda who has exercised his valuable talent in making the vedic study interesting for the classical scholars by culling out Subhāṣitas or proverbial maxims illustrated by means of the Vedic legends, to learn which he has put forth at our service his whole knowledge of so many Vedic texts for which he really deserves our great indebtedness.

इति शम्।

AGNI AND SOMA

CELESTIAL AND TERRESTRIAL

(Fatah Singh)

There is hardly any other myth so common to Indo-European mythology as the descent of fire and nectar from the celestial region.

The basis of these myths is said to be the phenomenon of lightning and rain which, however, stands in obvious contradiction with the details of the myths. The dark clouds, out of which comes the lightning are quite opposed to the resplendent palace of Zeus, whence Prometheous steals the fire, or from the bright heaven or guhā—which is equated with the other equally mysterious places like luminous padaṃ of Viṣṇu, and of birds—wherefrom Mātariśvan or some other god brings it down. Moreover this theory does not explain the other myths of the origin of the celestial fire, nor does it say anything about *Sūcika Agni*, Naciketas Agni and other relevant things that we shall explain below.

The descents of fire and nectar (amṛta or Soma) are, as in R. V. (1, 93, 6), closely connected and seem to be founded on the down-light of the North Pole with which Aryans were, indeed acquainted. In spite of the efforts of some scholars to prove the contrary, the presence of polar phenomenon in Aryan mythology, cannot be denied. Even Mr. Chocklingam Pillaī,[1] while bringing the Velo-Suran (Indo-European) race from the Atlantic in the far South, has to accept its connection with the snow-capped regions of the North pole.

The clue to the myths of Agni and Soma (amṛta) mentioned above is found in the myth of Ṛbhus that combines, as we shall see, the origin of Agni, Soma and sacrifice into one. It is the combination of these three that solves the problem.

We shall, however, for convenience's sake take the origin of celestical Agni and sacrifice first.

1. Origin of Indo-European.

I. **Agni** : Celestial and Physical

Ṛbhus as the originators of fire, and the ancient sacrificers

1. The close relation of Ṛbhu with the Agni has utterly been neglected by the scholars. Ṛbhu is the name of Agni (5, 777 ; 2, 1, 16 etc.) and he is also said to have created him (Agni 3, 5, 6), knowing the abode of the birds (Padaṃ Veḥ). Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa (14, 2, 5), according to Sāyaṇa, states that Indra's dear home is Ṛbhu, and with that home (dhāma) he generates Agni, from behind (parôkṣa). Like Ṛbhu, Mātariśvan also generates or brings Agni and is also identified with him (3, 5, 9 ; 26, 2, 9 ; 1, 96, 4–5). It is also curious that Ṛbhu and Mātariśvan are coupled together in one expression, Mātariśvā-Ṛbhu, one being the epithet of the other, suggesting thereby that Mātariśvan was also a kind of Ṛbhus.

2. In interpreting the originators of Agni it must be borne in mind that the identification of Agni with his creators is not peculiar to Ṛbhu-or-Mātariśvan-myth alone and that all the creators are interconnected. Bṛhaspati who found Agni (10, 68–9) is not only called Agni (1, 38, 13 ; cf. 2, 1, 3 ff), but also Mātariśvan (1, 190, 2 ; 3, 26, 2) with whom Ṛbhu has been already identified. Trita eagerly seeking Agni found him on the head of the cow,[1] while Dvita (the previous stage of the divinity found in Trita[2]) is identified with Agni (5, 18, 2). Atharvan who is associated with Trita, Mātariśvan and Dadhyānc (10, 48, 2 etc.) is said to have produced the Agni (10, 21, 5 ; 6, 16, 13 ; 6, 15, 17) and is the name of Agni itself (8, 9, 7). Aṅgiras, the finder of Agni (5, 11, 6) is the epithet of Agni who is the first seer Aṅgiras (1, 31, 1), the ancient Aṅgiras (10, 92, 15) and the oldest or most inspired of Aṅgirasas *(1, 127, 2 ; 6, 11, 3). Aṅgiras* is also the name of Bṛhaspati (2, 2, 3, 18) and is often mentioned with Mātariśvan, Atharvan (AV. 11, 8, 13) and Bhṛgus (10, 14, 3). Bhṛgu, the kindler of fire is the fire itself (RV. 4, 7, 1 ; 4 ; cf. 8, 91, 4).

3. Another great factor in the originators of the Agni is that they are generally the early sacrificers or priests also.

1. Macdonell : Vedic Myth p. 67.
2. See Trita, below.

Mātariśvan is mentioned as a sacrificer in the Vālakhilya (VIII. 52, 2) along with Medhya and Pṛṣadhra. Elsewhere also he is stated to be a sacrificer (ŚSS 5 ; cf. RV. 10, 48, 2 ; 105, 6) Bṛhaspati, the first born (4, 50, 4 cf. 10, 68, 12) has been placed in the front by the ancient seers (4, 50, 1 पुरोधा) probably for the sake of sacrifice, as he is called the domestic priest (2, 24, 9 ; Vs. 20, 11 ; TS. 6, 4, 10 ; AB. 8, 26, 4). Bhṛgu (2, 4, 2-4 ; cf. 3, 5, 10 along with 10, 46, 9 etc.) and Dadhyañc (1, 80, 16 ; 139, 9 cf. 6, 16, 14) are also said to be the ancient sacrificers. Aṅgirasas thought of the first ordinance of sacrifice (10, 67, 2) and by sacrifice they obtained immortality as well as the friendship of Indra (10, 62, 1). Atharvan also first established order by sacrifices (10, 92, 10). Atri who created sun or Agni and sharpened the blade of Agni with his prayer (4, 40, 5–8 ; 8, 62, 8 etc.) is the priest who dispelled darkness (SB. 4, 3, 4, 21). Tvaṣṭṛ, the originator of Agni (RV. 1, 95, 2) is found performing sacrifice in T. S. (2, 4, 12, 1 cf. SB. 1, 6, 3, 6 etc.). Apart from this, Agni himself is the oldest sacrificer (5, 3, 5) and the names of the ancient sacrificers or priest, are often the names of Agni.

If the ancient sacrifice and celestial fire is the Polar light of dawn, how could the human fathers or priests be connected with its origin ?

The connexion becomes quite clear when we know that the dead man was supposed to go to heaven with a luminous body,[1] and that the manes were thought to reside in the moon, dawn, stars or some other light phenomenon. Thus the moon is the place, the eye, and the light of the manes (K. B. 10, 2 ; M. S. 4, 2, 1 ; S. B. 2, 4, 2, 2). Their connexion with moon, in various respects, is often referred to (Rv. 10, 90, 13 ; AA. 11, 4, 1 ; B. A. Up. 1, 3, 16 ; 3, 2, 13 ; 6, 2 ; Ch. Up. 5, 10 ; J. B. 1, 2, 8 ; V.S. 1, 28 ; Ś. B., 1, 2, 5, 8 ff)[2] manes seat in the ruddy ones (twilight rays R. V. 10, 15, 7). Stars are the lights of the virtuous men who go to heaven (T. S. 5, 4, 13 ; Ś. B. 1, 9, 3, 10) and the ancient fathers especially seven Rishis, besides Atri and Agastya, are said to have been raised to the stars (T. A. 1, 11, 1, 2). Their con-

1. Cf. संगच्छस्व तन्वा सुवर्चाः.

2. Cf. Plutarch, de facie in Orbe Lunœ, 28, pp. 943a, 943c ; Iamblichos 5, p. 841, Keith : Rel. Phil. 28.

nexion with the Sun and its rays is very common (RV. I, 10, 9 ; 7, 125, 6 ; 10, 107, 2 ; 154, 5, S. B. 1, 9, 3, 10 etc.).

Therefore, the fathers, being the resident in dawns etc., could naturally be said to bring about the phenomenon of dawn etc. Any ancient forefather could, thus, attract the strange myths, impossible for human beings. Therefore, it will not be wrong to identify, as we have sometimes done below, the ancient forefathers and sacrificers like Ṛbhus and Mātariśvan with the rays of light.

1. *Ṛ'hu : Mātariśvan and the dawn fire*

4. Ṛbhus are also credited with the bringing down of the sacrifice from high heaven,[1] and establishing it amidst the tribes of Manu.[2] This reminds firstly of the Prometheus who brought the fire from the resplendent palace of Zeus to the earth, and taught men the use of it, and secondly of the divine sacrifice, performed, in the first Polar dawn-flames, which Nansen[3] calls as 'the glowing fire lit on the uttermost edge of the ice', by Tvaṣṭṛ, as we have seen[4] and by Yama or Manu, as shown in a subsequent chapter.[5] The identification of this sacrifice of Ṛbhus with that of Manu, becomes more probable, when we learn that they brought down the sacrifice like Manu (Manuṣvat), and established it during the last of the shining days.[6] That this descent of sacrifice is identical with the descent of fire from heaven will be clear from the comparative study of the myths of the bringing down of the fire and from the facts stated in the above paragraphs.

5. The identity of the above-mentioned act of Ṛbhu with the bringing of fire by Mātariśvan will be evident from the interpretation of Mātariśvan-Myth, and the identity of the two divini-

1. अयं यो यज्ञ ऋभवोऽकारि यमा मनुष्वत् प्रदिवो दधिध्वे i. iv. 34, 3.
2. उपनो वाजा अध्वरमृभुक्षा देवा यात पथिभिर्देवयानैः
यथा यज्ञं मनुषो विक्ष्वाऽसु दधिध्वे रण्वाः सुदिनेष्वह्नाम् iv. 37. 1. cf. ks. 38. ii ; Mss. 11, 12. V. S. 21, 23 ; TS. 11, 16 ; T. B. 3. 6. 19. 1 ; K.S. 7, 17.
3. Farthest North : Page 244.
4. See 'Ṛbhus and Tvaṣṭṛ.' Section iii. i.
5. See 'Yama, the lord of manes' Section 5, paragraph 20.
6. iv. 37. 1.

ties has also been suggested in one hymn of Ṛgveda where Indra is said to have fashioned (Agni) with the might as Mātariśvā Ṛbhu did with Kratus[1] (ततक्ष क्रतुभिः). Mātariśvan like Ṛbhu is also used in plural, and the Mātariśvā gods are said to have manufactured (ततक्षुः) the yajatraṃ (fire) as Ṛbhus did the yajnaṁ.[2] Ṛbhu in an Agni-hymn, is said to have created the wonderful Nāma (the Agni) "which is adorable (3-5-6.)."

6. The etymological meaning of the word 'Mātariśvan' also goes to prove the equation of the two deities. Yāska takes it to mean vāyu which breathes or goes fast (āśum) in the mother, antarikṣa.[3] But the more probable derivation may be had from the root Śva to go, to grow,[4] which is corroborated by the evidence of Ṛgveda itself. The description of the god as Amitā mātari (manufactured in the mother) suggests that Mātariśvan means 'the one growing in the mother,' a trait once given to Agni whom Mātariśvan churned down from high heaven[5], and who is elsewhere identified with him.[6] Matariśvan would, therefore be, as Macdonell thinks, a personification of a celestial form of Agni, who at the same time is thought of as having like Prometheus brought down the hidden fire from heaven to earth.[7] But the natural basis of the myth is not probably lightning, as suggested,[8] but the coming of the glowing light of the dawn of North pole which could be considered to grow in the mother i.e. the southern quarter.

Now, as the changing flashes of light are seen moving in the sky even before the glowing of crimson dawn, those rays of light, called Mātariśvā Ṛbhu, or simply Mātariśvā Devas or Ṛbhus, could be thought to bring or herald the arrival of the flaming-fire like dawn, and as the rays and the dawn are both at a time in-

1. प्रास्तौदृष्वौजा ऋष्वेभिस्ततक्ष शूरः शवसा । ऋभुर्न क्रतुभिर्मातरिश्वा.
x. 105, 6.
2. RV. 10, 46, 9. Cf. iv. 34, 3 ; iv. 37, 1.
3. मातरिश्वा वायुर्मातरि अन्तरिक्षे श्वसिति, मात्याश्वनितीति वा–नि. 7. 7.
4. श्वि गतिवृद्धियोः– पा. धा. पा., cf. शिशु, cf. also Whitney's 'Sanskṛit roots' p. 176 ; Roth, Nirukta, III—3 ; Weber : Ind. Stud., 1, 416, Reuter, k. z., 31, 544–5 ; Macdonell : Ved. Myth. p. 72.
5. RV. 1, 141, 3–5.
6. RV. III. 5, 9 ; 26, 2 ; I. 96, 4. Ved. Myth. 72.
7. Ibid.
8. X. 46, 9 ; X. 2, 7 etc.

distinct from each other in the sky and are also produced after their growth in the southern quarter, as it were, the both of them could be called Mātariśvan and be identified with each other.

7. That this fire brought by or identified with Mātariśvan is the Dawn-light would be clear from the description of that Mātariśvan fire itself. The Poet clearly says that this is another (अन्य:) Agni, the first, whom Dyaus, earth, waters,[1] Tvaṣṭṛ and Bhṛgus generated and the Mātariśvā gods manufactured for Manu.[1] In the other verses of the same hymn, this fire is described as being obtained by Bhṛgus and Trita in the horizon or in the head of the cows (probably dawns). Agni being the highest of the luminaries supports up, with his flames, the firmament, when Mātariśvan kindles him the oblation-bearer, existing in guhā.[2] Matariśvā fire identified with Vaiśvānara,[3] is the well, oozing forth having hundred torrents, which Rodasī filled,[4] in the horizon (उपस्थे)[5], a reference most probably to the red orb of the rising sun, with crimson rays issuing from it. Again Mātariśvan, also called Draviṇo-dā fire is the Child (शिशु) whom Night and Uṣas, together, conceived or bore.[6]

8. That the sacrifice of Ṛbhus is the glowing light of the dawns, and the Mātariśvan fire may be supported by the fact that dawns also gave birth to the sacrifice as well as sun and Agni.[7] Again from another point of view this first sacrifice, attributed to Yama or Manu, is also said to be conducted by Agni[8] himself who is, therefore, the oldest sacrificer.[9] Agni shone

1. द्यावा यमग्निं पृथिवी जनिष्टामापस्त्वष्टा भृगवो यं सहोभिः
इळे-यं प्रथमं मातरिश्वा देवास्ततक्षुर्मनवे यजत्रम् । X. 46. 9 ; X. 2. 7.

2. R. V. 3. 5. 9. This description refers evidently to the Arctic dawn that can fitly be called as propelling up the sky with its flaming light.

3. For Vaishwanara = Sun, see Nir. 7. 17 ; cf. Roth. Nir. erl. 7, 19 also प्रश्न. उप. 1, 8 which quotes a Ṛik in favour thereof.

4. RV. 3, 26, 9, पृ पालनपूरणयोः पा. धा पा.

5. Cf. सधस्थं. Where heaven and earth are brought close to each other cf. Sāyaṇa : सहस्थानं लोकत्रयाश्रयभूतमन्तरिक्षं—Sāyaṇa on RV. 1. 154, 2.

6. RV. I. 96, 4-5 नक्तोषासा वर्णमामेम्याने धापयेते शिशुमेकं समीची.

7. 7, 78, 3. 8. RV. III. 15. 4. 9. V. 3. 5.

forth after the former dawns,[1] and the part played by him in the sacrifice of the ancestors, which, as we shall see, is the same as the glowing light of the twilights, has also been often referred to.[2]

II. Agni and its Guhā

The Source of Dawn-fire

9. Agni's relation with guhā (secret place) may also corroborate to the same view. The secret place (गुहा) being the place in which Agni is churned, kindled or created (ततक्ष) by Mātariśvan or Ṛbhu Mātariśvan,[3] seems to correspond to padaṃ vēḥ, gōnaṃ padaṃ or gavāṃ nāma and the other mystic places or names, so frequently mentioned in Rgveda,[4] and may be identified with that mysterious source whence came, again and again, the rays of Dawn lights which are so often called cows and birds. This Padaṃ (place) is often called Nāma,[5] because Nāma is derived from mnā 'to repeat',[6] and the place (in the southern direction) which could repeatedly absorb and release the polar lights could appropriately be called Nāma, full of miraculous mystery. The word seems to mean firstly any recurring phenomenon (cf. Punarpurjāyamānā Uṣas), and secondly the name of a thing or person, because of its repeated use to denote that thing or individual. The meaning of the word may appear far-fetched, at the first glance, but no doubt remains as to its correctness when we find that Agni, as the dawn-light is called the adorable and wonderful nāma which Ṛbhu are said to have created,[7] and which is same as the sacrifice brought down by them. This secret guhā where rays of light like birds were seen issuing forth, at the end of the night, and re-entering, at the end of the day, was also called the nest (Nīḷa), of the bull and the birds, the dawns.[8] Curiously in this very Nīḷa of bull (वृषभस्य नीळे) while identified with the Pastyāsu, the great bottom of sky (maho

1. I. 44, 10. 2. VIII. 43, 13 etc.
3. RV. I. 141, 3 ; III. 5, 10 ; X. 46, 9 ; cf. X. 105, 6; IV. 705 and often.
4. RV. III. 5, 6 ; IX. 87, 3 ; IV. 3, 9 ; I. 11-12 etc.
5. IX. 87, 3 ; III. 5, 6 and often.
6. म्ना अभ्यासे-पा. धा. पा. see also Pr. Sams. Dict. III ed. by Apte, under नाम.
7. RV. III. 5, 6. 8. RV. IV. 1. 11, 12 and elsewhere.

budhnē rajasaḥ), is born the first fire, without feet and head concealing and uniting the ends (of quarters ?).[1] This can be compared with the fashioning of the first fire by Mātariśvan or with the establishment of it by Trita in the same Pastyāsu[2] which is also the abode of Varuṇa elsewhere,[3] and may be the sky, if Varuṇa is Ouranos or moon.[4]

10. The guhā of this primaeval Agni can also be compared with the equally mysterious source of Ṛta, which is called the Nīḷa or Yòni of Ṛta, which is identified in Ṛgveda itself with the Nīḷa of the bull, and where the first fire (dawn fire of above) is said to have been born.[5] To understand the full significance of it, it is essential to know what Ṛta is. N. Ṛta, though in Ṛgveda, essentially denotes the cosmic or moral order, seems to have a more concrete origin in some natural phenomenon. Ṛta is so often equated with Avestan asha which is again compared with Astu, Vesta, Hestia, vasu, and derived from Vas 'to swell'[6] or shine.[7] The suggestion cannot be dismissed as something improbable, and the asha of Avesta can be traced back to the Norse asa[8] that is the power of the gods, especially of Odin and

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1. RV. IV. 1, 11-12. 2. X. 46. 9, 6.

3. निषसाद धृतव्रतो वरुणः पस्त्याऽस्वा साम्राज्याय सुक्रतुः, I. 25, 10.

4. See Keith Varuṇa and Ouranos in 'Indian Culture' January 1936, pp. 121-126 cf. also M. Dumezil, Ouranos-Veruna in "Etude de mythologie comparée indo europeanne" and Solmen: "Untersuchungen zur griech: Leut und verslehre," pp. 297 ff., For Varuṇa as moon see Oldenberg: Rel des. ved. 285-98, for refutation see V. Schroeder, WZKM. 9.118; n Macdonell, JRAS 27, 947-9.

5. RV. IV. I. 11-12 and elsewhere.

6. Preller: Introduction to Greek and Latin Etymology p. 77.

7. Cox: Myths of the Aryan Nations, 425; Keith Rel. Phil. Ved. Up. P. 625. Brugmann, Griech. Gramm. 4, p. 52, Ehrlich, KZ. X. 1, 289.

8. or again, Wax not, Weimer
 Since to wade I desire
To the realm of the giants
 Knew, if thou waxest
Then waxest my *asa-might*
 As High as the heavens.

H. A. Gurber (Page 81) cf. also asa as a god, the brother of Odin (the Sky-god)—P. 15 (ibid.). Asa is also equated with Odin (ibid P. 123) and Balder (192 ibid), just as Indra and Varuṇa are associated very closely with Ṛita. See also asha on page 14 (ibid).

Thor just as Ṛta is of devas and of Varuṇa.

See Thor boasting :—
"Once I employed asa—might,
In the realm of giants,
When the Gialp and Griep,
Gerrod's daughters wanted to lift me to heaven."
(quoted in H. A. Guerber's Myths of Norsemen. p. 82).

Farrell's derivation of Vesta from Vas, 'to live' does not seem to be correct.[1]

11. The same root as or vas 'to shine' is found in the as or asir[2] (Pl.) the norse equivalent of Asura or Ahura of Indo-Iranians. This also goes to suggest that the Asura, like Devas originally meant 'shining ones', the gods, as is proved by Ṛgveda itself. Aesir are 12 in number and live in high heaven, and are always the destroyers of the demons of darkness and frost.

12. Thus not only Varuṇa is once definitely called Asura, but other gods including Agni are also given the same designation.[3] Agni is asura Samrāj,[4] or Asura of the wise (Vipaścitāṃ)[5] or simply Asura. Agni is also said to have been born from the belly of the asura.[6] Asura has also been suggested to be parallel to Babylonian Assur[7] though scholars do not agree to it.[8]

13. *a.* It seems, therefore, that originally Ṛta, asha, asa as the power of Asuras, Ahuras and aesir was the pure light of the shining ones at the time of dawn. Hence with the Ṛta the gods smite down darkness demons. With Ṛta Ṛbhus make or measure the cup. Indra can do all his exploits with Ṛta. Odin kills the demons with his asa-power,[9] and Ahura Mazda is able to resist the onslaughts of demons with asha. The Dawns are said to give over the ray of Ṛta (Ṛtasya Raśmim), when they

1. Cults of the Greek States V. 358.
2. Thorpe : Northern Myth. Vol. I, P. 1-3 (footnote).
3. Keith : Phil. Rel. Veda Up p. 33, see also Oldenberg ZDMG. 1, 48 ; Meyer : Gesch. des Alt. 3, I. ii. pp. 913-27.
4. RV. (7, 6, 1). 5. RV. III. 3, 4. 6. III. 29, 4.
7. Thomas, JRAS. 1916, p. 364 cf. Chadwick in Moultan, Early Zoroastrianism, p. 31.
8. Keith. Rel. Phil. Ved. Up p. 13.
9. RV. IV. 2, 5 cf. Oldenberg. Rel. des Veda, p. 104.

shine.[1] The first fire is called the child of Ṛta and the first fire means the dawn fire. With Ṛta the mountain (of darkness) is pierced, and as a consequence of this, when Agni is born, the dawns and sun also come into existence (4, 3, 11). With Ṛta are also (ib. 12) brought the immortal waters (ice waters of Arctic day) along with the bloods of Madhu (light, cf. next chap., RV. 4, 1, 19, etc.). The red horses (rays) of Ṛta go between men and gods (4, 2, 3), illumine the heaven and uṣas shine after them (3, 6, 6). Aśvins enjoy the first Ṛta (4, 44, 3) i.e. first light.

13. *b*. Now Ṛta as the first dawn-light, analogous to flaming fire of dawn light as we have seen was conceived as the first sacrifice of Yama, Manu, Agni, Ṛbhus, or the first fire manufactured by Mātariśvan. It is, therefore, that the source of the first fire and that of Ṛta is identified. Thus the first Agni is to be adored in the abode of birds (veḥ padaṃ),[2] when the gods enjoying the great Sāma join together in the common udder of Sasa, or of the Ṛta.[3] The conception of twilight land as Dēva-loka we have already seen, and may be compared to the twilights of the gods in the Norse mythology.

13. *c*. The sacrifice of Manu, the firs sacrifice being the proto-type of the Vedic sacrifice Ṛta, became the name of the ordinary sacrifice[4] in India. In Greece the astu (from as or vas) became the abode of Argive Phoroneus, the Vedic Bhuraṇyu.[5] Astu is same ás Cr. Hestia or vesta of Rome, the inviolable fire on the sacred hearth which may not be moved and stands fast for ever, and Argive Phoroneus is the Argive Hestia, with its holy flames of everlasting fire, conceived like Manu, as the first man, the father of all mortals.[6] In Iran also, Asha or Vṛta, like Indian Ṛta, is not only conceived as one of Amesh Spentas, but also included in the list of Yaztas as Atar, the genius of the fire which the Iranians worshipped. Perhaps, the same arta

1. RV. I. 123, 13. 2. IV. 7, 6-7 etc.
3. Cf. वे:पदं above.
4. Cf. निघंटुः, यज्ञनामानि frequently in Ṛgveda.
5. Cf. Gr. Phur. Feut. feur.
6. Cox Myth Ar. N. 422-25, cf. Preller Gr. Myth. II. 37.
7. A. J. Cornoy : Iranian Myth pp.

appears as an element in Artashuvara, (ऋतस्वर) Artatama (ऋततम) mentioned in the Tel-el Amarna correspondence,[1] and in the later mames like Art Xerces, Artaphernes[2] of Iran and Ārtabhāga of Upaniṣads.

13. *d.* The Ṛta, as the light of dawn, being itself the follower of an order, and making sun, waters etc. follow a definite order was also conceived as the embodiment of law and order, and the same idea was transferred to its counter-part, found in the fire-cult. Originally Ṛta stood for the cosmic order but in course of the natural development, it came to include the moral order also.[3] Thus Astu, Hestia and Vesta are the symbols of law and equity,[4] so is the yasna or Yajnya of Indo-Iranians. The association of virgin maidens with the vestal fire might be based on the fact that dawns, the kindlers and the keepers of the cosmic fire of dawn light were often regarded as virgins.[5]

14. It may be, therefore, concluded that Ṛta, is originally identical with the first flowing dawn-light, the first fire of Mātariśvan, and the udder, nest, birth-place, and abode of Ṛta is the same as the guhā and the Yoni of Agni, the nīḷa of the bull the secret sadaṃ, padaṃ or nāma of birds, or cows. It explains why in the texts of ritual, the sacrificial fire was required to be kindled at dawn and before sun-rise.[6] The Agni kindled by gods as contrasted with the men[7] seems to refer to the same fire. This notion seems to assume that gods also sacrifice, in the celestial fire like men.[8] The fact that fires (agnayaḥ p. 1) like water, after descending to earth again rise to heaven,[9] can be

1. Bloomfield, AJP. XXV. 8 ; Hall, Anc. Hist. of near East. pp. 201, 331. For the controversy regarding the Aryan origin of the word see. W. E. Clark, Am journ. Sem. lang XXXIII. 261-82.

2. Griswold : Religion of Ṛgveda, p. 24.

3. Ibid pp. 133-138, 201, 252, 122-133, 239 ; and also Cornoy : Iranian Myth. pp.

4. Preller : Greek Myth. II. 37.

5. Cf. Agruvah in IV. 30, 16, 19 ; II. 13, 12 ; I. 112, 8 is Uṣas. See also the chapter on 'Indra and Ṛbhus' ; 'Purāṇī yuvatiḥ,' is the standing epithet of Dawn in Ṛgveda.

6. M. S. 1.6.10.

7. RV. 6, 2, 3 ; cf. Bergaigne : La Religion Vedique ; 1, 103.

8. Cf. AB. 2, 3, 4.

9. I. 164, 50-51.

applicable only in the case of the twilight-fire, and accord with the Vajra that Tvaṣṭṛ sprinkled (asincat) at Vṛtra.[1]

The Saucika Fire

15. The Saucika Agni (Rv. 10, 51–53 ; 80 ; 124) pointed out by Leopold Von Schroeder, in his article "Die wierdergeuinnung des Agni,[2] is also a form of celestial fire. Schroeder compares the three escapes of Agni with those of Locki and points out that Saucika is derived from Sūci 'needle' as Locki's mother also is named 'Nal', needle. The name 'needle' appears a curious one, but the whole problem becomes quite evident if we take the help of Arctic phenomenon. It refers to the needle like streaks of light seen after dawn before sun-rise and is thus described by Nansen[3] :—

16. " According to the enthusiastic description given by many Arctic travellers of the first appearance of this god of life after the long winter night the impression ought to be one of jubilant excitement, but it was not so in my case. The mirage was at first like a flattened out glowing red streak of fire on horizon, later there were two streaks, the one above the other, with a dark space ; and from the main I could see four or even five such horizontal lines directly over one another. "

17. These thin lines of light are not only like needle but also indicate (Sūcayanti) the rise of the sun. Therefore the Saucika fire is, in fact the rising sun, who is indicated or produced by these needles. It is the heat of the sun that claims as Saucika fire to have entered unseen into the trees, plants and waters (10 ; 51) and that being ordered by gods to become the oblation-bearer for Manu Vivasvat[4] (10, 52, 1) who, desirous of gods and sacrifice, was formerly living in the darkness (10, 51, 5). It is the beneficial Agni that entered heaven and earth, killed many Vṛtras, and to whom the 1,000 birds, bayah (rays) fall upon in the aerial region, goes round the cows (10, 80, 4–5) and for whom Ṛbhus fashioned out the Bṛahma, the sacrifice (of Naigh.) or prayer (ibid. 7). Saucika fire follows the glow, in the

1. TS. II. IV. 12 ; See also 'Tvaṣṭr and Ṛbhu' Section III.
2. See his book "Mysterium und Mimus Im Ṛgveda" Pages 181–220.
3. Fritzolf Nansen: "The Farthest North" Page 244.
4. Manu-bright sky ; see Section I.

aeiral region, on the radiant path (10,53,6), and when it is born, 3339 gods (evidently the rays of the sun) wait upon it (10,52,6). This fire is also called trivṛtam, thrice-turned (cf. three steps of Visṇu) and seven-threaded (Saptatantusa cf. seven rays of sun).[1]

18. Saucika fire becomes also probably the Naciketas fire[2] (**नचिकेताहमग्निः**:- 10-51-4) that enters, guhā in many ways, at sunset. This identification is quite appropriate, for Naciketas fire is only the sun, in the womb of the southern quarter whom Yama the lord of death alone can see (Yamo acikēcit). This conception[3] of fire has been adapted to suit the philosophical notions of Upanishads, never-the-less we do find, even there, some traces of the original idea. There Nacikētas (lit. unburnt or unknown) the boy is said to go to the realm of death ; Yama describes him the Naciketas fire as the Agni existing before light (Lokadimāgnim), shining in three ways, coming to the joint (Sandhīn) in threefold manner. The description clearly refers to the polar-light, yet in the womb, manifesting itself in the three forms of twilight, sun and auroraborealis, and coming to the meeting point of sky, earth and the netherworld at every saṃdhi[4] i.e. evening or morning. The origin of the Nacikētas story is, however, found in Ṛgveda, 10,135 where some kumāra is mentioned and whom Sāyaṇa rightly identifies with Nacikētas of Upanishads. First of all addressing kumāra, the Poet refers to the new, wheelless chariot, made by mind, having one pole moving in all sides, rolled round for the sake of worshippers. Then he begins to question "Who created Kumāra ? Who rolled on the chariot ? Who can tell us now to-day ? How he became worthy to be given away (anudēyī)". Then comes the answer : "As he became anudēyī (to be given away to death), in the same way he was born first. From his front he extended the sky (Budhna) from behind he made (its) exit (Nirayanaṃ)". This is

1. 10, 52, 4.
2. तं त्वा यमो अचिकेच्चित्रमानो दशान्तरुष्यादतिरोचमानम्
होत्रादहं वरुण विभ्यदायं नेदेव मा युनजन्नत्र देवाः
तस्य मे तन्वो बहुधा निविष्टा एतमर्थं **नचिकेताहमग्निः** । (10. 51. 3-4).
3. Kath. Up. 1. 1-20.
4. For the same conception see the 'Yaggetrisalal tree' and 'Soma tree' mentioned elsewhere (Next Chapter).

obviously a reference to the Polar sun who revolves round the horizon and is given away (anudeyī bhavat) to the darkness (death) at sunset, in the same splendid way in which he is born in the morning. When he rises (purastāt) he spreads heaven and earth, (out of the darkness) and when he sinks (paścāt), they are enveloped in the darkness, lost for some time, as it were.

The Naciketas fire is like other agnis also said to be hidden in guhā, (Kath. Up. 1. 14).

19. The comparative mythology also shows that the fire which was brought from high heaven to the earth was the light brought by Dawn itself. The scholars so far strongly believe that the descent of fire has its natural basis in the stroke of lightning falling on earth, because, on overlooking the Polar phenomenon of long glowing dawn and our dawn being so transitory, there is no other phenomenon but lightning, that can serve as a prototype of the myth. But the analysis of these fire-myths prove, as we found in the case of Mātariśvan that the fire brought therein is most likely the radiant dawn-fire, though the myths may betray sometimes, the traces of later influence of the temperate zones, as in the case of the Vajra of Indra.[1] Here below are discussed a few myths that will support our view regarding the descent of fire.

a. Hermes

20. In the Greek mythology, Hermes is one of those gods who are said to have brought fire.[2] He has been thought to be like Mātariśvan, a wind-god, by some scholars,[3] but more correct view is that of Max Müller. To him Hermes is "a god of twilight, who betrays his equivocal nature by stealing, though only in fun, the herd of Apollōn, but restoring them without the violent combat that is waged for the same herds in India between Indra, the bright god and Vala the robber. In India the dawn brings the light, in Greece the twilight is itself supposed to have

1. See Indra's Vajra. Section I.

2. Hymn to Hermes, 110.

3. Kelly, following Kuhn, sees in Hermes and Rbhus, the storm winds: Curiosities of the Indo-European Folklore, 17; cf. also Dr. Mommsen History of Rome, I, 18.

stolen it, or to hold back the light, and Hermes, the twilight surrenders the booty when challenged by the sun-god Apollo."[1]

21. Hermes is undoubtedly the god of both twilights. At the time of evening twilight he removes the sunshine, the herd of Apollo, the sun-god. When Night ends, the similar twilight is again seen. It is Hermes ; just following close at its heels comes sun, as if searching him. He (Hermes) is said to leave the foot-steps after stealing the herd,[2] for how otherwise could Apollo find out ? His proper home is summer land,[3] and after delivering the sunshine (herd) to the sun, he is rightly said to make a contract with Appolo not to hurt him[4] for there is no danger for sun after Dawn as it is at the evening twilight.

22. Cox's objection[5] as to how Hermes as twilight could carry on a search throughout the whole night[6] has no weight, for the twilight or dawn in the form of, the Aurora Borialis (dawn light in disguise) as radiant as dawn hues, could easily be conceived as roaming in the dark night. Equally implausible seems his view that to a twilight god cannot be attributed music,[7] for we know that, in Ṛgveda uṣas frequently comes, while making sweet notes,[8] and Orpheus, the Greek sun-god is the musician par excellence. How the voice or sound is associated with light-god, will be clear from the fact that there are different noises at the time of dawn, at North Pole. The coming heat causes ice to melt, and thereby the displacement of ice, resulting in noise.

23. He is the leader of charites whom Max Müller identifies with Harits[9] who bring the dawns. He loves Herae, the dew, and Aglauros is his sister just as glow is the sister of twilight. Among his sons is Kepholos, the head of the day, as sun

1. Max Muller : Lect. on lang. second series, 475.
2. Hymn to Hermes, 110.
3. Ibid, 267–268.
4. Cox : Myth of Aryan Nations, Page 453.
5. Ibid, p. 452.
6. Hymn to Hermes, 141.
7. Myth of Aryan Nations Pages 452–455.
8. Sunṛta irayanti III, 61, 2 ; Sunṛta Maghoni VII, 57, 6, also Sunṛte IV, 55, 9 ; I, 23, 5 ; 124, 10 ; VIII, 9, 17, I, 113, 8 etc.
9. Lect. on long. 4, 473.

s the son of dawn. He is the herald of gods ; so is the twilight ; so was Sarmā the messenger of Indra.[1]

24. Hermes, though giver of dawn-fire, is also like Mātariś-van, the fire itself. But here he is not only the glowing fire of dawn, but also the ordinary fire of the altar or hearth. Therefore, he is the guide of souls to the realm of Hades just as Polar evening twilight to the dark dreary winter-night, and the ordinary fire to the other world. As the ordinary fire, he is ever hungry, longing for food whose savour fills his nostrils, a trait so well marked in vedic Agni, and thus it does not support the view of Cox[2] who assigns the permanent hunger to Hermes as wind-god, a thing perhaps unparallelled in mythology. Again like vedic Agni he terrifies gods and men, though still in his cradle.

b. Premetheus

25. Premetheus is the fire-thief par excellence. He belongs to a class of Titans, and the conception of him will not be clear, unless we know what the Titans are.

Titans

26. Titans have been equated by A. A Guerber with subterranean fires and the ice-giants of the Norse mythology,[3] to which there is hardly any evidence. They are twelve in number and include even Hyperion, (rising sun), Phoebe (moon) and other luminaries, and their banishment to Tartarus does not mean their going down to the subterranean region, but to the dark wintry night of North pole, in the form of the lights of Aurora Borealis. The very fact that the ice-giants are destructive to human and plant-life makes them contrasted with the Titans who are decidely beneficient to men, so much so that one[4] of them endangers even his life for the sake of them. Eos (Aurora) marries one of the Titans and produces the luminous evening star.[5]

27. It seems, therefore, that the Titans represented the violet and crimson hues of light that come from rising sun,

1. Ibid 436.
2. Aryan Myth p. 422.
3. Myths of Norsemen 343.
4. Premetheus.
5. The Myths of Greece and Rome.

moon, and dawn etc., and in the evening when the twilight etc., disappeared with all its hues, from the bright and long summar day, to the dark Arctic winter night, it was thought that they were hurled down to the cold Tartarus, the night where they are found in the form of Aurora Borealis. Again the Dawn was supposed to be the war of Titanomachia which ended in the supremacy of zeus, the brilliant sky over Cronus, the god of night sky who swallows up all his children (the stars), but zeus.[1] i.e., day sky.

28. The above description makes the view of Guerber untenable, and curbs the opinion of Cox who regards them wholly as personifications of lightnings.[2] Of course, from the flashes of lightning described in the battle of Titanomachio, it may be concluded that the lightning was also one of the Titans (though it could very well be an influence of the later Aryan habitat of Greece etc.), but all of them cannot be lightnings. The lightnings of Titanomachio may better be taken as the lightning of Aurora Borealis that may be found in early dawn.

Prometheus

29. From the myth of Prometheus also it does not appear that he personified the lightning. He brings the fire from the resplendent palace of zeus, which cannot be the cloudy sky but the bright guhā of Agnī. His punishment takes place in remote region of everlasting ice and storm, comparable to Tartarus, where the Titans were thrown down, presenting the most awful contrast with the sunlit palace of zeus.[3] This clearly refers to the transformation of the red and voilet twilight into the Auroras of the Arctic night; and that his heart is daily eaten by the Vulture and it daily grows up again, refers to same Northern lights that disappear often to appear again. This torture of Prometheus goes on till Eos, the dawn the mother of Heracles (sun) releases him ;[4] as dawn-light replaces the Aurora, when it dawns.

30. We also find in Prometheus myth an echo of the another exploit of Ṛbhus. His cutting of a bull for zeus, is parallel

1. Ibid.
2. Myth of Aryan Nations, Page 437.
3. Cox: Myth of Aryan Nations Pages 430-432.
4. Ibid, Page 436.

to the slaughter of the cow by the Ṛbhus for their parents (Dyāvā-Prithivī). He divides the body of bull into two heaps—one containing entirely the red flesh, the other consisting of the bones covered with fat, just as the rays of Dawn or rising sun may be said to make two heaps, one comprising the red light of dawn, and the other made of white sunshine. Zeus, the resplendent sky prefers the latter, the sunshine, thinking that it is all fat, a better substance.

31. Sometimes a distinction seems to have been made between the rays of the two twilights, and the morning twilight is personified in Prometheus and the evening twilight in the Epemetheus. Scholars have identified these two brothers with fore-thought and after-thought, but neither the myths connected with them, nor the etymology warrants this identification. In the two names, we have, apart from the two prefixes, the word Metheus which, as we shall see in the next chapter, is same as Madhu, and which signified light. Therefore Prometheus is the dawn twilight Epemetheus the other twilight.

32. The myth of Pandora also leads to identify the two brothers with the rays of two twilights. Prometheus, the morning light possesses the Polar day, containing all the blessings of heat and light etc. In the evening, when Prometheus is away, his brother Epemetheus (evening twilight) is in charge of the jar. Beautiful Pandora, the evening twilight, or Aurora Borealis the work of Hephastos, who as we shall see is Tvaṣṭṛ, comes to Epemetheus who in spite of his brother's warning, allows Pandora to open the lid of the day-jar and away go all the blessings of light, sun, heat and all, leaving only Hope that they will be obtained after the dark wintry night.

c. *Hephastos*

33. Another fire-god is Hephastos who, whatever be the etymology, corresponds to vedic Tvaṣṭṛ, who as we shall see is the same as Norse surt, the guardian of the Southern quarter (Muspell-heim). Like Tvaṣṭṛ he is a great manufacturer. Thus like Tvaṣṭṛ he fashioned the thunderbolt for zeus. He fashioned the two images of gold (perhaps sun and moon) endowed with motion. The glorious palace of gold made by him on Olympus is the bright heaven from where Prometheus steals the fire, the

dawn light He also manufactured for the other gods, edifices to live ın, and golden shoes to trod upon the air or water, so does the Southern sky endow golden light to all shining ones.

34. His masterpiece is Pandora who is, as we have found, the evening twilight or Aurora Borealis that robs the mortal of all the blessings by lifting the lid of the day-jar. This malevolent trait of evening twilight may also be found in Uṣas who are said to ever shorten the ages of men[1] and wasting the life of mortals.[2] From another point of view he is said to marry with the help of zeus, the dawn-goddess Aphorodite who laughs, as it were, when shines, at his deformity.

35. From the above analysis, we cannot but conclude that the fire created by him must be the down-fire with which he himself, like Mātariśvan may be identified. As in Agni, we find the combination of both the fires, terrestrial and divine, so Hephastos, too, could be conceived, later on, as the deity presiding over the fire of Hearth and Home.

D. Loki

36. Scholars are unanimous in regarding Loki as the god of fire,[3] but he is more than ordinary fire—In the phrases like 'Locke drinker vand' and 'Locki drinks water', we find a reference to the celestial light-streams issuing in shafts through the cloud-rifts, or the beams of the rising sun making a path or trunk of elephant as it were from sky to the ocean or earth. He is like Tvaṣṭṛ, Ṛbhus and Hephastos a great manufacturer, and provided Odin with Gungnir, his wife Frey with the ship Skidbladnir and Thor with golden hair.

37. The triple character of Loki as the two twilights and Aurora Borealis is also quite clear, and in this he shares with other fire-gods, like Hermes and Prometheus. Thus while as morning twilight he manufactures various gifts for gods, as evening twilight he manages the death of Balder (the sun-god) through blind Hodur, the god of darkness. In the same capacity

1. 1, 124-2.
2. 1, 12, 10.
3. H. A. Guerber : Norse Mythology , Cox. Myth. Ar. Nat. p. 426 and others cf. for etymology 'liuhan', Latin 'lucre' to shine and also German 'lohe', meaning blaze, fire.

he may be said to be sent by Odin to the dwelling of the dark elves, an emblem of dark wintry night, to give up the golden treasure (kept in the form of Aurora Borealis) which he had hoarded in the strong cave.[1] This cave reminds us of the guhā from which is brought the Agni by Mātariśvan, and which we found also to be the nest of the bull, the abode of Ṛta, and of the cows. In the same form again, Loki goes to recover the hammer of Thor, which is stolen by the giants of darkness living in the cold Jatunheim, and in this respect he may be compared with Hermes going to reclaim the maiden from the rugged lord of Hades.[2] As Aurora Borealis he is said to exist in the Nifel-Heim cold, dark region of the extreme North, identical with Wintry Arctic Night in the form of his offspring Hel who is the goddess of death and the ruler of that realm. He also steals away the most cherised ornament, the light, of Odin's wife Frey who as we have seen is the goddess of twilights of Polar region. From another point of view Aurora Borealis living in the dark wintry night was conceived as Utgard-Loki on whose vanishment such a mist enveloped it that the castle of the giant was not visible and Thor could not dash it down.[3]

38. Loki is peculiarly connected with the winning of wives for certain deities. He unites the unwilling Skadi, the daughter of the frost giant, the goddess of winter, with Niord, the god of summer[4]. Skadi's anger and dislike against the gods who had slain her father is an emblem of the unbending rigidity of the ice-enveloped earth of the Polar night, which softened at last by frolicsome play of Loki, the Aurora Borealis and dawnlight; at the commencement of spring she smiled and permitted the embrace of Niord (the summer). His love, however cannot hold her for more than three months of the year (typified in the myth of the three nights), as the winter and the summer, the Polar night and the Polar day can only be said to be united at the time of the Polar twilights which does not exceed three months. This couple, however, gives birth to Frey who, as we have seen, is the

1. Cox. Myth. Ar. Nat. Page 106.
2. Ibid.
3. H. A. Guerber : Myths of the Norsemen.
4. Ibid.

personification of the Glow of the sun. Polar night and the day necessarily give birth to the Glow of the sun. Loki again does the work of mating together Frey and Gerda though for a short time, in the land of Burii or of the dawn. He is again responsible for enticing away Idun, the personification of immortal youth like vedic Uṣas,[1] from Asgard, the land of Aesir to the Giant Thiassi, just as evening rays of light may be said to take away the twilight to the wintry night, the land of giants. On her going, gods begin to feel the loss of vigour and the approach of old age. Then Loki, like the suparṇa of veda, assumes the form of an eagle and brings back Idun; so does the morning beams of light the dawn. Idun once more faints and drops down from the branch of Ashyaggdrasil which is sky as we shall see in the next chapter. She continues falling and tumbling till Odin spreads up the wolf skin, just as twilight goes on slipping away from the sky till the darkness envelops the whole thing.

e. The conclusion

39. From the above discussion, we can firstly conclude that the light of dawn, which Nansen calls the 'glowing fire lit above the uttermost edge of the ice,' was conceived as the fire itself. It is this fire which Ṛbhus, Mātariśvan or Prometheus bring from the high heaven to the earth, it is only in this way that we can justify the creation of Agni by Ṛbhu mentioned in Ṛg-veda,[2] and also his connection with the creation of Agni by Indra, mentioned in the Tāṇdya-Mahā Brāhmaṇa.[3]

40. Tandya Brāhmaṇ mentions that Ṛbhus are the dear abode of Indra,[4] and with that dear abode (i.g. Ṛbhus), he creates the fire beyond. It seems to refer to the sun or dawn-fire yet in the womb, which cannot be brought by Ṛbhus, unless we assume that Ṛbhus are the lights of the dawn. In the Ṛg-veda, also the strange fire which he created must mean, as we have seen, the same fire, released from its guhā or secret abode.

1. Cf. पुराणा युवति as an epithet Cf. 4–19–7 etc.
2. 3, 5, 6.
3. 14, 2, 5, cf. also Sāyana's commentary on it.
4. Cf. RV. 1, 63, 3; 1, 16, 21; 1, 167, 10 etc. for the same conception; see also 'Ṛbhus and Indra above,' section I.

41. Secondly, we have seen that the Dawn-fire is the fire in which the first sacrificers performed their sacrifice, and that the sacrifice which Ṛbhus brought is the same. This is the sacrifice of Yama, Manu, and Tvaṣṭṛ, this is the fire which gods kindle and perform the sacrifice therein. This is also the Ṛta itself, as the sacrifice is also called Ṛta later on. With this Ṛta sacrifice, light or fire, the gods are able to smite down the demons of darkness, and of frost and cold, and therefore, we may account for the efficacy of sacrifice in chasing away the demons, and also for the disturbance created by them, in the sacrifice of gods (in the second twilight of Polar region), an idea so predominant in the later literature.

42. Thirdly, the ordinary sacrifice performed by human beings, was the counter-part of this divine sacrifice ; and it is why Ṛbhus, who brought that sacrifice, were also regarded as bringing that sacrifice. So important is this exploit of Ṛbhus that it becomes the standard of comparison in this respect[1], just as Manu's sacrifice becomes the Norm of any sacrifice, and every sacrifice is said to perform the sacrifice like Manu (Manusvat).

(To be continued)

1. कां० सं० 7. 17 ; TS. II. प० 11, 61.

MOGHUL PATRONAGE TO SANSKRIT LEARNING

(M. M. Patkar)

Although the subject of the present paper includes the whole of the Moghul period in general, it is limited, in particular, to the period between 1556 and 1707 A.D. i.e., from the beginning of Akbar's reign in 1556 to the death of Aurangzeb in 1707. The years of the first two Moghul emperors namely, Babar and Humayun, were mostly spent in the struggle for dominion in India and hence neither of them had time for literary activities. Babar, as will be seen from his delightful memoirs, was certainly a man of fine literary taste but as much of his time was spent in military activities he could hardly attend to literature and other fine arts. Humayun, although a cultured gentleman not lacking in ability, was deficient in the energetic promptitude of his versatile father. Besides, many years of his reign were spent in wanderings and although more than 25 years had elapsed since the death of Babar in 1530, the actual period of Humayun's reign subsisted only for about ten years. This is why we find no reference to the first two Moghul emperors in the Sanskrit literature of that period.

1. AKBAR (1556-1605)

The activity of Akbar's mind was not limited to the conquest and wars like his two predecessors. By the time Akbar ascended the throne the rebellious attitude of the enemies was considerably suppressed and Akbar could devote much of his time to cultural development. He encouraged Sanskrit learning and got prepared for himself Persian translations of Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata, the two sacred books of the Hindus. Apart from the translations of the standard Sanskrit texts he got several original Sanskrit works composed under his patronage and patronized many Hindu pandits. I now proceed to mention such of the Sanskrit works as were composed by several learned men under the patronage of Akbar and his three successors.


(i) RĀMAVINODA by Ramacandra

Rāmavinoda is a karaṇa grantha which gives a series of rules and data for the computation of calendars. It was composed by

Rāmacandra for Ramadāsa Bhupāla who was a minister of Akbar. At the beginning of the work the author gives the genealogy of emperor Akbar. He takes for his calculation the year 35 of the era of Akbar i.e., from A. D. 1556 when Akbar ascended the throne. The date of composition is given as śaka 1535=A.D. 1613.[1]

Rāma was the son of Ananta who wrote a commentary on the Kāmadhenu of Bopadeva. He also wrote a work on horoscopy called the Jātakapaddhati. He had two sons viz., Nīlakaṇṭha and Rāma. Nīlakaṇṭha also was a reputed author like his father and composed the celebrated work Ṭoḍarānanda for Todaramalla, the famous finance minister of Akbar. The family of Ananta belonged to the Gārgya gotra and lived at Dharmapuri, probably a place near Nasik.

Besides the Rāmavinoda, Rāma wrote in 1600 another work called Muhūrtacintāmaṇi which is a treatise on auspicious moments for the performance of religious ceremonies. He also wrote a commentary called Pramitākṣarā[2] on this work. His genealogy, as given in his Muhūrtacintāmaṇi, is as under :—



(ii) NARTANA-NIRṆAYA by Puṇḍarīka Viṭṭhala

Nartana-nirṇaya is an elaborate treatise on dancing and its accompaniments. Although the name of the work is Nartana-nirṇaya, it deals also with other parts of music viz. tāla, gāyana, different rāgas, the merits and defects of a singer and so on. The work contains four chapters, only the last which is devoted to the treatment of dancing. Before concluding the work the author states the purpose of composing his treatise. He states :—

1. This date is given in the I. O. Cat. Pt. V, No. 2944. Mr. Dikshit, however, gives the date of composition as Śaka 1512 i.e. A.D. 1590 Cf. Bhāratīya Jyotiṣśāstra, p. 278.

2. Bhār. Jyo. p. 278.

लक्ष्यलक्षणसंदिग्धं परं पारान्धसङ्गतं ।
तन्नर्तनं विठ्ठलेन निःसंदिग्धमकारि हि ॥
अकबरनृपरुच्यर्थं भूलोके सरलसङ्गीतं ।
कृतमिह बहुतरभेदं सुहृदां हृदये सुखं भूयात् ॥
श्रीमत्पुण्डरीकविठ्ठलेन रचितं लोकोत्तरं सुन्दरं
दृष्ट्वा नर्तननिर्णयं भुवि कलौ तत्तत्प्रयोगाधिकान् ।
श्रीमत्तालमृदङ्गगानचतुरश्रीवंशनृत्याग्रिणां ।
सर्वेषामपि दर्शयन्तु गुरवो भूत्वा सदा पण्डिताः ॥

The above verses clearly show that Puṇḍarīka Viṭṭhala composed his Nartana-nirṇaya to please emperor Akbar (अकबरनृपरुच्यर्थं). Puṇḍarīka Viṭṭhala originally belonged to Karnataka. He was a native of the Mysore province which was about that time (about 1500 A.D.) a tributary state of the Vijayanagar empire.[1] From his *Ṣaḍrāgacandrodaya* we see that Puṇḍarika was a resident of Śātanurvā, a village near the hill called Śivagaṅgā in the Kārṇāṭa country. He was a brahmin of the Jāmadagnya gotra of the Karṇāṭa Jāti. He flourished at the court of Mohomedan king Burhan Khan of the Faruki dynasty which ruled between 1370-1600 at a city called Ānandavallı in Khandesh in the South.[2] Later on he seems to have been introduced to emperor Akbar through Manasimha and Madhavasimha, the two feudatories of Akbar. In his *Rāgamañjarī* he refers to these two vassals :—

अकबरनृपधर्मौ शक्रतश्चातिभीमौ
धरणिगगनमध्ये जङ्गमौ मध्यमेरुः ।
सकलनृपतितारा चन्द्रसूर्याविमौ द्वौ
जगति जयनशीलौ माधवामानसिंहौ ॥

Puṇḍarīka Viṭṭhala composed some other works besides the Nartananirṇaya. As these works were composed under the patronage of different princes, the following tabular statement will enable us to form a better idea of our author's literary activity:—

Works	*Patron*	*Date of Composition*
Ṣaḍrāgacandrodaya	Burhan Khan	—
Rāgamañjarī	Manasingh and Madhavasimha	After 1556
Rāgamālā	—	A. D. 1576
Nartananirṇaya	Akbar	—

1. K. Hulgur : *Vijaynagar Sexcentenary Commemoration Volume*, 1936, p. 371.

2. P. K. Gode : *Journal of Music Academy*, vol. VI to VIII pp. 1-8.

(iii) ṬODARĀNANDA by Nīlakaṇṭha

Ṭoḍarānanda, which is an extensive work on religious and civil law, astronomy and medicine, was composed by Nīlakaṇṭha; the brother of Rāma, for his patron Todarmalla, the celebrated finance minister of Akbar. The work is divided into three parts, namely 1 Dharma or religious law, 2 Jyotiṣa or Astronomy and 3 Vaidyaka or Medicine. The Dharma section deals with religious and civil law, several parts of judicial procedure, marriage etc. The Joytiṣa section constitutes the saṁhitā branch of Indian Astronomy and deals with such topics as the results of eclipses, the rise of the comets, the signs of the zodiac and so on. The last section deals with the medical aspect. The vast nature of the work shows its encyclopaedic character.

Nīlakaṇṭha, as we have already seen (vide under Rāmavinoda) was the son of Ananta and brother of Rāma. His mother's name was Padmā. Nīlakaṇṭha's son Govinda mentions him as a learned man honoured at Akbar's court. Nīlakaṇṭha was well-versed in the two sciences viz. Mimānsā and Sāṁkhya. He also composed many astronomical treatises one of which is popularly known as Tājikanīlakaṇṭhī,[1] composed in A. D. 1587.

(iv) JAGGANNĀTHA-PRAKĀŚA by Sūra Miśra

Another great work on smṛti, composed in Akbar's time, is the *Jagannātha-prakāśa* composed by Sūra Miśra for Jaggannātha, a Kamboja warrior who lived at the court of Akbar. A unique Ms.[2] of this work exists in the Mss. library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal at Calcutta. The work deals with the following ten subjects in ten *prabhāsas* : 1 Virtue, vice and duty, 2 caste, 3 sacraments, 4 diurnal religious duties, 5 times meet for fasts, 6 loyalty and expiations, 7 impurity of the person from birth or death in one's family, 8 śrāddhas and gifts, 9 religious calendar, and 10 emancipation. The author praises his patron in the following verses :—

अज्ञानध्वान्तनाशं विकसितसकलस्वान्तकल्हारजातम्
धर्मानुष्ठानकामी जनकृतनिचयं प्रीणितः प्राणिकोकम् (?) ।

1. S. B. Dikshit : *Bhār. Jyo. P. 275.*
2. *A. S. B. Descriptive Catalogue*, Vol. III (Smṛti Mss.) No. 2041.

प्रत्यादिष्टारिवर्गप्रमुदितमनसा श्रीजगन्नाथनाम्ना
निर्दिष्टोऽसौ व्यधत्त प्रकटितयशसा सूरमिश्रः प्रकाशम् ॥ १ ॥
अशेषकारबोजकुलावतंसः श्रीमज्जगन्नाथ इति प्रसिद्धः ।
अकारयद्धर्मनिबन्धमेतं धराधिपेऽप्यर्कबले नरेशे ॥ २ ॥

The date of the composition of the first prabhā is given as Saṁvat 1654 i.e. A. D. 1598, which means that the work was composed in the last days of emperor Akbar.

(v) NĪTISĀRA by Gaṅgādhara

Nītisāra is a small work which deals with various topics in three Śatakas viz. 1 Rājanītivarṇana, 2 Śṛṅgārādivivaraṇa and 3 Paramārtha śataka. The author is one Gaṅgādhara who states that he composed the work at the instance of King Akbar. The colophon reads as under :—

इति श्रीमन्महाराजअकबरशाहिआज्ञया गंगाधरदीक्षितविरचितं नीतिसारं तृतीयपरमार्थशतकं संपूर्णम् ।[1]

(vi) PĀRASĪ-PRAKĀŚA by Bihārī Kṛṣṇadāsa

Pārasīprakās'a is an astronomical work which gives Sanskrit equivalents for Persian astronomical terms. It is, so to say, a Persian-Sanskrit glossary of astronomical terms.

The author of the work is one Bihārī Kṛṣṇadāsa. He states in the colophon that he composed the work at the instance of emperor Akbar. The colophon is as follows :—

इति श्रीशाहजल्लालदीन्द्र (= अकबर) कारिते विहारिकृष्णमिश्रकृते पारसीप्रकाशे कृत्प्रकरणं समाप्तम् ।

It is clear from the above colophon that the work was composed under Akbar. The exact date of the work is not known, but the oldest Ms. of this work which is described by R. Mitra in his Notices (Vol. III. No. 1321), bears the date Saṁvat 1666 or A.D. 1610 as the date of the copy. The work, therefore, must have been composed a few years earlier than 1610.

2. JAHANGIR (1605–1627)

Jahangir was a lover of art and himself could write sufficiently well. He patronized learning and encouraged literature in Persian and Sanskrit languages. His reign was, on the whole, fruitful of peace and prosperity to the empire. Under its auspices

1. *Ibid*, Vol. VII (Kāvya Mss.) No. 5505.

literature flourished as it had never done before[1] and a host of remarkable pandits gathered at his court and composed works in his honour. I shall mention here a few of such Sanskrit works as were written in his reign.

(i) BĪJANAVĀṄKURA by Kṛṣṇa

Bījanavāṅkura, also called Kalpalatāvatāra or Bījapallava, is a commentary on the metrical portions of Bhāskara's *Bījagaṇita*, a famous work on Algebra.

Kṛṣṇa Gaṇaka, the author of the present commentary, was the son of Ballāḷa and played a conspicuous part at the court of emperor Jahangir. From Munīśvara's statement in his commentary on the Siddhānta-śiromaṇi, composed in Śaka 1560, it appears that Kṛṣṇa was very much honoured at the court of Jahangir. In his commentary Munīśvara states as follows :—

यः श्रीकृष्णपदाम्बुजहितमतिः सिद्धान्तवारां निधेः
पोतः श्रीजहगीरभूमितिलकस्याननविश्वासभूः ।
षट्शास्त्रेषु कृतश्रमोऽखिलगुरुर्मान्यो वदान्यो विदाम्
श्रीकृष्णः किमु वर्णनीयविभवः श्रीकृष्ण एवापरः ॥ ८ ॥

In his commentary Kṛṣṇa calls himself a disciple of Viṣṇu, who was again a disciple of Nṛsiṁha, the nephew of Gaṇeśa, the reputed author of Grahalāghava. Although Kṛṣṇa nowhere mentions Jahangir's name as his patron, it is clear from Munīśvara's statement that he was one of the learned pandits who lived at the court of Jahangir.

(ii) NABĀBAKHĀNACARITA[2] by Rudra Kavi

The *Nabābakhānacarita* is a panegyric of the emperor Jahangir and was written by Rudra Kavi in A.D. 1609 at the instigation of Maharaja Pratapa. In several colophons the name of Pratapa is mentioned by the author e.g. cf. श्रीमन्महाराजाधिराजश्रीनबाबखानानुचरिते श्रीशामयूरशाह्पुरन्दरप्रतापशाहोद्योतितरुद्रकवीन्द्रविरचिते तृतीयोल्लासः ॥ etc.

The date of composition viz. Śaka 1531 is recorded in the following verse :—

शके क्ष्माग्नितिथौ (१५३१) सौम्ये वैशाखे शुक्लपक्षतौ ।
चरितं खानखानस्य वर्णितं रुद्रसूरिणा ॥

1. Beni Prasad : *Jahangir*, p. 448.
2. A single Ms. of this work is described by Keith in the India Office Catalogue No. 7304.

The following verse contains eulogy of Jahangir :—

वीरश्रीजहंगीरसाहे मदनप्रौढप्रतापोदय-
क्ष्युभ्यद्(ह)क्षिणदिक्कुरंगनयनासंसर्गसक्तनि ।
क्षोणीमंडनखानखानधरणीपाले तदीयांबर-
व्याक्षोपायकरं वितन्वति तया सानंया (?) भूयते ॥

Rudra Kavi also wrote two other works viz. 1 Kīrtisamullāsa[1] a panegyric of Sultan Khuram, son of Jahangir and 2 Dānasāhacarita,[2] a eulogy of Akbar's son named Dāniyal. The date of the composition of this work, as given by the author himself, is Śaka 1525 i.e. A.D. 1603. It appears, therefore, that the work was composed in the last days of Akbar.

From the colophons of the three works mentioned above it is clear that these works were composed at the instance of Maharaja Pratapa who was probably a feudatory prince.

3. SHAHJAHAN (1627–1655)

Shahjahan's reign marks the climax of the Moghul dynasty. During the space of thirty years Shahjahan did many activities of lasting importance. Art and literature never flourished so much as in the reign of Shahjahan. He patronized Persian and Sanskrit learning and got prepared manv works in these two languages. He abolished the tax which was levied on the pilgrims at Benares and Prayaga, at the request of a well-known Sanskrit pandit named Kavīndrācārya Sarasvati and conferred on him the title "Sarvavidyānidhāna". Jagannātha Paṇḍita, the celebrated author of *Rasagaṅgādharat*, *Bhāminī-vilāsa* and many other Sanskrit works, flourished in Shahjhan's reign. All these clearly show what a great regard Shahajahan had for Hindu pandits. The following are some of the Sanskrit works composed during his reign.

(i) SIDDHĀNTASĀRVABHAUMA by Munīśvara

Siddhāntasārvabhauma, also called Siddhantatattvārtha is a versified compendium of theoretical astronomy. It is a digest of the several siddhāntas on Indian astronomy. The contents of the work are : 1 measurement of true solar year, 2 duration

1. Ibid No. 7303.
2. Ibid No. 7089.

of years, 3 motions of planets, 4 measures of months and years and the mode of reckoning them, 5 modes of planetary orbits, 6 measures of bulk, 7 diameter and motions of the earth, 8 equatorial regions, 9 calculation of latitudes and nadir, 10 curved motions of planets, 11 nodes, 12 position of the earth, 13 the orbits of the planets, 14 arcs between the vernal equinoctical point and the equator etc.[1]

The work was composed by Munīśvara, also called Viśvarūpa who was the son of Raṅganātha. From the introduction to his work it seems that he composed this work in 1627 i.e. just when Shahjahan ascended the throne. In the work Munīśvara alludes to Shahjahan as follows :—

श्रीसार्वभौम[ज]हँगीरसुनन्दनोऽयं
श्रीशाहजाहँ धरणीपुरुहूत एवं ।
निष्कण्टकां वसुमतीं प्रतिधाय तस्याः
संरक्षणार्थमथ सेह गतासनेऽस्मिन् ॥

The above verse definitely proves that Munīśvara enjoyed the patronage of emperor Shahjahan. In his work he gives the time, the Hijari era, and the horoscope of the exact time of Shahjahan's coronation.

Munīśvara was born in A. D. 1603. At the end of his *Gūdhārthaprakāśa*, Raṅganātha, Munīśvara's father, states that "Wednesday, *S'ambhutithi*, of the light fortnight of Caitra, witnessed both the completion of his work and the birth of his son Munīśvara.[2]

Besides the Siddhāntasārvabhauma, Munīśvara wrote the following works :—

1. Niṣṛṣṭārthadūti, a commentary on the Lilāvatī of Bhāskarācārya, 2 Marīcī, an exhaustive commentary on the Gaṇitādhyāya and Golādhyāya of Bhāskar's Siddhāntaśiromaṇi, and 3 Pāṭisāra.

(ii) KĀVYAVṚTTI-PRABODHA by Bhagavatīsvāmin

The *Kāvyavṛttiprabodha* is a treatise on the metres that are used in kavyas. Each metre is followed by an illustrative verse. The work was composed by one Bhagavatīswāmī who

1. Rajendralal Mitra : *Notices of Sanskrit Mss.* vol. V, No. 1858.
2. I. O. Cat. Pt. V. p. 1019a.

was the son or Shahjahan's councellor Dvārikādāsa. The author appears to be a Jaina. He mentions the emperor Shahjahan in the following verse :—

प्रादुश्चक्रे कुशपुरिवशंश्चन्द्रभागाप्रतीर-
जन्मानन्तः स्ववरज(?)द्वारिकादाससूनुः ।
लोकाधीशे नरपतिपते(:) श्रीजहांगीरसूनोः
सभ्योद्भूतो निपुणभगवान् काव्यवृत्तप्रबोधम् ॥

(iii) SARVASIDDHĀNTARĀJA by Nityānanda

Sarvasiddhāntarāja is an astronomical work composed by Nityānanda in Saṁvat 1696 i.e. in A.D. 1640. The work is mainly divided into two parts viz. the Gaṇitādhyāya and Golādhyāya, The Gaṇitādhyāya contains the following nine chapters :—

(1) मीमांसा अधिकार,, (2) मध्यमाधिकार, (3) स्पष्टा°, (4) त्रिप्रश्ना°. (5) चन्द्रग्रहण, (6) सूर्यग्रहण, (7) शृंगोन्नति, (8) भग्रहयुति, (9) छायाधिकार, and the Golādhyāya contains three chapters viz. 1 भुवनकोश, 2 गोलबन्ध, 3 यन्त्राधिकार.

Nityānanda was a resident of Indrapurī near Kurukṣetra. He belonged to the Gauḍa family and his gotra was Mudgala. He was the son of Devadatta, son of Nārāyaṇa, son of Lakṣmaṇa, son of Icchā.

Nityānand's another work on astronomy is the Siddhāntasindhu wherein he refers to his patron Shahjahan and his ancestors upto Babar. A single Ms. of this work is available in Ulwar Mss. Library.[1] It was composed in Saṁvat 1685 i.e. A.D. 1629 at the request of Vasafkhan who was a Minister of Shahjahan. Nityānanda refers to both of his patrons in the following verses :—

यो राज्याह्वयमण्डपस्य सुदृढः स्तम्भः स्थितो निश्चलः
संसारार्णवधर्मपोततरणे यः कर्णधारः क्ष(कृ)ती ।
यः पृथ्वीपतिरत्नयोज्यकनकं भूपार्थशब्दोऽथवा
सोऽयं वासफखाँ विभाति सकलान्वर्णाश्रमान्पालयन् ॥ २३ ॥
तस्य प्रेरणया नृपालमुकुटालंकारचूडामणे-
र्मामाज्ञापितवान् सुतंत्रकरणे लोकोपकाराय यत् ।

1. *Ulwar Mss. Catalogue* by Peterson, Extract No. 600.

श्रीमत्साहजहांप्रकाशममलं सिद्धान्तसिन्धुं स्फुटं
नित्यानन्द इति प्रसिद्धगणकः कर्तुं समीहे ततः ॥ ४ ॥

(iv) VEDĀṄGARĀYA

Vedāṅgarāya was a celebrated author who wrote several astronomical and religious treatises. He flourished during emperor Shahjahan's reign and wrote several works to please the emperor. One of his famous works is the *Pārasī-prakāśa* in which are given methods for converting Hindu into Muhamedan dates and *vice versa* and Arabic and Persian names of the days of the week, the months, the planets, the constellations etc.[1] He wrote the work to please the emperor Shahjahan and gain his favour. Cf. the following line :—

श्रीमच्छाहजहांमहेन्द्रपरमप्रीतिप्रसादाप्तये ।

Vedāṅgarāya was the father of Nandikeśvara, the author of a celebrated astrological work called Gaṇakamaṇḍana. In his work Nandikeśvara states that his father's name was Mālajit, that he was conversant with the Vedas and Vedāṅgas, and got from the emperor of Delhi the little Vedāṅgarāya. Mālajit alias Vedāṅgarāya was the son of Tigalabhaṭṭa who was the son of Ratnabhaṭṭa. Ratnabhaṭṭa lived at Śrīsthala in Gujrat.[2]

Besides being in the court of Shahjahan, Vedāṅgarāya seems to have enjoyed the patronage of a Gauḍa king named Giridharadāsa in whose honour he composed an astronomical work called Giridharānanda.[3]

4. AURANGZEB (1656–1707)

The decline of the Moghul empire began with the death of Aurangzeb who is practically supposed to be the last of the Moghul emperors. Owing to his bigotry he was not at all inclined towards the encouragement of Sanskrit learning. However, I have come across two Sanskrit works in which Aurangzeb is mentioned in a laudatory style. I give below the description of the works composed during his reign.

1. R. G. Bhandarkar : *Report for 1882–83*, p. 34.
2. *Ibid*, p. 35.
3. A rare Ms. (No. 884 of 1886–92) of this work exists in the Govt. Mss. Library at the Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona.

(i) MUHŪRTARATNA by Īśvaradāsa[1]

Muhūrtaratna is a religio-astrological treatise which treats of auspicious moments fit for the performance of religious ceremonies. It is divided into twenty-seven chapters, each chapter prescribing certain moments as auspicious for performing particular acts. The last two chapters of the work contain the genealogy of emperor Aurangzeb and the author's own account respectively. From the allusion of the author to the emperor Aurangzeb it is clear that Īśvaradāsa composed his work under Aurangzeb.

Īśvaradāsa was the son of Keśavaśarmā who obtained the title *Jyotiśarāya* and also plenty of wealth from Jahangir on account of his proficiency in the science of astrology. The family hailed from Kālañjara and were Kanauj Brahmans[2] belonging to Vatsa gotra. The name of the author's grand-father was Kanharaśarmā.

The date of composition and Emperor Aurangzeb's name are mentioned in the following verse :—

पञ्चाष्ट(बाणे)न्दुगते १५८५ शकाद्बे
विष्णुप्रबोधेऽह्नि सूर्यवारे ।
संपूर्णमासीत्तु मुहूर्त्तरत्नं
प्रस्थे मघोनस्त्ववरंगराज्ये ॥

The date Śaka 1585 corresponds to A.D. 1663 when Aurangzeb was at the height of his power,

(ii) MUHŪRTAMĀLĀ by Raghunātha

Muhūrtamālā is another work on muhūrtas or auspicious moments composed in Aurangzeb's time. Like the other works on Muhūrtas the present work also deals with moments which are considered auspicious for performing religious ceremonies.

The author Raghunātha was the son of Nṛsiṁha who obtained the title *Jyotirvitsarasa* from Akbar when the latter conquered the fort of Āseri. Nṛsiṁha's family hailed from Dalbha-pura (= Dabhol) on the Western sea, but he settled at Benares.[3]

1. For a detailed description of this work see my note published in the *Poona Orientalist*, Vol. III, pp. 83-85.
2. *A. S. B. Des. Catalogue* 1925, vol. III, preface p. x.
3. Ibid, p. lxi.

Raghunātha belonged to the Śaṇḍilya gotra and was a Chitpavan Brahmin. He composed his work at Benares in Saṁvat 1717 i.e. A.D. 1660, when Aurangzeb had commenced his rule by defeating Dara Shah, Suja Shah and Murad Shah. Compare the following lines :—

जित्वा दाराशाहं सूजाशाहं मुरादसाहं च ।
अवरंगजेबशाहे शासत्यवनीं ममायमुद्योगः ॥
विक्रमार्कनृपराज्यसमासु क्ष्माभृदिन्दुकुभृदिन्दु १७१७ समासु ।
आश्विनस्य दशमेऽह्नि समाप्ता मत्कृतिः कृतिमुदेऽस्तु समाप्ता ॥

As Aurangzeb's hostile attitude towards Hindus is well-known it is doubtful whether he patronized Sanskrit learning at all. I am inclined to believe that the two authors mentioned above were probably under the subjection of the Moghul emperor and hence they must have mentioned him only in a laudatory style.

MANUSCRIPTS OF COMMENTARIES ON THE KAUṬALĪYA ARTHAŚĀSTRA

(P. K. GODE, M.A.)

In the recently published Catalogue[1] of Mss. in the Jain Bhandars at Pattan I find the following entries regarding Mss. of the celebrated *Kauṭalīya Arthaśātra* :—

> "**Polity**—*Kauṭalīya-Arthaśāstra* :—(on palm-leaf) only a fragment containing the first Adhikaraṇa and the second incomplete with some portion of Yogghama's commentary *Nīti-Nirṇaya*."[2]

The Mss. of the text and commentary of the *Arthaśāstra* are described in the above catalogue as follows :—[3]

" २९२ (१) **कौटलीय अर्थशास्त्र** (अधि. १–२ अपूर्ण) प० ६४; १३" × २$\frac{१}{४}$"*damaged (*५५–६३ पत्राणि विनष्टानि) End :—

शिरीषपुष्पकं गोमूत्रकं गोमेदकं शुद्धस्फटिकं etc.

(2) **कौटलीय टीका** (अधि. २ अपूर्ण) by योग्घम. प. १८ End :—

इति मुग्धविलासांकयोग्घमविरचितनीतिनीर्णीत्यभिधानायां कौटलीय-राजसिद्धांतटीकायामध्यक्षप्रचारे प्रथमोध्यायः ॥ "

The merit of the discovery, publication and translation of the *Arthaśātra* goes to Dr. Shama Sastri[4] of Mysore. Dr. Shama Sastri first used a Ms. of the text of the *Arthaśāstra* together with the fragment of a commentary by Bhaṭṭa Svāmin.[5] In the

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1. *Descriptive Catalogue of Mss.* in the Jain Bhandars at Pattan, Compiled from the Notes of the late Mr. C. D. Dalal with Introduction, Indices and Appendices by L. B. Gandhi, Jain Pandit, Oriental Institute, Baroda, (in two vols.) Vol. I—Palm-leaf Mss. Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1937.

2. Ibid. *Report on the Search for Mss.* p. 54.

3. Ibid, pp. 172–173—Mss. in Saṅghavī Pāḍā Bhandar at Pattan. This Collection belongs to the Laghupośālika branch of the Tapāgaccha. It contains many Sanskrit and Prākṛt Works both Jain and Brahmanical and an enormous bulk of works on Apabhraṁśa literature.

4. Vide p. 5 of Dr. Jolly's Introduction to the Edition of the Arthaśāstra (Punjab Sans. Series No. IV) Lahore, 1923.

5. Vide p. vi of J. F. Fleet's Introductory Note to the Second Edition of the *Arthaśāstra* by Dr. Shama Sastri, Mysore, 1923.

second edition of the *Arthaśāstra* Dr. Shama Sastri utilised two more commentaries of the work called the *Nayacandrikā* of Mādhavayajvan[1] and the other a translation or rather paraphrase by an unknown author in a mixture of Tāmil and Malayālam languages. Dr. Shama Sastri states that both of these commentaries are incomplete as Bhaṭṭa Svāmi's commentary.[2]

M. M. T. Ganapati Sastri who has composed and published his own commentary[3] on the *Arthaśāstra* deals in his Introduction with the necessity of adding a commentary to the text and also describes the fragments of ancient commentaries secured by him. He obtained Mss. of *two* commentaries from the Madras Government Oriental Library. One of these was a fragmentary copy of a learned Sanskrit Commentary called *Pratipadapañcikā* by Bhaṭṭasvāmin. The other contained a portion of a commentary known as *Nayacandrikā* by Mādhavayajvan. The source of these Mss. was apparently a palm-leaf Ms. belonging to the Kerala country. These fragments were "full of errors and gaps". Ganpati Śastri also made use of a palm-leaf MS. of an ancient Malayalam version of the *Arthaśāstra* on the line of Bhaṭṭasvāmin's commentary. This version was found in the Palace Library at Trivandrum. A similar copy of this version was found in the Madras Government Oriental Mss. Library. But both these copies were defective. "Since no ancient com-

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1. Ibid, Preface to the Second Edition (10th July 1923) p. xxv.

2. *Arthaśāstra* (Second Edition, 1923) Preface p. xxv–Dr. Shama Sastri's estimate of the commentaries used by him is as follows:—"The first extends from the seventh chapter of the Seventh Book to the end of the third chapter of the Twelfth Book. It is neither a word-by-word commentary like Bhaṭṭasvāmi's nor a paraphrase like the Tāmil-Malayālam commentary. Mādhava Yajvan, its author, satisfies himself by supplying some connecting links between successive chapters and successive paragraphs in each chapter. The Tamil-Malayalam paraphrase is on the other hand very copious but omits to notice obscure passages here and there. It extends from the beginning to the end of the Seventh Book. Written as it is in a mixture of dialects it is not very easy to understand it. It seems to be quite recent and is not free from misinterpretation of a few words."

3. *Arthaśāstra* (*Trivandrum Sans. Series* No. LXXIX) 1923, English Introduction (dated 4th June 1923) pp. 2–3.

mentary in its publishable shape is available" states M. M. T. Ganapati Sastri, "I thought of writing one of my own".[1]

In the foregoing paragraphs I have tried to record the available commentarial material regarding the *Kauṭalīya Arthaśāstra* as known to and utilised by the two great scholars viz. Dr. Sham Sastri and M. M. Ganapati Sastri. In view of the fragmentary and unsatisfactory nature of the Mss. material of the extant commentaries on the *Arthaśāstra* every newly discovered fragment of the known commentaries or the discovery of an entirely new commentary on the *Arthaśāstra* must be looked upon as a gain to this important branch of scholarship viz., the improvement of the text of the *Arthaśāstra* and its final stabilising in a strictly critical manner. For this purpose the Pattan Ms. of Yogghama's commentary as described by Mr. Dalal should be examined by scholars interested in this branch of research. Though the Pattan Bhandars were inaccessible to Dr. Bühler and Peterson when they carried out their search for Mss. in Gujarat more than sixty years ago it is now possible for responsible Jain scholars trained on modern lines to get access to these Bhandars by persuading the authorities in charge of them to allow at least their co-religionists to make proper use of the valuable Mss. material locked up for centuries in these rich treasures of ancient learning.

It will thus be seen that the total number of commentaries so far brought to light, are four only, viz. :—

(1) Bhaṭṭasvāmin : *Pratipadapañcikā.*

(2) Mādhavayajvan : *Nayacandrikā.*

(3) Yogghama : *Nītinirṇīti.*

(4) Anonymous : *Tāmil-Malayālam version* on the line of Bhaṭṭa Svāmin's commentary.

We know nothing about the chronology of the above commentaries or the personal history of their authors.

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1. About Ganapati Sastri's self-composed commentary, Dr. Shama Sastri remarks :—"It will be a great boon to the readers of the Arthaśāstra if Mahāmahopādhyāya T. Ganapati Śāstri, Curator of the Oriental Library in Trivandram publishes the long-advertised Sanskrit Commentary which he is said to have been writing with the aid of the three Commentaries." (P. XXV of Preface to the Second Edition, dated 10th July 1923)

The source of the Mss. of the commentaries of Bhaṭṭasvāmin and Mādhavayajvan was the Kerala country as we are informed by M. M. Ganapati Sastri (Preface, 1923). There is a Ms.[1] of a commentary on the *Setubandha*,[2] a Prākṛt poem ascribed to Pravarasena dealing with the destruction of Rāvaṇa by Rāma. This commentary is ascribed to a commentator called Mādhavayajvamiśra.[3] Is it possible to identify this commentator Mādhavayajvan with his namesake, the author of the commentary *Nayacandrikā*[4] on the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭalya? The Madras Ms. of the *Setubandha vyākhyā* was transcribed in 1918–19 from the original Ms. belonging to an owner of Nareri in Malabar District. The Ms. of the *Nayacandrikā* on which Jolly's edition of this commentary was based was transcribed in 1917–18 from the original in the possession of an owner, resident of Chelapuram, (Calicut).[5] There is, therefore, some possibility of the two commentators of the same name "Mādhavayajvan" styled in the colophons of their respective works by identical titles viz. "*Vādikavi-Cūḍāmaṇi*" and "*Mahopādhyāya*".[6] Pt. Udayavīraśāstri is of opinion that Mādhvayajvan may have been a *dākṣiṇātya* (i.e. Southerner).[7] He also thinks that he is an ancient

1. *Triennial Cata. of Madras Mss.* (1916–1919) Vol. III, Part 1, 1932 R. No. 2772, pp. 3976–78.

2. Ed. in *Kāvyamālā Series*,—the text as printed in this edition consists of 15 *Āśvāsas*.

3. The colophon of the Madras Ms. reads as follows :—

"इति वैदिकचूडामणिमहोपाध्यायमाधवयज्वमिश्रविरचितायां सेतुनाम्नि सेतुतत्पर्यटीकायां षोडश आश्वासः."

The text of the *Setubandha* in the Kāvyamālā edition has 15 *āśvāsas* only but in the Madras Ms. the 16th *āśvāsa* is also found though the 12th *āśvāsa* is missing.

Colophon of the 1st *āśvāsa* :—" वादिकविचूडामणिमहोपाध्याय etc."

4. Vide edition of *Arthaśāstra* by J. Jolly and R. Schmidt (Punjab Sans. Series, Lahore, 1923, 1924) Vol. II—Notes with Comm. of Mādhavayajvan.

5. *Triennial Catalogue of Madras Mss.* Vol. III, Part I—Sanskrit B, 1922, p. 3320.

6. Vide Sanskrit Intro. (p. 6) of Jolly's Edition of the *Arthaśāstra*, Vol. II by Pt. Udayavīra Śāstri :—

"कदाचिदुभयोरप्यनयोर्व्याख्याग्रन्थयोर्निर्माता अयमेक एव माधवयज्वा स्यात्।"

7. Ibid, p. 3—" परं माधवयज्वेति नामविधया वयमनुमीमहे-कदाचिदयं दाक्षिणात्य एव स्यादिति "

commentator born in the South about 500 years after the demolition of the Mauryan Empire[1] but the grounds put forward in support of this belief are not convincing.[2] Perhaps a comparison of the *Nayacandrikā* and the *Setubandhavyākhyā* referred to above may give us a few more facts bearing on the chronology of Mādhavayajvan. In the Madras Ms. of the *Setubandhavyākhyā* (extract) we find a definition of the figure **विभावना**[3] quoted by its author as follows :—

" **यथोक्तम्—**

प्रसिद्धहेतुव्यावृत्त्या यत्किञ्चित्कारणान्तरम् ।

यत्र स्वाभाविकत्वं वा विभाव्यं सा विभावना "

This definition of **विभावना** is exactly identical with Daṇḍin's definition as quoted by Prof. Kane.[4] It is clear, therefore, from this identification that Mādhavayajvan, the author of the *Setubandhavyākhyā* is later than Daṇḍin, the author of the *Kāvyādarśa*. According to Dr. S. K. De[5] Daṇḍin flourished "probably in the beginning of the *first half of the 8th century.*" According to Prof. Kane the date of Daṇḍin is "*6th century.*"[6] Prof. Keith[7] regards the date of Daṇḍin as "open to dispute" and states "if... we place the *Kāvyādarśa* definitely before Bhāmaha (c. A.D. 700)

1. Ibid, p. 5—" मौर्ये राजनि दिवंगते सति तदनुसम्भवत:
पञ्चशतवर्षेष्वतीतेषु अयं दक्षिणेषु जनिं लेभे इति । "

2. Ibid, p. 4—Cf. " एवञ्चास्य भरतवाक्यस्येव वाक्यान्तराण्यपि प्राचीनतमग्रन्थान्तरनिर्विष्टान्येव स्युरिति, तानि समुद्धरन् अयं माधवयज्वा कश्चन सुतरां प्राचीन एवाचार्य इति संभावयाम: "

This argument has no value historically as even a modern commentator can mention and quote from very ancient works.

3. Vide P. V. Kane : Edition of '*Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Bombay, 1923. Notes pp. 20, 235-237.

4. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Notes, p. 236.—"Daṇḍin's definition of विभावना is very clear 'प्रसिद्धहेतुव्यावृत्त्या यत्किञ्चित्कारणान्तरम् । यत्र स्वाभाविकत्वं वा विभाव्यं सा विभावना ॥' (K. D. II, 199).

5. *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Vol. I, 1923, p. 70.

6. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Index of Works, No. 274. p. CLXVII. Prof. Kane observes :—"The 6th century has been accepted by many scholars as the date of Daṇḍin. Vide Max Muller (*India ; what can it teach us ?* 1st edition p. 332, Weber (H. S. L. p. 232n) Prof. Macdonell (H. S. L. p. 434) and Col. Jacob (JRAS 1897, p. 284)."

7. H. S. L. 1928, p. 296-97.

there is no reason to assert that he wrote much earlier," His date may be "anterior to the empire of Harṣavardhana and also anterior to the work of Subandhu and Bāṇa." Inspite of the disputable character of Daṇḍin's exact date we shall not be wrong if we state that Mādhavayajvan, the author of the *Setubandhavyākhyā* is later than at least the 6th century and if his identity[1] with his namesake, the author of *Nayacandrikā* on the *Arthaśāstra* could be proved on valid evidence we would be in a position to put a definite limit to the date of *Nayacandrikā*. As, however, the Ms. of the *Setubandhavyākhyā* is not before me at present the question must await investigation at some future time.

As regards the commentary of Bhaṭṭasvāmin reference has already been made above to the Mss. of this commentary availed of by Dr. Sham Śāstri and T. Ganapati Sastri. The available fragments of this commentary have also been published by Dr. K. P. Jayaswal in the *Journal of the Behar and Orissa Research Society*.[2]

1. With a view to decide the question of this identity I may mention here a Brahmin of the name माधव सोमयाजी, the father of Viddamayya to whom Cālukya Bhīma (II)—A.D. 934-945—granted a field at the village of Ākulamannaṇḍu (Vide *Epi. Indica*, Vol. V, 135). Mādhava was devoted to Janārdana (Viṣṇu). Viddamayya was a student of the *Kramapāṭha* and was eminent in religious learning. His sons and grandsons were youths eloquent at Committee Assemblies and were honoured by people. He engaged in holy performances, followed Manu's guidance and was not weary of repeating the Vedas and the syllable *om*. The father of Mādhava Somayājī was also a student of *Kramapāṭha* and belonged to *Gautama* lineage. Viddamayya's sons and grandsons are styled as "वारगोष्ठिषु वाग्मिनः" an expression which reminds us of the title 'वादिकविचूडामणि' applied to माधवयज्वन्. I am unable at present to establish any connection of this माधव सोमयाजी with माधवयज्वन् (later than 6th cen.) author of सेतुबंधव्याख्या or his namesake the author of नयचंद्रिका.

2. *Prātipadapañcika*, ed. by K. P. Jayaswal and A. Banerji Sastri J. B. O. R. S. Vol. XI, Part 1-*March 1925*—Pp. 1 to 24, *June 1925*-Pp. 25-54, *Sept.* and *Dec. 1925*—Pp. 55-92. Vol. XII Part 1—*March 1926*—Pp. 93-130, *June 1926*—Pp. 131-168, *September 1926*—Pp. 169-214 ("समासेयं जायसवाल-वन्द्योपाध्याययोः संस्करणशोधिका पादटीका"). This edition has made use of the following publications :—(*Arthaśāstra* ed. by Shama Sastry,

The object of the present paper being to attract the attention of the scholars to the Pattan Bhandar Ms. of Gogghama's commentary on the *Arthaśāstra*, I have tried in the foregoing lines to indicate the importance of this yet unexploited Ms. of a rare commentary from North India on the *Arthaśāstra*. It is hoped that interested scholars will not fail to exploit this material by persuading the authorities of the Sanghavī Pāḍā Jain Bhandar to make this Ms. accessible to them for editing purposes so that we shall have before long in print the available fragments of Commentaries of (1) Bhaṭṭasvāmin, (2) Mādhavayajvan and (3) Gogghama. In the absence of any one commentary on the entire text of the *Arthaśāstra* the value of these fragments for the exposition of this important text of antiquity must be very great. It is still possible to discover other commentaries on the Arthaśāstra, because their existence is indicated by Mādhavayajvan himself in his occasional references to earlier commentators.[1]

Mysore, 1909 (2) *Notes* on the *Adhyakṣa-Pracāra* Book II of the *Arthaśāstra*, Allahabad, 1914, (3) *Arthaśāstra* ed. by Jolly, Lahore, 1923 (Vol. I), and (4) *Arthaśāstra* ed. by Ganapati Sastri, Trivandrum, 1924.

1. Vide p. 6 of Udayavīra Śāstri's Sanskrit Introduction to the *Arthaśāstra*, Lahore, 1924–" माधवयज्वा स्वव्याख्यायां 'केचिदित्याहुः, अपरे तु इत्याहुः, केचिदेवं व्याख्याकर्त्तारस्तु इत्येवं रूपेणान्यानपि बहून् पूर्वाचार्यान् कौटलीयार्थशास्त्रव्याख्यातॄन् निर्दिशन् स्वप्राङ्निर्मितान् बहून् व्याख्याग्रन्थानयं ददर्शेति स्पष्टयत्येव"— These remarks were made in 1924 but they are borne out by the discovery of Gogghama's commentary mentioned in the Baroda Catalogue of Pattan Mss. published in 1938. It remains to be seen if Gogghama refers to any commentators on the *Arthaśāstra* by name.

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॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥

कवीन्द्रचन्द्रोदयः ॥

पुण्डरीकाक्षचण्डांशू चण्डीं चण्डीश्वरं तथा ।
वेतण्ड[1]तुण्डमानम्य निबन्धोऽयं निबध्यते ॥ १ ॥
तमस्तमःसङ्घविघातकारी समस्तविद्वत्परितापहारी ।
कवीन्द्रचन्द्रोदयनामधारी प्रबन्ध एषोऽस्तु जगत्प्रचारी ॥ २ ॥
विद्यानुकृतफणीन्द्रो विजितयतीन्द्रो मतीन्द्रो यः ।
स्ववशीकृतपृथिवीन्द्रो जयति कवीन्द्रो यतिर्जगति ॥ ३ ॥
गोदातीरनिवासी पश्चाद्येनाश्रिता काशी ।
ऋग्वेदीयाभ्यस्ता साङ्गा शाखाश्वलायनी शस्ता ॥ ४ ॥
निःस्पृहता विषयेभ्यः परनिजजनताभिमानेभ्यः ।
प्राप्ता शैशवसमये विश्वेशानुग्रहाद्धृदये ॥ ५ ॥
लघुवयसा गततमसा सत्त्वाधिक्यादभिद्रवद्रजसा ।
येन च विद्या तरसा तपसा सर्वा वशीकृतैव[2] रसा ॥ ६ ॥
बुद्ध्वा विबुधाधिकतां दत्ता यस्मै कवीन्द्रसत्पदवी ।
यवनकरग्रहणाब्धौ मग्ना येनोद्धृता पृथिवी ॥ ७ ॥
विजितमहीतलतस्मै दत्तं विद्यानिधानपदमस्मै ।
आचार्याह्वयसहितं यतिबुधवृन्दैर्महीतले महितम् ॥ ८ ॥

इति कवीन्द्रवर्णनम् ।

श्रीमत्काशिविकाशिभिः सुकविभिस्तद्वत्प्रयागासिभि-
र्नानादेशनिवासिभिश्च रचिता विद्यागणोल्लासिभिः ।
श्रीकृष्णेन सरस्वतीपदयुताऽऽचार्योपनामाश्रित-
श्रीविद्यानिधिसत्कवीन्द्रविषया पद्यावली लिख्यते ॥ ९ ॥

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१. C. वैतंड°. २. C. °कृतेव.

तत्रादौ कवीन्द्राष्टकम् ।

(१) स षडङ्गचतुर्वेदव्याख्यानकुशलो यती ।
आनन्दारण्यपारीन्द्रश्रीकवीन्द्रसरस्वती ॥ १० ॥
(२) अष्टादशपुराणज्ञो न्यायविज्ञो विवादिजित् ।
मीमांसाधर्मशास्त्राणि शास्ति नास्तिकशास्तिकृत् ॥ ११ ॥
(३) साहित्योपेतसौहित्यो योगवासिष्ठयोगवित्[1] ।
विख्यातकीर्तिः पूर्णेन्द्रब्रह्मेन्द्राद्यभिनन्दितः[2] ॥ १२ ॥
(४) चतुर्णामपि वर्णानामाश्रमाणामविश्रमम् ।
शर्मकृत्कर्मनिरतो नर्मतो धर्ममर्मवित् ॥ १३ ॥
(५) दयादानसविज्ञानशीलसन्तोषभूषितः ।
धर्मवैराग्यसौभाग्यपरानन्दातिनन्दितः ॥ १४ ॥
(६) अमुना चिन्तितविभुना करनिर्मोकात्कवीन्द्रसुप्रभुणा ।
काशीप्रयागसंस्थः सुस्थः सर्वो जनोऽकारि ॥ १५ ॥
(७) विचार्याचार्यसादृश्यं सर्वैरानन्दकानने ।
आचार्यपदवी दत्ता कवीन्द्राय महात्मने ॥ १६ ॥
(८) कवीन्द्रशर्मणा शर्म सर्वेषां जगतीजुषाम् ।
वेदितव्या महीन्द्रेण भव्यानामत्र संमतिः ॥ १७ ॥

इति कवीन्द्राष्टकम् ।

(१) अशेषवेदार्थविशेषवेदी निःशेषशेषोदितसंनिवेदी ।
सन्न्यायविन्न्यायसुधासुधीन्द्रः स्वामी कवीन्द्रः स्मृतजाह्नवीन्द्रः ॥ १८
(२) विद्वद्वृन्दविभूषणः शुचिमतिप्रोन्मूलिताघोगणः
श्रौतस्मार्तविधार्ककारितपुरः पुण्याम्बुजोद्घाटनः ।
शश्वद्दाननिदाननाशितरमावाणीरणः शोभनः
प्रीतश्रीरमणः कवीन्द्रविजयी दारिद्र्यविद्रावणः ॥ १९ ॥
(३) कालेनोन्मूलितः प्राक्कलिमलबलतः भ्रान्तिवातातिशुष्क[3]–
स्तत्तद्द्वैजिह्वजिह्वाज्वलनकवलितः सर्वतः प्राज्वलिष्यत् ।

१. A. °वाशिष्ठ°. २. C. °नन्दवित्. ३. A. B. प्रांति°.

श्रेयःशाखी कवीन्द्रप्रभुवरजलदः सद्दयाम्भोभिषेकै-
रेनं नापालयिष्यद्यदि सुमतिकलाकृप्तमूलालवालम् ॥ २० ॥

(४) दानाधानविरागयोगयजनस्वाध्यायविध्यादिभिः[1]
कुर्वन्तु प्रतपः परन्तु न जनः[2] कोऽप्यापि कोऽपीदृशः ।
यो ग्राहाधिकयावनाधिपकरग्राहाधिपन्नद्विप-
श्रीतीर्थाधिपतिप्रमुक्तिसुकृतोपेन्द्रैः कवीन्द्रैः समैः[3] ॥ २१ ॥

(५) किं नो सन्ति सहस्रशोऽपि यतयः प्रौढाभिमानान्धयः
स्वीयस्वीयसुदुर्भरोदरदरीदुःपूरणैकोद्यमाः[4] ।
किन्तु श्रीन्द्रकवीन्द्रवीन्द्रमहिमस्वामीन्द्रमानीन्द्रस-
द्दिल्लीन्द्रप्रियषोडशीमपिकलामर्हन्ति नो दाम्भिकाः ॥ २२ ॥

(६) प्रपञ्चे निर्वेदी सुकृतविनिवेदी हरिपदे
छलांहोविच्छेदी[5] निखिलखलखेदी सुखखनिः ।
चतुर्वेदी वेदी भुवनभयभेदी करलयात्
स्फुरच्चित्संभेदी[6] त्रिजगति कवीन्द्रो विजयते ॥ २३ ॥

(७) प्रकाशिकृताऽतीव काशी समस्ता
प्रयागोऽपि चाऽगोपि दिल्लीन्द्रभीतेः ।
तमोनाशिभिः काशिभिः काशिसंस्थै-
र्यशोराशिसंभासिभिः श्रीकवीन्द्रैः ॥ २४ ॥

(८) जरीहर्त्ति जाड्यं जनानामजस्रं
चरीकर्त्ति कल्याणकूटं कलाभिः ।
सरीसर्त्ति संसारसिन्धोः प्रपारं
यतीन्द्रः कवीन्द्रो वरीवर्त्ति काश्याम् ॥ २५ ॥

(९) इन्द्रानन्दसरस्वत्याद्याभासाः सन्ति कोटिशः ।
एक एव यथार्थोऽयं श्रीकवीन्द्रसरस्वती ॥ २६ ॥

(१०) यथा स सर्वोपरिदेवरुद्रो नित्यं विनिद्रो निजभक्तकृत्ये ।
कवित्वपाण्डित्यदयासमुद्रो यतिः कवीन्द्रो विचकास्ति काश्याम् ॥२७॥

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१. C. °विद्यादिभिः २. ABC. read नजनुः । Shall we explain न जनुः यस्य सः? ३. C. समं ४. C. °दुष्पूर° ५. C. खलांहो°. ६. A. °संवेदी.

अथ पत्रिकाश्लोकाः ।

स्वस्ति श्रीमद्विशिष्टश्रुतिविधिविविधाकृष्टपुष्टप्रतिष्ठा-
निष्ठाकाष्ठाकनिष्ठीकृतकृतगरिमश्रीवसिष्ठादिकेषु ।
विद्वद्गोष्ठीगरिष्ठप्रथितनृपसभप्रोद्यदुद्दण्डचण्ड-
स्वीयप्रोक्तप्रयुक्तिप्रविहितसुमहद्वादिमालाजयेषु[1] ॥ २८ ॥
तत्तत्संसारसाराखिलगुणविहगैकालयक्ष्मारुहेषु
प्रौढाभिप्रीतपृथ्वीपतिनमतिमुहुःशर्मकर्मीकृतेषु ।
प्रोद्यत्कीर्तिप्रपूर्त्या धवलितदशदिङ्मण्डलेषु प्रकाण्ड-
ब्रह्माण्डोद्भूतभूताधिकतरगरिमैकान्तकान्तायितेषु ॥ २९ ॥
म्लायद्विद्याम्बुजालीविघटनपटुसद्भास्करेषु प्रशुष्यद्-
विद्वच्छ्रोतोवहाढ्यंकरणकृतिमहावारिवाहायितेषु ।
मज्जत्तीर्थप्रतिष्ठाधरणिसमधिकोद्धारवाराहरूप—
श्रीविष्णूद्दामजिष्णूकृतनिजमनुजालङ्करिष्णूत्तमेषु ॥ ३० ॥
काशीन्द्रश्रीफणीन्द्रप्रमुखमुनिकृतातीन्द्रसद्ग्याकृतीन्द्र—
ज्ञानीन्द्रद्योमणीन्द्रद्युतिमतिजितवागीन्द्रवीन्द्रायितेषु ।
दानीन्द्रश्रीमहीन्द्रप्रतिमकविकरारण्यगरीन्द्रशालि—
स्वामीन्द्रश्रीकवीन्द्रप्रभुवरचरणाम्भोजयुग्मेषु तेषु ॥ ३१ ।
साष्टाङ्गं समहामहं सविनयं सप्रेम सोत्कण्ठितं
श्रीकृष्णप्रहितं प्रणामशतकप्रापीदकं पत्रकम् ।
विज्ञाप्यं च भवद्यशःशशिकलानन्तोदयोद्द्योतना—
दानन्दाब्धिरिहापि मे प्रतिपलं वृद्धिं विधत्तेऽतुलाम् ॥ ३२ ॥
चन्द्रं चापि चकोरका मधुलिहो मध्वालयं वा मधुं
हंसालीव सुमानमानसमथो योगीव योगीश्वरम् ।
संशुष्यद्गलतालुचातक इवाम्भोदोदयं कामदं
यौष्माकीणमनुक्षणं प्रतिदिनं भव्योदयं भावये ॥ ३३ ॥
यद्वाणीवाणवाणी परिवृढदनुजाराध्यवाणीर्विजित्य
त्यैन्मूर्ध्न्याधाय पादं जगदुपरि नरीनर्ति कास्थेतरेषु ।

१. C. °जपेषु. २. ABC. यौष्माकीन. ३. A यन्मू°.

तान् को नाम स्वयोक्त्या सुखयतु सुषमाधामकामाभिरामान्
किंत्वेतान् भक्तिरेका मृडयति तदिदं क्षम्यतां मेऽपि धाष्टर्यम् ॥ ३४॥
किमधिकमधिकज्ञेष्विज्यपूज्याधिकेषु प्रणतिनुतिविकाशिस्वीयवृत्तप्रकाशि ।
कृतजगदुपकाराः श्रीमहेशावतारा यदिह विदितचित्तारूढगूढप्रचाराः ॥३५॥
श्रीकृष्णोपाध्याय।नामेतानि पञ्चत्रिंशत्पद्यानि ॥

१. कर्णादयो वितरणप्रथिताः पृथिव्यां यद्यप्यबोभवुरनल्पगुणाभिरामाः ।
साम्यं तथापि न कवीन्द्र ययुस्तवैते यावत्स्वतुल्यसमयैरहगृहीत वित्ताः ॥ ३६॥
२. क ईदृग्दाताभूज्जगति भविता वा भवति वा
प्रयागे विप्रेभ्यो मकरमधियाते दिनमणौ ।
विरक्तेभ्यो वित्ते वितरणपटुभ्योऽप्यतितरां
भवद्भिन्नो द्युम्नं वितरति ददौ दास्यति च यः ॥ ३७ ॥
३. तत्तच्छास्त्रप्रमेयप्रकथनपटुता काव्यनिर्माणदाक्ष्यं
वक्तृत्वं तच्च वाचस्पतिवचनजयि प्रेम विद्वत्स्वपूर्णम् ।
शीलं निःसीमरूपं नयनहृतिकरं चारुसीमन्तिनीनां
तन् किं चित्रं समेतैर्यदिह गुणगणैः कोटिमेतामयासीः ॥ ३८ ॥
४. विद्यानिधानकृतमान बहुप्रदान दिल्लीश्वरादृत शमत्र भवत्कृपातः ।
भूयः सदा सदिह तद्भवदीयमीहे विश्वोपकारघटनं यदधीनमस्ति ॥३९॥
५. नाकर्णि कश्चिन्निरवर्णि नो वा कीर्तिप्रियस्त्वज्जगतीतले त्वत् ।
स्वातन्त्र्यलक्ष्मीं यतिमात्रगम्यां हित्वा परार्थं परवानभूर्यत् ॥ ४० ॥
एतानि **हेमराजमिश्राणां** पञ्च पद्यानि ॥

१. दैन्यध्वान्तमुदस्य पुष्कलकरैराशास्यमापूरयन्
प्रोल्लास्य द्विजचक्रकेलिमनिशं मैत्रीं गुरौ वर्धयन् ।
सत्पद्मोन्नतिहेतुना सरभसं भृङ्गालिमुल्लासयन्
श्रीमत्स्वामिकवीन्द्र भास्कर इव प्रोल्लासमुच्चैः कियाः ॥ ४१ ॥
२. वक्त्राम्भोजं सरस्वत्यधिवसति सदा ज्ञानतृष्णां बुधाना–
मामूलं वारयन्ती स्फुरदमृतरसस्यन्दिनी यस्य सोऽयम् ।
ब्रह्मानुध्यानकारी विगलितविषयो विश्वकल्याणकारी
भाति श्रीमान् कवीन्द्रश्चतुरुदधिलसत्कीर्तिचन्द्रो यतीन्द्रः ॥ ४२ ॥

३. दुष्टाशीविषहन्ता गन्ता गोविन्दगौरवारूढः ।
विनतानन्दविधायी मन्ये नूनं कवीन्द्रोऽसि ॥ ४३ ॥
४. लोकानां प्रतिवस्तु शारदशशिभ्रान्तिं समुल्लासयन्
श्रीगौर्योर्गुरुविभ्रमं स्मरहराकारं हरौ कल्पयन् ।
आरादात्मविदामशेषविषयब्रह्मैक्यमुद्दीपयन्
धीर श्रीलकवीन्द्र तावक यशोराशिः समुज्जृम्भते ॥ ४४ ॥

जयरामभट्टाचार्याणामेतानि चत्वारि पद्यानि ॥

१. ब्रूमः कथं तव कवीन्द्र गुणानशेषान्
शेषः सहस्ररशनोऽपि न शक्त एव ।
वक्तुं तथापि कविकौतुकमादधानां
मानोन्नतिं तव नरेन्द्रकृतां वदामः ॥ ४५ ॥

माधवभट्टानामदः पद्यम्

१. गाम्भीर्यं जलधेर्नयं भृगुसुतात्प्रज्ञां गुरोर्धीरतां
पृथ्वीतः सुरभूरुहाद्वितरणं कान्तिं तुषारद्युतेः ।
किं चान्यज्जगदीश्वरादपि दयामाकृष्य विश्रान्तये
त्वय्याधाय कवीन्द्र भारमखिलं निद्राति सुस्थो विधिः ॥ ४६ ॥
२. वैरूप्यं नरभालभस्मनयनैर्धत्ते मृडानीपति-
स्तत्पातुं गरलं कलङ्ककपटादङ्के सुधांशुः स्वयम् ।
किं च प्रस्तरतां गतो हिमगिरिर्गङ्गा च नीचाश्रिता
कैः कैः किं न कृतं कवीन्द्रसुयशश्चन्द्रे समुन्मीलति ॥ ४७ ॥

विश्वनाथपञ्चाननभट्टाचार्यपुत्ररामदेवभट्टाचार्याणां[1] पद्यद्वयमिदम् ।

१. धर्मे धर्मसुतो द्युतौ दिनमणिर्विद्यासु वागीश्वरः
कीर्तौ पूर्णसुधानिधिः सुचरिते रामः सुरूपे स्मरः ।
ऐश्वर्ये गिरिशोऽवने सुररिपुः काव्ये स्वमेव स्वयं
दाने कल्पतरुः कवीन्द्र कविभिः केनोपमेयो भवान् ॥ ४८ ॥
२. योगीन्द्राः क्षोणिपालाः कति कति न बुधाः सन्त्यभूवंश्च लोके
किन्तु श्रीमत्कवीन्द्र त्वदतिगुणमणिक्षीरसिन्धोः पृषत्कम् ।

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१. A. विश्वनाथपञ्चाननभट्टाचार्याणां पद्यद्वयम्.

नालं स्प्रष्टुं च वेणीमरणजनिशतैरप्यसंख्यप्रयासै-
स्तद्वाणी चित्तदूराऽतुलमहिमनिधे त्वत्समानस्त्वमेव ॥ ४९ ॥

३. वेदात्माङ्गतनुः सुयोगतिलका वेदान्तसत्कुण्डला
मीमांसावलयाऽऽगमैकरसना काणादहारोज्ज्वला ।
सांख्यप्रस्वननूपुरा परिणमत्साहित्यदिव्यांबरा
न्यायोद्यन्मुकुटा कवीन्द्र जयति त्वद्भारती नर्तकी ॥ ५० ॥

कूर्माचलस्थवीरेश्वरपण्डितानां पद्यत्रयमिदम्

१. स्वकुलकमलभानुर्वैरिपक्षे कृशानु-
र्विबुधकुमुदचन्द्रो लोकवन्द्यो यतीन्द्रः ।
बहुविधगुणयुक्तः शिष्टलोकानुरक्तो
हरिचरणसुभक्तः श्रीकवीन्द्रो विभाति ॥ ५१ ॥

खड्गमिश्राणामिदमेकं पद्यम् ।

१. वाङ्माधुरीरसवशीकृतमेदिनीन्द्रः
सर्वंसहासुमनसां करुणाधुनीन्द्रः ।
मच्चेतसि स्फुरति चेत्सुकृती कवीन्द्रः
किं किं न दास्यति जगद्विदितो यतीन्द्रः ॥ ५२ ॥

रघुनन्दनद्विवेदानां[1] मिदमेकं पद्यम् ।

१. ब्रह्माद्वैतविभावनाहितमना वेदान्तसांख्यादिविद्
गण्यः पुण्ययशःसुधाधवलितब्रह्माण्डभाण्डावलिः ।
सौजन्याम्बुनिधिर्महागुणनिधिः साक्षाद्विधिः सर्वतः
श्रीमत्पर्वतकन्यकाचरणयोः सोऽयं कवीन्द्रो रतः ॥ ५३ ॥

२. जाताः स्वोदरपूरका बहुविधास्ते ते प्रतिष्ठान्विता
नैतादृङ्मम कोऽपि बुद्धिविषये यादृक्कवीन्द्रः कृती ।
केनैतादृगुपार्जितं जलनिधेः पारेतटं गामुकं
स्वर्गङ्गाप्रविगाहि भोगिभवनाभूषाप्रभूतं यशः ॥ ५४ ॥

रघुनाथदीक्षितानामिदं पद्यद्वयम् ।

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१. A. °द्विवेदिनां°.

१. उमेन्द्रं रमेन्द्रं दिनेन्द्रं गणेन्द्रं
महेन्द्रं महीन्द्रं तथा न स्मरामः ।
यथा श्रीकवीन्द्रं मुनीन्द्रं गुणीन्द्रं
यतीन्द्रं मतीन्द्रं रतीन्द्रं भजामः ॥ ५५ ॥

कस्यापि

१. नरीनर्ति तर्को यदीयः सभायां
सरीसर्ति वाणी यथा सिन्धुधारा ।
चरीकर्ति पद्यं जरीहर्ति मोहं
वरीवर्ति सोऽयं मुदा श्रीकवीन्द्रः ॥ ५६ ॥

२. वेदान्ता हृदयङ्गमाः किमपरं[1] वेदाः स्वयं हस्तिता
मीमांसा वशवर्तिनी चुलुकितो न्यायाम्बुधिः श्रीमता ।
काणादं रसनाग्रवर्ति भणितिः शेषस्य कण्ठावृता
सांख्यं काव्यमनर्गलं कविपते पातञ्जलं नेत्रयोः ॥ ५७ ॥

३. करितुरगसमूहे काञ्चने रत्नराशौ
क्वचिदपि स कवीन्द्रो दीयमाने न तृष्णाम् ।
अभजदखिलतीर्थोद्धारतां संदधानो
न हि जलधरजालं वर्षतस्तोषमेति ॥ ५८ ॥

४. दिक्पालाः स्वसमीहितं हि भवतः प्रापुः कवीन्द्र प्रभो
विद्वांसोऽपि समागता बहुविधा ब्रह्माण्डभूगोलकान् ।
भूपालाः कति नागतास्तत्र गृहे किं वर्णयामो वयं
दिल्लीशो यवनाधिपो नरवरो भाग्योदयं वाञ्छति ॥ ५९ ॥

५. आस्ते मन्मतमेतदद्भुततरं वादादिभिर्वर्जितं
मोक्षे काञ्चनमेव कारणमहो नापेक्ष्यते तत्त्वधीः ।
श्रीमद्देव कवीन्द्रनामसुकवे त्वच्चारुचामीकरो-
त्सर्गैरेव जगाम मोक्षपदवीं दारिद्र्यसुर्वीतले ॥ ६० ॥

क्षमानन्द[2]वाजपेयिनामेतानि पञ्च पद्यानि ॥

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१. A. किमपरे. २. C. क्षेमा°.

१. निर्धर्मं निर्गुणं ब्रह्मेत्यूचुर्वेदान्तिनो वरम् ।
सर्वे धर्मा गुणाश्चास्मिन् श्रीकवीन्द्रे वसन्ति यत् ॥ ६१ ॥

२. नो भूम्यादिचतुष्टयं तव यशो व्यापित्वतः खादि नै
श्वेतत्वान्न गुणादि मेऽधिकमिदं द्रव्यं मतं साम्प्रतम् ।
इत्थं शोणतया कवीन्द्र भवतः प्रेयान् प्रतापोऽप्यतः
काणादोक्तिरयुक्तिरेव विबुधैर्हेया गुणग्राहिभिः ॥ ६२ ॥

भय्याभट्टानां द्वयमिदम्

१. पृथ्वीशार्ककरेण दुःसहतरेणावग्रहार्त्तं नृणां
दृष्टादृष्टफलप्रदं सुकृतिनां क्षेत्रं प्रयागादिकम् ।
सूक्त्यैवामृतधारया प्रशमयन् योऽमूमुचत्तद्व्यथां
कुर्वन् सुग्रहसत्फलं जयति तच्छ्रीमान् कवीन्द्रो बुधः ॥ ६३ ॥

२. अम्भोजं श्रीनिवासो व्यभिचरितमिदं व्याप्तिरेषा न तादृग्-
यद्दृष्टं श्रीकवीन्द्रेक्षणयुगकमलं यं यमेवावृणीते ।
सम्पत्तिस्तं तमेव श्रयति बहुगुणा तत्र सङ्केत ईदृक्
चन्द्रस्येवाब्जताया ध्रुवमिदमुदितं भावितं तत्त्वविज्ञैः ॥ ६४ ॥

३. विद्या श्रीः कीर्तितुष्टी धृतिरतिशयिता ह्रीश्च धर्मैकसीमा
श्रेयः सत्त्वप्रधानं दधति हि मतुपं यं समासाद्य चाद्य ।
तस्मिञ्श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रे गुणिगणगणनारम्भसंख्यायमाने
मिश्रश्रीकेशवस्यानतिरतिगणितासंमदव्यूहदास्तु ॥ ६५ ॥

४. स्वामिश्रीमत्कवीन्द्रे चरणसरसिजानम्रविश्वम्भरेन्द्रे
योगीन्द्रे भूमिपेन्द्रेऽर्जुन इव कपिले ज्ञानशास्त्रे द्विजेन्द्रे ।
दिङ्नागेन्द्रे मृगेन्द्रे सुनयवितरणन्यूनदेवासुरेन्द्रे
शब्दाम्भोधौ फणीन्द्रे निवसतु कमला चातके मय्यपीन्द्रे ॥ ६६ ॥

केशवमिश्राणां चत्वारि पद्यानि ॥

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१. C. धर्मगुणाः. २. BC. खादिनः. ३. BC. भैया. ४. BC. भावित-तत्त्वविज्ञैः. ५. AB. विद्याः. ६. C. मनुषं. ७. C. भूम्युपेन्द्रे.

१. द्राक्षातिरूक्षाक्षरदग्धरक्षा क्षुद्रा भव क्षौद्रगिरोस्तु मुद्राः[1]।
वचः कवीन्द्रस्य बुधैर्निपेयं सुधैवकापीयमिति[2] प्रतीमः ॥ ६७ ॥[3]

२. स्वार्थातिक्रमवर्तिनो न विविधाः केऽप्यर्थवादा यतो
नो बाध्या जनिशिष्टसद्गुणगणैरुत्पन्नाशिष्टा गुणाः।
ऊहो यत्र वसन् स्फुरत्यविरतं सार्वत्रिकोऽकृत्रिमो
मीमांसात्वमपूर्वमंचति यतेर्मूर्तिः कवीन्द्रस्य किम् ॥ ६८ ॥

मीमांसकसिद्धेश्वरभट्टानामिदं पद्यद्वयम्[4] ॥

१. कविकर्मधारयोऽयं न चित्रमिन्द्रो बृहस्पतिर्नापि।
प्राप्तसकलात्मभावब्रह्मीभूतो यतो मतो जगति ॥ ६९ ॥

चक्रपाणिपण्डितानामिदमेकं पद्यम् ॥

१. अत्यादराद्ध्ययनं द्विजानामर्थोपलब्ध्या फलवद्विधाय।
क्रतूननुष्ठापयितुं कवीन्द्रमीमांसकाद्याधिकृतिः प्रसिद्धा ॥ ७० ॥

२. पावमानं हविर्ग्राह्यं करेणेत्यवदन्मुनिः।
श्रीमुनीन्द्रकवीन्द्रेण वारितोऽपि स वारितः ॥ ७१ ॥

३. यस्य वाक्यं विधिः सर्वं[5] सर्वे मन्त्रा विधायकाः।
सर्वाभिधा प्रसिद्धार्था तं कवीन्द्रमुपास्महे ॥ ७२ ॥

गणेशभट्टधर्माधिकारिणां पद्यत्रयम् ॥

१. येषां दया ब्राह्मणभूम्नि षाष्ठद्विरुक्तिवत्स्यात्समुदायगैव।
विनिश्चितानावयवप्रधाना जयन्तु ते भुव्यनिशं कवीन्द्राः ॥ ७३ ॥

२. सदाश्रितं यूयमवेत मां द्राग्वृद्धिर्भवेन्मे नितरां कवीन्द्राः।
शब्देऽस्त्ववृद्धिः फणिनाभ्युपेतो यतः पुरस्तादपवादभावः ॥ ७४ ॥

३. ब्राह्मणे द्रुतमसोढनिषेधा नुम्यधातुपदवत्कृतकार्याः।
सस्मितास्यकमलाः प्रियवाचः सर्वदा भुवि जयन्ति कवीन्द्राः ॥७५॥

४. राज्ञः कराद् ब्रह्मकुलस्य बाधां सद्यः प्रयागादिषु ये निरास्थन्।
वृद्धेष्वणश्छादिव भिन्नयोगोऽपत्यस्य ते यान्तु जयं कवीन्द्राः ॥७६॥

सामराजपण्डितसुतनागेशपण्डितानां[6] श्लोकचतुष्टयम् ॥

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१. C. °गिरोस्तु। Read क्षुद्राभवक्षौद्रगिरोऽस्तु मुद्रा। २. Read वापी।
३. Not given in A. ४. A. पद्यं। ५. C. सर्वे. ६. C. सोमराज°.

१. श्रीकवीन्द्र महाराज द्विजराजसमृद्धये ।
करोषि यानि कर्माणि तानि ते सन्तु सिद्धये ॥ ७७ ॥

परमेश्वराचार्याणामेकः श्लोकः

१. रूपे दस्रसमः कवित्वकरणे वागीशलब्धोपमः
सत्कीर्त्या हरिणा समः प्रभुतया शक्रोपमः सम्पदा ।
यक्षाधीशसमश्च यः स करुणासिन्धुः कवीन्द्रः कृती
भूमीमण्डलमण्डनाय भवताद्दीर्घायुषा संयुतः ॥ ७८ ॥

२. सुपत्राढ्यो[1] द्विजिह्वारिर्विनतानन्दवर्धनः ।
कवीन्द्र वीन्द्रवद्भासि भगवच्चरणाश्रयः ॥ ७९ ॥

३. गलद्दानोदककरः करिणीमण्डितः सितः ।
ऐरावण इवाभासि कवीन्द्र विबुधप्रियः ॥ ८० ॥

रामकृष्णनागरस्य पद्यत्रयम् ।

१. कवीन्द्रभूषणं भूमौ कवीन्द्रेन्दुं समाश्रये ।
यस्योदयाज्जगत्सर्वं निर्मलं तीर्थमण्डलम् ॥ ८१ ॥

२. धर्मद्रुमः कलिनिदाघसमुत्थदाहैः शोशुष्यते नियतमेव समस्त एव ।
नोचेद्भवेद् भुवि कवीन्द्रसुमालिकस्य चारित्र्यवारिलहरीप्रसरावसेकः ॥८२॥

मैथिलोपाध्यायविश्वम्भरकृतमिदं श्लोकद्वयम् ॥

१. श्रूयन्ते सखि यस्य निर्मलगुणाः सौन्दर्यमार्यं महा-
गाम्भीर्यं मधुरं वचः कथय मे कोऽसौ कवीन्द्रः कृती ।
म्लेच्छाम्भोनिधिमग्नहैन्दववृषोद्धाराय नारायणः
साक्षादेव समस्तलोककृपया पूर्णोऽवतीर्णो भुवि ॥ ८३ ॥

२. मीमांसाश्रुतिमौलिसांख्यरचनाकाणादपातञ्जल-
न्यायव्याकरणस्मृतिप्रवचनप्रत्यक्षवाचस्पतिः ।
सर्वस्वेन परोपकारकरणप्रौढव्रते दीक्षितः
सोऽयं सर्वकलाकलापकुशलो जीयात्कवीन्द्रः कृती ॥ ८४ ॥

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१. C. °त्राद्यो.

३. प्रालेयाचलमेव वा स्वपितरं पाथोनिधिं वा पतिं
भीता किं कुरुतां भगीरथसुता काशीं विहाय व्रजेत् ।
विश्वेशोऽपि महाश्मशाननिलयः किं वा विधत्तामसौ
त्वं धन्योऽसि कवीन्द्र यावनकरग्रस्ताविमौ मोचितौ ॥ ८५ ॥

जगदीशजानीकस्य श्लोकत्रयम् ॥

१. स्वर्गे कल्पमहीरुहो विजयते पातालमूले बलि–
र्मन्ये कोऽपि न विद्यते मतिमतां त्राता च दाता जनः ।
इत्यालोच्य विरिञ्चिना सुमतिना दातावदाताशयो
यत्नादेष विनिर्मितो नरपतिः श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रो यतिः ॥ ८६ ॥

२. का त्वं प्रेयसि ? दुग्धनीरधितनूजाताग्रजाता, कुतः ?
क्षोणीतः, कथमप्रसन्नवदनं ? स्थानं न मे कारणम् ।
दैन्यं क्वापि न विद्यते, कथमहो ? दानेन तन्नाशितं,
केन ? श्रीमतिमत्कवीन्द्रयतिना, तद्वैरिगेहं व्रज ॥ ८७ ॥

श्रीरामेश्वरपञ्चाननभट्टाचार्याणां श्लोकद्वयम् ॥

१. प्रामाण्यं परतः स्वतोऽपि भवतो विज्ञायते सन्मते
भूमीचन्द्र कवीन्द्र सुस्थिरतया वर्णाः स्थिरं स्थापिताः ।
सर्वज्ञैकसदीश्वरोऽपि न परं ब्रूते भवानीश्वरं
तन्नैयायिकनायकस्य भवतो मीमांसकत्वं कुतः ॥ ८८ ॥

२. प्रामाण्यं वचनेषु ते यतिपते जातिः परैवोन्नता
शक्तौ साधकमानमद्भुतमभूदेकोपमानं तव ।
जातौ सन्ति गुणा गुणेषु भवतो जातो विशेषोदय-
स्तद्भूमीन्द्र कवीन्द्र चित्रमभवद्वैशेषिकत्वं तव ॥ ८९ ॥

जयकृष्णोपाध्यायानां श्लोकद्वयम् ॥

१. यत्पाण्डित्यपराभवादिव दिवं यातो गिरामीश्वरो
भूमीतो भुजगाधिपः किमपरं पाताललीनोऽभवत् ।
यत्पादाम्बुजरेणवोऽपि सुषमां कुर्वन्ति भूमीभुजां[1]
सोऽयं लोचनगोचरो यतिवरो जातः कवीन्द्रोऽधुना ॥ ९० ॥

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१. C. °रुहां.

२. सौन्दर्येण विनिर्जितो रतिपतिर्दानेन कर्णो नृपः
पाण्डित्येन दिवौकसां गुरुरहो धर्मेण धर्मात्मजः।
इत्थं स्वामिकवीन्द्रभव्य भवता केनैव खर्वीकृताः
किं वा जेतुमतः परं विजयते यत्नस्तु सर्वाधिकः॥ ९१॥

गौरीपतिमिश्राणां पद्यद्वयम्॥

१. कवीन्द्र पृथ्वीन्द्रकरग्रहात्त्वया विमोचिता भाष्यसुभाषितादिभिः।
श्रीकाशिका साधुपदप्रकाशिका शब्दापशब्दोत्तमबोधकारिका॥९२॥

नीलकण्ठाचार्याणामेकं पद्यम्॥

१. तत्कृतं यन्न केनापि तद्दत्तं यन्न केनचित्।
तत्साधितमसाध्यं यत्कवीन्द्रयतिना भुवि॥ ९३॥

दामोदरभट्टकालोपनामकानाम्॥

१. तेजोनिधिस्त्वमसि किं च गुरुर्धरायां
सौम्यः कविः शुचिकलानिधिरप्यसि त्वम्।
एकोऽप्यनेकविधतां कथमागतोऽसि
श्रीमत्कवीन्द्र परमाद्भुतमेतदस्ति॥ ९४॥

२. गायति गोपीनाथं ध्यायति बुद्ध्यैव धूर्जटिं धीरः।
हरिहरभक्तिजितेन्द्रो[1] जयति कवीन्द्रः कृती[2] काश्याम्॥ ९५॥

३. बलिरथ च दधीचिः कर्ण आसीच्च पूर्वं
तदुपम उपकर्ता सांप्रतं कोऽपि नास्ति।
इति मनसि विभाव्योत्पन्नविश्वानुकम्पः
कलियुग इह धाता श्रीकवीन्द्रं ससर्ज॥ ९६॥

४. नो देवेषु न वासुरेषु च न वा यक्षेषु रक्षःस्वहो
नो वा योगिषु नापि सिद्धमुनिषु श्रुत्यागमज्ञेषु वा।
नो वा राजसु पण्डितेषु च न वा संन्यासिषु प्रक्रिया
या केनापि नवाऽनवा न रचिता सा श्रीकवीन्द्रैः कृता॥ ९७॥

अग्निहोत्रिधर्मेश्वरस्य पद्यचतुष्टयम्॥

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१. B. °भक्त°. २. A. यतिः.

१. विद्वद्वृन्दकरीन्द्रगण्डदलने[1] पारीन्द्रवारीन्द्र[2] भोः
श्रीयोगीन्द्र कवीन्द्रचन्द्र विदुषां त्वन्नामपुण्यावलीम् ।
श्रुत्वा सर्तुमपीहते चलहृदाऽघौघेन यानोन्मुखं
वैमुख्यं द्रुतमातनोति नितरां दारिद्र्यदावानलः ॥ ९८ ॥
२. पाण्डित्यं जगतीतले तनुभृतां तावद्धि संवर्धतां
यावद्विश्वविवस्वतोऽधिकरुचिर्जागर्ति योगीश्वरः ।
दारिद्र्यं सदनेऽवसीदतु भृशं तावन्नृणां नित्यशो
यावन्नैव कवीन्द्रसुन्दरदृशो रीतिः समुज्जृम्भते ॥ ९९ ॥

मैथिलदामोदरोपाध्यायानाम् ॥

१. वैयाकरणकुम्भीन्द्रकुम्भनिर्भेदभीषणः ।
कवीन्द्रकेसरी भाति काश्यामानन्दकानने ॥ १०० ॥

चक्रपाणिपण्डितानाम्[3] ॥

१. अर्थं चाभीष्टहेतुं प्रकलयसि पुनर्मानियोगं[4] फलेच्छौ
नापि त्वं स्तुत्यपेक्षः सकलगुणनिधे प्रस्फुरद्रूपभावः ।
सर्वैः कामैः प्रपन्नः प्रकटयसि नृणां कृत्यसाध्यं पुमर्थं
वैधं रूपं तवेत्थं प्रजयति परमं चित्रकृच्छ्रीकवीन्द्र ॥ १०१ ॥

विश्वनाथज्योतिर्विदामिदमेककम् ॥

१. विधाय वेषवैषम्यं निमज्जन्ती कराम्बुधौ ।
क्षोणीव विष्णुना वेणी कवीन्द्रेण समुद्धृता ॥ १०२ ॥

व्रजभूषणकवेः ॥

१. चक्रेण मोचयांचक्रे नक्राच्छक्रानुजो गजम् ।
प्रयागेभं करग्राहात् करग्राहात्कवीन्द्रवित् ॥ १०३ ॥

श्रीस्वामिनामेव[5] ॥

१. अवद्यजम्बालगवेषणाय कृतोद्यमानां खलसैरिभाणाम् ।
कवीन्द्रवाङ्निर्जरनिर्झरिण्यां संजायते व्यर्थमनोरथत्वम् ॥१०४॥

कृष्णचन्द्रभट्टानाम् ॥

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१. B.C °कवीन्द्र° । २. A. °वार्दीन्द्र. ३. BC. कस्यचिदिदमेकम् ।
४. C. नियोगे । ५. Read °मेकम् ?

१. गुणा द्रव्याण्याश्रयन्ते गौतमोक्तागमे ध्रुवम् ।
कवीन्द्र महदाश्चर्यं गुणास्तव तदाश्रयाः ॥ १०५ ॥
२. कवयः शतशः सन्ति कवीन्द्र त्वत्समा न ते ।
कलयन्ति किमुद्योतान् खद्योतास्तरणेस्तुलाम् ॥ १०६ ॥

कस्यचिदिदं द्वयम् ॥

१. यशः[२]पूरकर्पूरसम्पूरिताशो गुणागारसंसारसारैकसारः ॥
अलङ्कृत्य लोकं समुद्धृत्यशोकं पुनानो धुरीणश्चिरं स्यात्कवीन्द्रः ॥१०७॥
२. शेषाशेषस्य काकोलाद्भ्रमन्ती भारती शनैः ।
श्रीकवीन्द्रमुखं प्राप्ता सुखं वर्षति माधुरीः ॥ १०८ ॥

कस्यचिदिदं द्वयम् ॥

१. उमेन्द्रं च केचिद्रमेन्द्रं च केचिद्दिनेन्द्रं च केचिद्गणेन्द्रं नमन्ति ।
तदिन्द्रान्तमेतत्परित्यज्य सर्वं वयं त्वां यतीन्द्रं कवीन्द्रं नमामः ॥१०९॥

बालकृष्णत्रिपाठिनः ॥

१. स्वस्ति श्रीमदमन्दसुन्दरगिरिप्रावाग्रनृत्यद्यशः-
श्रेणीनिर्जितनिर्जरालयसरित्सौभाग्यसम्पत्तिषु ।
धीमद्ब्रह्मविचारचित्रितमनःसञ्जातबोधोदय-
प्रत्यक्षीकृतदिव्यवस्तुषु नतिः श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रेषु नः ॥ ११० ॥
२. श्रीकृष्णं व्रजसुन्दरीव विवशा सीतेव रामं पतिं
संसारार्तिहरं भवानिव परं ब्रह्म प्रमोदालयम् ।
सुच्छायां सरसीमिवार्ककिरणक्लिष्टस्तृषार्त्तः करी
नित्यं द्रष्टुमहं समुद्यतमनाः श्रीमत्कवीन्द्राभिधम् ॥ १११ ॥

अनिरुद्धमिश्राणां पद्यद्वयम् ॥

१. निखिलभुवनधाम प्रीणितश्रीसुदाम
प्रतिकलितसुदाम स्वर्पतिस्तव्यनाम ।

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१. Emendation. Mss. read °वद्योता । २. This verse wanting in A.

अवतु यतिकवीन्द्रं व्याप्तदिक्कीर्तिचन्द्रं
व्रजभुविकृतधाम व्यक्तमव्यक्तधाम ॥ ११२ ॥

बालकृष्णज्योतिर्विदाम् ॥

१. यत्पार्श्वे[1] श्रुतिशास्त्रनिश्चयरता गेहे स्थिताः पालका
द्वारे या करिणी विनोदकरिणी गङ्गातरङ्गाकुला ।
अन्ये भैरवदण्डपाणिसदृशाः काश्यां समन्तात् स्थिता-
स्तस्य श्रीविलसत्कवीन्द्रनृपतेः संदर्शनं दुर्लभम् ॥ ११३ ॥

२. करस्य मोचनं यस्माद् वीतरागो विवासनः ।
द्रवति द्रविणं नित्यं कवीन्द्रस्तेन कथ्यते ॥ ११४ ॥

३. दिल्लीश्वराय निगमागमशास्त्रबुद्ध्या
सम्बोधयन् प्रतिदिनं त्रिजगत्कवीन्द्रः ।
श्रीतीर्थराजकरमोचनलब्धकीर्ति-
र्विद्यानिधानमहिमा न हि मानगम्यः ॥ ११५ ॥

४. यः[2] साक्षाद्व्रजराजलब्धमहिमा प्राप्तः प्रतिष्ठां पुन-
र्देवत्वं निजशारदातनुलसल्लेभे कवीन्द्रः प्रभुः ।
श्रीविश्वेश्वरकाशिकासुरनदीतीरे सुवर्णं ददौ
श्रीमत्साहिजहांदिलीपकृपया विद्यानिधानाभिधः ॥ ११६ ॥

५. पुरी मस्तके भारती कण्ठदेशे मुखे शारदा चास्य केशा वनानि ।
भुजौ पर्वतौ सागरो नाभिनालं मनस्त्वाश्रमाः पादतीर्थं पिबन्ति ॥ ११७ ॥

६. कामाक्षाप्रथमप्रयाणसमये विद्यानिधानप्रभो-
रिन्द्रत्वं तव मस्तके कृतवती श्री[3]साहिजाहामुखात् ।
सा सद्यो भवतां प्रयच्छतु मुदा साम्राज्यलक्ष्मीं सदा
श्रीमत्सर्वमनोरथाः फलभृतस्ते सन्तु पूर्णाशिषः ॥ ११८ ॥

पूर्णानन्दब्रह्मचारिणां षट्[4] पद्यानि ॥

१. कवीन्द्रस्वामिनां नाम विख्यातं भुवनत्रये ।
नात्र चित्रमिरंभ्यां(?) च सिद्धं तत्पदवाचकम् ॥ ११९ ॥

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१. This verse wanting in A. २. This verse wanting in A.
३. Shall we read श्रीः? ४. A. चत्वारि.

कर्तुरसम्बन्धात् अकर्तुश्च[1] सम्बन्धात्। शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिवेदनाप्रबन्धे खल्वन्यः सङ्घात उत्पद्यतेऽन्यो निरुध्यते। उत्पादनिरोधसन्ततिभूतः प्रबन्धो नान्यत्वं बाधते देहादिसङ्घातस्यान्यत्वाधिष्ठानत्वात्। अन्यत्वाधिष्ठानो ह्यसौ प्रख्यायत इति। एवं सति यो देहादिसङ्घातः प्राणिभूतो हिंसां करोति नासौ हिंसाफलेन सम्बध्यते। यश्च सम्बध्यते न तेन हिंसा कृता। तदेवं सत्त्वभेदे कृतहानमकृताभ्यागमः प्रसज्यते। सति च सत्त्वोत्पादे सत्त्वनिरोधे चाकर्मनिमित्तः सत्त्वसर्गः प्राप्नोति। तत्र मुक्त्यर्थो ब्रह्मचर्यवासो न स्यात्। तद्यदि देहादिसङ्घातमात्रं सत्त्वं स्यात् शरीरदाहे पातकं न भवेत्। अनिष्टं चैतत्। तस्माद्देहादिसङ्घातव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा नित्य इति ॥ ४ ॥

"तदभावः सात्मकप्रदाहेऽपि तन्नित्यत्वात्" ॥ ५ ॥

"यस्यापि नित्येनात्मना सात्मकं शरीरं दह्यते तस्यापि शरीरदाहे पातकं न भवेद्दग्धुः। कस्मात्? नित्यत्वादात्मनः। न जातु कश्चिन्नित्यं हिंसितुमर्हति। अथ हिंस्यते? नित्यत्वमस्य न भवति। सेयमेकस्मिन्पक्षे हिंसा निष्फलाऽन्यस्मिंस्त्वनुपपन्नेति" ॥ ५ ॥

न[2] कार्याश्रयकर्तृवधात्[3] ॥ ६ ॥

इत्थमेव सूत्रार्थं इत्यग्रिमेण सूत्रकलापेन स्पष्टम्। अत एव—(१) यदि शरीरमेवात्माऽभविष्यत् तदा शरीरस्य–मृतकशरीरस्य–दाहे पातकं स्यात्, न च तदस्ति। अथवा (२) शरीरे दग्धे तदनन्तरमाश्रयाभावात् पुण्यपापाद्यभाव एव स्यात्, तथा च न पुनर्जन्मेति—यदर्थद्वयमस्य सूत्रद्वयस्योद्भावितं तस्य नास्त्यवकाशः।

१ अकर्तुरिति। शास्त्रचोदितं फलमनुष्ठातरीत्युत्सर्गः। यत्र पुनः शास्त्रमन्यस्य फलमाह—यथा श्राद्धे वैश्वानरीयेष्ट्यादौ—तत्र भवतु पुत्रकृतस्य श्राद्धस्य पितृगामि फलं पितृकृताया वा जातेष्टेः पुत्रगामि फलमिति भावः।

२ सूत्रमिदं द्विधा व्याख्यातम्भाष्यकारेण। 'कार्याश्रयस्य' शरीरस्य यानि 'कर्तृणि' इन्द्रियाणि तेषां वधादिति। अथवा 'कार्याश्रयो' देहेन्द्रियबुद्धिसङ्घातः, स एव कर्ता–तस्य वधादिति। द्वितीयमेतत् व्याख्यानं स्वीकृतं वृत्तिकृता।

• ३ वधादित्यस्य स्थाने बाधादिति पठन्ति न्यायसूत्रविवरणकाराः। तदर्थश्च—न शरीरदाहेऽदृष्टनाशः। 'कार्यम्' अदृष्टम्, तस्य 'आश्रयस्य' कर्तुः आत्मनः 'बाधात्' नाशाभावात्।

न ब्रूमो नित्यस्य सत्त्वस्य वधो हिंसा, अपि त्वनुच्छित्तिधर्मकस्य सत्त्वस्य कार्याश्रयस्य शरीरस्य स्वविषयोपलब्धेश्च कर्त्तॄणामिन्द्रियाणामुपघातः पीडा, वैकल्य[1]लक्षणः प्रबन्धोच्छेदो वा प्रमापणलक्षणो वा वधो हिंसेति। कार्यं तु सुखदुःखसंवेदनम्। तस्यायतनमधिष्ठानमाश्रयः शरीरम्। कार्याश्रयस्य शरीरस्य स्वविषयोपलब्धेश्च कर्त्तॄणामिन्द्रियाणां वधो हिंसा, न नित्यस्यात्मनः। तत्र यदुक्तं-"तदभावः सात्मकप्रदाहेऽपि तन्नित्यत्वात्" इत्येतदयुक्तम्। यस्य सत्त्वोच्छेदो हिंसा तस्य कृतहानमकृताभ्यागमश्चेति दोषः।

एतावच्चैतत् स्यात्-सत्त्वोच्छेदो वा हिंसा। अनुच्छित्तिधर्मकस्य सत्त्वस्य कार्याश्रयकर्तृवधो वा। न कल्पान्तरमस्ति। सत्त्वोच्छेदश्च प्रतिषिद्धः। तत्र किमन्यत्? शेषं यथाभूतमिति।

अथ[2]वा कार्याश्रयकर्तृवधादिति। कार्याश्रयो देहेन्द्रियबुद्धिसङ्घातः, नित्यस्यात्मनः, तत्र सुखदुःखप्रतिसंवेदनं, तस्याधिष्ठानमाश्रयः, तदायतनं तद्भवति, न ततोऽन्यदिति स एव कर्ता। तन्निमित्ता हि सुखदुःखसंवेदनस्य निर्वृत्तिः, न तमन्तरेणेति। तस्य वध उपघातः पीडा, प्रमापणं वा हिंसा, न नित्यत्वेनात्मोच्छेदः। तत्र यदुक्तं-"तदभावः सात्मकप्रदाहेऽपि तन्नित्यत्वात्" एतन्नेति ॥ ६ ॥

(३) चक्षुरद्वैतनिराकरणप्रकरणम् (प्रासङ्गिकम्[3])

इतश्च देहादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा—

अन्यदपि व्याख्यानमुल्लिख्य निराकुर्वन्ति विवरणकाराः। तद्यथा—न सात्मकशरीरदाहे पापानुत्पादः। 'कार्यम्' शरीरम् 'तदाश्रयस्य' तत्सम्बन्धस्य 'कर्तुः' आत्मनः 'बाधात्' नाशादिति।

१ वैकल्यलक्षण इति। यथा शरीरमुपघ्नन् हिनस्ति एवं चक्षुराद्युत्पाटयन्नपि हिनस्त्येवेति भावः।

२ अथवेति। प्रकारान्तरेण सूत्रं व्याचष्ट।

३ प्रासङ्गिकस्यैतस्य चक्षुरद्वैतनिराकरणपरस्य प्रकरणस्य विषये व्याख्यातृषु महान् मतभेदो दृश्यते। वस्तुतः सप्तविंशतितमसूत्रपर्यन्तमात्मनः स्वतन्त्रस्थितिनिरूपणपरमेकमेव प्रकरणं वर्तते। तत्साधनप्रकारभेदेन तु व्याख्यातारः प्रकरणभेदमत्र कुर्वन्ति। न्यायसूचीनिबन्धे तात्पर्ये च वाचस्पतिमिश्राः सप्तमसूत्रमारभ्य चतुर्दशसूत्रपर्यन्तमेकम्प्रकरणमभिप्रेत्य तदर्थम्-चक्षुरिन्द्रियस्य द्वित्वे आत्मनश्चैकत्वे सिद्धे नात्मेन्द्रिययोरभेदः सम्भवतीति-वर्णयन्ति।

सव्यदृष्टस्येतरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्[1] ॥ ७ ॥

पूर्वापरयोर्विज्ञानयोरेकविषये प्रतिसन्धिज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्—'तमेवैतर्हि पश्यामि यमज्ञासिषं स एवायमर्थ'। इति। सव्येन चक्षुषा दृष्टस्येतरेणापि चक्षुषा प्रत्यभिज्ञानाद्—'यमद्राक्षं तमेवैतर्हि पश्यामीति'। इन्द्रियचैतन्ये तु नान्यदृष्टमन्यः प्रत्यभिजानातीति प्रत्यभिज्ञानुपपत्तिः। अस्ति त्विदं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं, तस्मादिन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तश्चेतनः ॥ ७ ॥

"नैकस्मिन्नासास्थिव्यवहिते[2] द्वित्वाभिमानात्" ॥ ८ ॥

एतत्तु वार्तिककारस्य नाभिप्रेतम्। तैरुक्तम्—एके इदं प्रकरणमात्मन इन्द्रियव्यतिरेकज्ञापनार्थं वर्णयन्ति। तन्न पूर्वप्रकरणेनैव तत्सिद्धेः—इति।

भाष्यकारादपि वार्तिककारस्यात्र स्फुटो मतभेदः। भाष्यमते चक्षुरिन्द्रिये द्वित्वम्—वार्तिकमते चक्षुरेकत्वमेव—सिद्धान्तः। चक्षुर्द्वित्वसिद्धान्तपरिग्रहेण हि ताभ्याम्भिन्नस्यैकस्यात्मनः साधनं सुकरम्भवतीति भाष्यकारस्य हृदयम्।

भाष्यमतेनैवं सूत्रार्थविभागः। सप्तमसूत्रे सिद्धान्तोपक्रमः—वामेन चक्षुषा दृष्टस्य दक्षिणेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानादुभयाधिष्ठातैक आत्मा सिद्ध्यतीति। अष्टमसूत्रे तदाक्षेपः—उभयोरपि गोलकयोश्चक्षुरिन्द्रियस्यैकत्वे तन्मूलकमेव प्रत्यभिज्ञानमिति। नवमसूत्रे तत्परिहारः—गोलकद्वयस्थितस्येन्द्रियस्यैकत्वं न सम्भवतीति। दशमसूत्रे चक्षुरेकत्ववादिकृतमुत्तरम्—एकस्य गोलकस्य नाशे चक्षुरिन्द्रियस्यैकमवयवमेव नश्यतीति। तत्परिहार एकादशसूत्रे—चक्षुर्द्वित्वसिद्धान्तप्रतिषेधो न युक्त इति।

एवं च चक्षुर्द्वित्वमानिनो भाष्यकारस्य मतेन सप्तमसूत्रे सिद्धान्तेनैवोपक्रमः। वार्तिकमते त्वस्मिन् सूत्रे सव्यदृष्टस्येतरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानमात्मभेदसाधनायोपन्यस्तं सूत्रकारेण निराकरणार्थमेव। तन्निराकरणाङ्गत्वेनैवाष्टमसूत्रे चक्षुरद्वैतसिद्धान्तोपन्यासः। नवमसूत्रे तत्राक्षेपः, दशमसूत्रे केषांचिन्मतेन तदाक्षेपपरिहारः, एकादशसूत्रे च तत्परिहारस्य नवमसूत्रकृतस्याक्षेपस्य च खण्डनम्।

द्वादशसूत्रमारभ्य षोडशसूत्रपर्यन्तं तु न कोऽपि भेदः। उभयोरपि मतयोस्तेषामात्मसाधनपरत्वाभ्युपगमात्।

१ प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्—आत्मैक इति शेषः। चक्षुषोरभेदसिद्धिरिति तु न्यायसूत्रविवरणकाराः। तत्तु न सम्यक्। अकस्माच्चक्षुषोरद्वैतस्योपन्यासेन सूत्रकारस्यासम्बद्धप्रलापितैव स्यात्। आत्मभेदसाधनोपन्यासाङ्गतया चक्षुर्द्वैतोपन्यास एव प्राकरणिकत्वं स्यात्तदुपन्यासस्य।

२ उक्तं हेतुं चक्षुरैक्येनाक्षिपति-नैकस्मिन्निति।

" एकमिदं चक्षुर्मध्ये नासास्थिव्यवहितं, तस्यान्तौ गृह्यमाणौ द्वित्वाभिमानं प्रयोजयतो मध्यव्यवहितस्य दीर्घस्येव[1] " ॥ ८ ॥

एकविनाशे द्वितीयाविनाशान्नैकत्वम् ॥ ९ ॥

एकस्मिन्नुपहते चोद्धृते वा चक्षुषि द्वितीयमवतिष्ठते चक्षुर्विषयग्रहण[2]लिङ्गम् । तस्मादेकस्य व्यवधानानुपपत्तिः ॥ ९ ॥

" अवयवनाशे[3]ऽप्यवयव्युपलब्धेरहेतुः " ॥ १० ॥

" एकविनाशे द्वितीयाविनाशादित्यहेतुः । कस्मात्? वृक्षस्य हि कासुचिच्छाखासु छिन्नासूपलभ्यत एव वृक्षः " ॥ १० ॥

दृष्टान्तविरोधादप्रतिषेधः[4] ॥ ११ ॥

न कारणद्रव्यस्य विभागे कार्यद्रव्यमवतिष्ठते नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । बहुष्ववयविषु यस्य कारणानि विभक्तानि तस्य विनाशः । येषां कारणान्यविभक्तानि तानि अवतिष्ठन्ते ।

अथ वा दृश्यमानार्थविरोधो दृष्टान्तविरोधः । मृतस्य हि शिरःकपाले द्वाववटौ नासास्थिव्यवहितौ चक्षुषः स्थाने भेदेन गृह्येते । न चैतदेकस्मिन्नासास्थिव्यवहिते सम्भवति ।

अथ वा एकविनाशस्याऽनियमाद् द्वाविमावर्थौ, तौ च पृथगावरणोपघातौ अनुमीयेते विभिन्नाविति ।

अवपीडनाच्चैकस्य[5] चक्षुषो रश्मिविषयसन्निकर्षस्य भेदाद् दृश्यभेद इव गृह्यते, तच्चैकत्वे विरुद्ध्यते । अवपीडननिवृत्तौ चाभिन्नप्रतिसन्धानमिति । तस्मादेकस्य व्यवधानानुपपत्तिः ॥ ११ ॥

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१ दीर्घस्येति—वंशादेरिति शेषः ।

२ विषयेति । विषयग्रहणं लिङ्गं (सूचकं) यस्य तत् । विषयग्रहणे लिङ्गमिति मुद्रितवार्तिकपुस्तकधृतपाठः । तदर्थस्तु द्वितीयमेव चक्षुः विषयग्रहणे लिङ्गम् (करणं) भवतीति ।

३ चक्षुर्द्वैतं दूषयति–अवयवनाश इति सूत्रम् ।

४ सिद्धान्तिसूत्रम्–दृष्टान्तेति ।

५ अवपीडनादिति । द्वाभ्यां नेत्राभ्यामवलोकितं वस्त्वेकमेव प्रतिभाति । किन्तु यदैकं नेत्रमङ्गुल्याऽवपीडितं तदा तदेव द्वे इव प्रतिभाति । भाष्यचन्द्रोक्तस्य नयननिमीलनस्य चर्चाऽत्र सर्वथा वृथैव ।

अनुमीयते[1] चायं देहादिसङ्घातव्यतिरिक्तश्चेतन इति—

इन्द्रियान्तरविकारात् ॥ १२ ॥

कस्यचिदम्लफलस्य गृहीततद्रससाहचर्ये रूपे गन्धे वा केनचिदिन्द्रियेण गृह्यमाणे रसनस्येन्द्रियान्तरस्य विकारो रसानुस्मृतौ रसगर्धिप्रवर्त्तितो दन्तोदकसंप्लवभूतो गृह्यते। तस्येन्द्रियचैतन्येऽनुपपत्तिः, नान्यदृष्टमन्यः स्मरति[2]॥ १२॥

"न[3] स्मृतेः स्मर्त्तव्यविषयत्वात्" ॥ १३ ॥

"स्मृतिर्नाम धर्मो निमित्तादुत्पद्यते, तस्याः स्मर्तव्यो विषयः, तत्कृत इन्द्रियान्तरविकारो नात्मकृत इति" ॥ १३ ॥

तदा[4]त्मगुणत्वसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ १४ ॥

तस्या आत्मगुणत्वे सति सद्भावादप्रतिषेध आत्मनः। यदि स्मृतिरात्मगुणः? एवं सति स्मृतिरुपपद्यते, नान्यदृष्टमन्यः स्मरतीति। इन्द्रियचैतन्ये तु

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१ प्रतिसन्धानहेतुना (चक्षुर्द्वैतसाधनद्वारेण) आत्मनि प्रत्ययं प्रमाणयित्वाऽनुमानमिदानीम्प्रमाणयति–अनुमीयते चायमिति। विप्रतिपन्नं हि प्रति प्रतिसन्धानमुक्तम्। परमार्थतस्त्वनुभवानुसारमार्गोऽयमिति मन्तव्यम्।

२ स्मरतीति। रूपं गन्धञ्चानुभवति–अथ तत्सहचरितं रसं अनुस्मरति–स्मृत्वा चेच्छति–इच्छातो रसनेन्द्रियविकारो दन्तोदकसम्प्लवलक्षणः प्रवर्तते। तद्दर्शनाच्चास्येच्छाऽनुमीयते–इच्छया च स्मृतिरनुमीयते। सेयं स्मृतिरसति सर्वेन्द्रियविषयवेदिन्यात्मनि न भवितुमर्हति।

न्यायसूत्रविवरणकारा अन्यथा व्याचक्षते सूत्रमेतत्। तन्मतेनैतदपि चक्षुरद्वैतसाधनमेव। तदर्थस्तु–घर्षणादिना पूर्वचक्षुर्नाशे चक्षुरन्तरोत्पादादिति। नैतद्व्याख्यानं सम्यक् प्रतिभाति।

३ न स्मृतेरित्याक्षेपसूत्रम्। स्मृतिरात्मानं कारणत्वेनावगमयेत् विषयत्वेन वा। न तावत्कारणत्वेन, स्मृतेः संस्कारकारणत्वात्। नापि विषयत्वेन स्मृतेः स्मर्तव्यविषयत्वात्। स्मृताच्च तस्माद्विषयादिन्द्रियान्तरविकारोत्पत्तिरिति शङ्कस्य हृदयम्।

एतदपि सूत्रं चक्षुरद्वैतपरकत्वेनान्यथा व्याचष्टे विवरणकारः—स्मृतेः स्मर्तव्यविषयत्वात्—पूर्वानुभूतविषयत्वमात्रनियमात् –न तु तदिन्द्रियजन्यत्वनियमोऽपीति भाव इति।

४ तदात्मेति सूत्रम्। तद्व्याख्यानं विवरणमतेन यथा–ननु स्मृतिसमवायित्वं तत्तदिन्द्रिये स्वीकार्यम् तदन्यस्यानुपस्थितेः—इति कथं पूर्वचक्षुर्नाशे स्मृत्युपपत्तिरियत आह–तदात्मेति। तस्याः स्मृतेः आत्मगुणत्वसद्भावात्–आत्मसमवायितयाऽनुभवात्–न यथोक्तप्रतिषेधः। अनुभवाकारश्च स्मरामीत्यादिरूपः–इति।

नानाकर्तृकाणां विषयग्रहणानामप्रतिसन्धानम्, प्रतिसन्धाने वा विषयव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः। एकस्तु चेतनोऽनेकार्थदर्शी भिन्ननिमित्तः पूर्वदृष्टमर्थं स्मरतीति एकस्यानेकार्थदर्शिनो दर्शनप्रतिसन्धानात्। स्मृतेरात्मगुणत्वे सति सद्भावः, विपर्यये चानुपपत्तिः। स्मृत्याश्रयाः प्राणभृतां सर्वे व्यवहाराः। आत्मलिङ्गमुदाहरणमात्रमिन्द्रियान्तरविकार इति।

अपरिसङ्ख्यानाच्च स्मृतिविषयस्य[1]। अपरिसङ्ख्याय[2] च स्मृतिविषयमिदमुच्यते—'न स्मृतेः स्मर्तव्यविषयत्वादिति'। येयं स्मृतिरगृह्यमाणेऽर्थेऽज्ञासिषमहममुमर्थमिति, एतस्या ज्ञातृज्ञानविशिष्टः पूर्वज्ञातोऽर्थो विषयो नार्थमात्रं, ज्ञातवानहममुमर्थम्, असावर्थो मया ज्ञातः, अस्मिन्नर्थे मम ज्ञानमभूदिति। चतुर्विधमेतद्वाक्यं[3] स्मृतिविषयज्ञापकं समानार्थम्[4]। सर्वत्र खलु ज्ञाता ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं च गृह्यते।

अथ प्रत्यक्षेऽर्थे या स्मृतिस्तया[5] त्रीणि ज्ञानानि एकस्मिन्नर्थे प्रतिसन्धीयन्ते समानकर्तृकाणि, न नानाकर्तृकाणि, नाकर्तृकाणि। किं तर्हि? एककर्तृकाणि—अद्राक्षममुमर्थं यमेवैतर्हि पश्यामि। अद्राक्षमिति दर्शनं दर्शनसंविच्च। न खल्वसंविदिते स्वे दर्शने स्यादेतत्—'अद्राक्षमिति'। ते खल्वेते द्वे ज्ञाने। 'यमेवैतर्हि पश्यामीति' तृतीयं ज्ञानम्। एवमेकोऽर्थस्त्रिभिर्ज्ञानैर्युज्यमानो नाकर्तृको न नानाकर्तृकः। किं तर्हि? एककर्तृक इति।

सोऽयं स्मृतिविषयोऽपरिसङ्ख्यायमानो विद्यमानः प्रज्ञातोऽर्थः प्रतिषिध्यते—'नास्त्यात्मा स्मृतेः स्मर्तव्यविषयत्वादिति'। न चेदं स्मृतिमात्रं स्मर्तव्यमात्रविषयं वा। इदं खलु ज्ञानप्रतिसन्धानवत् स्मृतिप्रतिसन्धानमेकस्य सर्वविषयत्वात्। एकोऽयं ज्ञाता सर्वविषयः स्वानि ज्ञानानि प्रतिसन्धत्ते—

१ अपरिसङ्ख्यानादिति। नैतत्सूत्रम्। न्यायसूचीनिबन्धादौ प्राचीनपुस्तकेषु च तथात्वेनाग्रहणात्। भाष्यकारीयसूत्रमेतदिति विवरणकृतः।

२ अपरिसङ्ख्यायेति। असति आत्मनि स्मृत्यनुपपत्तिं दर्शयित्वा स्मर्तव्यार्थविषयैव स्मृतिर्नात्मविषयेति पूर्वपक्षिणोऽवधारणं त्रयोदशसूत्रोक्तं खण्डयति।

३ चतुर्विधमिति। (१) अज्ञासिषमहममुमर्थमिति तिङुक्तकर्तृकं वाक्यम्। (२) ज्ञातवानहममुमर्थमिति कृदुक्तकर्तृकम्। (३) असावर्थो मया ज्ञात इति कृदुक्तकर्मकम्। (४) असावर्थो मया ज्ञात इति कृदुक्तक्रियाकमिति विवेकः।

४ समानार्थमिति। ज्ञानज्ञेयज्ञाप्रकाशनं सर्वेषु समानमित्यर्थः।

५ स्मृतिरिति—प्रत्यभिज्ञानमित्यर्थः। स्मृतिच्छायया‌वगाहित्वात्तस्य।

'अमुमर्थं ज्ञास्यामि, अमुमर्थं विजानामि, अमुमर्थमज्ञासिषं, अमुमर्थं जिज्ञासमानश्चिरमज्ञात्वाऽध्यवस्यत्यज्ञासिषमिति'। एवं स्मृतिमपि त्रिकालविशिष्टां सुस्मूर्षाविशिष्टां च प्रतिसन्धत्ते।

संस्कारसन्ततिमात्रे तु सत्त्वे उत्पद्योत्पद्य संस्कारास्तिरोभवन्ति। स नास्त्येकोऽपि संस्कारो यस्त्रिकालविशिष्टं ज्ञानं स्मृतिं चानुभवेत्। न चानुभवमन्तरेण ज्ञानस्य स्मृतेश्च प्रतिसन्धानमहं ममेति चोत्पद्यते देहान्तरवत्। अतोऽनुमीयते—अस्त्येकः सर्वविषयः प्रतिदेहं स्वज्ञानप्रबन्धं स्मृतिप्रबन्धं च प्रतिसन्धत्त इति, यस्य देहान्तरेषु वृत्तेरभावान्न प्रतिसन्धानं भवतीति ॥१४॥

(४) आत्मनो मनोऽव्यतिरेकप्रकरणम्।

"नात्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां मनसि सम्भवात्" ॥ १५ ॥

"न देहादिसङ्घातव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा। कस्मात्? 'आत्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां मनसि सम्भवात्', 'दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात्' इत्येवमादीनामात्मप्रतिपादकानां हेतूनां मनसि सम्भवो यतः, मनो हि सर्वविषयमिति[1]। तस्मान्न शरीरेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिसङ्घातव्यतिरिक्त आत्मेति" ॥ १५ ॥

ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तेः संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् ॥ १६ ॥

ज्ञातुः खलु ज्ञानसाधनान्युपपद्यन्ते—चक्षुषा पश्यति, घ्राणेन जिघ्रति, स्पर्शनेन स्पृशति। एवं[2] मन्तुः सर्वविषयस्य मतिसाधनमन्तःकरणभूतं सर्वविषयं विद्यते येनायं मन्यत इति। एवं सति ज्ञातर्यात्मसंज्ञा न मृष्यते, मनःसंज्ञाभ्यनुज्ञायते। मनसि च मनःसंज्ञा न मृष्यते, मतिसाधनं त्वभ्यनुज्ञायते। तदिदं संज्ञाभेदमात्रं नार्थे विवाद इति।

प्रत्याख्याने वा सर्वेन्द्रियविलोपप्रसङ्गः। अथ मन्तुः सर्वविषयस्य मतिसाधनं सर्वविषयं प्रत्याख्यायते 'नास्तीति'। एवं रूपादिविषयग्रहणसाधनान्यपि न सन्ति इति सर्वेन्द्रियविलोपः प्रसज्यत इति ॥ १६ ॥

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१ सर्वविषयमिति। सर्वे बाह्यान्तरभूता विषया यस्य तत्—सर्वज्ञमित्यर्थः।

२ एवं मन्तुरिति। 'मतिः' स्मृत्यनुमानादिकं ज्ञानम्। यद्यपि चेदं प्रातिस्विकसंस्कारादिकारणकं तथाऽप्यवश्यमेतेनेन्द्रियजेन (अर्थात् शरीरसंयुक्तसंस्कारकद्रव्यसंयोगजेन) भवितव्यम्—ज्ञानत्वाद् रूपादिज्ञानवत्। तच्चेन्द्रियमसति चक्षुरादौ मतेर्भावात् चक्षुराद्यतिरिक्तम्मन इत्युच्यते।

• बुद्धिपर्यायत्वेपि मतिज्ञानशब्दयोः साक्षात्कारी प्रत्ययो ज्ञानमिह विवक्षितः, जिज्ञासाधीनं च ज्ञानमिह मतिः।

नियमश्च निरनुमानः ॥ १७ ॥

योऽयं नियम इष्यते-' रूपादिग्रहणसाधनान्यस्य सन्ति, मतिसाधनं सर्वविषयं नास्तीति '-अयं नियमो निरनुमानः। नात्रानुमानमस्ति येन नियमं प्रतिपद्यामह इति।

रूपादिभ्यश्च विषयान्तरं सुखादयस्तदुपलब्धौ करणान्तरसद्भावः। यथा[1] चक्षुषा गन्धो न गृह्यत इति, करणान्तरं घ्राणं, एवं चक्षुर्घ्राणाभ्यां रसो न गृह्यत इति करणान्तरं रसनम्, एवं शेषेष्वपि। तथा चक्षुरादिभिः सुखादयो न गृह्यन्त इति करणान्तरेण भवितव्यम्। तच्च ज्ञानायौगपद्यलिङ्गम्। यच्च सुखाद्युपलब्धौ करणं तच्च ज्ञानायौगपद्यलिङ्गं, तस्येन्द्रियमिन्द्रियं प्रति सन्निधेरसन्निधेश्च न युगपज्ज्ञानान्युत्पद्यन्त इति। तत्र यदुक्तं—' आत्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां मनसि सम्भवादिति ' तदयुक्तम् ॥ १७ ॥

(५) आत्मनित्यताप्रकरणम्।

" किम्पुनरयं[2] देहादिसङ्घातादन्यो नित्यः, उतानित्य इति। कुतः संशयः? उभयथा दृष्टत्वात् संशयः। विद्यमानमुभयथा भवति-नित्यमनित्यं च। प्रतिपादिते चात्मसद्भावे संशयानिवृत्तेरिति "।

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१ यथेति। यथा कारणसत्तया कार्यं जनितं कारणं ज्ञापयति एवम्मनःसत्तया मनोलिङ्गज्ञानं जनितम्मनो ज्ञापयति। तच्च लिङ्गजं मनोज्ञानं मनस्सत्ताहेतुकम्। न च स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधः। न हि मनस्सत्तायां मनः करणम्-मनोज्ञाने वा मनः करणम्-येन स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधः स्यात्। न च केवलं मनः स्वज्ञाने करणं येनैकत्र कर्मत्वकरणत्वे स्याताम्। अपि तु मनोज्ञाने लिङ्गज्ञानसहितम्मनः करणम्-तत्स्वरूप तु लिङ्गज्ञानसाहित्यादिति न स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधः।

तत्त्वतस्तु कर्मत्वकरणत्वयोर्विरोधोऽपि नास्ति। कर्तृव्यापार्यत्वं हि करणत्वम्, अनात्मसमवेतक्रियाफलभागित्वं च कर्मत्वम्। न च कर्तृव्यापार्यतायाः परसमवेत-क्रियाफलभागितायाः किञ्चित्स्वरूपतः फलतो वा विरुध्यते।

२ किम्पुनरिति-शास्त्रार्थभूताभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसोपयोगिनं परलोकं परिचिक्षिषुः परीक्षाहेतुभूतं संशयमाह।

उपर्युक्तं संशयं दूषयन्तः एतत्प्रकरणारम्भं केचिदाक्षिपन्ति—देहेन्द्रियबुद्धिवेदनाभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तत्वमात्मनो दर्शयता बाल्यकौमारयौवनवार्धक्यभेदेऽपि चैकात्म्यप्रतिसन्धानमर्थादुपपादयता शरीरनाशादूर्ध्वमात्मसद्भावो दर्शितः। तावतैव च नः प्रयोजनम्। ततः किमर्थमिदम्प्रकरणान्तरोत्थापनमिति। तत्परिहारश्च—सिद्धेऽपि देहादि

आत्मसद्भावहेतुभिरेवास्य प्रागूदेहभेदादवस्थानं सिद्धमूर्द्धमपि देहभेदा[1]-दवतिष्ठते । कुतः ?

पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धाज्जातस्य हर्षभयशोकसम्प्रतिपत्तेः ॥ १८ ॥

जातः खल्वयं कुमारकोऽस्मिन् जन्मन्यगृहीतेषु हर्षभयशोकहेतुषु हर्ष-भयशोकान् प्रतिपद्यते लिङ्गानुमेयान्[2] । ते च स्मृत्यनुबन्धादुत्पद्यन्ते नान्यथा । स्मृत्यनुबन्धश्च पूर्वाभ्यासमन्तरेण न भवति । पूर्वाभ्यासश्च पूर्वजन्मनि सति, नान्यथेति सिद्ध्यत्येतदवतिष्ठतेऽयमूर्द्धं शरीरभेदादिति ॥ १८ ॥

" पद्मादिषु प्रबोधसम्मीलनविकारवत्तद्विकारः" ॥१९॥

" यथा पद्मादिष्वनित्येषु प्रबोधः सम्मीलनं विकारो भवति, एवम-नित्यस्यात्मनो हर्षभयशोकसम्प्रतिपत्तिर्विकारः स्यात् " ।

हेत्वभावादयुक्तम् । अनेन हेतुना पद्मादिषु प्रबोधसम्मीलनविकारवद-नित्यस्यात्मनो हर्षादिसम्प्रतिपत्तिरिति नात्रोदाहरणसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनं हेतुर्न च वैधर्म्यादस्ति । हेत्वभावात् असम्बद्धार्थकमपार्थकमुच्यत इति ।

दृष्टान्ताच्च हर्षादिनिमित्तस्यानिवृत्तिः । या चेयमासेवितेषु विषयेषु हर्षादिसम्प्रतिपत्तिः स्मृत्यनुबन्धकृता प्रत्यात्मं गृह्यते सेयं पद्मादिप्रबोधसम्मीलन-दृष्टान्तेन न निवर्तते । यथा[3] चेयं न निवर्तते तथा जातस्यापीति । क्रियाजाताश्च

व्यतिरेके बाल्यादिषु चानुगमे—किमयमात्मा आ शरीरोत्पत्तेरा च मरणात् यावद्देह-सन्तानभावी—आहोस्विदुपरतेऽपि देहादिसन्तानेऽनुवर्तत एवेत्येष विमर्षोऽद्यापि न निराकृत इति तन्निरासायेदं प्रकरणमारभ्यत इति ।

१ देहभेदादिति ल्यबलोपे पञ्चमी । बाल्यकौमारयौवनवार्धकदेहभेदमभिसमीक्ष्य प्रतिसन्धानादस्यावस्थानमित्यर्थः—इति तात्पर्यकृतः ।

प्रतिसन्धानेनैवास्य प्रतिसन्धातुरवस्थानं सिद्धम्, ' देहस्य भेदात् ' अप्रतिस-न्धातृत्वादित्यन्यथा व्याख्यानम्परिशुद्धिकृतः ।

२ लिङ्गानुमेयानिति—यथाक्रमं स्मितकम्परुदितानुमेयानिति यावत् । दृष्टो हि निरालम्बनो बालः स्खलन् मातुरङ्कात्पतनस्यानिष्टसाधनत्वमनुस्मृत्य इदं च पतन-मिति परामृश्य (प्रत्यभिज्ञाय) तस्याप्यनिष्टसाधनतामनुमाय रुदन् मातुर्मङ्गल्य-मुरःसूत्रं विक्षिप्य हस्तौ वेपमान उपाददानः तस्यानया चेष्टया भयशोकावनुमीयेते ।

३ यथा चेयमिति । यथा वृद्धादीनाम्प्रत्यात्मवेदनीया हर्षादिसम्प्रतिपत्तिः पद्मादिदृष्टान्तेन न निवर्तते तथैव जातमात्रस्य बालस्यापि सा न निवर्तयितुं शक्यत इति भावः ।

वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात्[1] ॥ २४ ॥

सरागो जायत इत्यर्थादापद्यते। अयं जायमानो रागानुबद्धो जायते। रागस्य पूर्वानुभूतविषयानुचिन्तनं[2] योनिः। पूर्वानुभवश्च विषयाणामन्यस्मिन जन्मनि शरीरमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते। सोऽयमात्मा पूर्वशरीरानुभूतान् विषयान् अनुस्मरन् तेषु तेषु रज्यते। तथा चायं द्वयोर्जन्मनोः प्रतिसन्धिः। एवं पूर्वशरीरस्य पूर्वतरेण पूर्वतरशरीरस्य पूर्वतमेनेत्यादिनाऽनादिश्चेतनस्य शरीरयोगः। अनादिश्च रागानुबन्ध इति सिद्धं नित्यत्वमिति ॥ २४ ॥

"कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते पूर्वानुभूतविषयानुचिन्तनजनितो जातस्य रागो न पुनः"--

"सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत्तदुत्पत्तिः[3]" ॥ २५ ॥

"यथोत्पत्तिधर्मकस्य द्रव्यस्य गुणाः कारणत उत्पद्यन्ते तथोत्पत्तिधर्मकस्यात्मनो रागः कुतश्चिदुत्पद्यते। अत्रायमुदितानुवादो[4] निदर्शनार्थः" ॥२५॥

न, सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्रागादीनाम् ॥ २६ ॥

न खलु सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवदुत्पत्तिरात्मनो रागस्य च। कस्मात्? 'सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्रागादीनाम्'। अयं खलु प्राणिनां विषयानासेवमानानां सङ्कल्पजनितो रागो गृह्यते। सङ्कल्पश्च पूर्वानुभूतविषयानुचिन्तनयोनिः। तेनानुमीयते-- 'जातस्यापि पूर्वानुभूतार्थानुचिन्तनकृतो राग' इति। आत्मोत्पादाधिकरणात्तु रागोत्पत्तिर्भवन्ती सङ्कल्पादन्यस्मिन् रागकारणे सति वाच्या कार्यद्रव्यगुणवत्।

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१ वीतरागेति सूत्रम्। स्तन्याभिलापोपन्यासपुनरुक्तिमेव मन्वानेन जन्मान्तरीयेष्टसाधनताज्ञानाधीनस्मरणं हेतुरिति पूर्वं स्तन्याभिलाष उक्तः, सम्प्रति तु पतंगादीनां कणादिभक्षणाभिलाषस्य धारणं रागमात्रमित्यपौनरुक्त्यमिति 'प्रेत्याहारा'दिसूत्रोक्तपुनरुक्तिमत्र मन्वाना वृत्तिकृतः। पूर्वत्र सूत्रे स्तन्याभिलाषस्मरणप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वेनोपन्यस्तमत्र तु रागो जन्महेतुत्वेनोपन्यस्त इति न पौनरुक्त्यशङ्कावकाशः।

२ पूर्वानुभूतेति। एकविषयस्मृतिप्रवाहः विजातीयप्रत्ययासंभिन्नः 'चिन्तनम्'। तच्चानुभवस्य पश्चाद्भवतीति 'अनुचिन्तनम्'। न चैतत् स्मृतिमन्तरेण भवतीत्यर्थः।

३ सगुणेत्याद्यनैकान्तिकत्वप्रतिपादनार्थं सूत्रम्।

४ अत्रायमिति। उदितमिदं चोद्यमयस्कान्तदृष्टान्तचोद्येन। तथापि तस्यानुवादो निदर्शनार्थः। पूर्वमयस्कान्तो निदर्शनम्, इदानीं तु घटादीनामुत्पद्यमानानां रूपादयो निदर्शनमिति तदर्थमित्यर्थः। चोद्यस्योदितानुवादत्वात्परिहारोऽप्युदितानुवाद एवेति हृदयम्।

न चात्मोत्पादः सिद्धो नापि सङ्कल्पादन्यद्रागकारणमस्ति। तस्मादयुक्तं—सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत्तयोरुत्पत्ति'रिति।

अथापि सङ्कल्पादन्यद्रागकारणं धर्माधर्मलक्षणमदृष्टमुपादीयते तथापि पूर्वशरीरयोगोऽप्रत्याख्येयः। तत्र हि तस्य निर्वृत्तिः नास्मिन् जन्मनि। तन्मयत्वाद्राग[1] इति, विषयाभ्यासः खल्वयं भावनाहेतुः तन्मयत्वमुच्यत इति। जातिविशेषाच्च[2] रागविशेष इति। कर्म खल्विदं जातिविशेषनिर्वर्तकं तादात्म्यात्ताच्छब्द्यं विज्ञायते। तस्मादनुपपन्नं—'सङ्कल्पादन्यद्रागकारणम्' इति॥ २६॥

(६) शरीरपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्

अनादिश्चेतनस्य[3] शरीरयोग इत्युक्तम्, स्वकृतकर्मनिमित्तं चास्य शरीरं सुखदुःखाधिष्ठानम्। तत्परीक्ष्यते—किं घ्राणादिवदेकप्रकृतिकमुत नानाप्रकृतिकमिति। कुतः संशयः? विप्रतिपत्तेः संशयः। पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि सङ्ख्याविकल्पेन[4] शरीरप्रकृतिरिति प्रतिजानत इति।

किं तत्र तत्त्वम्?

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१ तन्मयत्वादिति। रागादीनामदृष्टकारणत्वमभ्युपेत्य पूर्वं परिहृतम्, परमार्थतस्तु तन्मयत्वाद्राग इति तात्पर्यम्।

२ स्यादेतत्—यदि पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धाद् रागद्वेषादीनामुत्पादो हन्त मनुष्यजन्मानन्तरं प्राप्तकरभभावस्य मनुष्यजन्मोचितानां भावानामानन्तर्यात् तदनुरूपा एवास्य रागादयो भवेयुः, न करभरूपाः। करभजातेरस्य विजातीयजन्मसहस्रव्यवहितत्वादत आह—जातिविशेषाच्चेति। कर्मणः संस्कारोद्बोधकत्वात् करभजात्यनुबद्धेन कर्मणा जन्मसहस्रव्यवहिताऽपि करभभावनोद्बोध्यते नानन्तराऽपि मनुष्यभावना प्रायणाभिभूतेति भावः।

३ अनादिश्चेतनस्येति शरीरपरीक्षाप्रकरणमारभ्यते। आत्मनः शरीरादिभिन्नत्वसाधकस्य पूर्वप्रकरणस्यैवाङ्गभूतेनैतेन भवितव्यमिति न प्रकरणान्तरावकाश इति श्रीवत्सादिकृताशङ्काऽनूद्य परिहृता परिशुद्धिकृता। सर्वेषामुद्दिष्टानाम्परीक्षणे कर्तव्ये पूर्वप्रकरणे शरीराद्भिन्नत्वमात्मनः प्रसाधितम्—इदानीन्तु तस्यैव शरीरस्य परीक्षा कर्तव्यत्वेनोपतिष्ठते। परीक्षिते च शरीरे तत्स्वभावावगत्यनन्तरन्तत्र निर्विण्णस्तस्माज्जुगुप्सत इति परमोद्देश्यम्।

४ सङ्ख्याविकल्पेनेति। एकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चप्रकृतिकतामास्थिषत शरीरस्य वादिन इत्यर्थः।

पार्थिवं[1] गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः ॥ २७ ॥

तत्र मानुषं शरीरं पार्थिवम् । कस्मात् ? गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः । गन्धवती पृथिवी गन्धवच्च शरीरम् । अबादीनामगन्धत्वात् तत्प्रकृत्यगन्धं स्यात् । न त्विदमबादिभिरसम्पृक्तया पृथिव्याऽऽरब्धं चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयभावेन कल्पत इत्यतः पञ्चानां भूतानां संयोगे सति शरीरं भवति । भूतसंयोगो[2] हि मिथः पञ्चानां न निषिद्ध इति । आप्यतैजसवायव्यानि लोकान्तरे शरीराणि, तेष्वपि भूतसंयोगः पुरुषार्थतन्त्र इति । स्थाल्यादिद्रव्यनिष्पत्तावपि निःसंशयो नाबादिसंयोगमन्तरेण निष्पत्तिरिति ॥ २७ ॥

" पार्थिवाप्यतैजसं तद्गुणोपलब्धेः " ॥ २८ ॥

" निःश्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्धेश्चातुर्भौतिकम् " ॥ २९ ॥

" गन्धक्लेदपाकव्यूहावकाशदानेभ्यः पाञ्चभौतिकम् " ॥ ३० ॥

त इमे सन्दिग्धा हेतव इत्युपेक्षितवान्[3] सूत्रकारः । कथं सन्दिग्धाः ? सति च प्रकृतिभावे भूतानां धर्मोपलब्धिरसति च संयोगाप्रतिषेधात् सन्निहितानामिति । यथा स्थाल्यामुदकतेजोवाय्वाकाशानामिति । तदिदम्[4] अनेकभूतप्रकृति

१ पार्थिवमिति सूत्रम् । गुणान्तरोपलब्धेरिति—तद्विशेषगुणोपलब्धेरित्यर्थः ।

इह पार्थिवत्वेन आप्यत्वादिना वा शरीरलक्षणस्य चेष्टाश्रयत्वादेः किमुपपद्यते किं वा नोपपद्यते यत इदम्प्रस्तूयत—इति केषांचिदाक्षेपः । तत्परिहारश्च—भौतिकत्वे शरीरस्य निरूपिते भूतत्वाच्च घटादिवदचैतन्यमयत्नसिद्धम्भवेत् । ततः प्रयत्नवदात्मसंयोगासमवायिकारणकक्रियारूपचेष्टाश्रयत्वमेव सुखेन सिद्ध्येत् । तदारम्भकशेषीभूताहारावयवोपचयापचयहेतुभूतेन्द्रियोपचयापचयलक्षणमिन्द्रियाश्रयत्वं तदवच्छिन्नस्यात्मनो भोगाधिकरणत्वञ्च तस्यार्थाश्रयत्वं च सिद्ध्येदिति लक्षणमेवेदं परीक्ष्यते—इति ।

२ भूतसंयोग इति । पार्थिवं शरीरमिति सिद्धान्तस्यायमेवार्थो यत् पृथिव्येवास्य समवायिकारणमिति । न चैतावताऽबादीनां भूतान्तराणां संयोगः शरीरोत्पत्तौ निषिध्यते । यथा मृदेव घटस्य समवायिकारणम्—किन्तु तदुत्पत्तौ जलादिकमप्यपेक्ष्यत एवेति ।

३ उपेक्षितवानिति—तत्परिहारे यत्नं न कृतवानित्यर्थः ।

४ तदिदमिति । स्पष्टं व्याख्यातमिदं वार्तिककारेण । तद्यथा—

पृथिव्युदकाभ्यामारभ्यमाणमगन्धं कारणगन्धस्यैकस्यानारम्भकत्वात् । पृथिव्यनलाभ्यामारभ्यमाणमगन्धमरसं च कारणगन्धरसयोः केवलयोरनारम्भकत्वात् । पृथिव्यनिलाभ्यामगन्धमरसञ्चारूपं च वायोरगन्धरसरूपत्वात् । पृथिव्याकाशाभ्यामगन्धमरसमरूपमस्पर्शं च आकाशे गन्धाद्यभावात् । सर्वत्र समानो न्यायः कारणगुणस्य

शरीरमगन्धमरसमरूपमस्पर्शं च प्रकृत्यनुविधानात् स्यात्। न त्विदमित्थम्भूतम्। तस्मात्पार्थिवं गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः ॥ २८ ॥ २९ ॥ ३० ॥

श्रुतिप्रामाण्याच्च ॥ ३१ ॥

'सूर्यं ते चक्षुर्गच्छतात्' इत्यत्र मन्त्रे 'पृथिवीं ते शरीरमिति' श्रूयते। तदिदं प्रकृतौ विकारस्य प्रलयाभिधानमिति। 'सूर्यं ते चक्षुः स्पृणोमि' इत्यत्र मन्त्रान्तरे 'पृथिवीं ते शरीरं स्पृणोमी'ति श्रूयते। सेयं[1] कारणाद्विकारस्य स्पृतिरभिधीयत इति। स्थाल्यादिषु[2] च तुल्यजातीयानामेककार्यारम्भदर्शनाद्-भिन्नजातीयानामेककार्यारम्भानुपपत्तिः ॥ ३१ ॥

(७) इन्द्रियभौतिकत्वपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्।

अथेदानीमिन्द्रियाणि[3] प्रमेयक्रमेण विचार्यन्ते—किमाव्यक्तिकान्याहोस्विद्[4] भौतिकानीति। कुतः संशयः ?—

केवलस्यानारम्भकत्वात्। जलानलाभ्यामगन्धश्चारसं च, जलवायुभ्यामगन्धश्चारसश्चा-रूपश्च, जलाकाशाभ्यामगन्धमरसमरूपमस्पर्शञ्च, तेजोनिलाभ्यामगन्धश्चारसश्चारूपश्च, अनलाकाशाभ्यामगन्धमरसमरूपमस्पर्शञ्च, अनिलाकाशाभ्यामेवमेव भूजलानलैरग-न्धमेव, भूजलानिलैरेवमेव, भूजलाकाशैरेवमेव, पृथिव्यनिलानलैरगन्धमरसञ्च, पृथि-व्यनलाकाशैरेवमेव, पृथिव्यनिलाकाशैरगन्धमरसमरूपञ्च, जलानिलानलैरगन्धमरसञ्च, जलानलाकाशैरेवमेव, जलानिलाकाशैरगन्धश्चारसश्चारूपश्च, अनलानिलाकाशैरेवमेव, पृथिव्युदकतेजोवायुभिरगन्धस्पृथिव्युदकज्वलनाकाशैरेवमेव, अवनिजलाकाशैरेवमेव, पृथिव्यनिलज्वलनाकाशैरगन्धमरूपञ्च, जलानिलानलाकाशैरेवमेव, पृथिव्युदकतेजो-वाय्वाकाशैरगन्धश्कारणगुणस्यैकस्यानारम्भकत्वादिति वाच्यम्। एककारणकत्वे तु सत-तोत्पत्त्यनुत्पत्ती नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गश्चेत्युक्तम्।

१ सेयमिति। अस्यापि मन्त्रस्यायमर्थो यद् यस्मादायातं तत् तस्मिन्नेव लयं गच्छतीति प्रकृतौ विकारस्य लयाभिधानम्। प्रकृतिशब्देन च कार्यशून्यं कारणमुच्यते, न पुनः कारणे कार्यस्य लयः।

२ स्थाल्यादिष्विति। अयन्तावत्प्रमाणार्थः। विवादाध्यासितं द्व्यणुकं गन्धव-द्भ्यामेव परमाणुभ्यामारभ्यते गन्धवत्वात् उभयवादिसिद्धपार्थिवद्व्यणुकवत्।

३ भाष्यमतेनात्र साङ्ख्यनैयायिकयोरेव विप्रतिपत्तिः। तात्पर्यकृन्मते तु बौद्ध-नैयायिकयोरपीति ध्येयम्। तथा चोक्तन्तात्पर्ये—उपलक्षणं चैतत्। यदापि भौतिकानि तदापि किं कृष्णसारं यदेतदुपलभ्यते तदेवेन्द्रियमाहो तदधिष्ठानं तैजसमित्यपि संशयो द्रष्टव्यः। तत्र पूर्वः संशयः साङ्ख्यनैयायिकयोर्विप्रतिपत्तेः। उत्तरस्तु सौगतनैयायि-कयोरिति।

४ आव्यक्तिकानीति। साङ्ख्यमते इन्द्रियाणामुत्पत्तिर्नाव्यक्तात्साक्षात्

कृष्णसारे[1] सत्युपलम्भाद् व्यतिरिच्य चोपलम्भात्संशयः ॥३२॥

कृष्णसारं भौतिकं, तस्मिन्ननुपहते रूपोपलब्धिः, उपहते चानुपलब्धिरिति। व्यतिरिच्य[2] कृष्णसारमवस्थितस्य विषयस्य उपलम्भो न कृष्णसारप्राप्तस्य। न चाप्राप्यकारित्वमिन्द्रियाणां तदिदमभौतिकत्वे विभुत्वात्सम्भवति। एवमुभयधर्मोपलब्धेः संशयः ॥ ३२ ॥

अभौतिकानीत्याह[3]। कस्मात्?—

महदणुग्रहणात्[4] ॥ ३३ ॥

महदिति महत्तरं महत्तमं चोपलभ्यते, यथा न्यग्रोधपर्वतादि। अण्विति अणुतरमणुतमं च गृह्यते, यथा न्यग्रोधधानादि। तदुभयमुपलभ्यमानं चक्षुषो भौतिकत्वं बाधते। भौतिकं हि यावत्तावदेव व्याप्नोति। अभौतिकन्तु विभुत्वात्सर्वव्यापकमिति ॥ ३३ ॥

न[5] महदणुग्रहणमात्रादभौतिकत्वं विभुत्वं चेन्द्रियाणां शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम्। इदं खलु—

रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षविशेषात्तद्ग्रहणम्[6] ॥ ३४ ॥

किन्त्वहङ्कारादेव। अत एवोक्तं तात्पर्यकृद्भिः—आव्यक्तिकत्वमाहङ्कारिकत्वं द्रष्टव्यम्। अहङ्काराद्धि बुद्धिविकाराद्वैकारिकादेकादशेन्द्रियाणि जायन्त इति साङ्ख्याः। आव्यक्तिकत्वन्त्वव्यक्तस्य मूलकारणत्वादुक्तमिति।

१ संशयकारणोद्भावनपरं सूत्रं 'कृष्णसार' इति। व्यतिरिच्य चोपलम्भोऽहङ्कारिकत्वे सत्येव सम्भवति, अहङ्कारस्य विभुत्वेनाप्रतिघातात्। भौतिकत्वे काचाभ्रपटलादिभिर्भौतिकैः प्रतिघातसम्भवात्।

२ व्यतिरिच्येति। कृष्णसारव्यतिरेकेण विप्रकृष्टदेशावस्थितस्य विषयस्योपलब्धिरित्यर्थः।

३ अभौतिकानीति। साङ्ख्यमतमिदानीमुत्थाप्य अक्षिकर्नीतिकैवेन्द्रियमिति बौद्धपक्षं दूषयति।

४ अभौतिकत्वप्रतिपादनपरं सूत्रम्—महदिति। गोलकं नेन्द्रियम्—अप्राप्यकारित्वेऽतिप्रसङ्गात्। इत्थञ्च गोलकातिरिक्तं भौतिकमिति वाच्यम्भौतिकत्ववादिभिः। तदप्यसङ्गतम्। चक्षुषा हि न्यूनपरिमाणम्महत्परिमाणं च गृह्यते, भौतिकत्वे तदसम्भवादित्यर्थः।

५ न महदिति। पूर्वसूत्रोक्तं साङ्ख्यमतं न्यायमतेन दूषयति।

६ रश्म्यर्थेतिन्यायमतप्रतिपादकं सूत्रम्।

accepted; as the contact is cognised as subsisting in the same substratum with Duality; when we have the conception—'these two things are in contact,' we do not cognise the *contact* as subsisting in any manifold combinations of things. [The cognition is always of the contact as subsisting in *two* things.] These *two things* perceived could not be in the shape of '*two Atoms*', as no perception of 'two atoms' is possible (atoms being entirely imperceptible). From all this the conclusion is that what form the substratum of the contact are two such substances as are possessed of magnitude and form the substratum of Duality (*i.e., two large substances, not many small atoms*).

"As a matter of fact, Conjunction is only proximity culminating in impact; it is not something different (from the objects that are in contact)."—This is not true; as Conjunction does actually serve to produce (in things) something entirely different (from those things themselves); for instance, Conjunction is found to be the cause (productive) of a sound (when the contact of the stick with the drum makes the the drum sound), of colour (when the contact of the Jar with fire produces red colour in the Jar), and of motion (when the contact with the ground of the ball thrown down makes the ball rebound);—and unless an entirely distinct quality (in the shape of Conjunction) appeared in the two things (in contact), it could not be possible to ascertain what is the cause of the appearance of the said *sound*, *colour* and *motion*;—from all this it follows that Conjunction is a quality, distinct (from the conjoined things); and it is also directly perceived as such.* (In common parlance) we have the denial also (of Conjunction),—for instance, when we say—'the Teacher is with the ear-ing, and the Pupil is without the ear-ing' (where the former phrase affirms and the latter denies the conjunction of the Ring) [and what is thus denied must be something different from the Pupil's ear and the Ring]; if a distinct quality (other than the two things) were not the object of the conception of 'Conjunction', then the said denial must pertain to something else; and in that case it behoves you to explain what it is that is denied (by the phrase 'the pupil is without the ear-ring');

* *Pratyaya* stands for *pratyakṣa*, says *Bhāṣyacandra*.

that is to say, you should explain what is that something else (other than a distinct quality in the shape of 'Conjunction') which you recognise in another case, where two things are in contact, and which is denied by the phrase in question ('the pupil is without the ear-ring'). [And as a matter of fact no such explanation is possible.]

[Thus then, Conjunction being a quality, distinct from the objects in contact) whenever Conjuncion is perceived, it is perceived as subsisting in two *large* substances (and never in atoms); so that it can never be regarded as subsisting in Atoms [all which goes to prove the existence of the Composites as the substratum of Conjunction.]

Lastly, (to be consistent) you have to deny the existence of 'Communities', which from the basis* of all comprehensive or inclusive conceptions; but if these were denied, you could not have such limitation to cognitions as we have [in the shape of the restriction of the conception of 'horse' to only particular individual animals, and not to others; this restriction being possible only by the fact of those animals alone belonging to the *Community* 'Horse'].

[The existence of Communities being thus undeniable] Inasmuch as no Community could be manifested (or perceived) without a substratum, it is necessary to explain what that substratum is.

If it be held that—"what forms the said substratum is only the Atoms arranged or grouped in a certain manner (and not any *Composite* substance)",—then it behoves you to explain whether the Atom to which the capability (to manifest the Community) belongs is itself in contact (with the perceiving organ) or not; that is to say, when a particular Community is cognised, is it, or is it not, cognised as subsisting in the Atom-groups that are themselves in contact with the perceiving organ? If it be held that it is cognised as subsisting (and perceived) in the *unperceived* atoms,—then it would be

* The *Bhāṣya* uses the term *'liṅga'*, which the *Vārtika* explains as *'nimitta'*, *basis*. The *Tātparya* however explains it as 'probans'; by which the passage would mean that the existence of communities is *proved* by comprehensive cognitions.

possible to perceive even such atoms as are hidden from view; that is to say, it would be possible to perceive the Community as subsisting in atoms hidden from view. If, on the other hand, it be held that the Community is perceived as subsisting in the *perceived* atoms, then it could not be manifested in the inner and back parts (of the thing), which (not being in contact with the perceiving organ) are *not perceived* (and this would be absurd).—":But there would be manifestation of the Community in that much of the thing as is perceived."—In that case only that much of the Atom would be the substratum (of the Community); and it would come to this that the substratum of the Community is only that much of the Atom as is perceived and in which that Community is cognised. And this would mean that when a certain *mass of atoms* is perceived, there is a diversity of things in it (that much which is perceived being one and that much which is not perceived being another)! That is to say when a certain mass of atoms in the shape of a *Tree* is perceived, there is perceived a plurality of trees—and each of those portions of the mass wherein the community 'Tree' is perceived would be a distrinct Tree! [which is absurd.]

From all this we conclude that what serves to manifest a particular community is some such entirely distinct substance as subsists in the aggregated Atoms; and this distinct substance is the *Composite* (as something different from the component atoms).

SECTION 6

Examination of Inference

Sūtras 38–39

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Perception has been examined; we now start the examination of Inference.

Sūtra 38

Pūrvapakṣa—**"Inference cannot be an Instrument of Right Cognition,—as [in the particular instances cited of the three kinds of Inference] the Premises are untrue—in view of Obstruction, Demolition and Resemblance."**

BHĀṢYA

" The word '*Apramāṇam*' in the Sūtra means that Inference cannot even once be the means of the (definite) right cognition of anything. *

"(*a*) [Under Sū. 1-1-5 the *Bhāṣya* has cited as an instance of the '*S'ēṣavat*' Inference—the inference of the fact of it having rained up the river from perceiving the river to be full ;—now] as a matter of fact, the river may be seen to be full also by reason of its course being blocked (by a dam) ; hence from the mere perception of the fullness of the river, to conclude that 'the Rain-god has rained in the regions up the river' cannot be a correct Inference.

"(*b*) [As an instance of the '*Pūrvavat*' Inference some writers have cited the inference that 'it is going to rain' from perceiving the ants running away with their eggs ; now] as a matter of fact, the running about of the ants with their eggs might be due to the *demolition* of their nests; so that from seeing the ants running about with their eggs, to conclude that 'it is going to rain' cannot be a correct Inference. †

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* The *Tātparya* says that प्रतिपादकम् of the *Bhāṣya* must be taken in the sense of निश्चायक ; because (the *Pariśuddhi* adds) some sort of cognition may be brought about by even wrong premises. The *Bhāṣya-candra* also explains प्रतिपादकम् as प्रमितिकरणम्.

† '*Pūrvavat*' Inference consists in the inferring of the effect from the perception of its cause ; but as a matter of fact, the running about of the ants with the eggs cannot be regarded as the cause of rain ; for the simple reason that there is rain even without the running about of the ants. The fact however which makes the ants running about an indication of coming rain is the fact that what brings about rain is some sort of commotion in the elements, in the form, for instance, of the rising of heat-waves below the earth's surface ; but before this commotion brings on rain, it produces certain other phenomena also ; and the running about of the ants is one of these phenomena ;—the ants being turned out of their nests underground by the sudden rising of the heat-waves, and thus carrying away their eggs outside. So that the appearance of ants thus running about leads to the inference of the elemental commotion, which is the precursor and cause of rain ; and from this we go on to the inference that 'it is going to rain.' In this manner alone can we regard the instance as one of *Pūrvavat* Inference. But it is possible that a man may infer the coming of rain, without regarding the ants running about as the *cause* of rain; that is,

(c) "[Some writers have cited the inference of the *presence of the peacock*—from the hearing of the peacock's scream; but] as a matter of fact, a man might be mimicking the peacock's scream; so that on account of this *resemblance* (between the real peacock's scream and the man's mimicking of it), the inference of the peacock's presence from hearing of what sounds like its scream cannot but be incorrect."*

Sūtra 39

[*Reply to the Pūrvapakṣa-Sūtra*]—**Not so; because [what are the real Probans in the three Inferences cited] are entirely different from—(a) such (rise of water) as is restricted to one place, (b) such (running about of ants with their eggs) as is due to fright, and (c) such (Peacock's scream) as is a mere resemblance of it.**

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the 'falsity' that has been urged does not apply to Inference; it is clear that what is not an Inference has been mistaken for Inference (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*). "How so?" Well, in reality, what can be rightly regarded as the Probans of an Inference is not anything in its mere unqualified (vague, general) form. For instance, [in the case of the three Inferences cited], (a) when one infers that 'the Rain-god has rained in the regions above the river', from the fact that the river is full, he does so, not by merely perceiving *a rise in the river*, but by perceiving that the water previously existing in the river has become qualified (augmented) by rain-water,

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it may be an act of simple inductive reasoning; in which case this would be an instance of the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* Inference.

As a matter of fact the instance of *Pūrvavat* Inference cited by the *Bhāṣya* under 1-1-5 is the inference of coming rain from the gathering of clouds. The case of the ants running leading to the inference of coming rain has been cited by other writers.

* The *Vārtika* takes this third instance as the inference of the presence of the peacock; hence we have adopted that view in the translation. But the fact appears to be, as pointed out by later commentators on the *Sūtra*, that the inference is of the *presence of clouds*; so that the three cases could be then of past, future and present rains. But by the *Vārtika's* interpretation also the third would be a case of inference of something *present*; the difference being that while the other two refer to *rain*, the third refers to something else.

that the velocity of the stream-current has increased, and that the stream is carrying along in its course flakes of foam, fruits, leaves and logs of wood;*—(*b*) when one infers 'coming rain', he does so from the fact that whole hosts of ants are running about† (calmly and peacefully) with their eggs,—and not only a few ants;—(*c*) and lastly, the third Inference (that of the presence of the Peacock from hearing the Peacock's scream) is wrong only when the scream is in reality not that of a Peacock, and the observer fails to perceive the fact that 'this what I am hearing is not the screaming of the Peacock, but some other sound resembling it'; but when the observer hears a particular (qualified) kind of Sound (*i. e.*, a Sound in the musical tone called '*ṣadja*', in which the peacock's scream is always pitched), he realises that what he is hearing is that peculiar Sound which can emanate only from the peacock, and then what leads to the right Inference of the peacock's presence is that particular kind of Sound (pitched in the 'Ṣadja' tone, and not what merely resembles it vaguely);§ such infallible Inference of the peacock's presence from its scream is drawn by serpents (who can never mistake any mimicking Sound to be the 'peacock's scream'). Thus then, it is clear that when a person tries to infer, from the perception of an *un-qualified* thing, something that can be inferred from the perception of a *particular qualified thing*, the fault lies with the inferring person, not with the Inference itself.

* All these additional ideas do not arise when the rise is due to some obstruction placed in the course of the stream.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains प्रायस्य as प्रीतियुक्तस्य समवायस्य: 'a large number of ants running about in friendly groups.'

And when the running about is due to fright caused by the demolition of the nests, there would be only a few of them running about, distractedly, and not hosts of them, calmly and peacefully.

§ So also in the *first* Inference, it would be wrong *only* if the man failed to notice that the rise in the river was due to its course having been obstructed; and the *second* Inference would be wrong *only* if the man failed to perceive that only a few ants were running about through fright caused by the destruction of a particular ant-nest.

SECTION 7

Examination of the nature of Time—specially the Present.

Sūtras 40–44

BHĀṢYA

It has been asserted (in the *Bhāṣya*, under Sū. 1.1.5) that Inference is applicable to all three points of time *because it apprehends the three points of time.* Against this also* the following objection has been raised (by the Bauddha)—

Sūtra 40

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"**There is no Present (Time); for when an object falls, the only possible points of time are—that which has been fallen through, and that which has to be fallen through.**"†

BHĀṢYA

"When the fruit becomes detached from the stalk (it falls and) comes gradually nearer and nearer to the ground; now while it is so nearing the ground, the space above the fruit (and below the tree) is *space traversed*; and the time related to that *traversed* space is "*that which has been fallen through*" (i.e. the *Past*); and the space below the fruit (and above the ground) is the space *to be traversed*; and the time related to this latter space is '*that which has to be fallen through*' (i.e. the *Future*);—and (apart from these two) there is no third space, in relation to which there could be the notion of *being traversed*, which would give rise to the conception of the *Present* Time. From this we conclude that there is no such thing as *Present* Time."

Sūtra 41

[Answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—**[If there is no 'Present' Time] the other two ('Past' and 'Future') also would be inconceivable; as these are relative to that.**

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* interprets the *cha* to mean that the opponent objects to the three points of time, just as he does to the three kinds of Reason (dealt with in the preceding Section).

† Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyabhuṣana finds in this Sūtra a distinct reference to the माध्यमिकसूत्र. The mere mention of a doctrine, however, does not justify us to regard it as referring to any particular work.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, Time is not manifested by (conceived of in relation to) *Space*; it is manifested by *Action** *of falling*, f.i.; so that we have the conception of the *time that has been fallen through* (i.e. *Past* Time) when the *action of falling*,—which is expressed by the phrase 'it *falls*'—has ceased: and when that same action is *going to happen*, we have the conception of Time *that has to be fallen through* (*i.e. Future* Time); and lastly, when the *action* of the thing is perceived as *going on* at the time, we have the conception of '*Present*' Time. Under the circumstances, if a person were never to perceive the *action* as 'going on' at the time, what could he conceive of as 'having ceased' or as 'going to happen'? For as a matter of fact, what is meant by 'time having been fallen through' is that the *action* of 'falling' is over, has ceased; and what is meant by 'time to be fallen through' is that the action is going to happen; so that at both these points of time (Past and Future) the object is devoid of the *action*; whereas when we have the idea that the thing 'is falling', the Object is actually connected (imbued) with the *action*; so that what the *Present* Time apprehends (indicates) is the actual existing connection of the *Object* and the *Action*; and thus it is only on the basis of this (existing connection and the time indicated by it) that we can have the conception of the other two points of Time (Past and Future); which latter, for this reason, would not be conceivable if the 'Present' Time did not exist. [Thus then all the *three* points of Time being realities, there is nothing wrong in the idea that 'Inference is applicable to the three points of Time'.]†

* It is true Time is conceived of only in relation to some *Kriyā*, but *Kriyā* stands for *action in general*, not for mere *motion*, as the opponent has taken it.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The reality of the conception 'the thing *is falling*'—on which the idea of *Present* Time is based—cannot be denied; as it is attested by direct Perception—says the *Pariśuddhi*. If the *present action* were not there, what would be there that is produced by the gravity of the thing when its support has been removed (and when it falls)? Whose effect would it be that the thing touches the ground? Neither the *Past* nor the *Futnre* could be the effect or the cause; as they are non-existent at the time.—*Tātparya*.

Sūtra 42

Then Again—

As a matter of fact, the conceptions of 'Past' and 'Future' cannot be merely relative to each other.

BHĀṢYA

If the conceptions of 'Past' and 'Future' could be merely relative to each other,—'accomplished on the basis of each other',—then we might accept the rejection of the 'Present'. As a matter of fact, however, neither the conception of 'Future' can be based upon the conception of the 'Past', nor that of the 'Past' can be based upon that of the 'Future'. By what reasoning and by what means would the conception of 'Past' be obtained?—How too in relation to the notion of 'Past' would you obtain the notion of 'Future?'—Or by what means would you get at the conception of the 'Future' at all? That is to say, all this cannot be explained, if you reject the 'Present' time.

It might be urged that—"there are several such pairs of relative conceptions as '*long and short*', '*ground and underground*', '*light and shade*', where one is merely relative to the other; and in the same manner the conceptions of '*past and future*' could be accomplished entirely in relation to each other."

This, however, cannot be accepted, in the absence of special reasons. That is to say, just as you have cited some examples (of relative terms), so could we also cite some counter-examples (to show that conceptions do not arise merely in relation to each other); for instance, just as the pairs of conceptions as '*colour and touch*', '*odour and taste*' are such in which the conceptions are not merely relative to each other, in the same manner the conceptions of '*past and future*' also could not be accomplished entirely in relation to each other. [And unless you have adduced some special reason in favour of the effectiveness of your examples, we cannot accept them in the face of these counter-examples.] [We have answered your argument after assuming that the instances you have cited are really those of purely relative conceptions.] As a matter of fact, however, there can be no conceptions which are accomplished merely in relation to each other; for if one were entirely dependent upon the other, then, the negation of one would

imply the negation of the other, and thus there would be negation of both ; that is to say, if the existence of one were entirely dependent upon the other, then, upon what would the existence of the former be dependent ?—And if the existence of the former depended upon the other, on what would the existence of this latter depend ?—And thus as in the absence of the one, the other could not be possible, the result would be that both would be impossible.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Further, *Present* Time is indicated by the *existence* of things ;—as we find in such conceptions as 'the Substance *exists*', 'Quality *is* there', 'Motion *is* there', and so on.* So that for one who does not admit this—

Sūtra 43

There being no 'Present', there could be no cognition of anything (by any Instrument of Cognition), as no 'Perception' would be possible. †

BHĀṢYA

Perception is brought about by the contact of the sense-organ with the object ; ‡ and that which is not *present*—that is (*ex-hypothesi*) which is *non-existent*—cannot be in contact with a sense-organ ; and there is nothing which our Opponent accepts as *present* or *existing* ; so that for him there can be no *cause of perception* (in the shape of sense-object contact), no *object of perception* (in the shape of existing things), and no *perceptional cognition*. And there being no Perception, there could be no Inference or Verbal Cognition, as both of these are based upon Perception. Thus all Instruments of Cognition becoming impossible there could be no cognition of anything at all.

* That is to say, the Present Time is indicated, not only by the notion of *Falling*, but also by the *existence* of things.—i.e. by the action of *Being*. This is meant to be an introduction to the following *Sūtra*.—*Tātparya*.

† The actions of *Falling* and the like are such as appear and disappear [so that they do not extend over all *present* things] ; but the action of *Being* is one that extends over all *present* things ; so that if you deny the *Present*, which is indicated by an action (of *Being*) that extends over all things, you make 'Perception' impossible, and thence every other form of cognition also becomes impossible.—*Tātparya*.

‡ 'Which presupposes the *present* existence of the *Object*, the *Organ* and the *Contact*.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

Then again, as a matter of fact, the *Present* Time is actually recognised in two ways ;—sometimes it is indicated by the *existence of things* (*i.e.* by the mere action of *Being*),—as for instance, in the conception 'the Substance *exists*, '—and sometimes it is indicated by a *series of actions*,—*e.g.* in such conceptions as 'he *is cooking*', 'he *is cutting*', ; this ' series of actions ' may consist, either in several actions bearing upon a single thing, or in a repetition of the same action (on the same thing) ; of the former kind is the action spoken of as ' is cooking', which consists of several actions bearing upon the same thing—the action of ' cooking ' comprising the actions of *placing the pot upon the oven, pouring water into the pot, putting rice into it, fetching fuel* *, *lighting the fire, stirring with the ladle, straining the gruel, and bringing down the pot from the oven* ;—in the action of '*cutting*' on the other hand, we have a repetition of the same action ; for a man is said to be 'cutting' wood when he repeatedly raises the axe and lets it fall upon the wood. Now (in both these cases) that which is *being cooked* and that which is *being cut* is that which is *being acted upon* [*i.e.* connected with an action *at the 'present' time*].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Inasmuch as it is only in connection with what is *being done* (being operated upon by an Action) that,—

Sūtra 44

—we have the conceptions of ' has been done ' and ' to be done '—it follows that the idea (of the Present) is established in both ways.

BHĀṢYA

When the ' series of actions ' (comprising *Cooking*) is not yet commenced and is only intended *to be done*, it is spoken of as ' will cook '; which denotes the ' Future ' Time ;—when the ' series of actions ' has ceased and its purpose accomplished, it is spoken of as 'has cooked' ; which denotes the 'Past' Time;—and lastly, when the ' series of actions ' has commenced (and has not ceased), it is spoken of as ' is cooking '; which denotes the 'Present' Time. Now of these, that which has ceased is what is

* The fuel-fetching and fire-lighting should come first ; as they do in the *Vārtika*.

spoken of as 'has been done'; that which is intended to be done (and not yet commenced) is what is spoken of as 'to be done'; and that which is going on (has been commenced and has not ended) is spoken of as 'being done'. Now we find here that the collocation of the three points of time is with reference to a 'series of actions' (of Cooking), and is possible only when it is conceived of as 'present', being spoken of either as 'is cooking' or as 'is being cooked'; wherein what is expressed is the *continuity* of the series of actions, and not either *non-commencement* or *cessation*. This 'Present' is conceived of in both ways—*i. e.* (1) as not mixed up with the notions of Past and Future, and (2) as mixed up with them;* that conception of Present which is *unmixed*, we find in such expressions as 'the substance exists', where the *Present* is indicated by the mere *existence* (continuity of the Substance); while such expressions as 'is cooking', 'is cutting' and the like indicate the *Present* as involving all three points, of Time, and as expressing the continuity of a *series of actions*.† There are other ways also of this involved use of the Present Tense, met with in ordinary usage;—when, for instance, it is used with a view to denote proximity (to Past or Future), and such other ideas.‡

From all this the conclusion is that there *is* such a thing as the 'Present' Time.

SECTION 8

Examination of Analogical Cognition

Sūtras 45–49

Sūtra 45

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"**There can be no Analogy on the basis of either perfect or partial resemblance.**"—§

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* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains '*apavṛktaḥ*' and '*vyapavṛktaḥ*' as '*rahitaḥ*' and '*sahitaḥ*'.

† When we say 'he is cooking', some of the actions composing the composite act of cooking have been done, while some are being done and some are yet to be done.

‡ For examples, see *Vārtika*.

§ When one perceives the resemblance in the animal before him, of the bull, and remembers at the same time the advice that 'as is the bull so is the *gavaya*',—this perception of resemblance along with the remembrance becomes the means that accomplishes the cognition of the connection of

BHĀṢYA

"(A) There can be no Analogy on the basis of *perfect or absolute resemblance*; for certainly there can be no such conception as 'as the bull so the bull' [and this would be the sense of the sentence 'as the bull so the *gavaya*', if *perfect resemblance* between the two were meant]. (B) Nor can Analogy be based upon *partial resemblance*; for there is no such conception as 'as the bull so the buffalo' [and this is what the sentence 'as the bull so the *gavaya*' might mean, if the sense conveyed were that of *semi-perfect resemblance*; as the buffalo has many points of resemblance to the bull]. (C) Nor lastly can Analogy be based upon *partial or slight resemblance*; for all things cannot be conceived of as resembling one another [and such would be the said *Analogy*, if it were based upon slight resemblance, for all things are similar in some way or the other]."

Sūtra 46

[*Purvapakṣa answered*]—**Inasmuch as Analogy is based upon such resemblance as is actually recognised, there is no room for the objection that has been urged.***

the name 'gavaya' with the animal perceived. So that this recognition of the connection of the name is 'Analogical Cognition'; and the means by which this is brought about has been called 'Analogy.' This, the Pūrvapakṣin says, is not right; for does the advice upon which the cognition is based—'as the bull so the *gavaya*'—denote *perfect* resemblance, or *semi-perfect* (almost perfect) resemblance, or only *slight*, partial, resemblance? Neither of these is possible.

* The exact sense conveyed by a sentence depends upon the context and such other circumstances; so that what particular sort of ressemblance is expressed by a certain sentence will be contigent upon these, *e.g.*, when the advisory sentence 'as the bull so the gavaya', is addressed to a person who knows such animals as the buffalo and the like, *it is semi-perfect resemblance* that is meant; so that when the man sees the *gavaya*, and finds that it has several points of resemblance to the bull, he recognises it as the 'Gavaya'; even though there is similar resemblance between the bull and the buffalo, the man will not recognise the animal as a 'buffalo', for, as already pointed out, he perfectly knows what a buffalo is; then under the special circumstances of the case, the sentence 'as the bull so the *gavaya*', could never be understood to mean 'as the bull so the buffalo.'—*Tātparya*.

The Sūtra speaks of 'such resemblance as is recognised'; and the *Pariśuddhi* adds that what is meant is that resemblance of which the idea is derived from the particular advisory sentence—*e. g.* 'as the bull so the *gavaya*'.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the Analogy (mentioned in the advisory sentence) does not proceed on the basis of either *perfect* or *semi-perfect* or *slight* resemblance ; it proceeds with reference to (*i. e.* as indicative, and on the basis, of), such resemblance as is actually recognised (from the advisory sentence), and which arises in reference to (*i. e.* as indicative of, pointing to) the relation of cause and effect* [between the Analogy and the recognition of the connection of the particular name with the particular thing].† And in a case where these conditions are found to be present, Analogy cannot be denied. For this reason the objection that has been urged (in Sū. 44) is not relevant.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Pūrvapakṣin says]—"In that case, Analogical Cognition may be regarded as purely *inferential*" :

Sūtra 47

"Because it consists in the cognition of what is not perceived by means of what is perceived."

BHĀṢYA

"That is to say, just as the cognition of Fire, which is not perceived, by means of Smoke, which is perceived, is *Inferential*,—so the cognition of the unperceived *gavaya* by means of the perceived *bull* should be *inferential* ;—so that Analogical Cognition does not in any way differ from the Inferential."‡

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* That is, the relation subsisting between what *is known* and *what makes it known*'.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† That is to say, there can be no restriction as to any particular sort of resemblance upon which Analogy can be based. What happens is that when one has become cognisant of some sort of resemblance, by means of the advisory sentence, he comes to recognise the relation of cause and effect, between the *resemblance* and the cognition of the connection of the particular thing and the particular name. And what precise sort of resemblance is recognised will depend upon circumstances ; so that there can be no such restriction as that Analogy is based upon *perfect resemblance only*, or on *semi-perfect resemblance only*, or on *slight resemblance only*.—(*Tātparya* and *Pariśuddhi*).

‡ The sentence 'as the bull so the *gavaya*' describes the unperceived *gavaya*, through the perceived bull ; and one who has heard this sentence, when he comes to *perceive* the *gavaya*, he does not apprehend anything

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Siddhāntin answers—*Analogical* Cognition does differ from the *inferential*. "By what reasoning do you arrive at this conclusion ?". [The answer is given in the Sūtra.]—

Sūtra 48

In regard to the 'Unperceived' Gavaya we do not find any use for the particular Instrument of Cognition called 'Analogy.'

BHĀṢYA

[What actually happens in Analogical Cognition is as follows]—A person, who has seen the Bull and has been apprised of the resemblance (between the Bull and the Gavaya), comes to *perceive* an animal (of unknown name) resembling the Bull, and then arrives at the cognition, 'this is *gavaya*,' in which he recognises the application of the name 'gavaya' ;—now this certainly is not *Inference.**

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more than what he has learnt from the said sentence ; even the connection of the name '*gavaya*' with the particular animal is known only from that sentence. So that in analogical cognition, the cognition of the perceived *bull* gives rise to the cognition of the *animal bearing the name of 'gavaya'*, which is not perceived. [Even though the *gavaya* is actually *perceived* when the analogical cognition appears, yet the animal *as bearing the particular name* can never be said to be *perceived*; for the application of the name depends entirely upon the advisory sentence ; so that when the qualifying *name* is not-perceived, even though the aninal itself is *perceived, yet as along with the qualification*, the animal is '*not perceived*'.] Thus, being the cognition of the unperceived by means of the perceived, Analogical Cognition is purely *inferential*. Such is the sense of the *Pūrvapakṣa*.—*Tātparya*.

* The species '*gavaya*' is that to which the name '*gavaya*' belongs ; this is not cognised by means of the sentence 'as the bull so the *gavaya*' ; all that this sentence expresses is the resemblance to the bull of a certain unknown animal ; nor does the word '*gavaya*' as occurring in the sentence denote the said resemblance ; so that at the time that the sentence is heard, the man does not become cognisant of the connection between the name '*gavaya*' and the unknown animal ; and what actually happens in *analogical* cognition is that, when the particular animal comes to be actually *seen*, the species to which that animal belongs becomes *perceived* ; and thence results the cognition that this animal belongs to the species named '*gavaya*' ; and this is the operation of 'analogy', which is thus found to operate upon the *perceived*, and not *unperceived gavaya*.—*Tātparya*.

[There is a further difference between Analogical and Inferential Cognitions]—Analogy is (propounded) for the sake of another person; that is to say, it is propounded by a person who knows both members (of resemblance), for the benefit of another person to whom one member, the *upamēya* (the object that is described as resembling a known thing), is not known.*

Says the *Opponent*,—"If what you mean is that Analogy is for the benefit of another person, then what you say is not right; for as a matter of fact, the cognition arising therefrom belongs to the man himself; certainly, my good Sir, when the man propounds the analogy in the words, 'as the bull so the *gavaya*', the cognition produced by it arises in the man himself (just as much as in another person) [so that being for one's own benefit as well as for that of another person, Analogy is exactly like Inference]."

We do not deny that the resulting cognition arises in the man also; what we mean is that the propounder's own cognition is not *analogical*; for 'Analogy is that which accomplishes what has to be accomplished on the basis of well-known resemblance' (says the Sūṭra, 1-1·6); and certainly for the man to whom both members of the analogy are well-known, and as such fully *accomplished*, there can be no relation (between Analogy and the Cognition) of what is *to be accomplished* and the *means* accomplishing it.

Further—

Sūtra 49

Inasmuch as Analogy is always stated in the form 'as—so,' it cannot be regarded as non-different (from Inference).

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, Analogy is always stated in the form 'as—so', by means of which the common property (constituting resemblance) is mentioned; so that it cannot be the same as Inference. This also is what constitutes a difference between Analogy and Inference.

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* उपमेय is the better reading as found in the Puri Mss. For प्रसिद्धोभयेन also the Puri Mss. read प्रसिद्धोपमेयेन; but from what follows in L. 4 below प्रसिद्धोभयेन appears to be the better reading.

THE POONA ORIENTALIST

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EDITORIAL

With the outgoing issue THE POONA ORIENTALIST completes its third volume or Three years. That it has rendered useful service to the cause of Indology, we are able to infer from the encouragement given to us by the Scholarly world. Our continuing the Journal is dependent upon the help given to us by contributors as well as subscribers. And we are glad to announce that we have been able to get this help unstintingly. During the course of the last one or two years several other learned periodicals have begun to appear from Poona. We are glad to notice that the subject of Indology is becoming very popular and attracting the attention of a larger number of people.

Among the contributors to the pages of this journal, we are proud to say, the readers will find the names of scholars of high eminence and international reputation. The choice of the subjects has also been varied and suiting different tastes. In short, the activities and usefulness of this journal are unique. By the Grace of God we hope to keep up the standard of its excellence and usefulness.

In the pages of this journal, the text of the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama has already run upto the 3rd *adhyāya*, 1st *āhnika* and 32nd *sūtra*. But the corresponding translation has reached the 2nd *adhyāya*, 1st *āhnika* and 49th *sūtra*. We realise the difficulty which the readers must be experiencing on account of this discrepancy.

We have already added 16 pages of a new but hitherto unpublished work entitled Kavīndracandrodaya (कवीन्द्रचन्द्रोदयः) in No. 3, Vol. III of *The Poona Orientalist* without any preliminary note about that work. In order to make our learned readers acquainted with the nature of this rare treasure-house, we have

added in this issue the first 10 pages containing the title and introduction which would explain the value of this work. The remaining 54 pages of this work would be added in the next issues of *The Poona Orientalist.*

In the fourth Vol. of this journal we propose to publish very original articles on hitherto untrodden subjects such as Sāmagāna, Pāṇini's Gaṇa pāṭha, Dhātupāṭha and Geography, Indian Mathematics etc. by learned savants who have devoted their thought and labours to these subjects for their life-time.

ANNOUNCEMENT

We have now started the English Translation of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, along with the Bhāṣya of Saṅkarācārya. The importance of this Upaniṣad for the students of the Advaita philosophy is quite well-known. But the difficulty is that of understanding the text and the Bhāṣya without a good translation. Fortunately, Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Ganga Nath Jha, with great pains and trouble, has revised, nay re-written, at this advanced age, his old translation formerly printed in Madras. The scholarly world cannot adequately express its gratitude to the great scholar who is a veritable devotee at the shrine of Sarasvatī.

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
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY

OF

BRĀHMANICAL ASCETICISM (SAMNYĀSA)

BY

Vidyāsudhākara PANDIT HAR DUTT SHARMA, M. A., Ph. D.
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TO THE SACRED AND LOVING MEMORY

OF

The late Professor Dr. M. WINTERNITZ

One of the greatest Indologists that the modern times have known
This humble work is most respectfully dedicated

by

his affectionate pupil

Har Dutt Sharma

PREFACE

In the following pages I am presenting an abridged form of my thesis approved for the degree of Ph. D. by the German University (Deutsche Universität) of Prague in June 1930. For want of space the texts of the passages are not quoted but references only are given to them in the foot-notes. As all the editions are notified in the list of abbreviations, it will not be difficult to check these quotations. It was the desire of my late Guru, Professor Dr. M. Winternitz, to print it in Europe along with his long Introduction dealing with the other phases of Asceticism from the point of view of Buddhism and Jainism. Financial stringency in the German University and the ill health of Prof. Winternitz were responsible for the delay in printing. At long last in July 1936 he sent a typed copy of my thesis along with various suggestions for my approval and revision. On account of several unavoidable circumstances I could not pay any attention to it for a long time. But, in the meantime, as ill-luck would have it, my beloved Professor suddenly expired on the 9th of January, 1937. The exhaustive notes which the Professor had prepared could not be traced in his papers and they have been irretrievably lost. Then I approached my other teacher and friend Professor Dr. Otto Stein of the same University to take up the task which Prof. Winternitz intended to do. Prof. Stein very kindly and gladly accepted the proposal of writing an Introduction. But the political turmoil in Europe which developed into a crisis in Czechoslovakia in the last few months prevented him from doing anything. As there had been frequent enquiries from my friends about this work I decided to print it off without further delay. I am fully conscious that in its present form it labours under several disadvantages and there are various problems which need further elucidation, but I hope that the scholarly world would forgive all the shortcomings. If time permits I shall take up these problems at some future date.

As a mark of deep reverence and love for my Guru, the late Prof. Dr. M. Winternitz, I dedicate this volume respectfully to his sacred memory.

In the end I offer my most sincere thanks to Dr. N. G. Sardesai whose obligations on me are too many to be expressed.

Hindu College, Delhi.
January, 1939 **Har Dutt Sharma.**

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

Ait. Br.	= Aitareya Brāhmaṇa..
Āp. Dh. S.	= Āpastambadharmasūtra.
Āp. Ś. S.	= Āpastambaśrautasūtra.
A. S. S.	= Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series.
A. V.	= Atharvaveda.
Baudh. Dh. S.	= Baudhāyanadharmasūtra (Hultzsch's Edn.)
B. R.	= Böhtlingk and Roth : Sanskrit Wörterbuch. (Petersburg)
Bomb. S. S.	= Bombay Sanskrit Series.
Bṛh. Ā. U.	= Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
Chānd. U.	= Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
E. R. E.	= Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.
Gaut. Dh. S.	= Gautamadharmasūtra.
H. O. S.	= Harvard Oriental Series.
J. R. A. S.	= Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Mahāni. T.	= Mahānirvāṇatantra (Tāntrik Texts edtd. by Arthur Avalon) Madras, 1929.
Mbh.	= Mahābhārata (Calcutta Edn.)
Mu. U.	= Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
M. U.	= Minor Upaniṣads, Vol. I. Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads, (Edtd. by F. Otto Schrader, Madras, 1912).
Ār. U.	= Āruṇi Upaniṣad (M. U.)
Āś. U.	= Āśrama Upaniṣad ,,
B. U.	= Brahma Upaniṣad ,,
Bh. U.	= Bhikṣuka Upaniṣad ,,
B. S. U.	= Bṛhatsaṃnyāsa Upaniṣad ,,
Brh. U.	= Bṛhadavadhūta Upaniṣad ,,
J. U.	= Jābāla Upaniṣad ,,
K. Ś. U.	= Kaṭhaśruti Upaniṣad ,,
L. U.	= Laghvavadhūta Upaniṣad ,,
Mai. U.	= Maitreya Upaniṣad ,,

their studies are embodied in their writings. But in its ancient form the problem has not been thoroughly examined. The similarity existing between the Buddhistic, the Jinistic and the Brāhmaṇic asceticism is so great, their rules and regulations of life so akin to each other, that a comparative study and the chronological position presents an interesting problem. Scholars like T. W. Rhys Davids, H. Jacobi and G. Bühler have tackled this question in the last century, and it has not lost its interest even for modern students. They have arrived at conclusions which are contradictory. It will be well to quote their opinions in their own words.

At one place[1] Rhys Davids says :

" Unable, therefore, whether they (brāhmaṇas) wanted or not, to stay the progress of newer ideas (of Buddhism), the priests strove to turn the incoming tide into channels favourable to their order. They formulated—though this was sometime after the rise of Buddhism—the famous theory of the Āśramas or Efforts, according to which no one could become either a Hermit or a Wanderer without having first passed many years as a student in the Brāhmin school and lived after that the life of a married householder as regulated in the brahmin law-books."

At another place[2] he remarks :

" We can, I think, go safely further, and say that it (the institution of Saṃnyāsa) must have been, in all probability, after Buddha, and even after the time when the Piṭakas were put together."

Jacobi says[3] :

" We see thus that the germs of dissenting sects like those of the Buddhists and the Jainas were contained in the institute of the fourth Āśrama, and that latter was the model of the heretical sects ; therefore, Buddhism and Jainism must be regarded as religions developed out of Brāhmiṇism not by a sudden reformation but prepared by a religious movement going on for a long time. "

1. Buddhist India, p. 249.

2. See Dialogues of Buddha (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. II) Pp. 212-219.

3. S. B. E. 22, p. XXXII.

Bühler[1] also arrives at a similar conclusion :

"Wie die fünf grossen Gelübde sind auch die meisten speciellen Vorschriften über die Disciplin der Jaina-Asceten Copien und oft outrirte Copien der brahmanischen Regeln für Büsser. Die äusseren Abzeichen des Ordens sind denen der Saṃnyāsin sehr ähnlich. Das Wanderleben während der acht Monate und die Rast während der Regenxeit stimmen genau. In diesen und manchen anderen Punkten, z. B. in dem Gebrauche der Beichte, treffen sie auch mit den Buddhisten zusammen. Mit den Brahmanen allein ist ihnen aber die ascetische Selbstpeinigung gemeinsam, welche der Buddhismus verwirft, und besonders charakteristisch ist der Umstand, dass auch der alte Brahmanismus den Hungertod seinen Büssern als heilsam empfiehlt".

Jarl Charpentier[2] opines :

"...........but it is a strange characteristic of these sects (Jaina and Bauddha), so far as we know of them, that they adopted in their ascetic practices and in their whole mode of life the rules which had already been fixed by their Brāhman antagonists."

Later on, Schubring[3] and Dikshitar[4] also take it for granted that the Jinistic and the Buddhistic rules of asceticism are derived from Brāhmanism.

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1. Sekte der Jainas (Die feierliche Sitzung d. k. Akad. d. Wiss. Wien, 1887.)

The translation of the passage is :—

Like the five great vows, most of the special rules for the discipline of the Jaina ascetics are copies, often exact copies, of the brahmanical rules for the penitent. The external marks of their Order are very much similar to that of Saṃnyāsins. The tour of eight months and the rest of four months during the rains, are the same in both. In these and many other points, e. g., confession, both these systems agree with the Buddhist system also. The Jainas and Brāhmaṇas both have in common the ascetic self-torture, which, however, is rejected by the Buddhists. And the circumstance that even the old Brahmanism recommends fasting unto death in the case of penitents, is specially remarkable.

2. Cambridge History of India, Vol. I, p. 150.

3. See *Jinismus* in "Das Licht des Ostens," p. 120.

4. The Early History of Buddhism in India, published in the Journal of Bombay Historical Society, Vol. II, 1929, Pp. 51-74. (Reprint, Bombay, 1929).

But asceticism has not been studied thoroughly from the individual point of view of Brāhmaṇism, Buddhism and Jinism. For, without the thorough study of each system separately, a judgment of the priority of one over the other cannot be accurate. Feeling this want, an attempt is made here to give the Brāhmaṇical points of view of the question, without venturing upon the judgment of the relation existing between it and Buddhism and Jinism. This account is based upon the study and examination of the Saṃhitās, Upaniṣads, Brāhmaṇas, Dharmasūtras and Smṛtis, specially the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads published by Schrader in the first volume of the Minor Upaniṣads. I hope, this attempt will stimulate a similar study of Buddhistic and Jinistic asceticism, which will lead to an establishment of their comparative position.

The first question which presents itself for examination is the theory of the āśramas. The word āśrama has been explained as "efforts" by Rhys Davids,[1] and Keith[2] would have it in the sense of 'resting place'. But, I think, Prof. Winternitz[3] is right when he says :

"Das Wort āśrama (von derselben Wurzel śram wie śramaṇa) bedeutete wahrscheinlich zuerst *die religiose Bemuhüng* von śramaṇas, Asketen und Waldeinsiedlern, weshalb es auch die Bedeutung *Ort fur religiose Bemühungen*, *Einsiedelei* erhielt. Auch das Vedastudium beim Lehrer, das Brahmacarya, war ja mit

1. See n. 1, p. 8.
2. Macdonell and Keith : Vedic Index, I., p. 68.
3. "Zur Lehre von den Āśramas" published in age zur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Festga Jacobi zum 75. Geburtstag, Bonn 1926.

The translation of the passage is :—

The word āśrama (from the same root śram, as śramaṇa) denoted perhaps in the beginning *the religious exertion* on the part of śramaṇas, ascetics and forest-dwelling hermits, on account of which this word denotes also the meaning of *the place for religious exertion, a hermitage*. And even brahmacarya, (the period of) studying the Vedas with teacher, on account of being accompanied by different sorts of abstinences and mortifications, could be easily explained as āśrama. And because the brāhmaṇas named even the life of a householder as āśrama so, through this designation, they placed it (the householder's life) in one line with the life and all sorts of religious penances of ascetics.

allerlei Enthaltungen und Kasteiungen verbunden und konnte daher leicht als ein āśrama erklärt werden. Indem die Brahmanen auch das Leben des Hausvaters als āśrama bezeichneten, stellten sie es schon durch diese Bezeichnung in eine Linie mit dem Leben und de *religiosen Bemühungen* aller Arten von Asketen."

The question, as to the existence of any theory of the āśramas in the oldest texts has been very ably discussed by various scholars and recently by Prof. Winternitz,[1] N. N. Law,[2] and W. Eggers.[3] We find traces of the existence "in the Aryan Society from very early times of the student (brahmacārin), the householder (gṛhastha) and the person who renounced the world (muni or yati) as is evidenced in the earliest Vedic works."[4] But the establishment of the theory of āśramas does not seem to have taken place before the time of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad wherein we find the term atyāśramin.[5] In the oldest Upaniṣads there is evidence of only the first two or three āśramas, viz., that of a student, that of a householder, and that of a yati or a muni. According to the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad[6] a man reaches the *summum bonum*, even in the stage of a householder. We read there that a man, having learnt the Vedas at the house of his preceptor, should establish himself in the stage of a householder and spend his whole life in repeating the sacred texts, employing his sons or disciples in dharma, controlling his senses and practising non-injury towards all the living beings, except when ordered otherwise by the scriptures. One who behaves like this for his whole life, reaches the world of the Brahman and is never reborn.

In the old Upaniṣads, we find no difference made between the stages of a vānaprastha and a saṃnyāsin. Perhaps N. N. Law is right when he accounts for this lack of distinction :

"As both vānaprastha and saṃnyāsa were founded upon common basis of the renunciation of the world, so both are most

1. Ibid, Festgabe Hermann Jacobi, Bonn 1926.
2. N. N. Law, Studies in Indian History and Culture, Calcutta Oriental Series 18, chapter I.
3. Das Dharmasūtra der Vaikhānasas, Göttingen, 1929.
4. Studies in Ind. Hist. and Culture, p. 3.
5. VI. 21.
6. VIII. 15. 1.

probably combined and referred to as one in the Upaniṣads and it is perhaps for this reason that terms like muni are applied to both."[1]

But this fourth stage of Saṃnyāsa was not always looked upon with favour. For, we find very early the evidences which, although not directly opposed to Saṃnyāsa, yet prescribe the householder's life as the ideal life and to be followed till death. We read in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa :[2]

" *etad vai jarāmaryaṃ sattraṃ yad agnihotraṃ*," that is, one should offer sacrifice to fire as long as he lives. The Taittirīya-Upaniṣad[3] also orders :

"*Prajātantuṃ mā vyavacchetsīḥ*", i.e. do not break the thread of progeny. The Iśāvāsya-Upaniṣad[4] prescribes :

"*kurvann eva iha karmāṇi jijīviṣet śataṃ samāḥ*", a man should desire to live in this world performing actions for his whole life (and not renouncing them). According to Haradatta,[5] Āpastamba does not seem to approve of one's entering another stage of life and leaving the stage of a householder after once entering it.

We find a very interesting discussion on the importance or the blameworthiness of the Saṃnyāsa āśrama in the Mahābhārata.[6] Yudhiṣṭhira, after the great battle, is disgusted with the world and wants to become an ascetic. He is dissuaded by his brothers and wife. The arguments of Bhīma are of special interest[7] :

"It is taught (in the scriptures) that a man should enter Saṃnyāsa at the time of (the fall of some) calamity, or when a man is old or is harassed by his ennemies."

"Therefore, wise men do not acknowledge renunciation. And men of acute vision consider it a transgression of the law."

1. Studies in Ind. Hist. and Culture, ch. I.
2. XIII. 4. 1. 1.
3. I. 11. 1.
4. 2.
5. See his comm. on Āp. Dh. S. II. 9. 21. 1.
6. XII, Ch. 10 and sq.
7. Ibid, Ch. 10, verses 293, 294, 296-298 and 300-301.

"(Saṃnyāsa) has been started by (men who are) devoid of fortune, (and) paupers and atheists, (and it is represented by them) as the teaching of the Vedas, (whileas, in reality, it is) a falsehood looking like truth."

"By resorting to tonsure, (and thus) resorting to the deceit of the law, it is possible for one, who supports his self with the self, to perish but not to live."

"Again it is possible (i.e. very easy) to live alone in the forest happily, without (taking the trouble of) supporting sons, grandsons, gods, sages, guests and manes."

"O king! if a man could attain to perfection by Saṃnyāsa, then the mountains and the trees should very soon attain to perfection."

"They are seen always in renunciation, they have no troubles, they have no possessions and they are always chaste."

These verses suggest that very probably Saṃnyāsa was originally the doctrine of the dissenters from the orthodox ritualistic life of an ancient Ārya. This suggestion is supported by the arguments of Arjuna in the next chapter, where he relates a story, that in the days of yore some brāhmaṇas had entered Saṃnyāsa from Brahmacarya. Indra denounced the conduct of these brāhmaṇas and made them return to the Gṛhastha stage. The fact, that in these chapters of the Mahābhārata, Saṃnyāsa is referred to as *nāstikya*, and also the story of Indra and the brāhmaṇas, may have preserved a very ancient tradition when asceticism was looked upon with disfavour. In this connection, another fact may also be taken into account. It is the story of Indra's killing the Yatis which we find in the Atharvaveda.[1] This story, which is also found in the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa[2] and in the Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa,[3] is in direct contradiction to the

1. II. 5. 3. The text reads "*Yatīr na*". Whitney explains it as "like moving (streams)." H. O. S. VII, p. 44. Sāyaṇa explains: "*Yatīr na, Yatayo nāma niyamaśīlā āsuryāḥ prajāḥ......Yad vātra yatiśabdena vedāntārthavicāraśūnyāḥ parivrājakā vivakṣitāh.*" Cf. also "*Triśīrśāṇāṃ tvāṣṭram ahaṇam arunmukhān Yatīn sālāvṛkebhyaḥ prāyacchaṃ*:" Kausītaki Up. 3, 1.

2. VII. 28.

3. XIII, 4, 17 and VIII, 1. 4. In the first passage Sāyaṇa explains the term *Yatīn* as "*Yajñavirodhijanān*", in the second passage as "*vedaviruddhaniyamopetān*".

passage of the Ṛgveda,[1] where Indra is called "*munīnāṃ sakhā*", and also to the ākhyāyikā in the Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa,[2] wherein Indra is said to have restored the Vaikhānasa ṛṣis to life who had been put to death by the asuras at a place called "munimaraṇa". Further on, as Law points out in his book,[3] in the story of the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa quoted above, we find that Indra was excommunicated for the misdeeds committed by him, one of these being the killing of the Yatis.

So, according to the Ṛgveda, Indra is the friend of the *Munis* ; according to the Atharvaveda, he kills the *Yatis* ; according to the Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa, he restores the *vaikhānasa ṛṣis* to life ; and according to the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa, he is excommunicated by the gods and not allowed to drink the Soma for killing the *Yatis*.

Here, it would be interesting to take up the term Śramaṇa. We find in the Buddhistic literature the term samaṇa-brāhmaṇā[4] as a common term used for religious men. This term is also found in the Inscriptions of Aśoka.[5] Megasthenes also mentions the "sarmanes" in his account.[6]

"As to the Sarmanes, the most highly honoured are called 'forest-dwellers' (i.e. vānaprasthas). They live in the forests on leaves and wild fruits and wear clothes made of the bark of trees, abstaining from cohabitation and wine "[7]

This word *śramaṇa* occurs in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad,[8] along with the word *tāpasa*. Śaṅkara explains *śramaṇa* as *parivrāj*,

1. VIII. 17, 14.
2. XIV. 4. 7, see also Eggers : Das Dharmasūtra der Vaikhānasas, p. 13.
3. See above, n. 2, p. 14.
4. See Dīghanikāya I. 30. etc.
5. See Corpus Insc. Ind. Vol. L. Hultzsch Edn. IV Rock-Edict of Girnar, III and IV Rock-Edicts of Shahbazgarhi, III and IV Rock-Edicts of Mansehra.
6. For full account and discussion of this term, see O. Stein : Megasthenes und Kauṭilya, Wien, 1922, p. 279 ff, Bevan : The Cambridge History of India, Vol. I., Ch. XVI
7. Camb. Hist. Ind. I, p. 420.
8. IV. 3. 22.

and *tāpasa* as *vānaprastha*. We find this term in the Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka also. The passage is very important, so I quote it :

vātaraśanā ha vā ṛṣayaḥ śramaṇā ūrdhvamanthino babhūvuḥ.[1]

"The vātaraśana sages (lit. wind-girt, i.e. naked) were śramaṇas and chaste. The word ūrdhavamanthinaḥ is explained by Sāyaṇa as ūrdhvaretasaḥ. So, here we find that the Śramaṇas were naked and chaste.

But this term vātaraśanāḥ occurs at one more place in the Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka,[2] viz :

"He (Prajāpati) practised penance. He, after practising penance, shook his body. That what was his flesh, from it arose (the three kinds of) ṛṣis, Aruṇas, Ketus and Vātaraśanas. (Those) which (were his) nails (from them arose) Vaikhānasas, (and those) which (were his) hair (from them arose) the Vālakhilyas."

Further on, we find the term vātaraśanāḥ as an adjective for the munis in the Ṛgveda.[3] The munis are mentioned here as naked (or ?) having piśaṅga (i.e. yellow) and mala (i.e. soiled)[4] garments.

From the facts mentioned above, it is clear, that there existed śramaṇas during the time of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad and the Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka, and that they were naked and chaste. The term vātaraśanāḥ has been treated by the Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka as a proper noun, but it seems, that it is based on the etymology of being girt by the wind. These naked sages, who sometimes clothed themselves in yellow or dirty garments, are to be met with in the Ṛgveda also.

I am tempted to put forward the suggestion that these vātaraśanas of the Ṛgveda, who by the time of the Āraṇyakas took the title of śramaṇa, were the earliest dissenters from the orthodox Vedic religion. They are the same as the yatis who are killed by Indra. And the fact of Indra's being punished for this, does not necessarily prove that the yatis were so

1. T. Ā. II. 7.

2. *"Sa tapo'tapyata, sa tapas taptvā śarīram adhūnata, tasya yan māṃsam āsīt tato'ruṇāḥ Ketavo vātaraśanā ṛṣaya udatiṣṭhan, ye nakhāḥ te vaikhānasāḥ, ye vālāḥ te vālakhilyāḥ.* I. 23.

3. X. 136. 2. But Sāyaṇa explains it as *vātaraśanasya putrāḥ*.

4. Macd.—Keith. Vedic Index II, 137.

much honoured and approved of by the orthodox section, that their killing was considered to be a crime. For, amongst the crimes of Indra, there is also his killing of Vṛtrāsura. Analogically the killing of the asura must also be a crime, and Vṛtra must also have been looked upon with respect by the sages. But the facts are to the contrary.

This śramaṇa is the atyāśramin of the Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad.[1] I do not suggest that Saṃnyāsa as an āśrama rose after Buddhism. Most probably it was before the rise of Buddhism that the old three āśramas were expanded into four to find a place for these dissenters, who denied every sacrifice and the study of the Vedas, and later on, their conduct was given the shape of a regulated life, and still later (as will be shown in the following chapters) even the Vedic ritual was imposed upon them.

1. VI. 21.

CHAPTER I

Saṃnyāsa, the Time for it, and the People Qualified to Enter it.

The word Saṃnyāsa is derived from the root *as* (to throw), preceded by the prepositions *saṃ* and *ni*, by adding the suffix *ghañ*[1] in the sense of an abstract noun. It, therefore, means resignation, renunciation or abandoning. *Monier Williams*[2] explains the word Saṃnyāsin :

"One who abandons or resigns worldly affairs, an ascetic, devotee, who has renounced all earthly concerns and devotes himself to meditation and the study of the Āraṇyakas or Upaniṣads, a Brāhman in the fourth Āśrama or stage of his life, a religious mendicant."

This renunciation is that of fire, as is evident from the Saṃnyāsopaniṣad, where it is enjoined that no man should return to the house-holder's life after renouncing fire.[3] The Bhagavadgītā defines Samṇyāsa as the renunciation of actions done with some purpose in view.[4] But as all the actions done according to the Vedic ritual lead to some desired fruit, it comes to the renunciation of all the ritualistic actions.

This naturally leads to the question as to who should enter Saṃnyāsa. There is a very great difference of opinion on this point. Most of the Upaniṣads and the Dharmasūtras are of opinion that a man after having finished his student-career (brahmacarya) should enter a householders' life. After this, he should go to the forest and first lead the life of a forester (vānaprastha) and then he should enter the stage of a Saṃnyāsin.[5] In the Kaṭhaśruti-Upaniṣad, in answer to the question as to how one becomes Saṃnyasta, we read : "One who protects his self by actions."[6] This is explained by Nārāyaṇa in his Commentary : "One who makes himself untouched by sin by performing the obligatory and optional rites beginning from Brahmacarya."[7]

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1. Pāṇ. III. 3. 19 : Bhāve.
2. M. W., p. 1148.
3. S. U., p. 20.
4. XVIII. 2.
5. J. U., p. 64.
6. K. Ś. U., p. 31.
7. S. Ṭ., p. 386.

Further on, the Kaṭhaśruti-Upaniṣad enjoins that a man in his student-life may read one, two or all the Vedas, then he should marry. Then he should beget sons and place them in proper sphere of life. And after having performed sacrifices according to his means, he should enter Saṃnyāsa, being permitted by his elders and relatives.[1] The Viṣṇu-Smṛti also holds that a man should enter Saṃnyāsa after ripening (i.e. having become disgusted with) the desires in the three āśramas.[2] In the Manu-Smṛti[3] we read that a man should enter Saṃnyāsa after he has passed the third part of his life in the forest and renounced attachment to all objects. He should pass through all the three āśramas in their respective order, and having controlled his senses and getting tired of begging, he should go forth as an ascetic : thus, after death, he makes progress. He should attach his mind to salvation after having paid off the three debts, without doing which he would go to hell. He should attach himself to mokṣa, after he has learnt the Vedas in order, righteously begotten sons and performed sacrifices according to his means. If a twice-born desires for salvation without reading the Vedas, without begetting sons and without offering sacrifices, he goes to hell. In the Mahābhārata[4] it is said that when a man becomes miserable on account of old age and when he suffers from illness and when only a fourth of his life is left, he should leave the Vānaprastha-stage and enter Saṃnyāsa. According to Āpastamba[5] a man should enter Saṃnyāsa only after he has already fulfilled the duties of the student stage, and that he should remain chaste. Haradatta in his commentary Ujjvala has entered into a lengthy discussion on this sūtra, which may be summarised as follows :

The words *ata eva* in the text indicate that the ācārya does not approve of one's entering another stage of life and leaving the stage of a householder after entering it once. The sense is that when a man is married then for his entire life he should perform the sacrifice of fire. But this law will be contradicted

1. M. U., Pp. 37-38.
2. 96. 1. cf. Manu VI. 138, Yāj. III. 56.
3. VI. 33-37.
4. Mbh. XII, ch. 244. 8906, and also ch. 191.
5. Āp. Dh. S. II. 9. 21. 8.

if a man is allowed to leave the householder's stage and enter Saṃnyāsa. Therefore, even when his passions are extinct, a householder should not give up his stage; for he can attain salvation in his own stage by performing the obligatory and optional actions and by renouncing the actions which are either prohibited or are actuated by desires. So says Yājñavalkya (III. 205) also: "Even in the stage of a householder one can attain salvation, if he earns money lawfully, if he is well-established in the knowledge of the reality (of the Universe), if he welcomes guests, performs śrāddhas and speaks the truth." But if it is asked, that what objection have we to the Renunciation (Saṃnyāsa) by a man who has not kindled fires (that is, who is not married), we reply that it contradicts the Vedic injunction that a Brāhmaṇa is born with three debts: to the ṛṣis he pays off by living in the stage of a student, to the gods by performing sacrifices and to the manes by begetting children. Manu (VI. 35) also agrees with it. But now an opponent may say to us:— In this case one cannot enter Saṃnyāsa even from the stage of a student. And if you say that you can ordain Saṃnyāsa according to the injunction of the Śruti (Jābāla-Upaniṣad) "*Yad* (*ahar*) *eva virajet tad* (*ahar*) *eva pravrajet*" (i.e. one should enter Saṃnyāsa the very day he is free from passions), then this injunction will apply to the case of that householder also whose passions are extinct. Compare Manu (VI. 38). It will include the following case also:—a householder who is old, whose wife is dead, and who is unable to marry again. We, therefore, think that the only necessary condition for entering Saṃnyāsa is freedom from passions. All the remaining stages of brahmacarya, gṛhastha and vānaprastha are ordained for those who are not free from passions.

According to Baudhāyana[1] and the Vaikhānasadharmapraśna[2] the time for entering Saṃnyāsa is after a man is seventy years of age and when the worldly actions of a vānaprastha are over; when he has either no children or is a widower and when he meditates upon the problems of birth, death and old age and is desirous of Yoga. Or after having

1. Baud. Dh. S. II. 10. 3-6. 2. Vaikh. Dh. II. 6.

placed his children in the proper spheres of duties, having entrusted his wife to his son and having attached his mind to Parameśvara, he should enter Saṃnyāsa. Yājñavalkya also agrees with the above.[1]

The Bṛhatsaṃnyāsa-Upaniṣad[2] goes to a greater length and says that only that man is allowed to take up Saṃnyāsa who has undergone forty saṃskāras,[3] is indifferent to everything, is of pure mind, has burnt hope, envy, jealousy and egoism, and is possessed of the four requisites.[4]

In the Nāradaparivrājaka-Upaniṣad[5] we find a more detailed account of how one should enter Saṃnyāsa. He should first be invested with sacred thread by one born in high family and learn all the sciences, particularly the śākhā of his Veda, under a teacher whom he likes and who has already undergone the forty-four saṃskāras. For twelve years he should observe brahmacarya, for twenty-five years he should live as a gṛhastha, and twenty-five years he should spend in the vānaprastha stage. He should properly pass through all these stages of life in their respective order. He should well practise the fourfold brahmacarya, the sixfold gārhasthya and the fourfold vānaprastha stages,[6] performing all the necessary duties prescribed for these. A Saṃnyāsin who, being endowed with the four requisites,[7] and being above the world because of freedom from every expectation arising from the function of mind, speech and body, being above desires, and who is free from enmity, is peaceful and has his senses under control,—a Saṃnyāsin in the paramahaṃsa stage, when he gives up his body by constantly meditating upon his own self, attains salvation.

1. Yāj. III. 57.
2. M. U. Pp. 249–50.
3. On the number of saṃskāras in different texts, see Hillebrandt: Ritual-Litteratur, p. 41 (Grundriss der indoarischen Philologie u. Altertumskunde, III. 2).
4. The four means or requisites are (*a*) nityānityavastuviveka, (*b*) ihāmutra phalabhogavirāga, (*c*) śamadamādisampat and (*d*) mumukṣutva. For explanation, see Vedāntasāra, (K. Sundaram Aiyar's edn. Vanī Vilas Press, Srirangam, 1911) p. 23 ff.
5. M. U. Pp. 131–2.
6. For the different kinds of brahmacarya etc., see Āś. U. Pp. 95–100.
7. See note 4 above.

At the time of entering Saṃnyāsa, a man should take the permission of his parents, wife, sons, friends and relatives.[1] The Mahānirvāṇatantra[2] is very particular on this point and enjoins that nobody should enter Saṃnyāsa, leaving his old parents, devoted wife, his children and his relatives. One who does so, commits a great sin ; he commits the sin of murdering his parents, his wife, and a Brāhmaṇa, who enters Saṃnyāsa without their permission. According to the Arthaśāstra also,[3] a man should renounce the world, when he is free from passions and has taken the permission of religious men. And before entering into Saṃnyāsa, he should make provision for his wife and children, otherwise he is liable to punishment.

But the one necessary condition for entering Saṃnyāsa, as has already been pointed out, is vairāgya–indifference to the objects of the world. It is said in the Maitreya-Upaniṣad[4] that neither the renunciation of actions nor the utterance of the praiṣa formula (*saṃnyastaṃ mayā*) leads to Saṃnyāsa. What leads to Saṃnyāsa is the realisation of the Unity between the individual and the Universal Soul and not the performance of daily rites. He alone is fit for Saṃnyāsa who has given up all ideas about his body and to whom all worldly desires seem like eating vomitted food. A learned man should only then renounce when he becomes indifferent to all the objects of the world, otherwise he becomes an outcaste. One who renounces this world for the sake of money, food, clothes, or honour, falls from both the stages (worldly and spiritual) and can never attain salvation. The Nāradaparivrājaka-Upaniṣad[5] also agrees with this when it says that a wise man should renounce when he has no attachments ; but if he has attachment he should remain in the householder's stage. If a twice-born renounces the world before he is free from attachments, he goes to hell.

This point of vairāgya or virakti is considered so important that in whatsoever a stage a man might be, he can renounce the world if he is free from attachments. In opposition to the above

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1. K. Ś. U. p. 31, Ś. U. p. 327, cf. note 1, p. 18.
2. Mahāni. T. VIII. 17–19. For the character of this rather modern work, see, Winternitz : History of Indian Literature, Vol. I, p. 592, n. 4.
3. II, I. 19. 36, 38 (Jolly's edn.)
4. M. U. Pp. 116–117, 8–11.
5. M. U. p. 138.

view that a man should pass through the first three stages of life in their respective order, we find in other texts that a man can renounce the world whenever he likes. For instance, we read in the Jābāla Upaniṣad :[1]

" He may go forth (as a Saṃnyāsin) even from the brahmacarya stage or from the gṛhastha stage or from the vānaprastha stage. Again, whether he has taken vows or no vows, has bathed (after finishing his Veda-study) or not bathed, is entitled to sacrificial fire (i.e. married) or has no fire, he may enter Saṃnyāsa the very day he is free from attachments."

Baudhāyana[2] considers it to be the opinion of some that a man should renounce the world even immediately on the completion of his student career. The Āruṇi-Upaniṣad[3] is of opinion that a wise man who understands the real meaning of the Veda, may, after or even before being invested with the sacred thread, renounce the following :—father, son, fire, sacred thread, actions wife, and whatever else he possesses. The interesting thing to be noted here is that a man may become a Saṃnyāsin even before being invested with the sacred thread. The commentator Nārāyaṇa[4] is at great pains to explain this fact. He says that if a man knows the meaning of the Vedas for some inexplicable reason, even without being invested with the sacred thread, (perhaps) due to innumerable good deeds done in previous births, then he may renounce the world even before Upanayana. As it is remembered that there were such people before like Bharata, Aitareyaka, Durvāsas, Vyāsa, Śuka, etc.

But there are people who, even though they are free from worldly desires, are not entitled to enter Saṃnyāsa. We read in the Nāradaparivrājaka-Upaniṣad[5] that a blind man, a eunuch,

1. M. U. p. 64.

2. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 10. 17. 2. cf. above (p. 3. f), the discussion on Āpastamba.

3. M. U. p. 9.

4. S. Ṭ. p. 374.

5. M. U. Pp. 136-137 cf. also, W. Eggers : Das Dharmasūtra der Vaikhānasas, p. 16 sq. For the explanation why people bearing the marks of Vaiṣṇavism (cakra) and of Śaivism (liṅga) are not allowed to enter Saṃnyāsa, see, S. Ṭ. p. 430, where Schrader says : "*tayoś cakraliṅgayos tyāgasya āmaraṇaṃ niṣiddhatvāt sarvatyāgarūpe saṃnyāse na adhikṛtau ityṛrthaḥ.*"

and outcast, one who is deficient in any limb, a person attached to female society, a child, a dumb man, a pāṣaṇḍa (heretic), one who has a wheel-mark of Vaiṣṇavism or a phallus-mark of Śaivism, those who take fees for worshipping according to the Vaikhānasa rites or the Śaiva rites, one who accepts fees for teaching the Vedas, a bald man and one does not keep fire—those are not entitled to enter Saṃnyāsa, even when they possess vairāgya. And if they have taken Saṃnyāsa, then they are not entitled to be taught the Mahāvākyas (*tat tvaṃ asi*, etc.). Of course, an exception can be made in the case of an ātura (i.e. a person on his deathbed[1]).

A list of people not authorised to enter Saṃnyāsa is also found in the Bṛhatsaṃnyāsa-Upaniṣad :[2] The child of a person who is ārūḍhapatita (i.e. an apostate), one who has bad nails or black teeth, one suffering from phthisis and one destitute of some limb. The apostates from Saṃnyāsa, the persons who have committed a great sin (like brahmahatyā, surāpāna etc.), the Vrātyas[3] and the abhiśastas[4] should not be allowed to take up Saṃnyāsa. He should not be allowed to enter Saṃnyāsa, who has not observed any vows, has not performed sacrifices, penance, charity, fire-offering, daily study of the Vedas, and who has fallen from truth and purity.

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1. "*Prāṇasya utkramaṇāsannakālas tvātnrasaṃjñitaḥ,*" N. U. p. 137. But the word ātura occurs in the sense of a sick person in the Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra, I. 23, 20, III. 6. 3.

2. M. U. Pp. 250–51. cf. also e.g. Gautama Dh. S. XV, 18, where a list of persons unfit for being witnesses is given.

3. Cf. Winternitz : Die Vrātyas, München 1925 Zeitschrift for Buddhismus, Vol. VI. J. W. Hauer, Der Vrātya, I. 1928. Here evidently in the sense of Sāvitrīpatita, see Visṇu Smṛti XXVII, 27 and Manu X, 20.

4. See Āp. Dh. S. I. 24, 6–9.

CHAPTER II

Different Kinds of Saṃnyāsins

We now come to the different kinds of Saṃnyāsa and the Saṃnyāsins. In Manu[1] we find only two terms—Yati and Vedasaṃnyāsika. In Baudhāyana[2] also we find the term Vedasaṃnyāsika. The commentator Govinda remarks that the duties here prescribed refer to the gṛhastha, for there can be no renunciation of the Veda, as it is against the scriptures. We find the prohibition of the veda-saṃnyāsa in the Vasiṣṭha Smṛti,[3] where it is said that by renouncing the Veda one becomes a Śūdra. A term similar to Vedasaṃnyāsika is ghorasaṃnyāsika, which, according to the Āśramopanisad[4] is a kind of gṛhastha. He performs his duties with water drawn from a well and purified, sustains his daily life by gleaned corn, performs sacrifices lasting a hundred years (i.e. whole life) and prays for the realisation of the soul.

The Jābāla-Upaniṣad[5] mentions parivrāj, ātura and paramahaṃsa. A parivrāj has discoloured clothes, is shaved, has no, possessions, is pure, does not observe enmity towards any one lives upon begging and tends to become one with Brahman. An ātura can renounce merely by thought or by speech. The paramahaṃsas like Saṃvartaka, Āruṇi, Śvetaketu, Durvāsas, Ṛbhu, Nidāgha, Jaḍabharata, Dattātreya, Raivataka and others[6] have no caste or creed signs, have no definite mode of life and though not mad behave like mad people. A paramahaṃsa should meditate upon Self, throwing away his three staves, water-bowl, network bag,[7] his bowl, strainer for purifying water, hair-tuft (śikhā) and the sacred thread into water, pronouncing the

1. VI. 86.
2. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 10. 18. 24. cf. *Bühler's* note on this Sūtra, S. B. E. XIV, p. 283.
3. X. 4.
4. M. U., Pp. 96–98.
5. M. U. Pp. 68–71.
6. Cf. Winternitz, H. I. L. I. 549, n. 1 and 561.
7. Śikya, cf. Marāṭhī :—śiṅke, Hindi-Chīṅkā, see also Eggers : Das Dharmasūtra der Vaikhānasas, III. 8., note 1, p. 88.

formula : *bhūḥ svāhā*. He is naked, free from the pairs of opposites of pain and pleasure etc., has no possessions, is well-accomplished in the path of Brahman, is of pure mind, begs dispassionately at the proper time with the bowl of his stomach only for keeping up his life and becoming indifferent to gain or loss, he resides in empty houses, temples, thickets of grass, near ant-hills,[1] under the trees, in the house of a potter, or in the room for the sacrificial fire, on the beach of a river, in mountain-caves, a hollow of a tree or a deserted plain. He makes no fixed abode, no efforts for anything, has no attachments, is always engaged in meditating upon the pure,[2] is devoted to the Self and is intent upon uprooting evil actions. One, who thus gives up his body by renunciation, is verily a paramahaṃsa.

In the Bhikṣuka-Upaniṣad[3] we find that there are four kinds of bhikṣus who desire mokṣa. They are :—Kuṭīcaka, Bahūdaka, Haṃsa and Paramahaṃsa. To the Kuṭīcaka class belong Gautama, Bharadvāja, Yājñavalkya, Vasiṣṭha and others. They eat eight morsels a day and desire only mokṣa through Yoga. The Bahūdakas, having three staves, a water-pot, a tuft of hair, a sacred thread and reddish-brown cloth, beg eight morsels of food (except honey and meat) at the house of a brahmarṣi and desire for mokṣa through Yoga. The Haṃsas should not reside for more than one night in a village, for more than five nights in a town, and for more than seven nights in a field. They eat cow-dung and drink cow-urine and daily observe the Cāndrayaṇa-vow. They also desire for mokṣa through Yoga. The Paramahaṃsas like Saṃvartaka, Āruṇi, Śvetaketu, Jaḍabharata, Dattātreya, Śuka, Vāmadeva, Hārītaka and others[4] eat eight morsels a day and desire mokṣa through Yoga. They reside under the trees, in an empty house or at a burning-ground. They may or may not have clothes. Neither good (dharma) nor evil (adharma), neither gain nor loss exist for them. They have

1. Cf. *Valmīkāgranimagnamūrtiḥ*, etc. Śakuntalā, VII. 11.

2. *Śukladhyānaparāyaṇaḥ*, One engaged in meditation "on pure spirit" (M. W.), "meditation on the pure, on pure morality" (Böhtlingk). Cf. Hemacandra, Pariśiṣṭaparvan I, 252.

3. M. U., Pp. 233-236.

4. Compare this list with that of the J. U. above.

nothing to do with purity or impurity.[1] A clod of earth, a stone or gold are of the same value to them. They beg their food from every caste and realise their self everywhere.

The division of the Saṃnyāsins into four kinds is acceptable to the Hārīta-Smṛti also.[2] Although the Āśrama-Upaniṣad[3] also recognises the four kinds alluded to above, and although their description is also similar (even verbally) to that given by the Bhikṣuka-Upaniṣad (see above), yet there are some minor points which are peculiar to it and are, therefore, given here :

The Kuṭīcakas beg their meals in the houses of their sons. The Bahūdakas beg their meals in the houses of brāhmaṇas of good conduct and they carry shoes, a seat and have a loin-cloth (in addition to the things prescribed for them by the Bhikṣuka-Upaniṣad). The Haṃsas carry one staff, have no tuft of hair, but have their sacred thread and have their net-work bag and water-pot in their hands and reside for five nights in sacred places (tīrthas). They observe kṛcchracāndrāyaṇa vows etc., lasting for one or two nights. The Paramahaṃsas have no staff, are shaved and have a loin-cloth and a patched garment. They are free from falsehood, bear every trouble, behave equally towards all beings and things and beg their meals from all the four castes as the occasion might require.

The Nāradaparivrājaka-Upaniṣad gives two classifications of Saṃnyāsins. According to one classification,[4] they are of six kinds : Kuṭīcaka, Bahūdaka, Haṃsa, Paramahaṃsa, Turīyātīta and Avadhūta. A Kuṭīcaka has a tuft of hair, sacred thread, staff, waterpot, a loin-cloth and śāṭī (a bigger loin-cloth) ; he waits upon his parents and preceptors, possesses nothing except a pot, a shovel, a śikya etc. ; he eats by begging food at one place only, has a white vertical mark on his fore-head and carries three staves. A Bahūdaka has a tuft of hair, a cloth etc., has three

1. The Vaikh. Dh. is almost identical with this account. It does not, however, give the list of the paramahaṃsas, and instead of reading :— *Śuddhāśuddhadvaitavivarjitāḥ* (Bhi. U.) it reads :—*na teṣāṃ...śuddhyaśuddhī ityādi dvaitaṃ*.

2. X. 13–14., quoted by Mādhava in his Comm. on Parāśara (see p. 160), (Bombay, S. S.). Vol. 48.

3. M. U., Pp. 100–103.

4. M. U., Pp. 174–175.

marks on his fore-head and resembles the Kuṭīcaka in all other respects and eats eight morsels like a bee (begging from different houses and not one). A Haṃsa has matted hair, has three vertical marks on his fore-head, eats food like a bee without making any previous arrangement for it and has a rag for his loins. A Paramahaṃsa has no tuft of hair or sacred thread, begs his meals from five houses only, has no other alms-bowl except his own hands, has one loin-cloth, one śāṭī and one bamboo staff or has a śāṭī only. He besmears himself with ashes and renounces everything else. A Turīyātīta has a cow-mouth, (i.e., eats with his mouth only without the help of his hands ?) and eats fruits only. If he eats corn, then he begs it from three houses only. He has no other belongings except his body, is naked and regards his body like a corpse. An Avadhūta has no restrictions, eats his meals like a big serpent from all the castes except those who are either abhiśastas[1] or outcastes. He is always engaged in meditating upon his own self.

In contradiction to the above rules about the Paramahaṃsa's wearing a śāṭī, a loin-cloth, and a bamboo-staff is the following passage in this very Upaniṣad[2] where it is said that the last three kinds of Saṃnyāsins have no girdle, no loin-cloth, no garments, no water-pot, no staff and they beg their meals from every caste and are stark naked.

Another classification of the Saṃnyāsins is introduced by a question of Nārada : [3]

Then Nārada asked Brahman : Respected sir, you have just now said that Saṃnyāsa is the negation of all the actions (i.e., duties), and you again say that a Saṃnyāsin should observe the duties of his stage. How do you reconcile these contradictory statements ?

Brahman replied : A soul residing in body has four stages:— Jāgrat (wakeful), svapna (dream), suṣupti (deep sleep) and turīya (the fourth, i.e., emancipation). The human beings are subject to these stages and so they either perform actions or are devoted to knowledge and non-attachment.

1. See note 4, p. 23.
• 2. M. U., p. 175.
M. U., Pp. 170–173.

Nārada again asked: If it is so, then of how many kinds is Saṃnyāsa, and what are the different duties connected with them?

Brahman replied: Really speaking Saṃnyāsa is only one; but on account of ignorance, inability and absence of actions, it divided itself into three kinds[1] and subsequently became of four kinds: vairāgya-saṃnyāsa, jñāna-saṃnyāsa, Jñānavairāgya-saṃnyāsa and karma-saṃnyāsa.

A vairāgya-saṃnyāsin is he who, on account of the absence of the wicked god of love in him, becomes free from desires for the objects of senses, and on account of good deeds done before, enters Saṃnyāsa..

He alone is a jñāna-saṃnyāsin, who, endowed with the four requisites[2] has renounced all the worldly objects on account of the knowledge of the śāstras and on account of hearing the transitory experiences of the better worlds.[3] He renounces the entire mundane existence consisting of anger, jealousy, peevishness, egoism and pride. He renounces attachment towards his body in

1. The phrase:—*ajñānena aśaktivaśāt karmalopataś ca traividhyam etya* has been differently explained by Schrader in his Ṭippaṇī: *ajñānena jñānājñānnimittena vidvadvividiṣāsaṃnyāsāviti dvau, aśaktivaśāt karmalopataśca aśaktinimittakakarmasaṅkocāt ca tṛtīya āturasaṃnyāsa iti traividhyaṃ.* That is—the term ajñānena means "on account of knowledge and ignorance", and the two kinds of Saṃnyāsins arising out of them are Vidvatsaṃnyāsin and Vividiṣāsaṃnyāsin respectively. The third kind arises from the want of actions as a result of inability, and ātura belongs to this third class. S. Ṭ. p. 435.

Prof. Winternitz wrote in a letter to me: "The passage is far from clear, and Schrader's commentary is not satisfactory. The meaning seems to be that there is only one saṃnyāsa, viz., vairāgya, but on account of ignorance (of this fact) or of incapability (to attain vairāgya at once), or by giving up works (after having gone through the first three āśramas), there are three more kinds of saṃnyāsa."

2. See note 4, p. 20.

3. The text reads:—*puṇyalokānubhava-śravaṇāt.* I have corrected the translation of the word puṇyaloka from 'holy worlds to 'better worlds' as suggested by Prof. Winternitz. He thinks that the whole phrase should be translated as: 'On account of hearing about the experiences made in the better worlds.' He adds: It may mean as Schrader suggests in his ṭippaṇī, 'experiences made in the better worlds (as to the transitoriness even of these better worlds)'; but the text says nothing about the transitoriness; in my opinion *puṇyaloka* means 'other than human worlds'.

the shape of desire for wife, money and the worlds, and also the attachment towards learning and the better worlds. He considers that all the worldly objects are as worthless as vomitted food.

A jñānavairāgya-saṃnyāsin first practises everything (student-life, householder's life and a forester's life) in due order and then experiences every other thing. Then he realises his own self by knowledge and non-attachment and having no other thing with himself except his body, he enters Saṃnyāsa and goes about naked.

A karma-saṃnyāsin is he who, after having lived as a student, enters the stage of a householder, then that of a forester and finally, though he may not have acquired vairāgya, he enters Saṃnyāsa in the natural order of the four stages of life.

One who enters Saṃnyāsa from the brahmacarya stage only and then goes about naked is a vairāgya-saṃnyāsin. One who enters Saṃnyāsa on account of knowledge is a jñāna-saṃnyāsin ; and he, who enters Saṃnyāsa with a desire to attain knowledge, is a karmasaṃnyāsin.

The karma-saṃnyāsa also is of two kinds:—nimitta-saṃnyāsa (due to some particular reason) and animitta-saṃnyāsa. The nimittasaṃnyāsa is the āturasaṃnyāsa, and the animitta-saṃnyāsa is the karma-saṃnyāsa (entered in the respective order of the āśramas). The nimitta-saṃnyāsa is that which is entered into at the time of death by one who, on account of illness, weakness etc., has become incapable of all actions.

If a person resigns in due order after having become firm, knowing that everything which is created is destructible, and regarding everything like body etc., as a thing to be given up,

Haṃsah śuciṣad vasur antarikṣasad hotā vediṣad atithir duroṇa-sat । *Nṛṣad varasad ṛtasad vyomasad abjā gojā ṛtajā adrijā ṛtaṃ bṛhat.*।[1]

and having become convinced that everything else except Brahman is destructible, this kind of Saṃnyāsa is called an animitta-saṃnyāsa.

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1. R. V. IV. 40, 5 ; Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad V. 2.

CHAPTER III

The Appearance and the Outfit of a Saṃnyāsin

The external signs of a Saṃnyāsin, according to Manu,[1] are that he should have his hair, nails and whiskers clipped, should have a bowl for begging, staff and a water-pot. The pots should not be metallic but of bottle-gourd, wood, earth or split bamboo, and they should not be damaged. They are cleansed by water only (that is, earth etc. are not required for cleansing them), like the sacrificial pots. According to Yājñavalkya,[2] cow's hair may also be used for cleansing the pots. Baudhāyana[3] ordains that an ascetic should go to the forest, having his head including even the tuft of hair shaved, should have a loin-cloth to cover himself, and his upper garments should be reddish brown.

According to Gautama[4] he may have his head shaved entirely or with the tuft of hair left, and he should wear a cloth to cover his nakedness. This cloth, according to some, should be some cast-off cloth washed.

In the Saṃnyāsa-Upaniṣad[5] it is mentioned that an ascetic should have hair in his arm-pits and lower parts and should have a strainer (pavitra) for protecting the living creatures. In the same Upaniṣad, in a verse-quotation are enumerated several other things like a kuṇḍikā (a water-pot), camasa (a cup), śikya (a net-work bag), three staves, shoes, a cloth for protection against winter, a loin-cloth, a strainer, a bathing-cloth and an upper garment.

According to the Āruṇi and the Kaṭhaśruti-Upaniṣads[6] not only the hair along with śikhā are to be removed, but also the sacred thread is to be thrown away. The renunciation of the sacred thread is prescribed by other texts of the Upaniṣads also.[7]

1. VI. 52 sq. cf, also Baudh. Dh. S. II. 10. 17. 10, and Mbh. XII, Ch. 244, 8910, and Viṣṇu, Ch. 96, 7–8.
2. III. 60.
3. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 6. 11. 17–20.
4. Gaut. Dh. S. I. 3. 17–18, 21, Viṣṇu. Ch. 96, 13.
5. M. U., Pp. 20–21, cf. also Baudh. Dh. S. II. 10. 12 and 32,
6. M. U., Pp. 7–8 and 36.
7. Ār. U. p. 4, P. H. U. p. 46; J. U. p. 67, N. U. p. 139 P. B. U. p. 297.

The question, as to whether a Saṃnyāsin ought to throw away his sacred thread or not, is very interesting. The Āśrama–, Nāradaparivrājaka—and Bhikṣuka-Upaniṣads prescribe the sacred thread for the kuṭīcakas and the bahūdakas.[1]

In the Vaikhānasadharmapraśna[2] we have a passage about the sacred thread which Caland translates : "He now takes the girdle, the four sacred strings, or one single string, the hide of a black antelope and an upper garment in the manner as described formerly (at the Upanayana II. 5)".

In the commentary of Mādhava on the Parāśara Smṛti,[3] we find an interesting discussion as to the desirability or otherwise of entering the paramahaṃsa stage where the sacred thread and all other rights of a twice-born are done away with. Mādhava quotes as pūrvapakṣa the opinions of Hārīta, Baudhāyana and Atri.[4]

All those (persons in the) four stages, who renounce their daily rites of morning and evening, even though they perform severe penances, fall from the brāhmaṇahood.

How can those brāhmaṇas be regarded as brāhmaṇas, who do not perform the daily rites of morning and evening ?

The sacred thread is the means for acquiring mokṣa for all the twice-born. Those who renounce it by foolishness, go to hell.

The answer given to the arguments above is that all these texts prescribing the necessity of wearing the sacred thread

1. See Ch. II, above.

2. II. 7. Cf. Eggers, Das Dharmasūtra d. Vaikhānasas, note 9, II. 7. (7), p. 84 : "Bei der Jünglingsweihe, auf die verwiesen wird, kommt natürlich nur eine Schnur in Betracht. vgl. II 2. (2), n. 6. p. 82", where he says :—"die vier Schnüre des vierten Āśrama (in dem von den Smārtas u. a. keine Schnur getragen wird) und anderseits die eine Schnur des ersten und die zwei Schnure des zweiten Āśrama (allgemein)."

3. Bombay. S. S., Vol. 48, Pp. 164-165.

4. Catvāro'pyāśramā hyete sandhyāvandanavarjitāḥ,
Brāhmaṇyād eva hīyante Yadyapyugratapodharāḥ. (Hārīta. 14. 18).
Anāgatāṃ tu ye pūrvām anatītāṃ tu paścimāṃ,
Sandhyāṃ nopāsate viprāḥ kathaṃ te brāhmaṇāḥ smṛtāḥ. (Baudh. Dh. S. II, 4, 7 5.)
Yajñopavītaṃ sarveṣāṃ dvijānāṃ muktisādhanaṃ,
Parityajanti ye mohān narā nirayagāminaḥ. (Atri. 3).

can be applied to the cases of other ascetics except a paramahaṃsa. Whereas the stage of paramahaṃsa is directly prescribed, and so it cannot be objected to against.

Of course, this is begging the question.

The next important question is that of staff or daṇḍa. It is no wonder if Farquhar[1] is in a difficulty to find "the original distinction" between "*ekadaṇḍin*" and "*tridaṇḍin*". For, not only in the Mahābhārata, but even in the following works which have to be taken into consideration for deciding the question, there are contradictory injunctions prescribing one or three or none of the staves. In the Manusmṛti[2] no express mention is made of the number of staves. Only this much is said that he should have a pot and should be a *daṇḍin*, which may mean a bearer of one or three daṇḍas. But in the following passage, three staves are mentioned :

"He is said to possess three staves, who in his intellect preserves the three staves (i.e. control) of speech, mind and body. When a man deposits these three daṇḍas with all the living beings (i.e. when he observes the control of speech, mind and body towards all living beings), and when he has controlled passion and anger, then he attains success".[3]

In the Vaikhānasa-dharmapraśna,[4] we find the prescription of three staves. Baudhāyana is not very particular about the number. According to him an ascetic may have one or three staves.[5]

According to the Mahābhārata, a Saṃnyāsin should be revered irrespective of his having one or three staves, being shaved or otherwise and even when he has only reddish-brown cloth.[6]

Mādhava in his commentary on Parāśara[7] quotes (a) Atri, according to whom all the four kinds of Saṃnyāsins are to

1. J. R. A. S., 1925, p. 479 sq.
2. VI. 52.
3. Manu. XII 10–11, cf. also "saptāṅgasyeha rājyasya viṣṭabdhasya tridaṇḍavat", IX. 296.
4. III. 6. 9 and II. 6. 2.
5. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 10. 1.
6. Āśvamedhikaparvan, ch. 105, 8–9.
7. Ācārakāṇḍa, Vol. I, pt. II. (Bomb. S. S. 48).

possess three staves, and (b) Hārīta, according to whom if the water-strainer or the three staves are lost through carelessness, then an ascetic should wander with one staff of bamboo or palāśa or bilva, till he gets the three staves. Yājñavalkya also will have staves for an ascetic.[1]

The Bhikṣuka and the Āśrama-Upaniṣads[2] and the Vaikhānasa-dharmapraśna[3] prescribe three staves for the babūdakas.

In the Nāradaparivrājaka-Upaniṣad[4] we find that a vividiṣā-saṃnyāsin should have one staff measuring from head to foot, and it should be an undamaged, even, smooth and faultless (akākapṛṣṭha)[5] bamboo stick. At another place, this Upaniṣad[6] prescribes the staff for kuṭīcaka, bahūdaka, haṃsa and paramahaṃsa, and in a passage further denies it to paramahaṃsa.

The Paramahaṃsa-Upaniṣad divides the paramhaṃsas into two categories of higher and lower types. For the lower type it prescribes the staff, but prohibits it for the higher type.[7]

In the Turīyātītāvadhūta-Upaniṣad,[8] we read that a turīyātīta passes through the stages of kuṭīcaka, bahūdaka, haṃsa and paramahaṃsa in their respective order and then he deposits his staff, water-pot, girdle-thread, loin-cloth and the upper garment in water.

But in the Āruṇi-Upaniṣad[9] even a kuṭīcaka renounces his family, his pot, his water-strainer, his staves and the worlds.

According to the Jābāla-Upaniṣad,[10] a paramahaṃsa ought to renounce the three staves, water-pot, net-work-bag, pot, water-strainer, tuft of hair and the sacred thread.

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1. III. 58.
2. M. U. p. 234 and 101.
3. 1. 9. 3.
4. M. U. p. 169.
5. Kākapṛṣṭha is, according to Schrader, a black mark, a fault in a bamboo-stick. S. Ṭ. p. 434.
6. See Ch. II., notes 4, p. 26 and 2, p. 27 and M. U. p. 141.
7. M. U. pp. 46–47.
8. M. U. p. 242.
9. M. U. p. 6.
10. M. U. p. 70.

The account in the Śāṭyāyanīya Upaniṣad, however, is very peculiar.[1] We read there:

"A man, having entered the last āśrama, carrying five mātrās as far as possible, looking upon the Universe as the essence of Brahman and bearing the marks of Viṣṇu should wander over the earth.

Three staves, the sacred thread, a cloth to cover the loins, a network-bag and a water-strainer, these he should possess as long as he lives.

These five (things) are the mātrās of a Yati, and they are said to be the mātrās of Brahman. These he should not give up till death and even at the end they should be buried along with him.

The marks of Viṣṇu are of two kinds, manifest and unmanifest.[2] He undoubtedly falls (into hell) who renounces even one of them.

Three staves are the marks of Viṣṇu and are the means of salvation for the brāhmaṇas. They are the cessation of all the duties. This is the teaching of the Vedas.

Now, dear (pupil)! the parivrājakas are of four kinds:—kuṭīcaka, bahūdaka, haṃsa and paramahaṃsa. All these possess the marks of Viṣṇu, tuft of hair and the sacred thread. They are of pure mind, realise their soul as Brahman through their soul and are given to meditate upon the Pure and Conscious Form. They mutter (their prayers), observe yamas and niyamas, are of good conduct and are of good fame."

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1. M. U. pp. 323-324.
2. Upon the two kinds of viṣṇuliṅgas, see S. T. p. 483.

CHAPTER IV

Daily Life of a Saṃnyāsin

For the sake of perfection a Saṃnyāsin should always remain alone and should not be accompanied by anyone. Being fully convinced that perfection (i.e. final emancipation) attends only to a solitary man, such a man neither forsakes nor is forsaken. He should have no fire and no home, and if he goes to a village, he should do so to get food. He should be indifferent to everything and be a man of firm purpose, silent and have his mind concentrated.[1]

The Saṃnyāsa—Paramahaṃsa—and the Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣads,[2] the Dakṣasmṛti[3] and the Vaikhānasa-dharmapraśna[4] enjoin that a Saṃnyāsin should wander alone without any fixed abode. As long as he is alone he is a bhikṣu : two make a pair, three a village and more a town. A town or a village or a pair should not be formed, for by doing so a Yati falls from his duties. By contact and proximity, the Saṃnyāsins will certainly talk on politics or alms or will indulge in affection, back-biting and envy.

During the rains an ascetic should have a fixed abode, and for the remaining eight months he should wander alone.[5] Or he might wander for two months only.[6] He should have no hoard (collection) and should enter the village for begging only. He should not live the second night in a village out of (rainy) season.[7]

In the Vaikhānasa-dharmapraśna[8] we read that an ascetic should be indifferent to respect or insult, should renounce dis-

1. Manu VI. 42-43, cf. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 10. 18. 22, and Mbh. Śāntiparvan, Ch. 242, 8832.
2. M. U. Pp. 21, 51, 141 and 145.
3. Quoted by Mādhava in Parāśara, (Bombay S. S., Vol. 48) p. 180.
4. III. 6.
5. Gaut. Dh. S. I. 3. 12, Baudh. Dh. S. II. 6. 11. 20. on Baudhāyana, Bühler remarks : "This rule shows that the Vasso of the Bauddhas is also derived from a Brahmanical source."
6. M. U. p. 8.
7. Gaut. Dh. S. I. 3., 10, 13 and 20, cf. also Viṣṇu, Ch. 96, 12.
8. III. 6. 6-8.

cussion, anger, greed, error or falsehood. He should not reside at one place for more than one day, except during the four months of rain. The four months of rainy season should be spent by him at one place only.

As regards food, Manu[1] says that he should beg it once in a day. He should not be attached to the variety or the details of food. If a Yati is attached to begging, then he becomes attached even to the objects of senses. He should go to beg in a house where there is no smoke, where the pestal has been laid aside (that is, when the beating of paddy with the pestal has ceased), where there is no more fire, where people have already finished their meals and where the dishes have already been removed. He should feel no dejection if he gets no alms, nor should he be pleased when he gets them. He should beg only so much as would suffice for keeping his life and should have no attachment to household possessions or utensils. He should totally avoid the alms which are specially praised to him, for even the emancipated Yati is bound down by such gifts. He should control his senses by means of eating little food and standing and sitting in solitude. He should abandon all desire for sweet food.

Baudhāyana[2] says that an ascetic should ask for alms from Brāhmaṇas, both, such as live in the houses (śālīnas) and such as lead a wandering life (yāyāvaras),[3] after the vaiśvadeva offering. In begging he should always address with the word *bhavat*. He should wait for the alms only so long as the time necessary for milking a cow. Then he should place the alms on pure ground, wash his hands and feet and announce the first morsel to the sun with the mantras "*Ud u tyaṃ*" etc.,[4] and "*Citraṃ*" etc.[5] Then he should wash and sip some water and announce it to the Brahman with the mantra " *Brahma jajñānaṃ* etc.[6] It is said that he (the ascetic) represents the kindling etc., of the sacred fires. His prāṇa is the Gārhapatya fire, his apāna

1. VI. 55-59, cf. Mbh. XII Ch. 242, 8831 and Ch. 245, 8920, Viṣṇu, Ch. 96, 2-6 ; Vasiṣṭha X, 7-9 ; Gaut. Dh. S. I. 3. 13-15.
2. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 10. 18, 4-15 and Vaikh Dh. III. 7, 1-9.
3. Āp. Ś. S. V. 3. 22 and XI. 17. 1.
4. R V. I. 50. 1.
5. R. V. I. 115. 1.
6. T. Ā. X. 1. 10.

the Anvāhāryapacana, his vyāna the Āhavanīya, his udāna the Sabhya, and his samāna is the Āvasathya. All these fires reside in the body. Therefore he offers sacrifice in his self alone.[1] This is the sacrifice to the Self. "Having compassionately shared the food with the Beings (bhūtas), the ascetic should sprinkle the remainder with water and eat it like medicine (i.e., without relishing the taste)." After eating he should sip water and worship the sun with the mantra "*Ud :vayaṃ tamasaspari*" etc.[2] Here Baudhāyana quotes verses which say :

" An ascetic should eat only that food which is neither begged nor desired, but which he receives spontaneously and which is sufficient only just to keep up his life.

"A muni should eat eight morsels of food, a forester sixteen, a householder thirty-two, but a student has no limit.

" He might either beg food from all castes or have one meal from the twice-born or not. He should take only grains of corn, oil-cake, barley-gruel, sour-milk and milk. There are eight things which do not break the vow of an ascetic : roots, ghee milk, sacrificial food, desire of a brāhmaṇa, teacher's words and medicine".[3]

Yājñavalkya[4] says that a man having only the realisation of soul as the object of pleasure, should enter Saṃnyāsa and should resort to begging. He should be careful at the time of begging and should beg in the evening without drawing the attention of the people to himself and when there are no beggars about in the village. He should not be greedy, but should beg food only to keep up his life.

According to the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad,[5] an ascetic may live upon air or water or prescribed corn or ripe fruits. But if he lives upon alms, then he should not himself give charity.[6] This fact is emphasized in the Yatidharmasaṃgraha of Viśveśvara,[7] where, according to Kratu, an ascetic who collects his alms like a bee and

1. Here the Commentator remarks that the word *eva* in the text serves to remove the objection: "That food which is not offered in fire and the foremost part of which is not offered, should not be eaten."—Āp. Dh. S. II. 15. 13.

2. T. S. IV. 1, 7, 4.
3. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 10. 18, 19.
4. III. 58-59.
5. M. U. p. 18.
6. M. U. p. 21.
7. A. S. S., Vol 60, p. 110.

then offers them to brāhmaṇas, goes to hell ; and the brāhmaṇa who eats those alms, must perform the Cāndrāyaṇa penance ; and according to the Bahvṛcapariśiṣṭa, an ascetic who offers food in charity, mars by his action the following four : the giver, the food, his own self and the person to whom he gives the food.

According to the Kaṭhaśruti Upaniṣad,[1] an ascetic should beg his meals from all four castes. He should eat using his hands as a bowl. He should eat his food like medicine[2] and should eat whatever he gets to keep up his life, so that his belly may not protrude, but on the other hand he should be lean and thin. On this Schrader remarks in his tippaṇī[3] that according to the Buddhist teacher Nāgasena, as people protect their wound with oil etc., with this very idea an ascetic, only to keep up his life, should protect his body which is like a wound and which emits pus through nine openings.[4]

According to the Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad,[5] a kuṭīcaka should beg at one particular place ; a bahūdaka should beg from different places, like a bee collecting honey from different flowers, but not just what he desires ; a haṃsa should beg eight morsels from eight houses ; a paramahamsa should beg from five houses, using his hands as a bowl ; a turīyātīta should eat fruits like a cow ; and an avadhūta should behave like a python, eating anything and everything from all the castes.

According to the Vaikhānasadharmapraśna,[6] an ascetic should tie the reddish brown cloth, water-strainer etc., to his three staves and should carry them on his neck, holding them with his left hand, and in his right hand he should have his begging bowl. He should beg once a day from the houses of the pure brāhmaṇas after the Vaiśvadeva sacrifice. He should walk neither quickly nor slowly. He should not go to the house of anyone except at the time of begging. For begging, he should not go for more than two miles.[7]

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1. M. U. pp. 32-33.
2. Cf. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 10. 18, 10, quoted under note 137.
3. S. Ṭ. p. 388.
4. See Milindapanha, III. 6. (S. B. E. XXXV, p. 115).
5. M. U. p. 176-177.
6. Vaikh. Dh. III. 6. 9 and 11.
7. Ibid., III. 7, 3-5.

CHAPTER V

Behaviour of a Saṃnyāsin.

Now we come to the question of an ascetic's behaviour and his mental and moral condition.

Manu[1] lays down that an ascetic should have an indifferent mind and should not hoard anything. He should keep silence and should be concentrated. He should behave equally towards all. He should not desire for either death or life, but should wait for his death as a servant waits for his wages. He should walk looking carefully at the ground, should drink water purified through the strainer, should speak truth and should act with pure heart. He should patiently bear the provoking speech and should not insult anybody, and residing in this body should not bear enmity towards anyone. He should not show his anger to an angry person, and even though censured should speak well of the insulter. He should not utter an untrue speech.[2] He should delight in the comtemplation of the Supreme Spirit, should be indifferent and free from sensual desires. He should wander alone desirous of attaining the bliss. He becomes immortal by control of senses, destruction of attachment or aversion and non-injury to the living beings. In order to purify himself of the sin of unconsciously killing the living beings either by day or by night, a yati should take a bath and should perform six prāṇāyāmas. People attain the stage of

1. Manu VI. 43–49, 60, 69, 75; Cf. also Viṣṇu, Ch. 96, 9, 14–23; Āyāraṅgasuttaṁ I. 7. 8. 4; Arthaśāstra (Ind. ed. Shama-Sāstri) p. 8, 11, 4–6.

2. In the text we have: *saptadvārāvakīrṇāṃ ca na vācam anṛtāṃ vadet.* The meaning of *saptadvārāvakīrṇāṃ* is not clear. The seven doors, according to Medhātithi are: (1) dharmārtha, (2) dharmakāma, (3) arthakāma, (4) kāmārtha, (5) kāmadharma, (6) arthadharma and (7) dharmārthakāma; or the seven life-breaths in the head. According to Kullūka they are the five senses, mind and ego. According to others, says Kullūka, they are the seven worlds.

Jha remarks: "This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 954) which, reading *na vācaṃ samudīrayet* (for *na vācam anṛtāṃ vadet*), explains this much misunderstood second line as—He should not utter words vitiated by (1) desire, (2) anger, (3) greed, (4) delusion, (5) arrogance, (6) jealously and (7) vanity." It is quoted also in Parāśaramādhava (Ācāra p. 569).

salvation by non-injury, control of senses, the Vedic rites and practising of severe austerities. He should not think ill of that man who cut his arm, nor should he think well of the other man who besmears it with sandal.

Gautama[1] opines that a bhikṣu should abandon all desires for sweet food and control his speech, eyes and actions. He should not appropriate the parts of plants and trees, except such as have become detached spontaneously. He should not destroy seeds, should behave evenly towards all irrespective of injury or favour and should not indulge in an undertaking.

Baudhāyana[2] says that the vows to be observed by an ascetic are : non-injury, truth, absence of stealing, giving up of sexual intercourse and liberality. There are five sscondary vows also : absence of anger, service of the teacher, absence of negligence, purity of the body and purity of food.

It is declared in the Veda, " On that (occasion) he shall rigidly keep silence ; pressing the teeth together he may converse, without opening his mouth, as much as is necessary with teachers deeply versed in the three Vedas (and) with ascetics possessing a great knowledge of the scriptures, not with women nor when he would break his vow. "

(Let him keep) only one of (the rules which enjoin) standing (in the day-time), rigid silence, and sitting (at night) with crossed legs ; let him not keep all three together. It is declared in the Veda, "And he who has gone there may eat, in times of distress, a small quantity of the food prescribed by his vow after (having partaken of other dishes), provided he does not break his vow."[3] He should perform his evening devotions by reciting the verses called Vāruṇīs and his morning devotions by reciting the verses called Maitrīs.[4] He should utter speech only at the private recitation of the Veda.

An ascetic should also give up desire, anger, greed, infatuation, hypocrisy, pride, falsehood and such other things.[5]

1. Gaut. Dh. S. I. 3. 15, 17, 19, 22-24.
2. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 10. 18, 2-3, 16-18, 21-22.
3. Buhler's translation, S. B. E. XIV, p. 282, 16-18.
4. "The Maitrīs occur in Taitt. Saṃhitā III, 4, 11. 5, and the Vāruṇīs follow them immediately." Buhler, S. B. E. XIV, p. 283, n. 21.
5. Ār. U., p. 8.

According to the Paramahaṃsa-Upaniṣad,[1] an ascetic should have no garments ; he should not bow down to anyone ; he should not pray to the gods or to the manes, nor should he offer them praise. He should neither invite nor dismiss the gods and should have nothing to do with mantras, meditation or worshipping. In his actions he has neither a goal nor a non-goal; neither is anything separate from him nor non-separate ; he has neither the distinction of day or night nor any thing except his own self. He should have no fixed abode. He should not accept gold, no, not even look at it. If it were argued that mere looking at gold cannot be an obstacle in the path of an ascetic, then we say, it is. If a bhikṣu looks at gold with desire, he incurs the sin of killing a brāhmaṇa ; if he touches it with desire, he becomes untouchable ; if he accepts it with desire, he destroys his own self. Therefore, he should check himself so that he may not look, touch or accept gold with desire. He is neither sorry in pain nor desirous of pleasure. He abandons all attachments and is indifferent to all good or bad things. He neither hates nor loves anything. All his senses stop their function. He becomes steadfast in knowledge and his self resides for ever in the Supreme Self.

According to the Nāradaparivrājaka-Upaniṣad[2] an ascetic certainly attains salvation, when he behaves like (*a*) ajihma (*b*) paṇḍaka, (*c*) paṅgu, (*d*) andha, (*e*) badhira and (*f*) mugdha.

(*a*) One who even at the time of eating has no attachment towards the food, whether it is sweet or otherwise, and who speaks little and true and for the good of others, he is called ajihma.

(*b*) One who remains unaffected by a woman, whether she is born to-day or is sixteen years old or hundred years old, he is called paṇḍaka.

(*c*) One whose only walk is for begging the alms or attending the calls of nature and who does not walk for more than a yojana, he is called paṅgu.

1. M. U., Pp. 50–54.

2. M. U., Pp. 146–147. These verses, with minor differences in the readings, are qnoted by Mādhava in his Commentary on Parāśara, as from Medhātithi. (Bom. S. S.) Vol. 48, Pp. 185–187.

(*d*) One whose eyes do not observe more than four yugas of ground in front, whether walking or standing, he is called andha.

(*e*) One who, in spite of hearing words which are either beneficial or injurious, pleasant or sorrowful, does not seem to have listened to them, he is called badhira.

(*f*) One who remains unaffected in the midst of the objects of senses, in spite of his potentiality to enjoy them, and who always behaves like a man in sleep, he is called mugdha.

In another passage[1] this Upaniṣad gives a detailed account of the daily life and behaviour of an ascetic. A kuṭīcaka is to take his bath thrice a day, a bahūdaka twice and a haṃsa once. A paramahaṃsa should take a mental bath, a turīyātīta is to bathe in the ashes and an avadhūta should have an aerial bath.

A kuṭīcaka should have a perpendicular mark on his forehead, a bahūdaka three marks, a haṃsa three perpendicular marks; a paramahaṃsa should besmear ashes, a turīyātīta should have a tilakapuṇḍra (?) and an avadhūta nothing.

A kuṭīcaka should shave once in a season, a bahūdaka once in two seasons, a haṃsa and a paramahaṃsa do not shave. The latter, however, may (if he likes ?) get himself shaved once in half a year. Turīyātita and avadhūta have nothing to do with the shave.

A kuṭīcaka begs his alms from one place, a bahūdaka from several places. A haṃsa and a paramahaṃsa use their hands as vessels ; a turīyātīta has a cow-mouth and an avadhūta behaves like a python.

A kuṭīcaka is allowed two śāṭīs, a bahūdaka one, and a haṃsa only a piece of cloth. A paramahaṃsa may be naked or have a loin-cloth. Turīyātīta and avadhūta should be naked. But deer-skin is allowed to haṃsa and paramahaṃsa only.

Kuṭīcaka and bahūdaka are allowed the worship of gods ; haṃsa and paramahaṃsa mental devotion. Turīyātīta and avadhūta should meditate upon the identity between the self and the Supreme Soul.

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1. M. U., Pp. 203-206. A table for comparison is given in the appendix.

The muttering of mantras is prescribed for kuṭīcaka and bahūdaka, meditation for haṃsa and paramahaṃsa, whereas nothing is prescribed for turīyātīta and avadhūta.

Paramahaṃsa, turīyātīta and avadhūta are entitled to be taught the mahāvākyas (*tat tvam asi* etc.), whereas the remaining are not entitled.

Kuṭīcaka and bahūdaka are entitled to mānuṣapraṇava, haṃsa and paramahaṃsa to āntarapraṇava and turīyātīta and avadhūta to brahmapraṇava.[1]

Kuṭīcaka and bahūdaka are entitled to the hearing (of the śāstras), haṃsa and paramahṃsa to deliberation and turīyātīta and avadhūta to meditation.

All are enjoined to seek the Self.

The Vaikhānasadharmapraśna[2] also lays down several rules for the ascetics. An ascetic should daily satisfy (tarpayet) his own self with the syllable Om after his bath. He should salute the self with the same syllable. After having performed at least six prāṇāyāmas and after having repeated the Sāvitrī for at least one hundred times, an ascetic should say his daily prayers. He should sip water purified by the water-strainer. He should wear reddish-brown cloth, should renounce everything and should not indulge in sexual intercourse and stealing. While walking, he should carefully observe the ground and avoid hurting the living beings.

According to Manu,[3] the following things are prohibited for a Saṃnyāsin. He should not try to get alms by the interpretation of portents and omens, nor by astrology and palmistry,[4] instruction or discourse. He should not (for begging) go to a dwelling full of hermits, brāhmaṇas, birds, dogs, or other ascetics.

1. For the different kinds of of praṇavas, see M. U. Pp. 206-209.
2. Vaikh. Dh. III. 6. 1-5, 10.
3. VI. 50-51.
4. See Bühler's note on aṅgavidyā (S. B. E. XXV. 208, note on v. 50). Bühler remarks on this verse : "This verse, which occurs also in Vas. X, 21, is historically important, as it shows that in ancient as in modern times, ascetics followed worldly pursuits and were the teachers or advisers of the people."

According to the Nāradaparivrājaka-Upaniṣad,[1] an ascetic should avoid the following six things :—seeing actors etc., gambling, meeting his friend, food which requires mastication (bhakṣya), food which requires no mastication (bhojya), and looking at a woman in her courses. He should not even think of the following six things : attachment, aversion, pride, deceit enmity and infatuation. The following six are grievous offence, for an ascetic : a bed, a white cloth, talk about women, lustfulness, sleeping during the day and travelling. A meditator on soul should carefully avoid long travel.

He should not either read or teach the ritual, nor should he listen to anything else except the Vedānta. He should not recite anything else except the syllable Om, and should not read even logic or grammar. He should not teach (i.e. utter) many words, should not exhaust his speech too much, should mostly converse with the gestures of his hands etc., should not employ any other language in conversation,[2] and should not talk to śūdras, women, outcastes or women in their courses.[3] An ascetic should not worship the gods, frequent the festivals or go to a pilgrimage.[4]

He should not go across a river by means of his hands, should not ascend a tree or a carriage, and should not indulge in buying, selling or exchange. He should not be a hypocrite or a liar.[5]

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1. M. U. p. 148. These three verses are quoted by Mādhava on Parāśarasmṛti (Vol. I, Pt. II, Bomb. S. S. 48), as from Medhātithi.

2. "Except Sanskrit", Schrader. S. Ṭ. p. 435.

3. The text reads :—*na śūdrastrīpatitodakyāsaṃbhāṣaṇam.* It may also mean: He should not speak with the śūdra-women, the outcaste-women and the women in their courses. But in this case, it may be inferred that he is allowed to speak with other women. Whereas in the first explanation, either "women" or "women in their courses" is redundant.

4. M. U. p. 176.

5. M. U. p. 177.

CHAPTER VI

The Initiation of a Saṃnyāsin

According to Manu[1] a brāhmaṇa should go forth from his house, i.e. enter Saṃnyāsa, after having offered an oblation to Prajāpati in which he should bestow all his wealth upon the priests as the fees for the performance of sacrifice, and then reposit the fires in his own self.

According to the Mahābhārata,[2] before entering Saṃnyāsa one should perform a sacrifice lasting one day,[3] and should offer all his wealth as the fees to the priests. He should sacrifice to the Supreme Spirit,[4] should rejoice in the Supreme Spirit, play with the Supreme Spirit, and should depend upon the Supreme Spirit. After he has reposited the fires in his own self and given up all possessions, he should go on for ever performing the daily sacrifices[5] and the small offerings.[6] But when from the ordinary sacrifice of the sacrificers, the offering in the Self proceeds, then he should well worship the three fires in his own self, till he attains to the emancipation of his own self. As an offering to the prāṇas,[7] he should eat five or six morsels of food without finding fault with it.[8]

1. VI. 38 ; cf. also Yāj. III. 56 ; Viṣṇu 96, 1.
2. Mbh. XII. 244, 8906 sq.
3. According to Nīlakaṇṭha, prājāpatya or traidhātavī sacrifice.
4. According to Nīlakaṇṭha, he should perform his funeral rites even during his life-time.
5. It is not quite certain what *sādyaskān yajñān* exactly means. But I have translated it as "daily sacrifices" in the sense of *pañcamahāyajñas* which agrees with Nīlakaṇṭha, who explains it as *brahmayajña* etc.
6. *iṣṭi,* see B. R. s. v. 2 iṣṭi, but Nīlakaṇṭha takes it to mean sacrifices which take a long time, like darśa, pūrṇamāsa, mitravinda etc.
7. The reading *prāṇebhyo yajuṣaḥ* does not admit of any construction, but the general sense seems to be clear enough.
8. This difficult verse is thus explained by Nīlakaṇṭha : This verse describes the sacrifice within the self. The three fires, according to the Vaiśvānaravidyā are :—heart (i.e. the gārhapatya), mind (i.e. the anvāhāryapacana) and the mouth (i.e. the āhavanīya). He should offer sacrifice, according to the prāṇāgnihotra rites, to these fires in his own body till he dies. So says the Śruti also :—*tad yad bhaktaṃ prathamaṃ āgacchet tad homīyaṃ, sa yāṃ prathamāṃ āhutiṃ jnhuyāt tāṃ juhuyat prāṇāya svāhā,* "all that food which comes before is for sacrifice. And the first oblation which a man offers, should be offered with the formula *prāṇāya svāhā*".

According to Baudhāyana,[1] "After having caused the hair of his head, his beard, the hair on his body, and his nails to be cut, he prepares sticks, a rope, a cloth for straining water, a water-vessel and an alms-bowl.[2] Taking these (implements, let him go) to the extremity of the boundary (of the village), or to the house where the sacred fires are kept, partake of a three-fold (mixture of) clarified butter, milk, (and) sour milk, and afterwards fast ; or (he may partake of) water.

"(Saying), '*Om Bhūh*, I enter the Sāvitrī, *tat savitur vareṇyaṃ*; *Om*, *Bhuvaḥ*, I enter the Sāvitrī, *dhiyo yo naḥ praeodayāt* "; (he shall recite the Sāvitrī) foot by foot, half-verse by half-verse, (and finish by repeating) the whole or parts (of the verse).[3] It is declared in the Veda, 'Entering order after order, (man) becomes (one with) Brahman '.

"Now they quote also (the following verse) : 'He who has passed from order to order, has offered burnt oblations and kept his organs in subjection, becomes afterwards, tired with (giving) alms and (making) offerings, an ascetic.'[4] Such an ascetic (becomes one with) the infinite (Brahman)."

"Before the sun sets, he heaps fuel on the Gārhapatya fire, brings the Anvāhāryapacana fire (to the spot),[5] takes the

1. II. 10. 17, 10-30. Bühler's translation, S. B. E. XIV. p. 274 ff. Cf. also Vaikh. Dh. II. 6, 1-3 ; II. 7, 1-7, where the procedure is quite the same as in Baudhāyana. See also Baudh. Gṛhyaśeṣasūtra, IV. 16, Pp. 325-326 (Mysore Edition).

2. The comm. adds :—pādukā (wooden sandals), deer-skin, umbrella, thread, shoes, needle, garment of leaves, three staves and water-pot. Cf. also Yāj. III. 58-60.

3. Bühler : "This part of the ceremony is called Sāvitrīpraveśana, 'entering the Sāvitrī'. According to the Dharmasindhu, fol. 84 a, 1. 8, the last Mantra is : 'Om, Bhūḥ, Bhuvaḥ, Svaḥ, I enter the Sāvitrī, who may impel our thoughts'."

According to the comm. this mantra is called Prāśanamantra, 'the mantra for eating' the things enumerated in the 12th and the 13th sūtra. But it is clearly a mistake.

4. Manu VI. 34.

5. Bühler : "Anvāhāryapacana is another name of the so-called Dakṣiṇāgni, in which the sacrificial viands are cooked. The cleansing of the butter (utpavana) is performed by taking hold of the ends of blades of Kuśa grass and dipping the bent middle part into the melted butter and then drawing it upwards. A full burnt oblation (pūrṇāhuti) consists of a whole spoonful. As four spoonfuls are to be taken out, it follows that four oblations are to be offered."

flaming Āhavanīya fire out (of the Gārhapatya), melts butter on the Gārhapatya fire, cleanses it (with kuśa grass), takes four times (portions of it) in the sacrificial spoon (called Sruc), and offers in the Āhavanīya on which sacred fuel has been heaped, (four times) a full oblation, (saying), 'Om, Svāhā !' It is declared in the Veda that this (offering is) the Brahmānvādhāna (putting fuel on the sacred fires for the sake of the Universal Soul).

"Now in the evening, after the Agnihotra has been offered, he scatters grass to the north of the Gārhapatya fire, places the sacrificial vessels in pairs, the upper part turned downwards, on it, strews Darbha grass to the south of the Āhavanīya fire on the seat destined for the Brahman riest, covers it with thep skin of a black antelope and remains awake during that night. A Brāhmaṇa who, knowing this, dies after fasting during the night of Brahman[1] and repositing within himself the sacred fires, conquers all guilt, even (that of) killing a Brāhmaṇa.

"Then he rises in the muhūrta sacred to Brahman, and offers the early Agnihotra just at the (appointed) time. Next, after covering the (part of the altar called) Pṛṣṭhya and bringing water, he prepares (an offering) to (Agni) Vaiśvānara (which is cooked) in twelve potsherds. That (well-) known Iṣṭi is the last (which he performs).

"Afterwards he throws the sacrificial vessels, which are neither made of earth nor of stone, into the Āhavanīya fire. (And) throwing the two Araṇis[2] into [the Gārhapatya fire (with the words), 'May ye be of one mind with us', he reposits the sacred fires in himself (reciting the sacred text), 'O Fire, that body of thine, which is fit for the sacrifice', he inhales the smell of (the smoke of) each fire thrice three times.

"Then, standing within the sacrificial enclosure, (he says) thrice in a low voice and thrice aloud, 'Om, Bhūḥ, Bhuvaḥ, Svāḥ', I have entered the order of ascetics, I have entered the order of ascetics, I have entered the order of ascetics. It is declared in the Veda, 'The gods are trebly true'.[3]

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1. Bühler: "The night during which the ascetic keeps watch near the fires is called 'the night of Brahman'."

2. Bühler: "The Araṇis are the two pieces of wood used for producing fire by friction, Taittirīya Saṃhitā, I, 3, 7, 1–2."

3. T. Ā. II, 18, 6.

"(Finally) he pours out as much water as will fill his joined hands, (saying), 'I promise not to injure any living being.'[1] Now they quote also (the following verse): 'An ascetic who roams about after having given a promise of safety to all living beings, is not threatened with danger by any creature'."[2]

In the Jābāla Upaniṣad[3] we read that some people are in favour of offering sacrifice to Prajāpati. But an ascetic should not perform that, rather, he should offer an offering to the fire. Because fire is prāṇa and, therefore, he really offers an offering to prāṇa. Or he may offer a traidhātavī[4] offering. Sattva, rajas and tamas are the three dhātus. He should smell (the smoke of the) fire with the mantra :—'O Fire, this is your proper origin, born from which you shone. Knowing that, ascend and increase our wealth.'

It is the prāṇa which is the origin of fire. This is also said in the mantra : 'Go to prāṇa, Svāhā.'[5]

Having described the rules of entering Saṃnyāsa in the case of a man who keeps the sacred fires, the Upaniṣad further lays down the procedure for one who does not keep the fires.

"Having (got the fire) brought from (the house of a Śrotriya in) a village, he should smell (the smoke of) the fire as before. If he does not find the fire, then he should offer (the offering) in water. Waters are (the representatives of) all the gods. Having offered (the offering) with the mantra, 'I offer to all the gods, Svāhā,' (and) taking out the health-giving oblation (mixed)

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1. Bühler : "All gifts must be confirmed by a libation of water, which in other cases is poured into the hand of the recipient. The ceremony proves more clearly even than the numerous other passages of the Smṛtis, in which ascetics are exhorted to abstain from injuring living beings, that the so-called ahiṃsā doctrine is not of Buddhistic, but of Brahmanical origin."

2. Cf. Vasiṣṭha X, 1-2 and Mbh., XII, 244, 8911.

3. M. U. Pp. 64-67.

4. M. W. s. v. traidhātavī ; cf. Baudh. Dh. S. III, 1, 12 :—*traidhātavīyena iṣṭvā prasthāsyate vaiśvānaryā vā*. Bühler's note on this is :—"The meaning is that on the evening before his departure from the old home he is to offer the Traidhātavīya-homa. According to the Śrauta-sūtras (see Petersb. Dict. s. v. traidhātavī) the latter offering always occurs at the end of a great sacrifice. Hence it is appropriate for a person who wishes to begin a new mode of life."

5. R. V. III. 29. 10., R. V. reads āsīdāthā in place of ārohāthā.

with ghee, he should eat it. He should regard the mantra of salvation (i.e. Oṃ) as the three Vedas (themselves). That is Brahman, it should be meditated upon.

" If he is an ātura, then he should renounce (the world) with mind or speech (that is, without performing the fore-going ritual)."[1]

According to the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad,[2] if a man who preserves sacred fires dies, then his funeral ceremony ought to be performed according to mantras. But if he does not die before entering Saṃnyāsa and desires to enter the last stage of life he goes to a forest, carrying the necessary materials for offering a sacrifice to the manes.[3] On the amāvāsyā day he should kindle fires early in the morning and perform the śrāddha and the tarpaṇa ceremony of the manes. Then he should perform the brāhma sacrifice, which is laid down in the following śruti :

" (The Brahman), whose penance is knowledge, is all-knowing and all-understanding.[4] The celestial offering offered to him tends to bring about immortality to the sacrificer." [5] After this, he should recite the following initiatory verse :

" May Brahman, that rose above heaven, above both this and the other world entirely, he who is bringing forth every thing, the deity of a good heart, bestow all blessings."[6]

Then he should offer the oblation, uttering the following consecrating text : " The Brahman that was first born of old (purastāt : in the east ?) Vena hath unclosed from the well-shining edge (sīmatas : horizon ?) he unclosed the fundamental nearest shapes (viṣṭhā) of it, the womb (yoni) of the existent and the non-existent." [7]

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1. M. U. Pp. 68–69.
2. M. U. p. 15 ff.
3. Schrader conjectures that perhaps the original text reads :—*eṣa pitṛmedhakāmo vidhivat saṃbhārān* instead of *etān pitṛmedhikān oṣadhisaṃbhārān.* M. U. p. 345.
4. Mn. U. I. 1. 9.
5. Cf. Schrader's discussion of the reading 'Kalpate', M. U. p. 345.
6. "Nārāyaṇa is of opinion that here the Brahman is praised by means of the abhijit constellation, whose supervising deity the Brahman is. And so he explains this verse in the sense of the mantra : *Yasmin brahma abhyajayat sarvam etat,* etc., of the Taittirīya Śākhā, III. 1. 2. 5. S. Ṭ. p. 378.
7. A. V., IV. 1, 1. Whitney's translation.

Then he should throw into the fire the principal offerings of the Brāhma sacrifice with the following mantras :

" To Brahman, to Atharvan, to Prajāpati, to Anumati, to Agni Sviṣṭakṛt."

After this he should throw the two araṇis in the fire with the following mantras :

" O sacrifice, go to the sacrifice ; go to the lord of sacrifice ; go to (thine) own source (yoni) : hail !

"This is thy sacrifice, O lord of sacrifice, accompanied with song-utterance, of excellent heroism : Hail !"[1]

Then he should throw the oblations of ghee in the fire, reciting these four anuvākas :

" Unto a friend would I turn with friendship...................
Know me as such, O firmaments (rodasī)."[2]

With the foregoing mantras he should wait upon the āhavanīya fire also. After this he should repose both the fires in himself reciting the mantra :

" I seize in me Agni at first, together with dominion, splendour, strength, in me I put progeny, in me life-time, hail !—in me Agni."[3]

Then he should keep vows and should be free from laziness.

✓The Vaikhānasa-dharmapraśna[4] lays down the Vedic mantras which an ascetic ought to recite at the time of accepting the staff and so on. He should recite the following three mantras at the time of accepting the three staves :

Devasya tvā etc.[5]
Yo me daṇḍah etc.[6]
Sakkā me gopāya etc.[7]

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1. A. V., VII. 97 (102), 5–6. Whitney's translation.
2. These four anuvākas consitute the entire XVIII Book of the Atharvaveda, containing 88 verses For full translation see H. O. S. VIII, Pp. 813–894.
3. A. V. VII. 82 (87), 2. Whitney's translation.
4. II. 8. 1–7.
5. A. V. XIX, 51, 2.
6. P. G. II. 2. 12.
7. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 17. 32.

He should take the net-work bag with the mantra :

Yad asya pāre rajasaḥ etc.[1]

He should accept the water-strainer with the mantra :

Yena devāḥ pavitreṇa etc.[2]

And he should accept the water-pot and a pot for holding earth with the mantra :

Yena devā jyotiṣā etc.[3]

After taking the bath he should purify himself by reciting the 'aghamarṣaṇa' hymn.[4] Then he should sip water, perform sixteen prāṇāyāmas, repeat the Gāyatrī a hundred or a thousand times, and along with this recitation he should accept the begging bowl made of bottle-gourd, wood or earth. Then he should make libations of water for the gods into the water, uttering, " I refresh you", accompanied by the utterances of the seven mystical syllables (vyāhṛtis, viz : bhuḥ, bhuvaḥ, svaḥ, mahaḥ, janaḥ, tapas and satya) preceded by the syllable Om. Along with the utterance of the word svadhā, accompanied by the first four vyāhṛtis, he should refresh the manes. Then he should wait upon the sun with the mantra :

Ud vayaṃ tamasas etc.[5]

Having poured a libation of water, he should give a promise of safety to all the living beings. If he is devoted to the meditation of self, he should eat alms, should observe vows and penances, should control his senses and should see the Supreme Self by means of meditation.

The Āruṇi Upaniṣad[6] also prescribes the three-fold utterance of the formula, "I have renounced", and the declaration of giving promise of safety to all the living beings. It adds that an ascetic should take a long bamboo-staff uttering the mantra :

"As a friend protect me, you, who are the energy and friend of Indra. You are the thunderbolt of the slayer of Vṛtra (i.e. Indra), be my happiness (and) remove any sin that I may have." [7]

He should then take a loin-cloth and nothing else.

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1. T. S. IV. 2. 5. 2.
2. T. B. I. 4. 8. 6.
3. A. V. XI. 1. 37.
4. R. V. X. 190.
5. R. V. I. 50. 10.
6. M. U. Pp. 9–10.
7. See note 7, p. 50

In the Kaṭhaśruti Upaniṣad, we have three passages about the initiation.

The first passage[1] is curious in prescribing a ceremony quite different from that prescribed elsewhere. It enjoins that an ascetic should choose all his priests as before and should offer a sacrifice to Agni-Vaiśvānara. He should give away all his property. The priests, having reposited the limbs of the sacrificer in all the vessels of sacrifice, should reposit all his vital airs (that is, the apāna, the prāṇa, the vyāna, the udāna and the samāna) in all the fires–āhavanīya, gārhapatya, anvāhāryapacana, sabhya and āvasathya.[2]

The second passage[3] lays down that an ascetic should cut off his hair along with the tuft, and throw away his sacred thread and then coming out of the house, should address his son, looking at him, with these words :

"Thou art Brahman, thou art sacrifice, the call vaṣaṭ, the call Om, svāhā, svadhā, thou art dhātṛ, vidhātṛ, tvaṣṭṛ, and thou art the main-stay."

The son also should reply to him repeating : "I am Brahman" and so on.

The third passage[4] ordains that an intending ascetic, after being allowed to enter Saṃnyāsa by his teachers and relatives,

1. K. Ś. U. Pp. 31-32.

2. On this passage, Schrader remarks :—"When people keeping sacred fires (āhitāgnis) die, then the vessels with which they used to perform the sacrifices are thrown in their limbs. And when they enter Saṃnyāsa, they themselves (i.e. their body) being the fires according to Baudhāyana, all the five fires are reposited in themselves, according to Śaunaka (as quoted by Viśveśvara in his Yatidharmasaṃgraha). But in this Upaniṣad, on the contrary, the limbs are reposited in the sacrificial vessels and the five vital airs are reposited in the fires. The commentator Nārāyaṇa explains it, that this repositing of the limbs and the vital airs in the vessels and the fires is for establishing the bodyless condition (videhatva) of an ascetic. The sense, according to Nārāyaṇa, is, that after the death of a sacrificer, the different sacrificial vessels are placed on the different limbs of his corpse on the funeral pyre ; as for example, the dish (sthālī) is placed on his right hand, the two sacrificial spoons (srucs) on his nose, and so on. At the time of entering Saṃnyāsa, the limbs must be reposited in these vessels." S. Ṭ., p. 387.

3. K. Ś. U. Pp. 36-37.

4. K. Ś. U. Pp. 37-39.

should go to the forest and there perform the agnihotra with milk for twelve nights, himself also subsisting on milk. After this period, he should offer sacrificial offerings in twelve potsherds to Agni Vaiśvānara, to Prajāpati his portion and to Viṣṇu in three potsherds. He should then throw the wooden pots prepared for Agni into the fire. The earthen pots he should throw in water and the metal pots he should offer to his teacher. Then he should address the following mantra to the gārhapatya, dakṣiṇa and āhavanīya fires in turn :

"Do not go away leaving me, I did not go away leaving you."

Here, some people prescribe that he should then "drink" a handful of ashes taking it from that place where the two araṇis have been burnt. Then he should cut his hair along with the tuft and removing the sacred thread should throw it into water, reciting the mantra : "Bhūḥ svāhā."

The Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad, while laying down the rules of initiation, distinguishes four cases : (1) Ātura, (2) Āhitāgni but when he is not at home, (3) Vidvatsaṃnyāsin and (4) Vividiṣā-saṃnyāsin.

(1) Even in the case of an Āturasaṃnyāsin,[1] a wise man should repeat all the mantras. As to the pronouncement of the praiṣa formula, there is no difference in the case of an Ātura-saṃnyāsin or a Kramasaṃnyāsin. The only difference is, that in the case of an Āturasaṃnyāsin, all the necessary and the ordained duties of the ritual are cut short. Therefore, in his case also the mantras must be repeated.

(2) An Āhitāgni,[2] if he becomes virakta (free from worldly attachments) when he is not at home but in another country, then, before entering the Saṃnyāsa, he must perform the prājāpatya sacrifice, even though it may be in water. Or he may repeat the necessary mantras in his mind, or, he should repeat the

1. M. U. Pp. 137–138. But compare Mādhava in his commentary on Prāśara, Bomb. S. S. VII. I. part 2, p. 149—Tatra Mahābhāratam

Utpanne saṅkaṭe ghore coravyāghrādisaṅkaṭe,
Bhayabhītasya saṃnyāsam Aṅgira munir abravīt
Āturāṇāṃ ca saṃnyase na vidhir naiva ca kriya,
Praiṣa—(praṣa) mātraṃ samuccārya saṃnyāsaṃ tatra kārayet.

2. M. U. p. 138.

mantras in water according to the Vedic injunctions or, he should perform the entire ritual. For, otherwise, he will go to hell.

(3) A Vidvatsaṃnyāsin,[1] whether he is on the sick-bed or has passed through the three previous stages of life in their due order, should perform the Kṛcchraprāyaścitta and then perform the eight śrāddha ceremonies of gods, sages, celestials, men, beings, father, mother and his own self. He should first invoke all the gods named Satyavasu.[2] In the śrāddha for the gods, he should invoke Brahman, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara ; in the śrāddha for the sages, he should invoke the celestials, the kṣattriya and the mortal sages ; in the śrāddha for the celestials, he should invoke Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Sanatkumāra and Sanatsujāta ; in the śrāddha for Beings, he should invoke the five elements (earth, water, etc.), the eleven senses and the fourfold beings (viviparous, born of egg, born of sweat and sprouting) ; in the śrāddha for the fathers, he should invoke the father, the grand-father and the great grandfather ; in the śrāddha for the mothers, he should invoke the mother, the grand-mother and the great grandmother ; in the śrāddha for the self, he should invoke the Vasus, the Rudras and the Ādityas ; in the śrāddha for men, he should invoke his own self, the father and the grandfather. If the father is alive, then, leaving him out, he should invoke his own self, the grandfather and the great grandfather. He should offer worship to two brāhmaṇas for each person whose śrāddha he performs. He should perform these eight śrāddhas in one day or eight days according to the mantras of the śākhā of the Veda he studies and feed and worship the brāhmaṇas according to the ritual prescribed for the śrāddha of the manes. Having finished the offering of rice-balls etc. to the manes and having dismissed the brāhmaṇas after offering them the sacrificial fees and

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1. M. U. Pp. 162-168. It is curious to observe that the passage begins with—*āture vā krame vāpi turīyāśramasvīkārārthaṃ*, and there is no mention of the Vidvatsaṃnyāsin in the beginning. But, that the entire ritual refers to a Vidvatsaṃnyāsin, is evident from the following sentence at the end of the whole ritual : *pūrvavat vidvatsaṃnyāsī cet.* Therefore I explain the passage :—a Vidvatsaṃnyāsin, whether he is an ātura or a krama—Saṃnyāsin, etc.

2. That is, the Viśvedevās.

betel-leaf, he should shave his head keeping back seven locks of hair for the completion of the remaining ritual. For it is said : "For the successful completion of the remaining ritual, a brāhmaṇa, having kept back seven or eight locks of hair, should cut his hair, whiskers and nails."

He should not shave his armpits or lower parts. Then he should take his bath, finish his evening prayers, repeat the Gāyatrī for one thousand times, recite the sacred texts, kindle an independent fire, withdraw in himself his own śākhā of the Veda, and having thrown oblations with ghee into the fire according to the mantras of his own śākhā, should eat the groats (saktu) thrice, with reference to his self, mind and the Universal Soul. He should then sip water, and having carefully kindled the fire, he should take his seat on a deer-skin to the north of the fire. He should listen to the Purāṇas the whole night, and in the last quarter of the night, should take a bath. He should, then, cook the sacrificial food on that fire and throw sixteen oblations into it, accompanied by the recitation of the Puruṣasūkta. He should, then, perform a virajā-homa,[1] and after sipping water, he should give the priest a cow, a golden vessel and a piece of cloth accompanied by his fees. After performing the brahmodvāsana (removing the Brahman) ceremony, he should reposit the fire in himself, reciting the following mantras :

"May gods fill me (with life), may Indra and Bṛhaspati (fill me with life), and may Agni fill me (i.e. grant me) with (long) life and strength and make me long-lived.[2]

"O Agni ! Come with that body of yours which is sacrificial and ascend myself with it yourself, granting us many riches which are desired for by men.

"Becoming a sacrifice, come to the sacrifice, which is your own birth-place, o Jātavedas ! born of earth ! Come with your residence (house)."[3]

Having meditated upon the fire, he should remove it after circumambulating and saluting it. Then he should say his morning

1. The homa of one who is free from all passions.
2. A. V. VII. 33. 1 ; T. Ā. II. 18. 1.
3. Āp. Ś. S. VI. 28. 11 ; T. B. II. 5. 8. 8.

prayers and worship the sun, repeating the Gāyatrī one thousand times. Then he should enter water reaching up to his navel and there, after offering water to the gods presiding over eight quarters, he should give up the Sāvitrī and reposit it in the seven mystical syllables (Bhūh, Bhuvaḥ, etc.).

He should then recite the following mantras :—

"I am he who has cut[1] the tree (of saṃsāra). (My) fame is like the back of a mountain. I am highly pure like the good immortality in Vājin (the sun). (May I acquire) the riches along with energy. (May I become) of good intellect and besprinkled with immortality. This is the recitation of the Vedas by Triśaṅku.[2]

"He who is the bull of the songs (chandas), and assumes all forms, and who above the songs, has arisen from the immortal, may that Indra please me (by granting) intelligence. O god ! may I become the holder of immortality."[3]

"(May) my body (become) very active, my tongue the sweetest, may I hear much with my ears. You are the treasure-house of the Brahman, covered with intelligence. Protect my hearing."[4]

He should then think that he is above the desire for his wife, riches and other worlds. He should then utter the following mantras in his mind as well as by his speech, in low, middle and high tones :—"Om Bhūḥ, I have renounced ; Om Bhuvaḥ, I have renounced ; Om Suvaḥ, I have renounced ; Om Bhūḥ, Bhuvaḥ, Suvaḥ, I have renounced."[5]

He should then sip water reciting the mantra :—

"To all living beings flows from me every kind of absence from danger, Svāhā."

He should then break his sacred thread, reciting the following verses :—

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1. The word in the text is "*rerivā*" which occurs only here. Śaṅkara explains it as *prerayitā antaryāmyātmanā*. Śaṅkarānanda gives the sense of "cutting" also, which, in my opinion, suits the context.

2. T. U. I. 10. 1.

3. T. U. I. 4. 1.

4. T. U. I. 4. 2.

5. Here are four formulas of Praiṣa, whereas, elsewhere we find only three.

"The sacred thread is the highest purifying thing which was formerly born with Prajāpati. Grant (me) the best (and) pure (long) life. The sacred thread may be strength and energy (to me)."[1]

"The sacred thread may not reside (elsewhere) outside. You (O sacred thread) for ever entering inside the centre (of my heart),[2] grant (me) the highest purifying thing, fame, strength, knowledge, non-attachment and intelligence."

And now, taking the fragments of the sacred thread in his hands full of water, he should make an oblation of them in water saying: "Om, go to the ocean, Svāhā."

Then he should thrice repeat "Om Bhūḥ, I have renounced, Om Bhuvaḥ, I have renounced, Om Suvaḥ, I have renounced," and muttering these mantras thrice over that water, he should drink that water, and afterwards sip water. He should then throw in water his cloth and girdle also, uttering, "Om Bhūḥ Svāhā".

He should then think that he is free from all actions. He should become naked, and searching after his true nature, should walk off towards the north with his arm raised up. This is how a Vidvatsaṃnyāsin ought to be initiated.

(4) A Vividiṣāsaṃnyāsin[3] should proceed towards a highway.

"There the brāhmaṇas like his teacher etc. should advise him:—'Wait, wait, O illustrious one! Take a staff, a cloth and a waterpot. Come near the preceptor to learn the syllable Om and the mahāvākyas.' He should then take a staff, a girdle, a loin-cloth, a śāṭī and a waterpot. (The staff ought to be) equal to his height from foot to head, should have no faults, should be even, smooth, free from black marks, possessed of good marks, and of bamboo. (This he should take) after sipping water and reciting, 'Thou art my friend,' etc.[4] Then he should take the waterpot, pronouncing Om and reciting the verse: 'Life of the world! basis of life! always advise me like a mother. O thou who art

1. P. G. II. 2. 10.

2. The idea is that the sacred thread, by being broken, should not reside elsewhere, but inside the heart of a Saṃnyāsin.

3. N. U. p. 169 ff.

4. See note 7, p. 51.

excellent to all!' He should then take the girdle, recitlng, 'The suspender of the loin-cloth, the girdle Om,' the loin-cloth, reciting, 'The covering of private parts, the loin-cloth, Om,' and the cloth, reciting 'The protector against cold, wind and heat, the sole protector of the body, the cloth, Om.' After sipping water and being consecrated with the Yogapaṭṭa,[1] and after thinking, 'I have attained my object,' he should perform the duties pertaining to his stage of life."

At the time of entering Saṃnyāsa, neither should his relations nor he himself shed tears. For, if he shed tears, the result will be the destruction of his progeny and the knowledge.[2]

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1. A cloth thrown around the knees and the back by a devotee at the time of meditation.

2. S. U. p. 19; K. Ś. U. p. 37.

CHAPTER VII

Female Ascetics

The next very important question is with regard to female ascetics. We find in no Dharmaśāstra any mention of female ascetics, except a reference to the word pravrajitā in three of the texts.[1] Now, it is very difficult to say what this word pravrajitā means, for this word is differntly explained by the commentators of Manu. According to Sarvajñanārāyaṇa, it stands for bhikṣukī. Kullūka and Rāghavānanda explain the term by: *bauddhābhir brahmacāriṇībhiḥ.* Rāmacandra explains it as *bauddhavṛttibrahmacāriṇyaḥ.*

How far the commentators are justified in explaining it as a Buddhistic female ascetic, is difficult to say. Still, two things go in favour of them. Firstly, nowhere in the rules of initiation, any female ascetic is mentioned. Rather even in the rules or his daily life an ascetic is warned against indulging in talk about females. Nowhere do we find any warning against indulging in talk about males. Secondly, as is evident from what has already been said, the real idea underlying Saṃnyāsa or renunciation has been the renunciation of the household-fire. This household-fire is kindled by a man and so its renunciation is also possible only by a man. A woman does not at all come into question.

But there is one instance which is difficult to explain. It is the story of Sulabhā in the Mahābhārata.[2] She had a

1. Viṣṇu XXXVI, 7; Manu VIII, 363; Nārada XII, 74. Bühler remarks on the passage of (Manu S. B. E. XXV, 317):—" 'Female ascetics', i.e. 'Rakṣakas (?), Śīlamitrās (?), and so forth' (Medh.), or 'Buddhist nuns' (Gov., Kull., Rāgh.). Nār. says 'female mendicants'. It deserves to be noted that according to a passage attributed by Govinda and Nār. to Baudhāyana, but not found in our text, 'some' permitted even orthodox females to become ascetics. Female ascetics were probably in ancient India as common as they are now, and were considered equally disreputable." See Yājñ. II, 293; and see also the Gaṇapāṭha *Śramaṇādi* to Pāṇini 2, 1, 70, where Śramaṇā, pravrajitā, tāpasī, respectively Kumāraśramaṇā, etc. are taught. Also Vārttika to Pāṇini 3, 2, 14, where Patañjali says: *Śaṃkarā nāma parivrājikā Śaṃkarā Śakunikā tacchīlā ca tasyām ubhayam prāpnoti.* Women are mentioned as being capable of Yoga and of learning in the Mahābhārata: Cf. Mbh. XII, 241, 34; 250, 23; 284, 203.

2. XII. 322.

conversation with the king Janaka on mokṣadharma. She carried three staves. Janaka mistook her to be a brāhmaṇī in the Saṃnyāsa stage. But she replied she was a kṣattriya girl, born in the family of the royal sage Pradhāna, and, because she could not find a suitable husband, she learnt the mokṣadharma and was observing the vows of a muni. The very mistake of Janaka, that she might be a brāhmaṇī, proves the existence of the brāhmaṇa female ascetics. That she was really a kṣattriyā, proves the existence of kṣattriya female ascetics.

On the other hand, we find in the Arthaśāstra[1] that a man, who makes a woman enter Saṃnyāsa, should be punished.

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1. II. 19. 37 (Jolly's edn.) *striyaṃ ca pravrājayataḥ.*

In the Rāmāyaṇa we find the terms bhikṣuṇī (II. 29. 13), tāpasī (VII. 45–50) and śramaṇī (III. 73–74). S. C. Sarkar is at pains to explain these terms as standing for the lady-students residing at a hermitage. One has to stretch one's imagination too far to accept his meanings. See his "Educational Ideas And Institutions in Ancient India, the 1925–1926 Readership Lectures, Patna, 1928," especially pages 62 ff, 74 ff. and 85 ff.

CHAPTER VIII

The Ascetics and the S'rāddha

The question as to whether an ascetic should be invited[1] to the śrāddha feast, is answered differently by the different law-books. Oldenberg[1] remarks :—

"The dinners offered in connection with these śrāddha sacrifices to Brāhmaṇas and also—though of this, of course, no notice is taken in Vedic texts—to śramaṇas stood in the first line among the exhibitions of liberality of lay people towards priests and monks. Thus we find among the stock phrases that constantly re-occur in the Pāli-Piṭakas, the mention of Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas who have eaten the 'food given to them out of faith' (*saddhādeyyāni bhojanāni bhuñjitvā*)—wherein the 'food given out of faith' (*saddhādeyya*), either chiefly or exclusively means the śrāddha dinners, which are so called because the sacrificer gives them 'full of faith' (*śraddhāsamanvita*, Manu III, 275) to the Brāhmaṇas and through them to the manes."

According to the Vasiṣthasmṛti,[2] an ascetic, who rejects meat at sacrifices or funeral meals, lives in hell for as many years as the animal has hair. This, of course, clearly shows that an ascetic was invited to the śrāddha feast. In the Manusmṛti,[3] however, we read that if a brāhmaṇa or a bhikṣuka comes to beg for meals at the time of the śrāddha feast, the sacrificer, with the permission of the brāhmaṇas (who have been invited to the feast) should feed him according to his means. The word bhikṣuka is explained by Medhātithi as *bhikṣārthinaṃ brāhmaṇam* — i.e. "a brāhmaṇa who comes to beg". Kullūka and Rāghavānanda explain the term to mean a saṃnyāsin. One thing, however, is clear that an ascetic here is not an invited guest, but one who comes to beg by chance. That Manu does not look favourably upon his invitation to the śrāddha, is clear from the fact that the sacrificer has to take the permission of the brāhmaṇa guests present before he gives anything to the ascetic.

1. Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra, S. B. E. XXIX, 106, n. 1.
2. XI. 34.
3. III. 243.

Apart from the śrāddha, it is the express duty of a householder to give alms to an ascetic. The Viṣṇusmṛti[1] lays down that a householder should give alms to an ascetic, even if he comes after the meal-time. For a brahmacārin, a yati and a bhikṣu depend for their food upon the stage of a householder. Manu[2] and Yājñavalkya[3] also lay this down as a duty of the householder. We read a similar injunction even in the Pāraskaragṛhyasūtra:—[4]

"They should give their due share to the mendicants (bhikṣukān) and the guests."

But as regards the śrāddha feast, the Viṣṇusmṛti[5] lays down that a man, who entertains an ascetic at this time, should be fined one hundred paṇas.

Mādhava, in his commentary on the Parāśarasmṛti,[6] quotes four lines, ascribing them to Yama (which, of course, are not found in any printed edition of Yamasaṃhitā), according to which the following persons are forbidden in the śrāddha-feast:—

"A back-biter, a false witness, one suffering from protracted illness, one who does not observe the rules of his āśrama, an apostate from Saṃnyāsa and a false ascetic.

One born of an ascetic and apostate are both brahmacaṇḍālas, so has Yama, the son of Vivasvat, said."

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1. LIX, 14; 18; 27.
2. III. 94.
3. I. 108.
4. II. 9. 12.
5. V. 115. See also Yājñavalkya II. 235.
6. Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 350 (Bomb. S. S. 48).

CHAPTER IX

The Position of an Ascetic in Law

We now come to the position of an ascetic in law. An ascetic, having nothing to do with worldly matters, is not to be called as a witness. The Viṣṇusmṛti[1] mentions ascetics in the long list of persons unfit to be witnesses. The Mitākṣarā[2] also quotes Nārada, enumerating the people unfit for being witnesses. They are :—

"A śrotriya, an anchorite, an old man, and other persons like ascetics, they are unfit for being witnesses according to the injunction of the law, and no cause of it is given."

Another list of the unfit witnesses, quoted in this commentary and ascribed to Śaṅkha, is :—

"The people, who quarrel with their father, who reside with the teacher, who are parivrājakas or vānaprasthas or nirgranthas, are non-witnesses."

But there are cases where anyone can be called as a witness. Yājñavalkya[3] says that in the cases of rape, theft, force and violence, everybody can be called as a witness. So, if an an ascetic is involved as a witness in such a case, then he gets the concession of being exempted from an ordeal.[4]

An ascetic, however, has a seat in the king's assembly. Gautama says :—

"They declare that an assembly should consist of at least ten members who are—four learned men in the four Vedas, three men belonging to the first three stages and three men who know the different (branches of) law."[5]

The stages or āśramas are enumerated by Gautama[6] in this order—brahmacārin, gṛhastha, bhikṣu and vaikhānasa.

1. VIII. 2.
2. Comm. on Yājñavalkya II. 68-69. The Nāradīyamanusaṃhitā (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 97) I. 158, also mentions pravrajita as an unfit witness.
3. II. 72.
4. Nārada I. 256.
5. XVIII. 49. (III. 10. 47, acc. to A. S. S. edn.)
6. III. 2.

Therefore, it clearly indicates that an ascetic is meant.

Manu[1] also uses the phrase :—"*trayas' ca āśramiṇaḥ pūrve.*"

The commentators differ in explaining it. Sarvajñanārāyaṇa, Kullūka, Rāghavānanda, Nandana and Govinda explain it to mean :—brahmacārin, gṛhastha and vānaprastha. Medhātithi says that according to some it means a brahmacārin, a gṛhastha and an ascetic, for an ascetic is not forbidden to enter a village and also because Gautama enumerates the aśramas in this order.

An ascetic is free from toll. The Viṣṇusmṛti[2] says that a man who collects the ferry-toll from a brahmacārin, a vānaprastha, an ascetic, a pregnant woman and a person going to visit the sacred places, shall be fined ten paṇas.

Āpastamba[3] also says : "And ascetics, who are intent on fulfilling the sacred law (are free from taxes), and those to whom the acquisition of property is forbidden."[4]

The conduct of a wife whose husband has entered Saṃnyāsa should be chaste according to Gautama.[5] That is, even if she is childless she should not submit to niyoga for bringing forth a child. But Nārada[6] is very radical in his opinions and prescribes re-marriage in the case of a woman whose husband has either disappeared, or is dead, or has entered Saṃnyāsa, or is impotent, or is an outcaste. This verse, of course, is considered to be an interpolation by the orthodox section of the brāhmaṇas who are against re-marriage.

The debts contracted by a man before entering the Saṃnyāsa are payable by his sons and grandsons.[7]

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1. XII. 111.
2. V. 132.
3. II. 10. 26. 14 and 17. Bühler's note on the 14th Sūtra is :

"Why does he say—*intent on fulfilling the holy law* ? Those shall not be free from taxes who perform austerities in order to make their magic charms efficacious—Haradatta." Probably, however, Āpastamba means to exclude all heretical hermits, of whom India has had plenty at all times.

4. Bühler's translation.
5. XVIII. 16.
6. XII. 97 (Jolly) ; Nāradīyamanusaṃhitā (Trivand. S. S. 97). XII. 99.
7. Viṣṇu VI. 27.

If amongst several brothers, any one dies childless or enters the Saṃnyāsa, then his property is to be divided amongst his remaining brothers.[1] But the property of an ascetic, after he has entered the order, goes to his worthy disciple.[2] A very interesting discussion is given in the Mitākṣarā on this line :

" Well, when according to the precept of Vasiṣṭha,[3] people in the other stages of life (except that of a householder) have no connection with the property, there can be no question as to its division......And according to Gautama's rule,[4] 'A bhikṣu has no store,' there can be no possibility of the private earnings of an ascetic. We reply :—Even an ascetic has belongings in the shape of clothes, books, etc., according to the following verse :—'He should carry cloth for his loins or for covering himself (completely). He should take different requisites for Yoga, and shoes.' "

As to the property used by a stranger, Gautama[5] lays down that after ten years of use, it belongs to the user. But this rule does not apply to an ascetic. Haradatta, commenting upon it, says, that the mere use of a house or a garden etc., does not entitle an ascetic to become its owner. For the real owner may have allowed the use of his property, even for a long period and without reclaiming it, in order to acquire merit. And as the ascetic cannot possess any property, the reference in this sūtra is naturally to some unoccupied property which has yet an owner.

Ths position of an apostate from Saṃnyāsa is not a convenient one. The Viṣṇusmṛti[6] ordains that he should be a slave of the King. Nārada[7] also, while enumerating fifteen kinds of royal slaves, names an apostate from Saṃnyāsa as one of them. Govinda, in his commentary on Baudhāyana,[8] quotes an authority according to which the children of an apostate should be made

1. Nārada XIII. 25.
2. Yājñavalkya II. 137 ; see also Arthaśāstra (I ed. Mysore 1909) p. 191, 11. 7-8.
3. XVII. 52.
4. III. 11.
5. XII. 37 and 38.
6. V. 132.
7. V. 27.
8. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 10. 2.

to reside with the Caṇḍālas. According to Saṃvarta, quoted here by Govinda, an apostate should practise kṛcchra continuously for six months. Yājñavalkya[1] is also of the opinion that an apostate from Saṃnyāsa is the king's slave as long as he lives. The commentary Mitākṣarā, however, remarks that it holds good if an apostate does not undergo some prāyaścitta. Nārada,[2] on the other hand, is so strict that he does not at all believe in either the liberation from slavery or purification of an apostate from Saṃnyāsa. According to a quotation ascribed to Kātyāyana by Mādhava in his Commentary on the Parāśarasmṛti,[3] an apostate, if he is a brāhmaṇa, should be exiled, but if he is either a kṣattriya or a vaiśya, then he should serve as a slave of the king. Further on, according to another authority ascribed to Nārada here, an apostate should be exiled, as soon as possible, by the king, after having him marked with the mark of a dog's foot. But according to another authority, quoted by Mādhava and ascribed to Pitāmaha[4] at one place and to Kātyāyana[5] at another place, an apostate should be either put to death or a double punishment (?) should be imposed upon him.

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1. II. 183.
2. V. 35.
3. Vol III. pt. II, Pp. 344-5. (Bomb. S. S.)
4. Parāśara, Vol. III, Pt. I, p. 212. (Bomb. S. S.)
5. Ibid, Vol. III. Pt. II, p. 582.

CHAPTER X

The Death and the Last Rites of an Ascetic

Now, we come to the last question, that of a Saṃnyāsin's death and his funeral rites.

In the Mahābhārata,[1] already a vānaprastha is advised to end his life by five methods: fasting, drowning in an ocean, crushing his feet with a stone, entering the fire, or fighting. A vānaprastha, ending his life by fasting, goes to heaven; one who drowns himself, enters the region of Varuṇa; to one who crushes his feet by a stone, the region of the Guhyakas is awarded; one entering the fire has his place in the region of Brahman; and one who ends his life by fighting enters the heaven of Śakra.

Also Manu[2] is in favour of a vānaprastha's putting an end to his life. "He should walk straight toward the north-east till his body falls (and in the meantime) eating (i.e. subsisting on) water and wind only." Yājñavalkya[3] also agrees with Manu. This religious suicide,[4] either by means of starvation ('Hungertod') or by any other means is to be found not only among the brāhmaṇas but also among the Jainas and the Bauddhas.[5]

This practice of the religious suicide is also prescribed for an ascetic.

We read in the Āpastambadharmasūtra,[6] that an ascetic will then live on water, then on air and then on ether. Of course, living on ether, as Haradatta rightly explains, means dying by fasting.

The Jābāla Upaniṣad[7] says; "This is the way (prescribed) for an ascetic :—an heroic death, fasting, entering into water,

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1. XI. 142.
2. VI. 31.
3. III. 55.
4. Cf. Keith: The Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and Upaniṣads II. 589 (H. O. S. 32) and E. R. E. XII, 34 (*a*).
5. Cf. G. Bühler, Die indische Sekte der Jainas (Die feierliche Sitzung der k. Akad. d. Wiss. Wien, 1887), Pp. 12, 37 (note 10).
6. II. 9. 22, 4 and II. 9. 23, 2; cf. also Vasiṣṭha XXIX. 4; Eggers: Das Dharmasūtra der Vaikhānasas, Pp. 32–33.
7. M. U. p. 68. See also Winternitz—History of Indian Literature, Vol. I, p. 240.

entering into fire, or the mahāprasthāna (i.e. walking straight till he dies)."

The Kaṭhaśruti Upaniṣad[1] also not only prescribes the above-named five alternatives, but adds a sixth one, namely :—"Or he may go to the vṛddhāśrama". The term vṛddhāśrama has been explained by *Schrader*[2] as the abode of wise men. But I think it stands for remaining in the Saṃnyāsāśrama until he dies by old age.

Both these Upaniṣads prescribe two courses for one who is intitiated as an ascetic. If he is willing to end his life then and there just after the initiation, then, of course, he has so many as five alternatives to choose from. But, if, on the other hand, he does not intend committing this religious suicide, then he may lead the full life of an ascetic.[3] The difference in the view-point of the Mahābhārata, Manu and Yājñavalkya on the one hand, and that of Āpastamba and the Upaniṣads on the other hand, is but technical. While the former prescribe the suicide after the vānaprastha stage, the latter after his initiation as an ascetic. This throws light on the point that formerly there was no marked distinction between the last two stages.

The body of an ascetic after his death was buried, as is done even to-day. This is evident also from the passage in the Śāṭyāyanīya Upaniṣad[4] where it is laid down as a strict rule that an ascetic should never part with his five mātrās during his life-time, and even after his death these mātrās should be buried with him.

But in the Vaikhānasadharmapraśna,[5] we find both burial and cremation. If he is an anāhitāgni (i.e. if he has kept no fires before entering the Saṃnyāsa), then his dead body should be

1. M. U., p. 39.
2. S. Ṭ., p. 391; cf. Winternitz: Zur Lehre von den Āśramas, p. 218, n. 1.
3. See S. Ṭ. on both these passages.
4. M. U. p. 323; see also note 1, p. 24.
5. III. 8 (X. 8 acc. to Caland). Also see Vaikh. Dh. V. 8 (Caland), which is much similar to it. We find a similar ritual about the burial and cremation in the Bodhāyanagṛhyasūtra (Mysore Govt. publication, 21) IV. 17, Pp. 326-328.

covered with grass by his son or others. Then his body should be carried by a Yantra (some conveyance) or by brāhmaṇas to the bank of a river flowing into an ocean or to any other holy place, and there a grave should be dug so deep that the body is not touched by the jackals etc. After the body has been washed, accompanied by the recitation of the Gāyatrī, it should be placed in the grave in the sitting or the lying posture, and the Gāyatrī should be repeated all the while. The three staves should be placed in his right hand reciting the vaiṣṇava mantras, and along with the recitation of the mantra "*Yad asya pāre rajasaḥ*,[1] his network-bag and the water-strainer should be placed in his left hand. His begging-bowl should be placed on his stomach, with the Gāyatrī being recited and his reddish-brown cloth, the pot for keeping the clay and the water-pot should be placed on his private parts, accompanied by the recitation of the mantra :— "*Bhūmir bhūmim*" etc.[2] Then the grave should be covered. If the body is touched by jackals etc., then the performer of the burial commits sin.

If the ascetic was an āhitāgni[3] and had entered the Saṃnyāsa by repositing the fires in himself, then his dead body should be washed along with the recitation of the Gāyatrī, and should be carried as before and placed on a sacred ground. Then his fire should be reposited in the ordinary fire with the mantra "*Upāvaroha*" etc.[4] Then clarified butter and milk should be poured in his mouth with the mantra "*Pavitraṃ te*" etc.[5] His three staves and other things should be placed as prescribed above. Then his body should be burnt according to the ritual of the Brahmamedha or the Pitṛmedha, by the recitation of the āhitāgni mantras.

In both cases named above, there is no period of impurity for the relatives (as in other cases), no offering of water (to the dead Saṃnyāsin) and no performance of the ekoddiṣṭa śrāddha. Only the Nārāyaṇabali[6] is to be offered.

All those who carry the dead body of an ascetic, or bury it after digging the grave, or cremate it, or offer the Nārāyaṇabali, get the fruit of performing a horse-sacrifice.

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1. Baudh. Dh. S. II. 17. 33 ; T. S. IV. 2. 5. 2.
2. Baudh. Dh S. I. 4. 6. 7 ; Ṣadviṃsa Br. I. 6-20.
3. Cf. n. 2, p. 52.
4. T. B. II. 5. 8. 8.
5. R. V. IX. 83. 1.
6. Vaikh Dh. III. 9.

CHAPTER XI

Conclusion

The facts which have been mentioned in the Introduction and the preceding chapters may also throw some light on the chronology of the sources on which our investigation of the Saṃnyāsa problem is based.

We have seen that the institution of Saṃnyāsa developed from the simple renunciation of the worldly desires to the most complicated system of rules and regulations for even such minute things as bathing, painting the forehead, worshipping and so on.

Our oldest sources are, of course, the Saṃhitās where we find the munis,[1] who are either naked or dressed in dirty garments. The Yatis[2] also have been mentioned, though they are said to have been killed by Indra.

Next follow the Brāhmaṇas,[3] where we find the story of the Yatis repeated and a mention of the Vaikhānasas.[4]

In the oldest Upaniṣads we find the mention of tapas[5] and the parivrājakas[6] who wander away, leaving all their worldly possessions. On the whole these Upaniṣads attach so much importance to the Vedic rites, that the stage of the householder is still considered as the proper thing.[7]

The Dharmasūtras also are more in favour of the stage of the householder and admit asceticism only in connection with the āśrama theory. The Dharmasūtras, the Smṛtis and the Epics may be divided into two classes. Those of the one class do not require a man to pass through the stages of a student, a house-

1. R. V. VIII. 17. 14, X. 136; A. V. VII. 74. 1.
2. A. V. II. 5. 3.
3. Ait. Br. VII. 28; Pañc. Br. VIII. I. 4; XIII. 4. 17.
4. Pañc. Br. XIV. 4. 7.
5. Chānd. U. V. 10. 1; Śaṅkara explains that it refers to the parivrājakas.
6. Bṛh. Ā. U. IV. 4. 22; T. Ā. II. 7.
7. Chānd. U. VIII. 15. 1.

holder and a forest-dweller in their due order, but allow entering into the fourth stage even from that of a brahmacārin. To this class belong the older Dharmasūtras of Āpastamba, Gautama, Vasiṣṭha and Baudhāyana. The others require the transition from one stage to the other to be strictly observed. To this class belong Manu, Viṣṇu, the Mahābhārata and the Vaikhānasadharmapraśna.

The position of the Yājñavalkya Smṛti is between these two. It does not favour the entrance into the fourth stage directly from the brahmacarya, but has no objection to the case of a man desiring to enter from the stage of a householder or a forest-dweller.

Coming now to the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads, we find a great confusion. The oldest of them is the Jābāla Upaniṣad, for we find the mention of only one class of ascetics viz., the paramahaṃsa.

In the Āruṇi Upaniṣad, two kinds of Saṃnyasins are distinguished, viz., the kuṭīcakā and the paramahaṃsa. The Saṃnyāsa and Kaṭhaśruti Upaniṣads do not mention any particular kinds, so also the Brahma and the Maitreya Upaniṣads. The Paramahaṃsa Upaniṣad, however, mentions two kinds of paramahaṃsas.

Those, which mention four or five different kinds of ascetics, may be considered as belonging to a later period.

The Āśrama and the Bhikṣuka Upaniṣads mention the kuṭīcaka, bahūdaka, haṃsa and paramahaṃṣa. The Turīyātītāvadhūta Upaniṣad mentions the turīyātīta as the additional fifth. The Nāradaparivrājaka and the Bṛhatsaṃnyāsa Upaniṣads mention several divisions, and give as well a very detailed ritual about the minutest activities of a Saṃnyāsin. They have all the appearance of still later works.

The Śāṭyāyanīya and the remaining Upaniṣads are the latest. For, the former is only a sectarian Vaiṣṇava Upaniṣad, whereas, the others either only copy from the older Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads or are rather treatises on the Vedānta than anything else.

APPENDIX TO NOTE 1, p. 42

Kinds of Ascetics	Bath	Painting the forehead	Shaving	Food	Clothing	Worship	Muttering of the mantras	Teachings	Different kinds of Praṇavas	Śravaṇa, Manana or Nididhyāsana
Kuṭīcaka	3 times a day	A vertical line drawn upwards	Every Season	From one place	2 śāṭīs	of gods	allowed to mutter the mantras	no special prescription	mānasa	Śravaṇa
Bahūdaka	2 times a day	Three lines	One in two seasons	From several places like a bee	1 śāṭī	do.	do.	do.	do.	do.
Haṃsa	once a day	Three vertical lines going upwards	None	Within the pot of hands	1 piece of cloth or a deerskin	mental	allowed to meditate	do.	āntara	manana
Paramahaṃsa	mental bath	Ash-Painting	None or once in the ayana	Within the pot of hands	naked or a loin-cloth or a deer-skin	do.	do.	The Mahāvākyas	do.	do.
Turīyātīta	bath in ashes	Tilakapuṇḍra	None	Like a cow	naked	Realisation of the unity of the individual with the Universal Soul	no mantras or meditation	do.	Brahma	Nididhyāsana
Avadhūta	air-bath	Nothing	None	Like a python	do.	do.	do.	do.	do.	do.

Note :—All should try to realise their own self.

SECTION 8

Examination of Word (in general).

Sūtra 50–57

Sūtra 50

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—" **'Word' is 'Inference',—(I) because its objective is such as is amenable to Inference only,—being (as it is) not apprehended (by Perception)**."—

BHĀṢYA

(I) " Word is only Inference, and not a separate Instrument of Cognition. ' Why so ? ' Because the objective of (object cognised by means of) Word is such as is amenable to Inference. ' How do you know that it can be inferred ? ' Because it is not apprehended by means of Perception. In the case of Inference what happens is that the *Subject*, which is not already apprehended by means of Perception, comes to be cognised afterwards by means of the already known* Probans;—such is the process of Inference ;—and in the case of Word, also an object which is not already known (by means of Perception) comes to be cognised afterwards, by means of the already-known Word,—such is the process of verbal cognition. Thus we find that ' Word ' is only ' Inference ' (and Verbal Cognition is purely Inferential).†

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also 'Word' is only 'Inference'—

Sūtra 51

(II) "Because cognitions do not involve two diverse processes."

"When the 'Instruments of Cognition' are different from one another, the cognition (brought about by them) involves two distinct processes ; for instance, the cognitional process

* 'Perceived'—says *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The Probans put forward in the Sūtra, is the fact of the object *not being perceptible*.—says the *Vārtika*. That cognition is called Inferential which apprehends an object not cognisable by Perception, and appears in the wake of Perception (of the Probans in the Inference, of the Word in Verbal Cognition) ; and a Verbal Cognition fulfills these conditions, it is purely inferential.—*Tātparya*.

tation *of the Word*', where 'word' is in the Possessive case (taking the Genitive case-ending); but we do not admit that between them there is any such relation as consists in *Contact* [or *Inherence* ;* and it is only on the basis of some relationship of this latter kind that verbal cognition could be regarded as *inferential*]. "But why is such relation not admitted?" *For the simple reason that no such relation can be recognised by means of any Instrument of Cognition.*† For instance,§ the Contact between the Word and its denotation cannot be recognised by means of Inference, as it is beyond the reach of the sense-organs; that is to say, the object denoted by the Word is beyond the reach of that sense-organ by which the Word itself is apprehended; and [not only this, but] there are also many objects (of verbal cognition) that are absolutely beyond the reach of any sense-organ; and as a matter of fact, only such contact is apprehended by the sense-organs as holds between objects perceptible by the same sense-organ.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Then again, if the relation comprehended as between the Word and the thing denoted by it were in the form of 'contact', then (*a*) either the thing would go over to (come into juxtaposition with) the Word,—or (*b*) the Word would go over to the thing, —or (*c*) both would go over to both. Now in regard to these, we find that—

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* *Prāptiḥ saṁyogasamavāyānyataraḥ*—'*Bhāṣyacandra*'.

† In both editions of the *Vārtika* this is printed as a *Sūtra*. But it is not found either in the *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, or any of the Sūtra Mss.

§ Why the *Bhāṣya* selects for attack the relation of *contact* is thus explained by the *Tātparya*—The natural (permanent) relationship between Word and its denotation could be only one of the following kinds—(*a*) it might be of the nature of identity; or (*b*) it might consist in the relation of denoter and denoted, that which makes cognisable and that which is cognised; or (*c*) it might be in the nature of contact. Now, that the relation cannot be that of identity we have already shown under Sū. 1-1-4. while explaining the term '*avyapadeśyam*' occurring in the definition of Perception. As for (*b*), though we admit of this relationship, we do not admit it to be eternal, as the Mimāṁsakas hold; this we shall show later on (*vide Tātparya*, P. 290, L. 18. *et. seq*). So that all that remains to be refuted is the relation of *Contact*.

Sūtra 54

There can be no such relation [between the Word and its Denotation] also because we do not find (actual) filling, burning and cutting (a) ;

*And because the place (of utterance) and the cause (human effort) are not coexistent** (*b*) ;—this (additional argument) is what is indicated by the particle '*ca*', 'also' in the Sūtra. †

[It has been shown that the 'contact' between the Word and the thing denoted by it cannot be cognised by means of Perception.]—(*a*) Nor can it be known by means of Inference that the thing goes over to the Word ; for if it did so, it would mean that the thing goes over to the Word ; and as the Word is uttered *in* the mouth§ and *by* the effort (subsisting in the Soul of the Man pronouncing the word), there should be *filling* of the mouth on the utterance of the word 'Food',—*burning* in the mouth on the utterance of the word 'Fire'—and *cutting* in the mouth on the utterance of the word 'Sword' [as the things, *food*, *fire* and *sword*, which are denoted by the three words, would, under the theory, go over to the Word, which has appeared in the mouth] ; as a matter of fact, however, no such effects are perceived ; so that, inasmuch as no such effects are produced, the conclusion is that there is no such relation of contact (between the Word and the thing denoted ; in the sense that the thing goes over to the Word).

(*b*) As regards the second alternative—that the Word goes over to the Thing,—if this were so, then no utterance of the Word would be possible, as neither the place (of utterance) nor its cause would be co-existent (at the place where the Thing is) ; —the 'place' of utterance is the throat and such other parts of the body, and its 'cause' consists of the particular effort of man ; and neither of these would subsist where the Thing exists.‡

* *Parasparasāmānādhi-karaṇyam na sambhavati-ityarthaḥ-Bhāṣyacandra.*

† The first alternative (*a*) is not possible, because of the reason given in the Sūtra ; the second alternative (*b*) is not possible, because of the reason added in the *Bhāṣya*, as implied by the particle '*cha*'. These reasons are explained by the *Bhāṣya* in the next sentence.

§ आस्यस्थान is the right reading ; supported by all but three Mss. and also by the *Vārtika*.

‡ Both—place of utterance and human effort—subsist in the man's body, while the Thing is outside.

(c) Lastly, as each of the two alternatives has been found to be untenable individually, it is not possible to accept the third alternative, that both (the Word and the Thing) go over to both.

The conclusion thus is that there can be no 'contact' between the Word and the Thing.

Sūtra 55

[Says the Opponent]—"From the fact of there being a limitation upon the denotation of Words, there can be no denial (of relationship between them)."

BHĀṢYA

"Inasmuch as we see that there is a limitation as to the cognition of certain things arising from certain words, we infer that what causes this limitation is some sort of relationship between the words and the things denoted by them;—for if there were no such determining relation, every word would denote every thing. For this reason there cannot be a denial of the said relationship."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The answer to the above argument of the Opponent is as follows—

Sūtra 56

The reasoning cannot be accepted; as the cognition of the denotation of a Word is based upon Convention.

As a matter of fact, the restriction that we find in connection with the denotation of words is due, not to any (eternal) relation between them, but to *Convention*. When we said on a previous occasion (*Vide* above) that *we do admit that there is such relation between them as is expressed by the assertion 'such is the denotation of this Word', where Word is in the Possessive case*,—what we referred to was this Convention. "But what is this *Convention*?" 'Convention' is the ordinance restricting the denotation of words by such injunctions as 'such and such a thing is to be denoted by such and such a word'. And as a matter of fact, it is only when this ordinance is known that there arises any cognition from the use of a word; while if the ordinance is not known, even though the word is heard pronounced, it does not give rise to any Cognition

(it expresses nothing). This fact (that verbal cognition arises only when one knows that 'such and such a thing is denoted by such and such a word') cannot be denied by even one who holds that there is an (eternal) relationship between the Word and the thing denoted by it. Ordinary men come to recognise this Convention (which is the ordinance of God) bearing upon words by observing their use in common parlance*; and it is for the preserving of this God-made Convention that we have the science of Grammar, which explains and determines that form of speech which consists of *single Words*—[by showing that a word can be regarded as *correct* only when used in the form and in the sense imparted to it by God, when propounding the ordinance and thereby fixing the Convention upon that word,—and it is incorrect when used in another form or another sense]; and of that form of speech which consists of *sentences*, the only explanation or definition possible is that it is 'such collection of connected Words as expresses one complete idea.'

Thus we conclude that, even though the Wood is denotative, there is not the slightest reason† (or use) for the inferring of any (permanent) relationship in the form of *Contact*.‡

Sūtra 57

Also because there is no such limitation (in actual usage) among different people.§

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* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains प्रयुज्यमान as नियुज्यमान, 'the person to whom a direction is addressed'; the sentence, according to this, would mean—'the relationship is recognised by watching the action of the man to whom the verbal direction is addressed.'

† Both Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyacandra* read अर्थतुषोऽपि, which gives good sense: 'not the *slightest tittle* of reason or use'; while अर्थजुषोऽपि can be made to give some sense only by a forced construction. The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains 'अर्थ' as प्रयोजन, *purpose, use*.

‡ Such being the case, inasmuch as there is no natural relationship between the Word and its denotation, it is not right for the Opponent to urge such relationship with a view to identify Word with Inference, which is based upon the natural relationship between the Probans and the Probandum.—*Tātparya*.

§ It is noteworthy that the word '*jāti*' here stands for *people*, and not *caste*; as the *Bhāṣya* paraphrases the term as referring to Ṛṣis, Āryas and Mlēchhas.'

BHĀṢYA

[Because there is diversity in actual usage among diverse people,] the denotation of things by words must be regarded as based upon convention, and not upon any natural relationship. As a matter of fact, we find that among such diverse people as Sages, Āryas and Mlēchchhas, they make use of words for expressing things in any way they choose (without any restriction); and if there were any natural relationship between Words and their denotations, no such arbitrary usage would be possible ; for instance, in the case of the *light* of fire, we find that its capability of being the cause of making colour cognised (where the relationship is natural and eternal), does not fail among any particular people at all.*

SECTION 10

On ' Word ' in Particular [i. e. Scripture]

Sūtras 58–69

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"In the Scriptural texts dealing respectively with—(*a*) the *Putrakāma Iṣṭi* (the sacrifice laid down for the purpose of obtaining a son), (*b*) the *Havana* (oblations) and (*c*) Repetitions—

Sūtra 58

"That (Word) cannot be regarded as an Instrument of Right Cognition, because of such defects as (A) Falsity, (B) Contradiction and (C) Tautology."

BHĀṢYA

The pronoun ' that ' in the Sūtra is meant by the revered author of the Sutra to refer to a particular kind of Word.

Word cannot be regarded as an Instrument of Right Cognition (i.e. trustworthy). Why ?

* (*a*) The word '*yava*' is used by the *Āryas* to express *barley*, and by the *Mlēchhas* to express *long-pepper* ; (*b*) the word '*trivṛt* is used by *Ṛṣis* in the sense of *nine hymns*, and the *Āryas* used it in the sense of a *particular creeper*. Such diversity of usage could not be possible if there were a natural relationship between Words and their denotations. For Light, which bears a natural relation to the illumining of things and rendering colour cognisable, cannot be made to be connected with Taste or Odour by even thousands of artists. This diversity of usage in the case of Words can be explained only on the basis of Convention, which can vary among different peoples.—*Tātparya*.

(A) Because of the defect of Falsity—as found in the case of the text dealing with the *Putrakāma* Sacrifice. The text declares that, 'One who desires a son should perform the Putreṣṭi, and yet we find that even when the Sacrifice has been finished, no son is born; and thus finding a text laying down something for a visible purpose to be false, we naturally conclude that other texts,—which deal with acts for invisible (transcendental) purposes—such texts, for instance, as 'One should perform the Agnihotra (for the purpose of attaining heaven)'—are also false.

(B) Secondly, because we find the defect of *Contradition* (by one text) of what has been enjoined (by another). For instance, in regard to the (Agnihotra) Oblation, we find such injunctions as—(*a*) 'The oblation should be offered *after* sunrise', (*b*) The oblation should be offered *before sunrise* ', (*c*) 'the oblation should be offered at a time when the stars have ceased to be visible and the sun has not become visible';—and after having laid down these points of time, other texts go on to say—(*a*) ' If one offers the oblations *after sunrise*, the oblations are eaten up by Shabala (the Dog of variegated colour)', and (*c*) 'if one offers the oblations at the time when the stars have set and the sun has not risen, the oblations are eaten up by both Śyāva and Śabala';—and as there is apparent contradiction among these (pairs of) texts, one or the other must be *false*.

(C) Lastly, because we find the defect of *tautology*, in those texts that lay down repetition; in the text—'One should repeat three times the first verse, and three times the final verse', we find the defect of tautology; and certainly a tautological assertion can proceed only from a demented person.

From all this the conclusion is that Word is not an Instrument of Right Cognition (i.e. it is not *trustworthy*); as it is beset with such defects as 'falsity, contradiction and tautology'.

Sūtra 59

Siddhānta—(A) Not so; as the failure is due to deficiencies in the Action, the Agent and the Means.

BHĀṢYA

The text bearing upon the Putreṣṭi cannot be regarded as 'false'. "Why?" Because *the failure is due to deficiencies in the*

Action, *e Agent and the Means*. (What the text declares is that) t parents, becoming connected with the particular sacrifice (by performing it), give birth to a son; so that the *sacrifice* is the *instrument*, the 'means',—the *parents* are the 'Agents', and their connection with the sacrifice is the 'Action'; and the son is born when all these three are perfect; but when they are not perfect, no son is born.

In regard to the Sacrifice itself, there is 'deficiency' in the *action*, when there is non-performance or omission of its details; —there is 'deficiency' in the *agent* when the performer happens to be illiterate and of immoral character; there is 'deficiency' in the *means* (*a*) when the material offered is not duly sanctified or has been desecrated, (*b*) when the mantras recited are shorter or longer (than their correct forms), or devoid of proper accent or the necessary syllables, or (*c*) when the sacrificial fee is such as has been acquired by unfair means, or is too small, or consists of deprecated material.

In regard to the act of procreation itself, there is 'deficiency' in the *act* when the method of intercourse is wrong;—there is 'deficiency' in the *agent* when there are uterine diseases (preventing conception) or defective semen; and 'deficiency' in the *means*, has been described in connection with the Sacrifice.

In regard to ordinary actions of the world, we have the injunction, 'Desiring fire one should rub together two pieces of wood'; and in connection with this, there is 'deficiency' in the *act* when the rubbing is done in the wrong manner;—there is 'deficiency' in the *agent* when there is some remissness in his knowledge or in his effort; and there is 'deficiency' in the *means* when the wood is wet and with holes (worm-eaten).

Now, when there are these deficiencies, the result is not achieved; but that does not make the said injunction ('Desiring fire one should rub together two pieces of wood') *false*; as when everything is perfect, the result does become accomplished. And in no way does the case of the injunction (of the Vedic sacrifice)—'Desiring son one should perform the Putreṣṭi'—differ from the said injunction (of the worldly act of rubbing the wood-pieces for obtaining fire).

Sūtra 60

(B)—The deprecatory assertion applies to the changing of a particular time after having (once) adopted it ;—

BHĀṢYA

'So that there is no *contradiction* in texts bearing upon the Agnihotra oblations'—this has to be supplied to the Sūtra (in order to complete the sentence). The deprecatory text—'When a man offers the oblations after sunrise, they are eaten up by the Śyāva dog'—is meant to point out that it is not right to change the time that has been once adopted ; as is done when a person, having in the first instance made the offerings at one time (e. g. *before* sunrise), changes it subsequently and makes them at another time (e. g. *after* sunrise). So that the text only serves to deprecate the *abandoning of the enjoined procedure* (and there is no 'contradiction' in this).

Sūtra 61

(C)—It may be rightly regarded as a useful reiteration.

BHĀṢYA

What is referred to in this Sūtra is the Purvapaksa argument that the Veda is tainted with 'tautology' by reason of the repetitions that it lays down (Su. 58). (It has to be borne in mind, however, that) it is only *needless* repetition that constitutes 'tautology'; there is, however, repetition with a *purpose*, which is called 'anuvāda', 'Reiteration'. Now, the repetition that is laid down in the Vedic text 'One should recite the first verse thrice and the final verse also thrice'—is of the latter kind, 'Reiteration'; as it is done *with a purpose* ; the purpose being that by repeating the first and final verses thrice each, the number of the *Sāmidhenī* verses becomes *fifteen* ; and it is with reference to this that we have the following description of the 'mantra' (the 'kindling' verses)—'By means of this verbal thunderbolt with its *fifteen* spokes I attack my enemy who hates me and whom I hate' ; where the name 'mantra-thunderbolt' refers to the *fifteen* 'Sāmidhenī' verses ; and this number 'fifteen' could not be obtained without the aforesaid repetition (of the first and final verses) (the actual number of verses being only eleven).

Sūtra 62

Specially as a classification of the texts is accepted on the basis of (diversity in their) purpose.

BHĀṢYA

(*As a classification of the texts is accepted on the basis of diversity in their purpose*, therefore) Vedic texts must be regarded as 'instruments of right cognition'; just as is done in common parlance (where every word serving a useful purpose is accepted as an instrument of Right Cognition).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The 'classification' of Vedic Brāhmaṇa texts is three-fold, as follows :—

Sūtra 63

The texts being employed as (A) 'Injunctions', (B) 'Descriptions' and (C) 'Reiterations with a Purpose'.

Vedic texts are employed in three ways—(A) as 'injunctive', (B) as 'descriptive' and (C) as 'reiterative',—assertions.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Of these three—

Sūtra 64

The injunction is that which prescribes (a certain act).

BHĀṢYA

That text which *prescribes*—i. e. urges or incites (the Agent to activity)—is called 'Injunction'; and this Injunction is either mandatory or permissive ; e. g. such texts as 'One desiring heaven *should offer* the Agnihotra oblations'.

Sūtra 65

The Descriptions are—Valedictory, Deprecatory, Illustrative and Narrative.

BHĀṢYA

(*a*) That text which eulogises a certain Injunction by describing the (desirable) results (following from the enjoined act) is called 'Valedictory'; such a text serves two purposes : (1) it serves the purpose of inspiring confidence, whereby the agent comes to have faith in what is thus eulogised (and is thereby led to perform it) ; (2) it also serves the purpose of persuading ; whereby on knowing the result following from a certain

act, the agent is persuaded to do it ; e.g. such texts as—'As the gods cognised all beings by means of the Sarvajit sacrifice, this sacrifice accomplishes the purpose of cognising all beings and obtaining all things ; by means of this a man obtains all things and conquers all beings' &c., &c.

(*b*) The text that describes the undesirable results (following from the act enjoined) is called 'deprecatory' ; it serves the purpose of dissuasion ; whereby the agent may not do the act deprecated ; *e.g.* such texts as—'That which is known as the Jyotiṣṭoma is the foremost of all sacrifices, one who, without performing this, performs another sacrifice, falls into a pit, the act perishes and the man is destroyed ' ; and so forth.

(*c*) That text which describes a contrary (different) method of action adopted by a certain person is called 'illustrative' ; *e.g.* such texts as—'Having offered the oblation, people pour out the fat, and then the mixture of ghee and coagulated milk ; but the Caraka priests pour this mixture first and they say that this mixture constitutes the very life of Agni', and so forth.

(*d*) The text that describes a method as adopted traditionally is called 'narrative' ; *e.g.*, such texts as—'Thus it is that Brāhmaṇas have adopted, in their hymns, the Bahiṣpavamāna Sāma, thinking that in so doing they were performing the Sacrifice in its very womb', and so forth.

" Why should the illustrative and Narrative texts be regarded as ' Descriptive ' (and not ' Injunctive ') ? "

These are regarded as ' Descriptive ', firstly because they are connected with *praise* or *deprecation*, and secondly because they indicate something connected with (bearing upon) some other Injunction (to which, therefore, they are supplementary).

Sūtra 66

(C) When the Injunction and the Enjoined are mentioned again, it constitutes 'Reiteration (with a purpose)' .

BHĀṢYA

The compound ' *vidhivihitānuvacana* ' means the ' *anuvacana*', re-mention, of (*a*) the 'vidhi', Injunction and (*b*) the 'vihita', Enjoined ;—the former being verbal ' reiteration ', and the latter material ' reiteration ' ; so that just as there are two

kinds of 'Repetition' so are there two kinds of 'Reiteration' also.

"Why should the *enjoined* be 'reiterated'?"

It is reiterated for the purpose of *reference*; it is in reference to what is *enjoined* that we have either (*a*) praise (of the act) or (*b*) deprecation (of the omitting of the act), or (*c*) a supplementary detail is laid down; and (*d*) some times Reiteration is for the purpose of indicating the sequence between two enjoined acts, and so on other purposes may be found out.

In common parlance also, we have three kinds of assertions —*injunctive*, *descriptive* and *reiterative*. (*a*) 'One should cook rice' is an *injunction*; (*b*) 'Long life, glory, strength, pleasure, intelligence—all this resides in food' is a *description* (of the food whose cooking has been enjoined); (*c*) we have the 'reiteration' (of the enjoined cooking) in the following forms: 'cook, cook, please', where we have repetition; 'cook quickly', 'do please cook', in the form of entreaty; and 'you must cook', for the purpose of emphasising.

Thus then, as in the case of ordinary assertions, Words are accepted as 'Instruments of Right Cognition', when it is found that they are classified according to the diverse purposes served by them,—exactly in the same manner, inasmuch as Vedic texts also are capable of being classified according to the different purposes served by them, they may be regarded as 'Instruments of Right Cognition' (as pointed out above, under Su. 63).

Sūtra 67

(The Opponent says)—"There is no difference between 'Reiteration' and 'Repetition'; as both consist in the restating of the same word."

BHĀṢYA

"As a matter of fact, no distinction is possible as that 'Repetition' is *wrong* and 'Reiteration' *right*. Because in both cases a word, whose meaning has been already comprehended, is repeated; so that by reason of the same word being repeated, both are equally *wrong*."

Sūtra 68

(Answer)—(Reiteration is) not the same (as Repetition), as (in the former) the re-mention (of the word) is like the exhortation to go 'more quickly'.

BHĀṢYA

'Reiteration' cannot be regarded as the same as 'Repetition';—Why?—because when the re-mention of a word serves a useful purpose, then it is 'Reiteration'; so that even though in 'Repetition' also we have the re-mention of words, the re-mention in this case is entirely useless; while 'Reiteration', serving a useful purpose, is *like the exhortation to go 'more quickly'*; that is to say, when one is exhorted in the words 'go quickly, quickly', the meaning is 'go more quickly'; so that the re-mention (of the word 'quickly') serves the purpose of indicating a peculiarity in the act (of *going*; which purpose could not be accomplished by the single mention of the word 'quickly'). This exhortation is cited only as an instance; there are several other instances of re-mention with a purpose; *e.g.* when it is said 'he cooks and cooks', what is meant is that the act of cooking is unceasing; 'village upon village is pleasant' means that every village is pleasant; 'God rained round and round the Trigarta country (the modern Jullundhur)' means *exception* (that rainfall avoided that country); 'Seated near and about the Wall' means *proximity*; 'there are bitters and bitters' means that there are several kinds of bitterness.

Thus then, we conclude that Reiteration is meant to be a *reference*, for the purpose of praising or deprecating, or laying down a supplementary detail, or pointing out the sequence of what has been enjoined (as explained under Su. 66).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question—"Does then the trustworthiness of Word (Scripture) become established simply by setting aside the arguments against its trust-worthiness"?—

Answer—It becomes established also by the following positive argument:—

Sūtra 69

The Trustworthiness of the Word (of the Veda) is based upon the trustworthiness of the reliable (veracious) expositor, just like the trustworthiness of Incantations and of Medical Scriptures.

BHĀṢYA

"In what does the trustworthiness of the Medical Scriptures consist ? "

It consists in this fact that, when the Medical Scriptures declare that 'by doing this and this one obtains what he desires, and by avoiding this and this he escapes from what is undesirable'—and a person acts accordingly,—the result turns out to be exactly as asserted ; and this shows that the said Scriptures are *true*, not *wrong*, in what they assert.

In the case of *Incantations* also it is found that whenever they are used for the purpose of averting such evils as poison, ghosts and thunderbolt, they are found effective, in bringing about that result ; and this fact establishes the 'trustworthiness' of the Incantations.

"But to what is all this *trustworthiness* due ? "

It is due to the trustworthiness of the veracious expositor.

"And in what does the trustworthiness of veracious expositors consist ? "

It consists in the following facts—that they have a direct cognition of the real essence of things—they have compassion on living beings,—and they are desirous of describing things as they really exist. As a matter of fact, veracious persons (*a*) have a direct perception of the real essence of things,—that is, they know that such and such a thing should be avoided by man, and also the method of avoiding it,—that such and such a thing should be acquired by man, and also the method of acquiring it,—(*b*) they take compassion on living beings,—that is, they feel as follows:—'These poor creatures being by themselves ignorant, there is no other means, save instruction, available to them for knowing things; until they know, they cannot either perform or avoid any acts, and unless they do perform acts, it cannot be well with them, and there is no one (save myself) who would help them in this matter ;—so, well, I am going to instruct them about things as they exist and as I know them ; having listened to these instructions, these creatures will understand things, and thereby they shall avoid what should be avoided and take up only what should be take up.' It is on this basis that the instruction of veracious persons proceeds ; and when an act is known on

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॥ कवीन्द्रचन्द्रोदयः ॥

KAVĪNDRACANDRODAYA

[*A collection of addresses presented to Kavīndrācārya by some of his contemporary scholars during Shah Jehan's Reign*]

CRITICALLY EDITED BY

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INTRODUCTION[1]

1. *Manuscript Material.* The present edition of the Kavīndracandrodaya, published for the first time, is based on three Mss, two of which were acquired from the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal Library and the third from the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay.[2] The description of the three Mss is as under :—

(*A*) "Substance, country-made paper, 12 × $5\frac{3}{4}$ inches. Folia 49. Lines 8 on a page. Extent 1,053 ślokas.[3] Character Nāgara. Date ? Place of deposit, Calcutta, Government of India. Appearance, fresh. Prose and verse. Very incorrect" (=No. 4145, Notices of Sanskrit Mss. by R. Mitra. Vol. X. p. 263).

(*B*) "Substance, country paper, $11\frac{1}{2}$ × 4 inches. Folia 31. Lines 10 on a page. Extent, 900 ślokas.[3] Character, Nāgara. *Date S. 1734.* Place of deposit, Calcutta, Government of India. Appearance, old. Prose and verse. Incorrect." (=No. 815, Notices of Sanskrit Mss. by R. Mitra, Vol. II).

(*C*) "$13\frac{1}{2}$ × $8\frac{1}{2}$ inches ; Devanāgarī hand-writing. Foll. 22 ; about 18 lines to a page. (=No. 1165 B. B. R. A. S. Des. Cat. Vol. II p. 263)." This is a recent copy and not very accurate.

2. *The Anthology.* When the pilgrim tax was abolished by Emperor Shah Jehan at the request of Kavīndrācārya, the joy of Hindu India knew no bounds and congratulations poured from all quarters. Addresses after addresses, verse and prose-eulogies were presented to the Sanyāsin, the Defender of the Faith. Titles of Kavīndra, Vidyānidhāna and Ācārya were conferred upon him.

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1. The major portion of the facts discussed here is dealt with by Dr. Har Dutt Sharma in his article "A Forgotten Event of Shah Jahan's Reign," published in the Kuppuswami Commemoration Vol., 1936, pp. 53-60.

2. The editors are thankful to Mr. P. K. Gode, M.A., Curator of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, for procuring the Mss. from the above two libraries for editing purposes.

3. The extent includes the number of prose passages also.

These addresses in prose and verse along with the names of their authors who were scholars of repute or holy men have been preserved for us by Śrīkṛṣṇa Upādhyāya in an anthology (padyāvalī) called the *Kavīndracandrodaya*. It is, however, difficult to say whether the people who contributed to the anthology were the inhabitants of Allahabad or Benares or people who had aasembled at one of these places on the occasion of some bathing festival. A few quotations are given here:

" यवनकरग्रहणाब्धौ मग्ना येनोद्धृता पृथिवी ॥ " Verse—7

" चक्रेण मोचयांचक्रे नक्राच्छक्रानुजो गजम् ।
प्रयागेभं करग्राहात् करग्राहात् कवीन्द्रवित् ॥ "—103

श्रीस्वामिनः ।

" येन श्रीसाहिजाहानरपतितिलकः स्वस्य वश्यः कृतोऽभूत्
किं चावश्यं प्रपन्नः पुनरपि विहितः साहिदाराशकोहः ।
काशीतीर्थप्रयागप्रतिजनितकरग्राहमोक्षैकहेतुः
सोऽयं श्रीमान्कवीन्द्रो जयति कविगुरुस्तीर्थराजाधिराजः ॥ "—169

हीरारामकवेः ॥ etc.

3. *The Author or Compiler.* It has already been stated that the addresses presented to Kavīndra in prose and verse by different pandits were collected together by one Śrī Kṛṣṇa Upādhyāya in a book-form. The author's name is given in a verse which reads as follows :—

श्रीमत्काशिविकाशिभिः सुकविभिस्तद्वत्प्रयागासिभि-
र्नानादेशनिवासिभिश्च रचिता विद्याग(गु)णोल्लासिभिः ।
श्रीकृष्णेन सरस्वतीपदयुताचार्योपनामाश्रित-
श्रीविद्यानिधिसत्कवीन्द्रविषया पद्यावली लिख्यते ॥ 9 ॥

It will be evident from the above verse that the author or compiler, who is also a contributor to the anthology is, Śrī Kṛṣṇa. Rajendralal Mitra is, therefore, wrong in attributing the authorship of the work to Kavīndra himself. Unfortunately no record of the compiler of these valuable adresses is available and hence nothing more can be said about him at present.

4. *Kavīndra, His Personal History.* Ācārya Kavīndra or Kavīndra (which is only a title) was originally an inhabitant of a place called Puṇyabhūmi on the banks of the river Godāvarī.

In his *Kavīndra-Kalpadruma* he states that he lived on the banks of Godāvarī, and having learnt the Veda and the Vedāṅgas along with other śāstras he took to asceticism and commenced meditation of Brahma. Cf. The following lines :—

“ गोदातीरे प्रमोदावलिबलिततमे जन्मभाक्पुण्यभूमाव[1]—
ऋग्वेदी वेदवेदी जगति विजयते श्रीकवीन्द्रो द्विजेन्द्रः ॥
अधीत्य वेदवेदाङ्गकाव्यशास्त्राणि सर्वशः ।
ततः स्वीकृत्य संन्यासं ब्रह्माभ्यासं समाश्रितः ॥ ३ ॥ ”[2]

“He had studied the Āśvalāyana Śākhā of the Ṛgveda and had mastered other branches of learning also. In his very childhood he lost his interest in the world and having taken Sannyāsa made Benares his abode. The Sannyāsī must have met Shah Jehan when the persecution of Hindus was at its highest and the tax was re-imposed on pilgrims to Allahabad and Benares. The Sannyāsi seems to have exercised wonderful influence on the Emperor in order to make him abolish the tax.”[3]

Kavīndra was a learned man as is evidenced from the fact that he was the head of the Pandits at Benares. He was well

1. Mr. G. K. Srigondekar, M.A., of Baroda regards Kavīndrācārya's birth-place to be पण्यभूमि i.e. a market-town on the banks of the Godāvarī. He is of opinion that पण्यभूमि is the correct reading (G.O. Series No. XVII P. S. p. 1). पुण्यभूमि, however, appears to be the correct reading to us. Kavīndra must have been born in some holy place (perhaps Nasik ?) on the bank of the river Godāvarī and then he must have migrated to Benares. This reading has also the support of two Mss. Unless it can be proved that पण्यभूमि is the proper name of a place, there is no sanction to change the Ms. reading. Moreover, if the name पण्यभूमि or पुण्यभूमि merely describes the place, (and is not a proper name), then it is more in the fitness of things that Kavīndra was born at a holy place than at a market town.

2. I. O. Cat. pt. VII. No. 3947.

3. MM. Harprasad Shastri gives the following account of the abolition of the pilgrim tax by Shah Jahan.—“He (Kavīndra) journeyed to Agra with a large following and proceeded to the Diwan-ī-am and there he pleaded the cause of the Hindu pilgrims with so much force of eloquence that all the noblemen of the court from Irāk, Iran, Badakshan, Balkh etc. were struck with wonder. Shah Jahan and Dara Shikoh relented and abolished the tax. That was a day of great rejoicings throughout Hindu India. It was on this occasion that the title of *Sarvavidyānidhāna* was conferred on him.........” (Indian Antiquary, Vol. XLI, 1912 p. 11.)

8. *Raghunandana Dvivedi* = Raghunandana Dīkṣita, father of Kṣamānanda. See No. 10 below. Verse 52.

9. *Raghunātha Dīkṣita.* Verses 53–54.

10. *Kṣamānanda Bājapeyin.* Son of Raghunandana Dīkṣita (See No. 8 above) and the author of Nyāyaratnākara and Sāṁkhya-tattvavivecana, a comm. on Tattvasamāsa, published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 246 (Sāṁkhya-saṅgrahaḥ; C.C·I., 135). The editor of Sāṁkhyasaṅgraha, P. Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedī, reads his name as Ṣimānanda and remarks :—अत्र क्षेमेन्द्रेणेत्यनुमीयते। 'षिमानन्द' इति तु मातापित्रोरुल्लापने नामेति सर्वजनप्रसिद्धार्थं तथैव लिखितमिति सभाव्यते.

The first verse of the Saṁkhya-tattva-vivecana is :—

रघुनन्दनसुतेनेदमिष्टिकापुरवासिना।
कान्यकुब्जद्विजाग्र्येण षिमानन्देन तन्यते ॥

Bājapeyin is one of the titles of Kānyakubja Brahmins· Verses 56–60.

11. *Bhaiyyābhaṭṭa* or *Bhayyābhaṭṭa* is also quoted in the Sūktisundara, an anthology by Sundadaradeva (Ms. No. 1237 in the Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss., B.B.R.A.S.). He is the son of Bhaṭṭāraka Bhaṭṭa and the author of Dharmaratna (C.C.I, 416). The Ms. No. 1254 (Baroda O. I.) is Āhnika-dīdhiti from Dharmaratna (Kane : Hist. Dharm. Lit. I, 719a). Verses 61–62, 273–80.

12. *Keśava Miśra.* Probably he is identical with the author of Alaṅkāraśekhara and lived under Māṇikyacandra, son of Dharmacandra, grandson of Rāmacandra. Māṇikyacandra came to the throne of Koṭ Kāṅgra in 1563 A.D. "The literary activity of Keśava may, therefore, be fixed in the 3rd quarter of the 16th century A.D." (De : Sanskrit Poetics, I, 261 ; C.C.I., II, 28). We think his time should be fixed in the last quarter of the 16th and the early part of the 17th century A.D. It is just possible that he was an old man when he wrote his eulogy about Kavīndra. Verses 63–66.

13. *Siddheśvara Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka*, son of Dāmodara Bhaṭṭa, grandson of Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa and the author of Saṁskāra-bhāskara or Saṁskāramayūkha and Saṁskārāmṛta About 1630–1670 A.D. (Kane : Hist. Dharm. Lit.I, 756, C.C.I, 723b). Verses 67–68.

14. *Cakrapāṇi Paṇḍita*, probably identical with Śeṣa Cakrapāni, pupil of Vīreśvara or Viśveśvara and author of Kārakatattva (Gr.) (C.C. III, 38a). Verses 69, 100, p. 26.

15. *Gaṇeśa Bhaṭṭa Dharmādhikārin*, author of Vyavasthāsaṅkṣepa (C.C.III, 31). Verses 70–72, 172–73.

16. *Nāgeśa*, son of Somarāja Paṇḍita. Can he be identified with the author of Śrāddhendu-śekhara (C.C. II, 207a)? We come across only one Somarāja in Aufrecht's C.C. (different from Somarājadeva) who is the son of Nṛhari or Narhar and the author of Darśapūrṇamāseṣṭi and Rudrasūktabhāṣya (C.C. II, 235a, and III, 151b). Verses 73–76.

17. *Parameśvarācārya*. Verse, 77.

18. *Rāmakṛṣṇa Nāgara* is most probably identical with Rāmakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita Nānhābhāi, son of Dāmodara. who copied Tṛisthalīsetu at Benares in 1616. He is the author of several works quoted in C.C.I, 509a. Verses 78–80.

19. *Viśvambhara Maithilopādhyāya*. Verses 81–82.

20. *Jagadīśa Jānīka*. Verses 83–85.

21. *Rāmeśvara Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya*. Verses 86–87.

22. *Jayakṛṣṇa Upādhyāya*. Verses 88–89.

23. *Gaurīpati Miśra* is most probably identical with Gaurīpati, son of Dāmodara, who wrote at Benares in 1640 a comm. on the Ācārādarśa of Śrīdatta (C.C.I, 172a ; Kane : Hist. Dharm. Lit. I., 696a). Verses 90–91.

24. *Nīlakaṇṭha Ācārya* = Bhaṭṭa Nīlakaṇṭha ? (C.C.I, 301b; Kane : Hist. Dharm. Lit. I. 438ff.). Verse 92.

25. *Dāmodara Bhaṭṭa Kāla*. Verse 93.

26. *Viśvanātha Jyotirvid* = Viśvanātha, the fifth son of Divākara Daivajña, wrote between 1612—1632. He is the author of a legion of works (C.C.I, 584a). Verses 101, 272.

27. *Dharmeśvara Agnihotrin*. Verses 94—97.

28. *Dāmodara Upādhyāya Maithila*. Verses 98–99.

29. *Vrajabhūṣaṇa Kavi*. Verses 102, 201.

30. *S'rī Svāmin*. Verse 103.

31. *Kṛṣṇacandra Bhaṭṭa*. Verse 104.

32. *Bālakṛṣṇa Tripāṭhin*. Son of Kāśīrāma of the Mahāraṅga family ; wrote Guṇamañjarī on Prāyaścittaviveka. (Kane : Hist. Dharm. Lit. I, 714b ; C.C.II, 183b). Verse 109.

Date of Kavīndra. The exact date of the abolition of the pilgrim-tax by Shah Jehan being yet unknown, nothing can be said about the exact age of Kavīndra. The mention of Shah Jehan, Dara Shukoh, Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana in the anthology only leads us to conclude that Kavīndrācārya was a contemporary of these persons. Kavīndrācārya composed one work called *Kavīndra Kalpadruma* a Ms. of which exists in the India Office Library at London. It has been stated in the Catalogue[1] that the first leaf of the Ms. is of 'about A.D. 1650'. If this statement is correct we can assign the period between 1627 and 1650 A.D. to the literary activity of Kavīndrācārya.

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M. M. PATKAR

1. I. O. Cat. No. 3947.

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THE MODE OF SINGING SĀMA GĀNA

(Laksmana Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa Drāvida, Sāmavedī)

In this short article we have to consider the practical side only, that is, the practice of Sāma Gāna only. Every music has two sides of its own, the vocal and the denominable ; so also this Vaidic Music has two sides of its own,

In order to prepare a beginner, some directions as well as some instructions and rules are necessarily required to be given, and they are as follows : There are seven musical notes to this Vaidic-music or Sāma Gāna, just as they are to the present-day music. The names of the Sāmic notes first appear in the Sāma-vidhāna Brāhamaṇa as thus :—क्रुष्ट, प्रथम, द्वितीय, तृतीय, चतुर्थ, मन्द्र, अतिस्वार्य । In the Gāna text of Sāmaveda, these musical notes are denoted by the numericals -1, -2, -3, -4, -5, -6, and 7. These figures, though they apparently look as ascending, are really in descending order. Because the musical notes of Sāmaveda, have natural tendency to descend, which is called " Nidhana Prakṛti" (निधन प्रकृति). Every Sāman contains these notes, which are generally from 1 to 5 or 6 notes for each Sāman. Some Sāmans, as they appear, take five notes. Some take six notes and some even take seven notes while being sung. The relative values of these notes to one another, therefore, is that figure 1, used in the Sāman, always denotes the highest note to be sung in that Sāman ; the figure 2 will, therefore, denote the lower note than the figure 1, the figure 3, lower than 2 ; 4 lower than 3 and so on till the figure 6. But in some Sāmans, which are very few, the figure 7 is also used, but here its tonal value is one note higher than the figure 1, in that Sāman, and it is here, that the reader is advised to note this well for his guidance. Because here the figure 7,

Table of scale and notes—No. 1

(1) Sāmic Notes :— (1— 2 —3— 4— 5— 6— 7—)
(2) Ancient Indian Notes :—(ma ga re sa ni dha pa)
(3) Ancient European Notes :—
(F— E —D— C —B —A—G, (F)
(4) Modern Indian Notes :— (sa ni dha pa ma ga re (Sa),
(5) Modern European Notes :—
(C— B— A— G— F— E— D-(C),

In the scales Nos. (3), (4) and (5) we have added (F) (sa) and (C) respectively, so that the notes contained in the different scales should be concurrent with each other. If the notes will be read from right to the left, they will appear as ascending, otherwise, as shown above, they are descending. This is table No. 1 ; and the notes, which every scale contains, are written parallel to each other, so that they may be useful and helpful to sing Sāmans.

We will try to give another table No. 2 containing the same scales. In the last one the notes are placed in a horizontal position ; and now in No. 2 we will place them in a perpendicular position.

Table of Scales and Notes—No. 2

Sāmic Notes	Ancient Indian Notes	Ancient European Notes	Modern Indian Notes	Modern European Notes
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1	ma	F	sa	C
2	ga	E	ni	B
3	re	D	dha	A
4	sa	C	pa	G
5	ni	B	ma	F
6	dha	A	Ga	E
7	pa	G (F)	re (sa)	D (C)

We give these two tables, of different scales, having their notes, placed in descending order. These two are quite sufficient to show that the Sāmic Notes have a tendency to descend, which is a tradition of all the Sāma Singers.

There is another tradition, which is very old, of expressing these musical tones by moving the fingers of the right hand,

while singing. This tradition is current and common with the followers of both, the Rāṇāyanīya and the Kouthuma branches of the Sāma Veda. While singing the Sāman, the singer intonates his musical tunes, with the help of his 5 fingers of the right hand.

(1) First finger, the thumb stands to denote the 1st note to be sung.


(2) Second finger, next to the thumb denotes the 2nd note lower than the 1st.

(3) Third finger, middle one, denotes the 3rd note, lower than the 2nd.

(4) Fourth finger, next to the middle one and (5) or the last finger, denotes the 4th and 5th notes of the Sāman. The fingers are named as "Aṅguṣṭha" (1), "Tarjanī" (2), "Madhyamā" (3), "Anāmikā" (4), and "Kaniṣṭhikā" (5).

Like the hand of a clock, the thumb is made to move and touch the other fingers, and this helps any Sāma singer to sing his Sāman tunes, with proper intonation. While vocally singing the musical tunes of any Sāman, the fingers of a Sāma singer, serve the purpose of lines in the musical staff. This tradition which has come from the long past and is still current, is followed by very Sāmavedin, while the Sāmagāna is being sung vocally. We quote here a few verses from "Nāradiya Śikṣā" to support our theory and the tradition of denoting the musical tones by touching the four fingers of the right hand by the thumb.

॥ दारवी गात्रवीणा च द्वे वीणे गानजातिषु। सामकी गात्रवीणा तु तस्याः शृणुत लक्षणम् ॥ १ ॥ गात्रवीणा तु सा प्रोक्ता यस्यां गायंति सामगाः। स्वर-व्यंजनसंयुक्ता अंगुल्यांगुष्ठरंजिता ॥ २ ॥ हस्तौ सुसंयुतौ धार्यौ जानुभ्यामुपरि स्थितौ। गुरोरनुकृतिं कुर्यात् यथाज्ञानमतिर्भवेत् ॥ ३ ॥ प्रणवं प्राक् (वाक्) प्रयुंजीत व्याहृतिं तदनंतरम्।। सावित्रीं चानुवचनं ततो वृत्तांतमारभेत् ॥ ४ ॥ प्रसार्य चांगुलीस्सर्वा रोपयेस्स्वरमंडलम्।। न चांगुलिभिरंगुष्ठमंगुष्ठे नांगुलिं स्पृशेत् ॥ ५ ॥ विरला नांगुलीः कुर्यान्मूले चैना न संस्पृशेत्।। अंगुष्ठाग्रेण ता नित्यं मध्यमे पर्वणि स्थितम् ॥६॥ नासिकायास्तु पूर्वेण हस्तं गोकर्णवद्धरेत् ॥ निवेश्य दृष्टिं हस्ताग्रे शास्त्रार्थमनुचिन्तयेत् ॥ ७ ॥ समभुच्चारयेद्द्वावयं हस्तेन च मुखेन च। यथैवोच्चारयेद्वर्णांस्तथैवैनान्समापयेत् ॥ ८ ॥ अंगुष्ठोस्योत्तमे क्रुष्टोऽङ्गुष्ठे तु प्रथमः स्वरः। प्रादेशिन्यां तु गांधार ऋषभस्तदनंतरम् ॥ ९ ॥ अनामिकायां षड्जस्तु कनिष्ठायां (निषादवान् ?)



The Figure of Hand for Sāma-Gāna

Gātra Vīṇā of Sāma-Gāna

These verses give some directions, which every Sāma-singer knows well.

The tradition of expressing the musical tunes by touching the fingers is, no doubt, really useful for a Sāma singer, but the purpose for which it might have come into being, has been, it appears totally forgotten by the modern singers. This tradition, if carefully followed, will surely enable any singer to intonate correctly and properly the Sāmic tunes denoted by the numericals 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the text of the Sāmagāna. The figure of the right hand with its five fingers, just shown above, will therefore give, a proper idea, to our learned readers, as to how these fingers help every Sāma singer to fix the respective pitch of these tunes, and intonate them accordingly. The figures in the Gāna Text, the fingers of the right hand, and the vocal tones actually sung, must coincide with one another, so that there may prevail a musical harmony, between these three, and a perfect concord between one another.

The Sāma Gāna Text

The Samhita texts of the Ṛgveda and the Yajurveda printed or written as they may be, are easy to read, while it is not so, with the texts, of the Saṃhitā of the Sāmaveda or the Sāma Gāna, which are rather difficult to read. The Saṃhitā text contains the figures —1, —2 and —3, written over the heads of the letters which form the ṛcā of the Gāna. What these figures are, is really a very important question for the consideration of the learned Vaidic scholars for investigation. Some consider, the figures —1, —2, —3, as mere accents for Vaidic recitation.

Ājyadoham Sāman

We give here, the texts of the ṛcā and the Gāna of the above mentioned Sāman, for the perusal of the learned readers. (I) "The text of the Sāma ṛcā" is thus :—

3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1
(Mū—rdhā —nan—divo —aratim—pṛ—thivyā)

३ १ २ ३ १ २ ३ १ २ ३ १
॥ मूर्धा नं दिवो अ र तिं पृ थि व्या ॥

Here the arrangement followed appears to be, that the figure —1 denotes "the Svarita", the figure —2 denotes "Udātta", and

the figure —3 denotes "Anudātta" and these denote mere accents of recitation. We, therefore, humbly beg to suggest that if the order, followed here, is slightly allowed to be altered, that is, figure —1 for —2 and figure—2 for—1, it will exactly tally with the style of singing the Sāma Gāna.

(II) "The text of the Sāma Gāna" is as follows :—

2r 2r 2r 2r3 4r 5 2r 1r 2 1
hā.u, hā.u, hā.u/ ājya.do—ham/ mū.rdhā.nandāi/ vāS3ara/

2 3 · 4 5
tim.pṛ thiv—yāh/

२र २र २र २र ३ ४र ५ २र १र
॥ हाउ, हाउ, हाउ ॥ आ ज्य दो हम् ॥ ३ ॥ मू र्धा नंदाइ ॥

२ १ २ ३ ४ ५
वा ऽ ३ अर ॥ तिं पृ थि व्याः ॥

We find that the Sāman contains the figures —1 —2 —3 —4 —5. Some of these figures are written over the head of a letter in the line and some are written through the line between any two letters of that line. We also find that the Sāman begins with the figure "2" placed over the head of the letter "hā" which is the first letter in that line. The letter "r" next to —2 is used to stress or lengthen the tone denoted by the figure.

As a rule, therefore, the reader may note this well that any figure from —1 to —5, placed over the head of the first letter of a Sāman, becomes the fundamental note of the Sāman. The figures —6 and —7 are never used in the beginning. In this "Ājyadoham Sāman" the fundamental tone "ārambhaka-svara" is denoted by fig.—2, placed over the head of "hā", which is called "Ṣaḍja" or "C"—on the middle line of the staff. It must also be noted that some Sāmans begin with fig.—1, some with —2, some with —3, some with —4, and some with —5, which becomes the fundamental tone of that Sāman. "प्रत्येकं षड्जभावेन" (Pratyekam ṣaḍja bhāvena), this important rule must be well remembered, as it is very useful to fix the vocal pitch of the singer, with the respective tones denoted by the figures, which occur first in the Sāman.

HOW TO BEGIN THE GĀNA

Praṇavaṃ prāk prayuñjīta

Any Sāma-singer, when he begins to sing vocally, first applies this " *Praṇava*" " *Oṃkāra* " to the song or Sāman. To do this, he first adjusts the four wires of the " Sāma Vīṇā ", giving a harmonious sound according to the vocal pitch, suitable to the singer. The " Praṇava " is called " Oṃkāra ", which means " Udgītha" " उद्गीथम् " " Om ", a Sāman or a song sung in high pitch. As soon as there prevails concord between the vocal sound and the wire sound, the singer begins first to sing vocally the " Oṃkāra, " thus :—

२ १   2 1
। ओऽ ३ म् ।   । Os 3 m ।

(s) This sign denotes that the tone is lengthened or doubled. This process signifies the pre-application of the " Oṃkāra" to the Sāman that will be sung. The above is the text of " Om", as given in the "Gāna Book". The tones —2 and —1 are placed over the heads of the letters -O- and -m- and tone -3 is placed through the line between -O- and -m-. This "Om", therefore, contains the tones " -2 -3 -1" which are equal to " Sa Ni Re" equal to " -C -B -D ". Here the fiqure -2 representing the tone " Sa " (Indian) or ' C ' (European) becomes the fundamental note or " Ārambhaka Svara " -ṣaḍja or -C- on, the leger line of the staff : the figure -3 representing " Ni " or "B" is one tone lower than " C " or " Sa ", and the figure " I " representing " Re " or " D " is one tone higher than " C " or " Sa ". The portrayal form of " Om " in music, will, therefore, appear as

२ १   2 1
। ओऽ ^३ म् । or—"O s 3 m"—or Sa-Ni-Re or -C -B -D.

Ājyadoham vocally sung

This Sāman begins with figure " 2 " having a letter ": r " affixed to it. (Here " r " denotes stress or दीर्घत्व of the tone to which it is attached.) The figure " 2 " denoting Sa or " C " is the fundamental note or " Ārambhaka Svara " or " Ṣaḍja " of this Sāman.

२ र   २ र   २ र   २र३४र५   २र३४र५   २र३४र५
॥ हाउ, हाउ, हाउ ॥ आज्य दो हम् ॥ आज्य दो हम् ॥ आज्य दो हम्॥
(१)   (२)   (३)   (४)
। साऽसा, साऽसा, साऽसा । साऽनी धऽप । साऽनी धऽप । साऽनी धऽप ।

(Parvans 1 to 4).

२ र १ र   २ १   २ ३ ४ ५
॥ मू र्धा नं दा इ ॥ वाऽ इ अ र ॥ ति पृ थि व्याः ॥
(५)   (६)   (७)
। साऽ रेऽ रे रे रे । साऽ नी रे रे । सा नि ध प ।

(Parvans 5 to 7).

There are 27 " Parvans (Musical pieces) in this Sāman, out of which we have tried to simplify the first (7) " Parvans " by giving the Indian Notation. As for the remaining (20) "Parvans" we beg to request our readers, to see the Sāman Chart prepared by us, in which the musical notation of each " Parvan " (piece) is given.

We beg to tell our learned readers, that if the portrayal form of the " Sāman " Ājyadoham in its musical aspect is carefully considered and the notation properly studied, any one, having a little knowledge of music, will be able to sing the Sāman. Not only this, but any Sāman having the figure " 2 " for its beginning, may also be sung if the process given is carefully followed and studied.

The chief points to be carefully noted, therefore, in this —Ājyadoham Sāman—are :

(1) that this Sāman begins with figure ' 2 ';

(2) (Praṇavam Prāk Prayuñjīta) प्रणवं प्राक् प्रयुंजित apply
2 1
" Praṇava " । Oऽ 3m । Oṃkara ;

(3) remember " Pratyekam Ṣaḍja Bhāvana ";

(4) This Sāman takes the following musical tones —1 —2 —3 —4 —5 $= \frac{\text{Re.}}{\text{D}}\ \frac{\text{Sa,}}{\text{C}}\ \frac{\text{Ni,}}{\text{B}}\ \frac{\text{Dha,}}{\text{A}}\ \frac{\text{Pa,}}{\text{G}}$ while it is vocally sung. The tone 'क्रुष्ट' " Kruṣṭa " 1 $\frac{\text{Re}}{\text{D}}$ is the only tone which ascends.

(5) The Sāman will, therefore, be called " ओडव " गीतम् taking five tones, only in descending order.

In this way the Sāman beginning with figure "2" can be sung.

Mahā Vāmadevyam

The text of the ṛcā is

१ २ ३ १ २र ३ १ ३ १ २३ १ २ १ ३ १ २ ३ २
॥ कयानः चित्र आभुवदुती सदावृधः सखा ॥ कयाशचिष्ठयावृता ॥ सामसंहिता.

The text of the Gāna is as follows

३ र ४ २ ४र ५ १ र २१र २ १ १
॥ का ऽ ५ या ॥ नश्चा ऽ ३ इत्रा ऽ ३ आभूवात् ॥ ऊ ॥ ती सदावृधः सा ॥ खा ॥

२ र२ १ २ ३ र २ १—
॥ औ ऽ ३ होहाइ ॥ ॥ कया ऽ २३ शचाइ ॥ ष्ठयौहो ऽ ३ ॥ हिम्मा ऽ २ ॥

१ २
वा ऽ २ तों ऽ ३५हाइ ॥२॥

This Sāman begins with figure —"3"—. Now, we shall have to consider how to sing this Sāman vocally. In this Gāna text, the first letter —Kā—, having figure —'3'— written over its head, we find that the first —Parvan— of this Sāman is written as :—

3 r
"Kā s yā." Hence —'3'—, over the head of —Kā—, is the -षड्ज- Ṣaḍja- of this Sāman, (प्रत्येकं षड्जभावेन), by this rule. After this we will use the "-Oṃkāra-", which will appear like

3 2
this, -Os 4m-, and which will musically sound like this,

३ २
ओऽ ४ म्‌। $\frac{\text{Sa, Ni, Re}}{3 \quad 4 \quad 2}$. In this Sāman the tone -"Kruṣṭa"- denoted by the thumb will be equal to $\frac{\text{-"Ga"-}}{1}$ $\frac{\text{"E"}}{1}$, and the rest of the tones will be, $\frac{\text{Re, Sa, Ni, Dha,}}{2 \quad 3 \quad 4 \quad 5} = \frac{\text{D, C, B, A,}}{2 \quad 3 \quad 4 \quad 5}$ (European tones), descending.

The musical form of this Sāman will appear thus :—

The reader may kindly see the Sāman Chart for details.

३ र ४ २ ४र ५ १ र २१र २ १ १
॥ का^ऽ ५ या ॥ नश्चा^ऽ ३ इत्रा^ऽ ३ आभुवात् ॥ ऊ ॥ ती सदावृधः सा ॥ खा ॥
। सा ऽ धधऽ । धनी ऽ साऽरे ऽ सानीऽधऽ । गऽ । गऽ रे ग ऽ ग रे गऽ । गऽ ।

२ र२
॥ औ^ऽ ३ होहाइ ॥
। रे ऽ सासाऽरेरे ।

The reader may also see the picture of the "Gātra Vīṇā"— which is given at the end, and which is useful for notation. In this Sāman there are two –" Stobhas" – "स्तोभ", which must be noted well, and they are ॥ ओ^ऽ ३ हो हाइ ॥ (२, र २) and ॥ हिम्मीऽ २ ॥ (१)

For vocally singing this –"Mahā Vāmadevyam" – Sāman – the following points deserve careful attention.

(1) That the Sāman begins with figure –"3"–, which is the Ṣaḍja – of this Sāman ;

(2) that the Sāman takes the following musical tones :
Ga, Re, Sa, Ni, Dha, (1 2 3 4 5) equal to E, D, C, B, A, G (European);

(3) that the Sāman may be called ओडव गीतम्.

(4) In this Sāman the highest tone is –" Ga "– (1), the lowest " Dha " (5)

(5) The figure of the Gātra Vīṇā, will be found useful and helpful for the learned readers.

In this way any Sāman, having figure –"3"– for its beginning can be sung vocally, with proper intonation and a suitable pitch.

We will now proceed to explain the next Sāman, having figure –" 4 "– for its beginning.

Gautamasya Parkam

This is the name of this Sāman, and it begins with the figure –" 4 "–. It is therefore given here as a sample. The text of the –ṛcā– is as follows :—

२३ १ ३ १ ३ २ ३ १ २ १ र२र ३ १ २
॥ अग्न आ याहि वीतये गृणानो हव्यदातये ॥ निहोता सत्सि बर्हिषि ॥ १ ॥

and the text of the Gāna is as follows :—

४ २र र १ — १— १ र २ र
॥ ओम्माइ् ॥ आयाहिऽ ३ वोइतोया^ऽ २ इ ॥ तोया^ऽ २ इ ॥ गृणानोह ॥
१ —
ब्यादातोया^ऽ २ इ ॥

१
१ २ र १ १ ३ १ १ १ ५`र र
॥ नाइ् होतासा^ऽ २३ ॥ त्सा^ऽ २ ^इबा^ऽ २`३`४` औहोवा ॥
३ ५ऽ
ही^ऽ २`३`४` षी ॥ १ ॥ दीर्घ ७ ॥ पर्व ९ ॥ मात्रा ९ ॥

We shall have to consider now, as to how we can sing vocally this – Gautamasya Parkam Sāman. Use –Praṇava, the Sāman begins with figure –'4'– ; this is the Ṣaḍja of this Sāman. The Oṃkāra – will be formed like this,

४ ३
॥ ओऽ ५ म् ॥ This is (4 5 3) = (Sa– Ne– Re) or (C– B– D–) This is the "-Oṃkāra-".

The notation of this Sāman, in deatail, will be found in the Sāman Chart given at the end.

४ २र र १ — ३ ५ऽ
॥ ओम्माइ् ॥ आयाहीऽ`३, वोइतोया^ऽ २ इ ॥ ही^ऽ २`३`४` षी ॥
सासासा गऽगऽगऽरे मममम ऽ ग ऽ। रे ऽ गऽरेऽसाऽनीऽ।

In this way the Sāman can be vocally sung. (म, ग, रे, सा, नी) (1–2–3–4–5) are the five tones of this Sāman.

Tārkṣyam Prathamam

This is the name of this Sāman, and it begins with figure –" 5 ". There are two Sāmans of this name. तार्क्ष्यम् "Tārkṣyam" –of which the 1st is taken here for example. The text of the – ṛcā – runs thus,

३ ३२ ३ १२ ३१२ ३१ २ २ ३२३ १ ३
॥ त्यमूषु वाजिनं देवजूतं सहोवानं तरुतार॰ रथानाम् ॥

and the text of the Gāna is as follows :—

५ र २र ३ १ १ १ १ २र २र ३ १ १ १
॥ त्यमूषु ॥ वाजि ॥ ना^ ऽ २`३`४`५` म् ॥ देवजूता^ऽ२^३^४^म् ॥
५ र ३र २ १ २ २ ३ ४ ५
स हो वा नं ता ॥ रुता^ऽ ३ ॥ र॰ रथानाम् ॥

As this Sāman begins with figure –" 5 "–, it denotes here the –" Ṣaḍja "– or the fundamental tone of the Sāman. We shall have to arrange the ओंकार ' Oṃkāra '– accordingly, which will appear thus :—

५ ४ 5 4
ओऽ ६ म् Oऽ 6m ; that is equal to साऽनीरे=(5 – 6 – 4)

=(C – B – D), and this is the ' Oṃkāra ' of the Sāman. We shall have to consider as before for vocally singing this Sāman. We give below the notation of this Sāman.

५र २र ३ १ १ १ २र२र३ १ १ १
॥ स्य मू षु ॥ वाजि ॥ ना^ऽ २`३`४`५` मू ॥ दे व जू ता^ऽ २`३`४` मू ॥
।सा साऽसा । मऽम । ग ऽ मऽगऽरे ऽ साऽ । म ऽ म ऽ ग ऽ म ऽ ग ऽ रे ऽ ।

५ र ३र २ १ २ २ ३ ४ ५
स हो वा नं ता ॥ रु ता^ऽ ३ ॥ र॰ र था ना मू ॥
सासाऽगऽमऽपऽ। म म ऽ ग ॥ मऽगऽरेऽसाऽ ।

The notation of the rest of the Sāman can be seen in the 'chart' attached at the end.

The reader may kindly note here, that this Sāman ' तार्क्ष्यम् ' Tārkṣyam – Prathamam – contains six musical tones, (Pa, Ma, Ga, Re, Sa, Ni) = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) = (G, F, E, D, C, B,). The Sāman, therefore, may be called " षाडव " " Ṣāḍava " गीतम् Gītam. The reader may also note that there is another Sāman, called " Tārkṣyam Dvitīyam " – which has the same ṛcā – as that of the first, but the Gāna is different than the –"Prathamam"– that is the – 1st – Sāman.

'Gāyatram'

This is the fifth or the last Sāman, which we humbly offer for the perusal of our learned readers. This Sāman is called "Gāyatram" and it begins with the figure " 1 ". Almost all know the – ṛcā – of this Sāman. The text of the ṛcā of " Gāyatram " Sāma, is as follows :—

१ २ ३ १ २र३ १ २३१ २ २ ३ १ २ ३ १ २
॥ तत्सवितुवरेण्यं भर्गोदेवस्य धीमही । धियोयोनः प्रचोदयात् ।

The text of the Gāna of this ṛcā together with the —Notation— of the musical tones is given as below. The ' Oṃkāra ' is at the beginning.

२ १ १ र र र —
॥ ओऽ^३ म् ॥ तत्सवितुर्वरेणियो^ऽ म् ॥ भार्गोदेवस्य धीमाही^ऽ २ ॥
। साऽनी रे । रेरेरेरेरेरेऽरेरेऽ रे । रेरेऽरेऽरेरेरेऽरेऽसा ।
१रर २ १ १ १ १ १ — १ २ १ १ १
॥ धियोयोनःप्रचो^ऽ १`२`१`२ ॥ हिम् आ^ऽ २ ॥ दायो ॥ आ^ऽ ३`४`५ ॥१॥
। सारेऽरेऽरेरे साऽरेऽसाऽरेऽसाऽ । रेऽरेऽरे सा । रेऽरेऽ । साऽनीऽधऽपऽ ।

We humbly wish to bring to the notice of the readers, that the Sāman while being vocally sung, does not make any change in its 'Oṃkāra' because, the basic tones, required for the —Oṃkāra — of this Sāman, which begins with figure —'I' are just the same as that of the Sāman which begins with the figure —"2"—. The tone —"ṛṣabha"— denoted by figure —' 1 ' or Re=D, standing on its proper place in the —'Oṃkāra'—of this Sāman, naturally helps the singer to intonate or fix his vocal pitch, with this tone.

Hence, the reader may kindly note that the Sāmans, having figures –' 1 '– and –' 2 '– for their beginning, make no change in the formation of their respective " Oṃkāras ".

In conclusion, we humbly beg to state that the above given five Sāmans, as samples or examples which begin with different tones or figures, such as 1–2–3–4 and 5–, may be found useful to any learned scholar whoever may wish to study and practise the Sāma-Gāna. In this small attempt, in which we have ventured to offer in English, the Ancient Mode or The Rāṇāyanīya Mode – of singing the Sāma Gāna, for the consideration of the learned readers, we have tried to give the mode, in as simple and easy a manner, as possible to the best of our ability.

Still, however, from the view point of some learned readers, there might have remained some points unsolved, which might have escaped our attention, and which we dare not deny ; but any such points, if referred to the writer will be promptly attended to, with satisfactory answers. This much we heartily promise.

FIVE SPECIMENS OF THE SĀMA-GĀNA

(Prepared by **Lakṣmaṇa Śaṅkar-Bhaṭṭa Drāviḍa**, Sāma-Gāyaka, Poona)

॥ श्रीः ॥

(I) ॥ ॐ नमः सामवेदाय ॥ गायत्रम् ॥

१ २ ३ १ २र ३ १ २ ३ १ २ १

॥ ऋचा ॥ ॥ तत्सवितुर्वरेण्यं भर्गो देवस्य धीमही ॥

२ ३ १ २ ३ १ २

धियो यो नः प्रचोदयात् ॥ १ ॥

२ ^ १ १ र १

॥ सामन् ॥ ॥ ओऽ३म् ॥ ॥ तत्सावितुर्वरेणियोऽम् ॥

(प्रचलित संगीत) । साऽनीरे । । रे रे रे रे रे रेऽ रे रेऽ रे ।

र र र — १र र

भार्गो देवस्यधीमाहीऽ२ ॥ धियो यो नः

रेऽरेऽरेऽरेरेरेऽरेऽरेऽसाऽ । सा रेऽ रेऽ रे

२ऽ १ — १

प्रचो १ २ १ २ ॥ हिम् आ२ ॥ दायो ॥

रेसाऽरेऽसाऽरेऽसाऽ। रे रे रे ऽसाऽ । रेऽरेऽ ।

२

आऽ३४५ ॥ १ ॥

साऽनीऽधऽपऽ । (स्वर.)

॥ दीर्घ ६ ॥ पर्व ६ ॥ मात्रा २ ॥

॥ इति प्रकृतिसप्तगानांगभूतं गायत्राख्यं प्रथमं गानं संपूर्णम् ॥

॥ श्रीः ॥

(II) ॥ ॐ नमः सामवेदाय ॥ ज्येष्ठसाम ॥ आज्यदोहम् ॥

३ १ २ ३ १ २ ३ १ २ ३ १ २ ३ २ ३ २उ
॥ ऋचा ॥ ॥ मूर्द्धानं दिवो अरतिं पृथिव्या वैश्वानरमृत
३ २ ३ २ ३ २ ३ २ ३ १ २ ३ १ २ ३ २ ३
आजातमग्निम् ॥ कविँ सम्राजमतिथिंजनानामासन्नः
१ २ ३ २
पात्रं जनयन्त देवाः ॥ २ ॥

२ ^ १ २र २र २र २र ३ ४र ५
॥ सामन् ॥ ॥ ओऽ३म् ॥ ॥ हाउ, हाउ, हाउ ॥ आज्यदोहम् ॥
। साऽ नी रे । । साऽसा साऽसा साऽसा । साऽ नीऽ धऽ पऽ ।

२र ३ ४र ५ २र ३ ४र ५ २र १र
आज्यदोहम् ॥ आज्यदोहम् ॥ मूर्द्धानंदाइ ॥
साऽ नीऽ धऽ पऽ । साऽ नीऽ धऽ पऽ । साऽ रेऽ रे रे रे ।

२ ^ १ २ ३ ४र ५ २र १र २ १ र
वाऽ३अर ॥ तिंपृथिव्याः ॥ वैश्वानराम् ॥ ऋतआ ॥
सा ऽनी रे रे । सा नी धऽ पऽ । साऽ रेऽ रे रे रे । सा रे रेऽ ।

२र ३ ४ ५ २ १ २ ^ १
जातमग्नीम् ॥ कविँ सम्रा ॥ जा ऽ ३ मति ॥
साऽ नी ध पऽ । सा रे रे रे रेऽ । सा ऽ नी रे रे ।

२र ३ ४ ५ २र १ २ ^ १
थिंजनानाम् ॥ आसन्नःपा ॥ त्रा ऽ ३ व्जन ॥
साऽ नी ध पऽ । साऽ रे रे रेऽ । साऽ नी धऽ रे रे ।

२ ३ ४ ५ २र २र २र २र ३ ४र ५
यंतदेवाः ॥ हाउ, हाउ, हाउ ॥ आज्यदोहम् ॥
सानीधपऽ । साऽसा,साऽसा,साऽसा । साऽनीऽधऽपऽ ।

२र ३ ४र ५ २र ३ ४ ^ २र
आज्यदोहम् ॥ आज्यदोऽ५हाउ ॥ वा ॥ ए ॥
साऽनीऽधऽपऽ । साऽ नी धऽ प प प । प सा ।

२र १ २ २र २र १ २ २र
आज्यदोहम् ॥ ए ॥ आज्यदोहम् ॥ ए ॥
साऽ सा रेऽ सा । सांऽ। साऽसा रेऽ सा । साऽ।

२र १ ३ ^^^^^
आज्यदोहाऽ२३४५म् ॥ २ ॥
साऽसा रेऽनीऽसाऽनीऽधऽपऽ ।

॥ दीर्घ ३२ ॥ पर्व २७ ॥ मात्रा २३ ॥

॥ श्रीः ॥

(III) ॥ ॐ नमः सामवेदाय ॥ महावामदेव्यम् ॥

१ २ ३ १ २र ३ २ ३ १ २ ३ १ २
॥ ऋचा ॥ ॥ कयानः चित्र आभुवदूती सदावृधः सखा ॥

३ १ २ ३ २
कयाशचिष्ठयावृता ॥ ३ ॥

३ ^ २ ३ ^ र ४ ^ ^ २ ^
॥ सामन् ॥ ॥ ओऽ४म् ॥ काऽ५या ॥ नश्चा ऽ ३ इत्रा ऽ ३
। साऽ नी रे । साऽ ध धऽ । ध नी ऽ सा ऽ रे ऽ सा

४र ५ १ र २ १र २ १ १
आभूवात् ॥ ऊ ॥ तीसदावृधःसाः ॥ खा ॥
नीऽ नी धऽ । गऽ । गऽ रे गऽ ग रे गऽ । गऽ ।

२ ^ र २ १ ^ १ १ ^ २ ३ र २ ^
॥ औऽ३होहाइ ॥ कयाऽ२३शचाइ ॥ ष्ठयौहोऽ३ ॥
। रेऽसासाऽरेरे । ग गऽ रे साऽ रे रे । सासाऽरेऽसा ।

१ — ^ १ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ २
हिम्माऽ२ ॥ वाऽ२र्तोऽ३५हाइ ॥ ३ ॥
ग ग गऽ रे । गऽरेरेरेसाऽधऽरेरे ।

॥ दीर्घ ६ ॥ पर्व १० ॥ मात्रा १४ ॥

श्री

(IV) ॥ ॐ नमः सामवेदाय ॥ गौतमस्य पर्कम् ॥

१ ३ १ २ ३ १ २ ३ २ ३ १ २

॥ ऋचा ॥ ॥ अग्न आयाहि वीतये गृणानो हव्यदातये ॥

१ २ ३ १ २

निहोता सत्सिबर्हिषि ॥ ४ ॥

४ ^ ३ ४ २र र ^ १

॥ सामन् ॥ ॥ ओऽ५म् ॥ ॥ ओग्नाइ ॥ आयाहिऽ३वोइतो-

(प्रचलित संगीत) । सा ऽनी रे । । सा सा सा । । गऽगऽगऽ रे म म म

— ^ १ — ^ १ र २र

–याऽ२इ ॥ तोयाऽ२इ ॥ गृणानोह ॥

म ऽ ग ग । म म ऽ ग ग । म मऽ गऽ ग ।

१ — ^ १ — १ २र १ ^

व्यादातोयाऽ२इ ॥ तोयाऽ२इ ॥ नाइहोतासाऽ२३ ॥

ग म म म ऽ ग ग । म म म ग ग । म म गऽम म ऽ ग रे ।

१ ^ ३ ^ ^ ^ ^ ५र र ३ ^ ^ ^ ^ ५ऽ

त्साऽ२इबाऽ२३४औहोवा ॥ हीऽ२३४षी ॥४॥

म ऽ ग ग रे ऽगऽ रेऽसाऽनीऽनीऽनी । रेऽगऽ रेऽसाऽनीऽ। (स्वर.)

॥ दी. ७ ॥ प० ९ ॥ मा० ९ ॥

॥ श्रीः ॥

(V) ॥ ॐ नमः सामवेदाय ॥ तार्क्ष्यम्-प्रथमम् ॥

३ ३२ ३ १ २ ३ १ २ ३ १ २ ३ १ ३ २ ३ १ २

॥ ऋचा ॥ ॥ त्यमूषु वाजिनं देवजूतं सहोवानं तरुतारं रथा

१ २ ३ १ २ १ २ २ २ १ ३ १ ३ ३ १

नाम् ॥ अरिष्टनेमिंपृतनाजमाशुं स्वस्तयेतार्क्ष्यं मिहा

२

हुवेम ॥ ५ ॥

५ ^ ४ ५ र २र ३ ^१ १ १

॥ सामन् ॥ ॥ ओऽ६म् ॥ ॥ त्यमूषु ॥ वाजि ॥ नाऽ२३४-

(प्रचलित संगीत) । साऽ नी रे । । सा साऽ । मऽ म । गऽमऽगऽ रेऽ

१ २र २र ३ ^ ^ ^ ^ ५ र ३र२ १ २ ^

५म् ॥ देवजूताऽ२३४म् ॥ सहोवानंता ॥ रुताऽ३ ॥

साऽ । मऽममऽगऽमऽगऽ रेऽ । सासाऽगऽमपऽ । म म म ग ।

२ ३ ४ ५ २ ^ ३ ^ ^ ^ ^५ १ २ ^

रं॑ रथानाम् ॥ आरिष्टऽनाऽ२३४इमीम् ॥ पृतनाऽ

मऽगऽ रेऽ साऽ । म म म ऽ ग ऽ म ऽगऽ रेऽसाऽ । म म म म

२ ३र ५ २ १ १ र २ ३ २ ^

३४३जमाशूम् ॥ स्वस्त ॥ याइ ॥ तार्क्ष्यमिहाऽ३४३ ॥

ग रे ग म गऽ साऽ । म प । प पऽ । प ऽ म ग म ऽ ग रे ग ।

२ ^ १ ४ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

हूऽ३वाऽ५इमाऽ६५६ ॥ ५ ॥

मऽगऽ रेऽसासासासानीसानी । (स्वर.)

॥ दीर्घ. ८ ॥ पर्व. १३ ॥ मात्रा ८ ॥

Some Musical Signs used in the Sāmagāna-Text

The ordinals, 7 —1 —2 —3 —4 —5 —6 denote the Indian musical tunes. प –म –ग –रे –सा –नी –ध (मध्यम-ग्राम)
रे –सा –नी –ध –प –म –ग (षड्ज-ग्राम)

(र)—Written over the head of a letter denotes stress, or to lengthen the tune of that letter or melody.

(उ)—Denotes high tune. (Ucca) (क) denotes low tune. (Nīca)

(—)—Denotes—trebling of the tune.

(^)—Joins the tune of the preceding letter with the अवग्रह (ऽ).

(ऽ)—Continues the tune of the preceding letter.


(~)—Augmentation of the tune.

AN UNPUBLISHED INSCRIPTION OF PARAMĀRAS

(Har Dutt Sharma)

Sometime ago I had an opportunity of deciphering an inscription on two copper-plates, granting 16 *padas* in the village *Dādarapadra* (most probably identical with the modern Dadarpur in Bhopal State), in the Mahādvādaśaka-maṇḍala by Haricandradeva. A photo of the copper-plates was brought to me by my friend Pandit Gaṅgārāma Śāstrī, M.A., M. O. L., Professor of Sanskrit, Ramjas College, Delhi. I am very much indebted to Pandit Gaṅgārāma for many valuable suggestions. On one of the plates, there was a figure of Garuḍa in the centre. The writing was in old Devanāgarī script with पृष्ठमात्रा's. The inscription is quite readable, though illegible, at a few places. The inscription grants 16 *padas* to 19 Brahmins who are mostly *Dvivedas*. The grant was made on the occasion of a lunar eclipse occurring on Kārtika sudi pūrṇimā of Vikrama Saṁvat 1214. I have consulted Pillai's Indian Ephemeris and have found that the date tallies with Saturday the 19th of October, 1157 A.D., and there was an eclipse of the moon on that day.

We know of Haricandradeva (spelt in other grants as Hariścandradeva) as belonging to the Paramāra family of Dhārā. The genealogy of Haricandradeva as given in other inscriptions is as follows :



According to the Pipliānagar grant (of Vikrama Saṁvat 1235 and 1236, edited by Wilkinson in ASB. Vol. VII, p. 736) Mahākumāra Hariścandradeva was the son of Lakṣmivarmadeva. But in the present grant the genealogy is as follows :

Naravarman
|
Yaśovarman
|
Trailokyavarman
|
Haricandradeva.

Here we find Trailokyavarman preceding Haricandradeva. As yet no inscription of Paramāras containing the name of Trailokyavarman has been found. It may be that Trailokyavarman was another name of Lakṣmīvarman. But this point cannot be definitely settled unless more light is thrown by other grants which might come to light subsequently.

TEXT

उों स्वस्ति श्रीर्जयोभ्युदयश्च ॥ जयति व्योमकेशोऽसौ यः सर्ग्गाय वि(बि)-
भर्त्ति ताम्। ऐंदवीं सि(शि)रसा लेखाञ्जगद्वी(द्बी)जांकुराकृतिम्। तन्वंतु च
स्मराराते (:) कल्याणमनिसं (शं) जटाः। कल्पान्तसमयोद्दामतडिद्वलयपिंगलाः॥
परमभट्टारकमहाराजाधिराजपरमेश्वरश्रीनरवर्म्मदेवपादानुगतपरमभट्टारकमहाराजा-
धिराजपरमेश्वरश्रीयशोवर्म्मदेवपादानुध्यातसमस्तप्रस (श) स्तोपेतसमधिगतपंच-
महाशब्दालंकारविराजमानमहाकुमारश्रीत्रैलोक्यवर्म्मदेवपादप्रसादावाप्तविज्ञाधि-
पत्ये समस्तप्रशस्तोपेतसमधिगतपंचमहाशब्दालंकारविराजमानमहाकुमारश्रीहरिचंद्र-
देवो महाद्वादशकमंडले निखिलपद्रद्वादशकसंबद्ध: (द्धान् ?) दादरपद्रग्राम-
निवासिनः प्रतिग्रामनिवासिनश्च राजपुरुषविषयिकपट्टकिलजनपदादीन् ब्राह्मणेतरान्
बोधयत्यस्तु वः संविदितं। यदिह मया श्रीताहलस्वामिदेवपुर(:)
स्थितेन श्रीमद्विक्रमकालातीतचतुर्द्दसा(शा)धिकद्वादशस(श)तांत(:)पातिसंव-
(त्स lost)रे कार्त्तिकसुदि पूर्णिमायां संजातसोमग्रहणसर्व्वंग्रासपर्व्वणि कलि-
कलुषहारिणि वेत्रवतीवारिणि स्नात्वा देवर्षिमनुष्यपितॄन् संतर्प्य चराचरगुरुं
भगवंतं भवानीपतिं दर्प्पितदनुजेंद्रनिद्राहरं हरिं च समभ्यर्च्य तिलाज्याद्याहुतिभि-
र्हिरण्यरेतसं हुत्वा जगदानंददायिने शसि(शि)ने अर्घं विधाय सवत्सकपिलां त्रिः
प्रदक्षिणीकृत्य आकलय्य संसार(रा)सारतां परिलुलितकमलदलतलजललवचल-
मालक्ष्य यौवनं यौवनमदमत्तवाणिनीभ्रूभंगभंगुरमवलोक्य द्रविणं द्रविणकणिकानुश-
(स)रणविवशविषविलासिनीचित(त्त)चंचलमभिगम्य जीवितं। उक्तं च
वाताभ्रविभ्रममिदं तु धनाधिपत्यमापातमात्रमधुरो विषयोपभोगः। प्राणास्तृणाग्र-
जलविं(बिं)दुसमा नराणां धर्मः सखा परमहो परलोकयाने।

सांकृत्यगोत्राय अग्निहोत्रिक श्रीभारद्वाजसुत आवस्थिकश्रीधराय पद १
भारद्वाजगोत्राय त्रिपादि (ठि) नारायणसुत त्रिपाटि (ठि) गर्तेस्व (श्व) राय

पद १ कृष्णात्रेयगोत्राय द्विवेदक्षीरस्वामिसुत द्विवेद उद्धरणाय पद १ अदवाह-गोत्राय द्विवेदवस्वसुत द्विवेदयशोधवलाय पद १ कास्य(श्य)पगोत्राय आव-स्थिकदेल्हसुत पं. मधुसूदनाय पद १ शौनकगोत्राय द्विवेदसीलेसुत द्विवेदपाहुलाय पद १ कास्य(श्य)पगोत्राय अ(आ)वस्थिकदेल्हसुत पं० सो(शो)भादेवाय पद १ अदवाहगोत्राय द्विवेदयशोधवलसुत द्विवेद...पद १...सगोत्राय पं० वामदेवसुत पं० रणपालाय पद १ द्विवेदसोतासुत द्विवेदगंगाधराय पद १ कृष्णात्रेयगोत्राय द्विवेदक्षीरस्वामिसुत द्विवेदलष्मी(क्ष्मी)धराय पद १ सौ(शौ)नकगोत्राय द्विवेदसीलेसुत द्विवेदश्रीधराय० ॥ भारद्वाजगोत्राय ठकुरवीश्वेसुत ठकुर-वाभुकाय पद १ सां(शां)डिल्यगोत्राय ठकुरकुलधरसुत ठकुरवाघुकाय पद १ गोतमगोत्राय द्विवेदगोल्हेसुत द्विवेदवाल्हुकाय पद० सां(शां)डिल्यगोत्राय ठकुरकुलधरसुत ठकुररासलाय पद० ॥ कास्य(श्य)प गोत्राय पं० सोल्ह(ल्हु ?)-लसुत ठकुरविष्णवे पद० कौण्डिन्यगोत्राय ठकुरजण्हुसुत वटुक आहहाय पद० कास्य(श्य)पगोत्राय ठकुरविज[य]पालसुत वटुकमहणाय पद० तदेवं यथायथं ब्राह्मण (णानां) एकोन्न(न)विंस(श)तीनां पद षोडसां(शां)के पद १६ तदमीषां ब्राह्मणानां उपरिलि[खि]तग्रामः पूर्व्वदक्षिणतलद्वयोपेतो निधिनिक्षेप-सहितो नदनदीकूपतडागवाटिकारामसंयुतश्च राजायोपेतः सर्व्वाभ्यंतरसिद्ध्योदक-पूर्व्वकतया शासने प्रदत्तस्तदेतत् ग्रामनिवासिभिः कर्षकैश्च करहिरण्यभागभोगादिक (कं) आज्ञाश्रवणविधेयैर्भूत्वा देवब्राह्मणभुक्तिवर्जं सर्व्वममीभ्यो ब्राह्मणेभ्यः समुपनेतव्यं ॥ यदुत् (क्तं) बहुभिर्वसुधा भुक्ता राजभिः सगरादिभिः। यस्य यस्य यदा भूमिस्तस्य तस्य तदा फलं ॥ त्रीण्ये-ति (वैतानि ?) दानानि गावः पृथ्वी सरस्वती। आसप्तमं पुनंत्येता दोहवाहनिवेदनैः। सर्व्वानेतान् भाविनः पार्थिवेंद्रानु (न्) भूयो भूयो याचते रामभद्रः। सामान्योयं धर्म्मसे [तुर्] नृपाणां काले काले पालनीयो भवद्भिः ॥ स्वदत्तां परदत्तां वा यो हरेद्वसुधां नृपः। न तस्य पुनरावृत्ति-र्नराकात्कुंभिपाका(क)तः ॥ देवब्राह्मणद्विजप्रदत्ता भूर्न्न हर्तव्या नृपे (पैः) ये (य) तः केनापि सह वेस्ये (श्ये) व न गता न चिरस्थिता। इति पुरातनमुनि-प्रणीतवचनपरिपाटीश्रवणसमुद्भूतप्रभूतविवेकोदयेन मातापित्रोरात्मनश्च पुण्य-यशोभिवृद्धये ॥ इति ज्ञात्वा परैर्भूपैरस्मद्गोत्रोद्भवैस्तथा। धर्म्मोयमिह नालोप्योथैः केश्चिद्वं......कैः (?)। अयं मुख्यादेशः ॥ शिवमस्तु ॥ मंगलं महाश्रीः ॥

स्वहस्तोयं महाकुमारश्रीहरिचंद्रदेवस्य श्रीः ॥

TRANSLATION

Om. Hail Riches, Victory and Prosperity (may come to you all).

Victorious is that sky-haired (Lord Śiva) who bears on his head the digit of the moon in the shape of the seed of the world, for the sake of creation.

May the matted hair of the foe of Cupid (i.e. Lord Śiva) which are tawny like the circle of lightning terrible at the end of the duration of the world, forever grant you welfare.

The illustrious Mahākumāra Haricandradeva who has attained the five mahāśabdas, who is possessed of all that is praiseworthy and who has obtained sovereignty of his own by the favour of the feet of the illustrious mahākumāra Trailokyavarmadeva bearing the five mahāśabdas and possessed of all that is praiseworthy and who is devoted to the feet of the illustrious Paramabhaṭṭāraka Mahārājādhirāja Parameśvara Yaśovarmadeva, devoted to the feet of the illustrious Paramabhaṭṭāraka Mahārājādhirāja Parameśvara Naravarmadeva, proclaims to the residents of *Dādarapadra* connected with *Padradvādaśaka* in the *Mahādvādaśakamaṇḍala* and to the residents of the neighbouring villages and the chief brahmins and the people residing as tenants on the land under State-control. Be it known to you that I, sitting in the presence of Sri Tāhalasvāmideva on the pūrṇimā day of the bright half of Kārttika, on the occasion of the festival of Lunar Eclipse falling in the Samvat 1214 of the Vikrama Era, having taken (my) bath in the waters of the Vetravatī (Betwa) capable of destroying the evils of Kali (age), having propitiated the gods, the sages, the men and the Manes, having worshipped the Bhavānīpati, the Lord of all that moves and of all that does not move and Hari, the destroyer of the sleep of the proud lords of demons, having offered oblations of tila, grain, etc., to (the god of) Fire, having given libations to the Moon, giver of delight to the world, having gone thrice round a Kapila cow with her calf, realising the worthlessness of the world, seeing that youth is as unsteady as the drop of water fallen on the surface of a tremulous lotus-leaf, realising wealth to be fickle as the knitting of eye-brows of a wanton woman intoxicated with the pride of youth and knowing that life is changeable like the mind of a poisonous girl helplessly running after bits of money ;

As it is said :—Possession of riches is like the clouds tossed about by winds, that the enjoyment of worldly objects is sweet

only in appearance, that life of men is like drops of water at the tip of a straw and that Dharma is the only great friend of people on their journey to the next world.

1 pada to Āvasthika-Śrīdhara, son of Agnihotrika-Śrī Bhāradvāja of Sāṅkṛtya Gotra. 1 pada to Tripāṭhi-Gaṇeśvara, son of Tripāṭhi-Nārāyaṇa of Bhāradvāja Gotra. 1 pada to Dviveda-Uddharaṇa, son of Dviveda-Kṣīrasvāmi of Kṛṣṇātreya Gotra. 1 pada to Dviveda Yaśodhavala, son of Dviveda Vasva of Adavāha Gotra. 1 pada to P. Madhusūdhana, son of Āvasthika Delha of Kāśyapa Gotra. 1 pada to Dviveda Pāhula, son of Dviveda Sile of Śaunaka Gotra. 1 pada to P. Sosa(Śobha ?)deva, son of Āvasthika Delha of Kāśyapa Gotra. 1 pada to Dviveda (name illegible), son of Dviveda Yaśodhavala of Adavāha Gotra. 1 pada to P. Raṇapāla, son of P. Vāmadeva (illegible) Gotra. 1 pada to Dviveda Gaṅgādhara, son of Dviveda Sotā. 1 pada to Dviveda Lakṣmīdhara, son of Dviveda Kṣīrasvāmi of Kṛṣṇātreya Gotra. O (i.e. 1/2 pada) to Dviveda Śrīdhara, son of Dviveda Sīle of Śaunaka Gotra. 1 pada to Ṭhakura Vābhuka, son of Ṭhakura Vīśce of Bhāradvāja Gotra. 1 pada to Ṭhakura Vāghuka, son of Ṭhakura Kuladhara of Śāṇḍilya Gotra. O (i.e. 1/2) pada to Dviveda Vālhuka, son of Dviveda Golhe of Gotama Gotra. O (i.e. 1/2) pada to Ṭhakura Rāsala, son of Ṭhakura Kuladhara of Śāṇḍilya Gotra. O (i.e. 1/2) pada to Ṭhakura Viṣṇu, son of P. Solḍa(read ḍḍha ?)la of Kāśyapa Gotra. O (i.e. 1/2) pada to Vaṭuka Ā (?) haha, son of Ṭhakura Jaṇhu of Kauṇḍinya Gotra. O (i.e. 1/2) pada to Ṭhakura Mahaṇa, son of Ṭhakura Vija(ya)pāla of Kāśyapa Gotra. Thus in the manner described above (are allotted) to 19 brahmins these 16 pada, in figure 16. So the above-mentioned village along with its eastern and southern talas (parts), along with deposited treasure, endowed with rivers, rivulets, wells, tanks, gardens and parks, and along with the royal income (attaching thereto) is, by me who am in (sound) possession of all (my) inner faculties, bestowed, with (this act of) pouring water (on the palms of the recipients) upon these brahmins to be under their (absolute) control. Hence the residents of this village and the farmers in obedience to this proclamation should hand over to these brahmins taxes, shares of gold and revenues, except the portions (set apart) for the gods and (other) brahmins.

As it is said :—Many kings like Sagara, etc., have enjoyed the earth. Whosoever has possessed the earth has got its fruits. There are only three gifts, (viz.) the cows, the earth and learning; these purify a person for seven generations by milking, tilling and by imparting (respectively).

Rāmabhadra requests again and again all the future kings that this is the common bridge of Dharma (to convey them across this world) for the kings and you should observe this Dharma.

A person who takes away the earth given by himself or by any other person never comes back from the Kumbhipāka (hell.)

Land given to gods and brahmins should not be snatched away by the kings as it (even) like a courtesan does not accompany or remain with him.

Thus on account of great knowledge born of hearing the words composed by ancient sages for the increase of merit and fame of myself and of the parents (is this gift made).

Knowing this, the other kings as well as the kings born (hereafter) in our family this (act of) righteousness should not be destroyed by.........(illegible).

This is the chief command. Maṅgalam Mahāśrīḥ.

This is the own hand of the illustrious Mahākumāra Haricandradeva. Śrīḥ.

Uṣṇīṣa AND *Chatra*: ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA

Page 1. note 1, after 3, p. read: 136
note 2 add: Observe that the coping surrounds the stūpa as a filet or turban encircles a head; the stūpa itself being the Budha's cranium (*Sīsa-kapāla*) in a likeness, as can be clearly seen from the parallel case of the Mahākapi Jātaka (No. 407, J. III. 370 f.)

Page 2. Line 8, "crown", add Note: Cf. J. IV. 129, *unhīsaṁ sīse patimuñcitvā*, "put the turban on his head": the Bodhisattva having so done, could properly have been described as *unhīso-sīso.*

Page 3. note 3, add :, and "Note on Uṣṇīṣa", ib. IV, 1936.

Page 4. note 2, Line 16, for *himsitavan* read: *hiṁsitavān.*
17 note 2 for *vāṁśa* read: *vaṁśa.*

Page 7. Line 27, for *alter* read: altar.

Page 10. Line 7, add Note: Cf. Jer. XXIII. 24 "Do not I fill heaven and earth?"
notes, line 6, for *fleah* read: flesh
note 2, line 3, read: " rays ".

Page 11. Line 7, for *asātmā* read: *asyātmā.*

Page 12. note 2, line 9, read: '"high" (*sauraṁ dvāram*).

Page 13. note 1, for Svayamāamalroṇṇā had: Svayamātṛṇṇā

Page 13. notes line 5, read: "ascended.
note 1, line 4, delete;
line 7, read: *saṁyānyaḥ.*

Page 14. notes line 4, for *śarkarāh* read: *śarkarāḥ.*

Page 15. Line 11, continue: is closed from the standpoint of secular life on earth.

Page 16. Line 7, read: (*chardisā*).
Line 19, *box*, add Note: Cf. " this vast box whose lid is the sky ".
(Lethaby, W. R., *Architecture, Mysticism and Myth*, 1892, p. 13.)

Page 17, note 1, read: God, (*udisi–*).
note 3, read: homonymy.

Page 18. Line 19, transpose the words *uṣṇīṣa* and *chatra.*

SOME MORE REFERENCES TO KAUṬILYA IN LATER LITERATURE

(Vasudeva S. Agrawala)

Dr. R. Shamasastry in his Introduction to the English *Artha-śāstra* has brought together a list of very important references to Kauṭilya and his *Arthaśāstra* as scattered in various Sanskrit and Prākrita works. I give below some more references which I came across during the course of my studies.

On pp. xii—xiv, Dr. Shamasastry brings out inferentially that Kālidāsa must have been indebted to Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra for some political terms, the explanation of which Mallinātha-sūri could find in no other political work other than that of Kauṭilya. I believe this is a very valid inference, but I wish to point out that in the 1st Act of his Mālavikāgnimitra Kālidāsa more explicitly refers to a teacher under the designation of *Tantrakāra* :

राजा:— अथवा किं भवान्मन्यते ?

अमात्य:—शास्त्रदृष्टमाह देव: ।

अचिराधिष्ठितराज्यः शत्रुः प्रकृतिष्वरूढमूलत्वात् ।
नवसंरोपणाशिथिलस्तरुरिव सुकरः समुद्धर्तुम् ॥८॥

राजा:—तेन ह्यवितथं तन्त्रकारवचनम् । इदमेव वचनम् निमित्तमुपादाय समुद्योज्यतां सेनाधिपतिः ।

Now the verse *Acirādhishṭhita* etc. seems to be a poetical rendering bv Kalidāsa of the opinion of a political teacher whom the king refers to as the *Tantrakāra.* The famous commentator Kāṭayavemabhūpa, author of the commentaries called *Kumāragiri rājīya* on the plays of Kālidāsa, who was at the helm of administration during the reign of the king Kumaragiri (1381–1403A.D), the Reddi king of Koṇḍavidu,[1] explains *tantrakāra* as the author of the Arthaśāstra :

तेनारूढमूलत्वेन हेतुना तन्त्रकारवचनमर्थशास्त्रकारवचनमवितथं हि सत्यमेव

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1 I am indebted to my friend Dr. Hara Datta Sharma for this information about Komaragiri.

I am unable just at present to point out the particular passage from the *Arthaśāstra* of which Kālidāsa has given us a version in *śloka*-form, but the idea agrees wonderfully with the political technique adumbrated generally in the Arthaśāstra. In case it is possible to trace out the passage in question the identity of Tantrakāra with the author of the Arthaśāstra, viz. Kauṭilya, as pointed out by Kaṭayavemaḷehūpa, will be established on firm grounds ; and we shall then be able to infer a divest reference to the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya by the greatest poet of Sanskrit literature.

2. The next reference is in the form of an unnamed quotation in the Kāśikā, a grammatical commentary on the Aśṭādhyāyi. In explanation of Pāṇini's sūtra V. 2. 10 (परोवरपरम्परपुत्रपौत्र मनुभवहित), the Kāśikā says :

परम्परशब्दो विनापि प्रत्ययेन दृश्यते । मन्त्रिपरम्परा मन्त्रं भिनत्तीति । तच्छब्दान्तरमेव द्रष्टव्यम् ।

Here the author of the Kāśikā is definitely quoting from the Arthaśāstrā, I. 15 [p. 27 of Sanskrit text] :—

सैषा मन्त्रिपरम्परा मन्त्रं भिनत्ति ।

The इति stop in the Kāśikā is a distinct sign of quotation. The Kāśikā is generally regarded as a work of the seventh century A.D., but recently Mr. I. S. Pawate in his book, *Structure of the Asṭādhyāyī*,has pleaded for ascribing to it an earlier date.

3. Next in point of time there is a reference by Vardhamāna (1140 A. D.)[1] in his *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi.* At the end of verse 252,he gives sixteen *ślokas* illustrating the Gārgādi group. In the 12th śloka mention is made of one who has traversed his way across the ocean of Cāṇakya's treatise :

चाणाक्यशास्त्रार्णव पारदृश्वा ननन्द गौलन्ध्यमुनीन्द्रवाग्मि : ।

Obviously Vardhamāna writing in the 12th century had in his mind the comprehensive treatise of Cāṇakya which could have been nothing else but the Arthaśāstra.

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1. सप्तनवन्यधिकेष्वेकादशसु शतेष्वतीतेषु ।
वर्षाणां विक्रमतो गदारत्नमहोदधिर्विहितः ॥
Colophon to the Gaṇaratnamahodadhi.

4. Dr. Shamasastri has already shown that Bāṇabhaṭṭa refers to Kauṭilyaśāstra in the Kādambarī. Here I want to point out that *Saṅketa*, a commentary on the *Harśacarita* by Śaṅkara (seventeenth century), refers twice to Kauṭilya, both these references occurring in the II Ucchvāsa of the Harśacarita. Explaining उच्चकुम्भकूटाट्टालकविकंट संचारि गिरिदुर्ग राज्यस्य, Śaṅkara writes :

सञ्चारी जंगमः । यदाह कौटिल्य :—'हस्तिनो हि जंगमं दुर्गम्' इति ।

Immediately after this there is another phrase: कृतानेकबाणा विवरसहस्रं लोहप्रकारं पृथिव्याः on which the *Saṅketa* says :

कृतान्यनेकानि बाणैर्विवरसहस्राणि यस्यतम् । प्राकारेषु बाणानुस्त्रष्टु विवर-सहस्राणि क्रियन्ते, य इन्दुकोशा इति चाणाक्यादिषु प्रसिद्धाः ।

p. 64, Harśacharita, N. S. 5th edition, p. 68.

The first reference viz. हस्तिनोहि जंगमं दुर्गम् is not traceable in the Arthaśāstra, while the reference to इन्दुकोश is found in the second *adhikaraṇa*, adhyāya 3 on p. 52 of the Text by Dr. Shamasastri. From the tone of Śaṅkara's quotation it appears that he had seen the reference to the *indrakośas*, (openings in the battlements for the bowmen to discharge arrows from behind a shelter) not only in the book of Cāṇakya but also in the works of other political writers.

POST-VYĀSARĀYA POLEMICS

(B. N. Krishnamurti Śarma, M.A.)

It has been stated that the polemical activity begun by Vyāsarāya resulted in a series of attacks and counter-attacks by the champions of the two opposing schools of Vedānta, which occupied the attention of the philosophical world for over two centuries from the days of Vyāsarāya. Most of the Dvaitin writers that figure in this period are connected in one way or other with Vyāsarāya either as disciples or as participators in the intellectual warfare started by him, or else as his admirers.[1] The history of that controversy has already been touched upon. For some time after Vyāsarāya, the attack of the Dvaitins had been deemed irrefutable. No serious attempt was made to reply to the criticisms of the *Nyāyāmṛta* in its original form. A small beginning was made by Nṛsimhāśrama who in his *Advaitadīpikā* quoted and criticised certain passages of the *Nym.* [See Pariccheda ii, pp. 3–5, 7, 9, 15, 16–18, of *Advaitadīpikā*, Medical Hall Press, Benares, 1919]. But it was not until the days of Madhusūdana Sarasvati that the first mighty attack was made by way of retaliation, in the famous *Advaitasiddhi*. This was promptly repulsed by Rāmācārya, in his *Taraṅgiṇī*.

1. TARAṄGIṆĪ-RĀMĀCĀRYA OR VYĀSA-RĀMĀCĀRYA (C. 1566–1616)[1]

The most outstanding controversialist of the day was Rāmācārya, the author of the (*Nyāyāmṛta*)—*Taraṅgiṇī*. He was a native of the village of Ambāpurī on the Godavari river.[2] He came of a distinguished family of scholars belonging to the

1. It is not to be supposed from this that there was a lull in commentatorial activity. The more prosaic and dutiful task of commentary-making went on as before as may be seen from the activities of a host of commentators (to be noticed in the next section) like Raghūttama, Rāghavendra, Yadupati, Vedeśa, Vidyādhīsa etc. A few distinguished writers like Vādirāja and Vijayīndra combined polemics with commentary-making activities. But, for the time being Dvaita-Advaita polemics loomed large before men's eyes.

2. सद्योजातजटाजपावनसरिद्गोदावरीतीरतो
गव्यूतिर्वसतिः सतां कुलवतामम्बापुरी तत्र ये ॥

Upamanyu-gotra. His father Viśvanātha Vyāsa, learned in the Śāstras, was a devout Mādhva, and the author of a commentary on the *Sadācāra Smṛti* of Madhva.[1] His elder brother was Nārāyaṇācārya.[2] Rāmācārya's teacher was the famous Mādhva saint Raghūttama Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt.[3]

There is a tradition that soon after the publication of the *Advaitasiddhi* Rāmācārya went up to Madhusūdana and became his disciple and studied the *Advaitasiddhi* line by line directly under its author, maintaining a successful incognito. On the day of the termination of his studies, he is said to have placed before his teacher a complete criticism of the *Advaitasiddhi*, as his Guru-dakṣiṇā. The Guru is said to have been very much incensed at this proceeding and expressed his resentment by adding a verse of depreciation at the close of his work.[4] Rāmācārya returned to his native province and there published his *Taraṅgiṇi* of which an advance-copy had already been sent there. This story is narrated also by Rajendranath Ghose in his Introd. to the *Advaitasiddhi*.

Date

Whether Rāmācārya actually read under Madhusūdana or not, there can be no doubt that the two were contemporaneous. Rāmācārya's Guru Raghūttama Tīrtha died in 1596 A.D. Assuming that the disciple was at least 30 years old at the time, we arrive at 1566 or thereabout as the probable date of Rāmācārya's birth. A passage in the *Taragiṇī* is quoted and criticised by

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1. ग्रन्थं व्याकृत पूर्गर्धाकृतसदाचारस्मृतिव्याकृतिव्याजेन०

2. तस्मादविरभूत् सुरद्रुमयशा आचार्यनारायणः । (concluding ver.).

It was presumably the same Nārāyaṇa who wrote the *Madhvamantrārthamañjari* (noticed later). Rāmācārya's family name was 'Vyāsa'. व्यासाख्या उपमन्युगोत्रजबुधाः...... ॥

3. Introd. verse. No. 4. Mm. Anantakṛsna Sastri's surmise (Vide his introd. to the edn. of Nym-Advaitasiddhi, Calcutta Skt. Ser. IX) that Rāmācārya's father could not have been a Mādhva, has been exposed by me in my paper 'The Truth about Vijayīndra and Rāmācārya', in the *New Ind. Antiquary*.

4. इह कुमतिरतत्त्वे तत्त्ववादी वराकः ।
प्रलपति यदकाण्डे खण्डनाभासमुच्चैः ॥ (*Advaitasiddhi*)

Keśavācārya[1] the disciple of Vidyādhīśa Tīrtha (1619–31). We may therefore take it that Rāmācārya flourished between 1566–1616. His *Taraṅgiṇī* was probably composed between 1605–10. Madhusūdana Sarasvati would then go back to C. 1555–1615.[2] The following table may make these facts clearer :

Raghūttama ^{A1} (1557–96)	Nṛsimhāśrama (1558–)	Vijayīndra^{A2} (1539–95)
	Madhusūdana Sarasvati (C. 1555–1615)	
Vedavyāsa^{B1} (disciple)	Rāmācārya^{B2}	Ānandabhaṭṭāraka^{C} (1563–1620) (Son)
Vedeśabhikṣu^{C1} (C. 1570–1620)		Vidyādhīśa Tīrtha^{C2} (1585–1631)
Yadupati^{C3} (C. 1580–1630)		
Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha^{D1} (C. 1590–1640)		Keśavācārya^{D2} (C. 1605–60)

NOTE

C^1	criticises	A^2	C criticises A^2 and B^2
C^2	do	B^2	C^2 was a contemporary of Raṅgojibhaṭṭa
D^2	do	B^2	brother of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (1575–1650)

1. See under KEŚAVĀCĀRYA. Keśava mentions two other teachers of this ; Śrīnivāsa and Ānandabhaṭṭaraka whom he calls Paramaguru. It is difficult to fix the identity of the latter. He must in any case have been a contemporary of Kesava's other teacher Vidyādhīśa. He is traditionally believed to have belonged to the Pāṇḍuraṅgi-family and to have been the father of Vidyādhīśa. *In Cal. Skt. Ser. IX*, a c. on the Nym. called *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* is published. It criticises the *Tarangiṇī*. Its author is however not known. The Editor Mm. Anantakṛṣns Śāstri says in the Intro. that it has been ascribed to three different persons ; Vyāsarāya, Vijayīndra and one Pāṇḍuraṅgī Ānandabhaṭṭāraka. The Editor has accepted the authorship of the second-named. This is a sheer impossibility since the *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* criticises the commentary (*Āmoda*) of Vijayīndra Tīrtha himself (as shown by me in my paper in the *New Indian Antiquary*). Moreover Vijayīndra is far earlier than C1 as can be seen from the fact that he has been criticised by D1 's grand-preceptor Vedeśabhikṣu. (See later on). The *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* must therefore be a work of a different author probably of Ānandabhaṭṭāraka himself as traditionally held.

2. Chinnasvāmi Sastri gives 1570–1640 as his correct date.

Rāmācārya's claims to recognition rest upon his *magnum opus*, the *Taraṅgiṇī*.[1] It is both a commentary on the *Nym*, as well as a fair criticism of the *Advaitasiddhi*. The total number of granthas in it is 13560. It is not necessary to notice its contents here as it covers much the same ground as the *Nym*. Among other works ascribed to him are (2) a commentary on the *Sadācārasmṛti*[2] and a polemical tract called (3) *Virodhi-dhvānta-candrikā*[3] of which there are four Mss. in the Mysore O.L. (C.–2064). The latter runs to about 800 granthas and seeks to establish Viṣṇu as the Supreme Being of Metaphysics and Author of the Cosmos, dismissing the claims advanced on behalf of Śiva, in this respect. The work is divided into two sections : the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta. The position of the objector (Śaiva) is explained and summed up (pp. 1–17 Dev. Ms.) in accordance with texts from the *Atharva-śiras* (P, 10) *Brahmabindu*, *S'iva-saṁkalpa* and such other Upaniṣads. Principles of Mīmāmsā interpretation are freely introduced and discussed. The author argues in his turn that the Supreme Being can only be one and that he is to be identified with Viṣṇu. The authorities cited by the Pūrvapakṣin are discussed in all their bearings and reinterpreted in harmony with the Siddhānta view. The 'Trimūrtyuttīrṇa-Paramaśiva-vāda', which seeks to escape certain difficulties pointed out by the Vaiṣṇavas by maintaining that the Śiva who is the Supreme Being, is as such different from the god Śiva included in the trinity (P.11–12), is also refuted.

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1. Published by T. R. Kriśṇacārya, and printed at the Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay.

2. This evidently a case of mistaken ascription. We are informed by Rāmācārya himself, that his father had written a c. on the *Sadācāra Smṛti* and it is unlikely that the son also wrote one.

३. श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थार्यान्नत्वा रामाभिधः सुधीः ।
तनोति तत्त्वविद्रीत्या विरोधध्वान्तचन्द्रिकाम् ॥

4. SATYANĀTHA YATI (1648–74)

Satyanātha was the sixth in succession from Raghūttama Tīrtha (1558-96) of the Uttarādi Mutt, and the immediate predecessor of Satyābhinava (1674–1706). The latter was the Guru of Chalāri Saṃkarṣaṇācārya, grandson of Chalāri Nṛsimha who wrote one of his works in 1661 A. D. The tutorial and chronological relation between Satyanātha and his succesor, to the Chalari family may be exhibited as follows :

1. Chalāri Nārāyaṇa
2. Chalāri Nṛsimha (1661) = Satyanātha (1648–74)
3. Chalāri Śeṣācārya = Satyābhinava
   (son) (disciple)

4. *Chalāri Saṃkarṣaṇācārya*

The (newly discovered) *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* also speaks of Satyanātha as a contemporary of the Keladi queen Cannamāmbā (1672–98).

Life

Satyanātha was a memorable personality in many ways. He was a fiery and prolific writer and very ambitious for the glory of Madhvaism and the secular ascendancy of his Mutt. His former name is given in the *S. K.* as Raghunāthācārya. He is reported to have been a contemporary of Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa Tīrtha of the Vyasārāya Mutt. He seems also to have been a contemporary of Aurangazeb. According to the account in the *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya*, he visited Benares at a time when the Moghul Emperor was harassing the Hindus there. Satyanātha himself seems to have suffered persecution and was helped out of a difficult situation by the High Priest of the Koṅkaṇi (Gauḍasārasvat) Brāhmins. It was presumably at this time that he visited Gayā and strengthened the hold of his Mutt over the Gayāpālas who had been converted to Mādhvaism by his predecessor Vidyādhīśa. His victorious career formed the subject of eulogy by Chalāri Samkarṣaṇa, in his *Satyanātha-Māhātmyaratnākara*, of which two Mss. are noticed by Aufrecht. It is presumably the same work from which the *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* quotes passages relating to the incident at Benares. This biography of Satyanātha is not

well-known in traditional circles. It deserves publication at an early date as a good deal of historical information can be gathered from it.

Satyanātha seems to have entertained an inward ambition to outshine the great Vyāsarāya by his literary output and its brilliance. The titles of at least three of his works are reminiscent of the Vyāsatraya.[1] His energy and determination to crush out the rivalry of Monism is reflected even in the choice of the titles for some of his works, four of which go by the name of 'Paraśu' (the Axe). His *Abinavagadā* is a devastating criticism of the *Madhvamatamukhamardana* of Appayya Dīkṣita.

Works

A dozen works are known to have been written by Satyanātha of which only eight have so far been attested by Mss. They include glosses on the *Khaṇḍanatraya*, the *K. N.*, and the Ṛgbhāṣya, a couple of original works and glosses again on the *Pramāṇa Paddhati* and the *NS*. and a stotra.

GLOSSES ON THE KHAṆḌANATRAYA

Of these only the gloss on the *Māyāvādakhaṇḍana*, called *Paraśu*, is said to be available in Ms.[2] (4) A gloss on the *KN-ṭīkā* known as *Karma-Prakāśikā* is reported both from the *T.P.L* and *Mysore O. L.* The number of granthas is 1500. (5) No trace of his c. on the *NS*. (also called *Paraśu*) is to be found.

(6) *Abhinava Candrikā* (*m*)

This (*T.P.L.* 7842) is a super-commentary on the *T. P.* of Jayatīrtha on the same lines as the *Tātparya-Candrikā* of Vyāsarāya. It runs to over 12600 granthas and is undoubtedly the author's *magnum opus*. It is not a continuation of the *Candrikā*, but an independent gloss, covering also the portions (i. e., Ch. I–II) commented upon by Vyāsarāya. The author refers in one of the introductory verses (No. 4) to the *Sattarkadīpāvali* of Padmanābha Tīrtha.

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1. There is a particularly spicy anecdote about his *Abhinavacandrikā* and how Subhānu Rau, the then Jahgīrdār of Ārṇi refused to recognise it as equal to the famous *Candrikā* of Vyāsarāya, when pressed to do so by the Svāmi, and how he managed to convince the Svāmi of his mistake.

2. G. R. Savanur reports a Ms. of this work in his possession.

The plan of the work is the same as that of the *Candrikā*. Satyanātha sets forth the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta views under each adhikaraṇa, and offers criticisms on the former in accordance with the views of his teacher Satyanidhi (Tanjore p. 10). He quotes from the *Tattvapradīpa and Candrikā* as well as the *Bhāvabodha* (on *TP*) of Raghūttama. The passages of the *TP* are commented upon as in the *Candrikā*. Under B.S.iii, 2, adh. 8, p, 22, the author takes note of a series of 'interpolations' in the text of Jayatīrtha's commentary. He is fond of detecting " interpolations " in his other commentaries also. The adhikaraṇaśarīras as made out as in the *Vivaraṇa* and *Bhāmatī* are systematically assailed.

(7) *Ṛg-Bhāṣya Tippaṇi* (*m*)

Here (Mysore O. L. 1903) the author is frequently on his guard against what he terms " corruptions and interpolations " in the text of Jayatīrtha's commentary on the *Ṛgbhāsya* : (*Mys.* pp. 7, 10, 24 etc.). He carries on elaborate discussions on the grammatical form, etymology etc. of the various Vedic forms to be found in the text, and refutes certain criticisms against the Bhāṣya (p. 11).

(8) *Abhinavāmṛta* (*p*) *D*

This is a gloss on the *Pramāṇa–Paddhati* of Jayatīrtha running to a little over 1400 granthas. The commentary is fairly lucid. It follows the c. of Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha, in the main which it nevertheless criticises on occasions : See p. 51, line 28 and Sri. p. 53,26 (Same edn) and p. 54, 1.15 Sri. and:p. 52, 4 of Satya.

(9) *Abhinava-Gadā* (*p*)

We have seen Vijayīndra Tīrtha's reply to the *Madhvamatamukhamardana* of Appayya Dīkṣita. The *Abhinavagadā* is another criticism of the Dīkṣita's work, but from a slightly different point of view. It runs to over 4750 granthas and is being published by H. H. Satyadhyāna Tīrtha Svāmi of the Uttarādi Mutt.[1] There are six chapters in the work designated " Yuddhas " (battles) with an obvious allusion to the Gadā–yuddha between Bhīma and Suyodhana in the *Mbh.* The intensely bellicose attitude of the author is reflected even in the opening verse :

1. I have nearly 168 pages of the printed work with me.

सदापेये दीक्षितस्य मृधे दुरभिमानिनः ।
पातयामि शिरस्यद्य गुर्वीमभिनवां गदाम् ॥

Unlike Vijayīndra, the author tries to silence the criticisms of Appayya, without reference, as a rule, to the opinions expressed by Jayatīrtha and Vyāsarāya, in their works. In other words, he isolates Madhva from his commentators and so confounds the critic, suggesting sometimes that the Bhāṣyakāra is not to be blamed for the views of his commentators. Vijayīndra on the other hand has throughout endeavoured to treat the works of the bhāṣyakāra and those of the commentators as a homogeneous whole and make them withstand the criticisms of the Dīkṣita, as united body of texts. Satyanātha's retort to the alleged flouting of Mīmāmsaka rules in the works of Madhva is characteristic:

श्रीमदाचार्यैः पूर्वमीमांसाया अनाश्रयणात् । टीकाकारैः पूर्वमीमांसा आश्रितेति वेन । श्रीमदाचार्यदूषणाय प्रवृत्तेन त्वया, दूष्यत्वेन अन्यवाक्यस्य अनुदाहर्तव्यत्वात् । वस्तुतस्तु टीकाकारवचनेऽपि दोषो नास्तीति वक्ष्यामः ॥ (P. 10)

(10) *Abhinava-Tarkatāṇḍava(m)*

This (Tanjore P. L. 8098–101) is another voluminous original work of Satyanātha, which as the name indicates, is a dialectical classic expounding the nature and constitution of the logical and epistemological categories of the Dvaita system and refuting those of rival systems especially those of the Nyāyavaiśeṣikas. On the same lines as the original *Tarkatāṇḍava* of Vyāsarāya, The work runs to 11367 granthas.

The views of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Rucidatta, commentators of Gaṅgeśa, those of the Prābhākaras, Rāmānuja and the Vaiśeṣikas, are here quoted and refuted in detail.

Like the original *Tarkatāṇḍava*, this work is also divided into three Paricchedas. Mangaḷa-vāda, the self-validity of knowledge, Sannikarṣa, samavaya, the relation between a subject and its attributes, the invisibility of Vāyu, the *pārthivatva* of gold, and Udayana's view of it, the validity of Smṛti (recollection), the definition of Inference, Vyāpti and the criticism of the second Vyāptilakṣaṇa formulated by the *Maṇi*, the definition of Upādhi, Pakṣatā, Avayavalakṣaṇa (p. 103), Hetvābhāsa, the subsumption of other Pramāṇas like Upamāna within the three, the validity of Śabda, its fitness to be recognised as an independent Pramāṇa, the definitions of Ākaṅṣā Yogyatā and āsatti, and the examina-

tion of Gaṅgeśa views on these, the Apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas, the eternity of sound, criticism of the Mīmāmsaka view that (some) Vedic texts are Nityānumeya (p. 43), the import of Injunctions (p. 47), the refutation of the Prābhakara view of 'Karyatājñāna' as the pivot of activity, Apūrva, the physical existence of the gods (p. 76), Śakti-vāda, Samāsa-Śakti, the import of the negative (126–28 etc.) are some of the topics raised and discussed in the course of the work. Besides Gaṅgesa,[1] the author refers also to the views of Śiromaṇi (i.e., Raghunātha)[2] and Rucidatta[3].

(11) *Vijaya-Mālā* (*m*)

This (Mysore O. L. C. 2042) discusses various topics of metaphysical, etymological and exgetical interest such as Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa, Tārkikokta-vidhyarthaparīkṣā, Śyenāgnīṣomīyavaiṣamyabhaṅga etc. The doctrine of the unreality of the world is severely condemned. Certain objections to the statement of the issues (Vipratipattyākāra) in the *Nyāyāmṛta* are answered. Quotations are made from the Mbh. T. N. and the *MK.* of Madhva. (12) The *Vāyubhāratīstotra* of the author is, as the name implies, in praise of Vāyu and his consort Bhāratī.

5. VANAMĀLI MIŚRA (C. 1590–1655)

Vanamāli Miśra takes his place among the participators in the great Dvaita-Advaita polemics of the 16th–17th centuries. From the very beginning, the issue raised by Vyāsarāya was destined to become an all-India one to which were attracted the best brains of all parts of India.

Vanamāli Miśra was not a South Indian.[4] He tells us both in his *Śrutisiddhāntaprakāśa*[5] and his *Madhvamukhālaṁkāra*, that he was descended from a family of Brahmins belonging to

1. i, 27; 103; ii, 37; iii, 2; 9; 80. (Pp.)
2. ii, 54; 63; 103; iii, 130.
3. iii, 3.
4. The *Nyāyaratnākara* (Madras R. No. 1615) of unknown authorship, however, makes him a descendant of the family of Taraṅgini Rāmācārya, which is obviously mistaken, as the letter's gotra was that of उपमन्यु.

5. श्रीगोविन्दविहारभूपितभुवो वृन्दावनात्प्राग्दिशि
क्रोशान्तात् त्रियुगे पुरे मुनिभरद्वाजीयवंशोद्भवा : ।
श्रीसन्नाहमुचो वसन्ति विबुधो वर्णी ह्यभूत्तत्कुले
सम्पूर्णः श्रुतिसंग्रहो विरचितोऽयं तेन कृष्णेच्छया ॥

the Bhārgava-gotra, and settled at the village of Triyugapura in the vicinity of Bṛndāvana (Muttra). With the westward expansion of the Bhakti movement of Caitanya in the days of the Gosvāmis, Bṛndāvana became the centre of attraction and the home of a number of Bengalis. Vanamāli Miśra was probably descended from one such family.[1] He was a life-celibate. Beyond these meagre details, we know nothing more about his life or career. A Ms. of his *Māruta-Maṇḍana* (Deccan College Coll. XV of 1882–3) is found dated 1741 Saṁvat (1685 A. D.). This gives us the *terminus a quem* of his date. We may venture to place him roughly between 1590–1655 and his literary activities between 1620–1655.

Works

Over ten works are known and extant in the name of Vanamāli Miśra, of which only three have been printed :

(1) *Brahmasūtravṛtti* (*Marīcikā*) (*m*)

Aufrecht (II, 130) mentions a Ms. of this work.

(2) *Gītāniguḍhārthacandrikā* (*m*)

Stein 193 and Peters vi, 292, are said (Aufrecht ii, 89) to refer to a commentary on the Gītā by Vanamāli, called *Gītāniguḍhārthacandrikā*.

CONTROVERSIAL WORKS

His (3) *Madhvamukhālaṁkāra* (p)[2] is a defence of the Pancādhikarnī-interpretation of the *BS.*, by Madhva, as against the criticisms of the *Madhvamatavidhvamsana* of Appayya Dīkṣita. It is divided into the following seven sections :

सदसच्छास्त्रप्रवर्तकनिर्णय; (Introductory)
जिज्ञासाधिकरण; जन्माधिकरण; शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरण;
समन्वयाधिकरण; ईक्षत्यधिकरण; and

शेषब्रह्ममीमांसातात्पर्यवर्णनम् a general survey of the rest of the Sūtras. The author is indebted very much to the *Madhva-tantramukhabhūṣaṇam* or *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* of Vijayīndra Tīrtha and most of the arguments are taken over from Vijayīndra but without acknowledgment. But of the two works Vanamāli's is the more readable one.

1. Another tradition makes him a Hindi-speaking Brahmin of U. P. (presumably of Gayā). The surname 'Miśra' is common in these parts.
2. *Sarasvati Bhavana Texts*, No. 68, 1936. (Benares)

(4) *Tàraṅgiṇī-Saurabha* (m)

This is the *magnum opus* of Vanamāli (Mysore OM. 522) criticising the *Gurucandrikā* of Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, and forming the last treatise in the series of Dvaitādvaita polemics, and yet to be surpassed in keenness and subtlety of arguments. It may have been composed about 1645.

(5) *Caṇḍamāruta* (m)

Yet another controversial classic of the author is reported under the above title by Dr. Nagaraja Sarma, in his *Reign of Realism* (1931 p. 25). It is said to be a criticism of some unknown Advaitic work :—

मायावाद्यङ्घ्रिपध्वंस्युत्थापितो वनमालिना ।
यश्चण्डमारुतस्तस्य परिच्छेदोऽयमादिमः ॥

(6) The *Nyāyāmṛta-saugandhya*[1] (p)

is a further criticism of the *Advaitasiddhi* and the Brahmānandīya, which has recently been published in the *Calcutta Skt. Series No.* IX, by Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri.

CONSTRUCTIVE WORKS

His (7) *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvali* is preserved at the Mysore O. L. (A 447) and so too his (8) *S'rutisiddhāntaprakāśa* (Mys. C 346) containing two chapters. (9) His *Viṣṇutattvaprakāśa* (Mys. O. L. C 350) is a short prose tract in 600 granthas establishing Viṣṇu as the supreme Brahman on the basis of Śrutis and Smṛtis. The claims of Śiva are repudiated. (10) His *Bhaktiratnākara* (m) is preserved with a commentary by an unknown hand in the Deccan College Coll. (No. 710 of XV of 1882–3). It is divided into 9 Prakaraṇas and runs to about 650 granthas. His *Mārutamaṇḍanam*(m) also formed part of the Deccan College Collection. It has a total of 2079 granthas, and the Ms. itself is dated 1741 Samvat. It is referred to in the closing verse of the *Madhvamukhālamkāra* and from the manner of the reference it would appear that the *Mārutamaṇḍana* and *Madhvamukhālamkāra* are not in reality two different works, but one and the same :—

1. Quotes from the *Dīdhiti* (C. 1500-50), P. 341.

2. Presumably the same as the *Vedānta* (Śruti) *Siddhāntasamgraha* Choukh. 1913.

श्रीगोविन्दविहारभूषितभुवः श्रीगोकुलात्प्राग्दिशि
क्रोशान्तं त्रियुगे पुरे द्विजवरो वंशे भरद्वाजतः ।
श्रीसन्नाहमुचो भवन्ति विबुधो वर्णीकुलेऽभूत्ततः
ग्रन्थो मारुतमण्डनोऽस्ति परितः पूर्णः कृतोऽविघ्नतः ॥

Four more works of Vanamāli are mentioned by name by Gopinath Kaviraj, in his preface to the *Madhvamukhālamkara* : (11) *Jīveśvarābhedadhikkāra*[1] (presumably a reply to the *Bhedadhikkāra* ; (12) *Pramāṇasamgraha* (Benares Skt. Coll. Lib.) (13); *Abhinavaparimala* (Ben. S. Coll.) and (14) *Vedantadīpikā* (Ben. S. Coll.). The *Advaitasiddhikhaṇḍana* (Bh. 1882 p. 102) mentioned by Kaviraj, is evidently the same as the *Taraṅgiṇīsaurabha*.

6. GAUḌA PŪRṆĀNANDA-CAKRAVARTI ALIAS PŪRṆĀNANDA CAKRAVARTI (Circa 17th cent.)

Pūrṇānanda Cakravartī was a native of Bengal (Gauḍa).[2] Nothing is known about his date or life. He describes himself as a disciple of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa.[3] He may without difficulty be placed in the 17th century or later, when the influence of Madhva philosophy was strongest in Bengal.

His most famous work is the *Tattvamuktāvali* otherwise known as *Māyāvādaśatadūṣaṇī*, a metrical piece in 120 verses vigorously attacking the cherished views of the Advaitins. It is quoted by Śrīnivāsa Sūri in his c. on the *Bhāgavata* (X. 87, 31).[4] It was edited and translated by Cowell in the J. R. A. S. (New Series) XV, pp. 137–173 of 1883.

The *Tattvamuktavāli* is a very elegant performance, almost unique of its kind in the history of Dvaita literature. There are, of course, some earlier works of the same kind such as the *Nyāyaratnāvali* of Vādirāja (which is a more erudite work). The burden of the song in the *Tattvamuktāvali* is that the identity of Jīva and Brahman claimed by the Advaitin is a metaphysical impossibility. It is fraught with serious and terrible consequences on the moral and religious life of man (verses 88–89,91–4).

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1. Benares Skt. Coll. Library, *Mahindra Collection.*
2. He is called 'Gauḍa'-Pūrṇānanda in the colophon to his work.
3. Verse 117 of his *Tattvamuktāvali.*
4. Bṛṇdāvana Edition, P. 1105.

Pūrṇānanda pleads that "Aham Brahmasmi" should be interpreted only figuratively.

अग्निं माणवकं वदन्ति कवयः पूर्णेन्दुबिम्बं मुखं
नीलेन्दीवरमीक्षणं कुचतटीं मेरुं करं पल्लवम् ॥

He draws a very lucid picture *a la* Vādirāja, of the limitations of Man and the infinitude of God and queries with mystic naivete how two beings which are so widely different in essence can ever be equated with each other ! (12–17). He observes that there are insurmountable difficulties in the way of offering a monistic interpretation of the *Tattvamasi* text as the Brahman in the Advaitavedānta is avowedly beyond the sphere of utterance and no lakṣaṇā can operate in such a case (20–22). He therefore thinks that texts *Aham Brahmāsmi* should be viewed as having been prescribed for purpose of meditation (upāsanārtha,65) and that *Tattvamasi* should be interpreted as implying the elision of the genitive case termination : Thou Art His (Servant). In the illustration of the several fruit-juices, there is no case for the disappearance of individuality ; for the very fact that the essence resulting from their mixture is able to cure one's bodily disorders arising on account of the disturbance of the three humours, is proof of their persistence in honey (81–83).

Among his other works mentioned by Aufrecht are :

(1) Yoga Vāsiṣtha Sāraṭīkā.
(2) Śatadūsaṇi-Yamana (Catalogus Cat. 344).

ADVAITIC CONCEPTION OF TIME

(M. Hiriyanna)

It is well known that Advaitins differ among themselves in regard to several points relating to their doctrine; and it may appear strange that they should do so, when all of them alike claim to be the followers of one and the same teacher, Śaṁkara, Appayya Dīkṣita explains, in the beginning of his *Siddhānta-leśa-saṁgraha* that these differences of view do not matter, because they relate to the details of the doctrine and not to the central conclusion of it, viz., the identity or, more strictly, the non-duality of the individual self and Brahman. We propose to refer here to the divergence of opinion among Advaitins in respect of one such detail, viz., Time. At least *four* distinct views can be traced about it in extant advaitic works. Only one of them, as we shall see, has the approval of Śaṁkara: yet the others are not rejected, since they do not affect the main point of the doctrine.

(1) The first view is what Śaṁkara himself states in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*[1]. According to it, Time is an effect (*kārya*) of *avidyā* or Māyā like Space. That is, it is not primary. This view makes Time objective in the sense in which all effects of *avidyā* are, viz., that they are not constructions of the individual's mind. It also means that temporal relations are irrelevant not only to Brahman but also to *avidyā*[2], taken by itself. Again, being an effect, Time must have a beginning as well as an end. It may be said that it is difficult to think of a beginning or an end in regard to Time, for all thought presupposes it. But this difficulty is only to be expected since, as an effect of *avidyā*, it is merely an empirical reality. All empirical objects are riddled with such inconsistencies, and it is just for this reason that they are described as 'appearances'. They are quite familiar to us, but yet we cannot give a coherent account of them.

(2) The second view is that Time is not an effect of *avidyā*, but is the relation between it and spirit or Brahman. It is referred to in the *Vana-mālā*,[3] a commentary on Śaṁkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. Time thus falls outside *avidyā*, unlike the rest of the physical universe including Space. It is not accordingly conceived here as co-ordinate with Space, as it is in the previous view. But though Time does not fall

1. *Etena dik-kāla-manaḥ-paramānvādīnam kāryatvam vyākhyātam* (II. iii. 7). The same is the significance of *Saṁvatsaro vai Prajā-patiḥ* (*Prāśna Up*: i. 9). See also *Dakṣiṇāmūrti Stotra*, st. 2.

2. Cf. the description of *avyākṛta* as *kālāparicchedya* in *the Bhāṣya* on *Māṇḍukya Up*: 1.

3. *Cidavidyā-sambandhaḥ kālaḥ* p. 121. (Śrī Vāṇī Vilās Press, Śrīraṅgam).

within *avidyā*, it is dependent upon it which is one of the relata it relates. That is, it is not given by itself. The significance of this view is that Time is beginningless although it has an end and ceases to be, along with *avidyā*, when right knowledge is acquired. Further, it is false (*mithyā*) because one of the relata, viz., *avidyā* is so, and the relation between reality and appearance must necessarily be an appearance.

(3) The third view identifies Time with *avidyā* and is mentioned by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Siddhānta-bindu*,[1] which is a commentary on what is known as the *Daśa-ślokī*, a work ascribed to Śaṁkara. Madhusūdana might have meant his statement to be understood literally ; but, in view of Sureśvara's description of Time as a *śakti* (i.e., *kriyā-śakti*),[2] we may perhaps take it to mean that Time is an aspect of *avidyā*, and not identical with it. That is, it is the dynamic aspect of *avidyā*. Since *avidyā* and Brahman must be thought of as related so long as we reckon them as two, we should assume that the present view admits that relation *in addition to* Time.

(4) The last view takes Time to be an aspect (*rūpa-bheda*) of Brahman itself. It also is referred to in the *Vana-mālā*[3] already mentioned, but is there traced to the authority of the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*. Since Brahman, according to Advaita, excludes all diversity, Time is to be explained, in this view, as identical with it, like *sat* and *cit*. Like them, it is not what characterises Brahman but is the very essence of it. That is, by Time here we have to understand eternity. In the three views so far considered, it is in one sense or other connected with the principle of becoming ; here it is identical with the principle of Being. In other words, *Kāla* is changing time in all those cases, but it is changeless eternity here in which, as Eckhart says, there is no before or after. It is this 'aspect' of Brahman, we should add, that appears as phenomenal time, when viewed from the empirical standpoint.

The common aim of the first three explanations is to show that time and change are transcended in the ultimate Reality. The last view implies that the Advaita doctrine has no objection to regard it as real and ultimate, provided its conception is transformed into that of eternity.

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1. *Kālastu avidyaiva* : p. 180 (Kambhakonam Edition).

2. Cf. st. 14 of his *Mānasollāsa* on st. 2 of the *Dakṣiṇāmūrti Stotra*. It is there ascribed to Iśvara ; but that, according to Advaita, is virtually to ascribe it to *avidyā*.

3. P. 121.

THE NATURE AND CONTENTS OF A LOST MEDICAL TREATISE BY KHARANĀDA OR KHĀRAṆĀDI

(P. K. Gode, M.A.)

Aufrecht[1] refers to खरनाद as the name of an author referred to by Aruṇadatta in his commentary on the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya* of Vāgbhaṭa II. The following passage is found in Aruṇadatta's commentary on verse 34 of Chapter I of the *Cikitsitasthāna* of the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya.*[2]

'तथाच खारणादिरपाठीत्—" बहुद्रव्यो घनः स्वच्छमल्पोदकंजलम् " इति '

In foot-note 7 on p. 549 the editor notes the variant 'खरनादोऽपाठीत्'. These two variants खारणादि and खरनाद found in two MSS of Aruṇadatta's commentary *Sarvāṅgasundarā* on the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya* give rise to the question whether the correct name of the author quoted by Aruṇadatta[3] (about 1220 A.D.) is खारणादि or खरनाद. This doubt is further aggravated by the use of the variant खरणादि in the following passage from Aruṇadatta's commentary on verse 77 of Chap. I of the *Cikitsitasthāna* (p. 559) :—

" खरणादेऽप्युक्तम्—' पटोलं फलं निम्बं कर्कोटककठिल्लकम् । शाकं पर्पटकं च स्यात् ' इति '

As against these three variants viz. (1) खारणादि ; (2) खरणादि and (3) खरनाद found in the MSS of Aruṇadatta's commentary, we find that Hemādri has quoted extensively from a medical writer called by him as 'खारणादि'. As Aufrecht does not record any MSS of the works of the author खारणादि or even his name it would be useful to record the quotations from खारणादि's work found in the *Āyurvedarasāyana*[4] of Hemādri.

1. *Cata. Catalogorum* Part I, p. 136 *b.*

2. Edited by Paradkar Sastri, N. S. Press, Bombay, p. 549 ; On p. 136 Hemādri (between 1260-1309 A. D.) quotes Aruṇadatta " मधु-क्षौद्रम् ' मार्द्वीकम् ' इति अरुणदत्तः " and " ' मैरेयो '...' खर्जुरासवः ' इति अरुणदत्तः "

3. Vide Hoernle : *Osteology,* Oxford, 1907, p. 17.

4. Vide p. 10 of my Introduction to the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya* of Vāgbhaṭa II (Ed. by Paradkar Shastri). *Āyurvedarasāyara* was composed between 1271 and 1309 A.D. (when Rāmacandra of Devagiri was ruling). Hemādri refers to his earlier work *Caturvarga-Cintāmaṇi* in the *Ā. rasāyana.*

These quotations are as under :

Page 40—" यदाह **खारणादिः**—"पित्तं शाम्यति, तच्छैत्याद्वायुः श्लेष्मा च चीयते " इति

Page 42—" यथोक्तं **खारणादिना**—" स्वभावशैत्याद्रौक्ष्याच्च वातकोपाद्बलक्षयात् । विधिर्विशेषात्स्निग्धोष्णः शिशिरे हैमनो मतः ॥ " इति

Page 43—" यदाह **खारणादिः**—" हेमन्ते निचितः श्लेष्मा शिशिरेऽपि न कुप्यति । आहारैश्च गुरुस्निग्धैर्भृशमेवोपचीयते " ॥ इति

Page 63—" कालमानं तूक्तं **खारणादिना**—" वार्षिकं तदहर्वृष्टं भूमिष्ठमहितं जलम् । व्युष्टं द्विरात्रं तच्चैव प्रसन्नममृतोपमम् " ॥ इति

Page 65—" **खारणादिना** च—" नदीकूपतडागोद्भिद्वाप्यादिषु विशिष्यते । अनूपे गौरवादम्बु शैले धन्वनि लाघवात् " ॥ इति

Page 67—" **खारणादिस्तु** पाल्वलमवरमाह—" पाल्वलं जलमम्भसाम् " इति

Page 69—" अत एव **खारणादिनो**त्तमशब्दः प्रयुक्तः—
" गव्यं स्नेहोत्तमं क्षीरं गव्याच्च प्रयसः पयः ।
यथोत्तरं स्नेहहीनमौरभ्रछागमाहिषम् ॥ " इति

Page 70—" **खारणादिस्त्वाह**—" स्वाद्वम्लपाकं स्निग्धोष्णं गुरुपित्तकफोल्बणम् ।
आविकं बृंहणं क्षीरं हिक्काश्वासानिलापहम् ॥ " इति
—" युक्तिरुक्ता **खारणादिना**[1]—"अर्धोदकं क्षीरशिष्टमामाल्लघुतरं स्मृतम् ।
" स्यान्निर्जलं श्रुतं द्वित्रिचतुरष्टांश शेषितम् ॥
यथाशृततमं सारं गुरुबल्यतमं पयः । " इति

Page 74—" मारुताध्मानजननश्चेक्षूणां भक्षितो रसः । " इति **खारणादिना**प्युक्तं वातलत्वं भुक्तमात्रपीतेक्षुरसविषयम् । "
—" उक्तं च **खारणादिना**—" मध्यकाण्डे सुमाधुर्यमिक्षोर्मूलाग्रपर्वसु ।
माधुर्यं साम्ललवणं विदाही तेन यान्त्रिकः ॥ " इति

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1. These three lines quoted by Hemādri as from खारणादि's work are quoted by Aruṇadatta as from खरनाद's work :—

Page 70—(*Sarvāṅga-Sundarā* of Aruṇadatta on verse 28 of chap. V of Sūtra-sthāna of Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya)—" युक्तिः योग उपायः । **खरनादेन** क्षीरस्य श्रपणे युक्तिः स्पष्टं कृत्वा दर्शिता—" अर्धोदकं क्षीरशिष्टमामाल्लघुतरं शृतम् । " इति........
" **खरनादेनोक्तम्**—" स्यान्निर्जलं शृतं द्वित्रिचतुरष्टांशशेषितम् ।
यथा शृतमं सारं गुरुबल्यतमं पयः ॥ " इति "

Page 85—" रक्तः श्येनाहृतो गौरः सुगन्धः काञ्चनो महान् ।
पतङ्ग : कलमः पाण्डुर्लोहवाल : प्रमोदक : ॥
दीर्घनालः शीतभीरुः सारिवः शङ्खमौक्तिकः ।
तूर्णको दीर्घशूकाख्यो लाङ्गलाद्यश्च शालयः ॥
शीतला मधुराः स्निग्धा ग्राहिणो मांसशुक्रलाः ।
वातपित्तहराबल्याः सृष्टमूत्राः सहायनाः ॥
स्निग्धः शीतो लघुर्ग्राही तृष्टाघ्नः शुक्रमूत्रलः ।
रक्तशालिस्त्रिदोषघ्नः कलमोऽनु महांस्ततः ॥ " इति खारणादिः "

Page 88—" ननु, स्निग्धोष्णा कफवातघ्नी सतिक्ता मधुराऽतसी । "
इति खारणादिना श्लेष्मघ्नत्वमुक्तम् "

Page 89—" यदाह खारणादिः—" वर्षस्थितं सर्वधान्यं परित्यजति गौरवम् ।
न तु त्यजति तद्वीर्यं वीर्यं मुञ्चत्यतः क्रमात् ॥ " इति

Page 98—उक्तं च खारणादिना—" अविदाह्यनतिस्निग्धं नातिशीतलमामिषम्
छागं लघु त्रिदोषघ्नमनभिष्यन्दि बृंहणम् ॥ " इति

Page 99—" स्वाद्वम्लपाकं स्निग्धोष्णं वातघ्नं बृंहणं गुरु ।
स्वेदनं तर्पणं हृद्यं बल्यं शौकरमामिषम् ॥ "
इति खारणादिवचनादुष्णत्वस्याप्यौपदेशिकत्वात् "

Page 100—" शिरोवत्पादगौरवम् " इति खारणादिना पादयोः शिरस्तुल्यत्व-
वचनात् चकारात् पादयोश्च गौरवं विद्यात् ॥
—" यदाह खारणादिः—" सक्थिस्कन्धा उरः शीर्षं मुष्कौत्वङ् मेहनं
कटिः । गुरूत्तरोत्तरं विद्याच्छिरोवत्पादगौरवम् " इति । ननु,
खारणादिस्वचोधिकं कठ्या गौरवमाह etc. "

Pane 102—" खारणादिः—" सस्नेहोष्णं लघुस्वाद पाके दोषानुलोमनम् ।
उक्तं तिक्तं त्रिदोषघ्नं शाकं निम्बपटोलयोः ॥[1]
तथा,—पटोलनिम्बवातघ्नतिक्तमन्यत्तु वातलम् । " इति । तत्र
खारणाद्युक्तं त्रिदोषघ्नत्वमेव ग्राह्यं etc. "
—" निम्बे तु खारणाद्युक्तं त्रिदोषघ्नत्वं फलविषयम् "
—"आह खारणादिः—"अवल्गुजः सैडगजः पित्रकृत्कफवातजित् ।"
इति । "
—" तथा वेत्राग्रस्य खारणादिना त्रिदोषघ्नत्वमुक्तम् "

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1. Quoted by Vopadeva in *Siddhamantraprakāśa*, folio 8.

Page 104—" अत एवोक्तं खारणादिना—
" चञ्चुर्मर्मरिका पाठा वेत्राग्रं सुनिषण्णकम् ।
शठी शाकं च सङ्ग्राही दोषत्रय हितं लघु ॥[1] " इत्यादि

Page 105—" अलाबु भेदनं तेषां त्रपुस त्वतिमूत्रलम् ।
एर्वारुकं सृष्टमूत्रं, ग्राहि कर्कारुचिर्भटम् ॥ " इति खारणादि वचनात् "

Page 105—" यदाह खारणादिः—" कालशाकं सकारञ्जं कटुकं वातकोपनम् ।
दीपनीयं प्रशस्तं च विषशोकोदरार्शसाम् ॥ इति "

Page 107—" तथा च खारणादिः—" रूक्षं विदाहि तीक्ष्णोष्णं कटुकं स्वादु-पच्यते । उत्क्लेदि स्तम्भि गुर्वामं मूलकं त्रिमलोल्बणम् ॥ " इति

Page 110—" रूक्षमाम्लं दाडिमं यत्तु तत्पित्तानिलकोपनम् " इति खारणादि वचनात् । "

Page 113—" भव्यं स्वादुकषायाम्लं रूक्षं गुर्वास्यशोधनम् ।
शीतं ग्राह्यरुचिच्छर्दिरक्तपित्तकफापहम् ॥ " इति खारणादिना पृथग्गुणकथनात् "

Page 114—" उक्तं च खारणादिना—" फलाम्लिकैरावतककोशाम्रकरमर्दकम् ।
आम्रातकं दन्तशठमम्लोष्णं रक्तपित्तलम् " इति । "
—" अत एव खारणादिना—" ग्राह्यम्लं बदरं रुच्यं लघूष्णं मारुता-पहम् । मधुरं तद्गुरुस्निग्धं शीतं पित्तानिलापहम् " इत्युक्तम् "

Page 116—" सस्नेहं मधुरं पाके वर्ण्यं रोचनदीपनम् ।
दोषत्रयघ्नं चक्षुष्यं शीतं सस्वादु सैन्धवम् ॥ " इति खारणादिना शीतमुक्तम् etc. "
—" सैन्धवं सारसं पाक्यं सौवर्चलमथोद्भिदम् ।
पूर्वं पूर्वं गुणोत्कृष्टमुष्णं तेषां यथोत्तरम् ॥ " इति खारणादिनैवो-ष्णत्वस्योक्तत्वात् "
—" ऊर्ध्वानुलोम्यकृद्वायोः शूलघ्नं दीपनं बिडम् । " इति खारणादि वचनात् "

Page 117—" ननु, " स्वाद्वम्लभावात्पवनं, कटुतिक्ततया कफम् ।
कषायमधुरत्वाच्च पित्तं हन्ति हरीतकी ॥ "
इति खारणादिना पित्तघ्नत्वमप्युक्तम्

1. Quoted by Vopadeva, Ibid, folio 7.

Page 118—" खारणादिना हरीतकीलक्षणमप्युक्तम्—
" क्षिप्ताम्भसि निमज्जेद्या गुणकृत्सा प्रकीर्तिता । " इति
—" खारणादिरपि—" कषायमधुरं शीतं लघुपित्तकफापहम् ।
बिभीतक तस्मात्त्रिफला सार्वयौगिकी ॥ " इति
—" अत एव खारणादिना कषायमधुरमुक्तम् "

Page 119—" यत्तु " रोपनं दीपनं छेदि सुगन्धिकफवातजित् ।
नात्युष्णं कटुकं तीक्ष्णं मरिचं नातिपित्तलम् ॥ इति
खारणादिना नात्युष्णत्वं नातिपित्तलत्वं चोक्तम् "

Page 133—" यदाह खारणादिः—" गुडमाषतिलक्षीरविरूढबिसमूलकैः ।
ग्राम्यानूपौदमांसानि त्वेकेनापि विरुध्यते ॥ " इति ।

Page 138—" यदाह खारणादिः—" दोषप्रकृतिदेशर्तुव्याधीनां स्वगुणैः पृथक् ।
विपरीतगुणैः सात्म्यं तुल्यं चासात्म्यमुच्यते ॥ " इति ।

Page 141—" उक्तं च खाराणादिना—" इन्द्रियातिश्रमाद्रूक्षो वातलो जागरो निशि । तदालस्याद्दिवास्वप्नः स्निग्धः पित्तकफोल्बणः ॥ आसीन-प्रचलस्वप्नो निरभिष्यन्दि बृंहणः । ' 'इति

Page 143—" अत एवाह खारणादिः—" असुप्तानां तथा रात्रौ तन्मात्रं स्वपनं दिवा । " इति

Page 148—" उक्तं च खारणादिना—" यदभ्यवहृतं सम्यग्यथाकालं जरां व्रजेत् । प्रकृत्यविकृतिं कृत्वा तन्मात्रालक्षणं विदुः ॥ " इति । "

Page 150—" उक्तं च खारणादिना—" विसूच्यलसकौ वाम्यौ पिप्पलीलवणाम्भसा । " इति ।
—" स्वेदफलवर्तिद्रव्याण्युक्तानि खारणादिना.—
" शूले तु स्तिमिते सामे स्वेदः शस्तो मुहुर्मुहुः ।
रूक्षोष्णैः कटुकैः पांशुकरीषसिकतादिभिः ॥
पिप्पल्योगारधूमश्च मदनं सर्षपास्त्रिवृत् ।
हेमक्षीरीवचा किण्वं कुष्ठं दन्ती यवाग्रजः ॥
समूत्रलवणाभ्यक्ताफलवर्तिरियं हिता ।
संस्वेद्यालसके शूलविबन्धानाह नाशिनी ॥ " इति

Page 151—" तथा च खारणादिः—" आमाशयविशुध्यर्थमथैनमुपवासयेत् ।
जीर्णे विरिक्तवृत्तिः स्याद्या प्रोक्ता मण्डपूर्विका ॥ इति ।

Page 153—" यदाह खारणादिः—" विष्टब्धे स्वेदनं वर्त्यो लवणोष्णाम्बु शस्यते । विदग्धे वमनं शस्तमुपवासो विरेचनम् ॥ " इति "

Page 154—"तथा च खारणादिः—" एतान्युक्तानि लिङ्गानि त्वामाजीर्णे विनिर्दिशेत् । " इति

—तथा च खारणादिः—" आमे त्वामप्रशमनं विमाने द्विविधं मतम् । इति ।

Page 155—यदाह खारणादिः—"रसशेषे हितः स्वप्नो घर्माम्बु लघुभोजनम्" । इति । "

Page 158—यत्तूक्तं खारणादिना—" कटुं लवणमम्लं वा पूर्वमाहारमाहरेत् । आहारो मधुरोऽग्रे हि गुरुर्विष्टभ्य जीर्यति ॥ " इति ।

—" यदाह खारणादिः—"कामं दोषवदप्यन्नममात्रं वा निषेवितम् । अन्यदोषमदोषं वाऽप्यनुपानेन जीर्यति ॥ " इति ।

Page 159—" यदाह खारणादिः—" कृशक्षीणामयोन्मुक्तपुष्टिवर्णबलार्थिनाम् । मद्यस्त्रीश्रमनित्यानां शुष्यतां च रसो हितः ॥ " इति ।

Page 167—" एके खारणादिप्रभृतयः गुर्वादीन् गुणान् वीर्यं च वदन्ति । "

Page 188—"यथा च खारणादिः—" पञ्चकर्माणि सर्पींषि सतिक्तावस्तय-स्तथा । पयः " इति ।

Page 189—" खारणादिरप्याहः--" रसधातोः परं धाम पच्यमानात्प्रसीदति । सौम्यस्वभाव रक्ताग्रे यत्तदोजः प्रकीर्तितम् ॥ " इति ।

It will be seen from the foregoing extracts that Hemādri (about A.D. 1271) had before him a medical work by a writer of the name खारणादि and even though the work has been now lost the quotations recorded above will acquaint the reader with the form and nature of its contents. It appears that in Hemādri's time and even earlier the treatise of *Khāraṇādi* was looked upon with authority since a writer of Hemādri's learning and literary repute quotes from it extensively as an authoritative work. From the identity of a quotation ascribed by Hemādri to खारणादि, and to खरनाद by Aruṇadatta we have suggested above that the names खारणादि and खरनाद are identical. Let us now see if the name खारणादि uniformly used by Hemādri in his quotations from this treatise is corroborated by any contemporary usages. Fortunately for us such contemporary testimony has been forthcoming from Vopadeva and his father Keśava. Vopadeva was a protege

of Hemādri and was the author of several works.[1] The following verse[2] found at the end of the *Muktāphala* shows us the versatile productivity of Vopadeva :—

"यस्य व्याकरणे वरेण्यघटनाः स्फीताः प्रबन्धा दश। प्रख्याता नववैद्यकेऽपि तिथिनिर्धारार्थमेकोद्भुतः। साहित्ये त्रय एव भागवततत्त्वोक्तौत्रयस्तस्य च। भूगीर्वाणशिरोमणेरिह गुणाः के के न लोकोत्तराः॥"

Farquhar[3] assigns Vopadeva[4] to 'C. 1300 A.D.' or 'End of the 13th century'. Our Vopadeva should not be confounded with a late writer of the same name[5] who wrote a commentary on the *Rasamañjarī* of Bhānudatta in A.D. 1572.

In view of the close personal contact of Hemādri and his learned protege Vopadeva, it is possible to suggest that the treatise of 'खारणादि' used by the one is exactly identical with that used by the other and mentioned as 'खारणादि' as the following quotations in Vopadeva's *Siddhamantraprakāśa*[6] will amply prove :—

1. Vide Aufrecht, CCI, 616*a*—Vopadeva was son of Keśava and pupil of Dhaneśa. He was Pandit to Mahādeva, King of Devagiri. He is quoted in the *Mādhavīyādhātuvṛtti*. He composed the following works :—(1) *Kavi Kalpadruma*, (2) *Kāvya Kāmadhenu*, (3) *Triṁśat-ślokī Āśc ucasaṁgraha*,- (4) *Dhātukośa* and *Dhātūpāṭha*, (5) *Paramahaṁsapriyā*, (6) *Paraśurāma-pratāpaṭīkā* (*Śrāddha Kāṇḍa*), (7) *Bhāgavata-purāṇa-dvādaśaskandhānu krama*, (8) *Mahimnastavaṭīkā*, (9) *Mugdhabodha*, (10) *Rāmavyākaraṇa* (perhaps the same as *Mugdhabodha*, (11) *Śataślokī* and its comm. *Śataślokī-Candrakalā*, (12) *Śārṅgadharasaṁhitā-gūḍhā-rthadīpikā* (med.), (13) *Siddha-mantra-prakāśa* (med.), sometimes attributed to his father, (14) *Harilīlā*, (15) *Hṛdayadīpanighaṇṭu* (med.), (16) Some anonymous work on *dharma* sometimes quoted in *Nirṇayasindhu*, in *Ācāramayūkha* and once in *Śrāddha-mayūkha*, (17) *Muktāphala*.

2. Vide P. V. Kane : *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I, 358.

3. *Outline of Religious Literature of India*, Oxford, 1920, pp. 234, 374.

4. Vide pp. 44-45 of *Life of Hemāḍpant* by K. H. Padhye, Bombay February 1931.

5. Vide S. K. De : *Sanskrit Poetics* I (1923) p. 251—Gopāla Ācārya alias *Vopadeva* of the Kauṇḍinya-gotra, son of Nṛsiṁha and grandson of Gopāla of Jabala-grāma in the Mahārāṣṭra country. The date of this Commentary is A.D. 1572 and not A.D. 1428 (vide my note in the *Annals* of the B. O. R. Institute, Vol. XVI (1934-35) pp. 145-147.

6. My references to this work are from MS. No. 1101 of 1886-92 in the Govt. MSS. Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona. Aufrecht records the following MSS of the text and commentary :—

(*continued on the next page*)

Folio 5—Keśava refers to खारणादि in the following verse :—

"वातलं चरको ब्रूते वातघ्नं वष्टि सु(सु)श्रुतः ।
खारणादिर्वदत्यन्यदित्युक्तेरत्र निर्णयः ॥ ५ ॥ "

Vopadeva comments :—" चरकसुश्रुतयोश्चरकखारणाद्योः etc."॥ " चरक-सुश्रुतखारणादीनां च परस्परविरुद्धानां द्रव्यशक्तिविषयाणामुक्तीनामत्रग्रंथे निर्णयो निर्णीतार्थकथनं ". This comment makes it clear that the treatise of खारणादि had assumed so much importance in the 13th century that Keśava wrote the work *Siddhamantra* to determine the mutually conflicting texts of *Caraka*, *Suśruta* and *Khāraṇādi* as stated by Keśava in the verse quoted above. It is also clear that Keśava, a contemporary of Aruṇadatta (about 1220 A.D.) uses the name खारणादि and not खरनाद used by the latter as we have seen already. This evidence shows that in the 13th century the names खरनाद and खारणादि were current in Bengal[1] and Mahārāṣṭra[2] respectively and perhaps owing to the

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CCI, 717*a* —"सिद्धमन्त्र med. by Keśava K 222. Kh. 91. Kaśīn. 34 comm· सिद्धमन्त्रप्रकाश by his son Vopadeva. K. 222. Kh. 91. Benn. 63. Oudh XIX, 128. Kāśīn. 34.

CCII, 171*b*—" सिद्धमन्त्र med. by Keśava. Peters. 41. comm.—Prakāśa Devipr. 79, 54. Stein 192 (inc.).

CCIII, 148*a*—" सिद्धमन्त्र med. by Keśava AK 955. Peters 5. 553. See also MS No. 13379 (Madras MSS Cata. Vol. XXIII, p. 9006).

1. Vide Mr. N. N. Das Gupta's article on "*Vaidyaka Literature of Bengal in the early Mediaeval Period*" (*Indian Culture* III, pp. 159-160) in which he appears to include Aruṇdatta among Bengali writers on medicine.

2. In the *Siddhamantraprakāśa* Vopadeva gives the genealogy of his father (fol. 45) as follows :—

महादेव who is styled as " महाराष्ट्रनिवासी विप्र "
केशव (learnt आयुर्वेद from भास्कर who is described as " वेदपुराख्य श्रीमद्राजधानीनिवासी विप्र "
वोपदेव.

Keśava states that he was honoured by सिंहराज (सिंहराजात्सन्मानं लेभे). His son explains :—" सिंहराजात्सन्मानं सम्यक्पूजां लेभे लब्धवान्......सिंहराजो दंडक महाराजाधिपो राजविशेषः—सिंहराज the patron of Vopadeva's father is identical with सिंघण or सिंहण (II) (of the Later Yādavas of Devagīri) who ruled from *1210 to 1247* A.D. (Vide p. 189 of Padhye's *Life of Hemādpant* and Duff : *Chronology*, p. 310). The date of सिद्धमन्त्र of Keśava may be

(*continued on the next page*)

love of '*taddhita*' formations ascribed to the *dākṣiṇātyas* by the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* the form खारणादि became current in the Mahārāṣṭra as proved by the usages of the name in the works of Keśava, his son Vopadeva and Hemādri, the friend and patron of Vopadeva. As the treatise of खारणादि has been lost it is advisable to collect all quotations from it wherever found; I shall, therefore, record here the following quotations in Vopadeva's *Siddhamantraprakāśa* (B. O. R. I. MS) :—

Folio 6—" अत एव खारणादिनापि वातघ्नं न प्रोक्तं तद्वाक्यं—

' कषायात्तु रसं रूक्षं शीतं स्वादु गुणादिकं ।

लेखनं भग्नसंधातृछेदनं विशदं गुरु ॥ ' इति

Folio 7—" किं तु माक्षिकाख्यस्य मधुविशेषस्य खारणादिना स्पष्टीकृतत्वात् "

—" खारणादिना त्रिदोषघ्नेषु पठितं ।

' चंचुर्मसूरिका पाठ वित्राग्रं सुनिपण्णकं ।

पत्र शाकं च संग्राहि दोपत्रय हितं लघु ' ॥ इति "[1]

between *1210 and 1247* A.D. It appears that the capital of सिंहराज was वेदपुर as stated by Vopadeva and that केशव was a resident of Vedapura.

Singhaṇa had in his employ an astronomer called Cangadeva the grandson of the celebrated Bhāskarācārya. Cangadeva was contemporary of Keśava, Vopadeva's father. This Cangadeva founded a *maṭha* at Pātaṇ 10 miles from Chalisgaon in Khandesh) for the study of the works of his grandfather and others (Vide Epi. Ind. I, 340 ff.). The inscription by Cangadeva at this *maṭha* appears to have been written some years after Śaka 1128 (= A.D. 1206) and it describes Cangadeva as " सिंघणचक्रवर्तिदैवज्ञवर्यः ". In another inscription [of Śaka 1144 (=A.D. 1222)—Epi. Ind., III, p. 112] we find the name of one Anantadeva, who is called *Daivajñāgraṇī* at Singhaṇa's Court. (Vide *History of Indian Astronomy* by S. B. Dikshit, Poona, 1896, p. 248).

1. Hemadri quotes this verse as from खारणादि and it reads as follows :—

" चञ्चुर्मर्मरिका पाठा वेत्राग्रं सुनिषण्णकम् ।
शठी शाकं च सङ्ग्राही दोषत्रयहितं लघु ॥ "

(P. 104 of N. S. P. edition).

Folio 8—" खारणादिना तु वातघ्नमुक्तं—
' सस्नेहोष्णं लघु स्वादु पाको दोषानुलोमनं ।
ऊष्णं तिक्तं त्रिदोषघ्नं शाकं निंबपटोलयोः ॥[2] इति "
—" खारणाद्योप्याहुः—
' पनसं नारिकेलं च ताल सस्यं च तर्पणं ।
स्वादु शीतं गुरु स्निग्धं बृंहणं कफ शुक्रलं ॥ ' इति "
Folio 34–" खारणादि वर्णपक्षः लटाको ललटूपके इति "

From the above quotations from खारणादि I have been able to identify 2 verses in the quotations from खारणादि recorded by Hemādri in *Āyurvedarasāyana*. This identity inspite of the slight variations of readings proves beyond doubt that the treatise of *Khāraṇādi* known to both the writers viz. Hemādri and Vopadeva, who were not only contemporaries but friends, is identical.

With the data recorded above we are in a position to sum up the results of our discussion as follows :—

(1) Aruṇadatta (about 1220 A.D.) quotes from a medical writer of the name खरनाद.

(2) Aruṇadatta appears to have been contemporary of Keśava, whose patron was King Singhaṇa of Devagiri (A.D. 1210–1247).

(3) Hemādri in his *Āyurvedarasāyana* (after 1270 A.D.) quotes extensively from a treatise mentioned as that of खारणादि.

(4) Keśava's medical work *Siddhamantra* mentions the name of खारणादि and attaches some importance to his views even though they were at variance with those of *Caraka* and *Suśruta*.

(5) The identity of a quotation of three lines found in Aruṇadatta's commentary on the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya* as from *Kharanāda* and in Hemādri's commentary on the same work as from *Khāraṇādi* makes it highly probable that *Kharanāda* and *Khāraṇādi* are identical medical writers.

(6) Vopadeva, the son of Keśava and friend of Hemādri quotes from *Khāraṇādi*'s treatise.

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2. Hemādri quotes this verse as from खारणादि :—
" सस्नेहोष्णं लघु स्वादु पाके दोषानुलोमनं ।
उक्तं तिक्तं त्रिदोषघ्नं शाकं निंबपटोलयोः ॥ "
(P. 102 of N. S. P. edition).

(7) The identity of two stanzas of *Khāraṇādi* quoted by Vopadeva with two stanzas of *Khāraṇādi* mentioned as such by Hemādri in his *Āyurvedarasāyana* proves that both these commentators are referring to an identical work of *Khāraṇādi.*

(8) *Khāraṇādi's* treatise, judging by the quotations, appears to have been in verse. It must have been composed before say A.D. 1150 as it is quoted largely by Aruṇadatta and Keśava about A. D. 1220 and by Vopadeva and Hemādri about 1275 A. D. It would really be an achievement if this treatise of Khāraṇādi, the subject of this paper is discovered hereafter by any one interested in the history of the Aryan medical science. With a view to help such discovery I note below a reference to खारनादः in the commentary of Niścalakara[1] on Cakrapāṇidatta's *Dravyaguṇa-Saṁgraha* (MS No. 620 of 1895–1902).

Folio 11b—" यदाह खारनादः—

'बहुद्रव्यो घनः क्राथः स्वच्छाल्पद्रवकं जलम्' इति

The above quotation appears to be from the work of खारणादि but I am unable to say if it is taken first-hand from the treatise in

1. Aufrecht records the following MSS of the *Dravyaguṇa–Saṁgraha* and its commentaries :—

CCI, 264—"W. p. 294, L 2931, Ben. 64, Bik. 634"

—Comm. by *Niścalakara* Bik. 634

—Comm. by *Śivadāsa* L 2932"

CCIII, 57—"Bd 889

—Comm. by *Niścalakara* Bd. 889 (No. 889 of 1887–91)

—Comm. by *Śiva dāsa*, son of Anantasena, Hpr. 1, 189.

Hence we have 3 MSS of Niścalakara's commentary viz. (1) at Bikaner and (2 and 3) in the Govt. MSS Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona, one of which viz. No 889 of 1887–91 is mentioned by Aufrecht. The other MS viz. No. 620 of 1895–1902 was acquired subsequent to Aufrecht's Catalogue.

Cakrapāṇidatta's father was Nārāyaṇa of the *Lodhravati* family and was a minister as also the Superintendent of the culinary department of Nayapāla. Cakrapāṇi's elder brother was Bhānu styled as *Antaraṅga.* The commentator Śivadāsa-sena of Mālañci in Pabna was the court physician of Barbek Shah (16th Century) of Bengal. His commentary was based upon an older commentary called रत्नप्रभा (vide N. N. Das Gupta's article in *Indian Culture*, III, p. 157). Śivadāsa's commentary has been edited by Devendra Nath Sen (1st edn.). Evidently the commentary रत्नप्रभा mentioned by Śivadāsa is identical with Niścalakara's commentary of the same name) two MSS of which are at the B. O. R. Institute as stated above.

would enable us to fix the date of the *Ratnaprabhā* to about 1300 A.D. In this case we have to imagine that the death of Vijaya Rakṣita (about 1240 A.D.) was looked upon in contemporary medical circles as a great loss to the science of *Āyurveda*. Our commentator being perhaps a junior contemporary of Vijaya Rakṣita and a great admirer of this *Āyurveda-guru* deplores the demise of this *guru* and himself undertakes the work of giving proper interpretation of Cakrapāṇidatta's work by way of his tribute to the departed guru. He, therefore, asks his daughter रत्नप्रभा to serve the pre-eminent physician (भजस्व भिषजां वरम्).

If the above hypothesis gets corroborated by further internal evidence or by external evidence the reference to खारनाद् by Niścalakara becomes almost contemporaneous with Hemādri's references to खारणादि reproduced in detail in this paper.

यो वेदमन्त्रनिखिलागमतत्त्ववेत्ता, षट्कर्मतत्परपुरोहित वन्द्यपादः ।
योगी त्रिसत्यप विभाति कदम्बवासी, ब्रह्मर्षिसद्गुरुमहोबलमाश्रये तम् ॥

BRĀHMAṆA DHARMA, THE UNIVERSAL RELIGION

(R. N. Suryanarayana, M. A.)

(a) *Hinduism?*

The word 'Hinduism' is a very vague one. It has neither denotation nor connotation. It conveys no meaning to us. The term may give a meaning, a narrower meaning too, to some aliens who coined the same, but it does not stand for a religion, especially the religion of our Brāhmaṇa Nation. No sacred text book of our religion contains such a contemptible term as Hindu even if you make a careful search with the help of one thousand search-lights and with the assistance of the best detective scholars of Sanskrit, including those of the West. The Prabuddha Bhārata has published in its issue of September 1928, an extract from the article of Mr. S. T. who wrote for the Century Magazine, New York, in the month of May 1928. "Hinduism", says, Mr. S. T. "what a strange medley of grotesque images that word evokes in most occidental minds. With Indians there is, of course, no such term." Vidwan Sri Ganesha Sastry Avl of Madras, enlightened the audience of the Mysore Sanskrit College on the same point and expressed his aversion to styling ourselves as Hindus.

The political situation of our country from centuries past, say 20–25 centuries, has made it very difficult to understand the nature of this nation and its religion. The Western Scholars and historians too have failed to trace the true name of this Brahmanal and a vast continent-like country, and therefore they have contented themselves by calling it by that detestable term 'Hindu' of which we should be ashamed. This word which is a foreign innovation is not made use of by any of our Sanskrit writers and revered Acaryas in their books. It seems that the political power is responsible for insisting upon the continuous use of the word.

(*b*) *No Hinduism*

'Hindu' is no nation, 'Hinduism' is no religion and 'Hindustan' or 'India' is no country. We are not Hindus,—Miss Mayo's Hindus !—at any rate, I am not a Hindu, I appeal to all to realise our position in the world and keep off the notion of Hindu from our minds.

The religion, Dharma and Brahma

Religion is one of the most abstruse terms which can be hardly defined precisely and conclusively. It is a term as mysterious as the terms God, Dharma or Brahma. The term religion stands for one thing as well as many things at the same time. It is derived from the root 'relegere' meaning 'to gather together' i.e., from 're 'and' legere' meaning to collect together. This is adapted by Cicero and supported by Gallius. Lacetantius takes it as 'religere' meaning 'to fasten or bind together'. The word religion is very elastic and flexible, and has stood for a number of things or actions from times immemorial. It is clear that the above two meanings are not far different from each other.

The meaning of the word religion is nearer to the meanings of the words Dharma and Brahma. The words Dharma and religion may be taken to be identically equal, in so far as their application and meaning are concerned. Dharma is also a mysterious term as mysterious as it is common connoting a great number of things. Of course an attempt has been earnestly made by the seers to understand the term Brahman which is indescribable and undefinable. The meanings implied by the roots Dhṛ and Bhṛ are supplementary to each other. The terms Dharma and Brahma have the widest application extending to the infinity itself. Both religiously and scientifically they are considered to be identical in their meanings. In the list of the characteristic definitions of these two terms, to be given hereafter, we may not be far wrong in taking them as nearly equivalent to the term 'religion' in the English language.

The word 'Mata' is in vogue among many of us. It has been unfortunately misunderstood for the word religion. 'Mata' or 'Darśana' or philosophy has got a definite place in the realm

of religion. It is a particular out-look on life or a special aspect of religion, and hence is not common and universal.

Dharma

We may in our country, find a general term for our religion in the word ' Dharma '. The word Dharma, like religion, speaks volumes to-day. Mr. S. T. of America writes :—" Dharma is that which is to be held fast, or kept ; the law of life, the eternal and immutable principles which hold together the universe in its parts and in its whole. And within that general law there is the religion, a national path and belief for every type of man and every grade of intelligence from the lowest fetishism of the illiterate Paraya, to the highest Absolutism of the Yogi who has literally ' realised God'. "

The Source of Dharma

To put in a nut-shell, the source of the Universal Dharma is the Veda. The fact that the Vedas are the most fundamental sacred books of the world of highest antiquity is universally recognised. Mention is made in the outlines of Arts and literature that even the Bible of Christianity came from the East to the West. The Vedas are the fountain head that have watered the whole world with religion.

The Vedic sages are very clear to us on matters of Dharma. Therefore, no complication need arise in our minds. Consequently no necessity was felt for the consideration of a distinct term for our religion, because the aliens were then insignificant, being styled as Mlencchas, Yavanas and Anāryas.

Dharma and the Caste

The then Mlencchas dared not rebel against the supremacy of Dharma of this land. The Dharma was confined only to four or five classes of people including the Niśadas consisting of the Śabaras, Pulindas, and also Parayas, and it reigned peacefully for a number of centuries. To most of us religion seems to be identical with the caste system. But it is not true. In the earliest times of history this present system of caste existed ; it might have been a socio-economic institution or a religious institution. It might have been planned out or it might have been evolved. (Cf. Cāturvarṇyam mayā sṛṣṭam guṇa-karma-vibhāgaśaḥ—mayā–

self ; sṛṣṭam = evolved). The evolutionary characteristics of the caste system are experienced even today. The people choose, voluntarily either an easy course of ordinary service and gratification of their senses or a comparatively more difficult course of learning and penance. The religion may be viewed and understood from any standpoint. Any sane interpretation may be quite welcome. But religion as religion is beyond the experience of mind, and it shall be revealed to a religious soul. The caste system, too, is not understood precisely and perfectly in all its colours.

Today the Parayas are considered to be outcastes having no religion of their own. The word Paraya is made unnecessarily contemptible. It is forgotten that the word ' Hindu ' is a more polluted and contemptuous one than the word Paraya. A Paraya is not inferior in any way to either a Christian or a Mahamedan or any person following a faith which hates and scorns our religion under the sway of which comes also the Paraya class. It is to be understood, therefore, that this Paraya class should not be made insignificant and no attempts may be made to substitute a different form to this one. The phrase ' the depressed class ' is to be similarly treated. Strictly speaking it is not the Parayas that form the ' depressed class ' but, sorry to say, that we all belong to the depressed class as we are made to be deprived of our beloved religion. Today we are classed as Hindus by certain people who may put forth, sometime hence, that the Hindus have no origin and therefore cannot claim to be a nation possessing a religion of their own. They are classifying us all under ' Hindu ' only to root us out and throw away just as an elephant throws out playfully the scattered grasses holding together with its trunk. Miss Mayo's attempt may indicate to a certain extent what is working in the minds of some of the Western people.

Dharma, the Basis of National Unity

(i)

So long as we talk of Dharma amongst ourselves in this land of ours, from Lanka to the Himalayas, so long as the word gives us to our satisfaction the idea of spirituality and practice, so long as the people of this land adhere to and abide by the rules of Revered Dharma, so long as we are not influenced by the devils and

demons that may capture our common sense and bring about a havoc over our country and Religion, so long as we are not entirely devoured by foreign faiths, so long as most of us, especially that class of people whom the evolution entrusted with the preservation of knowledge and sacred learning prove themselves capable of discharging their duties to the best satisfaction and approbation of all others whom the same evolution had made responsible for managing the whole system of religion and defending Dharma from foreign attacks, so long as there is unity amongst ourselves, a unity for fortifying our Dharma, but not a unity in the sense of a medley of principles that lead to the deterioration and nullity in the long run,–no conflict arises in our minds and the great Dharma of an adamantine character can withstand any amount of rigorous tests at the hands of foreigners.

(ii)

But the moment, the barbarity of foreign faiths appears to shake its foundations, break the unity, poison the innocent followers of one Dharma of this Brāhmaṇa-land, the present, net-like, loosened fortresses of that Dharma are sure to be broken down and cast aside. We must, therefore, join together and build or rather repair the great impregnable and irresistible fortifications of Dharma within which we may safely and peacefully lead for ever, a life of piety, and if we like, we may dispute amongst ourselves for the sake of clear understanding. And at the same time, we must appear to all foreigners to be one united whole and therefore their formidable enemy and also a most merciful and generous class to treat them as friends if they prove to be sincere as we have been doing all these days. The editor of Prabuddha Bharata writes under 'Whither India' the following :—

> " It is said sometimes that we must not talk of higher things till we have emancipated ourselves materially. Nothing can be more fallacious. No nation on earth ever progressed in such leisurely and routine work fashion. When a nation revives, it flourishes in all spheres of its life. It cannot stop the flow of vigour to certain spheres arbitrarily. If India gains strength, it will be strong in all aspects, material, mental and

spiritual, nationally and internationally. All activities should be simultaneous ; but the greatest effort should be towards the acquisition of strength. And what can be a greater source of strength than Religion, 'even a little of which banishes great fear' ? It is religion which has been the greatest stimulant to progress in all the past ages of India and it will be always so. So we must emphasise religion above all in our present crisis. Secondly, even if we are to achieve material prosperity, first it is absolutely necessary that the nation should be united. The masses should be roused and the greatest enthusiasm evoked in their heart. How can we do that ? What will be the battle cry that will bring the nation together ? What is that Mantram that will make the three hundred million hearts beat in unison ? The Bolshevic ideal ? The lure of material prosperity ? The hatred of Indian Ideals ? The hatred of the British ? We do not hear our leaders speak anything of this secret of unity. We shall tell them that secret. It is religion. Religion is our vitality. Mahatma Gandhi stood for religion, therefore he was able to invoke that tremendous enthusiasm in the heart of the Indian People. Let us warn our leaders that this is the only way to unite the people and make them strong, and any serious interference with true religion will neither help them nor the people. It is a vain hope to find any other basis of national unity than spirituality. The sooner we recognise this, the better for all."

The archbishop of Canterbury says, "We are convinced that in the last resort the only power which can secure and maintain the peace of the world is spiritual power—a power which will lift man above national ambitions and excitements and establish that rule of righteousness, mutual considerateness and justice, which is the only basis of peace,—in short loyalty to the kingdom of God."

(Headway. pp. 211)

The Problem of the Common Name for our Religion

In order to accomplish this our supreme and noble object we must try first to know who we are and what our position and religion are on this extensive globe.

The difficulty will, to a considerable extent, be easily solved if we could find a common name for all the people of our land and our religion with the help of our historical and sacred texts. The word Aryan denotes only one of the sections of the people of this Brāhmaṇa-land. Now it has been taken to mean the people of Āryāvarta—later Āryāvarta, which separates or excludes the later Draviḍa land. Therefore it fails to represent either the people or the religion of the Brāhmaṇa-land as a whole, consisting of both the Āryana and the Draviḍian lands, the two sister nations of a common Brāhmaṇa mother-land. The word Bhārata is only a later one and hence it does not point out the religion or geography of the earliest times. The other term which is equally vague and indefinite is Sanātana which means eternal. The Sanātanists are nowadays digging out a great gulf, to isolate themselves from the whole, just as the Ārya Samājists and the Brahmo Samājists are doing. Unfortunately, the so-called non-brāhmin element has crept into several provinces including even Mysore. Thus there is hardly any opportunity for understanding the unity of our religion amidst this medley of classifications. There are many schools of philosophy each advancing its own views. One modern mission goes to say that our religion is Vedāntism. But this Vedāntism is very vaguely understood. The modern schools of Brahmo Samāja and Ārya Samāja have failed to represent the ideals of our religion and to give us a comprehensive view of the same. Swami Avināsa Chandraji of R. K. Mission lectured very recently on Hinduism in Mysore, the central core of which was according to him the realisation of Omnipresence (Sarvāntaryāmitva) of the Almighty. Vidwan Sri. Ganesh Sastry is of opinion that our religion is Vaidika Dharma and its followers are all Vaidikas including even the Parayas or Harijans.

It is quite evident that none of these views or interpretations, can bring about any reconciliation or compromise. One excludes the other; it is very necessary that a term representing

fully our religious doctrines with all the minor aspects is to be searched in our sacred texts. Swāmi Vivekānanda says "that it is very hard to find a common name for our religion, seeing that this religion is a collection of various religious ideas, commonly found, gathered together almost without a name and without a church and without an organisation."

In the light of these diversified situations we may not be discouraged to feel that we are at a loss amidst these confusions. Though we are indifferent towards our Mother Religion, she will not let us go undefended and forsaken.

The religion that is revealed and explained to us in the Vedas is the absolute Brāhmaṇa Dharma '*Dharma Brahmaṇi Vedaika Vedye*' says our Venerable Sāyaṇacārya. Appayyā Dixita has tried to draw a line of demarcation between Dharma and Brahma on the authorities of the two statements 'Athāto Dharma jijñasā' and 'Athāto Brahma jijñāsā'. He says that 'dharma śabdasya brahma-sādhāraṇya vacanamayuktam' which means that it is not proper to interpret Dharma śabda as being equivalent to Brahma śabda. But, it is quite certain that the meanings of each of the above terms are complimentary to each other and hence can never be said to give a perfect meaning independently of each other. The same learned Appayyā Dixita says further that 'astu vā yathā kathanchit dharma śabdasya brahmaṇyapi pravṛttiḥ' meaning that the word Dharma can be applied in place of the word Brahma somehow or other.

No distinction is made between the Dharmabhāga and the Brahmabhāga in the Vedas. It may be said, for practical purposes that the Vedas are divided into two parts, viz., the Pūrvakāṇḍa and the Uttarakāṇḍa standing for Karma and Jñāna respectively. But in the real sense, no such division holds good as the Vedas are always an undivided whole. To the sages like Apastamba it is clear that the Jñānakānda prescribed for the third and the fourth Aśramas is not at all superior to and separate from the Karmakanda which is prescribed for the first and the second Asramas. One cannot do without the other. As I have remarked in the introduction to my 'Apastamba Dharma Sūtra Manjarī' "without the realisation of Self no religious action is perfect and the realisation of Self is void if it does not express itself in

the form of meritorious actions. If Pūrvabhāga stands for Dharma and Uttarabhāga for Brahma, then the whole of the Veda must necessarily stand for Brāhmaṇa Dharma, or the Religion Absolute.

Dharma or Religion and Ācāra

Both the words Religion and Dharma have two aspects ; one is the idealistic or the absolute aspect and the other is the practical or the Ācāra aspect. It is in the latter sense that people use in general the term religion or Dharma. When the absolute Dharma is put into practice or when it expresses or manifests itself in action it is called 'Ācāra'. That Ācāra which is immediately connected with Brāhmaṇa-dharma is known as Brāhmaṇācāra. The religious practices or Dharmācāras are many—as many as there are individuals in this universe or collectively speaking as many as there are communities, tribes, nations and groups including all animate and inanimate beings. All this is beautifully corroborated by the Vedas. Some scholars talk of the religion of the Ṛgveda, that of the Atharva Veda and that of the Upaniṣads and so on. It must be understood that they are here viewing religion 'from the very narrow point of view'. Even then it would be a mistake to view them as different religions ; for, the texts of the Vedas as a whole, proclaim to the world only one religion, viz., the religion of the Vedas or Brāhmaṇa dharma. In my opinion, Brāhmaṇācāra is universal in character and therefore comprises a great many minor ācāras in accordance with the adhikara to which each being is entitled. The determination and scope of the Adhikāra of the individual depends upon one's psychological and physiological endowments as well as environments.

The Symbol of Brāhmaṇa-dharma

The sound symbol of Brāhmana-dharma may be deemed to have been revealed in 'Kenopaniṣad'. There this symbol is called 'Yakṣa' i.e., the symbol which was revealed to and revered by the gods. It is no other than 'OM' which is the manifestation of the absolute and which comprises the whole of the Vedas. It is perfection itself. It can, therefore, perfect all that is associated with it. This is evident by the fact that in all Sahasranamas, every one of the name of the Almighty is invariably preceded by

this 'OMKĀRA'. The constant repeating of this OMKARA is the sole function of all ascetics. Consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly PRAṆAVA is adored and recited by one and all, following Brāhmaṇācāra. In order to make it accessible to all the good and the bad, the rich and the poor, the virtuous and the vicious, the righteous and the sinful, and theist and atheist, this glorious religion has instituted and blessed all beings on the earth both animate and inanimate with the worship of 'Praṇaveśvara' or the Almighty. The illiterate and the ignorant who cannot understand the nature and the sacredness of 'praṇava' are directed to visualise its symbolic form in the head of the elephant the peculiar formation or posture of whose trunk teaches everybody, in the best manner possible, the form of 'ॐ'. There are many facts which go to show that it is OMKARA that should be thought of, honoured respectfully and worshipped at the commencement of all undertakings. There is not a single soul in this Brāhmaṇa-land, who has not recognised the greatness of OMKARA and the worship of 'Praṇaveśwara' or the absolute Almighty. It is the origin of Yajña and Pūja of the Almighty in various forms called Mūrti and designs. One may worship his officer, his wife, his wealth etc., or Kṛṣṇa, Iśwara, Brahma, Tirthankara, Buddha, Christ or Allah. All that may be thought of is 'OM'. The painters and artists too are inculcating this idea into the minds of all, through their pictures of deities symbolised as 'ॐ'. The necessity of such symbols is keenly felt by western religionists and psychologists like Professor Huxley.

Yajña and its Place in Life

Brāhmaṇācāra is in other words styled as 'Yajña'. It is inseparable from Brahma or Dharma. Dharma is according to Mimaṁsakas 'Yāgādi'. Yāga again means 'Devatoddeśena Dravya Tyāga'. Yajña is love or love is Yajña. Yamaniyamāsana prāṇāyāma pratyāhāra dhyāna dhāraṇa samādhi-yogas, Jñana, Bhakti and Karma are all Yajñas. That chemical affinity between one element and the other or between the souls may be said to be the key-note of yajña or love.

The Function of Yajña

'The function of Yajña is to bring about unity between the individual Soul and the Universal Soul— a process which destroys

the condition of the individual Soul, so that the two souls may come in contact with each other and unite themselves like magnets when the interposing elements disappear. Though the soul is pure and simple, the inclination on the part of the conditioned Soul to perform Yajña or sacrifice depends upon, how far the Soul has attempted to extricate itself from its material environments. It is not a binding on any body to perform Yajña, which is nothing but the manifestation of divinity.

Yajña may be a way of life, an attitude of the individual Soul toward that single Universal Soul or the supreme being. For all practical purposes that single Universal Self is called by several names and it is thought of in various forms and shapes.

Deities and the Absolute God

There may be as many deities as there are individuals on earth. But all of them are classified, and their number is commonly known as 33 crores. All the same, there are thirty-three chief Deities according to the Vedas with their special features, each presiding over a particular natural phenomenon. In addition to these we find that there are many sage deities like Viśwāmitra, Vāmadeva, etc. It is generally known by one and all that it is only one Absolute Almighty 'Prajāpati or Brahman' that pervades the whole universe.

The Mahārāja is the embodiment of our Government. But there are many officers in whom certain regal powers are vested indispensably by the king for the smooth management of the Government. Though the Government is represented by many, still it is one, only one power, the Mahārāja. Each officer is a Mahārāja inasmuch as he represents a particular aspect of the Mahārāja. And we pay our respects to our Mahārāja through these officers who are his direct representatives and who discharge their onerous duties on behalf of the king. Just as the revenue reaches the Government though it is, in different circumstances laid down by the Government, placed in the hands of a shanbog or Patel, so also does all the worship or Yajña offered in different circumstances in honour of the several individual deities reach the Absolute Almighty. (Cf. Ākāśāt patitam toyam yathā gacchati sāgaram, sarva-deva-namaskāraḥ keśavam prati gacchati.)

Viewing the same from another angle of vision, we can quite clearly see that such natural divine and rational regulations as are described in the Vedas are very necessary, essential and therefore indispensable.

Forms of Yajñas

Yajna is not of one kind, nor of one particular form. It is indescribable. There is nothing which is wholly different from Yajña. My speech or writing is a Yajña. Your hearing or considering what I say is also a Yajña :—

Brahma Yajña
Yoga Yajña
Swādhyāya Yajña
Dāna Yajña
Jñāna Yajña
Tapo Yajña
Ārambha Yajña
Paricaryā Yajña
Havir Yajña
Prema Yajña (Gopi's love is Yajña.)
Bhakti Yajña etc.

are all yajñas. There are twenty-one classified and well-defined yajñas in the Vedas, Viz.

Sapta pāka Yajñas
Sapta Havir Yajñas
Sapta Soma Yajñas.

There are many more greater sacrifices expounded in the Vedas.

A Śrotriya is required to perform daily five Yajñas, called pancamahāyajñas which enjoin every one of us to offer worship to Bhuta, Manuśya, Deva, Pitṛ, and the Vedas (Brahma). " Ijyanti devatāḥ atra iti yajñaḥ, ijyate havirdīyate atra iti yajñaḥ". These are the etymological explanations of Yajña which are derived from the root word ' yaj ' meaning to worship. We convey our hospitality directly to the invisible deities through the Fire God or Agni Deva (Tejas or Electrons). And no Yajña ends without the conclusive statement that it is to please the one Absolute God. (Cf. Sarvam Nārāyaṇāyeti samarpayāmi.)

Methods of Yajña

A Yajna consists of invocation and hospitality which should not exceed one's means. The hospitality is generally known to comprise Āsana, Arghya, Nivedana, Nirājana etc. In Śrouta sacrifices the Nivedana is known as Havis which may be Ghṛta, Samith, Puroḍaśa, Paśu and kindred things.

Pashu Yajña

'Paśu Yajña' is nothing but the offering of one's self. It is also called 'Puruśa Medha'. We have heard of so many scientists who have offered at the altar of their investigations their very lives. The individual soul cutting through the condition or Upādhis, unites directly with the Universal Soul. This is Ātmayajña—Self-realisation.—This is the same as Puruśa-medha praised very much in the Vedic texts. It has got its own form of execution. Paśu Yajña gives a golden opportunity for the growth of the sciences of Physiology, Anatomy, etc., the knowledge of which leads one to Self-realisation. No animal is butchered for gratification of one's senses. We see in the world that each is sacrificing himself in the interest of something good. Śri Śankarācarya offered willingly his life for the sake of a devotee. Tilak etc., have sacrificed themselves in the cause of their mother-country. You may recall to your mind the atrocities of Jalliyanwallabagh, where many people offered their lives to the deity of Bhārata Māta at the altar of Swarājya. We have read in English History that Thomas a Becket became a victim to maintain the greatness and supremacy of the Church. Many soldiers have given up their lives for the sake of their country. Such sacrifices are at times indispensable. Strictly speaking, the killer of the body, the body that is killed and the sacrifice involving both, are all one and the same Brahman. Religious functions transcend all other functions. One of the religious functions of a Kṣatriya is fighting and protecting. Many of us may fail to apprehend this aspect of sacrifice, unless and until Kṛṣṇa-like incarnations bless us directly or indirectly with their divine sayings. But virtuous persons endowed with the gift of reasoning and discrimination, and as such indifferent to material and seeming pain or pleasure, can realise the exact signi-

ficance of the same. The Paśu Yajña is to be performed by those who possess great wisdom and control over the senses.

The Universal Nature of Yajñas

There are many other simple but equally great Yajñas prescribed for those who are mentally and physically weak and who, therefore, are incapable of doing greater sacrifices. A great religionist—Śri Śankara says :—

Ātmā tvam Girijā Matih parijanāḥ praṇaḥ śarīram Gṛham
Pūja-te viśayopabhogaracanā nidrā samādhi sthitiḥ
Sancāraḥ padayoḥ pradakṣināvidhiḥ stotrāṇi sarvā Giraḥ
Yadyatkarmakaromi tattadakhilam śambho tavārādhanam.

The Sevā Yajña is highly spoken of by another revered Ācārya who says:—

'Tvadbhṛtya paricāraka bhṛtya bhṛtya
Bhṛtyasya Bhṛtya iti kuru mām Mukunda.'

According to another religionist "Saṁtoṣam janayet prājñaḥ tadeveśvara pūjanam". A socialist and a politician may take it as "The country is the temple and service to humanity is the service to God".

It is therefore clear that anything and everything may be treated as Yajña. The Cuckoo's song may be deemed to be a sacrifice, judged from its own standard. A parrot and a peacock delight our eyes—a kind of service or sacrifice—by their resplendent feathers. Can there be a more exemplary sacrifice than the fidelity of the dog towards his master? Medical service or advice is also a service to the 'Absolute Self'. A musician's sweet and melodious song is one of the greatest Yajñas. The invention of the steam engine by George Stevenson and that made by B. Franklin are no mean sacrifices considering the great contribution of the same towards the development of the world's material civilisation. Similarly, passive resistance or Satyāgraha is undoubtedly a kind of sacrifice performed for the political salvation of the Brāhmaṇa-land. The Lawyer's pleadings for his clients are also Yajñas. A teacher teaching a student and a student's learning, the contributions of a journalist, a scavenger's cleaning, thieving, a butcher's selling of flesh are all certainly Yajñas. But they must be performed with a spirit of religion in order to realise the religious value of them in full.

Test of Yajñas

The depth of one's feeling is to be measured by the Almighty himself commonly known as 'conscience'. The test of a true sacrifice can be judged by the presiding deities of the several natural phenomena.

Ādityacandrāvanilo'nalaśca dyaurbhūmirāpo
hṛdayam yamaśca
Ahaśca ratriśca ubhe casandhye dharmohi jānāti
narasya vṛttim.

Manifestation of Religion

The religion manifests itself in several ways.

Śravaṇam kirtanam viṣṇoḥ smaraṇam pādasevanam
Arcaṇam vandanam dāsyam sakhyaṁātmanivedanam.

Each of these in an aspect of Yajña. Ātma Nivedana is the consummation of worship. The worship of God may be in any forms, like designs called yantras, stone, mud, wood, man, woman etc., or it may be purely mental. The so-called idol-worship is wrongly understood by many, since their mental vision is too dull to perceive the metaphysical significance of the same. Religionists like J. S. Huxley are coming nearer the solution of the problem, but owing to their lack of clear perspective and understanding, they are stuck up in the middle and are unable to reach the goal. Nobody in the Brāhmaṇa-land worships idols. The worship of the Almighty in the form of idols is not merely a mechanical process but a process of spiritual training towards the attainment of the highest bliss. The result which a man achieves by the sacrifice or worship he may perform, is commensurate with the spiritual status his soul has reached. Certain sacrifices are to be performed by only a few in a particular place and at a particular time appointed for the same.

Kāmya and Niṣkāma Karma (Yajña)

There are also Kāmya and Niṣkāma Karmas. A Kāmya Karma paves the way to Niṣkāma Karma, which is made clear by the revered Śankarcārya who says:—

Satsangatve nissangatvam
Nissangatve Nirmohatvam
Nirmohatve niścalatatvam
Niścalatatve Jīvanmuktiḥ

The Vedic sayings and injunctions like "Atmā vā re draṣṭavyo mantavyo, śrotavyo nidhidhyasitavyaḥ. Jyotiṭṣomena svargakamo yajeta. Aharahassandhyāmupasīta. Yāvajjivam agnihotram juhuyāt. Tatvamasi. Tajjalānityupāsīta." etc., are not different from one another so far as Religion is concerned. The word svarga kama may not necessarily insist on swarga or earthly paradise. It may mean the highest bliss or emancipation or anything that is good, or that guides us towards salvation. Similarly the 'Putrakāmeṣti' resulting in Putraprāpti leads us to the realisation of Self in the long run.

The Expiations and Religion

Another thing this Brāhmaṇācāra blesses the world with, is the way of atonement or expiation (prayaścitta) which plays a great part in religion and life and which is a boon to the suffering humanity. A prayaścitta is only a voluntary punishment for the commital of evil actions knowingly or unknowingly and consciously or unconsciously. The criminal law tells us that there shall be punishment for one's evil or wrong behaviour. The ignorance of the individual soul commits mistakes ; but the innate justice and nobility of the Universal Self invariably condones all these imperfections. Therefore an expiation ceremony must come from within. It cannot be forced upon. All these are clearly mentioned in the texts of the Vedas, the greatest treasure house of knowledge. Inasmuch as due allowance is made also for these expiations, Brāhmaṇācāra is extensive and is applicable for all men and for all times.

(*To be continued*)

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Vārarucanirukti-samuccaya (वाररुचनिरुक्ति-समुच्चय:) with Sanskrit Comm. and English Notes by C. Kunhan Raja. It is a short work in which about 100 Vedic Mantras are commented upon Madras, 1938. Roy. Pp. 53, 82, 88. Rs. 2.

Mysticism of time in Ṛgveda with a chapter on what is Soma by Dr. Mohan Singh. Lahore 1938. Roy. Pp. 64. Rs. 5.

Sāmavedaḥ of the Jaiminiyas (सामवेद:) ed. by Dr. Raghu Vir. Lahore, 1938. Pp. 141. Rs. 10.

Vaidic Gītā being Ṛks of Veda, arranged into 15 chapter according to the principles of Karma, Bhakti, Jñāna, Yoga as enunciated in Gītā by Yatindra Mohan Chatterjee. An ideal Prayer book. Text in Devanagari with English translation. Poona 1937. As. 8.

REVIEWS

Annual Bibliography of Indian Archaeology. Published by the Kern Institute, Leyden. Volume xi, for the year 1936. Printed by E. J. Brill, Ltd. 1938. Published with the aid of the Government of Netherlands India, the Imperial Government of India, the Government of Ceylon and several other Indian States.

This famous publication is not only patronised by a galoxy of Indian and Foreign Governments but is likewise edited by a galoxy of National and Foreign Scholars, who have established a world-wide reputation in the domain of Indology in their respective spheres of research. The editorial board consists of nine eminent scholars, who again are helped by a board of eleven honorary editors.

"The editorial board wishes to render this annual bibliography as complete as possible, especially with regard to publications appearing in India. Authors are particularly requested to supply the Kern Institute with copies of any articles dealing with archaeology and allied subjects, so that, they may be duly noted in further issues of the bibliography."

The Annual Bibliography of Indian Architeture published by the Kern Institute is without doubt an indispensable companion to Indologists. But the editors very much regret to say, almost year after year, (and that inspite of its large and extensive patronage) that financial strigencies make its regular and timely appearance a rarity. I cannot help remarking, although knowledge should transcend the geographical boundaries, that it is not befitting for our national prestige, that we should be supplied, nay spoon-fed, by a team of self-less foreign workers with the rich heritage of our own fore-fathers.

A Survey of the work done in India during 1935–36. The most important event in Indian archaeology during the year 1935-36, was the arrival of the American School of Iranian and Indic studies, under the leadership of Dr. Ernest Mackay (lately of the Indian Service). The site selected for their field operations was Chandu-daro, in the Nawab-shah district of Sind. The results achieved during the course of this work were valuable, and besides the recovery of an unusually large number of antiqui-

ties, the excavations have thrown new lights on the problem of successive cultures that flourished in the Indus valley in the third millennium B. C. Dr. Mackay believes that the people connected with the two uppermost strata were alien to the people responsible for the Indus culture and that their short-lived occupation of the sites of Chanhu-daro was cut short by the depredations of the Indus.

Rao Bahadur K. N. Dikshit writes :—The departmental programme of excavation was fairly wide spread over northern India within the restricted limits of the funds available. In Sind Mr. Madhasarup Vats explored two sites in the Khairpur States viz., Diji-ji-taksi and Kotasur. (Plate 1. *a* and *b*.)

One of the main desiderate of Indian Archaeology is the systematic exploration of the mounds in the upper Gangetic basin with a view to trace the extension of the ancient culture at present mostly confined to the Indus valley. A begining was made in this direction by Dr. K. A. Ansari, who visited some sites in the Dehradun, Bijnor, and Saharanpur districts of the United Provinces.

At Taxila in the Punjab the north-western portion of the monastery attaches to the Dharmarajika Stupa Site was laid bare. From evidences brought to light the monastery must have been built in the third century A. D. It is noteworthy that antiquities include figures of Brahmanical deities such as Vishu and Karttikeya.

In the N. W. P. Dr. Simone Corbian, a Belgian lady, did some work to bring to light the relics of Hellenic and prehellenic cultures.

In Bihar the work was continued at Nalanda and at Rajgir, when fresh excavations were done at Maniyar Math. (Plates ii and iii.) At the Math a large number of earthen vessels have been discovered. But a most curious feature about them is that these vessels are perforated with spouts numbering as many as thirty in some cases. (Plate iii B.) The designs on the spouts include, serpants, sieves, animals, etc.

At Lauriya-Nandangarh in the district of Champaran in Bihar excavations were conducted by the late lamented Mr. N. G

Mojumdar. His researches re-established the fact that the Stupas were definitely Buddhist and could not be described as pre-Buddhist or Vedic.

In Bengal excavations were continued to the mound known as Medh in the vicinity of the City of Mahasthan. In the Madras Presidency two small caves were brought to light in Malabar near the village of Makkada Desam.

Indian Numismatics in 1936 :—Sir Richard Burn has contributed a chapter on new finds in Indian Numismatics in 1936. The first considerable work on Ancient Indian Numismatics was published by Cunnigham as early as 1891. Now Mr. John Allen, keeper of the department of Coins and Medals in the British Museum has produced a catalogue of ancient coins 'in his charge' which is the most considerable contribution on the subject since Cunnigham's Coins of Ancient India. The new work adds much material and in its long introduction carries conclusion further than Cunnigham was able to do (pp. 6–10).

Archaeological progress in Hyderabad-Deccan. During the year under review several new sites were discovered and surveyed by the department. In the Raichur district six pre-historic sites were added to the list of those previously discovered ; they are at Agati, Aidnal, Kodkal, Salgond, Totgal and Venkatapur. The excavations at Maski, which were started last year and continues during the present year, yielded a rich harvest of pre-historic antiquities in addition to structural remains. In the Aurangabad district the ancient site of Paithan on the banks of the river Godāvarī has long attracted the attention of archaeologists. Excavations were started here in May 1937 and the operations have revealed many things of importance. (Plates v. *a* and *b*). It is hoped, that, when explorations will be conducted on a large scale, they will throw light on the history of the Andhra dynasty and may as well lead to discoveries of a still earlier culture.

Progress of Archaeological Research in Baroda :—Systematic explorations of the extensive site of Anahilapattana, the ancient capital of Gujarat which was founded by Vamarāja Chāvadā about the year 802 of the Vikram Era (= 745 A. D.) was undertaken (See pp. 12–13). Among various interesting finds an elaborately carved stones column (Plate vi. *a*) was found in the debris.

Forty new inscriptions were copied during the year under review. Their dates range between Samvat years 802 and 1929. In the domain of Numismatics apart from the 2000 and odd silver coins of Kumar Gupta I, more than 3,000 coins were discovered and studied during the year.

Ceylon :—The marked affinity which the earliest example of Sinhalese sculpture bear to the Buddhist art of the Andhra country has already been noted by Dr. A, K. Coomasaswamy and others. Apart from this Andhra influence noticeable in the sculptures which obviously are the products of a local school a number of sculptures which distinctly are of South Indian origin and must at some time have been imported to Ceylon have come to light at various sites of the island. Notable among these are two fragmentary bas reliefs:(Plate vii, *a* and *b*) illustrating the dream of Queen Maya and the Great miracle of Sravasti (?) respectively.

Further India :—Two long chapters have been devoted to detail the work carried on in Further India i.e., Indo-China and Indonesia. (Pp. 18–32) (Plates viii–xiii), contributed by H. Manger and F. M. Schnitzer, respectively.

The Phnom Bayang :—The Bayang is a Khmer temple (Plate viii *a* and *b*), the foundation of which goes back to the seventh century. It is situated in Cambodia, not far from the borders of French Indo-China and stands on the top of a steep hill measuring 103 feet in height. The excavation and preservation of the Phnom Bayang temple were carried out in 1938. The temple is called 'Bayang' or 'Phnom Bayang' the word 'Phnom' in Cambodian meaning a hill or a mountain.

In the years 1935 and 1936 Mr. A. Gale of Surabaya in collaboration with Mr. F. M. Schnitzer explored part of the higher slopes of Mount-Pennanggungan in Eastern Java. The number of newly discovered remains was about thirty and among the new finds were several representations of human figures in relief, the existence of which was not even suspected. The dates range from 1400 to 1500 A. D. and belong, therefore, to the final period of Hinduism in Java. Of this period only very little is known with certainty, a circumstance which increases the importance of the finds. The plates in this connection with their explanatory notes are extremely interesting.

The Bibliography is fairly extensive and consists of a separate list of periodicals and the following:—A General. B India, which has separate bibliographies on Archaelogy, Art History, Architecture and Sculpture, Painting, Iconography, Paleography, Epigraphy, Chronology, Ancient History, Ancient Geography and Numismatics. Separate bibliographic chapters are furnished for Ceylon, Further India, Indonesia, and adjoining territories viz. Iran, Afghanisthan, Turan, Mesopotamia, Tibet and the Far East [China, Japan, Korea]. —*B. N. Mitra.*

S'aiva Siddhānta, by Miss V. Paranjoti, M.A., Ph.D. Published by Luzac and Co., London. Price Rs. 4.

This book deals with the Śaiva Siddhānta system, as presented in Tamil literature. It was originally the thesis submitted by Miss Paranjoti for the Ph.D. Degree of the University of Madtas. It is a very readable and interesting volume and its value cannot be over-established.

The origins of Śaivism are lost in obscurity; but it is clear that the Śaivism of history is a blend of two lines of development, the Aryan or Vedic and the pre-Aryan. Śaivism has a metaphysics and theology of its own. The book is a comprehensive treatment of the system based on the canonical literature of Tamil Śaivism with a clear exposition of its Epistemology, its conception of three *padārthas* (categories: God, soul and the bonds) and thirty six *tattvas* (principles). Reality is ascribed to the *tattvas* and independence to souls and matter. It varies from idealistic monism at one end of the scale to pluralistic realism at the other end. The author has given a critical estimate of its doctrines drawing attention to these fallacies and inconsistencies. All through them will be found in this philosophy the typically Hindu insistence on knowledge as essential to salvation though sometimes this requisite is diluted with and reinforced by deeds. Social ethics finds no place in the Siddhānta as each individual beyond caring for his own salvation does not concern himself with what happens to his fellowmen. It has been pointed out rightly by the author and the omission of this point does not mean that the Siddhānta does not encourage individuals to think beyond themselves. The question of atman's obligation to his fellow beings, however, was not a point of contention between

the various schools, but rather a point on which all were agreed. The hospitality of the East : into Charity, which are some of the artruistic virtues, are too proverbially known to require further mention.

A very important part of the book consists in :estimating the relation of Siddhānta to other religions. Here the reader finds nice and correct accounts of the principal tenets of the Lōkāyata school, Buddhism, Jainism, the Nyāya system, the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Māyāvāda, the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Pañca-rātra, a discrimination has also been made between Śaiva Siddhānta and some inner schools of Śaivism.

Theism cannot be substantiated by any consistent logical argument, unless one is prepared to finitise God. So long as Souls exist as independent individuals their will comes into conflict with that of God. If the working out of His purposes depends on the will of the individual, God is a limited being. The difficulty can be removed if the Soul be reduced to an appearance. The author concludes, "In changing souls into appearance, to magnify the power of God, however, we at the same time transform God into the Absolute. Hence, short of the absolute, God cannot rest, and having reached that goal, He is lost, and religion with Him."

One has to go back to the *S'vetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, a treatise which resembles the *Bhagavad Gītā* in many ways for grasping the theistic strain of thought. Just as *Gītā* voices the intense theism of Vaiṣṇavism, so does the *S'vetaśvatar* expound Śaivism by exalting Śiva above all other Gods, with the highly concrete conception of the deity of the intensely personal nature of the relation between him and his devotees. —*C. C. Mitra*

The Aryan Path—Special Hind Swaraj Number, September, 1938.

The Aryan Path stands for all that is noble in East and West alike. The present number advertises the principles in defence of which *Hind Swaraj* was written in 1908. "No man can be expected to remember what he wrote thirty years ago" says Bernard Shaw. But Gandhiji in his message contained in the issue under review says, "after the stormy thirty years through which I have since passed, I have seen nothing to make me alter

the views expounded in the book" ; and his view is, "It is my deliberate opinion that India is being ground down not under the English heel but under that of modern civilization."

The first article is by Frederick Soddy the well-known Chemist and Economist. Although he has missed the very soul of the subject, his views, nevertheless, are interesting for critical understanding of the principles of non-violence and non-co-operation. The second article is by G. D. N. Cole, the Vice-President of the Workers' Educational Associtian, Vice-Chairman of the New Fabian Research Bureau. He does not believe that Western civilization is of sharp necessity at enmity with the human soul. C. Dalisle Burns, the British Editor of the International Journal of Ethics, in his article "The Teaching of Gandhi", stresses the point that Western Civilization is not merely mechanical. To John Middleton Murry, a Christian and a Socialist, *Hind Swaraj* is a spiritual classics. J. D. Beresford not only appreciates but accepts for personal practice the doctrine of soul-force. In the next article Hush P. A. Faussit considers Hind Swaraj as one of the best hand books. In the article, "Civilization, the path of Duty", Claude Haughton, penetrates into the very soul of Hind Swaraj. Gerald Heard, the author of *The Third Morality* sees in Gandhiji's ideals the beginnings of a new world order and compares it with Rousseau's *Social Contract* and Carl Mark's *Das Capital.*

Irene Rathbone describes *Hind Swaraj* as an enormously powerful book. "Strength lies in the absence of fear, not in the quality of flesh and muscle we may have on our bodies"—this is something eternal.

The Editor is to be congratulated on his attempt to stimulate the minds of the modern youth to pursue diligently the message of Gandhiji. Gandhiji does not hate the English and would never be party to any revolution designed to turn the English out of India by force of wars. He desires to see the ancient culture of India left unimpeded, uninsuffered with, to achieve its own proper natural development. Hind Swaraj was written in Gujarathi in the form of a serial in 1908 and though it has suffered vicissitudes including proscription at one time by the Bombay Government, it is presented now in English in its original wording.

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२. कणादो जैमिनिर्व्यासः कपिलो गौतमस्तथा ।
पतञ्जलिः स्वयं साक्षात्कवीन्द्रस्वामिदेवताः ॥ १२० ॥
३. अष्टादशसु विद्यासु निष्णातो जगतां गुरुः ।
कवीन्द्रस्वामिराजेन्द्रो राजते रामचन्द्रवत् ॥ १२१ ॥
४. कवीन्द्रस्वामिनां नाम ग्रहणाद् दुःखराशयः ।
पलायन्ते हरेः सङ्घात्तमसामिव राशयः ॥ १२२ ॥
५. भट्टो नारायणः साक्षात्पुरासीच्छङ्करः शिवः ।
तथैवात्र स्वयं कृष्णः कवीन्द्रस्वामिदण्डधृक् ॥ १२३ ॥
६. कमनीये भवेद्रामः कामो वा नलनैषधः ।
गाम्भीर्ये सरितां नाथः कवीन्द्रस्वामिवाक्पतिः ॥ १२४ ॥
७. हनूमान् भयनाशाय करतापनिवारणे ।
सुधांशू रामभद्रोऽपि कवीन्द्रस्वामिशङ्करः ॥ १२५ ॥
८. सर्वोपकृतये विद्याऽधीता गीता सुनिश्चिता ।
गोब्राह्मणभयत्राणे कवीन्द्रस्वामिभास्करैः ॥ १२६ ॥
९. आचार्याचार्यहंसानां शंवऽतारजुषां[1] (?) सताम् ।
कवीन्द्रस्वामिनां भक्त्या मुरलीशकृताष्टकम् ॥ १२७ ॥

कालिदासमिश्रपौत्रस्य मुरलीधरस्यैतानि नव ॥

१. भ्रान्तेः पुरुषधर्मत्वाद् दोषाः पुरुषवर्तिनः ।
तद्गुणग्राहिणा भाव्यं गुणिगुण्यगुण त्वया ॥ १२८ ॥
२. कोविदव्रातकुमुदस्फुरत्कुमुदबन्धवे ।
नमः कवीन्द्रवर्याय सदा सद्गुहुतन्त्रिणे[2] ॥ १२९ ॥
३. पाण्डित्यदण्डितोद्दण्ड[3]पण्डाखण्डलमन्त्रिणे ।
नमः कवीन्द्रवर्याय सदा सद्गुहुतन्त्रिणे ॥ १३० ॥
४. सह्याद्रिग्राटवीभूँ[4]मविलसद्धूमकेतवे ।
नमः कवीन्द्रवर्याय भजनानन्द[5]हेतवे ॥ १३१ ॥

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१. C. शंवतारजुषां. २. A. गुणमाणिक्यसिन्धवे. B. स्वदास°. ३. Emendation; A reads °दण्ड°. This verse wanting in B and C. ४. C. °भूमौ. ५. C. जगद्ग°.

५. नमन्महीशमुकुटहीरहारिनखेन्दवे ।
नमः कवीन्द्रवर्याय सदानन्दितबिन्दवे ॥ १३२ ॥

६. वाडवार्त्याब्धिवडवहव्यवाडवतारिणे ।
नमः कवीन्द्रवर्याय स्वेच्छासौख्यविहारिणे ॥ १३३ ॥

७. श्रीखण्डपुण्डरीकेन्दुपिण्डपाण्डुरकीर्तये ।
नमः कवीन्द्रवर्याय दयासागरमूर्तये ॥ १३४ ॥

८. गुणच्छटापटाच्छन्नसमस्ताविलसद्दिशे ।
नमः कवीन्द्रवर्याय सरोजविकसद्दृशे ॥ १३५ ॥

९. दधीचिबलिकर्णादिवर्णवर्णापहारिणे ।
नमः कवीन्द्रवर्याय दानज्ञानाधिकारिणे ॥ १३६ ॥

१०. यः पठेत्स्पष्टमुत्कृष्टं कवीन्द्राष्टकमिष्टदम् ।
तुष्टः पिनष्टि तत्कष्टं स ह्यष्टापदयष्टिभिः ॥ १३७ ॥

कृष्णाचार्यस्यैतानि दश ॥[२]

१. केचिद्वेदविदग्रणीषु निरताः केचिच्च यज्ञक्रिया-
पारीणेषु परे पुराणकथकेष्वन्येऽथ सङ्गीतिषु ।
आयुर्वेदपरेषु केऽपि गणकेष्वन्ये ह हा हा कथं
कालेऽस्मिन् कवितावतारिषु न वा कोऽप्यस्ति लेशादरी ॥१३८

२. चिन्ताप्रतानपरिचुम्बितचित्तवृत्ति-
स्त्यक्तुं कविः स्वकवितां वनितामिवैषीत् ।
यावत्कृपापरवशा गिरिराजकन्या
तावत्सहासमवदत् श्रितनीपवन्या ॥ १३९ ॥

३. परोपकृतिसाहसी भुवनसीम्नि हंसीकृत-
प्रशस्तिरनिशं वशी दलितदुर्गताशीविषः ।
शशीव शुभलक्षणात्सदयमीक्षणावेक्षणा-
त्करिष्यति कवे[३] क्षणात्तव कवीन्द्रनामा क्षणात् ॥ १४० ॥

४. आस्ते कोऽप्यवनीतले परिचितः पाथोद एवोचितः
स्वोत्कर्षोत्कविलोकचातकमिलच्छोकावलोपे कृती ।

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१. This verse wanting in A. B. स्यछा°, C. स्वच्छा°. २. A.C. नव.
३. C. कदेक्षणा°.

सर्वस्वीकृतशास्त्रसागरमहोदारप्रचारव्रती
सत्कीर्तिप्रतिभूरभूतविनयः श्रीमान्कवीन्द्रो यतिः ॥ १४१ ॥
५. धैर्याकूपारसीमा प्रतिभटसुषमास्तोमसोमार्यमायं[१]
श्रीमान्कामारिवामास्तुतपदमहिमा पुण्यनामार्यधामा ।
श्रीमान् धर्मात्मना यः स्फुटतरमुपमामाप भूमाविहेष्ट-
प्रेमा जीयात्कवीन्द्राभिधयतितिलकः कोऽपि वंशावतंसः ॥१४२॥
६. यदालोके लोके कविकुलकलानां सफलता
परं स्वैरं पद्मा समजनि तदागारवशगा ।
यदीया सत्कीर्तिर्विहरति सदाशाऽतुलमुखे
मखेशप्रीतं तं यतिवरकवीन्द्रं श्रय सखे[३] ॥ १४३ ॥
७. यशः पारावारस्तिरयति सुधाम्भोनिधिमहो
महश्चान्द्रं सान्द्रं जगति जयिनो यस्य सुमतेः ।
गुणग्रामः स्फीतः कलयति विवृद्धिं कविमुखे
मखेशप्रीतं तं यतिपतिकवीन्द्रं श्रय सखे[४] ॥ १४४ ॥
८. केचित्काञ्चनवाञ्छयात्र बहुधा त्वां भूतलाखण्डलं
सेवन्ते विबुधा मुधाकृतसुधावाचां प्रपञ्चैश्चिरम् ।
विद्वद्भूषण दैन्यदूषणकलासिन्धो कवीन्द्र प्रभो
यातस्ते समया जयाधिककविः सोऽहं कपर्देच्छया ॥ १४५ ॥
९. दानेनालिपतकल्पपादपतते पद्मालयानायका-
सक्त प्राक्तनभूरिवैभवजितारातेे कृतेज्यानते ।
विद्वन्मण्डन दैन्यखण्डन मनाग् वर्षाशनान्नाश्रितं
कर्तुं मामुचितं कवीन्द्र भवतः काश्यां स्वनामोर्जितम् ॥ १४६ ॥
१०. श्रुतिसागरवारपारदृश्वा स्मृतिविश्वासवणिक् धृतेभसम्पत् ।
परिषत्प्रियकृत् श्रिया कवीन्द्रः प्रतिपच्चन्द्र इव प्रयातु वृद्धिम् ॥१४७॥
११. पहुवीअलएक्कचक्कवत्ती णिअकित्तीधवलीकिदाजमुत्ती ।
समिदाखिलसाहुलोअअत्ती तुह वत्वन्ति स कोवि पक्खवत्ती ॥१४८॥

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१. C. °यः २. C. पति° । ३. C. सखि. ४. This verse wanting in C. ५. C. °दाय°

न साधयेच्चेत्प्रतिपाद्यमानं
कवीन्द्रदीपो वद कोऽन्य ईदृक् ॥ १६३ ॥

९.

कौ न दुष्प्रर्क	अपि भवति समी	क्षतवीर्यः कृपे
अवनिपकुलदी	पे	श्रीरमातारवीश
यद्दीपे दिली	क्षितिरिह्कृतय	क्षितीन्द्रे यः

॥१६४॥


१०.

ली	नायदङ्घ्रिभजनादपि पङ्कमा	ला
म्यो हरंस्तम उदेति किमंशुमा	अत्र चतुर्षु कोणेषु स्थितैरक्षरैः कविनाम स्पष्टं भवति ॥	वर्ण्यमीदृशमघं यदघंसरो
न	नीलपङ्कजदृशाम...ऽम्बुज	प

॥ १६५ ॥

1. C. द्योतटीन्यामकृ. २. C. °मेतदनघं.

११.



॥१६६॥

१२. प्रकाशापुरीवासिलीलाधरेण ध्रुवं भट्टविश्वेश्वरस्यात्मजेन ॥
दलं पद्मनाभाश्रमस्याज्ञयेदं व्यजिज्ञापि चञ्चत्कवीन्द्राम्बुजेषु ॥ १६७ ॥
दाक्षिणात्यलीलाधरभट्टस्यैतानि द्वादश पद्यानि ॥

१. याति द्राक्स्थिरतां कवीन्द्र भगवन् त्रैलोक्यमाक्रामति
स्वैरं सर्पति सर्वतः प्रतिदिशं प्रोत्तुङ्गतामञ्चति ।
भूमीन्दो हृदयङ्गमं प्रणयिनां युष्मद्यशोमण्डलं
पृथ्वीवत्परिवेषवत्पवनवत्प्रासादवत्प्राणवत् ॥ १६८ ॥

मैथिलबदरीनाथोपाध्यायानाम् ॥

१. येन श्रीसाहिजाहाँ नरपतितिलकः स्वस्य वश्यः कृतोऽभूत्
किं चावश्यं प्रपन्नः पुनरपि विहितः शाहिदाराशकोहः ।
काशीतीर्थप्रयागप्रतिजनितकरग्राहमोक्षैकहेतुः
सोऽयं श्रीमान् कवीन्द्रो जयति कविगुरुस्तीर्थराजाधिराजः॥ १६९॥

२. काश्मीरैराककारस्करदरदखुरासानहबूशानजाता
वङ्गारव्याः फिरङ्गास्तुरुकशकवदकूशानमुल्तानवल्काः ।
खान्धाराः काबिलेन्द्रा अपि धरणिभृतस्ते मगा रूमशामाः
श्रीमच्छ्रीसाहिजाहानरपतिसदसि त्वां कवीन्द्र स्तुवन्ति ॥१७०॥

३. त्वद्वक्त्रोत्थकवित्वशीतकिरणत्रासाकुलान्तः पुटं
खिद्यद्वाग्भ्रमरीविलासमलसं दोषान्धकारावृतम् ।
मद्वक्त्राम्बुरुहं विकासयतु सद्वाणीलसत्सौरभं
श्रीवादीन्द्रकवीन्द्र तावकगुणप्रद्योतनोषःप्रभा ॥ १७१ ॥

हीरारामकवेस्त्रीणि ॥

१. दाने राज्ये गवि क्षान्तौ श्रीकवीन्द्रोऽस्तु सर्वदा ।
कर्ण-राम–गुरु-वीभिः समः सूर्येण तेजसा ॥ १७२ ॥

२. त्वं बुद्ध्या गुरुरंशुभिः शशधरः सूर्यश्च तेजोभरै-
रग्निस्त्वं च वरप्रतापनिवहैर्वायुर्बलेनासि किम् ।
श्रीदस्त्वं कमलासमर्पणतया विद्यानिधान प्रभो
गाम्भीर्येण च नीरधिश्च मदनो रूपेण विद्वद्विभो ॥ १७३ ॥

गणेशभट्टानां द्वयम् ॥

१. चतुर्वेदीविदां श्रेष्ठः षडङ्गाध्यायिनामपि ।
शास्ति शास्त्राणि सर्वाणि साहित्यसहितानि च ॥ १७४ ॥

२. अष्टादश पुराणानि तथा सर्वा अपि स्मृतीः ।
योगवाशिष्ठविज्ज्येष्ठः श्रीकवीन्द्रसरस्वती ॥ १७५ ॥

३. ब्राह्मणानां क्षत्रियाणां वैश्यानां शूद्रजन्मनाम्
ब्रह्मचारिगृहस्थानां वानप्रस्थाभिधाजुषाम् ॥ १७६ ॥

४. दण्डिनामवधूतानां सर्वकाशीनिवासिनाम् ।
पण्डितापण्डितानां च परमानन्ददायकः ॥ १७७ ॥

५. ब्रह्मेन्द्रपूर्णेन्द्रयतीन्द्रवृन्दमुख्यैरशेषैरभिनन्द्यमानः ।
यतिः कवीन्द्रोऽस्ति विभासमानः सद्धर्मपुञ्जेन विराजमानः ॥१७८॥

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१. BC. कश्मी°. २. B. गुराशान, A. खुराशान. ३. Emendation. । ABC. °स्तबंक°. ४. AB. °सामाः ५. AB. विकाशयतु.

६. दयाशीलसन्तोषवैराग्यधर्मक्षमादानविज्ञानसिन्धूपमानः[1] ।
परानन्दसन्दोहकन्दं ददानो महीमण्डलेऽसौ कवीन्द्राभिधानः॥१७९॥

७. अमुना कवीन्द्रनाम्ना श्रीब्रह्मेन्द्रस्वाम्यनुगृहीतेन ।
काशीप्रयागकरयोर्मोको लोकोत्तरोऽकारि ॥ १८० ॥

८. यस्य वासेन सर्वस्य वासो भवति निर्भयम् ।
वेदितव्या महीन्द्रेण सर्वेषामत्र संमतिः ॥ १८१ ॥

सकलवाराणसीनिवासिविशिष्टशिष्टकृतं कवीन्द्राष्टकमिदम् ॥

एष प्रवाहः करुणारसस्य १, सन्तरणसेतुः संसारसिन्धोः २, आधारः क्षमाम्भसाम् ३, परशुस्तृष्णालतागहनस्य ४, सागरः सन्तोषामृतस्य ५, उपदेष्टा सिद्धिमार्गस्य ६, अस्तगिरिरसद्गृहस्य ७, मूलमुपशमतरोः ८, नाभिः प्रज्ञाचक्रस्य ९, स्थितिवंशो धर्मध्वजस्य १०, निलयः कलानाम् ११, तीर्थं सर्वविद्यावताराणाम् १२, कुलभवनमाचाराणाम् १३, आयतनं मङ्गलानाम् १४, दर्शकः सत्पथानाम् १५, उत्पत्तिः साधुतायाः १६, नेमिरुत्साहचक्रस्य १७, आश्रयः सत्यस्य १८, प्रतिपक्षः कलिकालस्य १९, कोशस्तपसः २०, सखा सत्यस्य २१, क्षेत्रमार्जवस्य २२, प्रभवः पुण्यसञ्चयस्य २३, अदत्तावकाशो मत्सरस्य २४, दिवसकरो मोहान्धकारस्य २५, अरातिर्विपत्तेः २६, अस्थानं परिभूतेः २७, अननुकूलोऽभिमानस्य २८, असंमतो दैन्यस्य २९, अनायत्तो रोषस्य ३०, अविषयो विषयाणाम् ३१, अनभिमुखः सुखानाम् ३२, निकषोपलः शास्त्ररत्नानाम् ३३, श्रीकवीन्द्रो महेन्द्र इव चिरं जीवतु ३४.

मौनिविश्वेश्वरभट्टानामेताश्चतुस्त्रिंशच्चूर्णिकाः[2] ॥

येनामोचि महीन्द्रदुस्सहकरग्राहाद्धि पुण्यश्रियो
वेणीव प्रचुरप्रमोदनकरी वेणी कलिद्रोहिणा ।
तीर्णः शास्त्रसरित्पतिर्धिषणया नीता परं[4] गौरवं
श्रीमद्धीरकवीन्द्रसाधुपदवी धन्यो हि तादृग्जनः ॥ १८२ ॥

श्रीमहीपत्युपाध्यायानाम् ॥

स्वस्ति श्रीमत्प्रचण्डपाखण्डशङ्कासुरापहृत[5]पापपाथोधिमज्जत्त्रयीधर्मसमुद्धारमत्स्यावतारेषु १ सुविरूढतर्कभावनावशंवदाक्षपाददर्शनविख्यातनिर्वचन-

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१. A B यमानः २. Wanting in A ३. A. °त्रय° । Numbers २६-३० wanting in B. ४. C. पदं. ५. C. °कृत.°

पाटवेषु २ विशदवैशेषिकावेशप्रकाशिताशेषक्षणसंख्याकलनविषमकार्योत्पत्ति-विवेकेषु ३ भगत्पूज्यपादभाष्याकृतसम्भूतबादरायणीयन्यायनिदर्शनविवृतबृह-दारण्यककठवल्लीपैप्पलादकौषीतकिच्छांदोग्याद्युपनिषद्रहस्येषु ४ दृढतराभ्यास-स्फुरज्जैमिनीयविविक्ताशेषमन्त्रब्राह्मणेषु ५ निगमनिरुक्तव्याकरणशिक्षादि-तत्वावगाहनसफलस्वाध्यायेषु ६ वैदिकवासनापरिपूतहृदयोद्भूततर्कभावित-समस्तमानवीयादिधर्मशास्त्रेषु ७ पुराणपरिच्छेदप्रसृमरप्रतिभेषु परितः प्रसृत्वर-सारस्वतप्रतिभानुबन्धबंधुराध्यापनसुभगभावुकाध्ययनेषु ९ गर्गादिमुनिवर-यज्ञशास्त्रशालिदैवज्ञमनोज्ञव्यवहारसांवत्सरजातकासिद्धान्तपाटीबीजव्याख्यान-कौशलेषु १० वात्स्यायनादिशास्त्रसन्देहच्छेदिषु ११ गङ्गाजलप्राञ्जलपातञ्जल-परिशीलनानलसेषु १२ सांख्यसन्तोषितसंख्यावत्सु १३ परमाप्तेषु श्रीसर्वविद्या-निधानकवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीषु ॥ १४ ॥

शिवदत्तमिश्राणामेताश्चतुर्दश प्रशस्त्यानुपूर्व्यः ॥

॥स्वस्ति श्रीमदनवरतपरोपकारनिरतदिगन्तविश्रान्तकीर्त्तिकर्पूरपूरसुरभी-कृतत्रिलोकेषु १ सकलकरमोचकेत्यादिविरुदावलीराजमानेषु २ श्रीसर्वविद्या-निधानकवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीषु ॥

चक्रपाणिपण्डितानाम् ॥

१. या कालिदासादिमहाकवीनां वाणी विलासाज्जरती बभूव ।
सैवेयमानन्दभरेण वाणी कवीन्द्रवक्त्रे नवतामुपैति ॥ १८३ ॥

कविशेखरस्य ॥

१. या विद्या प्रौढविद्याविशदगुणयुता सर्वदा सर्वदात्री
विख्याता या त्रिलोक्यामभिमतमतयः सर्वदा यां स्तुवन्ति ।
सा विद्या प्रौढरूपा विलसति हृदये यस्य नित्यं समन्ता-
त्सोऽयं श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रो जगति विजयते भूसुरेन्द्रैकवन्द्यः ॥१८४॥

२. यद्दानानेकरूपाः सपदि विलिखितक्ष्मातलन्यस्तचित्ताः
प्राप्तानेकाधिमार्गाः सुविहितविहिताचारसन्त्यक्तमार्गाः ।
अस्तीभूताः समस्ताः प्रबलबलभुजो भूभुजो यन्निरस्ताः
सोऽयं जाग्रत्प्रभावो जगति विजयते श्रीकवीन्द्रो यतीन्द्रः ॥१८५॥

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१. A. °सकल°. २. C. °च्छेदप्रशस्तामरप्र°. ३. A. °सुभगं°. ४. C. °क्षी°.

सदाचारचारी सदा श्रीकवीन्द्रो
विचारी सतां सद्गतानां गुणानाम्।
समुद्योततां भास्वदुग्रप्रभाव-
स्वभावोऽखिलानां जनानां विभूत्यै ॥ १८६ ॥

४. सुरेन्द्रैः स्तुतो भूसुरेन्द्रैः प्रगीतः
सदा देवपूजारतिव्याप्रियुक्तः।
भृशं सच्चिदानन्दरूपः कवीन्द्रो
यतीन्द्रो विभातीति लोके महेन्द्रः ॥ १८७ ॥[1]

भूधरपाठकानां चत्वारि ॥

१. आसत्तिमाधुर्यविभङ्गिभाविराकाङ्क्षया योग्यतया प्रसन्ना।
कवीन्द्रवाणीतरुणीदृगेषा केषां न चेतस्तरलीकरोति ॥ १८८ ॥

रघुनाथोपाध्यायानाम् ॥

त्वं विद्याम्बुधिलंघनैकनिरतः सा सप्तवारां निधीन्
धन्या तीर्णवती तनोषि विदुषां त्वं मानसं निर्मलम्।
सा संसारमखण्डितं वितनुते चन्द्रोज्ज्वलं सर्वदा
तज्जानीहि कवीन्द्रधीर भवतः कीर्त्या भवान्निर्जितः ॥ १८९ ॥

२. नूनं शास्त्रसमुद्रोऽयं भवता निर्मलीकृतः।
कवीन्द्र त्वद्यशःसोमोऽपङ्को यस्मात्ततोऽभवत् ॥ १९० ॥

पुनरपि महीपत्युपाध्यायानां पद्यद्वयम् ॥

१. नीचीकृत्य मुकुन्दभक्तिनिचयैः षड्वैष्णवाहंकृतिं[2]
श्रीमद्धन्यकवीन्द्र दानविधिना निर्जित्य भूमीभुजः।
पादैकेन धरावलंबनविधौ खिन्नस्य मन्यामहे
धर्मस्येह करावलंबलगुडीभूतो भवान् वर्तते ॥ १९१ ॥

कविशेखरस्य ॥

१. कलौ युगे किलायाते धर्मोध्वंसे[3]ध्रुवं दधौ[4]।
कवीन्द्ररूपो भगवानाविर्भूतः स्वयं विभुः ॥ १९२ ॥

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१. Verses १८४-८७ are wanting in A, but found in C. २. C. °र्ती. ३. C. °सं. ४. C. दधे.

१. अम्भोऽधितनयाम्भोजवासदम्भोपशान्तये ।
कवीन्द्रवदनाम्भोजे वसति स्म सरस्वती ॥ १९६ ॥

२. न्यायज्ञोऽपि न संशयं छलमपि प्रायो न वेत्सि क्वचित्
मीमांसाविहितादरोऽपि न परं जानासि मन्युक्रमम् ।
वेदान्तकविचारकोऽपि मनुषे नो निर्गुणं सर्वतो
दण्डं मोचयसीह दण्डभृदपि श्रीमत्कवीन्द्र प्रभो ॥ १९७ ॥

तैलङ्गवैकुण्ठभट्टानामेतौ ॥

१. कल्पान्तःकरणप्रकाशकरणज्ञप्त्याचितश्रीपते-
र्ज्ञानाकारनिरूपणप्रकरणाकर्ण्यस्य[1] पूर्णाकृतेः ।
स्वाज्ञानाभयदानुभूतिविबुधारब्धप्रसादोन्मुख-
क्रीडादेववरस्य दर्शनमिदं भूत्यै कवीन्द्रस्य ते ॥ १९८ ॥

२. सदलंकारविख्यातं सदागतिजनोदितम् ।
रससेतुपदानन्दं कवीन्द्रं राघवं भजे ॥ १९९ ॥

भानभट्टानामेतौ

क्वचिद्बुद्धिगर्वः क्वचिच्छुद्धिगर्वः क्वचिच्छ्रीविगर्वः क्वचिद्बन्धुगर्वः ।
ममेत्थं मनोवृत्तयो गर्वगर्ते भ्रमित्वा महान्तं कवीन्द्रं भजन्ते[2] ॥२००॥

कस्यापि

१. दीनद्विजातिदारुणदुःखावालिदारुदारणे दृप्ता ।
वाणी सरसकृपाणी विलसति वाणी कवीन्द्रस्य ॥ २०१ ॥

व्रजभूषणकवेः ॥

१. आन्वीक्षिक्यच्छरत्नावलिविलित(विहित?)परीक्षाक्षमस्त्वं क्षमायां
मीमांसारण्यपञ्चाननफणिभणिताम्भोधिकुम्भोद्भवश्रीः ।
सांख्यप्रख्यातपातञ्जलकुमुदवनीचन्द्र वैशेषिकज्ञ
स्वाध्यायाध्यापकाद्य द्युमणिरिव समुद्द्योतसे श्रीकवीन्द्र ॥२०२॥

२. भट्टो भट्टनये गुरुर्गुरुनये श्रीशङ्करः शाङ्करे
काणादे च कणाद एव मनुतामाप्तो मते मानवे ।
साहित्ये भरतः पतञ्जलिमुनिः पातञ्जले गौतम-
स्तर्के व्याकरणे च पाणिनिरसौ श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रः कृती ॥ २०३ ॥

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१. B. °र्णं°. २. C. भजेहम् । Verses 198–200 wanting in B.

३. काणादे कणभुक् पतञ्जलिमुनिः पातञ्जले प्राञ्जले
सांख्ये संख्यविशेषभाजि कपिलो व्याख्यातृमुख्याधिपः।
श्रीव्यासोऽप्यथ चैष जैमिनिमुनिर्वेदान्तमीमांसयो-
स्तर्के गौतम एव केवलमसौ श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रो यतिः॥ २०४॥

केषांचित् पद्यत्रयम्॥

१. नित्यानन्दतिदाभदर्शनदयादेवस्य भद्रकते[1]
क्षुद्राहंकृतिमुद्रणप्रमितये प्रज्ञानमुद्रादरन्।
रूपं यस्य निरूपमानकवनोपाख्यानमुख्याकृते-
रेकाद्य प्रतिपाद्यसाधनमनानन्दैः कवीन्द्रप्रभो (?)॥ २०५॥

भानभट्टानाम्।

१. श्रीकवीन्द्रयशो भाति सर्वोपरि निरन्तरम्।
दानशक्त्या हरेर्भक्त्या धर्मशक्त्या च केवलम्॥ २०६॥

गङ्गाराममिश्राणाम्॥

॥ स्वस्ति श्रीमत्संजातस्वसंवेद्यापरोक्षनिरतिशयानन्दसाक्षात्कारान् १ अगणितगुणग्रामाभिरामान् २ वचनरचनाचमत्काराविष्कारनिराकृतप्रखरमुखरवादिवृन्दान् ३ अनवद्यगद्यपद्याद्यनेकविद्याविनोदितसकलसहृदयहृदयान् ४ पाखण्डपलाल[2]खण्डाच्छादितवेदशेवधिप्रकाशनप्रज्वलितशास्त्रज्वलनज्वालान् ५ यज्ञपुरुषोपासनपरायणानपि नयज्ञपुरुषोपासनपरायणान् ६ जगत्सु समदर्शनसेवनप्रसितानर्थे[3] समदर्शनसेवनप्रसितान् ७ हितोपदेशकुशलानपि विहितोपदेशकुशलान् ८ सज्जनासज्जनानुग्रहनिग्रहसंगृहीतधर्मसङ्ग्रहान् ९ दिगङ्गनावतंसीकृतयशःकुसुमोपचयान् १० करीन्द्रमोक्षवन्महाकरविमोचनपरिगृहीतश्रीभगवत्स्वरूपान् ११ श्रीसार्वभौमसंमानितान् १२ श्रीसर्वविद्यानिधानकवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीश्रीपादान् १३ वाराणसीवासिनः संन्यासिपण्डितमहाजनप्रभृतयः समस्तजना यथोचितकलिताञ्जलिपुटा अष्टाङ्गीस्पृष्टभूमयश्चाशीराशीन्प्रणामांश्च निवेदयन्तो विज्ञापयन्ति॥ १४॥

१. स्वयमिह सुदृशां सभासु केचिन्निजपुरुषार्थविधिं नु वर्णयन्तु।
करटिकपाटपाटनेन प्रकटितपाटव एक एव सिंहः॥ २०७॥

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1. Emend. भद्राकृतेः। 2. B. पाखण्डादिपलाल; 3. C. प्रमितान् for प्रसितान्; C. omits प्रसितानर्थसमदर्शनसेवन (haplography);

२. तीक्ष्णतुण्डाः श्लक्ष्णदण्डा रागिणः पक्षपातिनः ।
त्वां विनाऽन्ये तु यतयो विशिखा एव केवलम् ॥ २०८ ॥

काशीस्थसंन्यासि[1]पण्डितानां पत्रमदः ॥

॥ स्वस्ति श्रीपुरुषोत्तमप्रभाप्रभावोज्ज्वलबलवदाखण्डलकुलमण्डनपाण्डवदोर्दण्डखाण्डवदाहताण्डवगाण्डीवातिचण्डकोदण्डा[2]कुण्डकुण्डमण्डितभुजदण्डमण्डलाधी[3]शमौलिमण्डनरुचिररत्नचयकिरणानुल्लंघितप्रभाप्रवाहमणिनिवहोज्ज्वलचरणपीठमहीमहेन्द्रोदितमहेन्द्रगुरुगौरवेषु १ न्यायादिनिखिलशास्त्रावगमानुपहततत्त्वावगमविदिताखिलवेदान्तोदन्तप्रशान्तचित्तेषु २ नवर[4]सकलितकोमलपदन्यासोत्तमानुबन्धविशकलि[5]तकालिदासकवित्वललिततत्त्वे[6]षु ३ दिननाथेष्विवोदयाभिभूतदोषाकरेषु ४ न कैरवमानितेषु ५ द्विजराजेष्विव स्वकरासङ्गविनिमीलितपङ्कजकुलेषु ६ तीर्थराजेष्विव दृष्टादृष्टाभिलाषपरिपूरकेषु ७ ब्रह्मस्वरूपेष्विव ध्यानोपनीतनिखिलानन्देषु ८ श्रीसर्वविद्यानिधानकवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीजगदुज्ज्वलचरितेषु ९ ॥

जगन्नाथपञ्चाननभट्टाचार्याणां पत्रमदः

१. टीकाकारोऽपि नारोहति तव तुलनां खण्डनो मण्डनो वा
गङ्गेशो बुद्धिलेशोपहतमतिरणुर्वर्द्धमानोर्द्धमानः ।
देवाचार्यो विचार्यो भवति भुवि पुनः शेषनागोऽपि तादृक्
धीरश्रीमत्कवीन्द्र त्रिभुवनवलये कः समस्ते समस्ते ॥ २०९ ॥
२. यवनकरग्रहदुःखात् पुररिपुवनिता विमोचिता काशी ।
सुकृतेन तेन मन्ये कवीन्द्र भवतः समः कोऽस्ति ॥ २१० ॥

मैथिलकायस्थस्य ॥

१. सुधा भवति सा मुधा मधुकथा वृथा जायते
मदालसमरालिनीरवमदोऽपि मन्दोद्यमः ।

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१. A and C. omit °संन्यासि; २. B °ण्डकाण्डकुण्डलन°. ३. B °भुजदण्डली°
४. AC add the following before नवरसः– " पुरुहूतपुरोहितोत्तमविपक्षलक्षक्षणविक्षोभशिष्यसन्तानमहोपाध्यायाध्यापन (C पित) कौशल ५. C °विकलित°
६. AC °ललिततत्त्वकवत्वेषु for °ललित°.

रसालफलजो रसो विफलतां तदालम्बते
कवीन्द्र भवतो यदा वचनमेतदाकर्ण्यते ॥ २११ ॥

गुर्जरस्य कस्यचित् ॥

१. वृथा मधुकथाप्रथा प्रवितथा तथा गोस्तनी
तरुण्यधरमाधुरी भवति साधुरीतिर्न हि ।
सुधापि वसुधातले भवति सा मुधा भो[1] बुधाः
कवीन्द्रकविता यदा कविवरैः समाकर्ण्यते ॥ २१२ ॥

स्वामिन एव ॥

१. वेदान्ते व्यासरूपं विमलरसमये भार्गवं काव्यकल्पे
जल्पे[2]ऽनल्पेऽक्षपादं परमतदलनायालमीशानसूनुम् ।
आशीर्वादे वासिष्ठं यतिवरममितध्वान्तनिध्वंसभानुं
दिल्लीशानन्दसानुं पशुपतिपुरपं श्रीकवीन्द्रं नमामि ॥ २१३ ॥
२. गृहे गृहे वै गुरवोऽत्र सन्ति पदे पदे गोत्रभिदो भवन्ति ।
कवीन्द्र साम्यं दिव एतदेव भूमण्डले कल्पतरुस्त्वमेव ॥ २१४ ॥
३. यद्रोमकूपेषु हि सावकाशं सहस्रशोऽण्डानि परिभ्रमन्ति ।
त्वच्चित्तदेशं स समाश्रितोऽस्ति कवीन्द्र कस्ते समतामुपैति ॥२१५॥
४. दिक्कालयोर्व्योम्नि तथात्मपुञ्जे यद्वैभवं वाचनिकं तदस्ति ।
प्रत्यक्षगम्यं तु भवत्प्रभुत्वं कवीन्द्र ! दिल्लीपतिपूज्यपाद ! ॥२१६॥
५. यत्तत्वमस्याद्युपदेशवाक्यं ब्रह्माहमस्मि व्यवसायवाक्च ।
लक्ष्यं तयोरस्ति यदात्मतत्त्वं तत्त्वं कवीन्द्रेति वयं प्रतीमः ॥२१७॥
६. अज्ञानतश्चावरणं त्वभानं ततश्च विक्षेप उदेति पुंसाम् ।
स्वरूपभासादपबोधनाशे यश्चापवादः स भवान् कवीन्द्र ॥ २१८ ॥
७. कवीन्द्र विज्ञप्तिरियं मदीया विश्वोपकाराय हि वाक्त्वदीया ।
विश्वोपकारैकनिधे यतीन्द्र कचित्कचिन्मामपि संस्मर त्वम् ॥२१९॥

दयालुमिश्राणां सप्त पद्यानि

स्वस्ति समस्तसामन्तसीमन्तिनीसिन्दूरपूरास्ताचलनिष्कृपकृपाणधारा-वलुप्तदृप्तमेदिनीपतिमण्डलीमण्डितचण्डीशमूर्त्तिसहीमण्डलबलवदखिलखले[3]दलन-

१. C नो. २. C transposes नल्पे and जल्पे. ३. AC om. °खल°.
३ क.

लीलाखण्डलनिखिलधरातलाखण्डलश्रीमच्चक्रवर्त्तिपरोपकारमात्रनिदानसेवन-सावधानेषु १ अनवरतप्रतन्यमानमहादानसन्तानसन्तोषितोर्वीसुपर्वप्रणीताशीर्वादमोदमानमानसयशोराजहंसोल्लासलीलानिवासमानसामन्दमन्दरगिरिपरिक्षुभितक्षीराब्धिमध्योल्लसल्लोलकल्लोलविमलसूक्तिमुक्ताफलकलापालंकृतकण्ठनालानेककलाविलासोपहसितासितकमलकलानिधिनिरवद्यसद्विद्यानवद्याश्रयपयोराशिषु विहितकरमोचनेष्वपि दत्तसमस्तजनकरावलम्बेषु २ क्षीरोदतनयासूयापरमुखकमलनिवसत्सरस्वतीषु ३ श्रीसर्वविद्यानिधानकवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीषु ॥ ४ ॥

विश्वेश्वरभट्टानाम्

स्वस्ति श्रीमत्समस्तप्रशस्तिरत्नावलीनदराजपूरेषु १ परितः प्रसृत्वरसारस्वतप्रतिभानुबन्धकोरकितकविताकलावतीकर्णपूरकमलमकरन्दसन्दोहसूक्तिषु २ शारदशर्वरीदयितगर्वसर्वंकषकीर्त्तिकल्लोलिनीपूरप्रक्षालितनिखिलाशामत्तकाशिनीवदनमण्डलेषु ३ स्वमात्रवृत्तिधर्मावच्छिन्नयावद्दोषाभावव्यक्तिकूटाधिकरणताकेषु ४ यावद्गुणाधिकरणतावच्छेदकस्वमात्रवृत्तिधर्मेषु ५ विविधतर्ककर्कशोक्तिनिरस्ताखिलनास्तिकराद्धान्तदर्शिताक्षपादपर्यायभावेषु ६ विषमतरन्यायनिकरदर्शितानेकवचनव्यक्तिनिर्णयपरिनिष्ठाविवृताखिलप्रवचनप्रवर्त्तितविविधाध्वरनिर्वृताखिलान्तर्वाणिनिर्णीतजैमिनिमूर्त्तिप्रतिनिधानेषु ७ निरन्तरविक्रियमाणबादरायणदर्शनदर्शितानेकोपनिषद्रहस्यपरिशीलितानेकदहराद्युपासनाभ्याससमासादितपरमतत्त्वनानापाराशरिपरिचर्यमाणचरणेषु ८ परिच्छिन्नपुरुषप्रधानपरिशुद्धसत्त्वानेकान्तेवासिनिश्चितकपिलासुरिपंचशिखादिसिद्धान्तेषु ९ विदितसंप्रज्ञातासंप्रज्ञातसमाधिनिर्द्धूताखिलकषायमानसनानामस्करिकमलभास्करेषु १० पिठरपीलुपरिमर्शपरिभाव्यमाननानाक्षणगणानुबद्धकाणादवादबहुतरवटुपरिसेव्यमानेषु ११ सततप्रदर्शितविविधविरिञ्च(?)कालपुरुषवचनोपग्रहसुपतिङ्विभागपरिकल्पिताखिलशब्दाकूपारपरब्रह्माभिनिवेशशंसितदाक्षीतनयतत्त्वेषु १२ अर्थ-

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१. B om. °खण्डल° to °निदान°. २. B °खण्डलेषु for °सावधानेषु. ३. C om. °परि°. ४. AC om. °ल्लोल.° ५. C om. °सूक्ति.° ६. C वीरे° for विश्वे° ७. C adds °बहुतर° again. ८. C. °बटु. ९. Shall we read विरुद्ध ?

प्रकृतिपञ्चकोत्क्षेपादिचतुःषष्टिमुखादिपञ्चकपरिशुद्धरूपकोपरूपकविरचनादि[1][2]-विदितकविताविभवेषु १३ स्वरविवृतिपूर्वाङ्गपराङ्गभावाद्याविःकरणविज्ञाताखिल-प्रातिशाख्यसारेषु १४ निरन्तरपरिशोधितशुद्धकूटादिकाकल्यन्तरांशग्रहादिस्वर-तत्त्वदेशीमार्गादितालावलिधुतविधुतादिनृत्तभेदविवृतिविवृतभरतावतारेषु १५ श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीसर्वविद्यानिधानकवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीषु निरन्त-राज्ञाकारिणः कमलनयनदीक्षितस्य नारायणोपनिबन्धपूर्विकाः प्रणतयः ॥

किं च ॥

१. येनाखिलस्य जगतो हि करग्रहाणा-
मुन्मोचने विरचिता न मनागुपेक्षा ।
तेनैककस्य वपुषा नियतस्य भूमी-
देवस्य मोचनविधौ कथमित्युदास्यम्[3] ॥ २२० ॥

श्री[4]कमलनयनदीक्षितानाम् ॥

स्वस्ति श्रीमत्सकललोकहितविहितावतारत्रिजगन्मण्डलायमानगुण-ग्रामाभिरामदिल्लीश्वरविश्रामधामसमासादितसर्वकामकमनीयमूर्त्तिषु १ श्रीसर्व-विद्यानिधानकवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीषु ॥

परमेश्वराचार्याणाम्[6]

स्वस्ति श्रीमदगण्यपुण्यविराजमानविविधगुणगणोदारलसदमन्दपाण्डित्य-तिरस्कृतानेकवादीन्द्रवृन्दवशीकृतसुरत्राणसद्गोष्ठीकनिष्ठीकृतानेकसुरपतिसमा-नसामन्तमण्डलोपार्जिताखण्डकीर्त्तिधवलिमधवलिताशेषभुवनविस्तरेषु १ श्रीसर्व-विद्यानिधानकवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीषु ॥

१. यदुक्तं भवद्भिः परिव्राजकेन्द्रैः कवीन्द्रैर्मुनीन्द्रै रहस्यादरेण ।
विधेयं तदेव प्रभुं चिन्तयित्वा यथा शं भवेज्जीवतामाशु भूमौ ॥ २२१ ॥

ब्रह्मगिरेः

१. गीयन्ते कीर्त्तयस्ते विविधमतियुतैः पण्डितैः सत्सभायां
शुद्धानन्दस्वरूपो निखिलगुणनिधिर्ज्ञानकारुण्यसिन्धुः ।

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१. B. om. अर्धप्रकृति to पञ्चक. २. A. विरचनाविदित. ३. B. कथमप्यु°. ४. B. om. श्री. ५. AC मण्डलमण्डनाय. ६. C om. कवीन्द्राचार्य to परमेश्वराचार्याणां. ७. BC om the whole portion from स्वस्ति to भूमौ.

विद्वद्वृन्दाभिवन्द्यः सुरगुरुसदृशः पुण्यलावण्ययुक्तः
श्रीमान्धीमान्कवीन्द्रो जयति परमुदे प्रत्यहं द्वारि साहेः ॥ २२२ ॥

२. काश्यां श्रीकोशलायां परममतियुताः पुष्करे नैमिषेये
कान्त्यां श्रीकामरूपे प्रविहिततपसस्सेतुबन्धे प्रयागे ।
ब्रह्मज्ञानावलीढा विदितगुणवरा द्वारवत्यां प्रमोदै-
स्ते ते ध्यायन्ति शश्वद्विबुधगणनुतं श्रीयतीन्द्रं कवीन्द्रम्[1] ॥ २२३ ॥

त्वरितकविरायस्य ॥

१. खद्योता मिहिरन्ति यर्हि सहसा सिंहन्ति शालावृकाः
कर्पूरन्ति रसोनकन्दशकला वेदन्ति मिथ्या गिरः ।
चक्रांगन्ति बका द्विपन्ति महिषाः शेषन्ति वा राजिला
ग्रावाणो मणयन्ति तर्हि यतयः श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रंत्यपि ॥ २२४ ॥

२. यशसामन्यनृपाणां धान्यं वारां यथोपरि प्रायः ॥
जगति तथैव यशस्ते जयति समस्ते कवीन्द्र कुन्दाभम् ॥ २२५[2] ॥

रामभद्रवाजपेयिनाम्

१. त्वद्दामोद्दामनीरोद्भवसलिलनिधिस्त्वद्यशस्ताम्रपर्णी-
सम्पाते भासमेते दिनकरहिमगुद्रंद्वपेशीपुटे यत् ।
मुक्तं त्वद्वैरिनारीनयनजलधरैरम्बु तस्मात्ततस्तां[3]-
स्तारा मुक्तास्तु तारा इति जगति धियं तन्वते श्रीकवीन्द्र ॥२२६॥

मौनीरङ्गनाथभट्टानाम्[4]

१. After v. 223; AC add the following verse:—
कर्पूराभा कराभा कृतकलितकला कामदा कान्तियुक्ता
कार्णाटे कल्पवल्ली सितकमलरुचिः काशभासा प्रकाशा ।
काम्या कल्याणदा संकलयति कलितं कर्म कैवल्यजातं
कैलासे का समाना कलिकलुषहरा श्रीकवीन्द्रस्य कीर्तिः ॥

२. AC give the following verse instead of verse 225:—
प्राचामिव कविवाचां धान्यं वारामुपर्युपर्येव ।
जगति कवीन्द्र यशस्ते गौरं गुरुमत्र मौनयति ॥ cf. verse 227

३. C तस्मात्त जाता. ४. B om मौनीरङ्गनाथभट्टानाम्.

१. मुक्तास्तु तारा इति जवा(?)न्धान्यं वारामुप र्येव ।
जगति कवीन्द्र यशस्ते गौरं गुरुमत्र मौनयति ॥ २२७ ॥
२. कविकुमुदवनीविकासशाली निजमहसा सहसार्यपूरिताशः ।
परिचितपरविष्णुपत्कलावान् स जयति कोऽपि[1] कवीन्द्र एष चन्द्रः२२८
३. यज्ज्योत्स्नाप्रसरेण भाति जगती कृत्स्नापि विष्वक् परम्
वारंवारमहो महोदधिजया धारेयमित्यद्भुता ।
प्रेम्णा संप्रति साधुसंसदि वरस्यास्तां तवार्याधिकम्
श्रीमन् धीरकवीन्द्र संप्रति पदं ज्वालामुखी संमुखी ॥ २२९ ॥
४. पद्माश्रयः सततशोणतरङ्गरेखाराजीभिरंचिततलः किल विद्रुमाभः ।
सुत्रामतापपरिपालितसर्वगोत्रः संपत्करस्तव कवीन्द्र करः समुद्रः ॥२३०॥
५. मोदस्वारं धरायां प्रविततसुयशाः सर्वसंपत्तिधूर्भूः
श्रीमान् धीमान् गुणाढ्यः परजितविषयः कौतुकी साहसी त्वम् ।
नित्यं प्रीतः प्रसन्नास्त्रिपुरहरगतिः शर्मदः शौर्यवृत्ति-
श्चित्रैः स्तोत्रैः पवित्रैः सुकृतकृतमतिर्वत्सरान् भूरिशः सन् ॥ २३१ ॥

स्रग्धरेयम् । अत्र प्रतिचरणं शरर्तुहयवसुवर्णान् विहाय मन्दाक्रान्त भवति । यथा ।

६. मोदस्वारं विततसुयशाः सर्वसंपत्तिधूर्भूः
श्रीमान् धीमान् रजितविषयः कौतुकी साहसी त्वम् ।
नित्यं प्रीतः पुरहरगतिः शर्मदः शौर्यवृत्ति-
श्चित्रैः स्तोत्रैः कृतकृतमतिर्वत्सरान् भूरिशः सन् ॥ २३२ ॥

शरादारभ्येन्द्रपर्यन्तान् वर्णान् विहाय शालिनी भवति । यथा ।

७. मोदस्वारं सर्वसंपत्तिधूर्भूः
श्रीमान् धीमान् कौतुकी साहसी त्वम् ।
नित्यं प्रीतः शर्मदः शौर्यवृत्ति-
श्चित्रैः स्तोत्रैर्वत्सरान् भूरिशः सन् ॥ २३३ ॥

शरर्तुशैलाक्षरत्रयं पंचदशात्पादान्तपर्यन्तानि चाक्षराणि विहाय भ्रमर-विलसितं भवति । यथा ।

1. C धीर for कोऽपि.

८. मोदस्वारं प्रविततसुयशाः श्रीमान् धीमान् परजितविषयः।
नित्यं प्रीतस्त्रिपुरहरगतिश्चित्रैः स्तोत्रैः सुकृतकृतमतिः ॥ २३४ ॥

शरर्तुहयवसुवर्णान्विहाय पञ्चदशादीनन्तपर्यन्तांश्च वर्णान् विहाय हंसी भवति । यथा ।

९. मोदस्वारं विततसुयशाः श्रीमान् धीमान् रजितविषयः ।
नित्यं प्रीतः पुरहरगतिश्चित्रैः स्तोत्रैः कृतकृतमतिः ॥ २३५ ॥

आद्याक्षरचतुष्टयमात्रमादाय कन्या भवति । यथा ।

१०. मोदस्वारं श्रीमान् धीमान् । नित्यं प्रीताश्चित्रैः स्तोत्रैः ॥ २३६ ।

पञ्चषट्सप्ताक्षरत्रयमादाय मध्या भवति ।

११. धरायां गुणाढ्यः । प्रसन्नः पवित्रैः ॥ २३७ ॥

अष्टमाद्यक्षरसप्तकमादाय मधुमान् भवति । यथा ।

१२. प्रविततसुयशाः परजितविषयः ।
त्रिपुरहरगतिः सुकृतकृतमतिः ॥ २३८ ॥

पञ्चदशाद्यक्षरषट्कमादाय गायत्री भवति । यथा ।

१३. सर्वसंपत्तिधूः कौतुकी साहसी ।
शर्मदः शौर्यवृत् वत्सरान् भूरिशः ॥ २३९ ॥

अन्तिमाक्षरमात्रमादाय श्रीर्भवति । यथा ।

१४. भूस्त्वन्तिः सन् ॥ २४० ॥[1]

प्रथमाक्षरद्वयं गृहीत्वा स्त्रीछन्दो भवति । यथा ।

१५. मोदश्रीमान् । नित्यं चित्रः ॥ २४१ ॥

तृतीयचतुर्थाभ्यां सैव भवति । यथा ।

१६. स्वारं धीमान् । प्रीतः स्तोत्रैः ॥ २४२ ॥

नवमादिषड्भिरक्षरैर्नगणसगणाभ्यां गायत्री भवति । यथा ।

१७. विततसुयशा रजितविषयः ।
पुरहरगतिः कृतकृतमतिः ॥ २४३ ॥

पञ्चदशादित्रयेणाष्टादशादित्रयेण च प्रत्येकं रगणेन मृगी भवति । यथा

१८. सर्वसंकौतुकी । शर्मदो वत्सरान् ।
पत्तिधूः साहसी । शौर्यवृद्भूरिशः ॥ २४४ ॥

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१. BC om. सर्वसंपत्ति to सन्.

अष्टमाक्षरादि गृहीत्वान्त्यमक्षरं विहायातिजगती भवति। यथा।

१९. प्रविततसुयशाः सर्वसंपत्तिधूः
परजितविषयः कौतुकी साहसी।
त्रिपुरहरगतिः शर्मदः शौर्यभृत्
सुकृतकृतमतिर्वत्सरान् भूरिशः ॥ २४५ ॥

तृतीयादा सप्तमं नवमदशमाभ्यां च पञ्चदशाद्यक्षरत्रयेणान्तिमेनचेन्द्रवज्रा भवति। यथा।

२०. स्वारंधरायां वितसर्वसंभूर्धीमान् गुणाढ्यो रजिकौतुकी त्वम्।
प्रीतः प्रसन्नः पुरशर्मदोति स्तोत्रैः पवित्रैः कृतवत्सरान् सन्॥२४६॥

प्रथमे आद्याक्षरचतुष्टयं गृहीत्वा सप्तदशान्त्याक्षरद्वयं च गृहीत्वा द्वितीये पादे[1] चाद्याक्षरादासप्त तथान्त्यं च गृहीत्वा तृतीये चाद्याक्षरचतुष्टयं गृहीत्वा[2] तथाष्टादशोपान्त्याक्षरद्वयं च गृहीत्वा चतुर्थे चाद्यादासप्त तथान्त्यं च गृहीत्वा आर्यागीतिर्भवति। यथा।

२१. मोदस्वारं स भूः श्रीमान् धीमान् गुणाढ्यस्त्वम्।
नित्यं प्रीतः शौर्यभृत् चित्रैः स्तोत्रैः पवित्रैः सन् ॥ २४७ ॥

२३. शशौ शूरभूवह्निर्मामाररिर्वः शगं वा विगौजीवरीयद्युगाक्रः।
पदाद्यन्तवर्णद्वयाहूयमानं सुखायास्तु तद्दैवतं श्रीकवीन्द्र ॥ २४८ ॥

२४. उदयाचलचरमाचलकूटद्वयसङ्गतायामा।
विधिनान्वबन्धि[3] धवला वन्दन[4]माला कवीन्द्र कीर्तिस्ते ॥ २४९ ॥

२५. हारं न तारं कलये न हारं दैवादगारं[5] न च हारसारम्।
साहारमीषद्भवतः[6] सहारं हारं पुरं प्राप्य परं विहारम् ॥ २५० ॥

२६. तन्द्रालु का दिसतसे भवदीय मुद्रा
कां यां न ये कविवरा दिनरात्रि निद्रा।
सांगेन तूज निजगूज महीमहेन्द्रा
देणें असे मज शतद्वय रौप्यमुद्रा ॥ २५१ ॥

२७. पर्याय हा होय सुरद्रुमाचा द्वितीय किंवा सुरभिप्रथेचा।
विकल्प नेणो अमरामणीचा कवीन्द्र मी वर्णिन कीर्तिवाचा ॥२५२॥

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१. C. om. पादे. २. AC. om. गृहीत्वा. ३. C विद्यानुबन्धि, A °न्नबन्धि. ४. C चन्दन° for वन्दन°. ५. C दैवाद°. ६. C °मेतद्भवतः.

२८. दानीं कल्परुहासमान दिसतो जो भासतो[१] सर्वदा
धैर्यं सागर हाचि शौर्यविभवें राधेय वाचें वदा ।
बुद्धीनें दुसरा बृहस्पति खरा रूपें स्मरातें स्मरा
काव्यालापकलाकलापवचनीं श्रीभोज हा आदरा ॥ २५३ ॥

२९. सलिलनिधि कृपेचा नामधारी त्रपेचा
जनककवि गयेचा बाधतो येक येचा[२] (?) ।
मुकुटमणि सभेचा मार्गकृत्सौरभेचा[३]
अति मधुर जिभेचा दुःकवीन्द्र प्रभेचा ॥ २५४ ॥

३०. तुजविण मज पाहे कोण आहे कवीन्द्रा
प्रभुवर दुसरा या भूतला कीर्तिचन्द्रा ।
त्यजुनि[४] कविकुलाच्या पोषणी दूरि तन्द्रा[५]
विभवजितमहेन्द्रासक्त होई सुभद्रा ॥ २५५ ॥

३१. श्रीकामधेनु जगतीवरि आजि आली
किंवा स्वयें त्रिदशनायक भूरुहाली ।
कीं मागुती प्रकटली नृपभोजमाया
श्रीमत्कवीन्द्र सकलां कविला पुसाया ॥ २५६ ॥

३२. तूझ्यानि साम्ये प्रभु कोण आहे
जो पंडितांची बहु दाटि साहे ।
स्वानंदसंपूर्ण कवीन्द्र राहे
आत्मीयभावें मजलागि पाहे ॥ २५७ ॥

३३. घनधनवसनांतें पण्डितांलागि देसी
अतिचतुरकलावान् कीर्त्ति हे सर्व देसी ।
सकलजनविसांवा धैर्यपाथोधि होसी
म्हणउनि कविला या श्रीकवीन्द्रार्य पोंसी ॥ २५८ ॥

३४. अति चतुर कलाचा जाणता कोण मानी
अभिनवनगरीं या नांदतो कर्ण दानीं ।

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१. C °विश्ये. २. C बाधते येक पेचा. ३. C °भा°. ४. C सजुनि. ५. C °चंद्रा for °तंद्रा.

कविवर पुसतों मी आदरें सांग कानीं
यतितिलककवीन्द्रालागि गाईन गानीं ॥ २५९ ॥

३५. पीयूषद्रवसारिणीव सुमनःसौहित्रसंवर्द्धिनी
स्वास्थानीव कलाकुलस्य सरसा कल्याणकल्लोलिनी ।
नीवृद्वंद्यकवीन्द्रभूपपरिषच्चेतश्चमत्कारिणी
वाणीयं सुमते त्वदीयवदनांभोजात्समुज्जृंभते ॥ २६० ॥

३६. देतसे कविवरासिं मोहरा जो असे प्रभुवरात मोहरा ।
तेजसा सम दिसे[1] तमोहरा तो वसे[2] सुखपदी मनोहरा[3] ॥२६१॥

३७. प्रतापतपनः परं निलयनं कलानामयम्
प्रचण्डवरपण्डितप्रकरलक्षदाता स्वयम् ।
जयन्तजनकाद्वयं समुपगम्य पुण्यालयः
क्षितीन्द्र तिलकीकृतो विजयते कवीन्द्रः कृती ॥ २६२ ॥
यश्च ।

पुण्यवतामधिवासो वासव इव वसुधामवतीर्णः । सदवधिर्धैर्यस्य[4] । परिधिः शर्मणाम् । शेवधिः कविसमुदायस्य । आधिर्विरोधिवर्गस्य । व्याधिरविद्यायाः । विततोपाधिः । दूरीकृतोपधिश्च । भानुरिव प्रवर्त्तितविमानप्रसरः । संवर्द्धितविविधसन्निधिः श्रुतिमार्गाविरोधी । सिन्धुः शौर्यस्य । अन्धुः साधुतायाः । बन्धुर्विद्वद्वृन्दस्य । सीमा सौजन्यस्य । विश्रान्तिस्तितिक्षायाः । आरामो रामणीयकस्य । धाम धर्मस्य । मर्म सत्कर्मणाम् । निलयनं[5] कलाकलापस्य । आलवालं वादि[6]सबलतायाः । प्रासादः सदाराधनस्य । उपधानं विमलकमलायाः । विपणिरगण्य[7]गुणगणमणीनाम् । पद्या सद्विद्यायाः । आदर्शः सर्वशास्त्राणाम् । शृणिरुन्मत्तद्विपानाम् । पत्तनं सत्यजातस्य । पथ्यं स्वस्त्ययनस्य । मूलं श्रुतिकलस्य । घण्टापथः पटुतायाः । शृङ्गारर्कः[8] शृङ्गाररसस्य । वरुणालयः करुणायाः । तत्त्वं[9] सत्त्वगुणस्य । कान्तारं कुबुद्धीनाम् । मरुः पापपयसः । पात्री मैत्रीकरण[10]स्य । आलोको

१. AC ते जनासमा°. २. AC वसो. ३. C नमो° for मनो°. ४. Emendation Mss read सदवधि धैर्यस्य. ५. A निलयं for निलयनं. ६. C व्याधि° for वादि°. ७. B °रगणाप° for °रगण्य°. ८. AC °पथः. ९. AC सत्त्वं. १०. AC करू°(c६)णस्य.

लौकायतिकस्य[1]। निदर्शनं दर्शनीयतायाः। ज्वलनकीला द्विषद्दैन्योपलस्य[2]। परशुः परवेदनाकाननस्य। आलानं मानमतङ्गजस्य[3]। उपदेशकः परोपकारस्य। प्रवर्त्तकः सत्रचित्रस्य। मार्गोपदेष्टा शिष्टाचारस्य[4]। आधारः संधाबन्धस्य। केदारः प्रमोदानाम्। सार्थः परमार्थानाम्। ग्रन्थिरतिथिपुरस्कारस्य। संवर्त्तः शत्रुवार्त्तस्य। ऊषरं खलतालतायाः। कपाटं कपटाचरणस्य[5]। वाटपाटच्चरः (?) शरणागताधीनाम्। निधानं सर्वमन्त्राणाम्। निदानं सर्वसंपत्तीनाम्। जेता सकलविनेतानियमस्य[6]। केतुर्विनयस्य। सेतुः कीर्तिपूर्तस्य। अहेतुः कोदण्डपाण्डित्यस्य। दानुः[7] सर्ववर्णानाम्[8]। चित्रभानुः शात्रवान्धाकाराणाम्। दिग्विलासिनीकर्णपूरीकृतकीर्त्तिपल्लवोऽपि निवारितनिजाश्रितविपल्लवः। बल्लवबालक इव विश्वपालको ध्वंसितकंसश्च। शूर इव सद्वृत्तरसः। हरिरिव प्रतीतविक्रमः। घन इव प्रसारितापः। भागीरथीप्रवाह इवास्खलितगतिः पावनश्च। परिवादरतोऽपि परिवादपराचीनचेतोवृत्तिः सुभाषितव्यसनी। भास्वानप्यपरोपतापी। पुण्याचलोऽप्यस्तम्भी[9]। पुण्यसान्द्रः संवर्द्धितविद्वद्वृन्दः परोपकारनिस्तन्द्रो यतीन्द्रः कवीन्द्र इति ॥ १ इति प्रथमा ॥ १ ॥

३८. सदाचरणचातुरीसहचरीकृतं संततं
कलामलकुलांचितं प्रणयसंचितं श्रीजितम्।
प्रणीयशरणीकृतं स्तुतफणीशवाग्वेदिभिः
कवीन्द्रमहमाश्रयेऽवितुमथोत्तमर्णग्रहान् ॥ २६३ ॥

यं च

निःस्नेह इति दोषैर्नीरस इत्ययशसा दुःस्पर्श इति दुर्व्यसनैरकरुण इति कारणाभिः सकल[10] इति कलिना शरीरीत्यशरीरिणा शस्त्रीति[11] परस्त्रीभिः भीरुरिति परस्वेन सहेतिरिति[12] प्राणिहत्या विशिष्ट[13] इति नष्टबुद्ध्या मनागप्यनाकलितम्[14]। समुद्रमिव महावाहिनीशपतिम्। धनञ्जयमिव महाभारतरणयोग्यम्। संकेतायतनमिव नीतीनाम्। आस्थानमण्डपमिव स्थितीनाम्[15]।

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१. B लौकिकस्य. २. B विद्वद्दैन्यो°. ३. A °गस्य. ४. AC om शिष्टाचारस्य. ५. AC कपटाचारस्य. ६. B सकविनेता. ७. AB दातुः. ८. C सवर्णानां. ९. AC °प्यस्तं नै°. १०. C सकरुण. ११. AC शस्त्रे for शस्त्रीति. १२. AC संहति°. १३. AC °हत्याच(cव)शिष्ट. १४. C मनागनाञ्जलितं. १५. AC om. स्थितीनां to वरुणालयमिव.

सर्वस्वमिव पराक्रमाणाम्। बीजमिव विबुधसञ्जीवनतरूणाम्। वरुणालयमिव शरणागतानाम्। धर्मराजमपि सुयोधनम्। नीलेन्दीवरसोदरनयनमपि वन्दितत्रिलोचनम्। तीर्थं तथ्यस्य। कोशं कुशलतायाः। प्रतानं प्रणयितायाः। चन्द्रशालातलं सुशीलतायाः। भीष्ममिव भागीरथ्याः। कुमारमिव गिरिजायाः। दामोदरमिव देवकनन्दिन्याः। जयन्तमिव पुलोमजायाः। परीक्षितमिवोत्तरायाः। भरतमिवशकुन्तलायाः। प्रेमपात्रं परिणतशेमुषीनिजजननीसदुदरखनिरत्नभूतम् बहलप्रभापटलनिर्विषयीकृतचन्द्रचण्डातपाच्छच्छविपुञ्जं सततवसुमतीपालमौलिहीरांकुरैर्नीराजितचरणसरोजं राजराजमिव शेवधीनां विश्वामित्रमिव सिद्धीनां शतक्रतुमिव समृद्धीनां काव्यमिव नव्यभव्यकाव्यानां भर्त्तारम्। शरणागतत्रासहर्त्तारम्। शार्दूलमिव मृगाणाम्, सिंहमिव मातङ्गानाम्, गरुत्मन्तमिव पन्नगानाम्, श्येनमिव खगानाम्, खलानां परमोद्वेगकर्त्तारम्। समुचितमृगमदपरिमलवाहिनांगरागेण राजमानं मूर्त्ताभिधानं पुण्यावदानं संपन्निदानं समिति संमुखोपचितवाङ्मुखश्रुतिसावधानं मङ्गलसंविधानं कृतविविधविधानं संपादितबिन्दुवृन्दविधानं द्वारोच्छ्रायितविधानम्, भूतिमन्तमपि स्नेहमयं जगत्प्राणमयमपि तेजस्विनं पार्थिवमपि गुणमयं घनरसात्मकमपि शब्दगुणप्रसादं दक्षिणाशाप्रसाधकमपि प्रचेतसं सदुत्तरमपि शुनासीरं सदम्बरमपि ऊर्जितकम्बलं दधानम्। घनागममपि समुत्सारितपङ्कम्। निर्जिताखिलभूभृतमपि गोत्रवर्द्धनम्। सुरभिमिव सुमनसां गुणप्रकाशकं पृथुमिव प्रसादितपृथ्वीतलं नागलोकमिव भोगिसंपन्नम्। चापमिव सद्वंशजातं द्विरदमिव दानभृतामग्रगण्यम्। कुलाङ्गनामिव अनन्यगम्यां प्रभुशक्तिमुद्वहन्तं रविकुलमिवाकुलकविकुलकोकलोकमानन्दयन्तं चिन्तामणिमिव श्रीसंनिधानरमणीयम्। शतमन्युमिव शास्त्रानल्पलोचनं सुहस्तमप्यविहस्तम्—सत्कविताविताननितभूमिप्रसराः कविवरविसरैः निजनिजसूक्तिमौक्तिकैः सोत्साहमहमिकया प्रयासहासं सन्ततं परिस्तुवन्ति सकलपरानन्दसान्द्रं योगिधुरंधरधौरेयकपारीणम्, विद्याम्भोधिपारीणं यतिकुलचन्द्रं कवीन्द्रमिति द्वितीया ॥ २ ॥

१. C को° for कु° २. AC तपाकच्छवि°. ३. B सुखो° for संमुखो°. ४. C °साधनं. ५. C om. वि. ६. B भूतिमपि. ७. C °प्रसाद°. ८. A सुरभितमिव. ९. AC om. सुमनसां to द्विरदमिव. १०. AC om. कविकुल. ११. AC om. कविवरविसराः. १२. B धौरेयधुरीणं C धौरेयकधु°.

३९. प्राची शचीसहचरेण विकासहासम्
वासन्तिका सुरभिणा करिणापि सेना।
कौलीनताच विनयेन नयेन संपत्
दिल्लीशसंसदपि पाति[1] कवीन्द्रधाम्ना ॥ २६४ ॥

येन च

सर्वदाकारि सत्कर्मनर्मपरंपरा। कृतं कृतयुगवत्कलिधर्माचरणम्। प्रणयेना[2]-सादिता गुरुजनाशिषः। रभसोत्सारितानि शिवश्लोकैर्दुःस्वप्नदुर्निमित्तानि। सम्यगभ्यस्ताः सुविद्याः। विधिवदाराधिताः सभ्याः। प्रपंचेनोपासिता वह्नयः। मुदाभ्यर्चितानि सदैवतानि दैवतानि। संमोदितास्सदसि वसनाशनभूषणादिभिर्भूनिलिंपाः। प्र[परि]क्रमणानमनस्पर्शन[नैः]परिशीलिताः सुरभयः। नरसिंहेनेव खरनखरकुठारकोटिविदारितामितबल[3]वदरिसपक्षदैत्यपक्षवक्षःस्थलेन। नलनहुषाम्बरीषपरीक्षितां सुकृतां वृत्तिमनुसरता। सुधावता हरिणांचितेन जैवातृकेणोपमितेन। ग्रीष्मवर्षागमसमयेनेव सर्वत्र संवार्द्धितायेन। शचीपतिनेवा[4]त्मनुतौ साचीकृतवदनेनाप्यानन्दसदनेन। क्ष्माभृदाश्रितपदेनापि विपद्[5]-पदेन[6]। सहृदयेनाथ सुहृदय[7]वेदिना। सुग्रीवेणापि सुवृत्तहनुमता। रामेणापि पुण्यजनोप[8]कारिणा। विनतानन्दनेनापि दीर्घपृष्ठेन। विनायकेनापि कविनायकेन। विशालनेत्रेणापि सूक्ष्मतरनेत्रेण। वन्दितमित्रेणाप्यानन्दितमित्रेण। समुचितमनुनापि वसिष्ठेन। यमुनाप्रवाहेणेवामुना चक्रवता सुरतरङ्गिणीव विभ्रमवती[9] चित्तवृत्तिरभेदि। पवित्रेण[10] नदीनेनाप्यनीचवृत्तिपूर्णेन। प्रशंसितवेशेन[11] सदोत्तमश्लोकगुणगानु[12]नाथ न धनदानुना। पूतजानुना[13] धन्यतमेनानेनापरुषा[14] कविता वनितेवात्मसादकारि[15]। फलितप्रसारितरुणाक्रीडोद्यानेव जीवातुनार्येण[16]। द्विजराजीयराजतसंख्यावताप्यसंख्यपराक्रमेण। साक्षाद्वाचस्पति-

१. A घात; C यांति; Shall we read भाति ? २. B प्रणामेना°. ३. AC om. बल. ४. A सर्वो यति°. ५. C विपदा° ६. AC °नापि. ७. B श्वहृदय°. C स्वहृदय°. ८. B पुण्यजनको°. ९. AB विभ्रवती; C °भ्रमवृत्ति. १०. B adds; अपि अपवित्रेण after पवित्रेण. ११. B adds अपि स्वप्नेनाशंसितवेशेन after °वेशेन. १२. C °गणानुनाथ. १३. AC om. पूतजानुना. १४. C करुषां १५. AC °वञ्चितानिञ्चितेवात्मसाद(C समाद)कारि. १६. AC नार्थेन

नापि कविना। सौम्येनापि भास्वता। मङ्गलाभिधानेनापि परापकृतिमन्देन, सुमतिना वसुमती कान्तिमतीव बभारेति तृतीया[1] ॥ ३ ॥

४०. येनावनीशकर्णे कुन्दसवर्णे[2]ऽवकल्पिता कीर्तिः।
नियतं निजस्य तस्मै भावुकमीहे कवीन्द्राय ॥ २६५ ॥

यस्मै च।

वृषोपस्थितचित्रभानुसमानधाम्ने। बृहद्भानुसंतापिततपनीयोपकृतोरुगुटिकाकृत[3]दाम्ने। सुकृतोच्छ्रायितवाचंयमोपस्तूयमान[4]नाम्ने। सर्वदोत्साहपरवशतयोपनीयमानान्यूनन्यूंखोचितसाम्ने। असंख्यसंख्यावज्जेगीय[5]मानगुणग्रामसीम्ने। सकलाशावकाशसेवासिता[6]मितविनयभूम्ने। महोपचितसाधुवादानुचितविकत्थनाङ्गीकृतात्यन्तलघिम्ने। अखिलसुरभिसमाजसंजीवनाविकलाय विनोदोपरतायापि विनोदपराय। स[7]शौटीरबिन्दुवृन्दगन्धाय। श्रमवच्छंबाय कलवत्कंबाय[8] संकल्पकल्पितानेककल्याणविशालाशयाय[9] विद्वन्मेलकाय[10] संचारशौण्डाय कल्पितानेकविबुधोपायाया[11]नुष्ठानकनिष्ठीकृत[12]वशिष्ठादिविशिष्टसमाजाय[13]। प्रतिसदनजायमानावदानपरंपरानन्दसन्दोह[14]कन्दाय रसराग[15]रङ्गगीतिगमकगीश्चातुर्यचर्या[16]चमत्कारविदग्धाय। अखर्व[17]गुणगर्वपर्वताय सर्वोर्वी[18]सुरश्रुतिसन्ततिसंश्रुतोदारचरिताय। अनवरतमभिसंमं (?) श्रुतिस्मृतिधर्मप्रपंचश्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनधारणा[19]समाधिसाधारणयोगसाधनशमदमनियमसमापितकामक्रोधमदमत्सरदम्भलोभसंरंभाय। अहर्दिव[20]मवनीतलतिलकीभूतविद्वज्जनसीमन्तिनी[21]समुदायाः[22] सहसा स्पृहयन्ति अविकलसकलोत्तुङ्गमङ्गलानि। गायन्ति च[23] गृहकर्मारम्भेषु दोलाखेलासु[24] निजनिजपाकसान्त्वनेषु कीर्त्तिपूर्त्त[25]प्रवर्त्तकाय यतीन्द्राय प्राज्यमद्राय[26] कवीन्द्रायेति चतुर्थी ॥ ४ ॥

१. B om तृतीया. २. C om कुन्दसवर्णे. ३. C वृत°. ४. B adds साधु after स्तूयमान. ५. B °गीय°. ६. B °संवासिता. ७. C om स. ८. C श्रमवच्छंबलंबायकलवावत्कंबाय. ९. AB विशायाय. १०. AB विद्वन्मेलकार. ११. C विबुधाय. १२. B सत्कर्मानुष्ठी°. १३. A °दि. १४. C °मदोह°. १५. C om रंग. १६. C वर्य for चर्या. १७. C आवर्त्त°. १८. B °पर्वतापसर्वोर्वी. १९. A °धारण°. २०. AC अहर्दिन. २१. AC सीमंतिनः. २२. B समुदयाः. २३. C व for च. २४. A om सु. C दोलाखेलमुनिजनं. २५. C कीर्तिपूर्व°. २६. C om यतीन्द्राय to प्राज्यमंद्राय.

४१. चित्ते[1] चकोरी वसुधांशुमण्डलात्
स्वैरं मयूरीव बलाहकोदयात्।
सत्यं विपश्चित्समितिः परां मुदम्
द्राग्याति[2] नित्यं सुमतेः कवीन्द्रतः॥ २६६॥

ययातेरिव संस्तुतायतः सुरभेरिव संपन्नजातेः वाचस्पतेरिव विबुधजनसंस्तुतमतेः[3] वञ्चितविप्रलापादप्यञ्चितविप्रलम्भात्[4] विद्वद्वृन्दोदवसितानवरतसञ्चरदमितदैन्यदन्तावलदलनकलाकोविदात्[5]। दूषितनृशंसादपि तोषितनृशंसात् पूजितदेवादपि न्यक्कृतदेवात्। कुसुमप्रियादप्यपास्तकुसुमात्। कृतारिवर्द्धनादप्याश्रितवर्धनकारिणः। निर्जितशय्यादपि परिचितशय्यात्। सुमेरोरिव मित्रोदयहेतोः। पुष्पकेतोरिव सुमनोभरप्रमोददायिनः। सूर्यादिव दोषाकरम्लानिकरणात्। चिन्तामणेरप्यचिन्त्यप्रभावात्। सम्भावितासंख्यसंख्या[6]वन्मुखकमलविलासवतीसरस्वतीपरिचितपुण्ययशसो हारीभूतविद्वत्कुलहरिश्चन्द्रा[7]दपि दानवीरात्। प्रवर्त्तितालौकिक[8]विद्यात्। आबालभूपावधिजनसमूहाः परमोदारवाग्विलासपरिणतचातुरीचमत्कारं चिरतरं चित्तकोषे निरस्तदोषे सञ्चयन्तितरां यतिकुलमहेन्द्रात्[9] कवीन्द्रात् इति पञ्चमी॥ ५॥

४२. कल्याणप्रसरोऽस्तु ते प्रतिपदं हर्षाश्रवस्याश्रव–
प्रावीण्याम्बुनिधेः परोदयविधेर्धैर्यावधेः श्रीजुषः।
दोषध्वान्तनिवारणैकचतुरस्याम्नायहृद्वेदिनः
क्षोणीचन्द्र कवीन्द्र सद्गुणलसद्विद्वद्घटाकल्पद॥ २६७॥

यस्य च।

अत्यन्तप्रमोदमेदुरबले[10] रिवत्यागः स्थानेषु। सस्पृहता[11] शिबेरिव परोत्साहेषु। श्लाघा धाराधीशस्येव विद्वज्जनसंवादेषु। दम्भस्तु नलनहुषयोरिव स्वायत्त[12]कविताललनाखेलासु। कृतज्ञता विक्रमार्कस्येव पुरुषवरेषु। सन्तोषः शङ्करस्येव कलाकलापकेषु। मैत्री[13] सुमित्रानन्दनस्येव[14] सदाचाररतेषु। संकोचः शचीसहचर[15]स्येव गुरुवचनेषु। खलता बिभीषण[16]स्येव चपलेषु। तत्परता

१. C वित्ते. २. B डारयति. ३. B °मते. ४. B °लापात्. ५. A नवरसाञ्च°. ६. A om संख्य. ७. B हारीभूताद्विद्वकुलस्या (C स्य). ८. B adds लोक after लौकिक. ९. C महोक्षात्. १०. B मेदुरस्य बले°. ११. A स्पृहता. १२. B स्वापत्र; A स्वावत्तक°. १३. AC मैत्रीमित्र. १४. AC °नन्दनस्य. १५. AB शचीहर°. १६. C विर्ना°.

तारापतेरिव धर्मकर्मसु। विश्वासो व्यासस्येव श्रुतिप्रसूतस्मृतिप्रपञ्चेषु। प्रागल्भ्यं वसिष्ठस्येवै[1] सभ्यसभासु। तितिक्षा भरतस्येव क्षमातिलकेषु। वञ्चकता शर्यातेरिव पराङ्गनासंसर्गेषु। दया काश्यपेरस्येव[2] दीनजनावनेषु। नियमपरिपालनं[3] हरिश्चन्द्रस्येवं[4] प्रतिज्ञातेषु। चिन्ताप्रतानिता गौतमस्येव शास्त्रतत्त्वेषु[5]। सदानुरागः काव्यस्येव नव्यनव्य[6]सत्काव्यप्रबन्धेषु। सौजन्यं विश्वामित्रस्येव सत्रकृत्सु। दाक्षिण्यं क्षणदाकरस्येव क्षणलक्षणेषु[7]। पाण्डित्यं गाण्डीवधनुष इव कोदण्डोद्दण्डाकाण्ड[8]सज्जनेषु। शूरता शौरेरिव तरवारिपरिचयेषु। कारुण्यं[9] रघोरिव शरणागताहिततमामितकुटुम्बकेषु। लुब्धतां[10] ऋतुंपर्ण[11]कर्णयोरिव लब्धवर्णसंमाननेषु[12]। भीरुता तापसस्येव परस्वहरणेषु। वन्दारुता अक्रूरस्येव वृन्दारकपदारविन्देषु। विदुरता विदुरस्येव बिन्दुवृन्दसंवादेषु। पराङ्मुखता दाशरथेरिव परापवादेषु। निदर्शनता गाङ्गेयस्येव कीर्त्तिमूर्त्तिषु[13]। दीर्घसूत्रता चित्रशिखण्डिजस्येवं[14] कार्यारम्भेषु। कृपालुता जीमूतस्येवाभिमतजीवदानसमयेषु[15]। विलासवशता शतानन्दस्येव तौर्यत्रिकेषु। सकलावनिचक्रतिलकीकृतकीर्त्तिपल्लवस्य यतिवरकवीन्द्रस्येति षष्ठी ॥ ६ ॥

४३. प्रबले सकले जाते[16] कवीन्द्रेऽत्र धरातले।
कवीनामधि[17] वेश्मासन्नवीनाकल्पभूधराः ॥ २६८ ॥

यस्मिंश्च।

परापवादमूके सुजनसंजवनपरमानन्दकारके दृङ्मात्रोत्सारितानेकदुर्गतानीके प्रशस्तिमूलधारिणि क्षणाम्भोधिमध्यविहारिणि प्रसूनमालाभारिणि सुवन्दिवृन्दसंस्तुते। भ्रूकुंशाभ्यसितलास्यलम्पटे प्रसारितोचितयशःपटे। विकस्वरसहकारनवपल्लवप्रसार[18]विराजमानकरपङ्कजोदरे महादानायातामितयाचकलोककोलाहलमुखरीकृतसंतताजिरे[19]। क्रमकोद्गीर्णमहोदीर्णविस्तीर्णवर्णस्वरक्रमश्रवणानन्दितश्रवणे। सन्ततोद्गीतोपनिषन्निनादप्रतिध्वनितसभा-

१. C प्रागालयं च सिष्टस्येव. २. B काश्यस्येव. ३. C नियत°. ४. AC हरिश्चंद्रस्य. ५. B °तत्के(र्के)षु. ६. C °भव्य°. ७. C लक्षणलक्षणेषु. ८. Emendation. AB कौदण्डं दण्डोद्दण्डकाण्ड°; C कोदण्डोदण्ड काण्ड°. ९. C om. the passage from कारुण्यं to परापवादेषु. १०. A. लघुता. ११. B. अनुर्ण°. १२. B संमानवेषु. १३. AB कीर्त्तिषु. १४. B चित्रखण्डिजस्येव. १५. B. °समर्येषु. १६. A याते for जाते. १७. AC कवीनामपि. १८. C. °प्रसर°. १९. A. संतता°.

मण्डपे। अभ्यसितपताकेप्युच्छ्रितकीर्त्तिपताके[1]। परशुराम इव परशुभदायिनि[2][3]। अष्टविधतुरगारोहणनिपुणे। तथाष्टधानृत्यकलापारगे। चतुर्विधवाद्यविद्याप्रवर्तके। षड्विधबलमालिनि[4]। अष्टावधानसंपन्ने[5]। समानेऽप्यसमाने। संमानितस्थविरेऽप्यसंमानितस्थविरे। परिचितविहारेऽप्यपरिचितविहारे[6]। भुवनरक्षके तोषितारक्षके कृतधर्मावापेऽपि न्यक्कृतावापे। शोभनपक्षाङ्गेऽपि ऊर्जितसम्राङ्गे। पुण्यपरिग्रहेऽपि पुण्यश्लोकपरिग्रहे। कल्पितवेशेऽप्यकल्पितवेशे। कपाटवत्सेऽप्युत्सारितारिवत्से। दूरीकृतविषादेऽप्यूरीकृतविषादे[7]। राजनीतिनिपुणे तरुणारुणप्रकाशे स्वकीर्त्तिनर्त्तकीसुषमासंराजितसकलाशावकाशे[8] समस्तानवद्यविद्यानिवासे विद्वद्गुणग्रहणप्रमोदसान्द्रे समुल्लसदमन्दकुन्दसुन्दरयशोवृन्दमन्दीकृतचन्द्रे भव्यभक्तिसम्भार[9]प्रसादितसदा[10]संमदानन्दामोदावलीमेदुरनिजहृदयेन्दिरामन्दिरासादितरुद्रे। सद्यः समुद्वदनहृद्यपद्याद्यनन्तविद्यासमुद्रे। महीतलमहामहीयमानमहेय[11]पुण्यश्लोकमुद्रे[12](?)। [13]महोदाननिर्विकारससारसंसारपरोपकारानस्ततन्द्रे। [14]निजनिजभावमुद्भावयंति कलाकलापैः समुल्लसन्तः सन्तः[15] सततं यतीन्द्रे विश्वंभराचन्द्रे श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रे इति सप्तमी ॥ ७ ॥

पट्टवर्द्धनमहादेवभट्टानाम् ॥

१. वाल्मीकिः प्रथमं बभूव तदनु श्रीव्यासदेवोऽभवत्
काव्ये[16] विश्रुतकीर्त्तिरास तदनु श्रीकालिदासः कृती।
तेषां चारुयशो गुणोत्तम तिरोधत्से यतः सांप्रतम्
हे योगीन्द्र कवीन्द्र तावकमतो व्यक्तं जनैर्गीयते ॥ २६९ ॥

२. धीराधीश कवीन्द्र कुन्दकुसुमस्तोमत्विषि त्वद्यशो—
राशौ मग्नतया कया पुनरिमान् जानातु युक्त्या जनः।

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१. C मण्डपेभ्युसित. २. C om कीर्त्ति. ३. C परशुन°. ४. AB मानिनि. ५. AC read अष्टविधसंयते. ६. C om विहारेप्यपरिचित. ७. A om प्यूरीकृत. विषादे. ८. C सकलावकाशे. ९. C संसार for संभार°. १०. A om सदा सं. ११. AB °महीपः. १२. C मुदे for मुद्रे. १३. C om महोदान to °स्ततंद्रे. १४. A om निज to °द्भावयंति. १५. C om संतः. १६. C काव्येऽपि.

तयोर्महदण्वोर्ग्रहणं चक्षूरश्मेरर्थस्य च सन्निकर्षविशेषाद्भवति,[1] यथा प्रदीपरश्मेरर्थस्य चेति। रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षविशेषश्चावरणलिङ्गः। चाक्षुषो हि रश्मिः कुड्यादिभिरावृतमर्थं न प्रकाशयति यथा प्रदीपरश्मिरिति ॥ ३४ ॥

आवरणानुमेयत्वे सतीदमाह —

"तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः"[2] ॥ ३५ ॥

"रूपस्पर्शवद्धि तेजः, महत्त्वादनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वाद्रूपवत्त्वाच्चोपलब्धिरिति[3] प्रदीपवत् प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्येत चाक्षुषो रश्मिर्यदि स्यादिति" ॥ ३५ ॥

नानुमीयमानस्य[4] प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिरभावहेतुः ॥ ३६ ॥

सन्निकर्षप्रतिषेधार्थेनावरणेन लिङ्गेनानुमीयमानस्य रश्मेर्या प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिर्नासावभावं प्रतिपादयति, यथा चन्द्रमसः परभागस्य पृथिव्याश्चाधोभागस्य ॥ ३६ ॥

द्रव्यगुणधर्मभेदाच्चोपलब्धिनियमः ॥ ३७ ॥

भिन्नः खल्वयं द्रव्यधर्मो गुणधर्मश्च। महदनेकद्रव्यवच्च विषक्तावयवमाप्यं[5] द्रव्यं प्रत्यक्षतो नोपलभ्यते, स्पर्शस्तु शीतो गृह्यते। तस्य द्रव्यस्यानुबन्धात् हेमन्तशिशिरौ कल्प्येते। तथाविधमेव च तैजसं द्रव्यमनुद्भूतरूपं सह रूपेण नोपलभ्यते, स्पर्शस्त्वस्योष्ण उपलभ्यते। तस्य द्रव्यस्यानुबन्धाद् ग्रीष्मवसन्तौ कल्प्येते ॥ ३७ ॥

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१ सन्निकर्षविशेषादिति। योऽयं सन्निकर्षो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिहेतुर्भूयोवयवसंयोगैरनुगृह्यते सोऽयमवान्तरसंयोगापेक्षयाऽवयवीन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः सन्निकर्षविशेष इत्युच्यते। स चेन्द्रियावयवानामर्थावयवैः—इन्द्रियावयवानामर्थेनावयविना—अर्थावयवानामिन्द्रियेण—इन्द्रियस्य चार्थेनेति। स च रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षविशेषो महदण्वोस्तुल्यो भवतीत्यन्यथा महदण्वोर्ग्रहणं सिध्यतीति हृदयम्।

२ तदनुपलब्धेरिति सूत्रं न्यायमतमाक्षिपति। न चाक्षुषो रश्मिर्विद्यत इति सूत्रार्थः। उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तमनुपलभ्यमानमनुमातुं न शक्यते। तथा सति नरविषाणादीनामप्यनुमानप्रसङ्ग इति हृदयम्।

३ महत्त्वादिति वैशेषिकसूत्रमनुवदति। तच्च सूत्रं यथा—महत्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वाद्रूपाच्चोपलब्धिरिति ४-१-६।

४ नानुमीयमानस्येति—आक्षेपपरिहारपरं सूत्रम्। प्रत्यक्षमात्रेणानुपलब्धिर्नैकान्ततोऽभावमेव साधयतीत्यर्थः।

५ आप्यं द्रव्यमिति। वायुनीतं जलीयत्र्यणुकादीत्यर्थः।

यत्र[1] त्वेषा भवति—

अनेकद्रव्यसमवायाद्रूपविशेषाच्च रूपोपलब्धिः ॥ ३८ ॥

यत्र रूपं च द्रव्यं च तदाश्रयः प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्यते, रूपविशेषस्तु यद्भावात् क्वचिद्रूपोपलब्धिः यदभावाच्च द्रव्यस्य क्वचिदनुपलब्धिः—स रूपधर्मोऽयमुद्भवसमाख्यात इति। अनुद्भूतरूपश्चायं नायनो रश्मिः। तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षतो नोपलभ्यत इति। दृष्टश्च तेजसो धर्मभेदः। उद्भूतरूपस्पर्शं प्रत्यक्षं तेजो यथा आदित्यरश्मयः। उद्भूतरूपमनुद्भूतस्पर्शं च प्रत्यक्षं तेजो यथा प्रदीपरश्मयः। उद्भूतस्पर्शमनुद्भूतरूपमप्रत्यक्षं यथाऽबादिसंयुक्तं तेजः। अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शोऽप्रत्यक्षश्चाक्षुषो रश्मिरिति ॥ ३८ ॥

कर्मकारितश्चेन्द्रियाणां व्यूहः पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः ॥ ३९ ॥

यथा चेतनस्यार्थो विषयोपलब्धिभूतः सुखदुःखोपलब्धिभूतश्च कल्प्यते तथेन्द्रियाणि व्यूढानि। विषयप्राप्त्यर्थश्च रश्मेश्चाक्षुषस्य व्यूहः। रूपस्पर्शानभिव्यक्तिश्च व्यवहारप्रक्लृप्त्यर्था। द्रव्यविशेषे च प्रतिघातादावरणोपपत्तिर्व्यवहारार्था। सर्वद्रव्याणां विश्वरूपो व्यूह इन्द्रियवत् कर्मकारितः पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः[2]। कर्म तु धर्माधर्मभूतं चेतनस्योपभोगार्थमिति।

[3]अव्यभिचाराच्च प्रतिघातो भौतिकधर्मः। यश्चावरणोपलम्भादिन्द्रियस्य द्रव्यविशेषे प्रतिघातः स भौतिकधर्मो न भूतानि व्यभिचरति—नाभौतिकं प्रतिघातधर्मकं दृष्टमिति। अप्रतिघातस्तु व्यभिचारी भौतिकाभौतिकयोः समानत्वादिति।

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१ यत्र त्विति। यत्रैषा रूपोपलब्धिः(तत्र) अनेकद्रव्यसमवायात् रूपविशेषाच्च भवति इति सम्बन्धस्सूत्रेण। सूत्रे 'रूपविशेषा'दिति 'रूपविशेषः' उद्भवसमाख्योऽभिधीयते न रूपत्वम्। न रूपत्वं रूपं रूपान्तरात् विशिनष्टि, अपि तूद्भवो विशेषकत्वात् विशेष इत्युच्यते। उद्भवश्च कार्यगम्यः—यस्याभावाद् विषक्तावयवमाप्यं द्रव्यं हेमन्ते न गृह्यते तैजसञ्च ग्रीष्मे, यस्य भावात् प्रदीपरश्मिरुपलभ्यते आदित्यरश्मिश्च—स उद्भवो नाम विशेषः। स तस्मिन्नायने रश्मौ रूपविशेषो नास्तीत्यतः चाक्षुषो रश्मिर्नोपलभ्यते।

२ पुरुषार्थतन्त्र इति—पुरुषार्थकारित इत्यर्थः।

३ अव्यभिचाराच्चेत्यादि न सूत्रम्। न्यायसूचीनिबन्धे वृत्तौ विवरणे प्राचीनपुस्तकेषु च तथाविधसूत्रस्याभावात्।

यदपि मन्यते "प्रतिघाताद्भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणि, अप्रतिघातादभौतिकानीति प्राप्तम्। दृष्टश्चाप्रतिघातः काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धेः—" तन्न युक्तम्। कस्मात्? यस्माद्भौतिकमपि न प्रतिहन्यते। काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितप्रकाशान् प्रदीपरश्मीनाम्। स्थाल्यादिषु च पाचकस्य तेजसोऽप्रतिघातः॥ ३९॥

उपपद्यते चानुपलब्धिः कारणभेदात्—

मध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशानुपलब्धिवत्तदनुपलब्धिः॥ ४०॥

यथाऽनेकद्रव्येण समवायाद्रूपविशेषाच्चोपलब्धिरिति सत्युपलब्धिकारणे मध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशो नोपलभ्यते आदित्यप्रकाशेनाभिभूतः। एवं महदनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वाद्रूपविशेषाच्चोपलब्धिरिति सत्युपलब्धिकारणे चाक्षुषो रश्मिर्नोपलभ्यते निमित्तान्तरतः। तच्च[1] व्याख्यातम[2]नुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिरिति। अत्यन्तानुपलब्धिश्चाभावकारणम्॥ ४०॥

यो हि ब्रवीति—" लोष्टप्रकाशो मध्यन्दिने आदित्यप्रकाशाभिभवान्नोपलभ्यते इति, तस्यैतत्स्यात्? "

[3]न, रात्रावप्यनुपलब्धेः॥ ४१॥

अप्यनुमानतोऽनुपलब्धेरिति। एवमत्यन्तानुपलब्धेर्लोष्टप्रकाशो नास्ति। न त्वेवं चाक्षुषो रश्मिरिति॥ ४१॥

उपपन्नरूपा चेयम्—

[4]बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहाद् विषयोपलब्धेरनभिव्यक्तितोऽनुपलब्धिः॥ ४२॥

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१ तच्चेति—निमित्तान्तरमिति यावत्।

२ व्याख्यातमिति—अनेकद्रव्यसमवायादिति सूत्रभाष्ये।

३ न रात्राविति सूत्रम्। स्यादेतत्—आदित्यप्रकाशाभिभवान्मध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशानुपलब्धिरिति यदुक्तं—तदयुक्तम्। तथा सति सर्वपदार्थानां रश्मिमत्त्वप्रसङ्गात्। एवं सति सर्वं लोष्टादिरश्मिमत् प्राप्नोति। लोष्टादिरश्मयः कस्मान्नोपलभ्यन्ते—इत्यनुक्तो ब्रूयात्—आदित्यरश्म्यभिभवादिति—एतस्यैवोत्तररूपमेतत् सूत्रम्।

४ बाह्यप्रकाशेति सूत्रं दृष्टान्तोपन्यासरूपम्। यद्यत् बाह्यप्रकाशमपेक्षते तस्य तस्यानुपलब्धौ रूपानभिव्यक्तित एव न पुनरभिभवात्। स्वोपलब्धौ बाह्यप्रकाशमनपेक्षमाणानामेवानुपलब्धिरभिभवाद् भवति यथा दिवसे तारकाणाम्। विषक्तावयवस्याप्यद्रव्यस्याकाशवर्तिनो यदनुपलब्धिस्तत्द्रूपस्यानभिव्यक्तेरेव, आप्यद्रव्याणां स्वग्रहणे बाह्यप्रकाशापेक्षत्वात्। एवमेव चाक्षुषस्यापि रश्मेः स्वग्रहणे बाह्यप्रकाशापेक्षत्वात् तस्याप्यनुलब्धिस्तद्रूपानभिव्यक्तेरेव स्यान्न पुनरभिभवात् इति हृदयम्।

बाह्येन प्रकाशेनानुगृहीतं चक्षुर्विषयग्राहकम् । तदभावेऽनुपलब्धिः । सति च प्रकाशानुग्रहे शीतस्पर्शोपलब्धौ च सत्यां तदाश्रयस्य द्रव्यस्य चक्षुषाऽग्रहणं रूपस्यानुद्भूतत्वात् । सेयं रूपानभिव्यक्तितो रूपाश्रयस्य द्रव्यस्यानुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा । तत्र यदुक्तं ' तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः ' इत्येतदयुक्तम् ।। ४२ ।।

कस्मात्पुनरभिभवोऽनुपलब्धिकारणं चाक्षुषस्य रश्मेर्नोच्यत इति ?—

अभिव्यक्तौ चाभिभवात् ।। ४३ ।।

बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहनिरपेक्षतायां चेति चार्थः । यद्रूपमभिव्यक्तमुद्भूतं बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहं च नापेक्षते तद्विषयोऽभिभवो विपर्ययेऽभिभवाभावात् । अनुद्भूतरूपत्वाच्चानुपलभ्यमानं बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहाच्चोपलभ्यमानं नाभिभूयत इति । एवमुपपन्नमस्ति चाक्षुषो रश्मिरिति ।। ४३ ।।

नक्तञ्चरनयनरश्मिदर्शनाच्च ।। ४४ ।।

दृश्यन्ते हि नक्तं नयनरश्मयो नक्तञ्चराणां वृषदंशप्रभृतीनाम्[1] । तेन शेषस्यानुमानमिति[2] ।

" जातिभेदवदिन्द्रियभेद इति[3] चेत् ? " धर्मभेदमात्रं[4] चानुपपन्नमावरणस्य[5] प्राप्तिप्रतिषेधार्थस्य दर्शनादिति ।। ४४ ।।

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१ वृषदंशेति । वृषदंशगोलकसंयोगि अन्यदेव तेजः प्रत्यक्षं न तु तदिन्द्रियम्—इन्द्रियस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् । इन्द्रियलक्षणे रूपशब्दातिरिक्तोद्भूतविशेषगुणशून्येति विशेषणपक्षेऽपि नोक्तस्य तेजस इन्द्रियत्वम्, गोलकात्तद्विषयपर्यन्तं तद्दर्शनप्रसङ्गात्—इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्यकारित्वनियमादिति विचारणीयम् ।

२ अनुमानमिति । अनुमानप्रकारा यथा—

(१) विप्रतिपत्तिविषयः कृष्णसारं रश्मिमत्–द्रव्यत्वे सति रूपोपलब्धौ नियतस्य साधनस्य निमित्तत्वात्—प्रदीपवदिति । (२) अथवा—रश्मिमच्चक्षुः—द्रव्यत्वे सति नियतत्वे सति स्फटिकाद्यव्यवहितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात्—प्रदीपवदिति । अथवा (३) मानुषं चक्षू रश्मिमत्—अप्राप्तिस्वभावत्वे सति रूपाद्युपलब्धिनिमित्तत्वात्—नक्तञ्चरचक्षुर्वदिति ।

३ जातिभेदवदिति । यथा बिडालत्वं जातिर्वृषदंशे वर्तते न मनुष्ये–एवं बिडालस्यैव चक्षू रश्मिमद् भविष्यति न मानुषस्येति शङ्कहृदयम् ।

४ तत्परिहारो–धर्मभेदमात्रमिति । वृषदंशनेत्रस्य रश्मिमत्त्वं धर्मो मनुष्यनेत्रस्य तु न तत्त्वमिति योऽयं धर्मभेदः सोऽनुपपन्न एव ।

५ अनुपपत्तौ हेतुः–आवरणस्येति । सत्यपि जातिभेदे यथा वृषदंशप्रभृतीनां रश्मयः कुड्यादिभिराव्रियन्ते तथा मनुष्याणामपीति समानमेवेति भावः ।

" इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य ज्ञानकारणत्वानुपपत्तिः । कस्मात् ?"—

"अप्राप्यग्रहणं काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धेः" ॥४५॥

" तृणादिसर्पद् द्रव्यं काचेऽभ्रपटले वा प्रतिहतं दृष्टमव्यवहितेन सन्निकृष्यते व्याहन्यते वै प्राप्तिर्व्यवधानेनेति । यदि च रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षो ग्रहणहेतुः स्याद् न व्यवहितस्य सन्निकर्ष इत्यग्रहणं स्यात् । अस्ति चेयं काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धिः । सा ज्ञापयत्यप्राप्यकारीणीन्द्रियाणि । अत एवाभौतिकानि । प्राप्यकारित्वं हि भौतिकधर्म इति " ॥ ४५ ॥

कुड्यान्तरितानुपलब्धेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४६ ॥

अप्राप्यकारित्वे सतीन्द्रियाणां कुड्यान्तरितस्यानुपलब्धिर्न स्यात् ॥४६॥

" प्राप्यकारित्वेऽपि तु काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धिर्न स्यात् " ।

अप्रतिघातात्सन्निकर्षोपपत्तिः ॥ ४७ ॥

न च काचोऽभ्रपटलं वा नयनरश्मिं विष्टभ्नाति । सोऽप्रतिहन्यमानः सन्निकृष्यत[1] इति ॥ ४७ ॥

यश्च मन्यते " न भौतिकस्याप्रतिघात " इति, तन्न—

आदित्यरश्मेः[2] स्फटिकान्तरितेऽपि दाह्येऽविघातात् ॥ ४८ ॥

आदित्यरश्मेरविघातात्—स्फटिकान्तरितेऽप्यविघातात्—दाह्येऽविघातान् । 'अविघातादि'ति पदाभिसम्बन्धभेदाद्वाक्यभेद इति । प्रतिवाक्यं चार्थभेद इति । आदित्यरश्मिः कुम्भादिषु न प्रतिहन्यते, अविघातात् कुम्भस्थमुदकं तपति । प्राप्तौ हि द्रव्यान्तरगुणस्य उष्णस्य स्पर्शस्य ग्रहणं तेन च शीतस्पर्शाभिभव इति । स्फटिकान्तरितेऽपि प्रकाशनीये प्रदीपरश्मीनामप्रतिघातः । अप्रतिघातात्प्राप्तस्य ग्रहणमिति । भर्जनकपालादिस्थं च द्रव्यमाग्नेयेन तेजसा दह्यते । तत्राविघातात्प्राप्तिः । प्राप्तौ तु दाहः । नाप्राप्यकारि तेज इति ।

अविघातादिति च केवलं पदमुपादीयते । कोऽयमविघातो नाम ?

१ सन्निकृष्यत इति–काचं निर्भिद्य काचान्तर्गतेनार्थेन सम्बध्यत इत्यर्थः ।

२ आदित्यरश्मेरिति सूत्रम् । भाष्यमतेनात्र तिस्र उक्तयः—

(१) आदित्यरश्मेरविघातः (२) स्फटिकान्तरितेऽविघातः, (३) दाह्येऽविघातः । किन्तु स्फटिकान्तरितेऽपि दाह्ये आदित्यरश्मेरविघात इत्येकैवोक्तिरत्रेत्येव समीचीनं प्रतिभाति । स्फटिकान्तरितैरप्यादित्यरश्मिभिस्तूलकादिकं दह्यत एवेति सूत्रकारस्य हृद्गतो भाव इव भासते ।

अव्यूह्यमानावयवेन[1] व्यवधायकेन द्रव्येण सर्वतो द्रव्यस्याविष्टम्भः—क्रियाहेतोरप्रतिबन्धः—प्राप्तेरप्रतिषेध इति। दृष्टं हि[2] कलशनिषक्तानामपां बहिः शीतस्पर्शस्य ग्रहणम्। न चेन्द्रियेणासन्निकृष्टस्य द्रव्यस्य स्पर्शोपलब्धिः। दृष्टौ[3] च प्रस्पन्दपरिस्रवौ। तत्र काचाभ्रपटलादिभिर्नायनरश्मेरप्रतिघाताद्विभिद्यार्थेन सह सन्निकर्षादुपपन्नं ग्रहणमिति ॥ ४८ ॥

" नेतरेतरधर्मप्रसङ्गात् " ॥ ४९ ॥

" काचाभ्रपटलादिवद्वा कुड्यादिभिरप्रतिघातः, कुड्यादिवद्वा काचाभ्रपटलादिभिः प्रतिघात इति प्रसज्यते। नियमे कारणं वाच्यमिति " ॥४९॥

आदर्शोदकयोः प्रसादस्वाभाव्याद्रूपोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः ॥५०॥

आदर्शोदकयोः प्रसादो रूपविशेषः[4] स्वो धर्मो नियमदर्शनात्। प्रसादस्य वा स्वो धर्मो रूपोपलम्भनम्। यथाऽऽदर्शप्रतिहतस्य परावृत्तस्य नयनरश्मेः स्वेन मुखेन सन्निकर्षे सति स्वमुखोपलम्भनं प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणाख्यमादर्शरूपानुग्रहात्तन्निमित्तं भवति—आदर्शरूपोपघाते तदभावात् कुड्यादिषु च प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणं न भवति—एवं काचाभ्रपटलादिभिरविघातश्चक्षूरश्मेः कुड्यादिभिश्च प्रतिघातो द्रव्यस्वभावनियमादिति ॥ ५० ॥

दृष्टानुमितानां हि नियोगप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ ५१ ॥

प्रमाणस्य तत्त्वविषयत्वात्। न खलु भोः परीक्षमाणेन दृष्टानुमिता अर्थाः शक्या नियोक्तुमेवं भवतेति—नापि प्रतिषेद्धुमेवं न भवतेति। न

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१ अव्यूह्यमानावयवेनेति। यस्य द्रव्यस्य भर्जनकपालादेः अवयवा न व्यूह्यन्ते—पूर्वोत्पन्नद्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगनाशेन द्रव्यान्तरजनकसंयोगोत्पादनं 'व्यूहनम्'—तन्न क्रियते—तस्य द्रव्यस्य भर्जनकपालादेः अन्तरावयवैः योऽभिसम्बन्धो वह्नेः, स एव 'अप्रतिघातः'। एतदुक्तं भवति—सान्तरत्वादवयविद्रव्याणां तदविनाशेनाग्नेर्योऽनुप्रवेशः स 'अप्रतिघातः'।

२ प्रवेशेऽप्रतिघातमुक्त्वा निस्सरणेऽप्यविघातम्प्रदर्शयितुमाह—दृष्टं हीति। घटस्थं जलं यदा परितप्यते तदा घटच्छिद्रद्वारा निस्सृत्य घर्मरश्मयोऽभ्यन्तरस्थं जलं तापयन्ति। तत्रापि घटस्य नाशो न भवति।

३ दृष्टाविति। एतदपि सूचयति यत् जलनिस्सरणादपि घटनाशो न भवतीति।

४ रूपविशेष इति। स च द्रव्यान्तरासंयुक्तसमवाय एव, तस्य वा रूपोपलम्भनसामर्थ्यम्। तस्य या विद्यमानता उदकादिषु तदेव स्वाभाव्यम्।

हीदमुपपद्यते रूपवद्गन्धोऽपि चाक्षुषो भवत्विति—गन्धवद्वा रूपं चाक्षुषं मा भूदिति—अग्निप्रतिपत्तिवद् धूमेनोदकप्रतिपत्तिरपि भवत्विति—उदकाप्रतिपत्तिवद्वा धूमेनाग्निप्रतिपत्तिरपि मा भूदिति। किं कारणम्? यथा खल्वर्था भवन्ति य एषां स्वो भावः स्वो धर्म इति तथाभूताः प्रमाणेन प्रतिपद्यन्त इति। तथाभूतविषयकं हि प्रमाणमिति। इमौ खलु नियोगप्रतिषेधौ भवता देशितौ, काचाभ्रपटलादिवद्वा कुड्यादिभिरप्रतिघातो भवतु, कुड्यादिवद्वा काचाभ्रपटलादिभिरप्रतिघातो मा भूदिति। न। दृष्टानुमिताः खल्विमे द्रव्यधर्माः। प्रतिघाताप्रतिघातयोर्ह्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी व्यवस्थापिके। व्यवहितानुपलब्ध्याऽनुमीयते कुड्यादिभिः प्रतिघातः। व्यवहितोपलब्ध्याऽनुमीयते काचाभ्रपटलादिभिरप्रतिघात इति ॥ ५१ ॥

(८) इन्द्रियनानात्वप्रकरणम्[1]।

अथापि खल्वेकमिदमिन्द्रियं बहूनीन्द्रियाणि वा। कुतः संशयः?—

स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वादवयविनानास्थानत्वाच्च संशयः ॥५२॥

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१ एवं भौतिकत्वं प्राप्यकारित्वं चेन्द्रियाणां प्रसाध्येन्द्रियनानात्वप्रकरणमारम्भणीयम्। तस्य चोपोद्घातादवतारः। नानात्वासिद्धौ हि भौतिकत्वन्न सिध्येत्—तदसिद्धौ च न प्राप्यकारित्वम्। एकत्वे हि रूपादिषु मध्ये नियमेन रूपस्य प्रकाशकत्वादित्यादीनाम्भौतिकत्वसाधकानामसिद्धिः स्यादिति। तथाच न प्राप्यकारित्वमत्र सिध्येत्, तस्य भूतधर्मत्वादिति। प्रयोजनं चास्य—इन्द्रियनानात्वसिद्धौ सत्यां दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणादित्यादिभिरिन्द्रियातिरिक्तात्मसिद्धिः, अन्यथेन्द्रियमेवैकत्वात्सर्वं प्रतिसन्दधीतेत्यादि परिशुद्धौ स्पष्टम्।

२ स्थानान्यत्व इति सूत्रम्। केचिदिदं सूत्रं भाष्यमतानपेक्षं यथाश्रुति व्याचक्षते। स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वं दृष्टम्—यथा बहूनां घटानामिति, एकस्य च नानास्थानत्वम्—यथाऽवयविन इति।

तदेतदसमञ्जसमिति वार्तिकतात्पर्ययोः स्पष्टम्। 'स्थानान्यत्वं' च स्थानस्य अन्यत्वमुच्यते—'नानास्थानत्वं' च नानास्थानानि यस्येत्यन्यपदार्थः 'स्थानान्यत्वात्' अन्यः। संशयकारणं चैक एव धर्मो, न धर्मद्वयमित्येकतरस्यैकानेकसाधारणं वाच्यम्। तत्र (१) यदि तावदेवं संशयः क्रियते—स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वैकत्वदर्शनात् संशय इति तदा सूत्रार्थालोचनेनैकत्वे स्थानान्यत्वस्यादर्शनात् न समानधर्मः। सूत्रे खल्वेकत्वे नानास्थानत्वमाह, न स्थानान्यत्वमात्रम्। अनेकत्वमात्रे हि स्थानान्यत्वमुक्तं सूत्रकारेण—'स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वादिति'। (२) अथ नानास्थानत्वे सत्येकत्वानेकत्वदर्शनात्संशय इति संशयः क्रियते तदा द्रव्यं नाना-

बहूनि द्रव्याणि नानास्थानानि दृश्यन्ते । नानास्थानश्च चेति । तेनेन्द्रियेषु भिन्नस्थानेषु[1] संशय इति ॥ ५२ ॥

" एकमिन्द्रियम्[2]-

" त्वगव्यतिरेकात् " ॥ ५३ ॥

त्वगेकमिन्द्रियमित्याह । कस्मात्? अव्यतिरेकात् । न त्वचा किञ्चिदिन्द्रियाधिष्ठानं न प्राप्तम्, न चासत्यां त्वचि किञ्चिद्विषयग्रहणं भवति यया सर्वेन्द्रियस्थानानि व्याप्तानि यस्यां च सत्यां विषयग्रहणं भवति स त्वगेकमिन्द्रियमिति " ।

नेन्द्रियान्तरार्थानुपलब्धेः[3] । स्पर्शोपलब्धिलक्षणायां सत्यां त्वचि गृह्यमाणे त्वगिन्द्रियेण स्पर्शे इन्द्रियान्तरार्था रूपादयो न गृह्यन्ते अन्धादिभिः न स्पर्शग्राहकादिन्द्रियादिन्द्रियान्तरमस्तीति स्पर्शवदन्धादिभिर्गृह्येरन् रूपादयः न च गृह्यन्ते । तस्मानैकमिन्द्रियं त्वगिति ।

स्थानमनेकं न किञ्चिद् दृष्टमिति न समानधर्मत्वम् । ' अवयविनानास्थानत्वादिति सूत्रं नानास्थानत्वेनैकत्वमाह न तु नानात्वमपि । यत् पुनर्घटाद्यनेकम्, न तन्नानास्थानमुक्तं सूत्रकृता, अपि तु स्थानान्यत्वमेव—' स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वात् इत्यनेनेति ।

वर्धमानोपाध्यायाश्चारुचिबीजमन्यथा वर्णितवन्तः । सूत्राक्षरानुसारे स्थानान्यत्वेन नानात्वसूचनमुद्भावितम्—न पुनरेकत्वम्—एकत्वं च संशयबीजम् नानास्थानत्वादप्येकत्वं द्वितीयसूत्रांशेन सूचितम्—तत्र च नानात्वन्नोद्भावितम् उभयत्रापि संशयबीजमनुक्तमेव वर्तत इति ।

एवं सूत्रं यथाश्रुतमसम्बद्धं ज्ञात्वा तच्छब्दगतिमवधीर्यार्थगत्यैव व्याख्यातवान् भाष्यकारः ।

सूत्रार्थस्तु स्पष्ट एव—यदा वस्तूनि नानास्थानमधितिष्ठन्ति तदा तान्यपि नानैव भवन्ति, यथा घटपटौ । एकमेव च वस्तु नानास्थानान्यधितिष्ठत् दृष्टम्—यथा नानावयवेष्वेक एवावयवी । एवं च यदा वयमिन्द्रियाणि नानास्थानान्यधितिष्ठन्तीति पश्यामस्तदा जायते संशयः—किमेतानि घटपटवन्नाना–उतावयविवदेकमेवेति ।

१ भिन्नस्थानेष्विति । अत्र नानास्थानत्वनिमित्त इन्द्रियेष्वेकानेकत्वसंशयः ।

२ एकमिन्द्रियमिति पूर्वपक्षः । तदुद्भावकं सूत्रम्—त्वगव्यतिरेकादिति ।

३ नेन्द्रियान्तरार्थेति पूर्वपक्षव्युदासभाष्यम् ।

"त्वगवयवविशेषेण धूमोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः। यथा त्वचोऽवयवविशेषः कश्चिच्चक्षुषि सन्निकृष्टो धूमस्पर्शं गृह्णाति नान्यः, एवं त्वचोऽवयवविशेषा रूपादिग्राहकास्तेषामुपघातादन्धादिभिर्न गृह्यन्ते रूपादय इति"।

व्याहतत्वादहेतुः। त्वगव्यतिरेकादेकमिन्द्रियमित्युक्त्वा 'त्वगवयवविशेषेण धूमोपलब्धिवद्रूपाद्युपलब्धिः' इत्युच्यते। एवञ्च सति नानाभूतानि विषयग्राहकाणि विषयव्यवस्थानात्–तद्भावे विषयग्रहणस्य भावात्तदुपघाते चाभावात्। तथा च पूर्वो वाद उत्तरेण वादेन व्याहन्यत[1] इति।

सन्दिग्धश्चाव्यतिरेकः। पृथिव्यादिभिरपि भूतैरिन्द्रियाधिष्ठानानि व्याप्तानि। न च तेष्वसत्सु विषयग्रहणं भवतीति। तस्मान्न त्वगन्यद्वा सर्वविषयमेकमिन्द्रियमिति ॥ ५३ ॥

न[2] युगपदर्थानुपलब्धेः ॥ ५४ ॥

आत्मा[3] मनसा सम्बध्यते, मन इन्द्रियेण, इन्द्रियं सर्वार्थैः सन्निकृष्टमिति—आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षेभ्यो युगपद्ग्रहणानि स्युः। न च युगपद्ग्-

१ व्याहन्यत इति। प्रागेकमिन्द्रियं त्वगित्यभ्युपगम्येदानीं त्वगवयवविशेषा रूपादिग्राहका इति ब्रुवाणः प्रतिषेध्यमनुजानातीति व्याघातः।

२ न युगपदिति सिद्धान्तनिरूपणपरं सूत्रम्। नैतदस्ति 'एकमिन्द्रियमिति'—कस्मात्—युगपदर्थानुलब्धेरिति सम्बन्धः।

३ आत्मा मनसेत्यादिभाष्यकारीयव्याख्याने वार्तिककारस्यारुचिः। तद्बीजं च तत्रैवोपन्यस्तम्। तद्यथा—यथैकेन्द्रियवादिनो युगपदनेकार्थसन्निधाने सति युगपदुलब्धिर्दोषो भवति, तथानेकेन्द्रियवादिनोऽप्येकेन्द्रियग्राह्येषु युगपदुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः। य एव चात्र परिहारः स एवैकेन्द्रियवादिनोऽपीति।

वस्तुतस्तु न ज्ञानानां यौगपद्यमिह विवक्षितम्–किन्तु एकदैवार्थानां ग्रहणमिति परिशुद्धिः।

भाष्यकारीयव्याख्यानं दूषयित्वा सूत्रमन्यथा व्याख्यातवान् वार्तिककारः। यत्तदेकमिन्द्रियं सर्वार्थमित्येकेन्द्रियवादी मन्यते तत् किं प्राप्यकारि उत न। यदि प्राप्यकारि, तर्हि किं तदिति वक्तव्यम्। यदि त्वगेव तत्—तर्हि त्वचाऽप्राप्तानां रूपाणामग्रहणप्रसङ्गः। अथाप्राप्तमेव रूपं गृह्यते—स्पर्शादिष्वप्येमेव प्रसङ्गः। अथ किञ्चिदिन्द्रियम्प्राप्तं गृह्णाति किञ्चिच्चाप्राप्तम्–एवं सति करणधर्मातिक्रमः। "भवतु करणधर्मातिक्रमः। किं नो बाध्यत" इति चेत्—तन्निराकरणपरमिदं सूत्रम्–'न युगपदि'ति। यथाऽनेकेन्द्रियवादिन एकेन्द्रियग्राह्येषु युगपदुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गे 'करणत्वादिति' परिहारस्सुवचः—तथायमेकेन्द्रियपक्षे न सम्भवति, तथाभूतस्य करणधर्मातिरेकाभ्युपगमादित्याशय इति।

पादयो गृह्यन्ते । तस्मान्नैकमिन्द्रियं सर्वविषयमस्तीति । असाहचर्याच्च विषयग्रहणानां नैकमिन्द्रियं सर्वविषयकम् । साहचर्ये हि विषयग्रहणानामन्धाद्यनुपपत्तिरिति ॥ ५४ ॥

विप्रतिषेधाच्च न त्वगेका ॥ ५५ ॥

न खलु त्वगेकमिन्द्रियं—व्याघातात् । त्वचा रूपाण्यप्राप्तानि गृह्यन्त इत्यप्राप्यकारित्वे स्पर्शादिष्वप्येवं प्रसङ्गः । स्पर्शादीनां च प्राप्तानां ग्रहणाद्रूपादीनामप्राप्तानामग्रहणमिति प्राप्तम् ।

" प्राप्याप्राप्यकारित्वमिति " चेत्—आवरणानुपपत्तेर्विषयमात्रस्य ग्रहणम् । अथापि मन्येत—" प्राप्ताः स्पर्शादयस्त्वचा गृह्यन्ते रूपाणि त्वप्राप्तानीति" एवं सति नास्त्यावरणम् । आवरणानुपपत्तेश्च रूपमात्रस्य ग्रहणं व्यवहितस्य चेति । दूरान्तिकानुविधानं च रूपोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्योर्न स्यात् । अप्राप्तं त्वचा गृह्यते रूपमिति दूरे रूपस्याग्रहणमन्तिके च ग्रहणमित्येतन्न स्यादिति ॥ ५५ ॥

एकत्वप्रतिषेधाच्च[१] नानात्वसिद्धौ स्थापनाहेतुरप्युपादीयते—

इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात् ॥ ५६ ॥

अर्थः प्रयोजनं, तत् पञ्चविधमिन्द्रियाणाम् । स्पर्शनेनेन्द्रियेण स्पर्शग्रहणे सति न तेनैव रूपं गृह्यत इति रूपग्रहणप्रयोजनं चक्षुरनुमीयते । स्पर्शरूपग्रहणे च ताभ्यामेव न गन्धो गृह्यत इति गन्धग्रहणप्रयोजनं घ्राणमनुमीयते । त्रयाणां ग्रहणे न तैरेव रसो गृह्यत इति रसग्रहणप्रयोजनं रसनमनुमीयते । न चतुर्णां ग्रहणे तैरेव शब्दः श्रूयत इति शब्दग्रहणप्रयोजनं श्रोत्रमनुमीयते । एवमिन्द्रियप्रयोजनस्यानितरेतरसाधनसाध्यत्वात्पञ्चैवेन्द्रियाणि ॥ ५३ ॥

" न, तदर्थबहुत्वात् " ॥ ५७ ॥

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१ एकत्वप्रतिषेधादिति । अत्र वाक्ये—(१) 'एकत्वप्रतिषेधात्'-अनन्तरम्—नानात्वसिद्धौ स्थापनाहेतुरुपादीयते—(२) अथवा प्रतिषेधहेतुभिरेव 'एकत्वप्रतिषेधात्' एव 'नानात्वसिद्धौ' संपातायातम्—' स्थापनाहेतुरपि ' शिष्यशिक्षार्थं उपादीयत इति च—उभयथा सम्बन्धः ॥

अत्र परिशुद्धिकृतः—यद्यपि साधनदूषणमात्रेण साध्यं न निवर्तते तथाऽपि परसाध्यनिवृत्तिरेव यत्र साध्यते तत्र तद्विपरीतसिद्धिः । एतदभिप्रायेणैवैतद् भाष्यम् । प्रयोगस्त्वेवम्—एकत्र शरीरे नैकमिन्द्रियम् युगपद्विषयसन्निधानेऽपि क्रमवृत्तित्वात् —यत् पुनरेकं न तत् युगपद्विषयसन्निधानेऽपि क्रमवृत्ति—यथा चक्षुः—तथा चेन्द्रियम्—तस्मान्नैकमिति ।

"न खल्विन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात्पञ्चेन्द्रियाणीति सिद्ध्यति। कस्मात्? तेषामर्थानां बहुत्वात्। बहवः खल्विमे इन्द्रियार्थाः। स्पर्शास्तावच्छीतोष्णानुष्णाशीता इति। रूपाणि शुक्लहरितादीनि। गन्धा इष्टानिष्टोपेक्षणीयाः। रसाः कटुकादयः। शब्दा वर्णात्मानो ध्वनिमात्राश्च भिन्नाः। तद्यस्येन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात् पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि तस्येन्द्रियार्थबहुत्वाद्बहूनीन्द्रियाणि प्रसज्यन्त इति" ॥ ५७ ॥

गन्धत्वाद्यव्यतिरेकाद्गन्धादीनामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५८ ॥

गन्धत्वादिभिः स्वसामान्यैः कृतव्यवस्थानां गन्धादीनां यानि गन्धादिग्रहणानि तान्यसमानसाधनसाध्यत्वाद्ग्राहकान्तराणि न प्रयोजयन्ति। अर्थसमूहोऽनुमानमुक्तो नार्थैकदेशः। अर्थैकदेशं चाश्रित्य विषयपञ्चत्वमात्रं भवान्प्रतिषेधति। तस्माद्युक्तोऽयं प्रतिषेध इति।

"कथं पुनर्गन्धत्वादिभिः स्वसामान्यैः कृतव्यवस्था गन्धादय इति"?

स्पर्शः खल्वयं त्रिविधः—शीत उष्णोऽनुष्णाशीतश्च स्पर्शत्वेन स्वसामान्येन सङ्गृहीतः। गृह्यमाणे च शीतस्पर्शे नोष्णस्यानुष्णाशीतस्य वा स्पर्शस्य ग्रहणं ग्राहकान्तरं प्रयोजयति, स्पर्शभेदानामेकसाधनसाध्यत्वाद् येनैव शीतस्पर्शो गृह्यते तेनैवेतरावपीति। एवं गन्धत्वेन गन्धानां, रूपत्वेन रूपाणां, रसत्वेन रसानां, शब्दत्वेन शब्दानामिति।

गन्धादिग्रहणानि पुनरसमानसाधनसाध्यत्वाद् ग्राहकान्तराणां प्रयोजकानि। तस्मादुपपन्नमिन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वान् पञ्चेन्द्रियाणीति ॥ ५८ ॥

"यदि सामान्यं सङ्ग्राहकं, प्राप्तमिन्द्रियाणाम्—

"विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकादेकत्वम्" ॥ ५९ ॥

विषयत्वेन हि सामान्येन गन्धादयः सङ्गृहीता इति" ॥ ५९ ॥

न, बुद्धिलक्षणाधिष्ठानगत्याकृतिजातिपञ्चत्वेभ्यः ॥ ६० ॥

न खलु विषयत्वेन सामान्येन कृतव्यवस्था विषया ग्राहकान्तरनिरपेक्षा एकसाधनग्राह्या अनुमीयन्ते। अनुमीयन्ते च पञ्चगन्धादयो गन्धत्वादिभिः स्वसामान्यैः कृतव्यवस्था इन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्याः। तस्मादसम्बद्धमेतत्।

अयमेव चार्थोऽनूद्यते—बुद्धिलक्षणपञ्चत्वादिति। बुद्धय एव लक्षणानि, विषयग्रहणलिङ्गत्वादिन्द्रियाणाम्। तदेतत्—'इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात्' इत्येतस्मिन् सूत्रे कृतभाष्यमिति। तस्माद् बुद्धिलक्षणपञ्चत्वात्पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि।

अधिष्ठानान्यपि खलु पञ्चेन्द्रियाणाम्। सर्वशरीराधिष्ठानं स्पर्शनं स्पर्शग्रहणलिङ्गम्। कृष्णसाराधिष्ठानं चक्षुः बहिर्निःसृतं रूपग्रहणलिङ्गम्। नासाधिष्ठानं घ्राणम्, जिह्वाधिष्ठानं रसनम्, कर्णच्छिद्राधिष्ठानं श्रोत्रम्, गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दग्रहणलिङ्गत्वादिति।

गतिभेदादपीन्द्रियभेदः। कृष्णसारोपनिबद्धं चक्षुर्बहिर्निःसृत्य रूपाधिकरणानि द्रव्याणि प्राप्नोति। स्पर्शनादीनि त्विन्द्रियाणि विषया एवाश्रयोपसर्पणात् प्रत्यासीदन्ति। सन्तानवृत्त्या शब्दस्य श्रोत्रप्रत्यासत्तिरिति।

आकृतिः खलु परिमाणमियत्ता। सा पञ्चधा। स्वस्थानमात्राणि घ्राणरसनस्पर्शनानि विषयग्रहणेनानुमेयानि। चक्षुः कृष्णसाराश्रयं बहिर्निःसृतं विषयव्यापि। श्रोत्रं नान्यदाकाशात्। तच्च विभु, शब्दमात्रानुभवानुमेयं, पुरुषसंस्कारोपग्रहाच्चाधिष्ठाननियमेन शब्दस्य व्यञ्जकमिति।

जातिरिति योनिं प्रचक्षते। पञ्च खल्विन्द्रिययोनयः—पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि। तस्मात्प्रकृतिपञ्चत्वादपि पञ्चेन्द्रियाणीति सिद्धम् ॥ ६० ॥

"कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते भूतप्रकृतीनीन्द्रियाणि नाव्यक्तप्रकृतीनीति"—

भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धेस्तादात्म्यम् ॥ ६१ ॥

दृष्टो हि वाय्वादीनां भूतानां गुणविशेषाभिव्यक्तिनियमः। वायुः स्पर्शव्यञ्जकः। आपो रसव्यञ्जिकाः। तेजो रूपव्यञ्जकम्। पार्थिवं किञ्चिद् द्रव्यं कस्यचिद् द्रव्यस्य गन्धव्यञ्जकम्। अस्ति चायमिन्द्रियाणां भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धिनियमः[1]। तेन भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धेर्मन्यामहे भूतप्रकृतीनीन्द्रियाणि नाव्यक्तप्रकृतीनीति ॥ ६१ ॥

१ भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धिनियम इति। 'पार्थिवं घ्राणम्, रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शेषु नियमेन गन्धस्य व्यञ्जकत्वा' दित्येवं रूपो नियमोऽत्र विवक्षितः।

अत्रेदमवधेयम्। इन्द्रियपञ्चत्वेन हस्तपादपायूपस्थवाचामिन्द्रियत्वनिषेधोऽपि सूचितः, तेषामिन्द्रियलक्षणविरहात्। यच्छरीरसंयुक्तं संस्कारदोषव्यतिरिक्तं साक्षात्प्रतीतिसाधनं तदिन्द्रियमिति हीन्द्रियलक्षणम्। न चैतदस्ति हस्तादिषु। "शरीराश्रितमसाधारणकारीन्द्रियमिति लक्षणं हस्तादिष्वपि वर्तत" इति चेत्—वक्तव्यं हस्तादीनामसाधारणं कार्यम्। "उक्तन्तत्—वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानामिति" चेत्—आदानविहरणोत्सर्गा वक्त्रहस्तादिभिरपि शक्याः कर्तुम्। अपि चास्ति कण्ठहृदयाऽऽमाशयपक्वाशयादीनामपि गिरणादि तत्तदसाधारणं कार्यमिति तान्यपीन्द्रियाणि प्रसज्येरन्—इति तात्पर्यकाराः।

(९) अर्थपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

गन्धादयः[1] पृथिव्यादिगुणा इत्युद्दिष्टम्[2] । उद्देशश्च पृथिव्यादीनामेकगुणत्वे चानेकगुणत्वे समान[3] इत्यत आह—

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दानां[4] स्पर्शपर्यन्ताः पृथिव्याः ॥ ६२ ॥

अप्तेजोवायूनां[5] पूर्वं पूर्वमपोह्याकाशस्योत्तरः ॥ ६३ ॥

स्पर्शपर्यन्तानामिति[6] विभक्तिविपरिणामः । आकाशस्योत्तरः शब्दः स्पर्शपर्यन्तेभ्य इति । कथं तर्हि तरब्निर्देशः ? स्वतन्त्रविनियोगसामर्थ्यात् । तेनोत्तरशब्दस्य परार्थाभिधानं विज्ञायते । उद्देशसूत्रे हि स्पर्शपर्यन्तेभ्यः परः शब्द इति । तन्त्रं[7] वा, स्पर्शस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । स्पर्शपर्यन्तेषु नियुक्तेषु योऽन्यस्तदुत्तरः शब्द इति ॥ ६३ ॥

"न,[8] सर्वगुणानुपलब्धेः" ॥ ६४ ॥

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१ गन्धादय इति । क्रमप्राप्तमर्थलक्षणं परिचिक्षिपमाणोऽर्थलक्षणम्पूर्वोक्त (१।१।१४) स्मारयति । प्रयोजनं चास्याः परीक्षाया इन्द्रियनानात्वसिद्धिः पृथिव्यादिलक्षणासिद्धिपरिहारश्च । समुच्चये हि नेन्द्रियपञ्चत्वं स्यात् ।

२ उद्दिष्टमिति–लक्षितमित्यर्थः । उद्देशस्तु सर्वेषां पदार्थानामाद्य एव सूत्रे कृत इति ध्येयम् ।

३ समान इति । नियोगविकल्पसमुच्चयैस्तुल्य इत्यर्थः । तत्र (१) नियोगे–घ्राणादिष्वेकस्य पृथिव्यादिष्वेक एव विषयः । (२) विकल्पे—कस्यचिदेकः कस्यचिद् द्वावित्येवमादिः । (३) समुच्चये–सर्वं सर्वत्रेति । तत्र गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दाः पृथिव्यादिगुणास्तदर्थाः (१।१।१४) इत्येतद्वाक्यं नियोगार्थं विकल्पार्थं समुच्चयार्थं वेति संशयः । अथवा गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्देष्वेव गुणत्वेन सन्देहः । गुणा हि केचित् सर्वद्रव्यसाधारणाः केचित्प्रतिनियतद्रव्यवृत्तयो दृष्टाः ।

४–५ नियमार्थं सूत्रद्वयम्–गन्धेति, अबिति च ।

६ स्पर्शपर्यन्तानामिति । पूर्वसूत्रगतस्पर्शपर्यन्ता इति पदस्यानुवृत्तिरबित्यादिसूत्रे कर्तव्या । तत्र तु विभक्तिविपरिणामः कर्तव्यः । स्पर्शपर्यन्ता इति प्रथमान्तस्थाने स्पर्शपर्यन्तानामिति षष्ठ्यन्तः कर्तव्य इत्यर्थः । तथा च स्पर्शपर्यन्तानां गन्धादीनाम्मध्ये पूर्वम्पूर्वमपोह्य अप्तेजोवायूनां गुणा इति सूत्रार्थः ।

७ तन्त्रं वेति । गन्धादिभ्यः परः स्पर्शः स्पर्शादयं (शब्दः) पर इति यावदुक्तं भवति तावदुक्तम्भवति 'उत्तर' इति ।

८ पूर्वपक्षी 'एकस्यैकमिति' नियोगपक्षमुत्थापयति–न सर्वगुणानुपलब्धेरिति सूत्रे ।

" नायं गुणनियमयोगः साधुः । कस्मात्? यस्य भूतस्य ये गुणा न ते तदात्मकेनेन्द्रियेण सर्वे उपलभ्यन्ते । पार्थिवेन हि घ्राणेन स्पर्शपर्यन्ता न गृह्यन्ते, गन्ध एव एको गृह्यते । एवं शेषेष्वपीति[1]" ॥ ६४ ॥

कथं तर्हीमे गुणा विनियोक्तव्या इति?—

" एकैकश्येनोत्तरोत्तरगुणसद्भावादुत्तरोत्तराणां तदनुपलब्धिः" ॥ ६५ ॥

" गन्धादीनामेकैको यथाक्रमं पृथिव्यादीनामेकैकस्य गुणः । अतस्तदनुपलब्धिः—तेषां तयोः तस्य चानुपलब्धिः—घ्राणेन रसरूपस्पर्शानां, रसनेन रूपस्पर्शयोः, चक्षुषा स्पर्शस्येति" ।

कथं तर्ह्यनेकगुणानि भूतानि गृह्यन्त इति? "संसर्गाच्चानेकगुणग्रहणम् । अबादिसंसर्गाच्च पृथिव्यां रसादयो गृह्यन्ते । एवं शेषेष्वपीति" ॥ ६५ ॥

नियमस्तर्हि न प्राप्नोति । संसर्गस्यानियमाच्चतुर्गुणा पृथिवी त्रिगुणा आपो द्विगुणं तेज एकगुणो वायुरिति ।

नियमश्चोपपद्यते । कथम्?—

" विष्टं[2] ह्यपरं परेण " ॥ ६६ ॥

" पृथिव्यादीनां पूर्वपूर्वमुत्तरेणोत्तरेण विष्टम् । अतः संसर्गनियम इति । तच्चैतद् भूतसृष्टौ[3] वेदितव्यं नैतर्हीति[4] " ॥ ६६ ॥

न, पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् ॥ ६७ ॥

नेति त्रिसूत्रीं प्रत्याचष्टे । कस्मात्? पार्थिवस्य द्रव्यस्याप्यस्य च

१ एवं शेषेष्विति । पृथिव्यादिप्रकृतीनां घ्राणादीनां गन्धादिप्रतिव्यक्तिनियम एवमुपपद्यते यदि गन्धमात्रगुणा पृथिवी रसमात्रगुणा आप इत्यादि, न त्वन्यथा । अन्यथा तु पार्थिवेन घ्राणेन गन्धवद् रूपरसस्पर्शा अपि व्यज्येरन्निति हृदयम् ।

२ विष्टमिति सूत्रम् । तत्र चन्द्रोक्तं व्याख्यानम्भाष्यसम्मतन्न प्रतिभाति । तदभिमतं तु प्रदर्शितन्तात्पर्यं तद्यथा—' अपरं ' पृथिव्यादि ' परेण ' अबादिना ' विष्टम् ' व्याप्तम् । नाबादिमन्तरेणास्ति पृथिवी । तेन पृथिव्यामबादिगुणानां रसादीनां नियमेनोपलम्भः, न त्वबादिषु पृथिवीगुणानाम् । एवमेवाप्सु अनलादिगुणो व्याख्यात इति ।

३ भूतसृष्टाविति । भूतसृष्ट्यादिप्रतिपादकेषु पुराणादिग्रन्थेष्वित्यर्थः ।

४ नैतर्हीति । नेदानीमिति यावत्—इदानीन्तनैरस्माभिस्तदननुभवादित्याशयः ।

प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । मह्त्त्वानेकद्रव्यवत्वाद्रूपाच्चोपलब्धिरिति[1] तैजसमेव द्रव्यं प्रत्यक्षं स्यात्, न पार्थिवमाप्यं वा, रूपाभावात् । तैजसवत्तु पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वान्न संसर्गादनेकगुणग्रहणं भूतानामिति । भूतान्तररूपकृतं च पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वं ब्रुवतः प्रत्यक्षो वायुः प्रसज्यते । नियमे वा कारणमुच्यतामिति ।

रसयोर्वा[2] पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । पार्थिवो रसः षड्विधः, आप्यो मधुर एव । न चैतत्संसर्गाद्भवितुमर्हति । रूपयोर्वा पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् तैजसरूपानुगृहीतयोः । संसर्गे हि व्यञ्जकमेव रूपं न व्यङ्ग्यमस्तीति । एकानेकविधत्वे च पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वाद् रूपयोः । पार्थिवं हरितलोहितपीताद्यनेकविधं रूपमाप्यं तु शुक्लमप्रकाशकम् । न चैतदेकगुणानां संसर्गे सत्युपपद्यत इति ।

उदाहरणमात्रं[3] चैतत् । अतः परं प्रपञ्चः ।

स्पर्शयोर्वा पार्थिवतैजसयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । पार्थिवोऽनुष्णाशीतः स्पर्शः उष्णस्तैजसः प्रत्यक्षः । न चैतदेकगुणानामनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शेन वायुना संसर्गेणोपपद्यत इति ।

अथ वा पार्थिवाप्ययोर्द्रव्ययोर्व्यवस्थितगुणयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । चतुर्गुणं पार्थिवं द्रव्यम्, त्रिगुणमाप्यं प्रत्यक्षम् । तेन तत्कारणमनुमीयते तथागुण्यमिति[4] । तस्य कार्यं लिङ्गम्, कारणभावाद्धि कार्यभाव इति । एवं तैजसवायव्ययोर्द्रव्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वाद् गुणव्यवस्थायास्तत्कारणे द्रव्ये व्यवस्थाऽनुमानमिति ।

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१ महत्त्वेति । त्रिविधं हि द्रव्यं चाक्षुषमिष्यते—पार्थिवमाप्यं तैजसं च । तत्र रूपवत्त्वेन तैजसमेव चाक्षुषं स्यात्, नेतरत्, अरूपवत्त्वात् । न च "रूपिद्रव्यसंसर्गाच्चाक्षुषत्वमरूपयोरपि पार्थिवाप्ययोः" इति वाच्यम् । तथा सति नभोनभस्वतोरपि अरूपवतोः चाक्षुषत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अस्ति हि रूपवता तेजसा तयोरपि संयोग इति ।

२ रसयोरित्यादि 'उपपद्यत' इत्यन्तस्य ग्रन्थसन्दर्भस्य संक्षेपार्थो वर्णितस्तात्पर्यकारेण—पार्थिवाप्यसम्बन्धिनो रसभेदस्य रूपभेदस्य चैकानेकविधत्वेन प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति सूत्रस्थहेतोरन्यथा व्याख्यानमिति ।

३ उदाहरणमात्रमिति । पार्थिवतैजसयोरप्येवमेव व्याख्यानं युक्तमिति भावः ।

४ तथागुण्यमिति । कार्यस्य व्यवस्थितगुणस्य दर्शनात् कारणमपि व्यवस्थितगुणमनुमीयत इत्यर्थः ।

दृष्टश्च विवेकः—पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात्। पार्थिवं द्रव्यमबादिभिर्वियुक्तं प्रत्यक्षतो गृह्यते, आप्यं च पराभ्यां, तैजसं च वायुना। न चैकैकगुणं गृह्यत इति। निरनुमानं तु—'विष्टं ह्यपरं परेण' इत्येतदिति। नात्र लिङ्गमनुमापकं गृह्यत इति येनैतदेवं प्रतिपद्येमहि।

यच्चोक्तं—"विष्टं ह्यपरं परेणेति भूतसृष्टौ वेदितव्यं न साम्प्रतमिति"—नियमकारणाभावादयुक्तम्[1]। दृष्टं च साम्प्रतमपरं परेण विष्टमिति—वायुना च विष्टं तेज इति। विष्टत्वं[2] संयोगः। स च द्वयोः समानः[3]। वायुना च विष्टत्वात् स्पर्शवत्तेजो, न तु तेजसा विष्टत्वाद् रूपवान्वायुरिति नियमकारणं नास्तीति। दृष्टं च तैजसेन स्पर्शेन वायव्यस्य स्पर्शस्याभिभवादग्रहणमिति। न च तेनैव तस्याभिभव इति॥ ६७॥

तदेवं न्यायविरुद्धं प्रवादं प्रतिषिध्य 'न सर्वगुणानुपलब्धे'रिति चोदितं समाधीयते—

पूर्वपूर्व[4]गुणोत्कर्षात्तत्तत्प्रधानम्॥ ६८॥

१ नियमकारणाभावादिति। नियमः—गन्धश्च वै पृथिव्यामित्येवमादिः। तस्य कारणं प्रमाणं त्वन्मते नास्ति—तद्बाधकस्यैव प्रमाणस्य त्वयोक्तत्वात्। तस्माद् भूतसृष्टिः कथंचिदुपचारतो व्याख्येयेत्यर्थः।

२ विष्टत्वमिति। आस्तान्तावत्प्रत्यक्षबाधः। विकल्पतोऽपि विष्टत्वन्नोपपद्यत इत्यभिप्रायः।

३ द्वयोः समान इति। अन्यगुणो यदन्यत्रोपलभ्यते तत् किं संयोगादुत व्याप्तेः। यदि व्याप्तेः, नायोगोलके वह्निसम्पृक्ते वह्निगुणा गृह्येरन्, तयोर्व्याप्यव्यापकभावाभावात्। तस्मादन्यसंयोग एव हेतुः। स च द्वयोरविशिष्ट इति तेजसा संयुक्तस्य वायोरपि रूपवत्त्वेन चाक्षुषत्वप्रसङ्ग इति।

४ पूर्वपूर्वेति सूत्रम्। घ्राणादीनाम्मध्ये यत् पूर्वं पूर्वं तत् गुणस्यैकस्य उत्कर्षात् (अर्थात् अभिव्यक्तिसामर्थ्यात्) तत्तत्प्रधानम् (स स गुणः प्रधानो यस्य तत्)। एवं च घ्राणं गन्धप्रधानम्, रसनं रसप्रधानमित्यादि सूत्रार्थो भाष्यसम्मतः।

अत्र तु वार्तिककारस्यानभिरुचिः। विषयग्राहकत्वं चेत् प्रधानत्वं ततः सर्वेषामिन्द्रियाणां विषयग्राहकत्वात् सर्वाणि प्रधानानि—इत्यरुचिबीजम्।

किन्तु यस्मिन् व्याख्याने वार्तिककारस्यारुचिर्न तद्भाष्यकारस्य विवक्षितमिति ध्येयम्। 'तत्तत्प्रधानम्' इत्यस्य नायमर्थो यत् पूर्वं पूर्वमिन्द्रियमपरस्मात्प्रधानम्—अपि तु स स गुणः प्रधानो यस्य तदेव पूर्वं पूर्वमिन्द्रियमिति। न चात्र व्याख्याने वार्तिकोक्तदूषणस्यावकाशः।

तस्मान्न सर्वगुणोपलब्धिः । घ्राणादीनां पूर्वं पूर्वं गन्धादेर्गुणस्योत्कर्षात्तत्प्रधानम् । का प्रधानता ? विषयग्राहकत्वम् । को गुणोत्कर्षः ? अभिव्यक्तौ समर्थत्वम् । यथा बाह्यानां पार्थिवाप्यतैजसानां द्रव्याणां चतुर्गुणत्रिगुणद्विगुणानां न सर्वगुणव्यञ्जकत्वं, गन्धरसरूपोत्कर्षात्तु यथाक्रमं गन्धरसरूपव्यञ्जकत्वम्, एवं घ्राणरसनचक्षुषां चतुर्गुणत्रिगुणद्विगुणानां न सर्वगुणग्राहकत्वम्, गन्धरसरूपोत्कर्षात्तु यथाक्रमं गन्धरसरूपग्राहकत्वम् । तस्माद् घ्राणादिभिर्न सर्वेषां गुणानामुपलब्धिरिति ।

यस्तु प्रतिजानीते–गन्धगुणत्वाद् घ्राणं गन्धस्य ग्राहकमेवं रसनादिष्वपीति तस्य यथा²गुणयोगं घ्राणादिभिर्गुणग्रहणं प्रसज्यत इति ॥ ६८ ॥

"किं कृतं पुनर्व्यवस्थानं–किञ्चित्पार्थिवमिन्द्रियं, न सर्वाणि, कानिचिदाप्यतैजसवायव्यानि इन्द्रियाणि, न सर्वाणीति ?"–

तद्व्यवस्थानं तु भूयस्त्वात् ॥ ६९ ॥

अर्थनिर्वृत्तिसमर्थस्य प्रविभक्तस्य द्रव्यस्य संसर्गः पुरुषसंस्कारकारितो 'भूयस्त्वम्' । दृष्टो हि प्रकर्षे भूयस्त्वशब्दः–प्रकृष्टो यथा विषयो भूयानित्युच्यते । यथा पृथगर्थक्रियासमर्थानि पुरुषसंस्कारवशाद्विषौषधिमणिप्रभृतीनि द्रव्याणि निर्वर्त्यन्ते, न सर्वं सर्वार्थम्, एवं पृथग्विषयग्रहणसमर्थानि घ्राणादीनि निर्वर्त्यन्ते, न सर्वविषयग्रहणसमर्थानीति ॥ ६९ ॥

"स्व³गुणान्नोपलभन्त इन्द्रियाणि कस्मादिति चेत्"–

वर्धमानोपाध्यायास्त्वेवं व्याचक्षते । पूर्वं पूर्वं घ्राणादिगुणानां गन्धादीनामुत्कर्षात्—उत्तररसनाद्यवृत्तित्वे सति पूर्ववृत्तित्वात्—तत्तत्प्रधानम् । तेन तेन गुणेन प्रधानमित्यर्थः यतस्तस्माद् घ्राणादिना न सर्वगुणोपलब्धिः । तथा च येनैव गुणेनोक्तरूपं प्रधानं स एवोद्भूतस्तेन गृह्यते न सर्वे–इति भाव इति ।

१ उत्कर्षादिति । सर्वेषां समवायाविशेषेऽपि गन्धस्यैव घ्राणे उत्कर्ष इति गन्धमेव गृह्णाति । तेनागन्धवत्त्वनिषेधपरं प्राधान्याभिधानम् । न पुनर्गन्धवत्त्वं गन्धग्रहणे प्रयोजकमपि तु गन्धस्योत्कर्ष इति सिद्धम् ।

२ तस्य यथा गुणयोगमिति । "गन्धमात्रगुणत्वादेव घ्राणं गन्धस्य व्यञ्जकं न तु गन्धस्य तत्रोत्कर्षात्" इति यः प्रतिजानीते तस्य वादिनः सर्वेषामेव पार्थिवान गुणानां घ्राणग्राह्यत्वप्रसङ्ग इति भावः ।

३ स्वगुणानिति–सूत्रोपोद्घातपरं वाक्यम् । वृत्तिकृतस्त्वन्यथैवोपोद्घातमाहुः—घ्राणादीनां गन्धादिगुणवत्त्वे मानमाहेति ।

सगुणानामिन्द्रियभावात् ॥ ७० ॥

"स्वान् गन्धादीन्नोपलभन्ते घ्राणादीनि। केन कारणेनेति चेत्"- स्वगुणैः सह घ्राणादीनामिन्द्रियभावात्। घ्राणं स्वेन गन्धेन समानार्थकारिणा सह बाह्यं गन्धं गृह्णाति। तस्य स्वगन्धग्रहणं सहकारिवैकल्यान्न भवति। एवं शेषाणामपि ॥ ७० ॥

"यदि पुनर्गन्धः सहकारी च स्याद् घ्राणस्य, ग्राह्यश्चे"त्यत आह—

तेनैव[1] तस्याग्रहणाच्च ॥ ७१ ॥

न स्वगुणोपलब्धिरिन्द्रियाणाम्। यो ब्रूते-'यथा बाह्यं द्रव्यं चक्षुषा गृह्यते तथा तेनैव चक्षुषा तदेव चक्षुर्गृह्यतामिति'-तादृगिदम्। तुल्यो ह्युभयत्र प्रतिपत्तिहेत्वभाव इति ॥ ७१ ॥

"न, शब्दगुणोपलब्धेः" ॥ ७२ ॥

"स्वगुणान्नोपलभन्त इन्द्रियाणीति,-एतन्न भवति। उपलभ्यते हि स्वगुणः शब्दः श्रोत्रेणेति" ॥ ७२ ॥

तदुपलब्धिरितरेतरद्रव्यगुणवैधर्म्यात्[2] ॥ ७३ ॥

न शब्देन गुणेन सगुणमाकाशमिन्द्रियं भवति। न शब्दः शब्दस्य व्यञ्जकः। न च घ्राणादीनां स्वगुणग्रहणं प्रत्यक्षम्-नाप्यनुमीयते। अनुमीयते तु श्रोत्रेणाकाशेन शब्दस्य ग्रहणं शब्दगुणत्वं च आकाशस्येति। परिशेषश्चानुमानं वेदितव्यम्। आत्मा तावच्छ्रोता, न करणम्। मनसः श्रोत्रत्वे बधिरत्वाभावः। पृथिव्यादीनां घ्राणादिभावे सामर्थ्यं श्रोत्रभावे चासामर्थ्यम्। अस्ति चेदं श्रोत्रम्। आकाशं च शिष्यते। परिशेषादाकाशं श्रोत्रमिति ॥ ७३ ॥

इति श्रीवात्स्यायनीये न्यायभाष्ये तृतीयाध्यायस्याद्यमाह्निकम् ॥

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१ तेनैवेतिसूत्रं वृत्तिकारोऽन्यथा व्याख्यातवान्। तद्यथा इत्थं च गन्धादिसिद्धौ अप्रत्यक्षत्वादनुद्भूतत्वकल्पनमित्याशयेनाह-तेनैवेति। 'तेन' इन्द्रियेण 'तस्य' सगुणस्य इन्द्रियस्य 'अग्रहणात्' अनुद्भूतत्वकल्पनमिति।

२ तदुपलब्धिरितिसूत्रम्। यथेतराणीन्द्रियाणि सगुणानि न तथाऽऽकाशम्। कस्मात्? शब्दस्येतरगुणवैधर्म्यात्, आकाशस्य चेतरद्रव्यवैधर्म्यादित्यर्थः। न श्रोत्रं सशब्दमिन्द्रियमिति भावः।

अथ तृतीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ।

(१) बुद्ध्यनित्यताप्रकरणम् ।

परीक्षितानीन्द्रियाण्यर्थाश्च[1] । बुद्धेरिदानीं परीक्षाक्रमः । सा किमनित्या नित्या वेति ? कुतः संशयः ?

कर्माकाशसाधर्म्यात् संशयः ॥ १ ॥

अस्पर्शवत्त्वं ताभ्यां समानो धर्म उपलभ्यते बुद्धौ । विशेषश्चोपजना-[2]पायधर्मवत्त्वं विपर्ययश्च यथास्वमनित्यनित्ययोस्तस्यां बुद्धौ नोपलभ्यते । तेन संशय इति ॥ १ ॥

" अनुपपन्नरूपः[3] खल्वयं संशयः । सर्वशरीरिणां हि प्रत्यात्मवेदनीया अनित्या बुद्धिः सुखादिवत् । भवति च संवित्तिः—ज्ञास्यामि जानामि अज्ञासिषमिति । न चोपजनापायावन्तरेण त्रैकाल्यव्यक्तिः । ततश्च त्रैकाल्यव्यक्तेरनित्या बुद्धिरित्येतत्सिद्धम् । प्रमाणसिद्धं चेदं शास्त्रेऽप्युक्तम्—' इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नम् ,'—' युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् ' इत्येवमादि । तस्मात्संशयप्रक्रियानुपपत्तिरिति " ।

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१ परीक्षितानीति । बाह्यप्रमेयपरीक्षां विधाय शरीरान्तर्वृत्तिप्रमेयपरीक्षामारभते—इति परिशुद्धिः । तत्र निबन्धप्रकाशकृतः—शरीरान्तर्वृत्तित्वं न तावच्छरीरान्तस्समवेतत्वम्, बुद्धिमनसोरतथात्वात् । नापि तत्संयुक्तत्वम् , बुद्धौ तदभावात् शरीराद्यतिव्यापकत्वाच्च ।

एवं च शरीरावच्छेद्यव्याप्यभोगानुकूलसम्बन्धवद्वृत्तिकारणप्रमेयविभाजकोपाधिमत्प्रमेयपरीक्षैव द्वितीयाह्निकार्थ इति वक्तुं युक्तम् । तद्रूपस्य निर्वेदोपयोगेन तत्र जिज्ञासोत्पत्तेः । न चातिव्याप्तिः । आत्मादिचतुष्के भोगानुकूलसम्बन्धस्य शरीरानवच्छेद्यत्वात् । अतिप्रसक्तेनापि रूपेणैकवाक्यतानिर्वाहाद्वा । तेन रूपेण बुद्धिमनसोरेव विवक्षितत्वात् । यद्यप्येतावताऽपि नाह्निकयोः सङ्गतिरुक्ता बुद्धिमात्रस्याह्निकार्थाभावेनोत्तराह्निकार्थानभिधानात्—तथाऽपि बुद्धिपदस्योपलक्षणतया मनसोऽप्युपग्रहो भवत्येवेति ।

२ विशेषश्चेति । ' विशेषश्च—उपजनापायधर्मवत्त्वम्—अनित्यनित्ययोः विपर्ययः बुद्धौ नोपलभ्यते '—इति सम्बन्धः ।

३ अनुपपन्नेति । यद्युपलभ्यमानज्ञानविषयः संशयः, सोऽनुपपन्नः साङ्ख्यानामपि तदनित्यत्वस्याभ्युपगमात् । अथ साङ्ख्याभिमतमहत्तत्त्वविषयः, तस्य महत्त-

दृष्टिप्रवादोपालम्भार्थं[1] तु प्रकरणम् ।

एवं हि पश्यन्तः प्रवदन्ति साङ्ख्याः—"पुरुषस्यान्तःकरणभूता नित्या बुद्धिरिति"।

साधनं च प्रचक्षते—

"विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानात्[2]" ॥ २ ॥

"किं पुनरिदं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्? यं पूर्वमज्ञासिषमर्थं तमिमं जानामीति ज्ञानयोः समानेऽर्थे प्रतिसन्धिज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्। एतच्चावस्थिताया बुद्धेरुपपन्नम्। नानात्वे तु बुद्धिभेदेषूत्पन्नापवर्गिषु प्रत्यभिज्ञानानुपपत्तिः। नान्यज्ञातमन्यः प्रत्यभिजानातीति" ॥ २ ॥

साध्यसमत्वादहेतुः[3] ॥ ३ ॥

यथा खलु नित्यत्वं बुद्धेः साध्यमेवं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमपीति। किं कारणम्? चेतनधर्मस्य करणेऽनुपपत्तिः। पुरुषधर्मः खल्वयं—ज्ञानं दर्शनमुपलब्धिर्बोधः

स्वस्य सत्त्व एव विप्रतिपत्तिरिति कुतस्तद्गतधर्मविचारः। सति धर्मिणि धर्मश्चिन्त्यते न सन्दिग्धसत्त्व इति।

१ दृष्टिप्रवादेति। साङ्ख्यानां हि दर्शने प्रवादो महदन्तःकरणं बुद्धिरिति—'तदुपालम्भनार्थं' दूषणार्थं 'प्रकरणमिति। अयमभिप्रायः—नेह नित्यानित्यविचारः प्रधानतः, अपि त्वनया द्वारा वृत्तेरतिरिक्ता साङ्ख्याभिमता बुद्धिर्निराक्रियते, सामान्यतो बुद्धिमात्रस्य नित्यानित्यत्वविचारेण। यदि हि नित्या बुद्धिः स्यात्ततो वृत्तिभ्य उदयवतीभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तं महत्तत्त्वमन्तःकरणं स्यात्। अथ तु नित्यत्वसाधनानि प्रतिसन्धानादीनि न बुद्धिनित्यत्वसाधनायालमिति वृत्तय एव बुद्धयो न तदतिरिक्तं बुद्धितत्त्वं सिध्यतीति सिध्यति 'बुद्धिरुपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्' (सूत्रं १।१।१५) इति बुद्धिलक्षणम्। तथा चास्य विचारस्य लक्षण एव सङ्गतिः। इतरथा तु प्रधानतो नित्यानित्यविचारो न लक्षणेन सङ्गच्छते।

२ बुद्धिनित्यत्वसाधनप्रदर्शनपरं सूत्रम्—विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानादिति। वृत्तिमान् किल विषयं प्रत्यभिजानन् आत्मानमपि प्रत्यभिजानाति। न च चेतनो वृत्तिमान्, तस्य कूटस्थनित्यत्वात्। अन्यथा तु पूर्वापरावस्थाभेदवान्न कूटस्थनित्यः स्यात्। परिणामिनित्या तु बुद्धिरुदयव्ययवदनेकवृत्तिमती युज्यत इति भावः।

३ पूर्वसूत्रोक्तसाधनदूषणपरं सूत्रम्—साध्यसमत्वादिति। वृत्तयो हि वृत्तिमतो भिन्नाः। तेन तासामनित्यत्वेऽपि न वृत्तिमान् कौटस्थ्याच्च्यवते। तथा च प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् प्रत्यभिज्ञाता आत्मैव नित्यः स्यात्, न त्वन्तःकरणं बुद्धिसंज्ञकम्। न हि तत् प्रत्यभिज्ञाने प्रकाशत इत्याशयः।

प्रत्ययोऽध्यवसाय इति। चेतनो हि पूर्वज्ञातमर्थं प्रत्यभिजानाति। तस्यैतस्माद्धेतोर्नित्यत्वं युक्तमिति। करणचैतन्याभ्युपगमे तु चेतनस्वरूपं वचनीयम्। नानिर्दिष्टस्वरूपमात्मान्तरं शक्यमस्तीति प्रतिपत्तुम्। ज्ञानं चेद्बुद्धेरन्तःकरणस्याभ्युपगम्यते, चेतनस्येदानीं किं स्वरूपं को धर्मः किं तत्त्वम्? ज्ञानेन च बुद्धौ वर्तमानेनायं चेतनः किं करोतीति?

"चेतयत इति चेत्" न, ज्ञानादर्थान्तरवचनम्। पुरुषश्चेतयते बुद्धिर्जानातीति नेदं ज्ञानादर्थान्तरमुच्यते। चेतयते जानीते बुध्यते पश्यति उपलभते इत्येकोऽयमर्थ इति। "बुद्धिर्ज्ञापयतीति चेत्" अद्धा, जानीते पुरुषो बुद्धिर्ज्ञापयतीति सत्यमेतत्। एवं चाभ्युपगमे ज्ञानं पुरुषस्येति सिद्धं भवति, न बुद्धेरन्तःकरणस्येति।

प्रतिपुरुषं च शब्दान्तरव्यवस्थाप्रतिज्ञाने प्रतिषेधहेतुवचनम्। यश्च प्रतिजानीते—"कश्चित्पुरुषश्चेतयते कश्चिद्बुध्यते कश्चिदुपलभते कश्चित्पश्यतीति" पुरुषान्तराणि खल्विमानि—चेतनो बोद्धोपलब्धा द्रष्टेति नैकस्यैते धर्मा इति। अत्र कः प्रतिषेधहेतुरिति।

"अर्थस्याभेद[1] इति चेत्"—समानम्। "अभिन्नार्था एते शब्दा इति तत्र व्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः"—इत्येवं चेन्मन्यसे—समानं भवति—पुरुषश्चेतयते बुद्धिर्जानीते इत्यत्राप्यर्थो न भिद्यते। तत्रोभयोश्चेतनत्वादन्यतरलोप इति।

"यदि पुनर्बुध्यतेऽनयेति बोधनं बुद्धिर्मन एवोच्यते, तच्च नित्यम्"—अस्त्वेतदेवम्। न तु मनसो विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानान्नित्यत्वम्। दृष्टं हि करणभेदे ज्ञातुरेकत्वात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्—'सव्यदृष्टस्येतरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानादिति' चक्षुर्वत्, प्रदीपवच्च प्रदीपान्तरदृष्टस्य प्रदीपान्तरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानमिति। तस्माज्ज्ञातुरयं नित्यत्वे हेतुरिति ॥ ३ ॥

१ अर्थस्य अभेद इति वार्तिकसम्मतः पाठः। 'चेतयते'—'बुद्ध्यते'—इत्यादिशब्दानामेकमेवाभिधेयम्—ततश्च एकेनैव ज्ञात्रा पुरुषेण तेषां सर्वेषामभिसम्बन्ध इति न युक्तं भवति। एवं यदि पूर्वपक्षिणोऽभिप्रायस्तर्हि स एवार्थाभेदस्तस्यापि पक्षे न युज्यते एव। तथा हि 'बुद्धिर्जानाति'—'पुरुषश्चेतयते'—इत्यनयोर्वाक्ययोः ज्ञानचेतनयोरेकार्थत्वात्तयोः सम्बन्धस्य बुद्धिपुरुषयोर्द्वयोः कर्तुमयुक्तमेव भवति। वरमेकस्यैव सम्बन्धोऽभ्युपगन्तुमित्याशयः।

प्राचीनतालपत्रपुस्तकानुसारेण 'अर्थस्य भेद' इत्येव पाठः। स एव च भाष्यचन्द्रसम्मतः। तदनुसारेण सन्दर्भस्यास्यार्थश्चन्द्रादेवावगन्तव्यः।

यच्च मन्यते—" बुद्धेरवस्थिताया यथाविषयं वृत्तयो ज्ञानानि निश्चरन्ति, वृत्तिश्च वृत्तिमतो नान्येति "—

तच्च—

न[1], युगपद्ग्रहणात् ॥ ४ ॥

वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरनन्यत्वे वृत्तिमतोऽवस्थानाद् वृत्तीनामवस्थानमिति, यानीमानि विषयग्रहणानि तान्यवतिष्ठन्त इति युगपद् विषयाणां ग्रहणं प्रसज्यत इति ॥ ४ ॥

अप्रत्यभिज्ञाने[2] च विनाशप्रसङ्गः ॥ ५ ॥

अतीते च प्रत्यभिज्ञाने वृत्तिमानप्यतीत इत्यन्तःकरणस्य विनाशः प्रसज्यते, विपर्यये च नानात्वमिति ॥ ५ ॥

अविभु चैकं मनः पर्यायेणेन्द्रियैः संयुज्यत इति—

क्रमवृत्तित्वादयुगपद्ग्रहणम्[3] ॥ ६ ॥

इन्द्रियार्थानाम् । वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोर्नानात्वादिति[4] । एकत्वे च प्रादुर्भावतिरोभावयोरभाव इति ॥ ६ ॥

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानं च विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गात् ॥ ७ ॥

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानमनुपलब्धिः । अनुपलब्धिश्च कस्यचिदर्थस्य विषयान्तरव्यासक्ते मनस्युपपद्यते, वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोर्नानात्वात्, एकत्वे हि अनर्थको व्यासङ्ग इति ॥ ७ ॥

विभुत्वे चान्तःकरणस्य पर्यायेणेन्द्रियैः संयोगः—

न[5], गत्यभावात् ॥ ८ ॥

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१ न युगपदितिसूत्रम् । वृत्तिमतोऽवस्थानात् वृत्त्यवस्थानप्रसङ्ग इति तदर्थः ।

२ अप्रत्यभिज्ञान इतिसूत्रम् । वृत्तीनामपगमे वृत्तिमतोऽप्यपगम इति तदर्थः ।

३ क्रमवृत्तित्वादयुगपद्ग्रहणमितिसूत्रम् । ' अयुगपद्ग्रहणम् ' ' इन्द्रियार्थानाम् '—इति भाष्येण सम्बन्धः ।

४ वृत्तीति । यत इन्द्रियार्थानामयुगपद्ग्रहणं भवति तत एव वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोर्नानात्वमिति ।

५ न गत्यभावादितिसूत्रम् । प्राप्तान्यन्तःकरणेनेन्द्रियाणीति तदर्थः ।

प्राप्तानीन्द्रियाण्यन्तःकरणेनेति प्राप्त्यर्थस्य गमनस्याभावः । तत्र क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावादयुगपद् ग्रहणानुपपत्तिरिति । गत्यभावाच्च प्रतिषिद्धं विभुनोऽन्तःकरणस्यायुगपद्ग्रहणं न लिङ्गान्तरेणानुमीयत इति । यथा चक्षुषो गतिः प्रतिषिद्धा सन्निकृष्टविप्रकृष्टयोस्तुल्यकालग्रहणात्पाणिचन्द्रमसोर्व्यवधानेन प्रतीघातेसानुमीयत इति ।

सोऽयं नान्तःकरणे विवादो न तस्य नित्यत्वे । सिद्धं हि मनोऽन्तःकरणं नित्यं चेति ।

" क्व तर्हि विवादः " ।

तस्य विभुत्वे । तच्च प्रमाणतोऽनुपलब्धेः प्रतिषिद्धमिति ।

एकं चान्तःकरणं नाना चैता ज्ञानात्मिका वृत्तयः—चक्षुर्विज्ञानं घ्राणविज्ञानं रूपविज्ञानं गन्धविज्ञानम् । एतच्च वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरेकत्वेऽनुपपन्नमिति । पुरुषो[1] जानीते नान्तःकरणमिति । एतेन[2] विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गः प्रत्युक्तः । विषयान्तरग्रहणलक्षणो विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गः पुरुषस्य नान्तःकरणस्येति । केनचिदिन्द्रियेण सन्निधिः केनचिदसन्निधिरित्ययं तु व्यासङ्गोऽनुज्ञायते मनस इति ॥ ८ ॥

" एकमन्तः[3]करणं नाना वृत्तय इति । सत्यभेदे वृत्तेरिदमुच्यते—

१ पुरुषो जानीत इति—स्वमतसाधनपरं भाष्यम् । यस्य पुनर्वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोर्नानात्वं तस्यान्तःकरणसाधनः चक्षुरादिसाधनश्चात्माऽर्थानुपलभत इति युक्तमेवेत्यर्थः ।

२ एतेनेति—यदपि साङ्ख्या आचचक्षिरे " विषयान्तरव्यासक्तेऽन्तःकरणे चक्षुरादिसम्बद्धस्याप्यर्थस्याज्ञानादन्तःकरणवृत्तिर्ज्ञानमिति "—तन्निराकरणपरं भाष्यम् । ' एतेन '—पुरुषो जानीते नान्तःकरणमिति हेतुना—' विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गः '—अन्तःकरणस्य—' प्रत्युक्तः ' । व्यासक्तो हि स भवति यो जानीते । न चान्तःकरणं जानीते, किन्तु पुरुष इति एतस्यैवेदृशो विषयान्तरग्रहणरूपो व्यासङ्गो, नान्तःकरणस्य । अन्यादृशस्त्वन्तःकरणस्य व्यासङ्ग इन्द्रियसंयोगरूपो न निषिध्यत इत्याशयः ।

३ एकमन्तःकरणमिति चोद्यभाष्यम् । ' वृत्तेः '—(वृत्तिमतः) ' अभेदे ' (सति), ' एकमन्तःकरणं नानावृत्तय '—इति—' इदम् उच्यते ' यत्—तत्र ' स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत्तदन्यत्वाभिमान ' एवेति सूत्रेण सम्बन्धः । अयं च पूर्वपक्षाशयः—यद्यपि वृत्तयो नाना प्रतिभान्ति, तथाऽपि भ्रान्तिरियम्, एकस्मादन्तःकरणादभिन्नानां नानात्वानुपपत्तेः । तस्मात् स्फटिकस्य यथैकस्यापि तापिच्छजपाकर्णिकारादिकुसुमोपधानभेदाद्भेद औपाधिकः—एवमन्तःकरणस्यापि स्वच्छस्येन्द्रियप्रणालिकया तत्तदर्थोपरक्तस्यौपाधिकं नानात्वम्—इति ॥

" स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत्तदन्यत्वाभिमानः" ॥ ९ ॥

" तस्यां वृत्तौ नानात्वाभिमानः । यथा द्रव्यान्तरोपहितस्फटिकद्रव्येऽन्यत्वाभिमानो—नीलो लोहित इति, एवं विषयान्तरोपधानादिति " ।

न[1], हेत्वभावात् । स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवदयं ज्ञानेषु नानात्वाभिमानो गौणो न पुनर्गन्धाद्यन्यत्वाभिमानवदिति हेतुर्नास्ति—हेत्वभावादनुपपन्न इति ।

" समानो हेत्वभाव इति चेत् "—न, ज्ञानानां क्रमेणोपजनापायदर्शनात् । क्रमेण हीन्द्रियार्थेषु ज्ञानान्युपजायन्ते चापयन्ति चेति दृश्यते । तस्माद् गन्धाद्यन्यत्वाभिमानवदयं ज्ञानेषु नानात्वाभिमान इति ॥ ९ ॥

(२) क्षणभङ्गप्रकरणम्—औपोद्घातिकम् ।

' स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत् ' इत्येतदमृष्यमाणः क्षणिकवाद्याह—

" स्फटिके[2]ऽप्यपरापरोत्पत्तेः क्षणिकत्वाद्व्यक्तीनामहेतुः " ॥ १० ॥

" स्फटिकस्याभेदेनावस्थितस्योपधानभेदान्नानात्वाभिमान इत्ययमविद्यमानहेतुकः पक्षः । कस्मात्? स्फटिकेऽप्यपरापरोत्पत्तेः । स्फटिकेऽपि अन्या

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१ सूत्रोक्तं दूषयति—न हेत्वभावादिति । योऽत्र दृष्टान्त उक्तः स्फटिकवदिति—तत्र विकल्पः—किमयं स्फटिक उपधानभेदेन भिद्यते उत नेति । यदि भिद्यते—न दृष्टान्तः । अथ न भिद्यते नानात्वाभिमानः कथम् ? यद्युपधानभेदान्नानात्वाभिमान इति—तर्हि भिन्नमुपधानमित्येव कथं प्रतिपद्यसे । यदि प्रत्ययभेदात्—तर्हि भवति व्याघातः, प्रत्ययपर्यायत्वात् वृत्तेः । न च प्रत्ययाभेदवादिनः स्फटिके नीलादिप्रत्ययभेदो युक्तः ।

एवं स्वमतेन साङ्ख्यपक्षं दूषयित्वा बौद्धैर्यत् साङ्ख्यसिद्धान्ते दूषणमुक्तं तद् दूषयितुं बौद्धमतमुपन्यस्यत्यत्र प्रकरणे । प्रयोजनं चास्य सर्वशास्त्रार्थोपकाराविशेषेऽपि प्राधान्यत आत्मसिद्धिरेव । स्थैर्ये हि सत्येव दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणादित्येवमादयः प्रतिसन्धानहेतवो निष्प्रत्यूहा भवन्ति । गुणगुणिभेदसिद्धौ चेच्छादयः क्वचिदाश्रिताः कार्यत्वात् गुणत्वाद्वेत्येवमादयश्च ।

एतत्प्रकरणं केचित्पूर्वप्रकरणाङ्गत्वेनैव व्याचख्युः । तत्साधकत्वेन चैतत्प्रकरणोपसंहारवाक्यं सप्तदशसूत्रभाष्यस्थम्—' इत्युपपन्नमनित्या बुद्धिरिति ' उपन्यस्तवन्तः । तत्त्वतस्त्वेतत्प्रकरणविषयो नितान्तं भिन्न एव । उक्तं भाष्यवाक्यं च केवलमुभयोः प्रकरणयोस्सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनार्थमित्यवधेयम् ।

२ स्फटिकेऽपीत्यादि बौद्धोक्तिरूपं सूत्रम् । ' स्फटिकत्वाभिमानवदि'ति गौतमसूत्रोक्तम्—' अहेतुः '—' स्फटिकेऽपि अपरापरोत्पत्तेः ' । प्रतिक्षणं विलक्षणस्फटिकोत्पत्तेरित्यर्थः । तत्र मानम्—' व्यक्तीनां क्षणिकत्वादिति ।

व्यक्तय उत्पद्यन्ते अन्या निरुद्धयन्त इति । कथम्? क्षणिकत्वाद् व्यक्तीनाम् । क्षणश्चाल्पीयान्कालः–क्षणस्थितिकाः क्षणिकाः । कथं पुनर्गम्यते क्षणिका व्यक्तय इति? उपचयापचयप्रबन्धदर्शनाच्छरीरादिषु[1] । पक्तिनिर्वृत्तस्याहार-रसस्य शरीरे रुधिरादिभावेनोपचयोऽपचयश्च प्रबन्धेन प्रवर्तते । उपचयाद्-व्यक्तीनामुत्पादः, अपचयाद्व्यक्तिनिरोधः । एवं[2] च सत्यवयवपरिणामभेदेन वृद्धिः शरीरस्य कालान्तरे गृह्यत इति । सोऽयं व्यक्तिविशेषधर्मो व्यक्तिमात्रे वेदितव्य इति" ॥ १० ॥

नियम[3]हेत्वभावाद्यथादर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा ॥ ११ ॥

सर्वासु व्यक्तिषु उपचयापचयप्रबन्धः शरीरवदिति नायं नियमः । कस्मात्? हेत्वभावात् । नात्र प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा प्रतिपादकमस्तीति । तस्माद् 'यथादर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा' । यत्र यत्रोपचयापचयप्रबन्धो दृश्यते तत्र तत्र व्यक्ती-नामपरापरोत्पत्तिरुपचयापचयप्रबन्धदर्शनेनाभ्यनुज्ञायते, यथा शरीरादिषु । यत्र यत्र न दृश्यते तत्र तत्र प्रत्याख्यायते, यथा ग्रावप्रभृतिषु । स्फटिकेऽप्युपचया-पचयप्रबन्धो न दृश्यते । तस्मादयुक्तं 'स्फटिकेऽप्यपरापरोत्पत्ते'रिति । यथा चार्कस्य कटुकिम्ना सर्वद्रव्याणां कटुकिमानमापादयेत्तादृगेतदिति ॥ ११ ॥

यश्च-'अशेषानिरोधेनापूर्वोत्पादं निरन्वयं द्रव्यसन्ताने क्षणिकतां मन्यते तस्यैतत्—

नोत्प[4]त्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः ॥ १२ ॥

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१ उपचयेति । 'शरीरादिषु उपचयापचयप्रबन्धदर्शनात् गम्यते यत् क्षणिका व्यक्तय' इति सम्बन्धः । अत्र प्रयोगः—प्रतिक्षणं शरीमन्यच्चान्यच्च भवति—बाह्य-प्रत्ययाभेदे सत्यन्ते विशेषदर्शनात्—पच्यमानभूमिपाकजवत् अपच्यमानभूमिपाक-जवच्चेति ।

२ एवञ्चेति । अयमत्र बौद्धोक्तेराशयः । यत् सत् तत् सर्वं क्षणिकम्—यथा शरीरम्—तथा च स्फटिकः । शरीरस्य च कालपरिपाकवशेन स्थौल्यस्य ह्रासस्य च दर्शनात् प्रतिक्षणं सूक्ष्मः परिणतिभेदोऽनुमीयते । स चान्तरा विनाश एवेति । यस्यापि स्फटिकादेस्तादृशस्थौल्यं ह्रासो वा न दृश्यते तस्यापि सत्त्वेन शरीरवदेव प्रतिक्षणं विनाशोत्पादावनुमीयेते इति ।

३ बौद्धोक्तनियमनिराकरणपरं सूत्रम्–नियमेति ।

४ नोत्पत्तीति सूत्रम् । उपचयापचयोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेरित्यर्थः । उप-चयापचयौ च तावुत्पत्तिविनाशकारणे चेति कर्मधारयसमासः ।

उत्पत्तिकारणं तावदुपलभ्यते अवयवोपचयो वल्मीकादीनाम् । विनाशकारणं चोपलभ्यते घटादीनामवयवविभागः । यस्य तु अनपचितावयवं निरुध्यते अनुपचितावयवं चोत्पद्यते तस्याशेषनिरोधे निरन्वये वाऽपूर्वोत्पादे न कारणमुभयत्राप्युपलभ्यत इति ॥ १२ ॥

" क्षीरविनाशे कारणानुपलब्धिवद्दध्युत्पत्तिवच्च तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

" यथानुपलभ्यमानं क्षीरविनाशकारणं दध्युत्पत्तिकारणं चाभ्यनुज्ञायते तथा स्फटिकेऽपरापरासु व्यक्तिषु विनाशकारणमुत्पादकारणं चाभ्यनुज्ञेयमिति " ॥ १३ ॥

लिङ्गतो ग्रहणान्नानुपलब्धिः ॥ १४ ॥

क्षीरविनाशलिङ्गं क्षीरविनाशकारणं दध्युत्पत्तिलिङ्गं दध्युत्पत्तिकारणं च गृह्यतेऽतो नानुपलब्धिः । विपर्ययस्तु स्फटिकादिषु द्रव्येषु, अपरापरोत्पत्तौ व्यक्तीनां न लिङ्गमस्तीत्यनुत्पत्तिरेवेति ॥ १४ ॥

अत्र कश्चित्परिहारमाह[1]—

न पयसः परिणामगुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावात् ॥ १५ ॥

पयसः परिणामो न विनाश—इत्येक आह । परिणामश्च अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिरिति ।

गुणान्तर[2]प्रादुर्भाव—इत्यपर आह । गुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावश्च सतो द्रव्यस्य पूर्वगुणनिवृत्तौ गुणान्तरमुत्पद्यत इति । स खल्वेक[3]पक्षीभाव इव ॥ १५ ॥

अत्र तु प्रतिषेधः—

व्यूहान्तराद् द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनं पूर्वद्रव्यनिवृत्तेरनुमानम् ॥ १६

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१ परिहारमिति—त्रयोदशसूत्रोक्तबौद्धकृताक्षेपस्येति यावत् ।

२ गुणान्तरेति । द्रव्यं तावत्सदेव, गुणोऽपि सन्नेव केवलमनुद्भूत आसीत् । एकश्चोद्भूतो गुणः तत्र य उद्भूतस्तिरोभवति पूर्वगुणस्य निवृत्तौ तिरोभूतौ गुणान्तरमुत्पद्यते तद् ' भवती 'त्यर्थः ।

३ स खल्विति । उभयोरपि पक्षयोरेकमेवावसानम् । उभयत्र द्रव्यमवतिष्ठते—एकस्याविर्भावतिरोभावौ एकस्य च विनाशप्रादुर्भावाविति हृदयम् ।

सम्मूर्च्छनलक्षणादवयवव्यूहाद् द्रव्यान्तरे दध्युत्पन्ने गृह्यमाणे पूर्वं पयोद्रव्यमवयवविभागेभ्यो निवृत्तमित्यनुमीयते। यथा मृदवयवानां व्यूहान्तराद्द्रव्यान्तरे स्थाल्यामुत्पन्नायां पूर्वं मृत्पिण्डद्रव्यं मृदवयवविभागेभ्यो निवर्तत इति। मृद्वच्चावयवान्वयः पयोदध्नोर्न अशेषनिरोधे निरन्वयो द्रव्यान्तरोत्पादो घटत इति ॥ १६ ॥

अभ्यनुज्ञाय च निष्कारणं क्षीरविनाशं दध्युत्पादं च प्रतिषेध उच्यत इति—

क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः क्वचिच्चोपलब्धेरनेकान्तः ॥ १७ ॥

क्षीरदधिवन्निष्कारणौ विनाशोत्पादौ स्फटिकादिव्यक्तीनामिति नायमेकान्त इति। कस्मात्? हेत्वभावात्, नात्र हेतुरस्ति। अकारणौ विनाशोत्पादौ स्फटिकादिव्यक्तीनां क्षीरदधिवत्, न पुनर्यथा विनाशकारणभावात् कुम्भस्य विनाश उत्पत्तिकारणभावाच्चोत्पत्तिः। एवं स्फटिकादिव्यक्तीनां विनाशोत्पत्तिकारणभावाद्विनाशोत्पत्तिभाव इति।

निरधिष्ठानं च दृष्टान्तवचनम्। गृह्यमाणयोर्विनाशोत्पादयोः स्फटिकादिषु स्यादयमाश्रयवान् दृष्टान्तः—क्षीरविनाशकारणानुपलब्धिवद्दध्युत्पत्तिकारणानुपलब्धिवच्चेति। तौ तु न गृह्येते। तस्मान्निरधिष्ठानोऽयं दृष्टान्त इति।

अभ्यनुज्ञाय च स्फटिकस्योत्पादविनाशौ योऽत्र साधकस्तस्याभ्यनुज्ञानादप्रतिषेधः। कुम्भवन्न निष्कारणौ विनाशोत्पादौ स्फटिकादीनामित्यभ्यनुज्ञेयोऽयं दृष्टान्तः प्रतिषेद्धुमशक्यत्वात्। क्षीरदधिवत्तु निष्कारणौ विनाशोत्पादाविति शक्योऽयं प्रतिषेद्धुं, कारणतो विनाशोत्पत्तिदर्शनात्। क्षीर-

१ सम्मूर्च्छनेति। क्षीरावयवा एव हि क्षीरविनाशे सत्युत्पन्नपाकजा विलक्षणं द्रव्यमुत्पादयन्ति। यदि तु सर्वं कार्यं सदेव कारणव्यापारात्प्रागपि—तर्हि व्यर्थः कारणव्यापारः, अभिव्यक्तेरपि कार्यत्वेन सत्त्वात्। असत्त्वे वा यथा सैव न सती क्रियते एवं कार्यान्तराण्यपीत्याशयः।

२ घटत इति। न ह्यनपवृत्तस्य पूर्वावस्थातोऽभिव्यक्त्यनभिव्यक्ती भवतो विनाशप्रादुर्भावौ वेति। तस्मादयुक्तमवस्थितस्य परिणाम इति।

३ निरधिष्ठानञ्चेति। धर्मिणमाश्रित्य तत्समानधर्मा दृष्टान्तो भवति। स्फटिकोत्पादविनाशौ च धर्मिणौ। तत्समानधर्मतया क्षीरदधिविनाशोत्पादयोर्दृष्टान्तवचनेन भवितव्यम्। न पुनः स्फटिकोत्पादविनाशौ धर्मिणौ गृह्येते। तस्मान्न तत्समानधर्मतया दृष्टान्तावुक्तौ भवत इति तात्पर्यम्।

दभ्रोर्विनाशोत्पत्ती पश्यता तत्कारणमनुमेयम्। कार्यलिङ्गं हि कारणम्। इत्युपपन्नमनित्या बुद्धिरिति ॥ १७ ॥

(३) बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वप्रकरणम्[1]।

इदं तु चिन्त्यते—कस्येयं बुद्धिरात्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थानां गुण इति। प्रसिद्धोऽपि[2] खल्वयमर्थः परीक्षाशेषं प्रवर्तयामीति प्रक्रियते। सोऽयं[3] बुद्धौ सन्निकर्षोत्पत्तेः संशयः, विशेषस्याग्रहणादिति।

तत्रायं[4] विशेषः—

नेन्द्रियार्थयोस्तद्विनाशेऽपि ज्ञानावस्थानात्[5] ॥ १८ ॥

नेन्द्रियाणामर्थानां वा गुणो ज्ञानं, तेषां विनाशेऽपि ज्ञानस्य भावात्। भवति खल्विदमिन्द्रियेऽर्थे च विनष्टे ज्ञानमद्राक्षमिति। न च ज्ञातरि

१ क्षणभङ्गप्रकरणानन्तरं बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वप्रतिपादनपरम्प्रकरणं प्रारभ्यते। सांख्याभिमतनित्यबुद्धितत्त्वनिराकरणे सति बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वं संभाव्यते। नित्यबुद्धिसद्भावे ज्ञानस्य तद्धर्मत्वादात्मधर्मत्वानुपपत्तिः। अतः पूर्वप्रकरणमुत्तरस्य हेतुर्निर्वाहकं चेति युक्तमिदानीन्तस्यावतारः।

प्रयोजनं चास्य प्रकरणस्य शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तात्मसिद्धिरेव। आत्मप्रकरणे हि प्रतिसन्धानबलेन बुद्ध्याऽऽत्मा साधितः, इह तु गुणतयेति विवेकः।

सर्वस्य क्षणिकत्वे समवायिकारणत्वस्यैवाभावः। तथा चात्मनि बुद्धिर्गुणतया समवैतीति न संभाव्यते। बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वं यद्यपि तृतीयाध्यायाद्याह्निकस्थचतुर्दशसूत्र एव साधितं तथाऽपि बुद्धिरूपगुणस्याधारत्वेनैवात्मा सन्निति साधितमत्र त्वात्मनो गुणभूता बुद्धिः सतीति साध्यत इति विवेचनीयम्।

२ प्रसिद्धोऽपीति। यद्यप्ययमर्थः प्रागेव (३।१।१) परीक्षितस्तथाऽप्यवान्तरविशेषपरिज्ञापनार्थं पुनः परीक्ष्यते। तथाहि—परलोकिनमात्मानं साधयता बुद्धिप्रतिकर्तृत्ववच्छरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तस्यैव स्मृतिसंस्कारानुभवाश्रयत्वमपि साधितमेवेत्याशयः।

३ प्रकरणविषये संशयमूलं दर्शयति—सोऽयमिति। बुद्ध्युत्पत्तौ आत्मनः इन्द्रियस्य अर्थस्य च सन्निकर्षोऽपेक्ष्यतेऽत एवैतेषामेव गुणः सेति ज्ञायते। किन्त्वेतेषां मध्ये कस्यैकस्येति संशयो जागर्त्ति।

४ तत्रेति। आत्मन एव गुणो बुद्धिर्नान्यस्येत्यत्र पक्षे साधकीभूतो 'विशेषः' विशिष्टो हेतुः प्रदर्श्यते सूत्र इति शेषः।

५ नेन्द्रियार्थयोरित्यादिसूत्रम्। न इन्द्रियार्थयोः (गुणो बुद्धिः) तयोः (इन्द्रियार्थयोः) विनाशेऽपि ज्ञानस्य (बुद्धेः, बुद्धिरुपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरमिति सूत्रम्) अवस्थानात् इति सम्बन्धः।

विनष्टे ज्ञानं भवितुमर्हति। अन्यत् खलु वै तदिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजं ज्ञानं, यदिन्द्रियार्थविनाशे न भवति। इदमन्यदात्ममनःसन्निकर्षजम्। तस्य युक्तो भाव इति। स्मृतिः खल्वियमद्राक्षमिति पूर्वदृष्टविषया। न च ज्ञातरि नष्टे पूर्वोपलब्धेः स्मरणं युक्तम्, न चान्यदृष्टमन्यः स्मरति। न च मनसि ज्ञातर्यभ्युपगम्यमाने शक्यमिन्द्रियार्थयोर्ज्ञातृत्वं प्रतिपादयितुम्॥ १८॥

"अस्तु तर्हि मनोगुणो ज्ञानम्"—

युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेश्च न मनसः॥ १९॥ [1]

युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धिरन्तःकरणस्य लिङ्गम्। तत्र युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्ध्या यदनुमीयते अन्तःकरणं, न तस्य गुणो ज्ञानम्। "कस्य तर्हि?" ज्ञस्य, वशित्वात्। वशी ज्ञाता, वश्यं करणं, ज्ञानगुणत्वे वा करणभावनिवृत्तिः। घ्राणादिसाधनस्य च ज्ञातुर्गन्धादिज्ञानभावादनुमीयते—अन्तःकरणसाधनस्य सुखादिज्ञानं स्मृतिश्चेति। तत्र यज्ज्ञानगुणं मनः स आत्मा, यत्तु सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमन्तःकरणं मनस्तदिति संज्ञाभेदमात्रं नार्थभेद इति।

युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेश्च योगिन इति वा 'चा'र्थः। योगी खलु ऋद्धौ प्रादुर्भूतायां विकरणधर्मा निर्माय सेन्द्रियाणि शरीरान्तराणि तेषु युगपज्ज्ञेयान्युपलभते। तच्चैतद्विभौ ज्ञातर्युपपद्यते, नाणौ मनसीति। विभुत्वे वा मनसो ज्ञानस्य नात्मगुणत्वप्रतिषेधः। विभु च मनस्तदन्तःकरणभूतमिति तस्य सर्वेन्द्रियैर्युगपत् संयोगाद्युगपज्ज्ञानान्युत्पद्येरन्निति॥ १९॥

"तदात्मगुणत्वेऽपि तुल्यम्"॥ २०॥ [2]

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१ बुद्धेर्मनोगुणत्वमपाकरोति—युगपदित्यादिसूत्रेण। त्रिधा व्याख्यातोऽस्य सम्बन्धः। स यथा (१) यन्मनो युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेर्हेतोरनुमीयते तस्य मनसो गुणो ज्ञानं न भवतीति। अत्र व्याख्याने 'युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धे' रिति मनसोऽनुमाने हेतुः, न पुनर्ज्ञानस्य मनोगुणत्वाभावे। (२) यतो युगपज्ज्ञेयोपलब्धिर्न भवति ततो न मनसो गुणो ज्ञानमिति। (३) अणुमनोद्वारा योगिनो युगपज्ज्ञेयोपलब्धिर्या भवति तस्या असम्भवः स्याद्यदि मनोगुणो ज्ञानं स्यात्। अनयैवानुपपत्त्या मनोगुणो न ज्ञानमिति सिध्यतीति। अयं हेतुः सूत्रस्थचकारेण समुच्चितो भवतीति भाष्यकारः।

२ परः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते—तदात्मेतिसूत्रेण। ज्ञानस्य 'आत्मगुणत्वेऽपि' 'तत्'—ज्ञानयौगपद्यम्—'तुल्यम्'। आत्मनो विभुत्वेन तस्य सर्वदा सर्वेन्द्रियैः संयुक्तत्वादिति भावः

" विभुरात्मा सर्वेन्द्रियैः संयुक्त इति युगपज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति " ॥ २० ॥

इन्द्रियैर्मनसः सन्निकर्षाभावात्तदनुत्पत्तिः ॥ २१ ॥

गन्धाद्युपलब्धेरिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षवदिन्द्रियमनःसन्निकर्षोऽपि कारणम् । तस्य चायौगपद्यमणुत्वान्मनसः । अयौगपद्यादनुत्पत्तिर्युगपज्ज्ञानानामात्मगुणत्वेऽपीति ॥ २१ ॥

यदि पुनरात्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षमात्राद् गन्धादिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते ?—

नोत्पत्तिकारणानपदेशात् ॥ २२ ॥

आत्मेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षमात्राद्गन्धादिज्ञानमुत्पद्यत इति, नात्रोत्पत्तिकारणमपदिश्यते येनैतत्प्रतिपद्येमहीति ॥ २२ ॥

" विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥२३॥

यथा ज्ञानस्य विभुमनोगुणत्वे युगपज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गस्तथैव विभ्वात्मगुणत्वे ऽपीति समानमेवैषाऽनुपपत्तिरुभयोरपि पक्षयोरतश्च नैकप्रत्यपरेण पर्यनुयोज्येति हृदयम् ।

१ उक्तं प्रत्यवस्थानमपाकरोति—इन्द्रियैरितिसूत्रेण । आत्मनो विभुत्वात्तस्य सन्निकर्षे सत्यपि ज्ञानोत्पत्ताविन्द्रियमनस्सन्निकर्षस्याप्यपेक्षितत्वादणोश्च मनसोऽनेकेन्द्रियैस्सह युगपत्सन्निकर्षस्यासम्भवान्न युगपज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिसम्भव इत्यर्थः ।

२ मनस्सन्निकर्षस्याप्युपलब्धावावश्यकतांपुनः समर्थयते—यदीति । " मनस्सन्निकर्षानपेक्षं केवलमात्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादेव गन्धादिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते " इति स्यान्मतमित्युपोद्घातभाष्यार्थः ।

३ तस्य मतस्योत्तरम्—नोत्पत्तीतिसूत्रम् । नैतन्मतमादरणीयम् । यतोऽत्र प्रतिज्ञामात्रं क्रियते—ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ मनस्सन्निकर्षो नापेक्ष्यत इत्यत्र ' कारणं ' प्रमाणं न अपदिश्यते प्रदर्श्यते—इत्यर्थः । यथोक्तं वार्तिककृद्भिः—अस्मादेवोत्पद्यतामिति न कारणमपदिश्यत इति सूत्रार्थ इति । अत्र—अस्मादेवेत्यात्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षमात्रादेवेत्यर्थः ।

विश्वनाथस्त्विदमपि सूत्रं पूर्वपक्षत्वेनोपवर्णितवान् । तन्मतेन चैवं सूत्रार्थः—बुद्ध्युत्पत्तौ कारणस्य अनपदेशात् अकथनात् नात्मगुणो बुद्धिः, आत्ममनस्संयोगस्य कारणत्वे ज्ञानस्य सार्वदिकत्वप्रसङ्ग इति ।

असश्चैवं समुच्चितोऽर्थः—बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वे तस्या विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेस्तन्नित्यत्वमिति ।

'तदात्मगुणत्वेऽपि तुल्यम्'—इत्येतदनेन समुच्चीयते । द्विविधो हि गुणनाशहेतुः—गुणानामाश्रयाभावो विरोधी च गुणः । नित्यत्वादात्मनोऽनुपपन्नः पूर्वः । विरोधी च बुद्धेर्गुणो न गृह्यते, तस्मादात्मगुणत्वे सति बुद्धेर्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः" ॥ २३ ॥

अनित्यत्वग्रहणाद्बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तराद्विनाशः शब्दवत् ॥ २४ ॥

अनित्या बुद्धिरिति सर्वशरीरिणां प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयमेतत् । गृह्यते च बुद्धिसन्तानः । तत्र बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तरं विरोधी गुण इत्यनुमीयते, यथा शब्दसन्ताने शब्दः शब्दान्तरविरोधीति ॥ २४ ॥

"असङ्ख्येयेषु ज्ञानकारितेषु संस्कारेषु स्मृतिहेतुष्वात्मसमवेतेष्वात्ममनसोश्च सन्निकर्षे समाने स्मृतिहेतौ सति न कारणस्यायौगपद्यमस्तीति युगपत्स्मृतयः प्रादुर्भवेयुः यदि बुद्धिरात्मगुणः स्यादिति ।"

तत्र[1] कश्चित्सान्निकर्षस्यायौगपद्यमुपपादयिष्यन्नाह—

"[2]ज्ञानसमवेतात्मप्रदेशसन्निकर्षान्मनसः स्मृत्युत्पत्तेर्न युगपदुत्पत्तिः ॥ २५ ॥

ज्ञानसाधनः संस्कारो ज्ञानमित्युच्यते । ज्ञानसंस्कृतैरात्मप्रदेशैः पर्यायेण मनः सन्निकृष्यते । आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षात्स्मृतयोऽपि पर्यायेण भवन्तीति" ॥ २५ ॥

नान्तः[3]शरीरवृत्तित्वान्मनसः ॥ २६ ॥

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१ एकदेशिमतमुपस्थापयति—तत्रेति । तत्र पूर्वोक्ताक्षेपविषये कश्चित् नैयायिकैकदेशी नानाज्ञानजन्यसंस्कारसन्निकर्षाणामयौगपद्यप्रदर्शनेन परिहारमाहेत्यर्थः ।

२ एकदेशिकृतपरिहारप्रदर्शनपरं सूत्रम्—ज्ञानसमवेतेत्यादि । एकज्ञानजनितः संस्कार एकस्मिन्नेवात्मप्रदेशे समवैति मनस्सन्निकर्षश्चात्मन एकस्मिन् क्षणे एकेनैवात्मप्रदेशेन भवति । ततश्च यज्ज्ञानजनितः संस्कारो यदात्मप्रदेशावच्छेदेन वर्तते तत्प्रदेशावच्छेदेनैव यस्मिन् क्षणे मनस्सन्निकर्षो भवति तस्मिन् क्षणे तत्संस्कारजमात्रजन्यस्मृतेः प्रादुर्भावः सम्भवति न स्मृत्यन्तरस्येति न युगपदनन्तरस्मृतिप्रादुर्भावप्रसङ्ग इति परिहारार्थः ।

३ एकदेशिमतं दूषयति—नान्तःशरीरेत्यादिसूत्रेण । (स्मृतियौगपद्यस्य एकदेशिप्रदर्शितपरिहारो) न (युज्यते) । कस्मात् ? मनसः अन्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वात् । अन्तःशरीरे वृत्तिः ज्ञानजनकीभूतो व्यापारो यस्य तत्त्वात् । विभोरात्मनः कतिचित्प्रदेशाः शरीरान्तर्वर्तिनः कतिचित्तद्बहिःप्रदेशवर्तिनः, अणुस्तु मनः शरीराभ्य-

सदेहस्यात्मनो मनसा संयोगो विपच्यमानकर्माशयसहितो जीवनमिष्यते। तत्रास्य प्राक् प्रायणादन्तःशरीरे वर्तमानस्य मनसः शरीराद्बहिर्ज्ञानसंस्कृतैरात्मप्रदेशैः संयोगो नोपपद्यत इति ॥ २६ ॥

"साध्यत्वादहेतुः[1] ॥ २७ ॥

विपच्यमानकर्माशयमात्रं जीवनम्। एवं च सति साध्यमन्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वं मनस इति" ॥ २७ ॥

स्मरतः[2] शरीरधारणोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ २८ ॥

सुस्मूर्षया[3] खल्वयं मनः प्रणिदधानः चिरादपि कञ्चिदर्थं स्मरति। स्मरतश्च शरीरधारणं दृश्यते। आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षजश्च प्रयत्नो द्विविधो—धारकः प्रेरकश्च। निःसृत च शरीराद्बहिर्मनसि धारकस्य प्रयत्नस्याभावाद् गुरुत्वात्पतनं स्यात् शरीरस्य स्मरत इति ॥ २८ ॥

"न[4] तदाशुगतित्वान्मनसः ॥ २९ ॥

आशुगति मनः। तस्य बहिःशरीरात्मप्रदेशेन ज्ञानसंस्कृतेन सन्निकर्षः—प्रत्यागतस्य च प्रयत्नोत्पादनमुभयं युज्यत इति। उत्पाद्य वा धारकं प्रयत्नं शरीरान्निःसरणं मनसोऽतस्तत्रोपपन्नं धारणमिति" ॥ २९ ॥

न्तरमात्रवृत्ति। अतः शरीरातिरिक्तात्मप्रदेशावच्छेदेन नात्ममनोयोगो भवति। किन्तु शरीरावच्छिन्नस्यात्ममनोयोगस्य ज्ञानहेतुत्वमस्त्येव। ततश्च तच्छरीरावच्छिन्ननानास्मृतियौगपद्यप्रसङ्ग आक्षेपकोद्भावितस्तदवस्थ एवेति नैकदेशिपरिहारः सम्यगित्यर्थः।

१ एकदेशी शङ्कते—साध्यत्वादितिसूत्रेण। शरीराद्बहिर्मनो ज्ञानादिपुरुषार्थं न साधयतीत्यद्यत्वे न सिद्धम्। एवं च मनसः शरीरवृत्तित्वादिति यो हेतुरुक्तस्तस्य 'साध्यत्वात्' साधनीयत्वात् स 'अहेतुः' हेत्वाभास इत्यर्थः। शरीराद्बहिर्मनः ज्ञानादिपुरुषार्थं न साधयतीत्यद्यत्वेऽपि न सिद्धमिति भावः।

२ एकदेशिकृतां शङ्कां परिहरति—स्मरत इत्यादिसूत्रेण। 'स्मरतः'—यः पुरुषः स्मरणं करोति तस्य—'शरीरधारणोपपत्तेः'—तेन पुरुषेण स्मरणकाले शरीरमपि ध्रियत एव—कदाप्यशरीरस्यात्मनः स्मरणं न दृश्यते—इत्येवंरूपाया 'उपपत्तेः'—शरीरवर्तित्वसाधकप्रमाणस्य सत्त्वात्—पूर्वसूत्रकृतः प्रतिषेधः—मनसः शरीरवृत्तित्वे प्रमाणं नास्तीत्याक्षेपः—'अप्रतिषेधः'—न समीचीनः प्रतिषेध इत्यर्थः।

३ स्मृतिप्रक्रियां सूचयति भाष्यकारः—सुस्मूर्षयेति।

४ पुनः परश्चोदयति—न तदाशुगतित्वादितिसूत्रेण। यत् पूर्वसूत्र उक्तं शरीरपतनं तन्न सम्भवति—'तदा' 'मनसो' बहिस्सन्निकर्षे 'आशुगतित्वात्' अतिशीघ्रगामित्वात्—शीघ्रमेव शरीरे परावृत्तेः न शरीरधारणप्रतिबन्ध इत्यर्थः।

this threefold authority of the Veracious Expositor, and is performed accordingly, it actually accomplishes the purpose (it is meant to accomplish). From this it follows that the instruction of veracious persons is trustworthy; and this leads to the veracious expositors themselves being regarded as trustworthy.

Thus (trustworthiness having been found in) the instruction of the Veracious Expositor, in the form of the Medical Scriptures (that part of the Veda which treats of the Medical Science,) which deal with visible things,—from this we infer the trustworthiness of those parts of the Veda also which deal with invisible (transcendental) things; as the ground of trustworthiness —which consists in the trustworthiness of the Veracious Expositor—is equally present in both. In fact some texts of the latter section of the Veda also are found to deal with visible things, e.g., the text 'One desiring to acquire a village should perform sacrifices'; and on seeing this coming out true, we can infer, from this also, the trustworthiness of the other Vedic texts (dealing with purely invisible things).

In ordinary worldly matters also, a large amount of business is carried on on the basis of the assertions of veracious persons; and here also the trustworthiness of the ordinary veracious expositor is based upon the same three conditions—he has full knowledge of what he is saying, he has sympathy for others (who listen to him), and he has the desire to expound things as they really exist;—and on the basis of these the assertion of the veracious expositor is regarded as trustworthy.

The inference (of the trustworthiness of all Vedic texts, from that of the medical texts) proceeds on the basis of the seer and expositor being the same (in both cases). That is to say, the omniscient Expositor and the Seers are the same veracious persons in the case of the Vedic texts and that of the Medical Scriptures; so that from the trustworthiness of the latter we can infer that of the latter also.

(The Mīmāṁsaka objects)—"Inasmuch as the trustworthiness of Vedic texts is due to their eternality, it is not right to say that their trustworthiness is *due to the trustworthiness of the Veracious Expositor.*"

But as a matter of fact, the trustworthiness or efficiency of words in the denotation of things is due to their denotative potency,—and not to their eternality ; for if it were due to their eternality, then (all words being equally eternal, *ex hypothesi*) all things would be denoted by all words ; and there would be no restriction as to words and their significations.

" But if words are not eternal, they cannot be expressive at all. "

This is not true ; ordinary words (in common usage) are actually found to denote their meanings (and certainly these words are not eternal). "These words also are eternal (just like Vedic words)." This is not possible ; as in that case the disagreement with facts that we find in the case of the assertions of untruthful persons would be inexplicable ; as being eternal, every word should be trustworthy (*i.e.* true, in equal agreement with facts). "This (common) Word cannot be eternal." But you do not point out any difference ; it behoves you to show cause why the assertion of the untruthful person in common parlance is not eternal (while all other words are eternal). Then again, in the case of Proper names, it is found that their trustworthiness depends upon their denoting the things named,—and this denotation is in accordance with the convention applying the name to a particular thing (and as such these cannot be eternal) ; so that it is not right to attribute *trustworthiness* to *eternality*. That is to say, in common parlance when the proper name is denotative of the thing to which it has been fixed by convention, it does so by reason of this convention, and not by reason of its eternality.

In fact all that can be meant by the Veda being 'eternal' is that there has been continuity of tradition of the texts and activity according to them is uninterrupted through all ages, past and future.

Thus we find that if we attribute the trustworthiness of Words to the trustworthiness of the Veracious Expositor, it meets the case of Vedic as well as ordinary words (while if we attribute it to *eternality*, it cannot apply to the case of ordinary words).

(*Thus ends the First Daily Lesson of the Second Discourse in the Bhāṣya*)

DISCOURSE II

SECOND DAILY LESSON

SECTION 1

The Exact Number of Means of Right Cognition

Sūtras 1–12

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The opponent, thinking that the division of 'Means of Right Cognition' (into Perception, Inference, Analogy and Word) is not right, urges the following objection.—

Sūtra 1

"The Number (of Means of Right Cognition) cannot be four (only); as Tradition, Presumption, Deduction and Antithesis are also Means or Instruments of Cognition."

BHĀṢYA

"There are not only *four* Instruments of Cognition; in fact there are four more, in the shape of Tradition, Presumption, Deduction and Antithesis; why have not these been mentioned?

(A) When there is a regular handing down of the assertion of a certain fact, in the form 'so they say', and the exact person who asserted the fact is not definitely known, we have a means of cognition which is called 'Tradition'.

(B) 'Presumption' consists in the 'āpatti', *presuming* (of a fact) *on the basis of another fact*, 'arthāt';—'āpatti, *is getting at*, i.e., *implication*; when a certain fact having been asserted, another fact is *implied*, we have the Means of Cognition called 'Presumption'; *e. g.*, when it is asserted that 'there is no rain when there are no clouds' what is *implied* is that 'there is rain when there are clouds'.

(C) When the cognition of the presence of one thing follows from the cognition of another thing, which is invariably concomitant with the former, we have the means of congnition called 'Deduction'; *e.g.*, from the congition of the presence of the 'Quarter Maund' follows that of the presence of the measure of 'Two Seers and a Half'; and from this latter follows the cognition of the presence of the 'Seer'.

(D) 'Antithesis' is contrast; as between what *exists* and what does *not exist*; (we have this as a Means of Cognition) when the *non-existent* action of *raining* brings about the cognition of the *existence* of the connection of the clouds with high winds; as it is only when there is some such obstruction, as the connection of the cloud with high winds, that there is no *falling* of the rain-drops, which would otherwise be there by reason of the force of gravity in the drops."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(The answer to the above Pūrvapakṣa is that) it is quite true that Tradition and the rest are 'Means of Cognition'; but it does not follow that they are distinct Means of Cognition (quite apart from those enumerated in Su. 1-1-3). In fact the denial (in the foregoing Sutra) of the four-foldness of Instruments of Cognition is based upon the assumption that Tradition and the rest are distinct (from Perception &c.);—and this

Sūtra 2

is not a correct denial; as 'Tradition' is not different from 'Word'; and 'Presumption', 'Deduction' and 'Antithesis' are not different from 'Inference'.

BHĀṢYA

The said denial of four-foldness cannot be right. "Why?" 'Word' having been defined as 'the assertion of a reliable person,' this definition does not fail to include 'Tradition'; so that the *difference* (between the two, which the opponent relies upon) is found to be engulfed in non-difference. Then again, 'Inference' consists in the cognising, through the perceptible, of the imperceptible related to it; and precisely the same is the case also with 'Presumption', 'Deduction' and 'Antithesis'. What happens in the case of 'Presumption' is that—on our cognising what is asserted by a certain sentence, there arises the cognition of what is not asserted by it,—this cognition being due to the relation of 'opposition', (negative concomitance) subsisting between what is asserted and what is not asserted; and this is only a case of 'Inference.' Similarly what happens in the case of 'Deduction' is that, the Composite and the Component being related to each other by the relation of invariable concomitance, the cognition of the former gives rise to the cognition of the

latter; and this is only a case of 'Inference'. Lastly, (what happens in the case of 'Antithesis' is that) it being found that of two things, while one is present the other cannot be present,—and thus the two being recognised as *contraries*,—if it is found that a certain effect does not come about (even when the necessary cause is there), we conclude that there must be something obstructing the cause (this something being what is *contrary* to the effect); and this is pure 'Inference'.

Thus we conclude that the said division of the Means of Cognition (into *four*) is quite right.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(Says the opponent)—"It has been asserted (in the Bhāṣya) *that it is true that Tradition and the rest are Means of Cognition; but it does not follow that they are distinct Means of Cognition*;—now this admits that Tradition &c. are real means of Cognition; but this admission is not right; because—

Sūtra 3

"Presumption cannot be a true Means of Cognition as it is uncertain (not always true)".

BHĀṢYA

"From the assertion—'there is no rain when there are no clouds'—it is presumed that 'there is rain when there are clouds'; as a matter of fact, however, sometimes it happens that even though clouds are present there is no rain; so that Presumption is not always a true Means of Right Cognition."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(Our answer to the above objection is as follows:)—There is no uncertainty attaching to Presumption;—

Sūtra 4

It is on account of what is not Presumption being regarded as Presumption (that there arises the idea of its being not always true).

BHĀṢYA

(What the particular instance of Presumption cited is meant to indicate is the general principle that) from the assertion that 'when the cause is absent the effect is not produced', we presume its obverse that 'when the cause is present the effect is produced'; *existence* being the obverse of *non-existence*; and certainly this

presumption of the production of the effect when the cause is present is never found to fail in any single case of the *presence of the cause*; that is, there is not a single case in which the effect is produced when the cause is *not present*; so that Presumption cannot be regarded as uncertain or *not always true*. As for a certain contingency under which, even when the cause (clouds) is present, the effect (rain) does not appear, by reason of the causal operation being obstructed by something (high winds, for instance),—this is a characteristic of all causes; and this is not what forms the subject of Presumption. "What is it that forms its subject?" The principle that 'the effect is produced when the cause is present'; i. e., that the production of the effect is never unconcomitant with the presence of the cause,—this is what forms the subject of Presumption. Such being the fact, it is clear that when the Opponent denies the truth of Presumption, he regards as Presumption what is not real Presumption. The characteristic of all causes (mentioned above) is what is actually seen, and hence cannot be denied.

Sūtra 5

Further, the denial itself is invalid,—being uncertain (not universally true).

BHĀṢYA

The denial (by the Opponent) is in the form of the sentence " Presumption cannot be a true Means of Cognition, as it is uncertain" (Su. 3); and what this denies is only the fact of Presumption being a true Means of Cognition; it does not deny the *existence* of Presumption; and as such this denial itself becomes 'uncertain'; being 'uncertain', it is invalid; and being invalid, it cannot serve the purpose of (rightly) denying anything.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

You might argue as follows:—"Particular assertions relate to only certain subjects; and their 'certainty' or 'uncertainty' also can be in relation to those particular subjects only; and in the case in question the mere *existence* (of Presumption) is not the subject of our denial (hence any 'uncertainty' relating to that *existence* cannot affect the validity of our denial."

To this our answer would be as follows:—

Sūtra 6

If the denial is valid, there can be no invalidity in Presumption.

BHĀṢYA

Of Presumption also what forms the subject is the fact that 'the appearance of the effect is never inconcomitant with the existence of the cause'; and not that the said concomitance is a character of the cause (*i.e.*, it does not mean that whenever the cause is present, the effect *must appear*); because as a matter of fact the cause does *not* produce the effect when there is an obstacle to its operation.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(Having failed in regard to Presumption, the Opponent next directs his attack against the validity of 'Antithesis.')—"Well, then, what you have said (Bhāṣya) admits the validity of 'Antithesis' as a Means of (Cognition); and this is not right. Why? Because—

Sūtra 7

"Antithesis cannot be regarded as a valid Means of Cognition; as there is nothing that can be the object of cognition by its means."

BHĀṢYA

(Our answer to this is as follows)—As a matter of fact there are many things that are found, in ordinary experience, to be the objects of Cognition by means of 'Antithesis'; and in view of this fact, it is through sheer audacity that you make the assertion that "Antithesis cannot be regarded as valid Means of Cognition, *as there is nothing that can be the object of cognition by its means.*"

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Of the vast number of things (cognised by means of Antithesis), a portion is exemplified :—

Sūtra 8

Certain things being marked, those not marked, being characterised by the absence of that mark, come to be regarded as the object of cognition by the said means (of 'Antithesis).

BHĀṢYA

That is to say, there are things that actually become the objects of cognition by means of 'Antithesis' or 'Negation'. " How so? " When certain things,—some pieces of cloth, which are indicated as not required—are marked, those (pieces of cloth) that are indicated as required and are not similarly marked are characterised by the absence of that mark; *i.e.*, they are recognised by the absence of that mark. So that when both (the marked and the unmarked pieces) are present, and a man is asked to 'bring the unmarked pieces of cloth', he recognises the unmarked pieces by the *absence* of the mark in them; and having recognised them, he brings them. And a 'Means of Cognition' is only that which brings about cognition [so that, as bringing about the 'cognition' of the required pieces of cloth, the *negation* of marks must be regarded as a Means of Cognition].

Sūtra 9

If it be urged that—"When the thing is non-existent, there can be no Antithesis (or negation) of it",—our answer is that this is not right, as it is possible for the thing to exist elsewhere.

BHĀṢYA

(The Opponent says)—"Where a certain thing, having existed, ceases to exist, there alone its antithesis is possible; in the case of the unmarked cloth-pieces, however, (where the marks have never existed), the marks have not ceased to exist *after having existed there*; so that any antithesis of the marks is not possible in this case."

Our answer to this is that *this is not right, as it is possible for the thing to exist elsewhere.* That is to say, what happens is that the man (asked to bring the unmarked cloths) sees the presence of marks in certain pieces, and does not perceive it in others,—so that perceiving the absence (antithesis, 'previous negation', non-appearance) of the marks in these latter, he cognises, by means of this antithesis, the thing required (i.e., the *unmarked* cloths).

Sūtra 10

(Says the Opponent)—"The presence of the mark (in the ủnmarked things) cannot be the means (of any cognition) in regard to the unmarked things."

BHĀṢYA

"The presence of the marks is in the *marked* cloths ; and the Antithesis is not of these marks ; in fact the Antithesis of those marks present in the marked cloths is in the *unmarked* cloths ; and this Antithesis cannot be the means (of a cognition). Those that are present, to speak of the Antithesis of those would involve contradiction in terms."

Sūtra 11

This is not right ; as the possibility of the cognition is in view of the actual presence of the marks (elsewhere).

BHĀṢYA

We do not say that there is antithesis (absence, non-existence) of those marks that are present (in that same thing where the antithesis is conceived of) ; what we say is that the marks being present in some and not present in other things, when a person, looking for the marks, does not find them present in these latter things, these things he comes to recognise by means of that *absence* (antithesis) of the marks. (So that the absence becomes the means of the cognition of those things.)

Sūtra 12

Then again, the antithesis of a thing is possible before it comes into existence.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, there are two kinds of Antishesis ; one consisting in the non-existence of the thing before it has come into existence, and another consisting in its non-existence after having come into existence, due to its destruction ;—now the 'Antithesis' of the marks that there is in the *unmarked* things is that of the former kind,—that consisting in their non-existence before they have come into existence ; and not of the other kind (so that the objection urged in Su. 9 does not lie with our view at all).

SECTION (2)

Non-Eternality of Words.

Sūtras (13–38)

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Sūtra 1-1-7 says '*āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*', 'Word is the assertion of a reliable person,' meaning that it is only Sound of a

belongs to the manifesting Impact ; from that arises the acuteness or dullness of the apprehension of the manifested Sound, and there is no difference in the Sound itself ; just as in the case of Colour, (the Colour remaining the same), its apprehension is heightened (rendered more acute) or lowered (rendered dull) by the light that manifests it."—But this cannot be, as there is suppression (in the case of Sound) ; that is to say, it is only when the Sound of the drum is acute that it suppresses the duller Sound of the lute, and not when it has been deadened and dull (this well-known fact cannot be explained on the hypothesis of the opponent ; for) the *suppression* could not be done by the apprehension of the Sound ; and as for the Sound itself, it is the same in both cases (according to the Opponent, whether the Sound of the Drum is acute or dull, it is the same Sound that has continued all along ; and hence dull or acute, it should always suppress the sound of the lute); if, on the other hand, the Sound, in the two cases, be regarded as different, the said phenomenon of suppression becomes quite explicable. From this it follows that Sound is *produced*, not *manifested*. Then again, (according to him) the Sound being manifested in the same place as their manifester, there could be no contact (between the two, and hence no suppression of the one by the other) ; so that according to the view that Sound is manifested in the same place as its manifester, no supression would be possible ; as the Sound of the lute (which is manifested in the lute) cannot be got at by the Sound of the Drum (which is manifested in the Drum). If it be urged that there could be suppression even without the one getting at the other,—then (our answer would be that) in that case there would be suppression of all Sounds. The Opponent might think that—"even though one Sound is not got at by another, there could be suppression" ;—but if this could be possible, then just as the drum-Sound suppresses one lute-Sound—*i.e.*, that which has its manifester near the manifester of the drum-Sound —so would it suppress all lute-Sounds,—even those whose manifesters would be at a distance from the Drum ; as the condition of *not being in contact* with the drum-Sound would be the same in the case of all lute-Sounds ; so that when a Drum would be sounded at any one place, it should render inaudible the Sound of all the lutes that might be sounded at the time anywhere, in all

regions of the world! On the other hand, (according to our view), the Series of Sounds (produced in each case) being distinct, it becomes possible for only a certain Dull Sound to be suppressed by a certain Acute Sound,—this being dependent upon their reaching the auditory organ at the same time. "What is it that you call *suppression* ?" The *suppression* of a thing consists in its being not apprehended, by reason of the apprehension of a similar thing; as for instance, the light of the torch,—which would be (otherwise) visible,—is suppressed by the light of the sun (so that there is suppression of one Sound by another, when, being otherwise audible, it is rendered inaudible by another Sound).

Sūtra 14

[Objection]—"(A) Because the destruction of the Jar is eternal, (B) because Community is eternal,—and (C) because even eternal things are conceived and spoken of as non-eternal [what has been urged in the preceding Sutra cannot be accepted as conclusive]."

BHĀṢYA

" (A) Sound cannot be regarded as non-eternal on the ground of its *having a cause* (as urged in Sū. 13). 'Why ?' Because the premiss (upon which that reasoning is based) is not universally true: In the case of the 'destruction of the Jar' we find that even though it has a cause (and a beginning), yet it is *eternal* [Hence the premiss that 'all that has cause is non-eternal' is not true]. 'But how do you know that the 'destruction of the Jar' has a cause ?' [We know this from the fact that] the Jar ceases to exist only when there is a disruption of its (component) causes (in the shape of the clay-particles making up the Jar). 'But how do you know that this *destruction of the Jar* is eternal ?' [That we infer from the fact that] when the Jar has once ceased to exist on the disruption of its component causes, this non-existence of that particular Jar is never again set aside by its existence [i. e. the Jar that has once been destroyed never comes into existence again.]

" (B) The second reason urged as proving the non-eternality of Sound is that *it is apprehended through a sense-organ.* But here also the premiss is not true; as we find that *Community*, though eternal, is yet apprehended through sense-organs.

"(C) The third reason urged is that Sound *is conceived* and *spoken of as non-eternal*; here also the premiss is not true; for we find even eternal things conceived and spoken of as non-eternal. *E. g.* just as we speak of the 'part of a tree', and the 'part of a blanket', so also do we speak of the 'part of Ākāśa', the 'part of Soul' [where Ākāśa and Soul, both eternal things, are spoken of as having *parts*; which means that they are non-eternal]."

Sūtra 15

[Answer]—Inasmuch as there is a clear difference and distinction between the real (direct) and the figurative (indirect) [denotation of the term 'eternal'], the premisses (urged in Su. 13) are not untrue.

BHĀṢYA

When a thing is spoken of as 'eternal', what is the 'real' connotation of that term? As a matter of fact what is meant by the thing being 'eternal' is that it is a thing* which has the character of having no beginning, and for which there is no possibility of its losing itself.† Now this connotation of the term 'eternal' cannot apply to Destruction [for Destruction, though having no end, does have a beginning]. The term could, however, be applied to Destruction in its 'figurative' (or indirect) connotation; that is to say, when Jar has lost itself,—*i.e.* having existed, it has ceased to exist,—and it does not come into existence again,—this negation or destruction of the Jar comes to be spoken of as 'eternal'; which can only mean that it is *as good as eternal*‡ [because having had a beginning, the Destruction could not be 'eternal' in the real sense of the term]. And as a matter of fact, we do not find any *product* which is similar to Sound (in having a cause and a beginning) fulfilling the said conditions of true eternality; hence the premiss (that 'what has a cause is not eternal') cannot be untrue.

* The right reading is अर्थान्तर for आत्मान्तर.

† 'Being destroyed'.—*Bhāṣyacandra.* It adds that *eternality* consists in being without beginning and without end.

‡ The correct reading is नित्य इव नित्यो as read in several Mss.; and supported by the *Vārtika.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the argument of the Opponent (urged in Su. 14) that Community is eternal (and yet perceptible by the Senses),—when we urge the *sense-perceptibility* of Sound as proving its non-eternality, what we mean is that it is apprehended through sense-contact, and—

Sūtra 16

—inasmuch as this is urged only as leading to the inference of the series (of Sounds),—

BHĀṢYA

the premisses are not untrue, in their bearing upon eternal things —this much has to be brought in from what has gone before.*

We do not mean that Sound is non-eternal simply by reason of its being apprehended by the senses ; what we do mean is that the fact of Sound being apprehended through sense-contact leads to the inference that in every phenomenon of Sound, there is a series of Sounds ; and this fact of there being a series of several Sounds (appearing one after the other) proves that each of these Sounds is *non-eternal*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The second argument urged by the Opponent (in Sū. 14) is that "even eternal things are conceived and spoken of as non-eternal". Now this also is not right.

Sūtra 17

Because what the term 'part' really denotes is the constituent cause ;—†

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* The printed text (Benares) reads नित्ये व्यभिचार इति प्रकृतम्. The right reading is supplied by the *Bhāṣyacandra*—नित्येष्वप्यव्यभिचार इति प्रकृतम् ; it explains प्रकृतं as अनुवृत्तम्. It calls these words as पूरक, completing the Sūtra.

† In the printed text (Benares), the text of the Sūtra is lengthened by the expression नित्येष्वप्यव्यभिचारः. But this expression does not appear in the body of the Sūtra itself either in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, or in the Puri Sūtra MS., or in Sūtra MS. B. The *Tātparya* also quotes this Sūtra (on p. 317) as ending with धानात्. We have, therefore, taken नित्येष्वव्यभिचार as the opening words of the Bhāṣya on the *Sūtra*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* also calls these words "supplementary" to the Sūtra.

BHĀṢYA

So that in its bearing on eternal things [*Ākāśa*, *f.i.*, where with the word 'part' cannot be used in its real connotation; though it may be used in a figurative sense hence] the figurative use of the term 'part' cannot vitiate our premiss (that 'what is spoken of as product must be non-eternal'). Now, in the expressions cited by the Opponent '*part of Ākāśa*' and '*part* of the Soul',—the term 'part' cannot be taken as denoting the *constituent cause* of Ākāśa and Soul, as it is taken to mean in the case of products (like *Tree* and *Blanket*); for how could the word denote what does not exist? That the *constituent cause* of Ākāśa or Soul does not exist we learn from the fact that no such cause can be known by any of the means of cognition. "What then does the word 'part' mean in those expressions?" It only means that its contact is no pervasive. [As a matter of fact, such expressions as 'part of *Ākāśa*'are used only in connection with the contact of substances with *Ākāśa*; and] in such cases all that is meant by saying that 'contact subsists in *a part of Ākāśa*' is that the contact *does not pervade over the whole Ākaśa*; the sense being that the contact of *Ākāśa* with any substance of limited extension does not extend over the entire *Ākāśa*; it subsists in it without extending over the whole of it. And herein lies a point of similarity between *Ākāśa* and ordinary Products; the contact between two berries, for instance, does not extend over the entire berries. So that it is on the basis of this similarity that we have such expressions as 'part of *Ākāśa*', where the word 'part' is used in its figurative sense (and not in its real denotation of *constituent cause*).

This same explanation applies also to the expression 'part of the Soul'.

Like *Contact*, Sound (in *Ākāśa*) and Cognition* (in the Soul) also subsist only partially in—not extending over the whole of—their substratum.

[The instances of eternal things being spoken of as non-eternal, that have been urged by the Opponent have been shown to be purely figurative.] On the other hand, [when Sound is spoken of as 'acute' or 'dull', the properties of *acuteness and*

* This includes Pleasure, Pain &c. also,—says the '*Bhāṣyacandra*.

dulness, that can belong only to a non-eternal thing, are such as have been proved above to belong to Sound in reality, and not attributed to it merely figuratively. [Hence our original reasoning remains unshaken].

"But how is it that we do not know of any Sūtra of Gautama's to this effect [(1) that *Ākāśa* and *Soul* cannot have *parts*, in the real sense of the term, and (2) that Sound appears in a series] ?"

Well; it is in the nature of the revered Gautama, that in many sections (he does not actually assert and prove certain facts);* so that in the present connection also he does not actually assert and prove the said two facts ; and the reason is that he thinks that the student will be able to learn these truths from the doctrine of the *S'āstra* ;—this 'Śāstra-doctrine' (in the present instance) consists of inferential reasonings that the Author has put forward (under Su. 16 and 17),—these reasonings having, as they have, several ramifications in the shape of implications; [the implication of Sū. 16 being that *there are Sound-series*, and that of Sū. 17 that *Ākāśa and Soul can have no constituent parts*. And inasmuch as these facts are already implied in the said Sutras, the Author does not find it necessary to assert them in so many words].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Further we ask—How is it to be known that a certain thing exists and another thing does not exist ? "Well, when a thing is apprehended through a Means of Cognition [it is recognised as *existing*], and when it is not apprehended by a Means of Cognition [it is recognised as *non-existing*]" In that case *your Sound would have to be regarded as non-existent*,—†

* For instance, under Sū. 3-1-1 he implies that 'Substance' is distinct from 'Quality' ; but he nowhere says this in so many words—*Pariśuddhi*.

† Those who regard Sound as eternal are asked to explain how it is to be ascertained whether or not a certain thing exists or not. Their answer naturally would be that when a thing is apprehended it is recognised as existing, and when it is not apprehended it is recognised as non-existing. By this criterion, the Siddhāntin rejoins, Sound will have to be regarded as non-existing before it is uttered, because of the reasons put forward in the following Sūtra (18).

The *Vārtika* suggests another introduction to the Sūtra. The Siddhāntin asks—When you regard the Jar as non-eternal, how do you know that it is

Sūtra 18

—before it is uttered; because it is not apprehended, and we do not find any obstruction (that could explain the non-apprehension of the Sound).

BHĀṢYA

That is to say, prior to its utterance, Sound does not exist. "How do you know that?" *Because it is not apprehended.* "But even an existing thing may fail to be apprehended on account of the presence of obstructions." This explanation is not possible in the case in question. "Why?" Because we do not find any such obstructions as would account for the non-apprehension of Sound. As a matter of fact, we do not find any such causes of non-apprehension as—(1) that 'Sound is *not* apprehended because it ie rendered imperceptible by such an obstruction',—or (2) that 'it is not close to the perceiving sense-organ',—or (3) that '(even though close to it) there is something intervening between the Sound and the sense-organ'.* Hence the conclusion is that until it is uttered, *Sound does not exist.*

"The utterance serves as a manifester (of the Sound); that is the reason why, prior to utterance, Sound (even though existing) fails to be apprehended."

But what do you mean by the *utterance* (of Sound)?

"When there is a desire to speak, on the part of a person, this desire gives rise to an effort on his part,—this effort raises the wind in the man's body,—this wind on rising strikes certain parts of the mouth, in the shape of the throat, the palate and the like,—this impact of the wind with particular spots of the mouth brings about the manifestation of particular letter-sounds;—this is what is meant by *utterance.*"

But this 'impact' is only a form of *Conjunction*; and it has been shown (in the *Bhāṣya*, on Sū. 13) that *Conjunction* cannot be

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non-eternal? The answer of the Opponent would be—"We know that the Jar is non-eternal because (at times) it is not apprehended by means of any Instrument of Cognition." Thereupon the Siddhāntin rejoins—Exactly for this same reason Sound also should be regarded as non-eternal; for reasons put forward in the Sūtra.

*. व्यवधानादित्येवमादि is the right reading supplied by the Puri Mss.

the *manifester* (of Sound). Consequently the non-apprehension of Sound cannot be said to be due to the absence of the *manifester*; it is due in fact, to the sheer *non-existence* of the Sound (at the time). Thus then, the fact that Sound is heard only when it is uttered leads us to the inference that when the Sound is heard, it comes into existence after having been non-existent* (prior to the utterance);—and that when *after* having been uttered, it is not heard,† what happens is that having come into existence, it ceases to exist; so that its not being heard is always due to its sheer *non-existence* [in the former case, to *prior non-existence*, and in the latter case, to *destruction* or *cessation of existence*].'

" But how do you know that it is so? "

We know this from the fact that *we do not find any obstruction etc.*—as the *Sūtra* says.

From all this the conclusion is that Sound is capable of *being produced* and of *ceasing to exist*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Such being the actual state of things, the Opponent, throwing dust, as it were, upon the truth, urges the following argument—

Sūtra 19

" As there is non-apprehension of the non-apprehension of obstruction,—this proves the existence of the obstruction.',

BHĀṢYA

" If the non-existence of the obstruction is deduced from the simple fact of its not being apprehended,—then, inasmuch as the non-apprehension of the obstruction also is not apprehended, we should deduce, from this latter non-apprehension' the non-existence of the ' non-apprehension of obstruction '; and this ' non-existence of the non-apprehension of obstruction ' sets aside the denial of the ' obstruction.'§ ' But how do you prove

* अभूत्वा is the right reading; supported by the Puri Mss. also by the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The right reading is चोच्चारणान्न श्रूयते supported by the Puri Mss.

§ The 'non-apprehension of obstruction,' being 'non-apprehension', no 'apprehension' or perception of it is possible. Hence all that can be postulated of the 'non-apprehension' is that it is *not-apprehended*; and (according to the reasoning propounded by the Siddhāntin himself in Sū. 18)

that the *non-apprehension of obstruction* is not apprehended?' What is there to be proved in this? This fact is realised by everyone intuitively by himself; just as in all similar cases; that is to say, as a matter of fact, when a man fails to apprehend an *obstruction*, he intuitively realises that *he does not apprehend an obstruction*,—just as (in the reverse case) when he actually finds that a certain thing is hidden behind a wall, he intuitively realises that he apprehends an obstruction; and just as he knows that there is *apprehension of obstruction*, so he should also know that there is *non-apprehension of obstruction* [but as he does not know that there is *non-apprehension of obstruction*, it follows that there is *no apprehension* of the non-apprehension]."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[To the above argument, the *Siddhāntin* replies]—If what you say is true, then that knocks the bottom completely out of the rejoinder urged by you.*

The Opponent accepts, for the sake of argument, what the *Siddhāntin* has just said, and then proceeds with the following reasoning:—

Sūtra 20

"If (as you say), even though there is 'non-apprehension of obstruction,' yet this 'non-apprehension of obstruction' exists,—then, in that case, the mere non-apprehension of 'obstruction' cannot prove the non-existence of the 'obstruction'."

BHĀṢYA

"That is to say, just as (according to you) the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' exists, even though it is not apprehended,

when the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' is *not-apprehended*, it follows that the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' does not exist; which means that the 'obstruction' *is apprehended*; which again proves that the 'Obstruction' exists; for when we have the conception of the 'apprehension of obstruction', this conception cannot be entirely baseless.

* The Opponent has declared that the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' can be realised intuitively.—If that be so, then that demolishes the whole Rejoinder put up by him; as this rejoinder based itself entirely upon the *non-apprehension* of the 'non-apprehension of obstruction'. The term '*uttaravākyam*' in the *Bhāṣya* stands for '*jātyuttara*', the Futile Rejoinder contained on Sū. 19.

exactly in the same manner, the 'obstruction' also exists, (as urged by me) even though it is not apprehended. Now if you admit that, 'even though not apprehended,—the *non-apprehension of obstruction* exists',—and having admitted this, still go on to argue (as you have done in Sū. 18) that 'as non-obstruction is apprehended, it does not exist',—then, under such a system of confession (and counter-confession), there can be no certainty as to any particular view being held by any person."*

Sūtra 21

[Reply to Sū. 19 and 20]—Inasmuch as the 'non-apprehension (of obstruction)' is of the nature of 'negation of apprehension (of obstruction)', the reason (put forward in Sū. 19) is not a true one.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, that which is *apprehended* (by means of a *positive* Instrument of Cognition) is accepted as *existing*, while that which is *not-apprehended* (i. e., apprehended only by means of a *negative* Instrument of Cognition) is regarded as *non-existent*. Such being the case, that which is of the nature of the 'negation of apprenhension' should be regarded (by all parties) as a *non-entity*. Now [turning to the case in question] 'non-apprehension' is merely the 'negation of apprehension'; and being purely negative in its character (and as such having no positive form), it cannot be apprehended (by means of any *positive* Instrument of Cognition). On the other hand, inasmuch as *obstruction* is (according to you) an *existent* (positive) entity, there should be *apprehension* of it ;—as a matter of fact, however, it is *not-apprehended*; —hence the conclusion is that it is *non-existent*. Under the circumstances,† it is not right to assert that 'the non-apprehen-

* Sutras 19 and 20 are meant to point out that the reasoning urged by the *Siddhantin* in Su. 18 is *non-conclusive*. —*Tātparya*.

For '*pratipattiniyamaḥ*' in the *Bhāṣya*, the *Bhāṣyacandra* reads '*pratiniyamḥ*', and explains it is *matpakṣapratiṣedhaniyamaḥ* ; according to this the passage means—'*it does not necessarily follow that it is our view that is wrong, and not yours.*'

† तत्र is the right reading for तच्च.

sion of obstruction cannot prove the non-existence of the obstruction' (as urged by the Opponent in Sū. 20).*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Siddāntin†asks]—When you declare Sound to be eternal, on what grounds do you base this declaration?

[The Opponent answers]—

Sūtra 22

(A) "Because of intangibility."

BHĀṢYA

"We have seen that *Ākāśa*, which is intangible, is eternal; hence it follows that Sound is also so."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The reason put forward by the Pūrvapakṣin, is 'inconclusive' (non-concomitant with the Probandum) in both ways; for (1) the Atom is *tangible* and yet *eternal* [which shows that *intangibility* is not the invariable concomitant of *eternality*], and (2) Motion is *intangible* and yet *non-eternal* [which shows that *eternality* is not always concomitant with *intangibility*]. Against the reasoning "because Sound is intangible, therefore it is eternal"—we have the next Sūtra pointing out an instance to the contrary: (Motion), which is similar to the Subject (Sound), is 'intangible'—

Sūtra 23

The reasoning is not right, because Motion (which is 'intangible') is 'non-eternal'.

BHĀṢYA

And the next *Sūtra* cites another instance to the contrary: (the Atom), which is dissimilar to the Subject (Sound, in being *tangible*)—

Sūtra 24

The reasoning is not right, because the Atom (which is 'tangible') is 'eternal'.

BHĀṢYA

Both these examples (cited in Sū. 23 and 24) show that the reasoning—'because Sound is intangible (it should be eternal)'—is not valid.

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* This assumption of the Opponent cannot be right; because, as just shown, the non-apprehension of an *entity* does prove its non-existence.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* wrongly attributes this question to the '*Śiṣya*', *pupil*. It is clearly addressed to the Opponent by the *Siddhāntin*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent says]—"In that case, the following is the reason (for Sound being regarded as *eternal*)—

Sūtra 25

(B) "Because of its being imparted"—

"A thing that is *imparted* is found to be constant; and as Sound is *imparted*, by the Teacher to the Pupil, it should be regarded as *constant*."

Sūtra 26

This also is not a valid reason; because Sound is not found to exist in the space intervening between the two persons.

BHĀṢYA

What is there to indicate the existence of Sound in the space intervening between the person imparting (the word-sounds) and the person to whom they are imparted?

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent answers]—"It cannot be denied that it is only a thing that persists (such as gold etc.) that can leave the imparter and go over to the person to whom it is imparted. So that—

Sūtra 27

" In view of the fact that it (Sound) is taught, (the validity of) the reason cannot be gainsaid."

BHĀṢYA

" What indicates the persistence of Sound is the fact that *it is taught*; if the Sound did not continue to exist, it would not be possible for it to be *taught*."

Sūtra 28

In accordance with the two views, 'being taught' may mean one thing or another; hence the argument fails to meet the objection (urged by us).*

BHĀṢYA

That Word-Sounds are *taught* is admitted by both parties. But the doubt still remains, as to whether in the 'teaching', the Sound that originally subsisted in the Teacher goes over to the

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* The *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as also *Bhāṣyacandra*, mentions this as a *Sūtra* and it is also found in Sutra Mss. A and B.

Pupil,—or when the Pupil is *taught*, he only imitates what he finds in the Teacher, as is the case with the *teaching* of Dancing; and by reason of this doubt, *being taught* cannot be a valid basis for the inference of Sound being "imparted."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent says]—"Well, in that case the following shall be the reason (proving the persistence of Sound)"—

Sūtra 29

"Because there is repetition."

BHĀṢYA

"As a matter of fact, we have found that what is repeated persists; *e. g.*, when one sees a certain colour *five times*, repeatedly, it means that what is seen is the same Colour that persists during all that time;—we have similar repetitions in connection with Sound; *e. g.*, people speak of having read a certain Chapter *ten times* or *twenty times*; which must mean that there is repeated reading of what persists during all that time."

Sūtra 30

This cannot be right; for the term 'repetition' is used figuratively also, in cases where the things concerned are different (not the same).

BHĀṢYA

Even in cases where it is not the same thing persisting all the same, people speak of 'repetition'; *e. g.*, in such assertions as —'please dance *twice*', 'please dance *thrice*', 'he danced *twice*', 'he danced *thrice*', 'he offers the Agnihotra *twice*', 'he eats *twice*' [in all which cases the acts, of *dancing*, *offering* and *eating* spoken of as 'repeated' are not the same, the first *dancing* being different from the second *dancing* and so forth.]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Opponent's reasoning having been thus shown to be based upon false premises, he proceeds to object (by verbal casuistry) to the use of the term '*anya*', 'different.'

Sūtra 31

"When a thing is 'different', it is 'different' from something that is 'different' (from it);—and what is 'different' from the 'different' must be 'non-different';—so that there is nothing that can be regarded as (purely) 'different.'"

BHĀṢYA

That which you regard as 'different' is *non-different* from itself; hence that cannot be regarded as 'different'; [and, as the Sūtra says, what is *different* from the 'different' is *non-different* also; hence that also cannot be regarded as 'different']; so that there is no possibility of anything being regarded as (purely) 'different'. Hence what has been urged (in Sū. 29)—that 'the term *repetition* is used figuratively also in cases where the things concerned are *different*'—is not right. [The very conception of 'difference' being impossible].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In answer to the Opponent who has objected to the use of a word (by the Siddhāntin, in Sū. 29), the Siddhāntin urges an objection against the use of a word (by the Opponent himself, in Sū. 30)—

Sūtra 32

If there is no conception of the 'different', there can be none of 'non-difference'; as the two conceptions are mutually relative.

BHĀṢYA

You are urging that the 'different' is 'non-different'; and having urged that you deny the conception of the 'different', you yet admit the conception of the 'non-different'; and you yourself actually use the term 'non-different.' But as a matter of fact, 'non-difierent' is a compound word—where the word 'different' is compounded with the negative particle 'non'; now if the second term of the compound is impossible (i.e. without a real denotation), with what would the negative particle be compounded? In fact, of the two terms 'different' and 'non-different', one is possible only in relation to the other. Thus, when you say that 'there is nothing that can be regarded as *different*' you say what if not quite right.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent puts forward another argument in support of the eternality of Sound]—"Well, now, we must accept the Sound to be eternal,—

Sūtra 33

"also* because we do not perceive any cause for its destruction".

BHĀṢYA

" Whatever thing is non-eternal, its destruction is brought about by some cause ; *e. g.*, the destruction of the Clod of earth is brought about by the disruption of its component particles ;—now if Sound were non-eternal, we should certainly perceive the cause of its destruction ;—as a matter of fact however, we do not perceive any such cause† (of the destruction of Sound) ;—hence it follows that Sound is *eternal*."

[*Answer to the above argument.*]

Sūtra 34

Inasmuch as we do not find any cause for Sound not being heard, it would mean that (if Sound is eternal) it should be heard always.

BHĀṢYA

Just as not finding any cause for its destruction, you argue that Sound should be *eternal*,—in the same manner, not finding any cause for its not being heard (when it exists), we can argue that Sound (being eternal) should be always heard. "But the non-hearing of Sound (at times) is due to the absence of a manifester (of it)." The hypothesis of the 'manifester' has been already exploded. And such being the case, if there is *non-hearing* of the existing Sound, even without a cause (of this non-hearing), in the same manner, there would also be *destruction* of the existing Sound even without a cause (of that destruction). And as for being contrary to all apparent facts,—that applies equally to both the contingencies,—of causeless *destruction*, as well as causeless *non-hearing*.

Sūtra 35

But (in reality) we do perceive it (the cause of the destruction of Sound) ; so that the said non-apprehension (of

* The *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the Puri Ms. of Sūtra both read a *'cha'* here.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* construes the *Sūtra* as *'vināśakāraṇena anupalabdhiḥ,'* which can only mean—'the non-apprehension of sound is due to the cause of destruction.' This interpretation is not supported either by the *Bhāṣya* or by the *Vārtika*.

such cause) being false, it cannot be regarded as a valid reason.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact the cause of the destruction of Sound is actually apprehended by means of Inference; so that the 'non-apprehension of the cause of destruction' being *non-existent*, false,—the reason put forward (by the Opponent in Su. 32) is not a valid one; being just like the reason in the reasoning 'this animal is a horse *because it has horns*.'

"What is that by means of which you *infer* the said cause of destruction?"

It is the established fact of there being *a series of Sounds* (in the case of every Sound uttered) [from which we infer the presence of causes of destruction of Sound]. We have already shown that (in the case of every Sound) there is a series of Sounds; which means that by means of conjunction and disjunction one Sound produces another Sound, this again produces another, and so on;—now in this series of Sounds, that (succeeding) Sound which is the product destroys that (preceding) Sound which is its cause [so that every Sound of the series is destroyed by that which follows it]; and what destroys the final Sound of the series is the conjunction or impact of an obrtructing substance.* [That such is the case is vouched for by our experience];

* This sentence has exercised the minds of commentators. As the passage stands it clearly means that it is the Sound that comes into contact with the obstructing substance and is thereby destroyed. Now this goes against the Vaishēsika doctrine that no quality can subsist in a quality; whence *Sound* being a quality cannot have *conjunction*, which also is a quality. Hence, as the *Pariśuddhi* remarks, finding the passage to be incompatible with the Vaiśēsika doctrine, the *Tātparya* provides the explanation that what destroys the Sound is 'the impact with the obstacle' of, not *Sound*, but the *Ākāśa*, the material or constituent cause of Sound; so that what happens is that this impact of *Ākāśa* with a denser substance renders it incapable of functioning as the constituent cause of further Sounds, and the immaterial cause of the initial Sound—in the shape of the contact of the stick with the drum—having ceased, there is nothing to start the series afresh; and the result is that the final Sound, and along with it, the 'series of Sounds, is *destroyed*. The *Nyāyakandalī* on Prashastapāda (P. 289) takes the contact of the obstacle to belong to *Air*, which is the efficient cause, the *nimittakāraṇa* of Sound. The *Bhāṣyacandra* also gives the same explanation as the *Tātparya*.

for instance, we find that in a case where a man, though close by, fails to hear a Sound emanating on the other side of a wall; while even though the man is at a distance, he does hear the Sound, if there is no obstacle intervening. Then again, when a bell is rung, what is heard is a continuous series of Sounds, as is clear from the fact that the several Sounds heard are of varying degrees of loudness or dullness; now if Sound were *eternal*, it would be necessary,—in order to account for this continuous series of audition—to postulate an equally permanent *Sound-manifester* abiding either in the Bell or in the Sound-series or in something else; [it would be necessary to find some such cause] as it has to be explained how, the Sound remaining the *same* (*ex-hypothesi*), there is a *diversity* in the hearing (as evinced by the varying degrees of intensity perceived). If, on the other hand, Sound is (regarded as) *non-eternal*, [the said phenomenon can be explained by the hypothesis that] there appears (at each stage of the Series) a fresh cause in the shape of a certain continuous stream of momentum, more or less forcible, subsisting in the Bell (as long as the Sound continues to be heard); which acts as an aid to the *contact* producing the initial Sound;—and by reason of this continued appearance of causes, there appears the Series of Sounds; and the greater or less force of the momentum gives rise to the greater or less intensity of the Sound; and this accounts for the aforesaid diversity of audition.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent says]—"But as a matter of fact, no such further cause (of Sound) as 'Momentum' is ever perceived; and as it is not perceived, it cannot exist." [The answer to this is

* *Sound* itself, if eternal, cannot have any diversity, either natural or accidental;—as will be explained later on. As for the *Audition* or *Hearing*, no diversity in this would be possible if the Sound were only *manifested* by some manifester abiding in either the Bell or some other thing. It may be held that what are heard as of varying degrees of intensity are so many distinct Sounds. But in that case, they should all be heard simultaneously; as all of them have been manifested by the same stroke of the Bell, and there is nothing else that could create a diversity. If however it be held that the Sounds are *produced*—not only manifested—by the stroke of the Bell,—which shows itself in a series of momentum,—the diversity in the hearing is easily explained; the Sounds themselves being diverse, having been brought by the diverse momenta of varying degrees of intensity.—*Tātparya*.

Sūtra 36

Inasmuch the cessation of Sound follows from the touch of such a cause as the 'Hand' it is not right to say that there is non-perception (of the Momentum).*

BHĀṢYA

A motion of the Hand brings about its contact with the Bell (while it is resounding); and upon this contact no further sound-series is perceived; this is what explains the fact that no further sound (of that series) is heard. And the inference in this case is that the touch of the striking substance (Hand) puts a check upon some cause other than the original cause that gave rise to the initial Sound [as this cause is no longer present at the time that the resonance ceases],—and this other cause is the Momentum (set up in the manner described above);—this Momentum being checked, the Sound-series is no longer kept going;—and this series having stopped, there is no further hearing. This is analogous to the case of the Arrow, which is found to stop, when the Momentum, which is the cause of its continuous motion forward, is checked by the impact of the substance struck by the arrow;—and further, in the case of the metallic vessel, the presence of Momentum is clearly indicated, firstly by the cessation of the vibrations that could be felt by touch, and secondly by the touch of the hand itself.† For these reasons, it is not true that there is no cognition of Momentum as an iddditional cause (in the continuance of Sound).

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* The translation of the Sūtra is in accordance with the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*; other commentators have suggested a different explanation,—'Inasmuch as we find the Sound' of the Bell to cease when the Bell is touched by the hand (while it is resounding), it is not right to say that 'we never perceive a cause for the destruction of Sound';—this being an answer to the general Pūrvapakṣa question that "as we can never find a cause that destroys Sound, we cannot regard Sound to be destructible."

† As the passage stands—and all Mss. read it as such—the above is the better interpretation. But it gives better sense if we read पाणिसंश्लषे; the construction being कांस्यपत्रादिषु पाणिसंश्लषे सति स्पर्शनेन्द्रियग्राह्यस्य कंपसन्तानस्य उपरमः संस्कारसन्तानस्य लिङ्गं भवति; that is,—'In the case of metalic vessels it is found that when they are touched by the hand, there is a cessation of vibration set up in them, and this cessation of vibration clearly proves that there has been a continuous momentum at work.'

*Sūtra 37**

Further, if the mere fact of the cause of its destruction not being perceived were to prove that a thing still abides,—then that thing (*e.g.*, the audition of Sound) also would have to be regarded as eternal.

BHĀṢYA

If it be held that when the cause of the destruction of a thing is not perceived, that thing should be regarded as still abiding,—and as abiding, it should be eternal,—then, in regard to *Sound-hearings*, which you hold to be only so many *manifestations of Sound*, as you do not point out any cause of destruction it would follow, from this non-indication that the said *hearings* continue to abide, and as such should be regarded as *eternal*. If this be not so, then it is not right to argue (as the Opponent has done) that, "because the destruction of Sound is not perceived, it must be regarded as abiding, and hence eternal."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The *Sāṅkhya* comes forward with his objection against the Nyāya view of Sound]—" (In the case of bell-ringing) we find that the *Resonance* subsists in the same substratum with the *Vibration*; and hence it ceases, like the Vibration, upon the removal of its cause by the hand-touch ;—if on the other hand, the Resonance subsisted in another substratum (and not in the same substratum with the Vibration), then on the touch of the striking object (Hand), what would cease would be that which subsists in the same substratum (and not the Resonance, which *ex-hypothesi*, subsists in another substratum). [For this reason, Sound must be regarded as subsisting in the sounding substance, wherein the vibrations subsist,—that is, in the Air,—and not in *Ākāśa*, as held by the Naiyāyika]."

[In answer to this, we have the following Sutra]—

* This Sūtra reverts to the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument put forward in Sū. 30. सिंहावलोकितन्यायेन पूर्वोक्तं हेतुं दूषयति—says the *Tātparya*. "The same argument that the Opponent had urged in support of the eternality of sound, the Siddhāntin now turns in support of the continuity of sound-audition."—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

Sūtra 38

Inasmuch as (the substratum of Sound) is intangible, the said objection (against Sound subsisting in Ākās'a) does not hold.

BHĀṢYA

The *Sāṅkhya* objects to the view that Sound is a quality subsisting in *Akāśa*; but this objection cannot be maintained; for the simple reason that the substratum of Sound (i.e. *Ākāśa*) is intangible. As a matter of fact, we find that the Sound-series is perceived even at a time when there is no perception of anything possessing Colour and other qualities; which shows that Sound has for its substratum a substance which is intangible and all-pervading,—and it does *not* subsist in the same substratum with the *Vibrations*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Further, it is not right to hold that Sound is manifested as subsisting in each substance, along with Colour and other qualities (as held by the *Sāṅkhyas*). "Why?"

Sūtra 39

Because, if Sound formed an aggregate (along with Colour &c.),—inasmuch as there are also divisions and subdivisions of it, [Sound could not be regarded as 'manifested']

BHĀṢYA

The particle '*cha*', 'also', points to the *presence of the series of Sounds* as a further reason (for denying the mere *manifestation* of Sound); which has already been explained (under Sū. 16).

If Sounds, Colours and other qualities co-exsist in each substance, and form an aggregate (as held by the *Sāṅkhya*),—then, inasmuch as it is found that in any particular substance, the Colour or some other quality is always perceived to be of one and the same kind, it would follow that Sound also (as forming a member of that same aggregate of qualities) should always be perceived to be of one and the same kind. And under the circumstances, there would be no possibility of—(1) the 'division' or diversity involved in the well-known phenomenon, that when Sound appears in connection with a substance (the string of a musical instrument, for instance), it is found to consist of several sounds of diverse kinds, belonging to different notes (in the musical scale),—or (2) of the 'sub-division' involved in the

phenomenon, that in the case of the Sounds of the same form, of the same kind and belonging to the same musical note, we perceive a diversity, due to the varying grades of intensity.* [Both these phenomena would be impossible, in accordance with the Sāṅkhya theory; because] the said phenomena could be possible only if there were *several* Sounds and they were *produced*; and not if there is a *single* Sound and that also is *manifested*. As a matter of fact, however, we know that the said 'division and subdivision' do exist. So that from the existence of these 'divisions and sub-divisions' we conclude that Sound cannot be *manifested* as subsisting, in each substance, along with Colour and other qualities.

SECTION (3)

The Modifications of Sound

Sūtras 40–54

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Sound is of two kinds—Letter-sounds and Sound in general (Noise).† Now in regard to Letter-sounds—

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains 'division' as 'division into Letters' and 'sub-division' as 'Sound and Resonance.'

† 'Letter-sound'—in the shape of *a*, *k* &c.; and 'noise'—the sound produced by conch-blowing, says *Praśastapāda*.

Sound in general has been dealt with up to Sū. 38. The author now takes up the particular kind of Sound, in the shape of Letter-sounds, which form the subject-matter of the present enquiry; as is clear from the fact that the Sound-modifications dealt with are only those pertaining to Letter-sounds.—*Tātparya*.

The connection of the present section with what has gone before is thus explained by the *Tātparya* :—The *Sāṅkhya* view, that 'Sound is manifested as co-existing with Colour and other qualities', having been refuted,—the same *Sāṅkhya* turns round with the view that, "though Sound may not be eternal, in the sense of continuing to exist in the same unchanged form, yet it could be eternal in the sense that it continues to exist and undergo modifications; just in the same manner as Primordial Matter is regarded as *eternal*; just as gold remains gold even in its endless modifications; and in support of this view we may cite the grammatical laws of *sandhi*, by which Letter-sounds undergo certain modifications." With a view to demolish this view, the Author proceeds to show that, in the case of Letter-sounds, there is no such modification, or transmutation, as would justify us in regarding them as having a continuity of existence.

BRĀHMAṆA DHARMA, THE UNIVERSAL RELIGION

(R. N. Suryanarayana, M. A.)

(*Continued from Vol. IV, No. I–II*)

The nature, significance, scope and extension of the term Brāhmaṇa

(i)

The title Brāhmaṇa has been aspired for, for the last twenty centuries by most of us. Even the Jains who have an aversion to the Vedas had an impetus to introduce the word Brāhmaṇa into their system irrespective of the knowledge of its relation to Vedas. Vīraśaivas struggled their utmost to be dubbed as Brāhmaṇas. Viśvakarma people too, are proud of the title of Brāhmaṇa. When the Portuguese landed in our land they worked in disguise of Brāhmaṇas and proclaimed that they were European Brāhmaṇas only to deceive our innocent people in Malabar coast. According to Mr. J. C. Chattarjee, the Director of India Academy, America, 'Some of the Americans who happened to study the imperfect translations of the Bhagavadgītā had a fascination to this religion and styled themselves as Brāhmaṇas i.e., Boston Brāhmaṇas'.

(ii)

Inspite of many differences in opinion regarding the Absolute the people of three main branches of Ācāras, viz., the Smārtha, the Vaiṣṇava, and the Śrīvaiṣṇava are all commonly known as Brāhmaṇas. Besides there are Gowda, Sāraswata, etc., classes of Brāhmaṇas.

(iii)

It seems that such a charming term as Brāhmaṇa, contains some magic in it. It is also tempting and therefore it is attracting like a powerful magnet, all those who are enamoured of it. It may be said that the word 'Brāhmaṇa' is an all-embracing term that can distinguish us, our nature, our religion, our philosophy etc., from all others and therefore be claimed by all people of our nation irrespective of communities including, even the Pancamas. There are great many saints among the Śūdras

and the Pancamas. Kanakadasa (Kuruba), Nanda (Pancama) and many others cannot be wholly kept apart from this Brāhmaṇa-fold. Rāmānujācārya was one of the great propagandists who realised Brāhmanhood even in that Pancama class just as his predecessors did and extended his generosity to many people. The Great Almighty, Śiva appeared as a Pancama in disguise and revealed his Omnipresence to the revered Śankarācārya who was proud to feel and express—

Jāgratsvapnasuṣuptiṣu sphuṭatarā yā samvidujjṛmbhate
Ya brahmādipipilikantatanuṣu prota jagatsakshiṇi
Śaivaham na ca dṛśyavastviti dṛdham prajñāpi yasyāśti chet
Chandalostu sa tu dvijostu gururityeṣā maniṣā mama.

Śri Dattatreya Guru is constantly emphasising this point of making no difference between a Paraya or Mlenchas and the people of other castes.

(iv)

Thus we can quite clearly see how this spirit of universality is taught by our teachers and texts. The statement 'Gobrāhmaṇebhysśubhamastu nityam' may suggest that all the living and moving beings are classified into two sections, viz., the animals and the human beings, i.e. Brāhmaṇas. No doubt we find in all the religious texts that the term Brāhmaṇa seems to represent one particular class of people. But the definition and the characteristics of Brāhmaṇa as mentioned in the Dharmaśāstra and the other texts have got nothing to say that the word Brāhmaṇa exclusively points out a single class.

(v)

The word Brāhmaṇa is used in more than one sense in the sacred texts. It is referred sometimes, according to Sāyanacarya, to all the three classes, viz., the Brāhmaṇa, the Kśatriya and the Vaiśya. Brāhmaṇas should, in accordance with their birth, virtue and profession, be styled as Śrotriyas. When the word Brāhmaṇa represents the second class, it is to be understood that we should consider it in its Kśatriya aspect. Similarly the Vaiśya Brāhmaṇa. We may say that the Śrotriya, the Kṣatriya, the Vaiśya, the Śūdra and the Niṣāda classes were all known as Brāhmaṇas, in the Vedas.

(vi)

The reference made in the Puruṣa Sūkta to Brāhmaṇa Kṣatriya etc., is to be taken in an abstract sense. All the Śrotriya, the Kṣatriya, the Vaiśya, the Śūdra and the Niśāda characteristics are found in a smaller or a greater degree in each class. The Kṣatriya characteristics are found in all other three classes. The Śūdra characteristics are also found in all other classes. If the percentage of the Śrotriyahood in Brāhmaṇa is greater, he is called Śrotriya—similarly the highest percentage of Kṣatriyahood, Vaiśyahood, Śūdrahood and the Niśādahood of Brāhmaṇas determine their relative position. The Śrotriyas are now known as Brāhmaṇas as though they form exclusively a class known as Brāhmaṇa. The fact that many people born as Śūdras and Niśādas have qualified themselves to be heroes of Dharma, virtually suggests that they too are entitled for the title 'Brāhmaṇa'.

(vii)

During the epic times, the Kṣatriya and other classes had recognised the superiority of birth as well as practices of Śrotriyas and faithfully followed the Śrotriya class. There was a sort of brotherhood among the four classes. Gradually, the Brāhmaṇa epithet was resigned in favour of knowledge, learning and almost beggary. That is why Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, and Śūdra classes are always individually spoken of in the later sacred works. There was no foreign element to be faced and as such, no necessity arose to represent the four or five classes collectively as Brāhmaṇas. As they were quite safe in their country they had the satisfaction of understanding Dharma in four different aspects of the four Varṇas.

(viii)

The one fundamental distinguishing feature of a Brāhmaṇa in general is to follow any one of the aspects of the Dharma as it is explained in any one of the following sacred texts, which are classified into Vedas and their branches evolved through the Vedas.

Purāna Nyāyamīmāmsādharmaśāstrangaviśrutāḥ
Sthānānividyānām vedāśca dharmasyaca caturdaśa.

(ix)

Both birth and virtue must be considered when the merits of an individual are to be determined. Birth solves many problems including that of legality. The question of Adhikāra is to be viewed from different points of view viz., Inheritance, physiology, psychology, etc.

(x)

There are twelve kinds of Vipras mentioned in the Bodhāyana Dharma Śāstra. There may be many more of them. Each of the Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, Śūdra and Niśada classes has a great many number of sub-castes in accordance with their relative merits.

(xi)

The sects Smārtha, Vaiṣṇava, and Śrivaiṣṇava are very little understood. Many of us may think that each of these sects excludes the others,—when it means that a Vaiṣṇava is not a Smārtha and a Smārtha may not necessarily be a Vaiṣṇava. But on the contrary a Vaiṣṇava is a Smārtha first and a Vaiṣṇava next. In order to make this point clear we should say that Smārthas are Smārtha-smārthas and Vaiṣṇavas are Smārtha-vaiṣṇavas. The circumstances that led to the vagueness of the existing classification of these sects may hold good to that of the present caste system. Strictly speaking we have the Śrotriya Brāhmaṇas, the Kṣatriya Brāhmaṇas, Vaiśya Brāhmaṇas the Śūdra Brāhmaṇas, and the Niṣada Brāhmaṇas following one Brāhmaṇa Dharma Ācāra. The present Brāhmaṇa class, then, may conveniently be promoted, as it were, to the Śrotriya class without prejudice and hatred in order to maintain the system.

(xii)

Now we see how we can bring all our people under the single banner of Brāhmaṇa Dharma and unite ourselves to defend our religion against the mischievous attacks of venomous minds like Miss Mayo and others.

The Ācāras of the World

The Universal religion Brāhmaṇadharma which took its origin first in this Brāhmaṇa land went abroad in all directions, to enlighten the ignorant masses of the world, who were grovelling in darkness :—

Sarvahotrācāra (Zorostrianism)

The worship of fire was, as it is mentioned above, confined to certain people called Śrotriyas who knew it and who were entitled to do it. It appears that a staunch believer of the worship of Almighty in the form of fire made it open to all, formulating his own rules thereon. The founder of this was therefore called Sarvahotṛ, whose religion is now known as Zorostrianism (sarvahotrācāra) according to which the daily worship either in the house or the temple should usually be before the sacred fire, the symbol of purity, as Widgery says. The followers of this Ācāra are aware of this fact that it is from Brāhmaṇa Dharma that their religion is sprung up. The circumstances that gave rise to this religion may be compared to those that inspired Basava born in a Śrotriya family to found the Vīra-śaivācāra in our land.

The Greekācāra

The Phanis of this land who were trading with many distant countries round the Mediterranean sea, founded some settlements known as the Phœnician lands. The aborigines of that land were living in villages which were called pallis by the Phanis.[1] The term Palli changed in due course its form into halli as it is known in Kannada today, and this may be taken as the origin of Hellas. The Phanis considered themselves superior to the aborigines and hence styled themselves as Gariamsaha, which later transformed into Greece. The religion of the Greeks bears resemblance to Brāhmaṇācāra and no wonder that Greekācāra must have sprung up from the universal Brāhmaṇadharma.

The Tao-ācāra

The doctrine of Brāhmaṇadharma travelled north and was propagated there as tatva or satya. The people on the other side of the Himalayas were capable of apprehending the quintessence of Brāhmaṇadharma as Satya or Tatva which was gradually corrupted by them into Tao, meaning nature God. The word may also be said to have been derived from Dyauh. The Tao-ācāra of the Chinese owes a deep debt of gratitude to its origin, the Brāhmaṇadharma. The Tao-ācāra is also known later as

1. People of Pani characteristics described in the Vedas.

Śāntyacāra (Shintoism), or Śarmācāra, samānacāra (Shamanaism) in some places.

The Heberācāra

The origin of the Semetic people may be accounted for, in the following manner:

> Most of the roaming Brāhmaṇas of the Brāhmaṇa-land emigrated in groups probably headed by a man Śama by name and settled down in the coastal strips of Western Asia and Africa and became the originators of the Hebrew, the Egyptians etc. The Śabaras of the Brāhmaṇa-land came to be called as Heberas or Arabs (Arabas) when they colonised in Asia Minor and Arabia and as Sthapathis in the Nile region. These Śabaras carried with them the sacred truths of Brāhmaṇadharma and inculcated the same into the minds of the aborigines. And their religion was known as Heberācāra.

The Judācāra

The Judācāra (Judaism) was in every respect borrowed from the Southern Brāhmaṇa-land, where the term Kudavul (meaning Gopala = Śrikṛṣṇa God) is still current. It is this word Kudavul that has been changed into Guda or God, first and finally into Juda.[1] The term Khuda may also be traced to this origin.

The Sthapatyācāra

The people inhabiting the fertile banks of the Nile River have surely adapted their religion from the Brāhmaṇa Dharma which was introduced by Sthapatis. The term 'Re' (Sun god of the Egyptians) is indeed derived from Ravi of Brāhmaṇadharma. There are many in Africa who have maintained the old customs of religion which resemble many of the customs of the Brāhmaṇācāra.

The rest of the ācāras abroad

The people in America, Japan, Java, etc. were all influenced by the Brāhmaṇācāra, and practised some aspect or the other of

1. Juda may also be said to have been derived from Kulam meaning family (or tribe) the corrupted Tamil form of which is kudam, Judācāra may mean the religious practice of a family or tribe.

it. Mana and Thabu which are current in those places are certainly derived from Manas, Manyu and Tapas of the Brāhmaṇa-land.

The Jainācāra

From the 10th cenury B. C. onwards, there was a gradual decline of the Brāhmaṇācāra owing perhaps to the circumstances such as foreign invasions, political changes etc. The Śrotriya class of Brāhmaṇas could not devote themselves to their learning peacefully. The Kṣatriya Brāhmaṇas had no opportunities to encourage the sacred institutions of learning. The truth was hidden. The Śrotriyas became oblivious of the reality. Some rich persons who knew this secret rose in rebellion against the Śrotriyas and the ununderstandable authoritative texts, especially the sacrificial cerimonies, the signifieance of which they could not realise for want of proper guidance and management. By about the 5th century, Mahāvīra the most learned among them became the hero of the party and established a religion parallel to the Brāhmaṇācāra devoid of the genuine sacrifice. This offshoot known as Jainācāra began to deny the authority of the Vedas. This denial of the Vedas on the part of the Jainācāra could not win over many people to its side. Though the new religion is too proud to recognise the authority of the Veda, still it can never boast of being an original Institution as different from the Brāhmaṇācāra. And it is quite clear that this Jainācāra too is—indirectly following the truth of the same Brāhmaṇācāra.

The Bouddhācāra

But at the same time, without disregarding the Vedas, a prince tried to put an end to the sacrifice and the mortifying tapas. He himself was very much benefited by this tapas but being a prince by birth he could not advooate the superiority of tapas and he attached the greatest importance to the moral side of the Brāhmaṇa-Dharma. It was very easy for the people to follow him without at the same time neglecting the authority of the Vedas. This new religion called Bouddhācāra became popular and spread over the whole world. Five centuries after the origin and growth of this religion there was a new reawakening among the people of the Brāhmaṇa land. Thereupon

the true Brāhmaṇācāra once again came into full sway and the Bouddhācāra merged or proselytized itself quietly in the mother Brāhmaṇācāra.

The Kristācāra

The Boudha religion which did not recognise the personification of the All-pervading power in the form of concrete thing shook the foundations of the shadowy religions of the western people, who were confused by the tenets of the Bouddhācāra. The Judaism was also declining and therefore the Judas were aspiring for the true interpretation of God and religion.

They looked upon the Brāhmaṇa land anxiously for succour. Accordingly the cult of Śri Kṛṣṇa worship spread to the West and assumed a via-media path in the realm of religion in those parts. And the protagonist of this new form of religion was Jesus Christ; Yaśoda-Kṛṣṇa, a devotee of Kṛṣṇa many of whose doctrines are culled out from Brāhmaṇadharma. There are in the Hebrew literature many words like Abraham and Aesiah which bear resemblances to the terms Brahma, Esa etc., of the Sanskrit language.

The Mahamadācāra (Mā ahammadaḥ)

Some of the followers of Kristācāra changed their mental outlook and abused their religion in a period of about 500 years. The Judācāra was also much corrupted. Sarvahotrācāra, too, was declined and corrupted. The rich oppressed the poor as though the poor were without religion. In this chaotic condition a self-less workman named Mahommed made a very determined effort to realise the truth until at last certain necessary modiffcations of religion were revealed to him by the Almighty so that they might be broadcast among the ignorant masses of that region; and his religion, as reflected from Zend Avesta is known as Islam or Mahamedanism (Mahammadācāra), the doctrines of which are similar to many doctrines of the ancient Brāhmaṇadharma which exercise their influence over all men at all times.

The Minor Ācāras of the Brāhmaṇa land

As time went on, in this very Brāhmaṇa land, owing to the lack of proper Kṣatriya Brāhmaṇas who are expected to fortify dharma and owing to incessant political turmoil in this country,

the peaceful Brāhmaṇācāra was shattered into pieces. Some Philanthropic rich men and educated leaders selected from the Brāhmaṇācāra one or two points which pleased them most and exhorted the people to follow their movements. I mean the Brahmasamāja, the Āryasamāja, etc. Though these were not aliens to the Brāhmaṇa Dharma they were not embraced by many owing to their limited and imperfect character. It was Ramakrishna Paramahamsa who realised the unity of all the different religions of the world and proclaimed the same to the whole world through his disciple Vivekananda.

The Isms

Polytheism, Henotheism, Pantheism, Monotheism, Theism and other forms of religion are erroneously adduced by the scholars to be the religions of the Vedas. This is due to their incorrect interpretations of the statements in the Vedas. Each of these 'isms' may indicate a particular aspect or phase of the Brāhmaṇācāra. But the Brāhmaṇācāra is the unique religion of the Vedas, holding good for all times and for all places.

(i)

The Universal spirit of the Brāhmaṇācāra

All varieties and walks of life come under sacrifice, and will have a particular stage of religion. Each one of these walks of life satisfies one or the other condition of religion, according to the Brāhmaṇācāra, the universal religion. Thus even according to the argument put forward by J. S. Huxley the Brāhmaṇācāra provides with all kinds and grades of religion.

(ii)

J. S. Huxley says, "A religion which takes this (effort, pain, fulfilment of duty) as its central core and interprets it with wide vision both of the possibilities opened to man and of the limitations in which he is confined will be a true religion, because it is co-terminus with life ; it will encourage the growth of life, and will itself grow with that growth. I believe in the religion of life." J. S. Huxley must be congratulated for his opinion on religion. His interpretation of religion bears close resemblances to that of universal religion or Brāhmaṇadharma. 'Growth of Soul' or life is indicated by the very word Brahma.

(iii)

Similarly it may be said that the religion of life is akin to the meaning of 'Tatvamasi'. Any man or woman endowed with the power of discrimination, will be able to endorse the doctrines of Brāhmaṇadharma. But to enjoy the pleasure of the realisation of the truths directly through the Brāhmaṇacāra one has to pass through a series of stages. It is very rare that one attains to the highest bliss. 'Bahunām janmanām ante Jñanavān mām prapadyate.' Wherever you go, you find the spirit of Brāhmaṇācāra prevailing there.

(iv)

The Limitations of all other Ācāras

But the particular form in which the same exists among the different nations, has been in accordance with their tradition as well as the physical and geographical environments in which they have been brought up. The Kristācāra can be seen in full sway only in those regions where it took its origin, where there was absolutely no proper religion suited to the temperament and circumstances of people existing before the introduction of the same. The followers of Christ and Mohamed can never maintain the rigour of their religions in a strange land, like this, the climate and geographical conditions of which do not allow them to do so. The Manifestation of Śrotriya Brāhmaṇācāra is impossible in a far-off land, where there is not the least hope for the maintenance of the same. A Christian or a Mahomedan living in the Brāhmaṇa-land is Brahmanised, and the Jains and the Boudhas have also been almost Brahmanised here. A Brahman will be Christianised or Mohamedanised when he resides in the lands of those respective regions. Although the Christians and Mohamedans are living side by side with the Brahmins whose ācāra appears to have been affected much by their influence, still,-'Nakraḥ swasthānamasādya Gajendramapi karṣati,'-the spirit of Brāhmaṇācāra will never be lost.

(v)

The glory of one's own Ācāra

Even now there are the staunchest representatives of Brāhmaṇācāra in this land. A worst Brāhmaṇa is superior to

the convert. A worst Harijana Brāhmaṇa or Pariah Brāhmaṇa or Adikarnāṭaka Brāhmaṇa is in all respects superior to either a Christian or a Mohamedan. Similarly a worst Mohamedan or a Christian may think that he is superior to a Brāhmaṇa. "Swadharme nidhanam śreyaḥ paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ." An ācāra (religion) ceased to be called a true ācāra when it excludes the spirit of tolerance which is one of the dominating doctrines of the universal religion.

(vi)

The aim of all Ācāras

It is quite certain that the individual soul in any upādhi is sure to realise the 'Self' and become one with the Universal Soul. "Sarvamukti" is the ultimate goal of the Brāhmaṇācāra. Every blessed individual may attain to the bliss of Brāhmaṇa-dharma provided he realises the universality of the Self; and this realisation is only possible after gaining greater and greater experience through a series of lives or stages which I should like to put as the cycle of evolution and involution of ब्रह्म or आत्मन्.

The Harijan movement

I consider it unnecessary to deal with the present movement of the Harijans. The seekers of fame, wealth or honour may purposely create 'untouchability' and pretend to suggest remedies for the same. The attitude of the Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore towards these Adikarnāṭaka Brāhmaṇas is exemplary. The feverish attempt on the part of some eminent leaders to bring about almost an immediate equanimity among all classes is rather Utopian.

(i)

The Religion, Science and Civilisation

Nowadays, it seems to be contageous disease among the people to confound universal religion with social intercourses like inter-dining, inter-marriage, etc., inspite of their advancement in science. No scientific mind can justify the propriety of such practices. The discoveries made by scientists tell us that mixing with all kinds of people very often leads us to many diseases like Meningitis, leprosy, consumption etc. All

these diseases are the direct consequence of either the violation of scientific truths or the want of the realisation of Dharma and Ācāra. Science seeks to explain away the things, but to realise the truth of it belongs to the realm of religion. We have to conclude that science like Philosophy is an imperfect process. It can analyse the things in any particular branch of knowledge, and be satisfied with the discoveries in the same. But it cannot explain the why and wherefore of all that it does, and it is blind. Therefore its progress results in the deterioration of the true civilisation.

(ii)

Religion which may be considered as the synthesis of all that exists in the world must come to its (Science's) rescue and illuminate the path towards the Eternal Truth or Dharma. 'It is physical science and experience that man ought to consult in religion' says Morley. This statement must be carefully weighed and understood here.

(iii)

It is for our good that Brāhmaṇācāra emphasises many strictures enabling us to guard ourselves against diseases and other calamities. It is a pity that there are not many who appreciate this. There are some aspects of Kristācāra which maintain all these hygienic truths. They are not far away from these doctrines of Brāhmaṇadharma. Dr. Kuhne, a great scientist in Germany, is capable of realising this truth superficially without the divine aspect of it and adopting it materially into his system of Nature Cure. From the point of view of Brāhmaṇadharma, Europeans, Mohamedans, Taoists, Boudhas, Negroes, Americans, etc., are all Brāhmaṇas in a more general sense of course. Because Brāhmaṇadharma asserts that they too one day or other can become Brāhmaṇas proper and attain salvation in the long run.

(iv)

It is unbecoming and even criminal on the part of one embracing a particular faith to compel, to induce or to deceive another person of a different faith so as to change his traditional religious observances with all the prerogatives and to enter into wilderness (paradharma). That it is against science, and

humanity has been proved by many scientists. Such and many other scientific, logical truths as detailed in this discourse are heaped up in the Brāhmaṇa sacred texts. It is expected that scholars in different branches of knowledge embracing different ācāras, should endeavour to interpret their sacred texts properly and thus understand through them the eternal truth of Brāhmaṇadharma which alone is the panacea for all the evils in the world. Let the Almighty keep the whole world in eternal peace; and strengthen us to put an end to tbe monstrous civilisation of securing facilities and let us breathe in an atmosphere of felicitous true civilisation of eternity. May the Universal Religion, Brāhmaṇadharma rule the whole world and be the guiding star for all classes of people on this earth.

PADACANDRIKĀ
A COMMENTARY ON THE DAŚAKUMĀRACARITA BY KAVĪNDRĀCĀRYA SARASVATĪ

(M. M. Patkar)

The Government Mss. Library at the Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona, contains two Mss[1]. of a commentary on the Daśakumāracarita. The commentary is called *Padacandrikā* and is ascribed to one Kavīndrācārya Sarasvatī.

Both the manuscripts of the above commentary are modern in appearance and are written on a bluish paper with water-marks. The two Mss. are complete and one of them bears the date of the copy which is recorded as Śaka 1788 or A. D. 1866, a year in which Dr. Bühler started the work of collecting Mss. for the Government of Bombay.

The commentary is exhaustive and contains numerous references to Sanskrit works and authors. In his learned commentary the author quotes about thirty-two authorities many of which are lexicons, the most frequently quoted being the *Amara Kośa*, *Vaijayanti Kośa*, *Haima Kośa*, *Bhāguri* and *Halāyudha*. The following are the works and authors quoted by *Kavīndrācārya* :—

अमर: foll. 1, 2, 3, 10, 11 etc.
इति स्मृते: foll. 2, 77.
विश्वः foll. 2, 17, 22, 26 etc.
वैजयन्तीकोश foll. 3, 9, 11, 13, 14 etc.
रत्नकोष: 3.
हैम: 6, 7, 17, 29, 33 etc.
द्विरूपकोष: 7.
महीप: =नानार्थकोष (?) 10, 29, 44, 85.
केशव: = कल्पद्रुकोश 11, 47.
भागुरि 11, 12, 14, 17, 46, 61, 62 etc.
हलायुध 33, 66, 68, 108, 146.
इति कोश: ? 34, 35, 81, 92, 98, 100 etc.
कोशसार 36.
संगीतसर्वस्व 36.
दिवाकर: 45.
वोपालित 46, 51.
वररुचि 51, 78, 105, 125.
वृत्तरत्नाकर
कामन्दक 58, 87, 151.
अजय 66, 71, 86.
वात्स्यायने कामशास्त्रे 75.

1. No. 128 and 129 of 1866–68.

मनुः 101, 142.
शार्ङ्गधर 118.
रत्नमाला 118,
वाग्भट 119.
मेदिनी 132, 141.
शाश्वतः 135.
चाणक्यो नीतिशास्त्रकर्त्ता 143.
अभिधानचिन्तामणि 144.
भरत 149.

Besides quoting authorities Kavīndra, in many places, gives vernacular equivalents for Sanskrit terms. I give below a few of such equivalents given by the author :—

Fol. 34 भस्त्रिका = भाता इति भाषया प्रसिद्धा.
,, 21 डिण्डिम = दाण्डोरा.
,, 48 नेत्रपुटिका = झांपीति भाषया.
,, 49 व्यामः परिणामविशेषः = वांव भाषया.
,, 51 उपबर्हः = उशी इति भाषाप्रसिद्धम्.
,, 53 अवलम्बमानकाष्ठं = खुंटी.
उपदस्तिका = चंच्वी.
,, 116 इंगुदी = हिंगणबेट.
,, 116 सेकपात्र = डोल.
,, 133 वस्त्रकृतनालिका = पलिता.
,, 136 लिकुच = बडहर (?)
,, 144 इहामृग = विग (?)

Mr. Krishnamachary[1] ascribes this commentary to Kavīndrācārya, the famous samnyasi of Benares who exercised wonderful influence on Shah Jahan in order to make him abolish the pilgrim tax on Hindus and in whose honour addresses after addresses, verses, and prose eulogies were presented by several pandits.[2] There is, however, nothing (except the title सर्वविद्यानिधान) in the present commentary to show that the author of the present commentary is identical with the famous samnyasi Kavīndra who lived during the reign of Shah Jahan. Some more evidence must, therefore, he brought forward to prove the identity of the two Kavīndras. But in case the identity is proved the present commentary may be said to have been composed between 1627–1650 A. D.—a period when Kavīndrācārya lived at Benares.

1. History of Classical Sanskrit Literature p. 310 c.

2. These addresses are collected in an anthology called *Kavīndracandrodaya* by Śri Kṛṣṇa. The work is published in the Poona Oriental Series No. 60.

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Gorakhanātha and the Kānaphāṭa Yogis by G. W. Briggs. In this close-up study of the split-ear yogis Prof. Briggs has combined an account of the life, customs, beliefs and monasteries of these famous ascetics with an exposition of their practice of Yoga as themselves describe it. Not only has he studied their own sacred books, but he has been in intimate touch with them in their monasterles and at their shrines by travelling through-out india. Calcutta, 1939. Cr. Pp. 394. Paper Rs. 4-8. Cloth Rs. 5-8.

Yogic Āsanas for Health and Vigour—a Physiological exposition by Dr. V. G. Rele, L. M. & S., with a Foreword by Lieut-Col. S. L. Bhatia. In this work, the author has endeavoured to show the Psychological importance of the Āsanas from his own personal experience, thus making the practice of this ancient science acceptable to the highly scientific mind as well as the layman. The chief object of this book is to impress on the reader how the vicissitudes of middle life react unfavourably on health and how the practice of the Āsanas—the well-known poses-mentioned in the Yogic literature of India, counteracts this tendency towards ill-health. Bombay, 1939. Boards Roy. Pp. 10, 113 with 44 illustrations. Rs. 3-12.

Yoga Upaniṣads translated into English on the basis of the comm. of Sri Upaniṣad Brahmayogin by T. R. Srinivasa Aiyangar. Adyar, 1938. Cloth Demy Pp. 49, 502. Rs. 5.

Yoga Yājñāvalkyam (योगयाज्ञवाल्क्यम्) ed. by K. Samba Śiva Śastri. Dealing with the Yoga System of Philosophy, comprises the teachings of Yājñavalkya imparted to his wife Gārgi. It has been the source of authority for all later eminent works on Yoga Philosophy. Trivandrum, 1938. Roy. Pp. 4, 4, 2, 47. As. 4.

POETRY, PROSE, POETICS, ROMANCE

Dayānanda Digvijayam, Illustrated (दयानंद-दिग्विजयम्) with Hindi translation by Pt. Medhavratācārya. Baroda, 1931. Cloth. Roy. Pp. 84,330. Rs. 3.

Dhvanyālokaḥ (ध्वन्यालोक:) of Ānandavardhanācārya with Sanskrit Comm. Avadhāna by Sri Madhusudana Miśra with Sanskrit, Intro. and its English trans. by Narendracandra ed. by Śri Ānanda Misra. Puri, 1939. Cr. Pp. 14, 18, 340, 4. Rs. 2-8.

Gangālaharī (गंगालहरी) of Pandit Jagannath being the Poem in praise of the Ganges ed. with introduction and Marathi trans. and notes etc. by D. G. Padhye. 1939. Poona Or. S. No. 63, Cr. Pp. 24, 103. As. 12.

Kādambarī-Kathāmukham (कादम्बरी-कथामुखम्) with Sanskrit Intro. and Text by Dr. P. L. Vaidya, English trans. by J. S. N. Chakrawarthy and Eng. Notes by P. V. Kane, 1939. Poona Or. S. No. 48 (I–IIIA). Rs. 3.

Kāvyadīpikā (काव्यदीपिका) with Sanskrit and Hindi Comms. by Pt. Hari Dutt Sāstri. Lahore 1939. Cr. Pp. 4, 4, 199. Re. 1.

Kumārsambhava (कुमारसंभव) of Kālidāsa with the comm. Puṁsavani by Pt. Gangadhar Śāstri Bhāradwaj. Cantos 1—VII only ed. with Hindi trans. by Śeṣaraja Śāstri. Benares 1939. Cr. Pp. 558. Rs. 1-8.

S'ankara-jīvanākhyānam (शङ्कर-जीवनाख्यानम्) by Panditā Mrs. Kshamabai Rao. Being the biography in Sanskrit verses of her late father S. P. Pandit. Bombay 1939. Cr. Pp, 14, 150. Paper Rs. 2.

Sanskrit Poetesses by Prof. J. B. Chaudhary. (Contribution of Women to Sanskrit Literature, Vol. II) Part A—Select Verses With a Supplement on Prakrit Poetesses, ed. with critical Notes and Eng. trans. and Intro. by Dr. Roma Chaudhuri and a Foreword by Dr. L. D. Barnett. The object of this

volume is to bring to light, for the first time the poetic genius of the Sanskrit Poetesses—Ancient and Mediæval. The materials have been collected mostly from unpublished Mss. The work is divided into 3 Parts : The first Part contains English Intro., giving informations about the personal histories, dates etc. of the Poetesses. In the second Part are given some select Verses of the Sanskrit and Prakrit Poetesses with annotations and references. The English trans. of the verses is given in the 3rd Part followed by 10 Appendices. Calcutta, 1939. Cr. Pp. 93, 196. Rs. 5 or Sh. 7-6.

S'ivamahimna Stotram (शिवमहिम्नस्तोत्रम्) or the Hymn on the greatness of Siva. Text with Eng. trans. and Notes by Swami Pavitrananda. Calcutta, 1938. Paper Pp. 2, 87. As. 5.

Sūktiratnāhāra (सूक्तिरत्नाहार:) A Sanskrit work on Anthology, ed. with Subject and Verse Indices by K. Sāmba Śiva Śāstri. Trivandrum, 1938. Roy. Pp. 8, 272, 83. Rs. 2.

Tantropākhyānam (तन्त्रोपाख्यानम्) ed. by K. Sāmba Śiva Śāstri. It is a simple Prose production and will indubitedly be of profound utility to the beginners of Sanskrit. Trivandrum, 1938. Pp. 2, 90. As. 6.

Udayavarma-caritam (उदयवर्मचरितम्) ed. by K. Sāmba Śiva Śāstri. It is a dialogue between Dvija and Sūta to pass for a legend at the time of the king Udayavarmā. Trivandrum, 1938. Pp. 3, 3, 16. Re. 1.

VEDA

L'Agnihotra. Description de l' Agnihotra dans le retuel Vedique by P. E. Dumont. D'apres les Śrautasūtras. de Kātyayana (Yajurveda Blanc); Āpastamba, Hiraṇyakeśi, Baudhāyana, Manu (Yajurveda Novi); Aśvalāyana ; Saṅkhyāyana (Ṛgveda); et la Vaitāna Sūtra (Atharvaveda). Baltimore, 1939. Demy Pp. 13, 213. Rs. 12.

As'valāyana-gṛhya-mantravyākhyā (आश्वलायगृह्यमन्त्रव्याख्या) of Hardutt Miśra ed., by K, Sāmba Śiva Śastri. Trivandrum 1938. Rs. 2-8-0.

Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda Prakaraṇa Kaumudī (कृष्णयजुर्वेद-प्रकरणकौमुदी) Part I. (Adhāna Purādhāna) ed. by Pt. Vaman Shastri Kinjavadekar and Ram Dikshit Hangal, with Eng. trans. by Dr. S. M. Katre. Poona, 1938. Rs. 6-4-0.

Ṛgveda Samhitā (ऋग्वेद संहिता-वेंकटमाधवभाष्यसंहिता) or the earliest literary monument of Aryan Race and most sacred scripture of the Hindus, ed. for the first time with Venkaṭa Mādhava's Comm. by Dr. L. Sarup, Vol. I only. It is Pre-Sāyaṇa Comm. and throws almost new light on Ṛgveda. Not only it contains critical foot-notes but also elaborate comparative notes relevent to the exegises of the Ṛgveda. Parallel passages from the Comms. of Sāyaṇa, Skānda, Yāska, Brāhmaṇas and other bearing on the interpretation of the Ṛgveda are given. This monumental edition will be complete in 6 Vols. of which this is the first Vol. Lahore, 1939. Rs. 40.

S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa (शतपथब्राह्मण) of the Kaṇvīya School. Critically ed. for the first time with an extensive historical Intro. of 120 pages by Dr. W. Caland. [Lahore, 1939. Vol. II. Pt. I. Rs. 5. Vol. II. Pt. II. Rs. 25.

Social and Religious Life in Gṛhyasūtras with brief surveys of Social conditions in Vedic Literature (from Ṛgveda to Śrauta Sūtras) and early Avestan Literature by Dr. V. M. Apte, with a Foreword by Principal R. D. Karmarkar. Bombay, 1939, Cr. Pp. 39, 339. Rs. 4.

REVIEW

The Mahābhārata, being the first part of the *Udyogaparvan* Fascicule 9, critically edited by Dr. Sushil Kumar De, Head of the Department of Sanskrit and Bengali, Dacca University, Dacca ; under the General Editorship of Dr. Vishnu S. Sukthankar, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1937. Royal size, pp. iv, 400.

The Mbh. Department of the B. O. R. I., Poona, is to be congratulated on bringing out another volume within one year of the publication of the *Virāṭaparvan*. The present volume forms the first half of the *Udyogaparvan*, consisting of 101 (and not 100 as mentioned in the Editorial Note) out of a total of 197 *adhyāyas*. It contains five *sub-parvans*, viz., *Sañjayayāna*, *Prajāgara*, *Sanatsujāta*, *Yānasandhi* and *Bhagavadyāna*, and three important episodes of *Indravijaya*, *Keśinīvirocana* and *Dambhodbhava*. Although the critical method employed in this edition is the same as discussed in the Prolegomena of the *Ādiparvan* by Dr. Sukthankar, yet it has its own peculiarities which Dr. De promises to discuss at length in his introduction to be published along with the remaining portion of this *parvan*.

In the short Editorial Note, Dr. S. K. De draws our attention to some of the interesting features of this volume. They are, firstly, about the text of the *Sanatsujāparvan*. Dr. De very reluctantly rejects the text as commented upon by Śaṅkarācārya ; the text adopted by the editor is authenticated by the commentaries of Devabodha, Arjunamiśra and Sarvajñanārāyaṇa, and by the independent agreement of the Northern Śāradā Kashmīrī ($Ś_1$ K) and Bengali (B) versions with Southern Malayālam. It is a pity that among the mss. utilised for this edition, the oldest dated ms. (1478 A. D.) does not contain this portion. The text of the Vulgate becomes valueless on the evidence of Nīlakaṇṭha himself, who says—उद्योगपर्वणि सनत्सुजातीये भाष्यकारादिभिर्व्याख्यातान्संप्रतितनपुस्तकेषु च स्थितान्पाठान् श्लोकांश्च गुणोपसंहारन्यायेनैकीकृत्य व्याख्यायते. This proves that Nīlakaṇṭha's text is of an inclusive character. That the evidence of the different mss. is very perplexing is clearly shown by Dr. De in the two elaborate comparative tables given

after pages 202 and 214. The problem has been thoroughly discussed by the editor in his lengthy note appearing on p. 192 and we entirely agree with the arguments and conclusions of Dr. De.

Secondly, the *Prajāgaraparvan*, dealing as it does with *Nīti*, must have offered a strong temptation to the redactors of the Mbh. text ; and the opportunity seems to have been fully utilised by them by adding small passages of a diadactic and gnomic character. These passages are given in the foot-notes by the editor. In one case we think that the 5 verses given under foot-note 183, on page 135, ought to have been incorporated in the text. There is ample ms. evidence in favour of their inclusion. They are found in the Bengali version, in one *Devanāgarī* transcript of the Kashmīrī version, in the Vulgate, in the text commented upon by Sarvajñanārāyaṇa, in three mss. of the *Devanāgarī* mixed versions and in one ms. of Telegu version. The various readings of these verses in several mss. being numerous also point out to their importance and to their being an authentic part of the text. Moreover, the subject-matter is also closely fitting in the context.

In this short review and in the absence of the long introduction and Appendices, it is not possible to touch the numerous problems that arise here. We would mention only one point here, viz., the reading नस्तकान् on page 385, verse 29a. We are of opinion that the reading नास्मिकां or नासिका: as supported by the best mss. (K_1, K_2, B, D_5, D_{9-10}, Dn_1) ought to have been adopted in the text or at least a wavy line ought to have been given under नस्तकान्. The word नस्तक can at best be a contemptuous term for nose, but there is no evidence of irony in the context which should warrant its retention.

On page 153, verse 28d, तेन वे जित:, appears to be a misprint for तेन वै जित:. A few other misprints are : -p. 34, 38b, त्रिशिरस्तदा for त्रिशिरसस्तदा ; p. 77, 34c, सिर्माके for मर्माके ; p. 82, 26b, मीमसेनश्च for भीमसेनश्च ; p. 125, 25a, त्वेवमन्ये for त्वेव मन्ये ; p. 161, 23a, नमो for तपो ; p. 165, 64a, गावो for गाव: ; p. 168, 9a, नराधिप: for नराधिप ; p. 250, 23c, ममा for मम ; p. 345, 6c, चतुर्युक्तकथांस्तस्मै for चतुर्युक्तान्नथांस्तस्मै ; p. 354, 13d, बाह्मणानां for ब्राह्मणानां ; p. 355, 20c, शीलवृतो° for शीलवृत्तो° ; p. 358, 57b, दु:खानामावासोऽस्मि for दु:खानामावासास्मि.

The number of small passages left out by the editor in the text, but given in the foot-notes, is 437. An edition coming out of the hands of so veteran an orientalist is bound to be excellent. Dr. De is a scholar of established reputation which is certainly immensely enhanced by his present performance. We congratulate him heartily on this excellent edition. Last, but not the least, the tremendous amount of labour, patience and scholarship evinced by Dr. Sukthankar in steering the Mbh. edition through, deserve praise and thanks at the hands of all orientalists.

Printing and get-up are excellent as usual. There is a coloured painting also depicting Draupadī reminding Śrīkṛṣṇa of her केशाकर्षण by Duḥśāsana.

HAR DUTT SHARMA.

अङ्के रङ्कुमतः कलानिधिरधादीशो विशालेऽनलम्[1]
भाले[2] कालभुजङ्गमङ्गविषये श्रीखण्डभूमीरुहः ॥ २७० ॥

मैथिलस्य ॥

१. तर्के प्रोद्दामतर्कः फणिपतिभणितौ केवलं शेषवेषो
मीमांसायां च[3] मीमांसनकलितमतिः सांख्यसंख्यावदाद्यः ।
योगेऽत्यन्ताभियोगो निखिलगुणनिधिः ख्यातरीतिः सुनीतौ
वेदार्थाभिज्ञ एको जगति विजयते श्रीयतीन्द्रः कवीन्द्रः[4] ॥ २७१ ॥

दिवाकरभट्टानाम्

१. विद्वद्वर्य विभो कवीन्द्र भवतो योग्यान्[5] विशिष्टान् गुणान्
ज्ञात्वा तत्तदनन्तरोद्भवगुणग्रामोदयेऽपि स्थिरान्[6] ।
तन्नाशं प्रवदन्ति मूढमनसो ये तार्किकास्तेऽपि ते
युक्तायुक्तविचारशून्यहृदयाश्चित्रं तवेष्टाः[7] पुनः[8] ॥ २७२ ॥

पुनर्विश्वनाथज्योतिर्विदाम् ॥

१. ये सन्तः पृथगाश्रयाः क्षितितले सद्भिः स्तुताः सद्गुणा-
स्तेषामेकतमे परार्थपरमे संभूय वासं क्वचित् ।
इच्छन् सत्फलमत्र[9] सद्गुणभृत[10]श्चाति[11]प्रयत्नाद्गुणान्
सर्वांस्तांस्त्वयि[12] सत्कवीन्द्रविबुधे वेधा व्यधात् सादरम्॥२७३॥

२. न स्वागन्तुकबाधकाः सुफलिनोऽप्येते कृतेर्भेदका
नाप्यन्याश्रयमाश्रयन्ति विकृतावप्यत्र कार्यक्षमाः ।
मीमांसाकुशलस्य तेऽपि किल चेदेवं गुणाः सन्त्यतः
श्रीमत्पूज्यकवीन्द्रवर्य भवतो नैवोपमानं क्वचित् ॥ २७४ ॥

३. धर्मं धर्मधनं धनञ्जयमथो शौर्येण सर्वोत्तमम्
भीमं भीमबलं च कर्णमसमं[13] दाने स्मरं देहिनम् ।

१. AC क्षणं for ऽनलं. २. AC काले. ३. B मीमांसातत्त्व°. ४. AC trans. यतींद्रः and कवीन्द्रः. ५. C योगान्. ६. A सत्त्व° C तत्त्व°.. ७. तदिष्टा. ८. AC om पुनः. ९. A मत्फल°. १०. C °भृतां. ११. C वाचि for चाति. १२. C सर्वांस्तान्विलसत्. १३. Ac °सदृशं.

द्रष्टुं वाञ्छसि चेत्तदा बुधवरं दिल्लीपुरं सादरम्[1]
गत्वा विज्ञ[2]कवीन्द्रवर्यविबुधं दृष्ट्वा सुखी त्वं भव ॥ २७५ ॥

४. नाप्राप्तप्रापणा[3]र्थं न हि भवति तथा पूरणार्थं न चान्य-
व्यावृत्त्यर्थं तथापि प्रबलहतरिपो श्रीकवीन्द्र त्वदीयम्।
प्राज्यं राज्यं परेषामनधिगतफलप्राप्तये देव यस्माद्
द्वेवाक्य(?)व्यायतो[4]ऽतो दशशतशरदो जीव भाग्यै[5]र्बुधानाम्॥२७६॥

५. न स्फोटो न खलु तवास्ति वर्णलोपो नो भङ्गः प्रकृतिषु नापि चोपसर्गः।
नो पातस्तदपि सुशाब्दिकः कवीन्द्र ख्यातोऽसि त्वमिति[6] जनेषु चित्रमेतत् ॥

६. सर्वार्थः[7] सर्वदेवाप्तो[8] व्यावर्त्यो न कवीन्द्र ते।
द्वे इत्याद्युक्तिवद्भाग्यमतोऽन्यफलसिद्धये ॥ २७८ ॥

७. विद्वन्नैवोपमा[9] ते किमपि न विषमं नापि दृष्टान्तसख्ये
सन्देहासंगती नो[10] धरणिसुरगुरोऽनन्वयो नो कवीन्द्र।
व्याघातापह्नुती न[11] प्रगुणगुणनिधे नो विरोधप्रतीपौ
साहित्याद्वैतभावो जगति विजयते तत्तथापीति चित्रम् ॥ २७९ ॥

८. वाणीशो यस्य वाण्यां नयनकमलयोः स्निग्धयोर्यस्य लक्ष्मी-
र्लक्ष्मीनारायणो यन्मनसि भुजयुगे यस्य हंहो हनूमान्।
यस्य क्रोधे कृतान्तो यशसि शिशिररुक् यस्य यस्य प्रतापे
सूर्यो देवाश्रयं तं मनुज इह कथं नाश्रयेच्छ्रीकवीन्द्रम् ॥ २८० ॥

पुनर्भैयाभट्टानामष्टौ ॥

स्वस्ति श्रीमदखण्डमहीमण्डलाखण्[12]डलापारकृपापारावारविश्रामधामनिकामकामाभिरामसकामागणितगुणगणैकनिल[13]यनिजनियमविवशीकृताचलावलयसमस्तवाङ्मयनि[14]कायाचरणपरैकलक्षदानमानसंभावनासंभावितानंतावनीवनीपकलक्षजेगीयमानातिमानकीर्त्तिमूर्त्तिनर्तकीसमधिष्ठितजगदङ्ग[15]णनिजप्रताप-

१. B सागरं for सादरं. २. C °भिज्ञ°. ३. AB नाप्रापणार्थं. ४. C. वाक्ये, B. न्यायतो for व्यायतो. ५. C °वाक्यै° for °भाग्यै°. ६. C त्वमसि. ७. AB सर्वोऽर्थः. ८. AB °दैवाप्तो. ९. C विद्वत्तैवोप°. १०. A से देहासंगतीनां, C संदेहासंगतीर्णो. ११. AB अपह्नतिर्न. १२. C om खण्ड. १३. °गणैः धुरिलय. १४. AC यत्र यक्ष B. निकाप्यत्रप्यक्ष. १५. AC दङ्गना.

कालानलकीलजालकलिताखर्वगर्व[1]विरुद्धगणमहोदार[2]चरितादद्भुतपरोपकृतिसंतर्पितसकलजनोदीर्यमाणजयस्वनेषु । श्रीमद्यतीन्द्रवर्यश्रीसर्वविद्यानिधानकवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीषु ॥ १ ॥

वीरेश्वरभट्टमौनिनः ॥

उपदेष्टा सच्चेष्टानाम्॥१॥भूमिर्भव्यतायाः॥२॥ समुद्भवो वैभवस्य॥३॥ सन्निधिः साधुतायाः ॥४॥ निलयं मङ्गलानाम् ॥५॥ वसुधानिधिर्बुधविबुधानाम् ॥ ६ ॥ आधारो निराधारधरासुराणाम् ॥ ७ ॥ स्तुतो वस्तु[3]तोऽस्तगिरिः समस्ताशस्तवस्तूनाम् ॥ ८ ॥ आलयः कलाकलापस्य ॥ ९ ॥ अविषयोऽशेषकलुषविषयाणाम् ॥ १० ॥ श्रेयानश्रान्तमाश्रयो[4]विश्वविश्रान्तिश्रेणीनाम्॥११॥ तत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य ॥ १२ ॥ मुख्यः[5] सखा नित्यसत्यस्य ॥१३॥ क्षेत्रमक्षयक्षमायाः ॥ १४ ॥ अक्षुण्णः क्षमायाम् ॥ १५ ॥ ब्रध्नायमानो महामोहा[6]न्धकारधारायाः ॥ १६ ॥ अग्रगण्योऽगण्यगुण्यपुण्यवताम् ॥ १७ ॥ मूर्द्धन्यो[7] धन्यानाम् ॥१८॥ वरेण्यः शरण्योऽनन्यशरणानाम् ॥ १९ ॥ चारुचिन्तामणिर्याचकनिचयचिन्तितानाम् ॥ २० ॥ अकलितः कलिकालकालानलज्वालाजालानाम् ॥ २१ ॥ निकषोपलः सकलशास्त्रनीलोपलानाम् ॥ २२ ॥ सुवर्णवर्णनीयो लब्धवर्णसुवर्णानाम् ॥ २३ ॥ कर्णवदभ्यर्ण[8]माकर्णनीयः कर्णैः सुवर्णदानेन ॥ २४ ॥ अनभिमुखो निखिलविषयसुखानाम् ॥ २५ ॥ समूलोत्खननः समुच्छृंखलखलतानाम् ॥ २६ ॥ शोषको रोषदोषसिन्धोः ॥ २७ ॥ अनायत्तो विपत्तेः ॥२८॥ आरादरातिरविरतेः॥२९॥ विमतस्ततानां मत्तानाम् ॥३०॥ संमतः सुमतीनाम् ॥३१॥ अखण्डखण्डकृद्दीननदीनपीनदैन्यसैन्यस्य ॥ ३२ ॥ मूलमनुकूलतायाः ॥ ३३ ॥ अभूमिर्दुरभिमानस्य॥३४॥ अस्थानं दुरवस्थानाम् ॥३५॥ स्थाने स्थानं सद्व्यवस्थानाम् ॥३६॥ भिदुरभिदुरः[9] प्रभूतसंभूतभूतभीतिभूरिभूरुहाणाम् ॥ ३७ ॥ अदत्तावकाशः प्रमत्तानाम् ॥३८॥ संभूतिः शुभारंभाणाम् ॥ ३९ ॥ आकरः[10] सदाचाररत्ननिकराणाम् ॥ ४० ॥ रत्नाकरो नूतन[11]-

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१. B om. गर्व. २. AC add कृताद्भुतपरोपकारसंतर्पित after महोदर. ३. AC om. वस्तुतो. ४. C श्रेयान् श्रातानां. ५. AC मुखसखा°. ६. C om मोहा. ७. A धूर्मण्यो for मूर्द्धन्यो. ८. BC read कर्णवदभ्यर्णावभ्य°. ९. B भिदुराभदुरः. १०. A आकारः. ११. C नूत्न for नूतन.

परोपकाररत्नानाम्[1] ॥ ४० ॥ सनाभिः पद्मनाभस्य ॥ ४१ ॥ नाभिश्चातुर्यचक्रस्य ॥ ४२ ॥ उत्तरोत्तरोपचीयमानबृहत्तरोपशमतरोर्मूलम् ॥ ४३ ॥ कूलं कल्याणकलाकौशलकुलीनतासमुल्लोलकल्लोलमालाकलितकल्लोलिनीकान्तस्य ॥ ४४ ॥ संवर्धको[2] विशुद्धधीसमृद्धीनाम् ॥ ४५ ॥[3] अनन्तासन्तानोऽनन्तायितसंतापहृदनन्तामण्डलस्य ॥४६॥ शुण्डीखण्डनकृदखण्डपाखण्डखण्डस्य ॥ ४७ ॥ संमुख्यो[4]ऽसंख्यसांख्यसंख्यावताम् ॥४८॥ पतञ्जलिप्राञ्जलः पातञ्जले सामञ्जस्येन ॥ ४९ ॥ मांसलो मीमांसायाम् ॥ ५० ॥ निःशेषविशेषज्ञो वैशेषिकाशेषविषयाणाम् ॥ ५१ ॥ सर्वोत्तमो वित्तमो[5] गौतमो[6]क्तेषु ॥ ५२ ॥ नितान्तकान्तः सकलवेदवेदान्तवेदानाम्[7] ॥ ५३ ॥ माननीयः[8] पाणिनीयानाम् ॥ ५४ ॥ ध्रुवमहीन्द्रोक्तिवित्सु महीमहीन्द्रः ॥ ५५ ॥ काव्याधिकः काव्यादिषु ॥ ५६ ॥ आर्य आचार्यः पाराशर्यवर्यवचनेषु ॥ ५७ ॥ धुर्यश्चातुर्यभाजाम् ॥ ५८ ॥ अविस्मृतिः स्मृतिषु ॥ ५९ ॥ सुरेन्द्रः श्रीकवीन्द्रो यतीन्द्रः भू[9]सुरेन्द्राणाम् ॥ ६० ॥

स्वामिपण्डितानाम्[10] ॥

१. त्वत्कीर्त्तिकर्पूरसुपूरगन्धलिप्ता यदि स्युर्न दिशः कवीन्द्र ।
सुराः किमाभिष्परिभोक्तुकामास्तदा किमित्यप्सरसस्त्यजेयुः[11] (?)॥२८१

२. कवीन्द्र त्वद्गुणान्वक्तुं रसना संकुचत्यतः ।
करदानभियां पुंसां करदानं करोषि यत् ॥ २८२ ॥

वीरेश्वरभट्टानाम् ॥

१. वाराणस्यां प्रयागादिषु च बहुषु किं[12] तीर्थजातेषु जन्तोर्यात्रा जायेत जातु स्थविरशिशुजनानाथदीनादिकस्य ।
कालेऽस्मिन्घोररूपे कलिकलुषभयेनावतीर्णो यदि स्यात्
साक्षाद्धर्मस्वरूपो निखिलजनहितः श्रीकवीन्द्रो यतीन्द्रः॥२८३॥[13]

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१. AB यत्नानाम् for रत्ना°. २. Emendation AB समर्द्धसो. C सधर्मको. ३. A adds पतञ्जलि प्राञ्जलयः before अनन्ता°. ४. Emendation for सन्मुख्यें, A om. 49 and repeats 56, C om 49. ५. C विनमो. ६. C om गौतमो. ७. C वेदान्तकानाम्. ८. C मननीय. ९. B om भ. १०. AC स्वामिनां; ११. A श्वरसत्यजेयुः, B °मस्त्यजेयुः १२. C om किं. १३. A om verse 283

२. वाराणसीप्रयागावुभौ जनैर्जगति यावति ख्यातौ[1]।
तावति कवीन्द्रकीर्तिर्मनोज्ञमूर्तिर्नरीनर्ति ॥ २८४ ॥
३. तीर्थराजस्य काश्याश्च कवीन्द्रस्य च संप्रति।
अभिधानत्रयं लोके साहचर्येण गीयते ॥ २८५ ॥
४. श्रेयः कुर्युः कियन्नाम स्वदेहैर्यतयः परे।
तत्परार्द्धं परद्वारा कवीन्द्रः कुरुतेऽन्वहम् ॥ २८६ ॥

कूर्माचलीयराजकीय**भवदेवपण्डितानां** पद्यानि ॥

१. आमलयमाहिमालयमामकरालयं धरावलयम्।
आस्ते व्याप्य कवीन्द्रो निजया कमनीयया कीर्त्या ॥ २८७ ॥

तेषामेव

१. विद्वांसो विश्वविद्या अपि विविधधियो लाघवं युक्तियुक्तम्
स्वीकृत्य स्वीयपक्षं गुणगणसरसं संगिरन्तेऽति[2] तुष्टाः।
अन्योन्यं गौरवेण प्रतिहतमिति ये सोपहासं त्यजन्ति
त्वत्तस्ते गौरवं स्वं सदसि समधिकं प्रार्थयन्ते कवीन्द्र ॥ २८८ ॥

पुन**र्भैग्याभट्टानाम्** ॥

१. धेनुर्मेऽनुत्तमा सा कनकगिरियुतः कल्पशाखी मतोऽल्पो
भोजो[3]ऽनोजस्क एवं बलिरपि न बली विक्रमो विक्रमी न।
कर्णोऽनाकर्णनीयो भवति तव पुरो दत्तवित्ताम्बुराशे
स्वस्ति श्रीमत्कवीन्द्र त्वमिह मिहिरवद्भाससे स्वप्रभावैः ॥२८९॥
२. नाना वागीशरम्या कविकुलकलिता मन्दमास्कन्दयन्ती
भास्वद्विभ्राजमाना द्विजपतिलसिता[4] निस्तमस्का विकेतुः।
विस्फूर्जन्मङ्गलौघा विविधबुधयुता यत्सभा भूतलेऽस्मिन्
सोऽयं श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रो जगति विजयते जाग्रदुग्रप्रतापः ॥२९०॥
३. कुन्दात्काशाच्च कोकात्कलिकलुषहरात्कोत्करात्कुण्डलीशात्
कौमुद्याः क्षीरवार्द्धेः करकनिकरा[5]च्छक्रकुम्भीन्द्रतोऽपि।

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१. C om ख्यातौ. २. C संसरंतोऽपि. ३. AC भौजो°. ४. A विजयति.
५. AB °रिकरा°.

कर्पूरात्कामपालात्सितकमलचयाच्छ्रीकवीन्द्रस्य कामं
कैलासात्कामशत्रोरपि कलितकथाः कीर्तयः कौ लसन्ति ॥ २९१ ॥

४. शीलं नो परिशीलितं किल कलौ दानस्य दानं मुहु-
र्दृष्टं शौर्यमपि प्रवर्जितमथो लज्जा समुज्जासिता ।
कौलीन्यं प्रविलीनमेव धरणौ चोद्धत्यमूद्धूनितं
शीलाद्यं सकलं विहाय सकलं श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रं श्रितम् ॥ २९२ ॥

५. श्रीमत्त्वं गुरुतां[1] कवित्वमपि च श्रीशङ्करत्वं तथा
शौर्यं च द्विजराजतां बुधगणेशत्वं शिवाकारताम् ।
एकस्त्वं तु[2] वहस्यदोऽखिलमतश्चित्रं जनानां पुन-
र्नानात्रैव पवित्रचित्त[3]मपि नो यच्छ्रीकवीन्द्रः कृती ॥ २९३ ॥

६. शिवा भवतु भूतये स सविता वितीर्यात्प्रजाः
शिवो जनयताच्छिवं गणपतिः पतित्वं नृणाम् ।
प्र[4]यच्छतु विचक्षणः क्षितिपते कवीन्द्राय ते (?)
हरिर्हरतु कल्मषं कलिभु[5]वां तवैवाख्यया ॥ २९४ ॥

७. मायूरीं मर्दयन्ती मृदुपदरचना न्यासतो भूतलेऽस्मिन्
चौरीं संचूर्णयन्ती सुरुचिररसभृत् सचमत्कारचर्वी ।
माघं संघर्षयन्ती कविकुलजयिनी मां च रोमांचयन्ती
यद्वाणी भाति भूयस्त्रिभुवनभवनोद्दीपिका दीपिकेव ॥ २९५ ॥

८. समुद्रो[6]ऽयमद्रोहि कुम्भोद्भवश्रीः
समुद्रोप्यमुद्रोसि[7] मद्रोघयस्ते ।
नि[8]जद्रोणसंग्रामनैपुण्यभूम्नो[9]
कृतद्रोणवर्णा[10]भिभूपालभूमन् (?) ॥ २९६ ॥

९. स्फुरद्रोमरुद्रोप[11]मस्फीतकीर्ते
लसद्रोहिताङ्घ्रे प्र(ग ?)लद्रोहितश्रीः ।
चलद्रोहितांभोरुहद्रोहिने[12]त्र
समुद्रोपमस्त्वं समुद्रो वसेत्र[13] ॥ २९७ ॥

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१. AC कवितां. २. C च for तु. ३. C om चित्त. ४. B प्रयन्तु. ५. C °भवं. ६. C समुद्रोप°. ७. C °मुद्रोऽस्ति. ८. B जित°. ९. B भूम्न, C भूम्ना. १०. B वर्णारि. ११. C रुद्रोय°. १२. B °नेत्रः. १३. B च सेत्र, C वसेत्र.

१०. प्रभावतः परं प्रभो सदा शिवाप्रभावतः
परो हितोदयस्य ते भवेत्परो हितोदयः ॥ २९८ ॥

११. शुभ्रं तव यशो भाति न यशो[1] भाति च क्षितौ ।
तेजसः काः कथा(थाः ?) कथ्या अयशस्ते खपुष्पवत् ॥ २९९ ॥

१२. साम्राज्यं प्राज्यमेवं क्षितिधरनृपतेः कन्यकाधन्यकाचित्
देयात्ते याचकाय प्रहरतु निखिलान्विघ्नहन्तैव[2] विघ्नान् ।
मित्रो मित्रोदयं ते कलयतु सततं श्रीपतिः श्रीपतित्वं ।
शत्रूणां भस्मभावं त्वरितमभिमतं कामशत्रुः करोतु ॥ ३०० ॥

१३. श्रीमत्कवीन्द्र नृपसम्भवदानवार्ता
विद्वत्सु शत्रुषु च तुल्यतरैव[3] भाति ।
एकत्र भूरितरवारिनिपातयोगात्
गङ्गा[4] भवत्यपरतो[5] रुधिरौघसिन्धुः ॥ ३०१ ॥

१४. काशा न पूर्णा तव दर्शनेन काशा न पूर्णा यशसा तवैवम्[6]
काशाधिकाशा तव कीर्तिरेषा[7] काशाजुर्षस्ते तव वैरिवर्गाः ॥ ३०२ ॥

१५. कीर्तिवल्ली मतल्ली ते मल्लीवल्लीव शोभते ।
सुधाधवलवापीन्दुर्भाति पुष्पाणि भान्ति च ॥ ३०३ ॥

१६. बाणं बाणवदेव दिक्षु सगुणः क्षिप्रं क्षिपन् भ्राजते
कृष्णं चौरमुरारिदण्डिजयदेवाख्यं च नारायणम् ।
दासत्वं लभते स कोऽपि सुभगः श्रीकालिदासः कविः
श्रीहर्षं च विहर्षयन् विजयते श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रः कृती ॥ ३०४ ॥

१७. श्रीमच्छ्रीभवभूतिभूतिमभितः प्रोद्भावयन् भूरिशः
श्रीमद्भारविभारतीमभिनवां गौवर्द्धनीं[9] वर्द्धयन् ।
श्रीमन्मोहनपाठकं प्रमदयन् श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रः कृती
प्रोद्दामं दमयन् ध्रुवं श्रुतिधरानुद्धूनयन् भ्राजते ॥ ३०५ ॥

१८. भट्टं कृष्णबुधं तथा हरिहरं प्राभाकरं डिण्डिमं
श्रीरामं कविरत्नमण्डनमहावाणीविलासादिकम् ।

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१. B नृपशो. २. C °न्तेव. ३. C °परैव. ४. A भृङ्गा. ५. C योगावनत्यः-वरतो. ६. B तवैव. ७. C °रेका. ८. B° युज°, C° युष°. ९. A गो°.

रुद्रं किं च तथा च लक्ष्मणकविं पञ्चाननं वाहिनी-
पत्यन्तं[1] कविराजकेसरिमुखं विस्मापयन् भ्राजते ॥ ३०६ ॥

१९. यावच्चन्द्रो दिनेन्द्रो धरणिरपि धनेन्द्रो गिरीन्द्रो गजेन्द्रो
योगीन्द्रो[2] भात्युपेन्द्रो निभृतमथ फणीन्द्रो गणेन्द्रो[3] महीन्द्रः[4] ।
तावच्छ्रीमान्कवीन्द्रः क्षितिपतिविजयी जीवतादस्ततन्द्रो
मन्द्रोद्यत्कान्तिराशीभिरिह भुवि भृशं श्रीद्विजेन्द्रोदिताभिः ॥३०७॥

२०. यदीयरसनागृहे सकलशास्त्रनार्योऽनिशं
वसन्ति[5] विलसन्ति वा परिहसन्ति चान्द्रीः कलाः ।
विरोधमवधूय किं समवधूतदोषाः स्फुटं
प्रभूतपरमार्थकः[6] स कविवासवो भासते ॥ ३०८ ॥

२१. काणादे कणभुक् पतञ्जलिरसौ प्रायेण पातञ्जले
सांख्ये श्रीकपिलः किलेति कलितं लोकेन लोकोत्तरः ।
श्रीव्यासोऽप्यथ चैष जैमिनिमुनिर्वेदान्तमीमांसयो-
र्न्याये गौतम एवं[7] केवलमसौ श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रो यतिः ॥ ३०९ ॥

२२. जरीहर्ति जाड्यं जनानामजस्रं चरीकर्ति लोकेषु कारुण्यमुच्चैः ।
दरीस्थो हृदा संदरीधर्ति रुद्रं बरीभ(Aव)र्ति विश्वं समन्तात्कवीन्द्रः[8]॥३१०

२३. जरीहर्त्यघं निर्जरीभावमाप्तश्चरीकर्ति कं स्वश्चरीस्तूयमानः ।
दरीस्थो हृदा संदरीधर्ति रुद्रं बरीभर्ति विश्वं समन्तात्[9] कवीन्द्रः॥३११॥

२४. समुद्योतते योऽनवद्योऽतिविद्यो[10]
विद्योत्तमं ब्रह्मविद्योत्तमश्रीः ।
सदा साध्यमानोऽथ[11] विद्यावदाद्यो
निदाघो मुहुर्गद्यपद्यैः कवीन्द्रः ॥ ३१२ ॥

२५. प्रभावः केन वर्ण्या सा यत्प्रभावो न शक्यते ।
गिरा वक्तुं महाशक्ति विरक्ततरसत्तमाः[12] (?) ॥ ३१३ ॥

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१. A यत्यन्तं. २. B गौरीन्द्रो. ३. C महेन्द्रो. ४. B महेन्द्रः. ५. A लसन्ति.
६. AB °काः. ७. C पञ्च for एव. ८. B समेताद्यतीशः. C समन्ताद्यतीशः.
९. BC वरीयान्. १०. B सद्यो. ११. BC °साध°. १२. C °क्ति नरसत्तमाः.

२६. ब्रह्म यो वेद वेदान्तं तं वेदान्तं विचिन्तये ।
काशीं संकाशयन्नृणां शङ्काशतविनाशनः ॥ ३१४ ॥

२७. अदभ्रभ्रमाभ्रप्रविभ्रंशवातो महातोषकारी यतिः श्रीकवीन्द्रः ।
समानोऽखिलप्राणिषु भ्राजमानोऽभिमानोऽपि नो यस्य कस्तत्समानः ३१५

२८. कनिष्ठो ह्रसिष्ठो लघिष्ठो दविष्ठो महेन्द्रो महीन्द्रो मुनीन्द्रोऽप्यहीन्द्रः ।
यतः संयतः श्रीगुणीन्द्रो यतीन्द्रो वरीवर्ति सर्वोपरि श्रीकवीन्द्रः ॥३१६॥

कस्यापि

१. प्रशस्ताकृतिर्यः समस्तारिजेता कवीन्द्रः कवीन्द्रो मुनिव्रातनेता[३] ।
तपश्चर्यया यः स्वयं[४] स्वर्णरेता यतिर्भ्राजते[५] सन्मणिस्वच्छचेताः ॥ ३१७ ॥

२. गलन्मत्सरोऽलं परब्रह्मवेदी विदामत्रसन्देहसन्दोहभेदी ।
कवीन्द्रः[६] कृती भूरिभूभृच्छुभायां सभायां[७] स भूर्जम्भजेतुर्विभाति[८] ॥३१८॥

३. सुवन्द्यो यतिर्गद्यपद्यादिहृद्याः प्रशस्ताः समस्ताश्च संपाद्य विद्याः ।
यशःपूरकर्पूरसान्द्रः कवीन्द्रः कलाभिः कलौ निर्मलाभिर्[९]विभाति ॥३१९॥

४. प्रजाते प्रभौ सानुगे सानुरागे करं दुःकरं देवयागे प्रयागे ।
सुचेताः शुचिः काञ्चनैर्मोचयित्वा वितन्द्रो मुनीन्द्रः कवीन्द्रो विभाति ॥

५. स्वकीयार्थमेकं समुद्दिश्य यत्नादनेके महान्तोऽपि ते ते यतन्ते ।
कवीन्द्रस्तु संप्राप्तपुण्यप्रशस्तिर्नृलोकेऽस्ति लोकोपकारार्थमेकः ॥३२१॥

६. दृढं योऽत्र दिल्लीपतिप्रीतिपात्रं मुहुः स्वर्द्धुनीस्नानसंशुद्धगात्रः ।
पवित्रः परित्रातसत्पात्रमात्रो[१०] विनिद्रोऽस्ति संवित्समुद्रः कवीन्द्रः ॥३२२

७. सदा वन्द्यपादोऽविमुक्तस्थितानां गुरुर्यश्च पुण्ये पथि प्रस्थितानाम् ।
गुणप्रोल्लसत्सूक्ति[११]मुक्तासमुद्रश्चिदानन्दसान्द्रः कवीन्द्रश्चकास्ति ॥३२३॥

८. प्रयागागतस्नानपुण्याम्बुपूरैः समुत्पाद्य सत्कीर्तिवल्लीमतल्लीः[१२] ।
पवित्रोरुगोत्रः सुरत्राणकारी सुरत्राण[१३]संसत्कवीन्द्रो विभाति ॥३२४॥

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१. BC तं वै. २. AC काशी. ३. A °नेत्रा. ४. AB om स्वयं. ५. C यतो भ्राजते. ६. AC om कवीन्द्रः. ७. C add कवीन्द्र. after सभायां. ८. AC भूर्जे. ९. A om कलौ निर्मलाभिः. १०. A °मात्रो. ११. A omits सूक्तिमुक्ता to समुत्पाद्य in verse 324. १२. AC °तल्लीं. १३. E सहान्दीन्द्र, C शहाद्दीन्द्र.

९. लसद्रसालंकृतिरुल्लसन्ती वसत्प्रसादा(द)रलीलयैव ।
वाणी कवीन्द्रस्य मुनेः कवीन्द्रशिरोमणेरेति शिरोमणित्वम् ॥३२५॥

१०. दैत्यारिसेवोपचितोचितश्रीः सुख्वापि[1] यो दक्षिणसन्मुखस्थः[2] ।
इनान्तिकेप्युत्कटकायकान्तिर्जीव्या(AC था)त् कवीन्द्रः कविरद्भुतो-
ऽयम् ॥३२६॥

एते रघुनाथभट्टगुर्जरस्य ॥[3]

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१. सखाय यो. २. AC °मुकस्था. ३. B gives the following colophon (which is omitted in AC) and AC have 35 additional verses (see appendix) which are wanting in B. श्रीसर्वविद्यानिधानकवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीकृतं कवीन्द्रचन्द्रोदयपुस्तकं कवीन्द्रचन्द्रोदयः ॥ लिःशावलदाशकाऐस्थ (कायस्थ) संवत् १७३४ सम्ये नाम फागुन सुदी दुइजीवारमङ्गलशुभमस्तुः ॥ यादृशं पुस्तकं दृष्ट्वा तादृशं लिखितं मया । यदि शुद्धमशुद्धं वा मम दोषो न दीयते ॥

APPENDIX

The following verses are found in AC and are wanting in B.

यस्तावद्दशकृत्व इत्यवतरद्धर्मो विलीयेत मा
स्वात्मानं विनियुक्तवानथ पुनस्तद्रक्षणायाधुना ।
त्वां सर्वोपकृतौ कवीन्द्र कृतवान् सत्यप्रतिज्ञं तथा
दौर्जन्यार्णवमग्नसज्जनसमुद्धाराय नारायणः ॥ १ ॥

श्रीकाशिका कापि पुरारिनायका
धन्येन येन त्रिजगत्प्रमोचिता ।
अमोचि यत्नाद्यवनेशदुष्करा(त्)
कवीन्द्रनामा स विराजतेतराम् ॥ २ ॥

नानात्वे सत्यनानात्वं येन निर्णीयते धिया ।
स चित्स्वरूपो जयति श्रीकवीन्द्रसरस्वती ॥ ३ ॥

एकोऽप्यनेकतामेति सद्विवेकसुरद्रुमः ।
कवीन्द्राशयसेकेन तं विना कं परं स्तुमः ॥ ४ ॥

बीजं स्पर्शसुखस्य यत्र परमं संबो(C यो)धनं सद्विधे
मुख्यं शब्दनिरूपकं शिवमयं लिङ्गं परं राजते ।
श्रीरूपं त्रितयं तदिन्द्रसहितं सत्यं[1] तुरीयास्पदम्
तन्नामात्र सरस्वतीवरयुतं श्रीधामजीयाच्चिरम् ॥ ५ ॥

नाकेशेनापि साकं गुरुगुरुपदभाक् दैवपाकाद्विनाकः
स्यान्निश्चेतुं समर्थो जगति वरमतिस्तत्कवीन्द्रं विना कः ।
येनासौ जीवलोकः सुखमनुभविता सद्गुणालंबिकस्त-
द्वन्दे सस्वरूपं (?) परमहममलं ज्ञानसंभाविना कः[2] ॥ ६ ॥

आनन्त्यं भजते न वस्तुगतिभिः सत्यप्रतीति पुन-
र्नानाकारमुपाधिभिः खलु निराकारां विकारायुताम् ।
श्रुत्या नेति च नेति वाङ्मनसयोर्गत्या न यन्निश्चितम्
तद्वन्दे परमात्मनः परिमितं रूपं कवीन्द्राश्रयम् ॥ ७ ॥

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१. C. मन्यं for सत्यं. २. A om 6 cd.

यत्सर्वप्रतिभं विभाति विभवप्रारब्धभावं भवे
भावाभावविभावभावि भुवि यद्भव्यं मतं भावुकैः।
अव्योम्नो विलसद्विलासममलं व्योमत्वमभ्येति यत्
तद्रूपं परमात्मनो मम मतं वन्दे कवीन्द्राश्रयम् ॥ ८ ॥
अन्तः सञ्चारचारी स्फुरति परिचर्या[1] चेतनाचेतनानाम्
स्वाहंता[2]चिन्त्यचिन्ता[3]सिचयपरिचिता[4]पञ्चपञ्चोपचारः।
यस्यायं चित्प्रपञ्चः प्रचयविचयवान् सोचिराचारचारु-
स्तद्रूपं श्रीकवीन्द्रैः करबदरचितं के परेऽत्रोपचर्याः ॥ ९ ॥
सोऽहं विष्णुः शिवोऽहं विधिरहममरा एत इन्द्रोस्म्यमीषाम्
त्रैलोक्यं मत्कृते वः[5] कृतमपरमतः किं च के लोकपालाः।
इत्थं माया यदीया[6] प्रतिघटमुदिता येन तन्निश्चितं ते
रूपं सत्यं स एव स्फुरति नतिरियं श्रीकवीन्द्राय तुभ्यम् ॥ १० ॥
संभाव्य ज्ञानदीपं भवभवनभवं वस्तुभाव्यं विभाव्या-
भावं सद्भावभानोरनुभवनभवत्स्वप्रभावप्रभावान्।
आभात्यद्वैत[7]भावप्रभवविभववान् भावयन् भावनां स्वा-
मेको नैकेषु योऽसाविह जयति सदा कश्चिदाभासभानुः ॥११॥
दर्शं दर्शमजागतं भ्रममिमं[8] यो जागतं जागतं
स्पर्शं स्पर्शमिमां दशां दशदिशामीशित्वमीषाकरः।
आधिव्याधिभवाभवैरिह मनो निर्विण्णतामाश्रयन्।
जीवोपाधिमपाश्रयन्विजयतेऽनिद्रः कवीन्द्रो यतिः ॥१२॥
नानाज्ञानपटावृतैर्विषयिभिर्निष्कारणैरिन्द्रियैः
पर्णैरप्यभिधीयते विषयिणां श्रीवासुदेवः प्रभुः।
एष ब्रह्मसनातनः स पुरुषो धाता विधाता विभु-
र्व्यक्ताव्यक्तशरीरवान् विजयते श्रीमान्कवीन्द्रो यतिः ॥१३॥
प्राणायामसमाधिचित्तनियमध्यानात्मसंधारणा-
ज्योतिः सूर्यविधुप्रभाप्रतिभया पश्यत्यपश्यन्निव।

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१. C °चया. २. C स्वातं. ३. A °चिन्त्या°. ४. C °चितः. ५. A मत्कृभेद्वः. ६. A दीयाः ७. A अमात्य°. ८. A°मियं.

संसारं गतसारमाकलयिता पञ्च प्रपञ्चान् परान्
पञ्चान्यैः सह पञ्चभिः स विषयैर्भिन्नश्चतुर्णां परः ॥१४॥
आविर्भावतिरोभवद्भवभवत्प्रज्ञाविजिज्ञासया
विज्ञानप्रतिभा विभाति सहसा ज्ञानस्वभावापहा।
नाना[1]भावविभावनानुभववित्सद्भावनाभावना
त्ज्ञा(ज्ञा?)व्यक्त[2]रसज्ञ नैव तव सा सर्वासनावासना ॥ १५ ॥
योऽहंकाररिपुः सदा निजकुलालंकारभूतः कृती
मोहद्रोहकरः परोपकृतये पुण्यार्थसन्दोहकृत्।
सोऽहं सोहमिति प्रबोधपटुवाक् सत्यं प्ररोहांकुरो
निःसंकल्पविकल्पको विजयते श्रीमान्कवीन्द्रः प्रभुः ॥१६॥
निःसन्देहा विदेहा विदधति परितः स्वप्रकाशं समेहा
मुक्तस्नेहाः सुखेहाविकलितकलना रत्नदीपोपमेहाः।
नेहामुत्राप्यपेहाः[3] सहृदयहृदयानेह[4]गेहा जितेहा
निस्तन्द्राः श्रीकवीन्द्रा विनयनयदशाव्याप्तसंसारगेहाः ॥ १७ ॥
आधारस्त्वं धरायाः धरणिधरधृति[5]र्धारणादौ समाधौ[6]
ध्यानध्येयैकसिद्धो विधिविविधविधीनादधानोऽनुपाधिः।
साध्यासाध्यावधिज्ञो[7] निरवधिधनदो निर्धनानां स जीया
द्दीलीपप्रीतिकारी विबुधवरविधुप्रीतिधारी कवीन्द्रः ॥ १८ ॥
कीर्तिः श्रीवाक्प्रभाभिर्जितहिमकिरणश्रीदजीवारुणाद्या
नीवाराम्नाद्यपीवाकृतिगतिमतयो नैरमीवाश्रयार्थाः।
सुग्रीवाधीशबद्धाशयनयविनयश्रीकवीन्द्रा नवीयो
यूयं संमान[10]जीवा वयमथ भवतां दानजीवा भवामः ॥ १९ ॥
आहेमाचलमा हिमाचलमथालोकापलोकाचलम्
सप्तद्वीपवतीं तथा वसुमतीमासप्तरत्नाकरान्।
शौर्यौदार्यमनस्विता न कविता दानादिशक्तिः श्रुता
दृष्टान्यत्र कवीन्द्र शास्ति भवतां काश्मीररत्नाकरैः ॥ २० ॥

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१. C ज्ञाना°. २. C °व्यत्त°. ३. C °देहाः. ४. C °वेह. ५. C °भृति°. ६. C समायौ. ७. A विधिज्ञो. ८. C ध्यान°. ९. C नमी वा. १०. A सन्मान°.

अथ समस्या ।

त्वं तीर्थीकुरुषे जनान् गुणिजना गायन्ति युष्मद्यशो
धीवाधारकरो भवान् गुणवतां धर्माग्रवर्ती सदा ।
त्वं दातासि कलौ कवीन्द्र नितरां संसारवारां निधौ
काशीवत्कलकण्ठवत्कमलवत्कर्णारिवत्कर्णवत् ॥ २१ ॥
सम्राञ्छासनमाबिभर्त्ति भवतस्त्वं रासि[1] सञ्ज्ञान्निजम्
सारूप्यं हरिचन्दनैः सुरभितं श्रीमद्वपू राजते ।
दानस्निग्धकरोऽसि नृत्यति गुणस्तेऽग्रे[2] कवीन्द्रे[3] प्रभो
मालावन्मलयाद्रिवन्मलयवन्मल्लभवन्मल्लवत् ॥२२॥
त्वं सर्वं क्षमसे तमः परिहरन् श्रीमान् सदा राजसे
वृन्दैः[4] सौमनसैर्यशोऽतिधवलं व्याप्नोति दैवं जगत् ।
हंसैरत्र वियोज्यते जडपरामर्शात्कवीन्द्र प्रभो
क्षोणीवत्क्षणदेशवत् क्षितिजवत् क्षीरोदवत्क्षीरवत् ॥२३॥
निःसंख्या भवतां गुणा निरुपमा कीर्तिः सदा वर्धते
संसारार्णवतारको मुनिसभामध्येऽसि सूतापहा ।
औन्नत्यं भजसे मुदैव गुणिनां श्रीमत्कवीन्द्र प्रभो
तारावत्तरुणोडुवत्तरणिवत्तालाङ्कवत्तालवत्[5] ॥ २४ ॥
विश्वाज्ञानतमोहरः परनृपान् संमोहयन् सर्वशः
पृथ्वीं पात्यखिलाममोहमनसा कामाकृतिर्द्रोहवत् ।
जीयात्सत्फलदः सदैव विजयी दारासुकोहश्चिरम्[6]
भास्वद्भृद्भृगुसूनुवद्भुरतवद्भर्गाक्षिवद्भार्गवत् ॥ २५ ॥
कीर्तिस्ते नरिनर्ति शक्रपुरतः पीयूषपूरश्रवा[7]
त्वं दातासि[8] भवत्प्रतापतपनोल्लासाद्विकासावहा[9] ।
साधूनां वदनावलीचिदंमलो[10] भासे कवीन्द्राधुना
रम्भावद्रजनीशवद्रविजवद्राजीववद्रामवत् ॥ २६ ॥

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१. A °राशि°. २. C ये for °ग्रे. ३. A कवीन्द्रा. ४. A वंदैः for वृन्दैः
५. A °त्तरुणेन्दु°. ६. A श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रश्चिरं. ७. C °पूरस्रवा. ८. C °सा° for °ता°
९. A °काशाद्वहा. १०. C वि°.

त्वल्लक्ष्मीः फलदायिनी सुमनसां श्रीमद्गभीरं मनो
भावत्कं[1] गुणि जीवनं तव यशोऽन्येषामसारं तु तत् ।
आदत्तं भवता शुभं प्रभवता श्रीमत्कवीन्द्र प्रभो
सीतावत्सरिदीशवत्सलिलवत्संसारवत्सारवत् ॥ २७ ॥

कारुण्यक्षीरराशिः कलिकृतकलनाकोपेतः[2] कल्पशाखी
निःसङ्कल्पो विकल्पप्रकृतिरविकृतिः प्राकृताव्याकृतिज्ञः ।
संसाराम्भोधिमग्ने कृपणनृपजने कर्णधारः कवीन्द्रैः[3]
श्रीमद्दिल्लीपतीष्टो जयति कलिरिपू रत्नशर्मादराय ॥ २८ ॥

बलं निर्बलानां स्थलं चास्थलाना-
मलं सत्कवीनामलङ्कारदाता ।
कुलालङ्कृतिस्त्वं खलाकालकाल-
स्त्वदालम्ब आलभ्यतां रत्नशर्मा ॥ २९ ॥

स्फुरच्चारुभालः सुखश्रीविशाल-
श्रितक्षोणिपालः[4] सदाशालवालः ।
उरःस्वर्णमालः सुरेन्द्रावतारः
कवीन्द्रो यतीन्द्रश्चिरं कालमास्व ॥ ३० ॥

मुक्तिदा श्रीमता युक्तिर्युक्तितो युक्तिदा सती ।
दुर्वर्णभ्रान्तिदानुक्तिः शुक्तिवत्सा परोदिता ॥ ३१ ॥
गर्वो वर्गत्वमायातो मोहो होमत्वमागतः ।
कवीन्द्र तव संसर्गान्मदेनापि दमायितम् ॥ ३२ ॥

अन्तः सन्तोषतोषो हसति रतिगतीः[5] जाग्रतीर्जाग्रतीर्यः[6]
सौवाप्रीरेव[7] पश्यन् जनक इव पुनः किं नु[8] रामः शुकः किम् ।
किं वा व्यासः सदासौ परमशमसुखास्वादवेत्ताधिरूढः[9]
सौषुप्तिं चित्स्वरूपो जयति मुनिवरः श्रीयतीन्द्रः कवीन्द्रः ॥ ३३ ॥

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१. A भावात्कं. २. A को पुनः. ३. A कवीन्द्र. ४. A श्रोणिपालः. ५. A °गती. ६. A जाग्रतीयः. ७. C सै°. ८. A तु for नु. ९. A °पिरूढः.

[१]श्रीमत्कवीन्द्रकक्षणमपि तरुणायते यत्र । (?)
परिहृतहरिहृत्कमला निवसति कमला गृहे तस्य ॥ ३४ ॥

कस्यापि

कति न कवयितारः स्वार्थतत्त्वावितारः
परगुणगणनाया बाधितारः कियन्तः ।
इति मनसि विदित्वाऽकारि विश्वार्तिहन्त्रा
सकलसुकृतसारः श्रीकवीन्द्रावतारः ॥ ३५ ॥
श्रीकवीन्द्रयशोवृन्दैरिन्दुरेष तृणीकृतः ।
अन्यथा कथमत्रास्ति सन्ततं हरिणीपतिः ॥ ॥ श्रीः ॥

१. C omits verses 34-36.

न स्मरणकालानियमात् ॥ ३० ॥

किञ्चित्क्षिप्रं स्मर्यते, किञ्चिच्चिरेण । यदा चिरेण तदा सुस्मूर्षया मनसि धार्यमाणे चिन्ताप्रबन्धे सति कस्यचिदेवार्थस्य लिङ्गभूतस्य चिन्तनमाराधितं स्मृतिहेतुर्भवति । तत्रैतच्चिरनिश्चरिते मनसि नोपपद्यत इति ।

शरीरसंयोगानपेक्षश्चात्ममनःसंयोगो न स्मृतिहेतुः, शरीरस्योपभोगायतनत्वात् । उपभोगायतनं पुरुषस्य ज्ञातुः शरीरं, न ततो निश्चरितस्य मनस आत्मसंयोगमात्रं ज्ञानसुखादीनामुत्पत्तौ कल्पते । क्लृप्तौ वा शरीरवैयर्थ्यमिति ॥ ३० ॥

" आत्मप्रेरणयदृच्छाज्ञताभिश्च न संयोगविशेषः ॥ ३१ ॥

आत्मप्रेरणेन वा मनसो बहिः शरीरात् संयोगविशेषः स्यात्? यदृच्छया वाऽऽकस्मिकतया, ज्ञतया वा मनसः? सर्वथा चानुपपत्तिः । कथम्? स्मर्तव्यत्वात्, इच्छातः स्मरणात्, ज्ञानासम्भवाच्च । यदि तावदात्मा अमुष्यार्थस्य स्मृतिहेतुः संस्कारः अमुष्मिन्नात्मदेशे समवेतस्तेन मनः संयुज्यतामिति मनः प्रेरयति, तदा स्मृत एवासावर्थो भवति न स्मर्तव्यः । न चात्मप्रत्यक्ष आत्मप्रदेशः संस्कारो वा । तत्रानुपपन्नात्मप्रत्यक्षेण संवित्तिरिति । सुस्मूर्षया चायं मनः प्रणिदधानश्चिरादपि कञ्चिदर्थं स्मरति नाकस्मात् । ज्ञत्वं च मनसो नास्ति ज्ञानप्रतिषेधादिति " ॥ ३१ ॥

एतच्च—

१ ज्ञानसमवेतेत्यादिसूत्रोक्तमेकदेशिमतं निराकरिष्णुरपर एकदेश्याह—आत्मप्रेरणेत्यादि सूत्रम् । आत्मनो बहिःप्रदेशे मनस्संयोगो—(१) न स्मृत्यर्थम् 'आत्मप्रेरणेन' सम्भवति [तस्य प्रयत्नस्य स्मरणीयज्ञानपूर्वकतया प्रागेव स्मृत्यापत्तेः]—(२) नापि 'यदृच्छया' अकस्मात् [आकस्मिकत्वस्य निषेधात्]—(३) नापि मनसो ज्ञतया' ज्ञातृतया [मनसो ज्ञातृत्वानभ्युपगमात्], न चैभ्यस्त्रिभ्योऽन्यः प्रकारो वर्तत इति सूत्रार्थः ।

२ अनन्तरोक्तं द्वितीयैकदेशिमतमपाकरोति—एतच्चेति भाष्याक्षराण्यारभ्य व्यासक्तमनस इत्यादिसूत्रेण । 'एतत्' यदुक्तं तत् 'संयोगविशेषेण समानम्' इति सम्बन्धः । व्यासक्तं मनो यस्य तस्य नृत्यादिदृश्यविशेषे दत्तचित्तस्य पुरुषस्य कण्टकादिना अकस्माद्विद्धः पादो यदा व्यथते तदा तदवच्छेदेन यथा आकस्मिक एव मनस्संयोगो जायते तथैवैतदपीति । तथा चाकस्मिको मनस्संयोगो न भवतीति यदुक्तं द्वितीयेनैकदेशिना तन्न तथ्यमिति हृदयम् ।

व्यासक्तमनसः पादव्यथनेन संयोगविशेषेण समानम्॥ ३२ ॥

यदा खल्वयं व्यासक्तमनाः क्वचिद् देशे शर्करया कण्टकेन वा पादव्यथनमाप्नोति तदाऽऽत्मनःसंयोगविशेष एषितव्यः। दृष्टं हि दुःखं दुःखसंवेदनं चेति। तत्रायं समानः प्रतिषेधः। यदृच्छया[1] तु न विशेषो नाकस्मिकी क्रिया नाकस्मिकः संयोग इति।

"कर्मादृष्टमुपभोगार्थं[2] क्रियाहेतुरिति" चेत्? समानम्। कर्मादृष्टं पुरुषस्थं पुरुषोपभोगार्थं मनसि क्रियाहेतुरेवं दुःखं दुःखसंवेदनं च सिध्यतीति" एवं चेन्मन्यसे– समानं, स्मृतिहेतावपि संयोगविशेषो भवितुमर्हति। तत्र यदुक्तम् 'आत्मप्रेरणयदृच्छाज्ञताभिश्च न संयोगविशेषः' इत्ययमप्रतिषेध इति। पूर्वस्तु[3] प्रतिषेधो–'नान्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वान्मनस'–इति ॥ ३२ ॥

"कः[4] खल्विदानीं कारणयौगपद्यसद्भावे युगपदस्मरणस्य हेतुरिति"—

प्रणिधानलिङ्गादिज्ञानानामयुगपद्भावादयुगपत्स्मरणम् ॥३३॥[5]

यथा[6] खल्वात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षः संस्कारश्च स्मृतिहेतुरेवं प्रणिधानलिङ्गादिज्ञानानि। तानि च न युगपद्भवन्ति। तत्कृता स्मृतीनां युगपदनुत्पत्तिरिति।

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१ एवं च एकदेशिना यः प्रतिषेध आकस्मिकमनस्संयोगस्य उक्तस्स प्रतिषेध उक्तेऽपि पादव्यथाजनकमनस्संयोगे स्यादेव–तच्चानुभवविरुद्धमिति हृदयम्। अनुभवविरोधम्प्रतिबन्दीरूपेणोपन्यस्य तत्त्वत उत्तरं प्रदर्शयति–यदृच्छयेति। यदृच्छया मनस्संयोगो न भवतीति यदुक्तंतस्येदमेवोत्तरं यत् किमप्यत्र यदृच्छया न भवतीत्याशयः।

२ परः समाधत्ते–कर्मेति। मनस्संयोगादावदृष्टमेव नियामकं भविष्यतीति नाकस्मिकत्वं क्वचिदपीति। तत्रोत्तरम्–समानमिति।

३ कः प्रतिषेधः पञ्चविंशसूत्रोक्तैकदेशिमतस्येत्यत आह–पूर्वस्त्विति। षड्विंशसूत्रे यत्तन्मतदूषणमुक्तं–नान्तःशरीरेतिसूत्रे–तदेव तस्योत्तरं सम्यगित्यर्थः।

४ परास्तः परः पृच्छति–कः खल्विति। स्मृतिकारणयौगपद्ये सति स्मृतियौगपद्यं कथन्न भवतीति प्रश्नार्थः।

५ प्रश्नस्योत्तरमर्पयन् स्मरणायौगपद्यं स्वयमुपपादयति–प्रणिधानेत्यादिसूत्रेण। प्रणिधानादयः स्मृतिहेतवो वक्ष्यमाणा ऊनविंशसङ्ख्यकाः सन्ति न पुनस्संस्कारसहितात्ममनस्संयोगमात्रम्। एवं चोक्तसंयोगस्य सत्त्वेऽप्यन्येषां स्मृतिहेतूनामयौगपद्यात् स्मृतीनामयौगपद्यमित्यर्थः।

६ एतदेव स्पष्टयति भाष्यकारः–यथा खल्विति।

“प्रातिभवत्तु[1] प्रणिधानाद्यनपेक्षे स्मार्ते यौगपद्यप्रसङ्गः। यत्खल्विदं[2] प्रातिभमिव ज्ञानं प्रणिधानाद्यनपेक्षं स्मार्त्तमुत्पद्यते कदाचित्तस्य युगपदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गो हेत्वभावात्[3]”।

सतः[4] स्मृतिहेतोरसंवेदनात् प्रातिभेन समानाभिमानः। बह्वर्थविषये वै चिन्ताप्रबन्धे कश्चिदेवार्थः कस्यचित्स्मृतिहेतुः तस्यानुचिन्तनात् तस्य स्मृतिर्भवति, न चायं स्मर्ता सर्वं स्मृतिहेतुं संवेदयते—एवं मे स्मृतिरुत्पन्नेति, असंवेदनात्प्रातिभमिव ज्ञानमिदं स्मार्तमित्यभिमन्यते। न[5] त्वस्ति प्रणिधानाद्यनपेक्षं स्मार्तमिति।

“प्रातिभे[6] कथमिति” चेन्? पुरुषकर्म[7]विशेषादुपभोगवन्नियमः। “प्रातिभमिदानीं[8] ज्ञानं युगपत् कस्मान्नोत्पद्यते”? यथोपभोगार्थं[9] कर्म युग-

१ आक्षिपति—प्रातिभवदिति। (‘प्रातिभवत्तु प्रणिधानाद्यनपेक्षे स्मार्त्ते यौगपद्यप्रसङ्ग’ इति वाक्यं केचित्सूत्रमन्यन्ते। तत्प्रमाणाभावादुपेक्ष्य भाष्यस्थमेवेदमाक्षेपवाक्यमिति निर्धारितम्।)

२ संक्षेपेणोक्तमाक्षेपमनुवदति—यत्खल्विदमिति। अस्ति खलु प्रातिभं ज्ञानं स्मृत्यनुरूपमेव। तच्च प्रणिधानादि विनैव संस्कारसहितात्ममनस्संयोगमात्रादुत्पद्यत आकस्मिकमेव। तद्वदन्या अपि स्मृतयस्तत्संयोगमात्रात्प्रादुर्भवितुमर्हन्ति। एतेषां च युगपदुत्पत्तिः सम्भवत्येवेत्याक्षेपाशयः।

३ हेत्वभावादिति—प्रणिधानादिहेत्वभावादित्यर्थः।

४ आक्षेपस्योत्तरम्—सतः स्मृतीति। स्मरणादावनुपलभ्यमानान्यपि कारणानि कारणक्रमश्च स्मृतिरूपकार्योत्पादक्रमेणानुमीयन्ते। एवं च प्रातिभमपि ज्ञानं पुरुषादृष्टविशेषापेक्षेभ्य आत्ममनस्सन्निकर्षादिभ्यः कारणेभ्य एव उपजायते न च तदप्यकारणमक्रमं वा। यथा च प्रातिभे वर्तमानान्यप्येतानि कारणानि नोपलभ्यन्ते क्रमश्च नानुभूयते एवमेव स्मृतिष्वपीति।

५ उपसंहरति—न त्वस्तीति। प्रणिधानाद्यनपेक्षं स्मरणं कदापि न भवतीत्याशयः

६ नन्वस्त्वेतत् सर्वम्—स्मरणेषु प्रातिभे तु ज्ञाने आकस्मिकत्वं कारणान्तररहितत्वं चानुभवसिद्धमेवेत्याशयवान् पृच्छति—प्रातिभे कथमिति। प्रधानभूतां स्वपक्षोपपत्तिमवतारयितुमेवायं प्रश्नः।

७ तत्रादौ यत्किञ्चिदुत्तरम्—पुरुषकर्मेति। यथा पुरुषस्यादृष्टं तस्योपभोगानां नियामकं तथैव प्रातिभस्येत्यर्थः।

८ प्रश्नस्याशयं प्रकटयति—प्रातिभमिति। प्रातिभे ज्ञाने यौगपद्यं नास्तीत्यत्र को हेतुरित्यर्थः।

९ उत्तरं विशदयति—यथोपभोगार्थमिति। आविलमेवेदमुत्तरमुत्तरसूत्रस्याग्रे वक्ष्यमाणत्वादिति तात्पर्यकृतः।

पदुपभोगं न करोति एवं पुरुषकर्मविशेषः प्रातिभहेतुर्न युगपदनेकं प्रातिभं ज्ञानमुत्पादयति ।

"हेत्वभावा[1]दयुक्तमिति" चेत्? न, करणस्य[2] प्रत्ययपर्याये सामर्थ्यात् ।

"उपभोगव[3]न्नियम इत्यस्ति दृष्टान्तो हेतुर्नास्तीति" चेन्मन्यसे? न, करणस्य[4] प्रत्ययपर्याये सामर्थ्यात् । नैकस्मिन्[5] ज्ञेये युगपदनेकं ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते—न चानेकस्मिन् । तदिदं दृष्टेन प्रत्ययपर्यायेणानुमेयं करणसामर्थ्यमित्थम्भूतमिति न ज्ञातुर्विकरणधर्मणो देहनानात्वे प्रत्ययायौगपद्यादिति ।

अयं[6] च द्वितीयः प्रतिषेधः—"अवस्थितशरीरस्य चानेकज्ञानसमवायादेकप्रदेशे युगपदनेकार्थस्मरणं स्यात् । क्वचिद्देशेऽवस्थितशरीरस्य ज्ञातुरिन्द्रियार्थप्रबन्धेन ज्ञानमनेकमेकस्मिन्नात्मप्रदेशे समवैति । तेन यदा मनः संयुज्यते तदा ज्ञातपूर्वस्यानेकस्य युगपत् स्मरणं प्रसज्यते, प्रदेशसंयोगपर्यायाभावादिति । आत्मप्रदेशानामद्रव्यान्तरत्वादेकार्थसमवायस्याविशेषे स्मृतियौगपद्यप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः" ।

शब्दसन्ताने[7] तु श्रोत्राधिष्ठानप्रत्यासत्त्या शब्दश्रवणवत्संस्कारप्रत्या-

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१ उत्तरस्याविलत्वमेव प्रकटयितुमाक्षिपति-हेत्वभावादिति । अदृष्टजन्यत्वात् प्रातिभे न यौगपद्यमिति कथामात्रञ्च तत्साधकहेतुः कश्चिदुक्तः—उपभोगो दृष्टान्तमात्ररूपेणोक्त इत्याशयः ।

२ सम्यगुत्तरमधुना समर्पयति—न—करणस्येति ।

३ आक्षेपमनुवदति—उपभोगवदिति । उपभोगदृष्टान्तोपन्यासमात्रेण न किञ्चित्सिध्यतीत्यर्थः ।

४ उत्तरमनुवदति—न, करणस्येति ।

५ तस्यार्थं विवृणोति—नैकस्मिन्निति ।

सामान्यतः सर्वेषामेव पुरुषाणामेवमेवानुभवो यदेकस्मिन् विषयेऽनेकेष्वपि वा युगपज्ज्ञानानि नैवोत्पद्यन्त इति ।

६ ज्ञानसमवेतसंस्कृतात्मप्रदेशभेदस्यायौगपद्यसाधकत्वम्प्रथमैकदेश्युपन्यस्तम्प्रति परोक्षावितदूषणान्तरमपाकर्त्तुन्तद्दूषणमुपन्यस्यति—अयं चेति । यदि ज्ञानसमवेतात्मप्रदेशसन्निकर्षादेव स्मृतीनां न युगपदुत्पत्तिः तर्हि ये संस्कारा एकदेशास्तेष्ववस्थितशरीरस्यानेकज्ञानसमवायादेकदेशे युगपदनेकार्थस्मरणं स्यात् । न चैतदस्ति अत एकदेश्युक्तः परिहारो न सम्यगिति दूषणस्याशयः ।

७ उक्तदूषणनिराकरणपरं भाष्यम्—शब्दसन्तान इति । शब्दसन्ताने यः शब्दः श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण साक्षात्सम्बद्धः स एव श्रूयते न तत्सन्तानगतसर्वाः शब्दव्यक्तयः ।

सत्त्या मनसः स्मृत्युत्पत्तेर्न युगपदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः । पूर्व[1] एव तु प्रतिषेधो नानेकज्ञानसमवायादेकप्रदेशे युगपत् स्मृतिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ ३३ ॥

यत्–"पुरुषधर्मो[2] ज्ञानं, अन्तःकरणस्येच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखानि धर्मा" इति कस्यचिद्दर्शनं–तत्प्रतिषिध्यते[3]—

ज्ञस्येच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वादारम्भनिवृत्त्योः[4] ॥ ३४ ॥

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१ एवमनन्तरोक्तदूषणे निरस्ते एकदेशिमतस्य का गतिरिति प्रदर्शयति–पूर्व एवेति । एकदेशिमतस्य यः प्रतिषेधोऽस्माभिः षड्विंशसूत्र उक्तस्स एवैकदेशिमतस्य निरासक इत्यर्थः ।

२ सम्प्रति बुद्धिरेव किमिच्छादिसमानाधिकरणा न वेति विचारं प्रस्तावयन् तद्विषये संशयबीजभूतां सांख्यवैनाशिकानां विप्रतिपत्तिं प्रदर्शयति–पुरुषधर्म इति । 'ज्ञानम्' बुद्धिः 'पुरुषस्य' आत्मनो धर्मः इच्छादयस्त्वन्तःकरणस्येति न सामानाधिकरण्यं बुद्धेरिच्छादिभिरित्यर्थः । अस्य मतस्य सारो वर्णितस्तात्पर्यकृता । पुरुषचैतन्यमेकमेव कूटस्थनित्यं सत् तत्तदर्थाकारपरिणतबुद्धितत्त्वप्रतिबिम्बविभ्रमवशात् भिन्नमिवोपजनापायधर्मकं विज्ञानमिति वृत्तिरिति चाख्यायते । इच्छादयस्तु वस्तुत उपजनापायधर्माणोऽन्तःकरणस्यैवेति ।

अस्य विचारस्य प्रयोजनं प्रदर्शितं परिशुद्धिकृता–यावदिच्छादीनामात्मगुणत्वं न साध्यते तावदिन्द्रियार्थमनोव्यतिरेकसिद्धावपि बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वं न सिध्यतीति । इच्छाया अन्तःकरणगुणत्वम्–ज्ञानस्य चेच्छाजन्यत्वम्–अत इच्छाज्ञानयोस्सामानाधिकरण्यस्यावश्यकतया ज्ञानस्याप्यन्तःकरणगुणत्वमेव नात्मगुणत्वमित्यस्य दर्शनस्य तात्पर्यं वर्णितं वृत्तिकृता ।

३ उक्तदर्शनप्रतिषेधमवतारयति–तत्प्रतिषिध्यत इति ।

४ सांख्यदर्शनप्रतिषेधपरं सूत्रम्–ज्ञस्येच्छेति । द्विधा वर्णितमिदं सूत्रं वृत्तिकृता । तद्यथा–'ज्ञस्य' ज्ञानवत एव गुणा इच्छाद्वेषादयः–कुतः–'आरम्भनिवृत्त्योः इच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वात्' इच्छाद्वेषप्रयुक्तत्वादिति यावत् । अथ वा 'आरम्भनिवृत्त्योः ज्ञस्यैव इच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वात्' (तस्यैव ज्ञस्य गुणा इच्छादय इति) 'कस्यचिद्दर्शनं प्रतिषिध्यते' इति भाष्यवाक्येन सम्बन्धः । पूर्वं व्याख्यानं न सम्यक् प्रतिभाति । इच्छादयोऽन्तःकरणस्य गुणा इति पूर्वपक्षिणः सिद्धान्तः । ततश्च तदनुसारेण यद्यारम्भनिवृत्ती इच्छाद्वेषजन्ये तर्हि ते अप्यन्तःकरणस्यैव भवेतां न ज्ञानवतः पुरुषस्येति द्वितीयमेव व्याख्यानं सुष्ठु । एतदेव वर्धमानोपाध्यायानां सम्मतम् । 'आरम्भनिवृत्ति प्रयत्नरूपे ज्ञानसमानाधिकरणे एवेति सूत्रार्थः' इत्युक्तं तैरन्वीक्षानयतत्त्वबोधे ।

अयं[1] खलु जानीते तावत्–इदं मे सुखसाधनमिदं मे दुःखसाधनमिति–ज्ञात्वा स्वस्य सुखसाधनमाप्तुमिच्छति, दुःखसाधनं हातुमिच्छति। प्राप्तीच्छाप्रयुक्तस्यास्य सुखसाधनावाप्तये समीहाविशेष आरम्भः, जिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य दुःखसाधनपरिवर्जनं निवृत्तिः। एवं ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नद्वेषसुखदुःखानामेकेनाभिसम्बन्धः। एककर्तृकत्वं ज्ञानेच्छाप्रवृत्तीनां समानाश्रयत्वं च। तस्माज् ज्ञस्येच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखानि धर्मा नाचेतनस्येति। आरम्भनिवृत्त्योश्च प्रत्यगात्मनि दृष्टत्वात् परत्रानुमानं वेदितव्यमिति ॥ ३४ ॥

अत्र भूतचैतनिक आह—

"तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः[2] पार्थिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३५ ॥

आरम्भनिवृत्तिलिङ्गाविच्छाद्वेषाविति यस्यारम्भनिवृत्ती तस्येच्छाद्वेषौ तस्य ज्ञानमिति प्राप्तं–पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायवीयानां शरीराणामारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनादिच्छाद्वेषज्ञानैर्योग इति चैतन्यम्" ॥ ३५ ॥

परश्वादिष्वारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् ॥ ३६ ॥

शरीरे चैतन्यनिवृत्तिः। आरम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनादिच्छाद्वेषज्ञानैर्योग इति प्राप्तं–परश्वादेः करणस्यारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनाच्चैतन्यमिति। अथ "शरीरस्येच्छादिभिर्योगः, परश्वादेस्तु करणस्यारम्भनिवृत्ती व्यभिचरतः" न तर्ह्ययं हेतुः–'पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायवीयानां शरीराणामारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनादिच्छाद्वेषज्ञानैर्योग' इति।

"अयं[3] तर्ह्यन्योऽर्थस्तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेधः। पृथिव्यादीनां[4] भूतानामारम्भस्तावत् त्रसत्स्थावरशरीरेषु तदवयवव्यूहलिङ्गः

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१ सूत्रार्थं व्याकुर्वन् ज्ञानेच्छादीनां समानाधिकरणत्वं प्रदर्शयति–अयं खल्विति।

२ नन्वस्त्वेकमेवाधिकरणं ज्ञानेच्छादीनाम्। भवतु पार्थिवमिदं शरीरमेव तदेकमधिकरणमित्याशयवान् भूतचैतनिकः–भूतचैतन्यवादी चार्वाकः–शङ्कते—तल्लिङ्गत्वादित्यादि सूत्रेण। 'पार्थिवाद्येषु' देहेषु 'अप्रतिषेधः' न प्रतिषेधः 'इच्छाद्वेषयोः तल्लिङ्गत्वात्' आरम्भनिवृत्तिलिङ्गकत्वात्, आरम्भनिवृत्त्योश्च शरीरे प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादित्यर्थः।

३ एवं निरस्तो भूतचैतनिकस्तल्लिङ्गत्वादिति स्वोक्तं हेतुं स्वपक्षसिद्ध्यर्थमन्यथा व्याचष्टे–अयं तर्हीति।

४ तदर्थान्तरं विवृणोति—पृथिव्यादीनामिति। 'त्रसत्सु' अस्थिरेषु कृमिप्रभृतीनां शरीरेषु-'स्थावरेषु' देवमनुष्यादीनां शरीरेष्ववयवव्यूहभेददर्शनाच्छरी-

प्रवृत्तिविशेषः। लोष्टादिषु च लिङ्गाभावात् प्रवृत्तिविशेषाभावो निवृत्तिः। आरम्भनिवृत्तिलिङ्गाविच्छाद्वेषाविति। पार्थिवाद्येष्वणुषु तद्दर्शनादिच्छाद्वेषयोगस्तद्योगाज्ज्ञानयोग इति सिद्धं भूतचैतन्यमिति"—

कुम्भादिष्वनुपलब्धेरहेतुः[1]। कुम्भादिमृदवयवानां व्यूहलिङ्गः प्रवृत्तिविशेष आरम्भः। सिकतादिषु प्रवृत्तिविशेषाभावो निवृत्तिः। न च मृत्सिकतानामारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनादिच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नज्ञानैर्योगः। तस्मात्—'तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयो':—इत्यहेतुरिति ॥ ३६ ॥

नियमानियमौ तु तद्विशेषकौ ॥ ३७ ॥

तयोरिच्छाद्वेषयोर्नियमानियमौ विशेषकौ भेदकौ। ज्ञस्येच्छाद्वेषनिमित्ते प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती, न स्वाश्रये। किं तर्हि? प्रयोज्याश्रये। तत्र प्रयुज्यमानेषु भूतेषु प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्तः न सर्वेष्वित्यनियमोपपत्तिः।

यस्य तु[2] ज्ञत्वाद् भूतानामिच्छाद्वेषनिमित्ते आरम्भनिवृत्ती स्वाश्रये तस्य नियमः स्यात्। यथा[3] भूतानां गुणान्तरनिमित्ता प्रवृत्तिर्गुणप्रतिबन्धाच्च निवृत्ति-

रारम्भकाणामणूनां प्रवृत्तिरूप आरम्भोऽनुमीयते—ततः प्रवृत्तिभेदादिच्छाद्वेषावनुमीयेते—ताभ्यां च चैतन्यमनुमीयते इत्याशयः।

१ भूतचैतनिकस्यामुं द्वितीयमपि हेतुं दूषयति—कुम्भादिष्विति। केचिदेतत् सूत्रत्वेनाभिप्रयन्ति। तत्र प्रमाणाभावाद्भाष्यवाक्यमेवेदमिति निर्धारितम्। 'कुम्भादिषु' आरम्भनिवृत्तिसत्त्वेऽपि इच्छादीनां 'अनुपलब्धेः'—'अहेतुः' इच्छाद्वेषयोरारम्भनिवृत्तिलिङ्गत्वादिति न सद्धेतुरित्यर्थः।

२ अनियमं भेदकं व्याचष्टे—यस्य त्विति। 'नियमः स्यादिति' सर्वेषु भूतेषु प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्यातामित्यर्थः।

३ उक्तमेव स्पष्टयति—यथा भूतानामिति। यथा भूतानां गुरुत्वादिगुणान्तरनिमित्ता प्रवृत्तिः पतनादिलक्षणा तस्यैव गुरुत्वादेर्गुणान्तरस्य 'प्रतिबन्धः' आधारद्रव्यसंयोगेन—तस्माच्च निवृत्तिः अपतनादिका—उभयमप्येतद्भूतमात्रे भवति नियमेन व्याप्त, न पुनः शरीरारम्भकमात्रभूतेषु (एष सार्वजनीनोऽनुभवः) एवं भूतमात्रे तद्गुणभूतज्ञानेच्छाद्वेषनिमित्ते प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती अपि स्वाश्रये एव स्याताम्। एतदुक्तं भवति—ये ये पृथिव्यादिगुणास्ते ते यावत्पृथिव्यादिभाविनो दृष्टाः, यथा गुरुत्वादयः। ज्ञानेच्छादयोऽपि चेत् पृथिव्यादिगुणास्तैरप्यवश्यं यावत्पृथिव्यादिभाविभिर्भवितव्यम्। न तु घटादौ तथा दृश्यन्ते। तस्माच्च पृथिव्यादिगुणा ज्ञानादय इति

भूतमात्रे भवति नियमेनैवं भूतमात्रे ज्ञानेच्छाद्वेषनिमित्ते प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्वाश्रये स्याताम्। न तु भवतः। तस्मात् प्रयोजकाश्रिता ज्ञानेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाः, प्रयोज्याश्रये तु प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती इति सिद्धम्।

एकशरीरे तु ज्ञातृबहुत्वं निरनुमानम्। भूतचैतनिकस्यैकशरीरे बहूनि भूतानि ज्ञानेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नगुणानीति ज्ञातृबहुत्वं प्राप्तम्। ओमिति ब्रुवतः प्रमाणं नास्ति। यथा नानाशरीरेषु नानाज्ञातारो बुद्ध्यादिगुणव्यवस्थानात्, एवमेकशरीरेऽपि बुद्ध्यादिगुणव्यवस्थानुमानं स्याज्ज्ञातृबहुत्वस्येति।

दृष्टश्चा[1]न्यगुणनिमित्तः प्रवृत्तिविशेषो भूतानां सोऽनुमानमन्यत्रापि। दृष्टः करणलक्षणेषु भूतेषु परश्वादिषु उपादानलक्षणेषु च मृत्प्रभृतिष्वन्यगुणनिमित्तः प्रवृत्तिविशेषः। सोऽनुमानमन्यत्रापि त्रसत्स्थावरशरीरेषु। तदवयवव्यूहलिङ्गः प्रवृत्तिविशेषो भूतानामन्यगुणनिमित्त इति। स च[2] गुणः प्रयत्नसमानाश्रयः संस्कारो धर्माधर्मसमाख्यातः सर्वार्थः पुरुषार्थाराधनाय प्रयोजको भूतानां प्रयत्नवदिति।

अत्र भाष्यकृता सार्वत्रिकत्वप्रसङ्गविवक्षया नियमशब्दः प्रयुक्तः असार्वत्रिकत्वविवक्षया त्वनियमशब्द इति तात्पर्यकृतः।

अत्र तात्पर्यम्—अवयवानां प्रत्येकं चैतन्ये शरीरे एकस्मिन् बहवश्चेतनाः स्युः। भवतु किन्नो बाध्यत इति चेन्न। विरुद्धाभिप्रायत्वेन स्वतन्त्राणां न किञ्चिदपि कार्यं जायेत। न च बहूनामेकाभिप्रायनियमो दृष्टः। काकतालीयन्यायेन स्यादेकाभिप्रायत्वं न पुनरस्य नियमो दृष्टचर इति एतद्दूषणमुपेक्ष्य वार्त्तिककृता प्रत्ययव्यवस्थानुमानं न भवेदिति दूषणमुक्तम्। एकस्मिन् शरीरे प्रत्ययानां परस्परप्रतिसन्धानं पश्यामो न शरीरान्तर इति व्यवस्था। सेयं यद्येकस्मिन् शरीर एक एव चेतनो न चासौ शरीरान्तरे ततो भवेन्नान्यथेत्यर्थ इति।

१ नियमानियमाविति यदुक्तं सूत्रे तत्रानुमानं सूचयति भाष्यकारः—दृष्टश्चान्यगुणेति। अत्र तात्पर्यम्—हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारहेतुः परिस्पन्दः प्रवृत्तिविशेषः। सोऽयं प्रयोगः—त्रसत्स्थावरशरीरेषु प्रवृत्तिः स्वाश्रयव्यतिरिक्ताश्रयगुणनिमित्ता प्रवृत्तिविशेषत्वात् परश्वादिगतप्रवृत्तिवदिति।

२ कोऽसौ गुणः किमाश्रयश्च यन्निमित्तः शरीरे प्रवृत्तिविशेष इत्यपेक्षायामाह—स च गुण इति। सोऽयं गुणः संस्कारविशेष एव धर्माधर्मनाम्ना प्रसिद्धः प्रयत्नसमानाश्रय एव। यस्मिन्नाश्रये प्रयत्नः समवैति तस्मिन्नेव स संस्कारोऽपीत्यर्थः। स एव 'सर्वार्थः' पुरुषसम्बद्धसकलार्थप्रयोजकः 'पुरुषार्थाराधनाय' पुरुषस्यार्थानामाराधनाय सम्पादनाय भूतानां तत्पुरुषशरीरारम्भकाणां 'प्रयोजकः' प्रवर्त्तकः।

आत्मास्तित्वहेतुभिरात्मनित्यत्वहेतुभिश्च भूतचैतन्यप्रतिषेधः कृतो वेदितव्यः । 'नेन्द्रियार्थयोस्तद्विनाशेऽपि ज्ञानावस्थानात्' इति च समानः प्रतिषेध इति ।

क्रियामात्रं[1] क्रियोपरममात्रं चारम्भनिवृत्ती इत्यभिप्रेत्योक्तम्—'तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेधः' इति । अन्यथा त्विमे आरम्भनिवृत्ती आख्याते, न च तथाविधे पृथिव्यादिषु दृश्येते । तस्मादयुक्तम्—'तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेध' इति ॥ ३७ ॥

भूतेन्द्रियमनसां[2] समानः प्रतिषेधो मनस्तूदाहरणमात्रम् ।

यथोक्तहेतुत्वात्[3]पारतन्त्र्यादकृताभ्यागमाच्च न मनसः ॥३८॥

'इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्ग' मित्यतः प्रभृति यथोक्तं सङ्गृह्यते । तेन भूतेन्द्रियमनसां चैतन्यप्रतिषेधः ।

पारतन्त्र्यात् । परतन्त्राणि भूतेन्द्रियमनांसि धारणप्रेरणव्यूहनक्रियासु प्रयत्नवशात्प्रवर्तन्ते । चैतन्ये पुनः स्वतन्त्राणि स्युरिति ।

अकृताभ्यागमाच्च । '[4]प्रवृत्तिर्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भ' इति चैतन्ये भूते-

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१ तल्लिङ्गत्वादिति (३५) सूत्रोक्तस्याक्षेपस्य समाधानान्तरमाह—क्रियामात्रमिति । ज्ञस्येच्छेत्यत्र (३४) सूत्रे आरम्भनिवृत्तिशब्देन न प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिमात्रमभिमतमस्माकमपि तु हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारार्थः स्पन्दविशेषः । तमिमं प्रवृत्तिविशेषमज्ञात्वाऽऽक्षेपकेण प्रवृत्तिसामान्येन प्रत्यवस्थितम् । अतोऽत्र 'अप्रतिपत्ति'—स्ते निग्रहस्थानमित्याशयः ।

२ बुद्धेःशरीरमात्रगुणत्वमपाकृत्य भूतेन्द्रियमनसामपि न सा गुणो भवितुमर्हतीत्युपपादयितुं हेतूनुपन्यसिष्यन् तत्र कथं केवलं मनस एव ग्रहणं कृतं न भूतेन्द्रिययोरिति बहिः पूर्वपक्षे समाधानमाह—भूतेन्द्रियमनसामिति । ये हेतवोऽग्रिमसूत्र उपन्यस्तास्ते सर्वे बुद्धेः भूतगुणत्वमिन्द्रियगुणत्वम्मनोगुणत्वं च निषेधयितुं तुल्यमेव समर्थास्तथाऽपि मनोमात्रस्य ग्रहणं केवलमुदाहरणरूपेण कृतम् । भूतेन्द्रियमनसाम्मध्ये आद्ययोरुभयोरपि भौतिकत्वान्मनसश्चाभौतिकत्वादस्यैवाभौतिकेनात्मना यत्किञ्चित्साद‍ृश्यमस्तीति मनोगुणत्वे निषिद्धे सुतरामेव भूतेन्द्रियगुणत्वमपि निषिद्धमेवेति हृदयं सूत्रकारस्येत्याशयः ।

३ बुद्धेर्मनोगुणत्वप्रतिषेधाय हेतुत्रयसमुच्चयपरं सूत्रम्—यथोक्तहेतुत्वादिति । न मनसः गुणो बुद्धिरिति शेषः ।

४ हेत्वर्थं प्रकटयति—प्रवृत्तिरिति । प्रथमाध्यायप्रथमाह्निकगतसप्तदशसूत्रे वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भस्य प्रवृत्तित्वमुक्तम्पुनस्तत्रैव द्वितीयसूत्रभाष्ये प्रवृत्तिजन्यत्वं धर्माधर्म्मयोरुपवर्णितम् ।

न्द्रियमनसां परकृतं कर्म पुरुषेणोपभुज्यत इति स्यात् । अचैतन्ये तु तत्साधनस्य स्वकृतकर्मफलोपभोगः पुरुषस्येत्युपपद्यत इति ॥ ३८ ॥

अथायं[1] सिद्धोपसङ्ग्रहः—

परिशेषाद्यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्च[2] ॥ ३९ ॥

आत्मगुणो[3] ज्ञानमिति प्रकृतम् ।

परिशेषो[4] नाम–प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधेऽन्यत्राप्रसङ्गाच्छिष्यमाणे सम्प्रत्ययः । भूतेन्द्रियमनसां[5] प्रतिषेधे द्रव्यान्तरं न प्रसज्यते, शिष्यते चात्मा । तस्य गुणो ज्ञानमिति ज्ञायते ।

'यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्चेति[6]', 'दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात्' इत्येवमादीनामात्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनामप्रतिषेधादिति ।

परिशेषज्ञापनार्थं प्रकृतस्थापनादिज्ञानार्थं[7] च यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तिवचनमिति ।

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१ बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वमुपसंहरति–अथायमिति । 'सिद्धस्य' सिद्धान्तस्य 'उपसङ्ग्रहः' उपसंहार इत्यर्थः ।

२ हेतूपसंहारपरं सूत्रम्—परिशेषादिति ।

३ सूत्रवाक्यं पूरयति—आत्मेति । एवं च परिशेषाद् यथोक्तापपत्तेश्च आत्मगुणो ज्ञानमिति सिद्धान्तसूत्रं पर्यवसितम् ।

४ परिशेषादिति हेतुं व्याचष्टे—परिशेषो नामेति । प्रथमाध्यायप्रथमाह्निकस्थपञ्चमसूत्रभाष्यस्थान्येतान्यक्षराणि तत्रैव व्याख्यातार्थानि ।

५ तत्रोक्तं शास्त्रं प्रकृते योजयति–भूतेन्द्रियेति । आत्मभूतेन्द्रियमनांस्येव बुद्ध्याधारत्वेन 'प्रसक्तानि' तेषु तावदुक्तप्रकारेण भूतेन्द्रियमनसां तदाधारत्वेन— 'प्रतिषेधे' 'अन्यत्र' आत्मभूतेन्द्रियमनोव्यतिरिक्तद्रव्यान्तरे 'अप्रसङ्गात्' बुद्ध्याधारत्वासम्भवात् 'शिष्यमाणः' अवशिष्टद्रव्यम् आत्मैव । ततश्चात्मन एव गुणो बुद्धिरिति निश्चीयते ।

६ यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेरिति द्वितीयं हेतुमनूद्य व्याचष्टे—यथोक्तेति । तृतीयाध्याये दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामित्यादिग्रन्थेन ये आत्मास्तित्वसाधनहेतव उपन्यस्तास्तेषां सर्वेषामात्मनो बुद्धिगुणत्वसाधनत्वेऽप्यत्वेऽपि कोऽपि प्रतिषेधो नोपलभ्यतेऽतो त एव सर्वेऽत्रातिदिश्यन्ते । 'उपपत्तेश्चेति' अप्रतिषेधादित्यर्थः ।

७ यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्चेत्येतस्य व्याख्यान्तराण्याह–परिशेषेति । परिशेषादित्यस्यैव हेतोरुपोद्बलकं यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्चेति वाक्यम्–यथोक्तहेत्विति । तथा च यदुक्तमात्मा शिष्यते इति तत्रैव तृतीयाध्यायोक्तहेतवः साधका इति पर्यवसितोऽर्थः ।

अथ[1] वो'पपत्तेश्चे'ति हेत्वन्तरमेवेदम् । नित्यः खल्वयमात्मा, यस्मादेकस्मिन् शरीरे धर्मं चरित्वा कायभेदात् स्वर्गे देवेषूपपद्यते, अधर्मं चरित्वा देहभेदान् नरकेषूपपद्यत इति । उपपत्तिः शरीरान्तरप्राप्तिलक्षणा, सा सति सत्त्वे नित्ये चाश्रयवती । बुद्धिप्रबन्धमात्रे तु निरात्मके निराश्रया नोपपद्यत इति । एकसत्त्वाधिष्ठानश्चानेकशरीरयोगः संसार उपपद्यते । शरीरप्रबन्धोच्छेदश्चापवर्गो मुक्तिरित्युपपद्यते । बुद्धिसन्ततिमात्रे त्वेकसत्त्वानुपपत्तेर्न कश्चिद्दीर्घमध्वानं सन्धावति न कश्चिच्छरीरप्रबन्धाद्विमुच्यत इति संसारापवर्गानुपपत्तिरिति । बुद्धिसन्ततिमात्रे च सत्त्वभेदात्सर्वमिदं प्राणिव्यवहारजातमप्रतिसंहितमव्यावृत्तमपरिनिष्ठितं च स्यात् । ततः[2] स्मरणाभावान्नान्यदृष्टमन्यः स्मरतीति । स्मरणं च खलु पूर्वज्ञातस्य समानेन ज्ञात्रा ग्रहणमज्ञासिषममुमर्थं ज्ञेयमिति । सोऽयमेको ज्ञाता पूर्वज्ञातमर्थं गृह्णाति, तच्चास्य ग्रहणं स्मरणमिति तद् बुद्धिप्रबन्धमात्रे निरात्मके नोपपद्यते ॥ ३९ ॥

स्मरणं[3] त्वात्मनो ज्ञस्वाभाव्यात् ॥ ४० ॥

उपपद्यत[4] इति । आत्मन एव स्मरणं न बुद्धिसन्ततिमात्रस्येति । 'तु'श-

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१ अपरं व्याख्यानम्—अथ वेति । 'उपपत्तेश्चे'ति तृतीयाध्यायोक्तहेतुभ्योऽन्या 'उपपत्तीः' हेतून् परामृशति ।

अत्र तात्पर्यम् । पूर्वेद्युरर्धकृतानामपरेद्युः परिसमापना दृष्टा मयारब्धस्मयैव परिसमापनीयमिति प्रतिसन्धाने अप्रतिसन्धाने तु न परिसमापयेयुः । परिसमापेन वा चैत्रारब्धमचैत्रः समापयेत् । यतः स्वयमारब्धात परारब्धमव्यावृत्तमविशिष्टम्—स्वस्यापि परत्वात् । अपरिनिष्ठितं च कर्मजातं स्यात् । तथाहि—वैश्यस्तं मे वैश्य एवाधिकारी न ब्राह्मणराजन्यौ—एवं राजसूये राजैव न ब्राह्मणो वैश्यो वा—एवं सोमसाधनके यागे ब्राह्मण एवाधिकृतो न राजन्यवैश्यौ—शूद्रश्चानधिकृत एवेति 'परिनिष्ठा' । सा बुद्धिसन्ततिमात्रे न स्यात । कुतः? सल्लक्षणानां सर्वेषामेव त्रैलोक्यवैलक्षण्येन भेदात्—अन्यापोहसामान्यस्य च व्यावर्त्तितत्वादित्यर्थ इति ।

२ इष्टापत्तिमाशंक्य दोषमाह—तत इति । 'ततः' सकलव्यवहाराणामप्रतिसंहितत्वात् स्मरणाभावः ।

३ नित्ये त्वात्मनि स्मरणमुपपद्यत एवेत्याह–स्मरणं त्विति सूत्रम् ।

४ सूत्रवाक्यम्पूरयति–उपपद्यत इति । तथा च स्मरणमात्मनो ज्ञस्वाभाव्यादुपपद्यत इति सूत्रस्वरूपं पर्यवसितम् । त्रिकालव्यापिनी ज्ञानशक्तिरेव 'ज्ञस्वाभाव्यम्' । तद्धि आकाशादिभ्यो व्यावृत्तं त्रिकालव्यापि स्वरूपमेवात्मनः । एतत्स्वरूपे आत्मनि सत्येव स्मरणमुपपद्यत इति भावः ।

ब्दोऽवधारणे। कथम्? ज्ञस्वभावत्वात्। ज्ञ इत्यस्य स्वभावः स्वो धर्मः। अयं खलु ज्ञास्यति जानाति अज्ञासीदिति त्रिकालविषयेणानेकेन ज्ञानेन सम्बध्यते। तच्चास्य त्रिकालविषयं ज्ञानं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं ज्ञास्यामि जानामि अज्ञासिषमिति वर्तते। तद्यस्यायं स्वो धर्मस्तस्य स्मरणं न बुद्धिप्रबन्धमात्रस्य निरात्मकस्येति ॥ ४० ॥

स्मृतिहेतूनामयौगपद्याद्युगपदस्मरणमित्युक्तम्। अथ[1] केभ्यः स्मृतिरुत्पद्यत इति?

स्मृतिः[2] खलु—

प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासलिङ्गलक्षणसादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धानन्तर्यवियोगैककार्यविरोधातिशयप्राप्तिव्यवधानसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषभयार्थित्वक्रियारागधर्माधर्मनिमित्तेभ्यः ॥ ४१ ॥

सुस्मूर्षया मनसो धारणं प्रणिधानं—सुस्मूर्षितलिङ्गानुचिन्तनं वार्थस्मृतिकारणम्।

निबन्धः—खल्वेकग्रन्थोपयमोऽर्थानाम्। एकग्रन्थोपयताः खल्वर्था अन्योन्यस्मृतिहेतव आनुपूर्व्येणेतरथा वा भवन्तीति। धारणशास्त्रकृतो वा प्रज्ञातेषु वस्तुषु स्मर्तव्यानामुपनिःक्षेपो निबन्ध इति।

अभ्यासस्तु—समाने विषये ज्ञानानामभ्यावृत्तिः। अभ्यासजनितः संस्कार आत्मगुणोऽभ्यासशब्देनोच्यते। स च स्मृतिहेतुः समान इति। लिङ्गं—पुनः संयोगि समवाय्येकार्थसमवायि विरोधि चेति। यथा—धूमोऽग्नेः, गोर्विषाणम्, पाणिः पादस्य, रूपं स्पर्शस्य, अभूतं भूतस्येति। लक्षणं—पशववयवस्थं गोत्रस्य स्मृतिहेतुः—विदानामिदं, गर्गाणामिदमिति। सादृश्यं—चित्रगतं प्रतिरूपकं—देवदत्तस्येत्येवमादि। परिग्रहात्—स्वेन वा स्वामी स्वामिना वा स्वं स्मर्यते। आश्रयात्—ग्रामण्या तदधीनं संस्मरति। आश्रितात्-तदधीनेन ग्रामण्यमिति। सम्बन्धात्—अन्तेवासिना युक्तं गुरुं स्मरति, ऋत्विजा याज्यमिति। आनन्तर्यादिति—करणीयेष्वर्थेषु। वियोगात्—येन विप्रयुज्यते

[1] स्मृतिहेतूनामयौगपद्यादिति पूर्वोक्तं स्मारयित्वा स्मृतिहेतुवर्णनपरं सूत्रमवतारयितुं पृच्छति—अथ केभ्य इति।

[2] पञ्चविंशतिस्मृतिहेतुनिरूपणपरमुत्तरम्—स्मृतिः खल्विति भाष्यमारभ्य प्रणिधानादि निमित्तेभ्य इत्यन्तम्।

तद्वियोगप्रतिसंवेदी भृशं स्मरति । एककार्यात्–कर्त्रन्तरदर्शनात् कर्त्रन्तरे स्मृतिः । विरोधात्–विजिगीषमाणयोरन्यतरदर्शनादन्यतरः स्मर्यते । अतिशयात्–येनातिशय उत्पादितः । प्राप्तेः–यतो येन किञ्चित्प्राप्तमाप्तव्यं वा भवति तमभीक्ष्णं स्मरति । व्यवधानात्–कोशादिभिरसिप्रभृतीनि स्मर्यन्ते । सुखदुःखाभ्यां–तद्धेतुः स्मर्यते । इच्छाद्वेषाभ्यां–यमिच्छति यं च द्वेष्टि तं स्मरति । भयात्–यतो बिभेति । अर्थित्वात्–येनार्थी भोजनेनाच्छादनेन वा । क्रियायाः–रथेन रथकारं स्मरति । रागात्–यस्यां स्त्रियां रक्तो भवति तामभीक्ष्णं स्मरति । धर्मात्–जात्यन्तरस्मरणमिह चाधीतश्रुतावधारणमिति । अधर्मात्–प्रागनुभूतदुःखसाधनं स्मरति ।

न[1] चैतेषु निमित्तेषु युगपत्संवेदनानि भवन्तीति युगपदस्मरणमिति । निदर्शनं[2] चेदं स्मृतिहेतूनां न परिसङ्ख्यानमिति[3] ॥ ४१ ॥

(४) बुद्धेरुत्पन्नापवर्गित्वप्रकरणम्[4] ।

अनित्यायां[5] च बुद्धौ उत्पन्नापवर्गित्वात् कालान्तरावस्थानाच्चानित्यानां

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१ उक्तमर्थं प्रकृते योजयन् प्रकरणार्थमुपसंहरति–न चैतेष्विति ।

२ ननून्मादादयोऽपि स्मृतिहेतवो लोकसिद्धास्तत् किन्तेऽत्र नोक्ता इत्यत आह–निदर्शनमिति ।

३ परिसंख्यानमिति–अशेषाणां स्मृतिहेतूनाम्परिगणनमित्यर्थः ।

४ बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वे प्रसाधिते तस्या उत्पन्नापवर्गित्वं निरूपयिष्यते । ज्ञानयौगपद्यनिराकरणप्रसङ्गेन च स्मृतिक्रमोऽपि विचारयिष्यते । ज्ञानस्यैवेच्छाद्येकाश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गेन तन्निर्वाहाय स्मरणं "चात्मनो ज्ञस्वाभाव्यादि"ति सूत्रे (४०) उक्तम् । तदेतत्सर्वं स्मरणे सत्येव स्यात् । तच्च सति संस्कारे । स च ज्ञानस्याशुतरविनाशित्वेन त्वन्यथेति तदेवाधुना विचार्यते । अत एव तृतीयाध्यायगतबुद्ध्यनित्यताप्रकरणेऽस्या उत्पन्नापवर्गित्वन्न निरूपितम्–तत्र प्रयोजनाभावात् । बुद्धेः सामान्यतोऽनित्यतायामात्मगुणत्वसिद्धिः प्रयोजनम् । तच्च तस्याः कालान्तरावस्थायित्व एव धर्माधर्मवदुपपद्यते । अतो बुद्धेरनित्यत्वस्य सामान्यतो विचारितस्य विशेषतस्तस्या उत्पन्नापवर्गित्वं (आशुतरविनाशित्वं) अधुना विचार्यते ।

५ तत्र संशयकारणं दर्शयति–अनित्यायामिति । बुद्धिरनित्येति साधितम् । अनित्यं चोत्पन्नापवर्गि दृष्टं यथा शब्दः, कालान्तरावस्थायि च यथा घटः–इत्युभयथादर्शनात् भवति संशयः । उत्पन्नापवर्गित्वमाशुतरविनाशित्वमिति यावत् । कालान्तरावस्थानाच्च नित्यानामित्येव सर्वत्र पाठ उपलभ्यते । किन्त्वग्रे कुम्भवदिति दृष्टान्तदृष्ट्याऽनित्यानामिति पाठः सम्यक्प्रतिभाति । नित्यतायामिति पाठे स्वयमर्थः ।

संशयः—किमुत्पन्नापवर्गिणी बुद्धिः शब्दवत् आहोस्वित् कालान्तरावस्थायिनी कुम्भवदिति ? उत्पन्नापवर्गिणीति पक्षः[1] परिगृह्यते ।

" कस्मात् ? "—

कर्मानवस्थायिग्रहणात् ॥ ४२ ॥

कर्मणोऽनवस्थायिनो ग्रहणादिति । क्षिप्तस्येषोरापतनात् क्रियासन्तानो गृह्यते । प्रत्यर्थनियमाच्च बुद्धीनां क्रियासन्तानवद् बुद्धिसन्तानोपपत्तिरिति । अवस्थितग्रहणे च व्यवधीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तेः । अवस्थिते च कुम्भे गृह्यमाणे सन्तानेनैव बुद्धिर्वर्तते प्राग्व्यवधानात् । तेन व्यवहिते प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं निवर्तते । कालान्तरावस्थाने तु बुद्धेर्दृश्यव्यवधानेऽपि प्रत्यक्षमवतिष्ठेतेति ।

स्मृतिश्चालिङ्गं बुद्ध्यवस्थाने । संस्कारस्य बुद्धिजस्य स्मृतिहेतुत्वात् । यश्च मन्येत—" अवतिष्ठते बुद्धिः दृष्टा हि बुद्धिविषये स्मृतिः, सा च बुद्धावनित्यायां कारणाभावान्न स्यादिति "—तदिदमलिङ्गम् । कस्मात् ? बुद्धिजो हि संस्कारो गुणान्तरं स्मृहिहेतुर्न बुद्धिरिति ।

" हेत्वभावादयुक्तमिति चेत् "—बुद्ध्यवस्थानात् प्रत्यक्षत्वे स्मृत्यभावः । यावदवतिष्ठते[2] बुद्धिस्तावदसौ बोद्धव्यार्थः प्रत्यक्षः, प्रत्यक्षे च स्मृतिरनुपपन्नेति ॥ ४२ ॥

" अव्यक्तग्रहणमनवस्थायित्वाद्विद्युत्सम्पाते[3] रूपाव्यक्तग्रहणवत् ॥ ४३ ॥

बुद्धिर्यद्यनित्या तर्हि उत्पन्नापवर्गिणी । अथ सा नित्या तर्हि कालान्तरावस्थायिनीति संशय इति । न चायं सङ्गच्छतेऽग्रिमेण ग्रन्थेनेत्ययं पाठ उपेक्षितव्यः ।

१ सिद्धान्तोपन्यासेनैवोपक्रमते—उत्पन्नापवर्गिणीति पक्ष इति । अन्येभ्यो विनाशिभ्य आशुतरं विनश्यतीत्येवोत्पन्नापवर्गित्वस्यार्थः । न त्वयमर्थः 'उत्पत्त्यनन्तरमेव ध्वंसत ' इति ।

२ यावदवतिष्ठत इति । यदि बुद्धिरेव कालान्तरावस्थायिनी तर्हि बुद्धिजनकीभूतेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिनिवृत्तावप्यवतिष्ठेतैव । ततश्च बहुकालपर्यन्तम्प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्यैवावस्थानात्स्मृतेरावश्यकताऽवसरो वा न स्यादित्याशयः ।

३ पुनः पर आक्षिपति—अव्यक्तग्रहणेत्यादिसूत्रेण । यदि 'ग्रहणं' 'अनवस्थायि' स्यात्तर्हि तत् सर्वदाऽव्यक्तमेव स्यात् । यथा विद्युत्सम्पाते यद्रूपग्रहणं भवति तत् क्षणिकं सदव्यक्तमेव भवतीति सूत्रार्थः ।

यद्युत्पन्नापवर्गिणी बुद्धिः, प्राप्तमव्यक्तं बोद्धव्यस्य ग्रहणं–यथा विद्युत्सम्पाते वैद्युतस्य प्रकाशस्यानवस्थानादव्यक्तं रूपग्रहणमिति व्यक्तं तु द्रव्याणां ग्रहणम्। तस्मादयुक्तमेतदिति ” ॥ ४३ ॥

हेतूपादानात्[1] प्रतिषेद्धव्याभ्यनुज्ञा ॥ ४४ ॥

उत्पन्नापवर्गिणी बुद्धिरिति प्रतिषेद्धव्यम्। तदेवाभ्यनुज्ञायते ‘ विद्युत्सम्पाते रूपाव्यक्तग्रहणवदिति ’। यत्राव्यक्तग्रहणं तत्रोत्पन्नापवर्गिणी बुद्धिरिति।

[2]ग्रहणे हेतुविकल्पाद्ग्रहणविकल्पो न बुद्धिविकल्पात्। यदिदं क्वचिदव्यक्तं क्वचिद्व्यक्तं ग्रहणमयं विकल्पो ग्रहणहेतुविकल्पात्। यत्रानवस्थितो ग्रहणहेतुः तत्राव्यक्तं ग्रहणं, यत्रवास्थितस्तत्र व्यक्तम्–न तु बुद्धेरवस्थानानवस्थानाभ्यामिति। कस्मात्? अर्थग्रहणं हि बुद्धिः। यत्र तदर्थग्रहणमव्यक्तं व्यक्तं वा बुद्धिः सेति। विशेषाग्रहणे च सामान्यग्रहणमात्रमव्यक्तग्रहणम्। तत्र विषयान्तरे बुद्ध्यन्तरानुत्पत्तिर्निमित्ताभावात्। यत्र समानधर्मयुक्तश्च धर्मी गृह्यते विशेषधर्मयुक्तश्च तद्व्यक्तं ग्रहणम्। यत्र तु विशेषेऽगृह्यमाणे सामान्यग्रहणमात्रं तदव्यक्तं ग्रहणम्। समानधर्मयोगाच्च विशिष्टधर्मयोगो विषयान्तरम्। तत्र यद्ग्रहणं न भवति तद्ग्रहणनिमित्ताभावात्, न बुद्धेरनवस्थानादिति।

यथाविषयं च ग्रहणं व्यक्तमेव। प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वाच्च बुद्धीनाम्। सामान्यविषयं च ग्रहणं स्वविषयं प्रति व्यक्तं, विशेषविषयं च ग्रहणं स्वविषयं प्रति व्यक्तम्। प्रत्यर्थनियता हि बुद्धयः। तदिदं[3]मव्यक्तग्रहणं देशितं क्व विषये बुद्ध्यनवस्थाकारितं स्यादिति ?

धर्मिणस्तु धर्मभेदे बुद्धिनानात्वस्य भावाभावाभ्यां तदुपपत्तिः। धर्मिणः खल्वर्थस्य समानाश्च धर्मा विशिष्टाश्च। तेषु प्रत्यर्थनियता नानाबुद्धयः। ता

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१ आक्षेपं परिहरति–हेतूपादानादितिसूत्रेण। यो हेतुराक्षेप्त्रोपन्यस्तस्तेनैवाक्षिप्तस्य पक्षस्य स्वीकारः कृत इत्यर्थः।

२ आक्षेपं प्रौढिवादेन परिहृत्य तात्त्विकपरिहारान्तमाह—ग्रहणे हेत्वित्यादि बुद्धिविकल्पादित्यन्तम्। एतद्वाक्यं केचित्सूत्रत्वेनाभिप्रयन्ति। तत्र प्रमाणाभावाद्भाष्यस्यैव संक्षिप्तोक्तिरियमिति निर्धारितम्।

३ तदिदमिति यदि बुद्धिरनवस्थिता स्यादव्यक्तमेव ग्रहणं स्यादिति परस्याक्षेपः। तत्र तावद्ग्रहणस्याव्यक्ततैवाप्रसिद्धेति प्रदर्शितम्। तथा चाक्षेपस्य मूलमेवापसारितमन्तव्यमिति हृदयम्।

उभय्यो यदि धर्मिणि वर्तन्ते तदा व्यक्तं ग्रहणं धर्मिणमभिप्रेत्य। यदा तु सामान्यग्रहणमात्रं तदाऽव्यक्तं ग्रहणमिति। एवं[1] धर्मिणमभिप्रेत्य व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोर्ग्रहणयोरुपपत्तिरिति ॥ ४४ ॥

न[2] चेदमव्यक्तं ग्रहणं बुद्धेर्बोद्धव्यस्य वानवस्थायित्वादुपपद्यत इति। इदं[3] हि–

न[4] प्रदीपार्चिःसन्तत्यभिव्यक्तग्रहणवत्तद्ग्रहणम् ॥ ४५ ॥

अनवस्थायित्वेऽपि बुद्धेस्तेषां द्रव्याणां ग्रहणं व्यक्तं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। कथम्? 'प्रदीपार्चिःसन्तत्यभिव्यक्तग्रहणवत्'। प्रदीपार्चिषां सन्तत्या वर्त्तमानानां ग्रहणानवस्थानं ग्राह्यानवस्थानं च, प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वाद्बुद्धीनां, यावन्ति प्रदीपार्चींषि तावत्यो बुद्धय इति। दृश्यते चात्र व्यक्तं प्रदीपार्चिषां ग्रहणमिति ॥ ४५ ॥

(५) बुद्धेः शरीरगुणव्यतिरेकप्रकरणम्[5]।

"चेतना[6] शरीरगुणः—सति शरीरे भावादसति चाभावादिति"—

द्रव्ये[7] स्वगुणपरगुणोपलब्धेः संशयः ॥ ४६ ॥

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१ सवमिति। ग्रहणस्य यद्व्यक्तत्वमव्यक्तत्वं वा न तज्ज्ञानस्यावस्थानानवस्थानकारितमपि तु गृहीतार्थस्वरूपकारितमिति भावः। ततश्चाक्षेपः समूलं पराहतो वेदितव्य इति।

२ द्वितीयमपि परिहारम्प्रौढिवादमात्रं मत्वा पुनः प्रकारान्तरेण परिहारमाह–न चेदमिति। ग्रहणस्याव्यक्तता ग्रहणानवस्थायित्वकारिता न भवत्यपि तु ग्रहणविषयस्वरूपकारितैवेति प्रसाधितम्। तत्त्वतस्तु ग्रहणगतमव्यक्तत्वन्न ग्रहणानवस्थायित्वकारितं न वा तद्विषयानवस्थायित्वकारितमिति तत्त्वम्।

३ एवं सति (४३) सूत्रकृतपराक्षेपस्य किमुत्तरमित्यपेक्षायामुत्तरसमर्पकसूत्रमवतारयति–'इदं हि' इति भाष्यम्।

४ इदमिति परकृतमाक्षेपं परामृशति–नेति। यत्परेणोक्तं तन्न सम्यगित्यर्थः। कुत इत्याह–प्रदीपार्चिरिति। परोक्तेरनैकान्तिकत्वप्रदर्शनार्थमेतत्।

५ उत्पन्नापवर्गित्वं बुद्धेः प्रसाध्य शरीरगुणव्यतिरेकप्रकरणमारम्भणीयम्। उत्पन्नापवर्गित्वे हि सिद्धे वक्ष्यमाणहेतवः सुप्रतिपदा भवन्तीति तदनन्तरमस्यारम्भः। पूर्वं भूतेन्द्रियमनोगुणत्वप्रतिषेधे साधारणैर्हेतुभिः शरीरगुणत्वमपि प्रतिषिद्धमेव। अधुना तु शरीरगुणत्वमेव प्रतिषेद्धुं विशेषहेतवोऽभिधीयन्ते। एतद्विशेषहेतुप्रतिपादनस्य तु बुद्ध्यनवस्थायिताधीनत्वादेव तत्प्रकरणमवान्तरे निवेशितमिति बोध्यम्।

६ तत्रोत्सूत्रमेव पूर्वपक्षमुपस्थापयति–चेतना शरीरगुण इति।

७ पूर्वपक्षं संशयग्रस्तत्वेन निराकरोति–द्रव्ये स्वेतिसूत्रेण। द्रव्येषु स्वगुणानां परगुणानां चोपलब्धिरतः संशय एवेति सूत्रार्थः।

Sūtra 40

There arises a doubt, because there is mention of both 'modification', and 'substitution'.

BHĀṢYA

In connection with the expression '*dadhyatra*' (as resulting from the combination of '*dadhi*' and '*atra*') some* people hold that the '*i*' (in '*dadhi*') renounces its own form and takes the from of '*ya*',—the sense of this view being that [what the grammatical law lays down is that, when *i* is followed by *a*] there is a *modification* (of *i* into *ya*).—Others†, however, hold that what happens is that, the '*i*' having been used (in the expression '*dadhi atra*'), it gives up its place, and in the place thus vacated the letter '*ya*' comes to be used (in the expression '*dadhi-atra*'),—the sense of this latter view being that [what the grammatical law means is that] when *i* and *a* are in juxtaposition, we use *ya* and not *i*, so that there is *substitution* (of *ya* in place of *i*). Both these opinions have been held (in connection with the grammatical law embodied in Pāṇini's sutras, '*Iko yaṇaci*' 6.1.77). So that one does not know what the truth is [unless he carries on a full enquiry into the matter].

The true view is that there is *substitution*.

(A) As regards the theory of 'modification',—as a matter of fact, we do not perceive any continuity or persistence; so that there can be no inference of 'modification'. If there were some sort of persistence (of the *i*-sound, even in the form '*dadhyatra*'), it would show that something of it (some part of its character) had ceased and something else come in; and this might justify the inference that there is 'modification';—as a matter of fact, however, no such persistence is ever perceived;—hence the conclusion is that there is no 'modification'.§—(B) *Secondly*, we

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* attributes this view to the followers of Kalāpa: and quotes a *Kālāpa-Sūtra*.

† *The followers of Pāṇini*—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ In the well-known cases of 'modification'—e.g. when a lump of gold is transmuted into a pair of ear-rings or bracelets—they are regarded as 'modification', because whatever the particular shape, through everyone of them the character of 'Gold' *persists*. But in 'ya' (in '*dadhyatra*') we do not find any such *persistence* of the 'i'-sound; so that this cannot be a case of 'modification'.—*Tātparya*.

find that the two letters (*i* and *ya*) being amenable to different instrumental forces, the utterance of one is possible without the utterance of the other; that is to say, as a matter of fact, the lettet '*i*' is amenable to the instrumentality of what is called the 'open articulation' (applicable to vowels), while the letter '*ya*' is amenable to the instrumentality of the 'slightly touched articulation' (applicable to semi-vowels); so that these two letters are pronouncible by two different kinds of 'effort', called 'instrumentality'; and this is what makes it possible for one of them being uttered while the other is not uttered [and all this shows that *ya* is only the *substitute*, and not the *modification*, of *i*]*.—(C) *Thirdly*, the case in question (that of *ya* in *dadhyatra*) is exactly analogous to that where there is no 'modification'; that is to say, there are cases where *i* and *ya* are not 'modifications' at all (even according to you); e.g., in such expressions as (*a*) '*yatatē*', '*yacchati*', and '*prāyamsta*' (where there can be no chance of *ya* being a 'modification' at all), and, '*ikārah*', '*idam*' (where *i* remains itself, without undergoing any change at all);—and there are well-marked cases where the two do appear like 'modifications'; e.g. '*iṣṭvā*' (which is derived from the root '*yaj*', and in which therefore, the *i* appears in the place of the *ya* in the root) and '*dadhyāhara*' which is the altered form resulting from the combination of '*dadhi*' and '*āhara*', (of which the *i* is changed into *ya*)—Now as a matter of fact, in both these cases, (of the utterance of *ya* or *i*, appearing by itself or as 'modification'), the effort of the speaker is precisely the same, and precisely the

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The *Pariśuddhi* remarks—The term '*vikāra*' in the present context does not stand for 'transmutation,' the total destruction of one thing and the appearance in its place of another thing; as no such '*vikāra*' is admitted by the *Sāṅkhya*; it stands for that *change* in which the basic element remaining the same, its characteristics appear and disappear. And as there is no such basic element of which 'i' could be a characteristic detail,—no 'modification' can be possible in this case.

* If *ya* were the modification of *i*, the forces necessary for its utterance would be the same as those necessary for the utterance of *i*; as a matter of fact, however, the force that is put into operation, for the uttering of *ya*, is that in the form of the effort called 'slightly touched articulation'; while in the case of *i*, the effort is that called 'open articulation'. Thus it is that for the uttering of *ya* it is not necessary to have a previous utterance of *i*. And this would not be possible if *ya* were a *modification* of *i*.

same also is the hearing of the hearer. All this shows that (in '*dadhyatra*') we have *substitution* (of *ya*, and not *modification* of *i*).*—(D) *Fourthly*, there is no perception of it in actual usage. That is to say, in actual usage, *i* is never perceived as becoming *ya* ;† what *is* perceived, however, is that *ya* is used in the place where *i* had been used before. From this also it follows that *ya* is not a 'modification' of *i*.§

The denial of *ya* being the 'modification' of *i* does not set aside the grammatical law (that '*ik* followed by *ach* becomes *yaṇ*' —Pāṇini, 6-1-77). That is to say, even in accordance with the view that *letters do not undergo modifications*, it is not impossible to have the grammatical law (of letter-changes),—which contingency (of impossibility of the law) should compel us to admit the 'modification' of letters. As a matter of fact, one letter is not the product of another letter ; e.g. *ya* is not produced from *i*, nor is *i* produced from *ya* ; each letter emanatss from a distinct spot in the organ of speech and is the outcome of a distinct articulation ; so that the correct view is that what happens (in the case of changes) is that *one is uttered in the place of another* [Hence what the grammatical law '*iko yaṇaci*' means is that when *i* and *a* are in juxtapasition, we should use *ya* in the place of *i*, and *not* that *i* is *modified* into *ya*]. And only if these two facts were otherwise, could the change in question be regarded either as a 'modification', or as a case of 'one being produced out of the other'. As a matter of fact, however, these two facts are not otherwise. Hence the conclusion is that there is no 'modification' of letters.

(E) Just as the 'modification' of a group of letters is not possible, so is the 'modification' of a single letter also not

* The effort necessary for the uttering of *ya* in '*yatatē*' is exactly the same as that necessary for its uttering in the expression '*dadhyatra*' ; similarly the effort required for uttering *i* in '*idam*' is the same as that required for its uttering in '*iṣṭvā*' ; which shows that the 'ya' in both cases is of the same kind ; *i. e.* just as in '*yatatē*', the *ya* is not a 'modification', so in '*dadhyatra*' also it is not a modification, and so on.

† *E. g.*, we perceive the *gold* becoming the *bracelet*.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ In the case of the well-known case of 'modification' of milk into curd, we can perceive the milk becoming curd ; in the same manner we should perceive the *i* becoming *ya*, if the letter were a 'modification' of *i*.

possible. In accordance with the rules—'the root *as* becomes '*bhū*,' 'the root *brū* becomes *vac*'—where *as* is changed into *bhū* and *brū* into *vac*,—this change of one set of letters in the root into another set of letters is not in any case regarded either as a 'modification', or as a case of one being produced out of the other; it is only regarded as a case of one set of letters being used *in the place* of another set of letters;—exactly similar should be the case when one *letter* (*i*) is changed into another (*ya*).*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also letters cannot be regarded as undergoing 'modifications'—

Sūtra 41

Because the enlargement of the original cause should always involve a corresponding enlargement in the modification.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, we always find that modifications always follow their original base.† In the case in question however we do not find the *ya* following the shortness or length of the *i* [as whether the preceding *i* is long or short, the *ya* is always short];—and it is only if there were such following by the *ya*, that we could infer it to be a 'modification'.

Sūtra 42

[Objection]—"The reason just urged is not a valid one; because, as a matter of fact, Modifications are found to be smaller than, equal to and larger than their original base."

BHĀṢYA

"In the case of Substances, we find that some modifications are smaller than their original base, some are equal to it, while

* The *Pariśudahi* formulates this reasoning as follows—'The case of the change of *i* into *ya* cannot be one of modification,—because the two are distinct letters,—just like *bhū* appearing in place of *as*'.

† For instance, the cloth made of long yarns is long, and that made of shorter yarns is shorter—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

some are larger. In the same manner *ya*, as the *madification* (of the long *i*), may be *smaller* (than its basic cause)."*

[*The Vārtika does not notice this Sūtra 42.*]

Sūtra 43

[Answer]—Inasmuch as there is (in the Opponent's reasoning) neither of the two kinds of Probans, the mere example cannot prove anything.

(*a*) In the argument urged by the Opponent (in Sū. 41), we do not find any *Probans* at all,—neither one 'similar' to the example, nor one 'dissimilar' to it [and these are the only two kinds of Probans, as explained under Sū. 1-1-34 and 35];—(*b*) secondly (though an example has been cited) a mere example, unless taken along with a Probans, cannot prove anything;—(*c*) lastly, as counter-instances are available (in support of the contrary conclusion), there would be an uncertainity in regard to the conclusion (sought to be proved); [this counter-instance being as follows :—] it sometimes happens that for the carrying of a load, a horse is yoked in the place of an ox,—and just as in this case the Horse is not regarded as a 'modification' of the Ox, so, when *ya* is used in place of *i*, it cannot be regarded as a 'modification' of *i*. And certainly there is no such rule as that a conclusion can be proved only by an *example*, and not by a *counter-example*.†

* "From the *small* seed of the banyan emanates the *large* banyan tree; while out of the large cocoanut, which is *larger* than the banyan-seed, comes out the cocoanut tree, which is *smaller* than the banyan tree; and from cocoanuts of equal size, we get trees of equal size."—*Tātparya*.

It would be more in keeping with the text if we had the following examples—(1) From the small seeds we get the tree, which is the modification of the seed, and is larger than it; (2) from a large volume of steam we get a small quantity of water, where the water, the modification of the steam, is smaller in volume than the steam; and (3) when milk turns into curd, the modification, curd, is equal in volume to the milk.

The *Bhāṣyacandra* gives the following examples :—(1) From the *elongated* gold-pieces, we get the *round* ear-ring; (2) from smooth yarns we get smooth cloth; (3) from the small ball of cotton we get the long yarns. Al this shows that the modification need not always correspond to its original.

† This Sūtra answers Sū. 41, taking it as an argument advanced to prove the conclusion that *ya* is a modification of *i*. But Sū. 41 may be taken, not as an argument to prove a conclusion, but only as pointing out a defect, a fallacy, in the premiss of the Siddhāntin's reasoning. The answer to this comes in Sū. 44.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the examples of the 'modification' of Substances, cited by the Opponent,—our answer is that—

Sūtra 44

It is not right; as 'modifications' always emanate from such original bases as are unequal [and they are always in conformity with these latter].

BHĀṢYA

Substances that constitute the origin (from which *modifications* emanate) are such as are not equal (to them); and yet the modifications are always in conformity with their original bases.* In the case in question, however, we find that the letter *ya* is not always in conformity with (does not necessarily emanate from) the letter *i*.† Hence the citing of the example of the modification of substances is not effective against us.

Sūtra 45

[*Objection*]—"**Just as there is diversity in the character of the modification of Substances, so is there diversity in the modification of Letters also.**"

BHĀṢYA

"Just as in the case of Substances, the modification differs from its original, even though both equally are *Substance*,—so in the case of Letters also, though both equally are '*Letter*,' yet the modification differs from the original."§

* E. g. From the small banyan-seed emanates the large banyan-tree; and yet from that seed will emanate only the *banyan*, and never the cocoanut tree.

† This is what we mean by what we have urged in Sū. 40, as regards the modifications following their origins; and not that the largeness and smallness of the modification follows those of the origin. If we meant this latter, then alone could the argument urged against us by the Opponent in Sū. 42 be effective.

§ "In the case of Substances also it is not true that the modification always follows its original; because as a matter of fact, we often find that there is a diversity between the modification and its original; so that, even though the *ya* does not follow the *i*, in its length or shortness, yet it may be its modification."

"The sense of the argument is as follows: When the modification is spoken of as *following* its original, is it meant that the *following* or conformity is absolute?—or that it is only partial? If the former, then no such conformity would be possible in the case of substances also. If the latter, then in the case of Letters also, there is conformity so far that both are 'Letter'."—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

Sūtra 46

[*Answer*]—**That cannot be; as the real character of 'Modification' is not possible (in the case of Letters).**

BHĀṢYA

In the case of Substances in general we find the character of 'Modification' to be as follows:—When a Substance, gold or clay, undergoes *modification*, what happens is that the general character of that substance (Gold or Clay) remaining constant, one form or shape of it (*i.e.* the *Lump* of Gold or Clay) disappears and another (*i.e.* the Ring or the Jar) comes into existence; and this latter they call 'modification.' In the case of Letters on the other hand (such for instance as the letters *ya* and *i*), there is no such general 'Letter'-character which, remaining constant, would give up its '*i*'-form and take up the '*ya*'-form.* So that, just as in the case of the Ox and the Horse, even though both are 'Substance,' yet, by reason of the diversity in their character, one is not regarded as the 'modification' of another,—simply because they do not fulfil the conditions of the true 'modification', —exactly in the same manner, the letter *ya* cannot be regarded as the 'modification' of the letter *i*; for the simple reason that the conditions of the true 'modification' are not fulfilled in this case.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also Letters cannot have modifications:—

Sūtra 47

[As a matter of fact] when things have undergone 'modification', they cannot revert to their original form.

BHĀṢYA

Reversion (to the original form) is not possible [for real modifications; *e.g.*, Curd cannot again become Milk]. "How do you know that?" We know this because there is no proof for such reversion. That is to say, there is nothing to prove—no reasoning available for the view—that "what happens (in the case

* For it is only the particular letter *i* that is held by the Opponent to be modified into another particular letter '*ya*'; while in the case of substances the *Gold* lump becomes modified into the *Gold*-ring; the *Gold-character* being *common.—Bhāṣyacandra.*

of the form '*dadhyatra*') is that the *i* has become *modified* into *ya*, and again becomes *i* (when the expression is again stated in its uncombined form, '*ḍaḍhi-aṭra*'); and *not* that in the former case *ya* had been used in the place of *i*, and in the latter case it has ceased to be so used."*

Sūtra 48

[*Objection*]—"**Inasmuch as Gold and other things do revert to their original form, the reason urged is not a true reason at all.**"

BHĀṢYA

Says the Opponent—"It has been asserted that there is no reasoning available for our view:—But this is not true: The following is the reasoning that proves it:—In the case of Gold we find that, renouncing the form of the *Ear-ring*, it takes the form of the *Necklet*, and again renouncing the form of the latter it takes that of the former; exactly in the same manner, *i* having taken the form of *ya*, again takes the form of *i*."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[Our answer to the above is as follows]—The reasoning put forward is not valid, as it is based upon premises that are not true; for instance, in the case of Curd it is found that the *Milk*, having once become Curd, never again reverts to the form of the *Milk*. "What does that prove?" It proves that in the case of Letters also there is no reversion [and the premiss that 'all modifications revert to their original position', as urged in Sū. 46, is found not true; there being no such reversions in the case of Curd].†

If the meaning of the Opponent's assertion is that the "reversion of '*i*' is analogous to the reversion of Gold [so that

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* cites an example where there is repeated 'reversion' between *i* and *ya*. From the root '*dhyai*', (to think) we get the word '*dhīḥ*' (intelligence); this latter word being compounded with '*āpti*', we get the form '*dhy-āpti*' (*ya* again); and this compound is explained as '*dhī-āptiḥ*' (*i* again).

† This is the answer to Sū. 48; if the reasoning therein urged is meant to prove that "there is reversion in the case of Letters, because there is such in the case of all modifications." If on the other hand, the Sūtra is to be taken only as putting forward an objection to the arguments of the *Siddhāntin*, then the answer is as given in Sūtra 49.

what is stated in Sū. 45 is not true] ",—then our answer is that, so far as the analogy of the case of Gold is concerned,—

Sūtra 49

There is no analogy at all ; as in the case of the 'modifications' of Gold, the 'Gold'-character is never absent.*

In the case of Gold what happens in that the Gold itself remaining the constant factor, it becomes different objects by the renouncing of one character (form) and the taking of another. In the case of '*i*' on the other hand, we do not perceive any such common factor, in the shape of 'Letters in general', which could beeome a different object by renouncing the '*i*'-form and taking the '*ya*'-form. Hence the example cf Gold is not applicable to the case in question.

[*Objection*]—" But inasmuchas the General Character of 'Letter' is never absent [in either '*i*' or '*ya*'], it is not right to deny the 'modification of Letters'."†

[Says the Opponent]—" In the: case of Letter-modifications also, the generic character of 'Letter' is never absent : exactly in the same manner as the character of 'Gold' is present in all modifications of Gold. [Hence the two cases are exactly analogous]."

[*Answer*]- But a character subsists in that which is endowed with the *Universal*, and not in the *Universal* itself.§

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* This appears as a *Sūtra* in the *Nāyāsūcīnibandha*, also in the *Vārtika Bhāṣyacandra* and in the two Sūtra Mss. The text of the Sūtra is न तद्विकाराणां सुवर्णभावाद्यतिरेकात्. The Puri Sūtra Ms., however, reads it as न तद्विकाराणां सुवर्णभावाद्यतिरेकात् ; which reading is not quite satisfactory ; though it may be construed to mean 'the analogy is not true ; *because there is a difference* व्यतिरेकात्, inasmuchas in the case of Gold, the gold-character remains constant, throughout.' The *Bhāṣyacandra* adopts this reading.

The न, according to some, forms part, not of the *Sūtra*, but of the *Bhāṣya*.

† This also appears as a *Sūtra*, in the *Vārtika* and the Sūtra Mss. ; but not in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, nor in the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ This appears as *Sūtra* in the Sūtra Mss., and also in the *Vārtika* ; but not in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, nor in the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

As a matter of fact, the *Ear-ring* and the *Necklet* are forms or properties that subsist in the *Gold*, and not in the *Universal* or generic character of 'Gold'.—Now, what is that Letter of which '*i*' and '*ya*' are properties? They cannot be properties of the genetic character of 'Letter', as this is a *Universal* (and not *something possessed of the Universal.*) [Even granting that these could be properties or forms of the said *Universal*] as a matter of fact, a property or form that is ceasing (or disappearing) cannot form the origin of another forthcoming property; hence in the case in question, the '*i*' that is ceasing (or disappearing) could not be the origin of the forthcoming '*ya*' [which means that '*ya*' cannot be the 'modification' of '*i*'].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also no 'modification' of Letters is possible :—

Sūtra 50

If Letters are eternal, they cannot undergo [or become] modifications ;—if they are non-eternal, they cannot persist (as a constant factor).

BHĀṢYA

According to the theory that Letters are *eternal*, the letters *i* and *ya* should both be eternal; so that neither could be regarded as a 'modification'; for both being eternal, what could be the 'modification' of what? [as all 'modifications' as such must be non-eternal]. If on the other hand, the view is held that Letters are non-eternal. then no persistence or continuity of Letters would be possible. "What do you mean by Letters having no *persistence*?" What is meant by this 'want of persistence' is that having come into existence, they cease to exist; so that (under this theory) it is only after the '*i*', having come into existence, had ceased to exist, that the '*ya*' would come into existence; and the '*i*' would come into existence again only after the '*ya*', having come into existence, had ceased to exist; and under the circumstances (the two never coexisting at any point of time), what would be the 'modification' of what? What we have said (in regard to the *i* and *ya* coming into existence and ceasing to exist) should be taken as referring to the

combining (of the two words '*dadhi-atra*') after having stated them in the disjoined form, and again disjoining them after having combined them.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Opponent makes the following answer† (on the basis of the theory that letters are *eternal*) to the argument (propounded by the *Siddhāntin*.)—

Sūtra 51

" Inasmuchas most Eternal things are beyond the reach of the senses, and yet there are some that are of the opposite character—the denial of Letter-modification is not right."

BHĀṢYA

" It is not quite correct§ to say that *eternal words can never undergo modifications*. [Because] as a matter of fact, we find that, of *eternal* things, while some are *beyond the reach of the senses* (e.g., the *Atom* and *Ākāśa*), there are some that are quite perceptible by the senses (e.g., the *Universal* 'cow' and the like); in fact Letters themselves are perceptible (by the Senses) and yet they are eternal, *ex-hypothesi*) ; similarly, of eternal things though some (e.g., *Ākāśa*) may be incapable of undergoing modification, yet Letters may be quite capable of doing so."

But the *presence of contrary properties* cannot be accepted as a valid reason ; because there is *incompatibility* (between *eternality* and *capability of modification*), [while there is no such *incompatibility* between *eternality* and *perceptibility* or *imperceptibility*]. That which is *eternal* is never born ; nor does it ever cease to exist ; that which is devoid of the character of *being born* and that of *ceasing to exist* is *eternal* ; while that which is possessed of the character of *being born* and of *ceasing to exist* is *non-eternal* ; and as a matter of fact, there can be no 'modification' without something being born and something ceasing to

* When we say '*dadhi-atra*' the *i* comes into existence ; when we say '*dadhyatra*', the *i* ceases to exist and the *ya* comes into existence ; when we again disjoin the words and say '*dadhi-atra*', the *ya* ceases to exist and the *i* comes into existence.

† This answer is in the form of a Futile Rejoinder—says the *Tātparya*.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains '*vipratiṣedhaḥ*' as equivalent to *apratiṣedhaḥ*.'

exist. So that if Letters undergo 'modification', they cannot be *eternal*; and if they are *eternal*, they cannot undergo 'modification'. Thus the 'presence of opposite characters' (urged as a reason by the Opponent) is a *fallacious* Probans, being tainted with the fallacy of 'Contradiction.'

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Opponent now answers the Siddhānta argument from the standpoint that Letters are *not-eternal*—

Sūtra 52

"Even though non-persistent, Letters may undergo modifications, in the same way as they are apprehended (perceived)."

BHĀṢYA

"Even though letters are non-persistent (transient), yet there is hearing of them (they are heard); and in the same manner their modification also would be possible (even though they are non-persistent.)"*

Our answer is as follows:—The 'hearing of letters' (which has been put forward by the Opponent as a reason for proving the modification of Letters) has, as a matter of fact, no connection at all (with the desired conclusion), and as such it is entirely inefficient. That is to say, the 'hearing of Letters,'—which, on being admitted, would (according to the Opponent) lead to the inference of the fact that 'letters undergo modifications'—can, as a matter of fact, only serve the purpose of bringing about the cognition of what is expressed by those letters, and it has absolutely no connection with the 'modification of letters'; and as such it is entirely inefficient (in the proving of the desired conclusion).† So that the reasoning of the Opponent is exactly

* 'Just as Letters, even though non-persistent, become related to the Auditory Organ and thereby bring about their own cognition,—in the same manner would they bring about modifications also.'—*Tātparya*.

† The best reading of this passage appears to be—अर्थप्रतिपादिका वर्णोपलब्धिः न विकारेण सम्बद्धा असमर्था या गृह्यमाणा वर्णविकारमर्थमनुमापयेत्- The construction being—या वर्णोपलब्धिःवर्णविकारमर्थमनुमापयेत् (सा) अर्थ-प्रतिपादिका विकारेण न-सम्बद्धा (सती) असमर्था. The *Bhāṣyacandra* reads thus, with the exception that for या, it reads चा.

similar (in absurdity) to the following reasoning—'Because the Earth is endowed with the quality of Odour, it must also be endowed with such qualities as Sound, Pleasure, and the like'.— Then again, the 'hearing of letters' does not preclude the possibility of the case being one of the use of one Letter after the cessation of another Letter; we hold that in the case in question what happens is that the letter '*i*' having ceased, the letter '*ya*' is used in its place; and if the possibility of such use were precluded by the fact of *letters being heard*, then there might be some justification for the view that the letter '*i*' itself becomes transformed (modified) into '*ya*'. *—[As a matter of fact however, it

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As for the mere denoting of meanings by letters, this can be done by them, even when they can subsist just for the moment, just long enough for them to be comprehended. In the case in question, however, the letters concerned should have to subsist much longer than that; they should have to subsist through the entire process—of uttering the disjoined words '*dadhi-atra*', the pronouncing of the combined form '*dadhyatra*', and the subsequent analysing into the disjoined form—before any idea could arise as to there being a 'modification.' But as such continuous existence is not possible, under the theory that Letters are non-eternal, the mere 'hearing of letters' can have no connection with the fact of 'modification'.—*Tātparya*.

The translation is in accordance with this interpretation of the *Tātparya*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* construes the passage differently. By this अर्थप्रतिपादिका वर्णोपलब्धिः (न भवति) is one sentence—'The hearing of letters does not serve to prove the desired conclusion (that the original letter undergoes modifications);'—विकारेण सम्बद्धा supplies the reason—'because the said hearing is connected with the *modified* letter (and not with the *modyfying* original)'; असमर्था—'hence it is inefficient; incapable of proving your proposition';—thus being अगृह्यमाणा—'not perceived (along with the modifying original)';—'वर्णविकारं' वर्णविकारत्वं, 'अर्थं अनुमापयेत्' सम्भावयेत् —'might lend probability to the modifiability of letters?

This explanation, however, is more far-fetched than the one by the *Tātparya*.

* It might be argued, in favour of the Opponent's view that even though the 'hearing of letters' has no direct connection with the subject of Letter-modifications, yet, inasmuch the fact of hearing precludes the possibility of all other explanations, it may be accepted as justifying the conclusion that Letters undergo modifications. The Author has anticipated this view, and has pointed out that the 'hearing' *does not* preclude the possibility of the explanation supplied by the *Siddhāntin*.

Of this passage also, the *Bhāṣyacandra* supplies a different explanation, reading निर्वार्तिका for निवार्तिका and निर्वर्तते for निवर्तते. According to this,

is not so.]—From all this it follows that the 'hearing of letters' is not a valid reason for holding that Letters undergo modifications.

Sūtra 53

(1) Inasmuch as, if the Letter is something modifiable, it cannot be eternal,—and (2) as the (so-called) 'modification' appears at a time other than that at which the modifying letter is present,—the objection (taken in Sū. 51) is not a right one.

BHĀṢYA

The objection taken (in Sū. 51) on the basis of the fact that 'eternal things are of opposite characters' is not right. (1) Because as a matter of fact, no modifiable thing is ever found to be *eternal*; hence the objection based upon the example of the 'hearing of Letters' is not right. (2) In the case in question, what happens is that, having used the disjoined expression '*dadhi-atra*', the person waits for several moments, and then he pronounces the words in close juxtaposition and uses the form '*dadhyatra*'; so that the letter '*ya*' is used long after the letter '*i*' has disappeared (after the uttering of the disjoined words); and under the circumstances, of which letter could the '*ya*' be recognised as the 'modification'? For the effect (*the modification*, the *ya*) cannot appear at a time when the cause (the modifying original, the *i*) is absent. This is the retort to which the Opponent's argument is open.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also it is not possible to hold that Letters undergo modifications :—

Sūtra 54

Because in regard to letter-modifications, there is no constancy as to the original base.

In one case we find it laid down that '*ya*' is to take the place of '*i*'; and in another it is laid down that '*i*' is to take the

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the passage means as follows :—"The hearing of the modified letter does not bring about the birth of the modified letter after the destruction of that which is meant to have been its original; e.g., if the production or birth of *ya* were brought about by the hearing of the letter after the destruction of '*i*',—then alone could the proposition be held that 'when heard it produces the modified form *ya*'.

place of '*ya*' :—*e.g.*, in the word '*bidhyati*' [which is derived from the root *byadh*, the *ya* of which gives place to *i* in the word '*bidhyati*']. Now, if the letters concerned were 'modifications', there should have been some constancy as to which is the 'modification' and which the 'original'; as is found in the case of all well-known modifications [*e.g.* the Milk is always the 'original', while the Curd is always the 'modification'; it is never found to be the other way about. In the case in question however, it has been shown that there is no such constancy; as in one case '*i*' gives place to '*ya*', while in another '*ya*' gives place to '*i*'].

Sūtra 55

[*The Casuist objects*]—**"As there is constancy in non-constancy, it is not right to say that there is no constancy".**

BHĀṢYA

"It has been urged (by the *Siddhāntin*, in Sū. 51) that there is no constancy as to what is the 'original' and what the 'modification'. Now this 'non-constancy' is *constant*; that is, it is constant in regard to each particular subject; and inasmuch as this is constant, there is 'constancy'; so that what has been urged in regard to there being no constancy as to what is original etc., is not true."

Sūtra 56

[*Answer*]—**(A) Inasmuch as 'constancy' and 'non-constancy' are contradictory terms,—and (B) as the 'constancy' (put forward by the Opponent) subsists in the 'non-constancy',—the objection urged is not effective.**

BHĀṢYA

(A) The term 'Constancy' signifies the affirmation of the thing (Constancy); while the term 'Non-constancy' signifies its negation; and as there is contradiction between *affirmation* and *negation*, the two terms ('constancy' and 'non-constancy') cannot be regarded as synonymous; so that *non-constancy* cannot become 'constancy' simply by being *constant* or fixed; though we do not deny that there is no 'constancy' in 'non-constancy'; what we mean is that what is signified by the term 'constancy' may subsist *in non-constancy*, and as such the term 'constancy' may be applied to *non-constancy* [but what we do deny is the possibility of both *Constancy* and *Non-constancy* belonging to the

same thing]. Thus the mere presence of *Constancy* in *Non-constancy* does not constitute an effective objection against us.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In fact, what appears (and is regarded) as the 'modification of Letters' is not that one Letter becomes transformed into another, or that one Letter (as product) is produced out of the other (as the constituent cause); what it really is, is shown in the following *Sūtra*—

Sūtras 57

What appears as the 'modification of Letters' involves a change in (one or the other of) the following forms—(*a*) the coming in of fresh properties, (*b*) suppression, (*c*) diminution, (*d*) increase, (*e*) curtailment and (*f*) coalescence.—

BHĀṢYA

What is actually meant by 'the modification of Letters' is that, there is substitution of another cognate letter,—*i.e.*, one cognate letter is used on the cessation of the use of another; and this substitution is in diverse forms;—(*a*) in some cases there is *coming in of fresh properties*; *e.g.*, when the low accent takes the place of the high-pitched accent;—(*b*) in some there is *suppression*; *e.g.*, when one form being dropped, another comes in in its place;—(*c*) in certain cases there is *diminution*; *e.g.*, when the short vowel takes the place of the long one;—(*d*) in others there is *increase*; *e.g.*, when the long vowel takes the place of the short one, or the prolated vowel takes the place of the long and short one;—(*e*) in certain cases there is *curtailment*; *i. e.*, '*staḥ*' (a single syllable) takes the place of '*asti*' (two syllables);—(*f*) in other cases there is *coalescence*; *e.g.*, when there is an augment, either in the base or in the affix. These are the changes that are spoken of as 'modifications'; and these are only *substitutions*. If this is what is meant by 'modification,' then we admit the statement that 'Letters undergo modifications.'

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* What is impossible is the co-subsistence of both, Constancy and Non-constancy, in any one thing, and not the subsistence of Constancy *in* Non-constancy. And this latter fact does not shake our position; as the mere fact of there being Constancy in Non-constancy does not imply that there is constancy as regards the *Original* and *Modification*. It is admitted that there is non-constancy in regard to this; and if the Constancy of this Non-constancy were to imply Constancy as regards the Original and Modification, then it would mean that in regard to this latter there are both Constancy and Non-constancy, which however is impossible.

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GAUḌAPĀDA'S ASPARŚAYOGA

AND

ŚAṄKARA'S JÑĀNAVĀDA

(P. C. Divanji)

Introductory Remarks:

The Kārikās of Gauḍapāda is a well-known pre-Śaṅkara work on the Advaita philosophy. The most famous and perhaps the only known earliest Bhāṣya on it is that of the first Śaṅkarācārya whom tradition calls his grand-pupil through Gowindapāda. The doctrine expounded therein is that consisting of a positive assertion of the existence of the Para (absolute) Brahma and a negative denial of the separate existence of an individual soul and the group of objects collectively called the universe, which is succinctly called Ajātivada. Strictly speaking there could be no room in such a doctrine for any kind of Yoga. Nevertheless the author of this work has made room for one called Asparśayoga in G. K. III. 39 and IV. 2 and has laid down the *modus operandi* thereof in chapter III by taking note of the fact that though not existing from a strictly philosophical view-point human beings are in fact conscious of the separate existence of their selfs and of the objects around them, by explaining that this consciousness is due to ignorance or error which again is the result of an illusion, and by opining that it would cease to arise if the particular kind of Yoga named as above is practised. The object of this paper is to ascertain what is the meaning of that technical term, whether it designates an unknown species of Yoga or merely expresses a familiar one by a strange nomenclature and whether Śaṅkara who is commonly believed to be an exponent of the pure Jñānavāda does or does not admit the necessity of the practice of any Yoga for the realisation of the true nature of the Self.

(I) The compound '*Asparśayoga*'

2. The principal term in the compound 'Asparaśayoga' is 'Yoga'. This is an abstract noun formed by the addition of the *kṛt* termination 'ghañ' (A) to the root 'yuj' meaning 'to join'. Its etymological meaning therefore is 'the process of joining together' any two things either objectively or subjectively. In that sense it is found widely used in the Saṁskṛt literature and in the Modern Indian literature allied to it, on almost all the subjects of human interest including philosophy. Over and besides that, it has, however, a secondary and specialized sense in Indian philosophy and that is 'a process by which it is sought to restore the individual soul to its original state'. There is a wide divergence of opinion amongst the Indian philosophers as to the true nature or original state of the individual soul and as to the particular process which should be resorted to for the attainment thereof. But all, even the philosophers of the Non-Vedic schools called the heterodox schools, except the Cārvākas, are agreed on one point and that is that the individual soul is distinct from the physical body, that it existed before the body came into existence, and that it will continue to exist somewhere in some form even after this body become lifeless, so long at least as individual consciousness persists, which according to some is a permanent feature and according to others a transitory one and since even those of the former class look upon the embodiment of the soul as a source of misery all Indian philosophers, except the Cārvākas, are agreed that the possibility of its being embodied should be avoided and that that can be done by resorting to some special effort, which may be of the nature of Jñāna (knowledge), Upāsanā (propitiation of the Supreme Being) or Karma (action), all of which fall under the general category of 'Yoga' and are distinguished from one another by prefixing a distinctive term to it.

3. This three-fold classification seems to have come into existence at a late stage in the development of the Indian philosophical thought. Till then the term 'Yoga' seems to have been used rather indiscriminately in several senses. Thus for instance in the Muṇḍaka and the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads the compound words Sannyāsa-yoga, Dhyāna-yoga and Sāṁkhya-

yoga emphasize a particular means recommended for adoption by an aspirant while in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad the compound word Adhyātma-yoga leads to the inference that it emphasises the goal to be reached namely the self *i.e.* the realization of the true nature of the self. · In the Bhagawadgītā too, which is called a Yoga-śāstra, the term 'Yoga' has been used in the colophons to its several Adhyāyas in the compound words Arjunaviṣāda-yoga, Sāṁkhya-yoga, Karma-yoga etc., in the sense of "an exposition of ....." but in the several other such words which occur in the body of the work such as Buddhi-yoga, Jñāna-yoga, Karma-yoga etc., there seems to be an emphasis on the particular means to be adopted as in the terms "Sannyāsa-yoga, Dhyāna yoga and Sāṁkhya-yoga" of the Upaniṣads. It is, therefore, an interesting point for investigation in what sense the term 'Asparśa-Yoga' which occurs in G. K. III. 39 and IV. 2 must have been used by the author. I therefore proceed to make it.

(II) Meaning of that Compound

4. The said Kārikās run as follows :—

Asparśa-yogo vai nāma durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ ।
Yogino bibhayati hyasmādabhaye bhayadarśinaḥ ॥ (III. 39)
Asparśa-yogo vai nāma sarva sattavasukho hitaḥ ।
Avivādo' viruddhaśca deśitastaṁ namāmyahaṁ ॥ (IV. 2).

Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya on the first of them says :—"Although the Paramātmatattva is such it is verily Asparśayoga, so called because it is devoid of all touch known as Saṁbandha (connection). This is well-known in the Upaniṣads." It might, at first sight, appear from this as if he meant that Asparśayoga was verily a synonym of Brahma, the highest spiritual essence of the universe. A reference to his Bhāṣya on G. K. IV. 2 however shows that this is not what he meant. He there says, "Now follows an obeisance to the Advaitadarśana-yoga. (Therein) 'Sparśanaṁ' means 'Sparśaḥ' or "Sambandhaḥ". That Yoga which has it not with anything else at any time is 'Asparśa-yoga'. This (*i.e.* asparśa) is the very nature of Brahma. (The indeclinables) 'Vai' and 'Nāma' indicate that this Asparśa-yoga is well-known amongst the knowers of Brahma. This is the meaning (of the compound 'Asparśayoga')." From this it is perfectly clear that he understands the term 'Yoga' in the com-

pound 'Asparśayoga' in the sense of 'a process by which the individual soul (Jīva) is joined to the Supreme soul (Brahma) and that the first member 'Asparśa' determines the meaning of the compound as a whole by emphasizing its special characteristic or principal feature which is the elimination of all kind of touch or connection. It is also further clear that he calls Brahma itself 'Asparśayoga' because 'Asparśa' is the very nature of Brahma and that the identification of this specific Yoga with Brahma does not result directly from the combination of the two words but by a further process of the identification of an attribute and the thing which possesses it (Guṇaguṇinorabhedaḥ). We, therefore, conclude that Śaṅkara understood this to be a particular kind of Yoga for the restoration of the Jīva to its original state in which it was unaffected by anything at any time.

5. This is further made clear by Ānandagiri in his gloss on the portion of the Bhāṣya on G. K. III. 39. He says while explaining what Śaṅkara means by saying "*Asparśayogo namayām* etc.:—"(He) now explains that realisation of the essence of which a repose in one's own nature is said to be the fruit by making the statement 'Asparśeti'. The realisation of the non-dual is Asparśa because by virtue thereof no touch takes place therein of Dharmas such as those of the Varṇas and the Āśramas and of impurities such as those of sins etc." and while explaining the terms 'Nāma' and 'Vai' he cites the Upaniṣad text "Na lipyate karmaṇā pāpakena" and others of that class. It is thus clear beyond doubt that the term "Asparśayoga" means the Yoga that is the realisation of the essence or the non-dual whose fruit is repose in one's own nature and whose special characteristic is Asparśa, a complete absence of touch of or connection with any merit or demerit.

(III) What is that Yoga?

6. This does not, however, explain what that consists of *i. e. to say* what is its *modus operandi*, the nature of the process which leads to that result. For this we must examine the context in which G. K. III. 39 occurs. Thus by the first 30 Kārikās of that chapter the author refutes the Dvaita view and establishes the Advaita one. Then in the 31st he says that our experience in the waking state is of the same nature as that

in the dreaming state and that since the latter is admittedly a purely imaginative subjective creation the former also is such *i. e. to say*, that the appearance of all the apparently diverse objects of both the animate and inanimate classes, is the result of our own imagination and that just as the dream-phenomena ceases to trouble us when our mind is brought under the control of our will-power in the waking state, so too the world-phenomena appearing in the waking state would cease to trouble us when the mind attains to the state of unmindness (Amanībhāva) *i. e. to say*, when it is effectually restrained from running its own natural course. Then in Kārikās 32 to 34 he explains how by a gradual process of the realisation of the true nature of the self such restraint is secured. But as the mind ceases to wander about even while we are in a state of dreamless sleep he explains the difference between that state which is well-known to every human being by self-experience and the fourth which it is his aim to make known by his work, by setting forth in bold relief in Kārikās III. 35 to 38, the distinguishing characteristics of the latter. It is thereafter in the 39th Kārikā above-quoted that he says that this is known as 'Asparśa-yoga'. It is clear from this that this author has given that specific name to the actual cessation of the aberrations of the mind and its repose in a state of equilibrium following upon the knowledge of the true nature of the self, which is a state of the individual soul quite distinct from the three daily experienced states and therefore called the fourth and that consequently "Asparśayoga" is a specific kind of yoga involving a definite course of mental exercises, that the knowledge of the true nature of the self derived from the scriptures or a Guru is in his view a means to that end and that the actual experience or realisation thereof its fruit. This inference drawn from the context with the aid of the commentaries is strengthened by the fact that in that Kārikā there is not the word 'Ayaṃ' which would indicate that the author intended to equate 'Asparśa' with Yoga *i. e. to say*, the characteristic with the thing the fruit with the process by which it is acquired. Śaṅkara seems to have taken that word as understood when he says *Yadyapīdamitthaṁ paramātmatattvaṁ asparśa ogo nāmāyaṁ* while commenting on this Kārikā and when he further introduces

the second Kārikā of the fourth chapter by the words *Adhunā advaitadarśanayogasya namaskārastutaye* etc. he seems to imply that it is the realisation of the non-dual essence itself which was intended to be called "Asparśayoga". As a matter of fact it is not so, for he has further made it clear that what he explains as Asparśayoga is not the fact of realisation of the non-dual essence but the process by which that realisation takes place because the principal characteristic of that process is that as the result of it the soul remains untouched by anything at any time. Hence he must be deemed to have used the word 'ayaṁ' in the Bhāṣya on the first Kārikā above-quoted in the sense of 'in this' or 'here', not in that of 'this' and to have used the compound word 'Advaitadarśana-yoga' in the Bhāṣya on the second in the sense of 'the Yoga which leads to the realisation of the non-dual essence' and the reason for doing so seems to be to establish a connection between the subject-matter of this Kārikā and that of the preceding ones.

7. Even if we take into consideration the nine Kārikās which follow no. 39 in the third chapter, the same conclusion seems to follow. Thus in the 40th he says that the state of fearlessness of a Jīvanmukta is dependent upon a control of the mind, in the 41st to 44th he gives a measure of the patience required in acquiring that control and draws attention to the pitfalls on the way, in the 45th he cautions the aspirant against being attached to the happiness which is experienced when the mind begins to acquire a balanced state and advises him to proceed to acquire a state of perfect equilibrium in which it remains completely steady like a lamp in a place where there is no breeze and says that Brahma is said to have been realised on the attainment of such steadiness, in the 47th he cites an opinion in support of that view and in the 48th winds up the exposition by saying that no soul is ever born because there is no reason which can be assigned for it individuality and that therefore the highest truth is that Brahma in which nothing is produced and in which no Vṛtti whatever arises. The reason for thus winding up the exposition is to warn aspirants against being led to believe that individual souls are produced from Brahma and return to its state by the remedy above-mentioned,

because such a belief is inconsistent with the Ajātivāda which the author has expounded in the previous chapters and which he has made perfectly intelligible by arguments and illustrations in the further chapter named "Alāta-śānti". This does not, however, exclude the possibility of Yoga practice. It only reduces it to the same kind of effort as is made in achieving any object outside the scope of philosophy and has therefore as much reality for the purpose of intercourse as the latter. Thus it is perfectly clear from Kārikās 40 to 46 also that the term 'Asparśayoga' has been used by the author not in the sense of a realisation of non-duality itself but in that of a specific kind of Upāsanā or mental exercise and that its peculiarity consists in making the mental arena clear of all objective and subjective ideas.

(IV) Is that a new species of Yoga?

8. The next question for consideration is whether this Asparśayoga is a new species of Yoga or it is one already known but named differently by Gauḍapāda. As to that he himself has not incorporated any Śruti texts in his Kārikās but as he has used the indeclinables 'Vai nāma' while mentioning that name it can be reasonably inferred that he meant that it was a familiar kind of Yoga. Śaṅkara too says in his Bhāṣya on G. K. III. 39 that this is well-known in the Upaniṣads and in that on G. K. IV. 2 that it is well-known by that name to the knowers of Brahma. He does not, however, cite any texts in support of that view at any of those places. In his gloss on the portion of the Bhāśya on G. K. III. 39 Ānandagiri cites one text namely *Na lipyate karmaṇā pāpakena* and indicates others by the term 'ādi' but that is in support of the meaning of the term Asparśa given by him and cannot therefore explain how the Asparśa-yoga can be said to be well-known.

9. But we need not despair of knowing in view of which texts of the Upaniṣads the author could have said so, for the Kārikās themselves furnish a clue to determine that. Thus a reference to Kārikās 40 to 48 of Chapter III thereof shows that the author has recommended thereby the cultivation of Vairāgya (non-attachment) and the practice of Abhyāsa (mental exercises) in order to get control over the mind. It can therefore

be inferred from that fact that these are the two principal characteristics of his Asparaśa Yoga. Such a Yoga is certainly not unknown to the Upaniṣads. In *Kaṭhopaniṣad* I. 2. 12 there is mention of an Adhyātmayoga and its *modus operandi* has been described in details further up to the end of the sixth Valli. In *Muṇḍakopanisad* III. 2-6 there is again a mention of a Sannyāsa-Yoga and it has been further up explained therein what constitutes it. In *S'vetāśvataropanisad* I. 3. there is a similar mention of a Dhyānayoga and in VI. 13 thereof one of a Sāṁkhyayoga. These are not really distinct kinds of Yoga but only distinct designations of the same Yoga looked at from different view-points.

10. Nor does Yoga seem to be unknown to the authors of the Smṛti works primarily based upon the Upaniṣads. It is true that in *Brahmasūtra* II. 1. 3 there is a refutation of a doctrine propounded in a *Yogasmṛti*[1] but Śaṅkara commenting upon it says that the Sūtrakāra has done that not because Yoga was unknown to the Śruti but because some of the Tattvas such as Pradhāna and Mahat mentioned in the work on Sāṁkhya philosophy on which the Yogasmṛti has been based are unknown to the Śruti and that being so the author was of the view that correct knowledge cannot arise from such a treatise. Further from the mere fact that there is no direct reference to any Yaugic exercises in the *Brahmasūtra*, it does not follow that Bādarāyaṇa was of the view that according to the Vedāntas it was not necessary to follow any course of such exercises. The term Saṁśodhana occurring in *Br.* III. 2. 24 has been explained by Śaṅkara as meaning an " Anuṣṭhāna of the nature of Bhakti, Dhyāna, Praṇidhāna, etc." Moreover it is implied in the Udgītha, S'āṅḍilya, Dahara and other Vidyās discussed in *Br.* III. 3. Even in Book IV of that work Yoga practice has been referred to at several places either expressly or impliedly. The Abhyāsa yoga or Ātmasaṁyama-yoga which has been expounded in Bhagawadgītā VI which Śaṅkara calls 'Dhyāna

1. The *Yogasmṛti* here referred to does not seem to be Patañjali's *Yogadarśana* because the first Sūtra quoted from it in Śaṅkara's Bhāsya namely *Atha tattvadarśanopayo yogaḥ* is not the same as the first Sūtra in that Darśana.

yoga' has the same characteristics–Abhyāsa and Vairāgya as the Asparśayoga of Gauḍapāda. The elaborate exposition of the *modus operandi* in the former of which the principal features are Abhyāsa and Vairāgya according to VI. 35 is in no way inconsistent with the main features of the latter Yoga and the goal to be reached according to both is identical and the only difference is that an intermediate stage is described in the Gītā but not in the Kārikā. In Pāda I of the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali also there is a description of a course of mental discipline, having Abhyāsa and Vairāgya as its principal characteristics, to be gone through by men who have a Samāhita citta (steady mind) and of the fruit resulting from it and in the second Pāda thereof there is a scientific and minute exposition of the physical exercises and materials besides the mental exercises consisting of Tapas, Svādhyāya and Īśvarapraṇidhāna which are recommended to be resorted to by those who have a Vyutthita citta (an unsteady mind) in order that they may be prepared for the higher course recommended in the previous Pāda. There is of course a difference as to the goal to be reached and the nature of God between the *Upaniṣads*, *Bhagawadgītā* and *Brahma-śūtra* on the one hand and the *Yogasūtra* on the other but there cannot be any doubt as to the definition of 'Yoga' as *Citta-vṛttinirodhaḥ* in Y. I. 1. 2 and as to the principal means for attaining it namely Abhyāsa and Vairāgya mentioned in Y. I. 1. 12 and the alternative means Iśvarapraṇidhāna expounded in Y. I. 1. 23–28 having been based upon the relevant Sruti texts. Therefore one can conclude with certainty that the Asparśa Yoga under consideration is not a new species of Yoga but an old one with a distinctive designation which has reference not to the means for accomplishing it as in the case of the terms 'Dhyāna-yoga', 'Sāmkhya-yoga', 'Sannyāsa-yoga' etc., but to the objective to be kept in view by the practiser namely complete detachment from the products of Avidyā, mental as well as material, as in the case of the term 'Adhyātma-yoga'.

(V) Is there a place for such a Yoga in Śaṅkara's Jñānavāda ?

11. The last question to which I address myself is whether Śaṅkara, who is well-known as a strong advocate of the view that Mokṣa takes place only as the result of knowledge of the true

nature of the self, admits that there is a place for the practice of Yoga of the above type in his said doctrine. At first it might be thought that he could not have done so and many people confidently assert that he does not. My study of a few of his principal works has however convinced me that he does. In order to be convinced of this one must read patiently and reflect over his Bhāṣyas on *Brahma-sūtra* II. 1. 3 and *Bh. G.* V. 27 and VI. 1. In that on *Bh. G.* VI. 1. he has called the Dhyānā-yoga an "Antaraṅga" of "Samyagdarśana". In *Aparokṣānubhūti* 101–44 he having given this process the name 'Rāja-yoga' has expounded each of its Aṅgas, whose names are the same as those of the Aṣṭāṅga-yoga expounded in Yogasūtra II. There can be no doubt that this Rājayoga is the same as Nididhyāsana or Parisaṁkhyāna, which is the third stage in the Jñāna-mārga, the first two being Śravaṇa (study of the scripture) and Manana (reflection over what one has gathered from the study). In order that this may not appear inconsistent, he has in his Bhāṣya on G. K. III. 40 made it clear that no practice is required by those who are of the nature of Brahma and look upon the mind and the senses as imaginary substances like a rope in a snake and therefore as having no separate existence apart from Brahma, but that those Yogis who are of the low or the middling type cannot attain the Śānti known as Mokṣa without resorting to some remedy and that therefore in their case, it is dependent upon a control of their mind.

12. Now since Yogis of the first type were few and far between in the whole history of Advaita doctrine it is crystal clear that even according to Śaṅkara the statement that Mokṣa takes place through knowledge unaccompanied or unsupplemented by any kind of Yoga must be taken to be true only in the case of an ideal individual and that in the case of all practical men in all ages the right view even according to him is that knowledge derived from the scripture or a Guru is not enough by itself for reaching the goal but must be supplemented by the Yoga which consists of a control of the mind as stated in this work or in the *Bhagawadgītā* and the concentration thereof on the true essence without which the eradication of Vāsanā (latent desire) is impossible and so long as that has not taken place it would be self-deception to believe oneself to be a *Brahmavit*.

ON THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF SAṀSĀRA

(H. G. Narahari)

It is a painful fact that we have to admit that the origin of the theory of Transmigration is still something of a problem, and that, though numerous views have been advanced in this direction, there is no settled opinion that is as yet available. The views that have been hitherto brought forward can be broadly divided into two classes: the first, which denies the origin of this doctrine in Vedic literature, attempts to seek its origin among the aboriginal inhabitants of India; and the second, less extremist in character, is insistent upon finding the traces of the doctrine in the early stages of Vedic belief alone. Two tendencies are perceptible among the followers of the latter view; some of them feel that it is inconsistent to think that the eschatology of the *Saṁhitā* period admits of a belief in this theory also, and hence trace the origin of the doctrine of Transmigration to the *Brāhmaṇas*; but others who are less conservative in nature feel that, if not these two doctrines in entirety, at least the conceptions that later led to the formulation of the theory of *Saṁsāra*, are all clearly seen even in the early stages of Vedic belief, that is to say, even in the *Saṁhitās*.

Macdonell[1] and other exponents of the same view feel that it is impossible to think that the Vedic Indians, whose attitude towards life was joyous and optimistic, could formulate a theory like the doctrine of *Saṁsāra*, which is so thoroughly opposed to their creed. But the fact is undeniable that, as early as the sixth cent. B. C. when Buddhism arose, the doctrine of Transmigration was, in its full-fledged form, already established on a sure foundation. These scholars, therefore, feel that the Aryan settlers might have received "the first impulse in this direction from the aboriginal inhabitants of India".[2] Feeling, however, that among these aboriginal races "the notion of transmigration does not go beyond a belief in the continuance

1. A.A. Macdonell—"A History of Sanskrit Literature" p. 387.
2. Ibid, p. 387 f.

of human existence in animals and trees",[1] *Macdonell* and others modify, a little, their statement that the Aryans might have borrowed the doctrine of Transmigration from the savage tribes. While they would hold that the theory of Transmigration is an alien doctrine, borrowed by the Aryans from the aboriginal tribes, they would also add that the Aryans "certainly deserve the credit of having elaborated out of it the theory of an unbroken chain of existences, intimately connected with the moral principle of requital".[2]

In direct opposition to the above view, we have the opinion of another band of scholars who maintain that it is more natural to expect and to seek the origin of this doctrine in the beginnings of Indian belief, rather than to indulge in such stray fancies as the influence of the aboriginal neighbours upon the Vedic Aryans. These scholars are convinced that, even though it may not be possible to find, in the earlier Vedic texts, the doctrine of Transmigration in its full-fledged form, it is still possible to seek therein definitely the various conceptions that led to the formulation of the theory. *Weber* and *Deussen* think that the real beginnings of the doctrine of Transmigration are to be seen only in the *Brāhmaṇas*, and that belief in this theory is inconsistent with the spirit of early Vedic eschatology.[3] And other scholars, chiefly Indian,[4] hold that a gradual growth of the doctrine can be traced even from the period of the *Saṁhitas*. But both, however, start with the conviction that it is fantastic to consider that the doctrine of Transmigration has been borrowed from the aboriginal tribes.

It has been indisputably accepted that the *locus classicus* of the doctrine of Transmigration is to be found only in the *Upaniṣads*, and that the Upaniṣadic theory has evolved in various

1. Ibid. p. 388.
2. Ibid.
3. Z. D.M. G.—IX. 243, 308.—cited by J. Muir—'Original Sanskrit Texts, Vol. 5.—pp. 322-23 ; and P. Deussen—'Philosophy of the Upaniṣads' p. 32.
4. Dr. C. Kunhan Raja—'Cultural Heritage of India'—Vol. I.—pp. 29-31 ; also R. D. Ranade—'A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy'—p. 146 f.

forms in popular literature, in the Epics, in the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and in the sacred texts of the Buddhists and the Jains.[1]

It may look at the very outset that belief in the theory of Transmigration is incompatible with the spirit of early Vedic Religion which teems with optimism. A spirit of healthy joy in the life on earth seems to be the leading characteristic of the religion of the early Aryans. If they worshipped the great gods, it was not immortality or Heaven that was their aim: they craved for a long life of a hundred autumns, for heroic sons, and for cattle (RV. IV. 50. 6.). 'May we live for a hundred autumns' is the oft-repeated boon that the Vedic people desire from their propitious gods. (RV. VII. 66. 16d.)

Nor were they afraid to die, for, even after death, they went to a place which was not uncovetable. Their ancestors, who went long back (RV. X. 14. 7.), had prepared for them another place which was even more joyous. Yama, the king, was the first ever to die (RV. X. 14. 2.), and consequently, perhaps, he is the ruler of the dead (RV. X. 16. 9.). He has found a dwelling in the highest Heaven, and to this place, Yama, the assembler of people (RV. X. 14. 1.), admits all the dead. Here the dead man obtains a resting place (RV. X. 14. 9.), when recognised by Yama as his own (AV. XVIII. 2. 37.). The dead man traverses by the well-trodden path and reaches the abode of Yama, who sits beside a tree engaged in an everlasting bout with the gods (RV. X. 135. 1.). To this party the new-comer is a welcome guest (RV. X. 14. 8; X. 16. 5.). The moment the dead man enters this abode, his true home, he shakes off all his imperfections. He overcomes old age and other bodily frailties. He is united with a glorious body and passes a life of eternal enjoyment (RV. X. 14. 10.). He has entered a place where there are no lame or crooked of limb, and where the weak are no longer subject to pay tribute to the strong (AV. III. 29. 3.). It is a 'land overflowing with milk and honey', where there is eternal light and variety of enjoyment, where all people are equal and where pleasure is unrestrained.

1. *E. W. Hopkins*—J. R. A. S. (1906)—pp. 581-949; J R. A. S. (1907)—pp. (668-71); *Louis De la Valle Poussin*—'Legacy of India'—Ed. *G. T. Garratt*—p. 167; *M. Barth*—'Religions of India'—p. 147.

3

Heaven, therefore, is, to the Vedic people, no more than 'a glorified world of material joys '.[1]

So much for the destiny of the righteous. We will now consider the destiny of the wicked. If the virtuous people got Heaven as their reward after death, it is natural for us to expect some abode after death to those whose conduct on earth was wicked. There is no specific mention in the Ṛg-veda of any such abode for the wicked, and, if there are a few subtle references, we can only say with *Macdonell* that 'the evidence cannot be said to go beyond showing belief in a Hell as an underground darkness'.[2] This does not mean that the Vedic Aryans considered sin very lightly.

The sinner was always detected and punished even while living on earth. Varuṇa stands out as the custodian of Justice, watching the conduct of people and setting his spies everywhere for the purpose. As a reminder and punishment of sin, Varuṇa is described as inflicting disease. A member of the family of Vasiṣṭha was fettered with disease (*pāśa*) and the wise assured him that he must be a sinner, because his illness was proof that Varuṇa, who hates sin, was angry with him. The stanza RV. VII. 89. 6. seems to refer to dropsy as the favourite infliction of Varuṇa.[3] The victim supplicates for mercy that he may be relieved of the disease and saved from death—

"Since like one tottering I move,
O Slinger, like inflated skin,
Be gracious, Mighty Lord, and spare."

We, therefore, see that the Ṛg-vedic seers seem to be content with the punishment on earth for sin, for in the Ṛg-veda there is no specific mention of Hell as of Heaven. The Atharva-veda speaks, however, of the house below, the abode of female goblins and sorceresses (AV. II. 14. 3.) called *Narka-loka* (AV. XII. 4. 36.), in contrast with *Svarga-loka*, the Heavenly world, the realm of Yama.

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1. A. A. Macdonell—'Vedic Mythology'—p. 168.
2. Ibid.—p. 169.
3. cp. AITAREYA BRĀHMAṆA—VII. 33., where Varuṇa inflicts dropsy on Harścandra for breaking his promise.

And in this simple eschatology of the early Vedic Aryans, it would be inconsistent to attempt to find traces of belief in the doctrine of Transmigration. But still, however superfluous and absurd such an attempt may be, the attempt to seek in early Vedic eschatology, the genesis of the doctrine of Transmigration would not be so ridiculous. A careful study of early Vedic beliefs is capable of showing that, at least with the conceptions that later led to the formulation of the theory of *Saṁsāra*, the Vedic poets were not unfamiliar.

The doctrine of *Saṁsāra* is a complex conception, and while it involves within it more than one doctrine, there also exist a few doctrines which are presupposed by it. An attempt at an analysis of the doctrine would make this clear. When the doctrine of Transmigration holds that the individual is reborn after death and exists in other corporeal forms determined by his deeds on earth, it involves within it the Karma doctrine that every man must reap what he has sown, and that every action on earth shall have its result. The doctrines presupposed by it are the eternality of the soul, its continued existence even though its present body is destroyed, and that the soul is the doer and sufferer.

We will examine if we can find in the early stages of Vedic belief a knowledge of any of these conceptions, and if we should be successful in such an attempt, there can be no hesitation in asserting that the genesis of the doctrine of *Saṁsāra* can be traced to the early Aryan texts. Prof. R. D. Ranade cites hymns[1] from the I and X Mandalas of the Ṛgveda to show that "the three chief moments in the idea of Transmigration viz: the passage of the soul from the body, its habitation in other forms of existence like the plants or the waters, and even its return to the human form, are all implicitly found even so far back as the times of the Ṛg-veda."[2]

Besides these stanzas noticed by Prof. Ranade, there exists one other stanza in the Ṛg-veda which seems to prove that the Ṛg-vedic Aryans were familiar with some kind of Transmigra-

1. RV. I. 164. 31; X. 16. 3; and X. 58. (1-12).

2. R. D. Ranade—'A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy' pp. (147-52).

ion. The verse in question runs as follows—

Navo navo bhavati jāyamāno'hnām ketuḥ uṣasāmetyagram ।
Bhāgam devebhyo vidadhāti āyan pra candramāḥ tirate
dīrghamāyuḥ ॥"[1]

Griffith translates this stanza as follows :—

"He, born afresh, is new and new for-ever ; ensign of days, ie goes before the mornings. Coming, he orders for the gods heir portion ; the Moon prolongs the days of our existence."

It is clear that in this stanza, the Moon is described, and hat the Vedic poet seems to think that the disappearance of the Moon on the New-moon day is only because he is dead. And when the Moon is visible the next day, the seer says that the dead Moon is reborn. From this, the inference is inevitable that the vedic poets did have an idea of survival after death ; only, we have no evidence to say that they believed that this rebirth had any connection with *Karma*.

The *Brāhmaṇas* seem to go a step further. It is their aim to prescribe rituals, and while they reward him that accomplishes, they do not hesitate to punish him that omits. The *S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa* says "For whatever food a man eats in this world, by the very same is he eaten again (*pratyatti*), in the other".[2] In another place the same Brāhmaṇa says—"For indeed they place him on the balance in yonder world ; and whichever of the two sinks down, that will he follow, whether it be the good or the evil".[3] Statements like these which speak of inevitable retribution are abundant in the *Brāhmaṇas*. The immediate inference that is inevitable from such statements, is that the *Brāhmaṇas* knew that each act on earth has its result, whether it is good or bad, and the doer must suffer for it. Only, it is not specified in these texts how the man is punished.

A similar idea occurs in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* also, where it is stated that the odour of a man's virtuous act spreads in all directions, as is the fragrance of a full-blown blossom, when it

1. RV. X. 85. 19 ; found also in AV. VII. 81. 2., XIV. 1. 24.; and Maitrāyaṇīya Saṁhitā—p. 181. 5.—Ed. by Roth and Bohtlingk.
2. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa—XII. 9. 1. 1.—S. B. E.—Vol. XLIV.—p. 260
3. Ibid.—XI. 2. 7. 33.—S. B. E.—Vol. XIIV.—p. 45.

is wafted by the wind. ("Yathā vṛkṣasya saṁpuṣpitasya durād gandho vāti, evam puṇyasya karmaṇaḥ gandho vāti).[1] Here also as in the *Brāhmaṇa*, the idea prevails that a man must suffer the consequence of his deeds.

From what we have seen so far, we find that, in the texts earlier than the *Upaniṣads*, we have the idea of survival in other bodily forms existing unconnected with the theory of Karma, and the theory of Karma existing unconnected with the idea of survival in other corporeal forms. Almost all the material that is necessary for the formulation of the conception of *Saṁsāra* seems to be available in the earlier texts, and there is every likelihood that the Upaniṣadic seers might have been led to consolidate all these floating conceptions to formulate the theory of *Saṁsāra*, which forms, even to this day, the leading gospel of an entire nation.

There seems to be, therefore, no justification to the view which denies the indigenous origin of the doctrine of transmigration, and which holds that it is un-Aryan in origin and that it was borrowed by the Vedic Aryans from their aboriginal neighbours. Instead of rushing to such unsupportable conclusions, there seems to be greater justification in holding that the doctrine of *Saṁsāra* has its origin among the Aryans themselves, though its *locus classicus* cannot be accurately found in any text earlier than the *Brāhmaṇas* or the *Upaniṣadas*.

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1 Taittirīya Āraṇyaka—X. 9.—p. 714 (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series).

CHANDRADŪTA OF JAMBŪ KAVI
WITH
THE COMMENTARY OF ŚĀNSTISŪRI

(N. V. Athaley)

This small poem of 23 verses has been secured by this library some five years ago, along with some other manuscripts of Jaina literature from Śri Pūjya Pannalal Jati of Mandasour (Gwalior). It is legibly written in Jaina Nāgari Script along with three other Khaṇḍa-kāvyas on straw paper containing only ten leaves and is of the size 10 × 4 inches. The right upper edges are damaged by water and are also moth-eaten. All these four Kāvyas are serially given with their commentaries, the names of which are quoted below with the names of authors and commentators with the numbers of verses against each :—

	Name	Author	Com.	No. of verses
1.	Vṛndāvana	Minañka	Śāntisūri	52
2.	Ghaṭakharpara	Ghaṭakhapara	,,	21
3.	Meghābhudaya	Minañka	,,	38
4.	Candradūta	Jambū	,,	23
5.	Śivabhadra Kāvya	Vṛtti	,,	upto 11th verse

It will be clearly seen from the above statement that the last Ms. wants in end. None of these Kāvyas appear to be printed upto now. Though the MS. is injured as stated above, its entire portion is readable and safe. The scribe has used red ink for borders, numbers of ślokas, colophons, for marking stops and in writing the beginning letters of the verses. Marginal notes in small type are also occasionally found. Slight mistakes appear in it committed by the scribe. Numbers of leaves are marked on the right downside corners of each leaf in red ink. There is no way to understand the antiquity of the MS. except the paper and script. The name of one माणिक्यसुंदर with the word खरतरगच्छेना० is found at the end of the Vṛndāvana-kāvya·Vṛtti and from this alone we can guess that Māṇikya Sundara who scribed hese MSS. belonged to Kharatara Gachha (Vihāra).

The author of Candradūta-Jambū Kavi is also known by the name of Jambūgurū. In the 7th Guccha of Kāvyamāla printed by the Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay, this name of Jambūgurū-Kavi is given under the Jinaśataka. So it seems that this learned author has compiled some other works too. The Jaina Granthāvali, published by Śri Jaina Śwetāmbara Conference, Bombay, Vikrama era 1965 enlists this Kāvya on page 219, No. 5 as चंद्रदूत काव्य, श्लो. का. २३ कर्ता जम्बू कवि C, पा. १ जे. A. H. but mentions nothing about his compilation time or residence. Aufrecht's information in Part I, Page 180[a] is mainly based on Peterson's report of Operations in search of Sanskrit MSS. in Bombay Circle (Part III 11[a], 292.).

In the colophons of Vṛndārana and Meghābhydaya Kāvya Vṛttis, mentioned below, the names of श्रीवर्द्धमानाचार्य and पूर्णतल्ल-गच्छ are given :—

i इति श्री पूर्णतल्ल गच्छ संबंधि श्रीवर्द्धमानाचार्य स्थापित श्रीशांतिसूरि विरचिता वृंदावन काव्यवृत्तिः समाप्ता ॥ ६ ॥

ii इति श्री पूर्ण तल्लगच्छ संबंधि श्रीवर्धमानाचार्य स्वपदस्थापित श्री शांति सूरि विरचिता मेघाभ्युदय लघुकाव्य वृत्तिः समाप्ता ॥ ६ ॥

It can be said from these colophons that Vardhamāna appointed Śāntisūri as his successor at Parṇatallagachha. The Jain Granthāvali informs us that there were two sūris—one वादिवेताल शांति सूरि and the other the present शांति सूरि. Vādivetāla's expiring Samvat is quoted in this Granthāvali as Samvat 1096 i.e. A.D. 1039. While that of Śāntisūri, who also compiled the Prākṛt पृथ्वीचंद्रचरित्र (along with many other works) is quoted to be the Samvat 1161 i.e. 1112 A.D. Vardhamāna wrote several works. Some of which contain the exact Samvats with numbers of ślokas as given below :—

i	धर्मरत्नकरंडक	९५००	श्लो. सं. ११७२
ii	मनोरमाचरित्र	१५०००	,, ,, ११४०
iii	आदिनाथचरित्र	११०००	,, ,, ११६०
iv	वासुपूज्य-स्वामिचरित्र		,, ,, ११९९
v	गणरत्नमहोदधि		,, ,, ११९७

After calculating the period of years from these Samvats we get the exact time of वर्धमान as A. D. 1083 to 1142 and this

includes the year 1112 A.D. It is, therefore, clear that Vardhamāṇa and Śāntisūri belong to the same period—the 4th quarter of the 11th to the 2nd quarter of the 12th centuries. Śāntisūri was a disciple of Śrī Vardhamānācārya of Parṇatallagucaha as stated in the colophons noted above and so the time of Jambū Kavi goes behind the 11th century and it will remain so, if the present Commentator of Candradūta is the same as I suppose, as long as no other reliable evidence comes forward.

The metre of the text is Mālinī and the figure used throughout is alliteration. To understand the ideas of the verses clearly without the aid of a commentary is rather difficult. The commentary of Śāntisūri is an easy and clear production of the text. The verses from 2 to 12 are accented only on the top of पदा's with up-ward straight red lines and with peculiar marks as given below :—

काले स्तब्धताऽधौर्यैन्तं

and these appear to be chiefly given for having the clue of different words easily.

The beginning verse addresses the peoples of the world to remember the Lord (Viṣṇu or Anant Tīrthaṁkara of Jains) who alone is able to release them from all sorts of worldly troubles. The Kāvya begins thus :—

Text :— यदतिशितशि[श]राग्र प्रस्तमापन्नदुःखं
ज्यजति जगदशेषं दीनमापन्नदुःखं ॥
स्मरत तदतनूनं सर्वदाशासनस्य
प्रभुम(र)जरमनंतं श्रीभिदाशासनस्य ॥ १ ॥

Com. :— ॥ ६ ॥ Ed. ॥ जंबू नामा कविश्चंद्रदूतकाव्यकरणे प्रवर्तमान आदौ मं[ग]लार्थं इष्टदेवतायै नमस्कारमाह ॥ यदति० हे लोकाः स्मर [त] ध्यायत। कमनंतं। अनंताभिधानं तीर्थ[ं]करं। यद्वालोकापेक्षयाऽनंतं वासुदेवं। कीदृशं द्वयं जरावयोर्हानिः सा विद्यते यस्याऽसावजरस्तं। तथा प्रभुं स्वामिनं नायकं। कस्य शासनस्य। शिष्यन्ते कृष्यन्ते जीवादयः पदार्था येन यस्मिन् वा शासनं आगमः तस्य। विष्णुपक्षे च शासनस्य [ा]देशस्याज्ञायाः कीदृशस्य द्वयस्य श्रीभिदाशासनस्य दूषणद्वारेण भिंदंति निराकुर्वंति ये ते श्रीभिदो बौद्धादयः तेषमाशामनोरथोऽभीष्टकरणतांऽस्यति क्षिपतीति तत्तथोक्तं तस्य। सकलपरवादिजिनमतनिराकर्तृतिरस्कारस्येत्यर्थः। आदेशस्य च। कीदृशं श्रियं लक्ष्मीं। हरेर्भिदंति तिरस्कुर्वंति विदारयंतीति

ये ते । श्रीभिदोदानवास्तेषामाशा तांस्यतीति । तत्तथोक्तं । तस्य । निःशेषाऽसुरमनोरघनाशकस्येत्यर्थः । तथा तद्ऽतनूनं । न विद्यते तनुः शरीरं यस्याऽऽसोऽतनुरनंगः । स चासौऽतनुश्च तदतनुस्तेनऊनोहीनस्तं च ऊनयति परिजहातीति तदतनूनं कामरहितं इत्यर्थः । कथं स्मरत सर्वदा सर्वकालं । कः सः अतनुः । यदतिशितशिराग्रग्रस्तं जगदापत् विपत् न त्यजति न मुंचति । यस्यातनोरतिशितानि । अतिशयतीक्ष्णाणि यानि शराग्राणि बाणमुखानि । तैग्रस्तं विदारितं कामबाणविद्धमित्यर्थः । कीदृश जगदुःखंदुष्टानि खानि इंद्रियाणि यस्य स । तं दुखं दुष्टेंद्रियं । तथा शेषं सर्वं । तथा आपन्नदुरकं प्राप्तकष्ट[म]त एव दीनं करुणावहं ॥ १ ॥

End of the text :–इति विविधवचोभिश्चंद्रमायामवत्यां
गदित उदयमानो दीनमायामवत्यां ॥
कथयितुमिवतस्मै तूर्णमध्वन्यबध्वः [बध्वा]
सरति रतिमिलाभृत्यंबराध्वन [न्य]ब[व]ध्वा ॥ २३ ॥

Com :— इति चंद्रदूतनामकाव्यं चतुर्थं ॥ ४ ॥

इति चंद्रमा शशी सरति गच्छति किं कर्तुमिव कथयितुमिव कस्मै तस्मै प्रियाय । क्व अबराध्वनि आकाशमार्गे । किं कृत्वाऽबध्वाऽकृत्वा । कां रतिं प्रीतिं । क्वइलाभृति पर्वते । ऽस्ताचले उदयाचले वा । कथं सरति तूर्णं शीघ्रं । कथं भूतः चंद्रमा गदित उक्तः । कयाऽध्वन्यवध्वा पथिकभार्य(ा)या । कस्यां यामवत्यां रात्रौ । कीदृश्यां द्रयमवात्यां दीर्घायां । कीदृशः उदयमानः उदयंगच्छन् । कथं गदितोदीनं दैन्ययुक्तं । कैर्गदितोविविधवचोभिर्नानावचनैः । कैर्विविधवचोभिः । कथमिति आदिकाव्यप्रभृतिपूर्वोक्तवचनैः । कथमित्येवं । शेषं पूर्वोक्तं ॥ २३ ॥

चंद्रदूतस्य काव्यस्य यथाबोधं कृता मया ॥
वृत्तिर्जनावबोधाय शोधनीया सुपंडितैः ॥

Colophon :— इति श्रीशांतिसूरिविरचिता चंद्रदूतकाव्यवृत्तिः समाप्ता ॥

In the ending verse, given after the commentary, Śāntisūri says that he prepared the commentary of Candradūta Kāvya as per his perception for the knowledge of the people and that it should be rectified if necessary by the good Pandits. The text begins with the second verse and ends at the 23rd the last verse The whole description belongs to a Virahiṇī—a separated woman. who observing the rising moon, expressed her ideas before it in order that (the moon) should convey them to her lover who is away from her. The Rasa is Karuṇa-Vipralambhākhya Sṛngāra and the poem is a Khaṇḍa Kāvya. This MS. appears to be not less than three centuries old and deserves publication.

A RARE COMMENTARY ON NYĀYAKUSUMĀÑJALI

(E. P. Radhakrishnan)

Nyāyakusumāñjali as a very important work requires no more introduction to the scholarly world ; because the host of commentaries written on it is sufficient testimony to the importance of it. Among the various commentaries on it, Dr. Aufrecht[1] mentions one by Vāmadhvaja also. Vāmadhvaja's commentary is very rare and even unknown. Aufrecht mentions only one manuscript of this in the late Paṇdit Rādhākṛṣna's library in Lahore. The late Mr. C. D. Dalal in his Report on the search for manuscripts in the Jain Bhandars at Pattan, mentions one *Nyāyakusumāñjalinibandha*, a commentary on *Kusumāñjali* by Paramapāśupatācārya Vāmadhvajācārya. No other notice of this rare manuscript is made up till now.

We are fortunate to know that a complete manuscript of this work is to be found in the Mss. collection of the Sanghavī Pādā in Pattan[2]. Unfortunately much about the author or the nature of the work cannot be said now, without actually perusing the manuscript itself. Anyway I shall content myself, for the present, by drawing the attention of scholars to a few details about the work and its author.

In the second introductory verse Vāmadhvaja mentions that one Virūpākṣa was his preceptor.

भुवनत्रितये यस्य कीर्त्यां पल्लवितं विभोः ।
तं नमामि विरूपाक्षं गुरुं वाक्कायमानसैः ॥

In the end also he says that he composed his *Kusumāñjalivṛtti* after knowing the principles correctly from Virūpākṣa.

यस्मिन् जल्पति वाद्यविक्रमवशात् वक्रत्वमत्यद्भुतं
बिभ्राणास्तदुपाधि[ये]षडपि ते तर्काः पुरो वादिनाम् ।
तस्मात् तत्त्वमवेत्य तात्त्विकगुरोः श्रीमद्विरूपाक्षतः
चक्रे वृत्तिमिमां समाहितमतिः वामध्वजो धीरधीः ॥

1. Cat. Catalogorum I, p. 307 b.
2. Catalogue of MSS. at Pattan—Vol. I. by Mr. L. B. Gandhi, G.O.S. lxxvi, p. 103.

This stanza makes one infer also that Virūpākṣa was a great dialectician.

Vāmadhvaja describes his work as a short ṭippaṇa or ṭīkā, elucidating some difficult points and explaining some knotty problems :

विषमग्रन्थदुर्ग्रन्थिविपाटनपुरःसरम् ।
वामध्वजेन संकेतः क्रियते कुसुमाञ्जलौ ॥

This work of Vāmadhvaja seems to have been written after the appearance of many commentaries on *Kusumāñjali.* Vāmadhvaja seems to be aware of this and humbly acknowledges the services of his previous writers. Still he says that his own work is not devoid of any new material. He brings in a happy simile to illustrate the point. Though the deities (Devas) have long ago churned the ocean and carefully removed the jewels from it, is the ocean completely deprived of all the valuable stones ? In a similar manner, *Kusumāñjali*, though commented on by many previous writers, is not completely devoid of materials for new lines of thought. Thus from the author's promise we are to suppose that his commentary presents a new approach towards the interpretation of *Kusumāñjali.*

यद्यप्यस्य विवेचितानि बहुशः तत्त्वानि तज्ज्ञैर्जनैः
मद्ग्रन्थे ननु पिष्टपेषणमतिः कार्या तथाप्यत्र न ।
रत्नानि त्रिदशैः यद्प्यवहितैः निर्मथ्य पाथोनिधेः
आकृष्टानि तथापि जातु किमसौ रत्नैः भवत्युज्झितः ? ॥

The author himself characterises his work as one which clearly points out the realistic principles of Nyāya to people who are afflicted by the sorrow of Saṁsāra and whose eyes (may mean both eyes of vision and eyes of knowledge) are sealed up so to say by the darkness of mithyā-jñāna.

मिथ्याज्ञानतमिस्रमुद्रितदृशः संसारदुःखाकुलान्
लोकान् दर्शयितुं सुमार्गमिता न्यायागमैः व्यञ्जिता ।
श्रीवामध्वजनामधेयमुनिना विद्यावतामर्जिता
टीकेयं कुसुमाञ्जलेः विरचिता चेतश्चमत्कारिणी ॥

Thus the author seems to make a promise to attempt to clear off this darkness and open out some new light into the realism of Nyāya, thus enabling thinkers to realise the true

doctrine which would help them to get free from the eternal bondage of Saṁsāra.

In the colophons his name is found as Vāmeśvaradhvaja. From the colophon of the 5th pariccheda[1] we are able to know that he was a follower of the pāśupata school of thought and a leading exponent of the pāśupata doctrines.[2]

Now from Vāmadhvaja's own references, we know that one Virūpākṣa was his guru. No other details about this Virūpākṣa are known. Can this Virūpākṣa, in all probability be the same as Virūpākṣa Śarman Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇācārya, who composed in 1531 A. D.[3] a commentary on *Devīmāhātmya*, entitled Tattvadīpikā?[4] This Virūpākṣa also seems to be identical with the Virūpākṣanāthapāda, author of the *Virūpākṣapañcāśat*, a small work on the pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism, in 50 verses. As mentioned by MM. Gaṇapati Śāstrin, this work closely follows the pratyabhijñā-darśana as propounded by Mādhava in this *Sarvadars'anasaṅgraha.* The combined effect of all these shows that Virūpākṣa lived somewhere in the middle of the 16th century A. D. and hence his disciple, Vāmadhvaja can be assumed to have flourished towards the close of the 16th century.

This date of Vāmadhvaja is likely to get further support from the following fact also. In a post colophon of the manuscript in the Pattan Catalogue some details are given regarding that particular manuscript.

स्वस्ति परमभट्टारक-परमेश्वर-परमशैवसप्रक्रियोपेतमहाराजाधिराजमहासामन्ताधिपतिः राज्ञा श्रीयुवराजदेवसभुज्यमान चौसानगरावस्थिते महामहोपाध्यायमिश्र-

1. इति परमपाशुपताचार्यपण्डित-श्रीवामेश्वरध्वजविरचिते न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलिनिबन्धने पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः ।

2. Vāmadhvaja is also the author of a commentary called Pañcikā or nibandha on Udayana's *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*. An incomplete copy of this commentary is available in the Madras Govt. MSS. Library, No. R. 3377 b.

3. नेत्रबाणश्रुतिग्लौभिः (1453) गणिते शकवत्सरे ।
अकारि चण्डिकाटीका श्रीविरूपाक्षशर्मणा ॥

See Mitra Notices Vol. VI. p. 211.

4. Cat. Catalogorum I, p. 579 b.

5. Published in Triv. Sans. Series, 9, with the commentary of Vidyācakravartin.

स्तलेमाणे सुत उपाध्याय श्री महादेवस्य पाठार्थं तीरभुक्ति सं० कर्णकुलालङ्कार **ठकुरश्रीमाधवेन** लिखितमिदं यथा दृष्टं तथा लि......

This speaks that the copy of this manuscript was written by one Mādhav Ṭhakkura of Tirhut (Tīrabhukti) for the study of one Mahādeva Upādhyāya, son of Mm Stalemane Miśra, who was a resident of the city of *Causā*, ruled by king Yuvarājadeva. No historical information about the king Yuvarājadeva is known at present. If any fact can be made out from the history of Tirhut, it may be of help in fixing the date of Vāmadhvaja also.

The fact that Vāmadhvaja was a staunch Śaivite would justify his being the disciple of Virūpākṣa, who was a Śaivite and author of the *Virūpākṣapañcāśat*. The comparatively late date (end of the 16th century) for Vāmadhvaja also receives striking support when the author himself says that there were many commentaries on *Kusumāñjali* before he wrote his ṭīkā (See the stanza quoted above : यद्यप्यस्य विवेचितानि बहुशः etc.)

THE PROBLEM OF EXPERIENCE IN SĀṄKHYA-YOGA METAPHYSICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO VĀCASPATI AND VIJÑĀNABHIKṢU

(S. K. Saksena)

It has been a difficult problem to justify experience and knowledge on the admittedly extreme dualism of 'Puruṣa' and 'Prakṛti' in the systems of Sāṅkhya-Yoga. It is accepted on all hands, that according to the orthodox Sāṅkhya-Yoga metaphysics, the 'Puruṣa' and the 'Prakṛti' are originally outside the realm of experience, prior to which, neither the 'Puruṣa' is the enjoyer or knower, nor is the 'Prakṛti' enjoyed and the 'known'. The 'Puruṣa' is never an experiencer or a direct seer, for he is always a 'Kevalin' and a 'driṁmātra'[1], and the 'Prakṛti' too, waits to be intelligised by the 'Puruṣa' before it can be seen or experienced. For the sake of clarity let us imagine for a moment that 'Puruṣa' and 'Prakṛti' stand on two opposite extremes, both possessing only the capacities of being a 'seer' and a 'seen', and of being a subject and an object, but as yet not being either the actual seer and the seen of experience or the subject and the object of knowledge.

Now, starting from the transcendental point of an experienceless potentiality, the question is, how do the mere transcendental potentialities of 'dṛśi' and 'dṛśya' come to be modified into the empirical actualities of the seer and the seen which necessitates the 'Puruṣa's' taking upon himself, attributes and characteristics which do not really belong to him in his 'svarūpa'. In other words, how is experience at all possible and how is the 'original fall' from the transcendental 'Puruṣa' to the empirical knower and feeler, is to be explained. This difficult question is S. Y. becomes more so, when we remember, as we must, that out of the two partners of the polarity of experience, it is only the one, i.e., the 'Prakṛti' alone that can be modified, for the other, viz: the 'Puruṣa' is held to be ever unmodifiable, 'apariṇāmin'.[2]

We shall here trace in brief the history of the attempt to explain experience in this particular system. Beginning with the

1. Y. S. 2. 20, 2. 23, 24, 25., 3. 35.   2. Y. S. 4. 18.

Sūtras of Patañjali we can successively point to four notable attempts in the Yoga-system to explain the supposed experience which remains even in the last resort, unexplained.

In the first stage of the 'Sūtras' it is more the transcendental and the unattached nature of the 'puruṣa' that is stressed rather than the experience of the 'puruṣa' that is explained. We are just told that there occurs experience when there is a *confusion* and a lack of discrimination between the natures of the two absolutely different and apart 'Śaktis' of 'dṛśi' and 'dṛśya'. Nothing more is said except the declaration (which forms the basis of our present problem) that the 'puruṣa' exists in two conditions, the one of his true 'svarūpa', in which he exists before confusion and after discrimination, and the other the untrue one of the 'sārūpya' with the 'vṛttis' which he erroneously takes upon himself under confusion.[1] How exactly does this lack of discrimination occur is left unexplained. If the 'puruṣa' is in reality not a seer but only a capacity of seeing, a 'dṛśiśakti', and if the 'prakṛti' is not originally an actual 'seen' but only a capacity of being seen, then the causes of the turning of the mere potentialities of seeing and being seen, into their empirical actualities is to be further investigated.

There is given, of course, the foremost reason 'hetu' of this big modification in the dogma of the 'puruṣārtha',[2] or the purpose of the 'Puruṣa' which has anyhow to be effected, but the hypothesis of 'puruṣārtha', is more of the nature of an ultimate axiom than an immediate cause. It can further be asked as to how does 'puruṣārtha' bring about a change in the essential natures of the 'puruṣa' and the 'prakṛti'? The answer again is:—by causing a mutual confusion between the essential attributes of each other. Here ends the first stage of explanation in the 'Sūtras', but this oft-repeated theory of 'Avidyā'[3] or lack of discrimination has obviously to be worked out further.

An explanation of the confusion between the opposed natures of the 'Sattva' and the 'Puruṣa' is developed in the 'Bhāṣya' out of the hints of the 'Sūtras' by a theory of "contact by proximity", 'sannidhimātreṇa', which forms the second stage of the attempt. It is held, that a mere proximity of the two

1. Y. S. 1. 3-4. 2. Y. S. 4. 34. 3. Y. S. 2. 24.

which is the most immediate cause of the potentialities turning into actualities, endows the 'puruṣa' with a quality of 'ownership', 'svāmin', and the 'Prakṛti' with a quality of the 'owned', 'sva', so that, through a misbelief, the 'Puruṣa' takes upon himself the modifications that belong really to the 'Prakṛti' exactly as one takes upon himself the loss or gain that actually occurs to what he owns. If the cows of Caitra die, he takes upon himself the qualities of poverty.[1] Similarly, the king takes upon himself the victory or defeat actually occurring to his soldiers.[2]

The implied meaning of these illustrations clearly is, that Caitra is not poor in his own 'svarūpa' by the death of his cows, and the king, directly and in his own 'svarūpa' is neither a winner nor a loser. And though it cannot be denied that the *empirical* self of Caitra is poorer by the death of his cows and that the king *does* lose and win by the defeat and victory of his army, yet what is meant is, that there is another and a truer self of Caitra and the king, which is not affected by these incidents happening within the zone of their 'ownership'. The degree of this *affection* to the owner, by what happens to the owned, depends on the degree of confusion and consequent identification between the natures of the 'owner' and the 'owned'.

It is affirmed, that through a gradual process of destruction of this lamentable confusion brought about by an inevitable proximity, the true nature of the 'Puruṣa' can be re-gained which then, would not be that of an 'owner' or of a 'pratyayānupaśyah', but only of a 'kevalin', and 'dṛśimātraḥ'. We are, however, here not concerned with how this reverse process of the 'isolation' of the 'puruṣa' is effected, but with the earlier process of how the original 'isolation' is destroyed into an actual experience of seeing and enjoying ; for, the original metaphysical position of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga is an absolute isolation of the 'Puruṣa' and 'Prakṛti' and not of a beginningless or eternal experience, or 'Bhoga'.

The Bhāṣya accepts the 'sūtra', admission of the two natures of the 'Puruṣa', one of the 'svarūpa' in which it is free from the fluctuations of experience, and the other, of the misbelieved nature of 'ownership' which is necessarily subject to mutations

1. Y. B. 2. 19. 2. Y. B. 2. 18.

and fluctuations. It tries to explain the confusion of the 'sārūpyam' of the two by the theory of the proximity illustrated by the analogy of the magnet and the iron, in which, an influence from the one flows inevitably into the other through the sheer fact of nearness. But such a theory of an eternal and unconditional proximity has obvious difficulties of making the contact eternal and so forth, into which we need not go at present.

The question now is, has the 'Puruṣa' two natures or only one? If it has two natures, i.e., one of an isolated, transcendental 'svarūpa', and the other of an 'ownership' and an empirical experiencer, it is then, never absolutely isolated or a 'kevalin', and if it has only one nature of 'svarūpa', how does it get the other of an 'ownership'?

The Bhāṣya leaves it at that. Obviously, the theory is to be worked out still further into how exactly the supposed proximity brings about the confusion of the wrong attribution of the nature of the one to the other, which is in other words, the taking place of the experience. If two objects are near one another, why should one necessarily think that it has the nature of the other.

We, therefore, come to a third stage of an attempt at explanation in Vācaspati Miśra, who further interprets the concept of proximity into a peculiar kind of capacity on the part of the 'Sattva' to catch a reflection of the 'Puruṣa', which brings about the desired experience. We had had as yet no detailed mention of the process through which the necessary misconception about the respective natures of the 'Puruṣa' and the 'Prakṛti' should occur. The detailed elucidation, therefore, starts with Vācaspati. He thinks that by proximity is not to be understood either spatial or temporal nearness, but only a potential suitability, or 'Yogyatā' by virtue of which the one can let the influence of its own flow into the other, and catch it.[1] The meaning clearly is, that though near, not everything would be affected by everything without having the peculiar ability of influencing and being influenced. While the magnet attracts the iron and the latter lets itself be attracted, another object may neither be attracted by a magnet, nor will the magnet attract it. The same must be understood with regard to the 'Puruṣa' and

1. Y. S. 1. 4.

the 'Prakṛti' too, so that, there is this bond of mutual suitability between the two that even though the 'Puruṣa' is only a transcendental 'dṛśi' and just 'cit', the unintelligent Sattva is yet able to take a reflection of the transcendental 'Puruṣa' who is able to cast it. The 'Sattva' can be intelligised as it were, through its association with the 'Puruṣa' just as the unshining water, which has the *capacity* to take the reflection of the moon (which other objects do not have), appears shining because of the reflection of the moon on it.

Vācaspati therefore thinks, that just as the aloof, the isolated, and the distant moon, by its mere shining, puts the water of the river into a state of brilliance and itself unaffected, overlooks 'anupaśyati' the fluctuations of the river; similarly there takes place a reflection of the 'Puruṣa' in the 'Sattva' of the 'Buddhi' by virtue of which the 'Buddhi' takes upon itself the character of a direct intelligent and a conscious agent or knower. The transcendental 'Puruṣa' remains an indirect 'over-looker' or an 'on-looker'.[1]

This explanation of experience may be called the theory of a "single reflection", to contrast it with the succeeding explanation of Vijñāna-bhikṣu, which will be called the theory of a "double or mutual reflection". It is to be noticed that a feature of this hypothesis is, that while the unconscious 'Buddhi' is intelligised and is made the experiencer, the 'Puruṣa' is yet only a transcendental 'dṛśiśakti'. It is in itself the 'acetana', and the now-intelligised 'Buddhi' that is actually the agent, the knower and the doer, and not the 'Puruṣa'.

We seem to succeed on this account of a single reflection in making the unconscious 'Buddhi' the actual knower and the experiencer, but what about the 'Puruṣa'? Is he still in his transcendental 'svabhāva', or has he also like 'Buddhi', been in any way influenced? The answer is that the 'Puruṣa' is still a capacity only, 'dṛśimātra' and is still only a transcendental and an experienceless principle. The experience has been made possible for the 'Buddhi', but not for the 'Puruṣa', who

1. Y. V. 1. 4.
3. 35.
4. 22.

is still not the 'owner' and the 'svāmin'. In order to make experience possible for the 'Puruṣa', it is still necessary that the mistake and the illusion of the appropriation on the part of the 'Puruṣa' of the experiences of the 'Buddhi' as 'his own' should be committed, a provision for which has not yet been made.

To revert to our analogy, let us imagine that when the moon above, throws its reflection on the lucid water below, the reflected water begins to think itself as the active and intelligent knower and the doer of all that happens to the water. But it only means that, the unconscious and the active water, which was devoid of consciousness prior to reflection, has been endowed with consciousness after the reflection. It does not, however, make the moon an experiencer or an agent. The gain is one-sided. The unconscious 'Buddhi' which was always active and dynamic and had lacked consciousness, has now by its association with the 'citśakti' been supplied with what it previously lacked. It is now, 'as if' a conscious agent. The 'Puruṣa' does not yet benefit or suffer by this contact of a single reflection. It yet remains only a potential power of seeing without actual experience of seeing. The reason why 'Puruṣa' should make the mistake of taking upon itself the fluctuations of 'Buddhi' as its own, which, (by the way) is absolutely necessary for the happening of experience, is left unexplained. The moon need not take the fluctuations of the water upon itself and suffer from it only because it is reflected on clear water. It is a favourite dogma of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga to affirm that the conscious is not called the agent if it is non-active. And so, now that the active 'Buddhi' has been 'intelligised' by reflection, the inactive consciousness too, has to be made active in order that the polarisation of their mutual influence be complete.

Vācaspati's theory of a single reflection of 'Puruṣa' on 'Buddhi' due to a bond of suitability between the two, though a decided development of Vyāsa's theory of proximity, does not yet fully and adequately make experience possible, which, in the original statement of the 'Bhāṣya' consists in the 'Puruṣa's' taking upon itself the attributes belonging to the 'Buddhi'. One can say, that while Vācaspati has intelligised the unintelligent 'Buddhi',

he has not yet 'materialised' or phenomenalised the transcendental 'citśakti' of the 'Puruṣa' both of which processes are inevitable for experience.

We, therefore, pass on to the fourth and the final stage of the development of a theory of experience in Sāṅkhya-Yoga, viz., to Vijñānabhikṣu's theory of a double or mutual reflection.[1]

Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that, in order that experience may take place, there should occur not only the reflection of the transcendental 'Puruṣa' on the 'Sattva' of the 'Buddhi', but also of the reflected 'Buddhi' on the 'Puruṣa'. So long as the intelligised 'Buddhi' is not in its turn reflected on the 'Puruṣa', the latter has no chance of confusing the fluctuations of the former as its own. There is thus, a mutual reflection of the one upon the other, due to the original bond of suitability between the 'Puruṣa' and the 'Prakṛti'. While the 'Puruṣa' casts its reflection on the 'Buddhi' and intelligises it, the reflected 'Buddhi' too casts its reflection on the transcendental 'Puruṣa' and phenomenalises it. This leads to a mistaken transference of the attributes of consciousness on 'Prakṛti' and vice versa, and thus follows experience. On account of this reflection of the 'Buddhi' upon the transcendental 'Puruṣa', the 'Puruṣa' mistakes the fluctuations of the 'Buddhi' as belonging to itself, much in the same way as the moon may take the to-and-fro movement of the water as its own, if the reflected water is also reflected back in the moon.

We thus see how the contact of the two transcendental 'Śaktis' leading to a confusion between the nature of the 'seer' and the 'seen', hinted in 'Patañjali—Sūtras', is successively explained by Vyāsa through the hypothesis of proximity in his 'Bhāṣya', by Vācaspati through the hypothesis of a 'single reflection' of the 'Puruṣa' on the 'Buddhi' in his 'Vaiśāradī' and finally by 'Vijñāna-bhikṣu' through his theory of "mutual reflection" of the one on the other in his 'Vārttika'. It would have been observed in our account of the development, that through all these different stages of the growth of a more and more consistent theory, the earlier and the older is never discarded. The later theories arose out of a need of a further elucidation of the

1. Y. Vārttika 1. 4., 3. 35.

accepted earlier ones, which is in all cases, taken as the basis for the new.

But what is of special significance for a student of metaphysics, is to observe the effect, which the later theories as they grow more and more consistent, must necessarily have upon the original position of a strict and transcendental dualism. We find that the original transcendentalism of the 'Puruṣa' and the 'Prakṛti' is compromised and modified. The earlier and the vague suggestions of the 'Sūtra' and the 'Bhāṣya' attempt an explanation of experience keeping the transcendental nature of the 'Puruṣa' as pure 'citśakti' and not as 'dṛṣṭā' more or less intact, and unjeopardised. Vācaspati's theory too, of a single reflection of the 'Puruṣa' on the 'Buddhi' is in conformity with the traditional Sāṅkhya-Yoga spirit of the transcendental 'Puruṣa's being isolated and lying wholly outside the range of experience ; for the 'Puruṣa' still remains passive in intelligising the 'Buddhi' through its reflection. It is not yet the actual knower or feeler. Vācaspati, by his theory of one-sided reflection, attempts for the last time, the difficult task of making experience possible while retaining the unmodifiably experienceless and 'kevalin' nature of the 'Puruṣa' which has always been declared to be the orthodox view of the 'Sānkhya-Yoga'. But we do not yet find the 'Puruṣa' committing the mistake of confusing the 'vṛtti' of the 'Buddhi' as its own, which it must, if experience on the part of the 'Puruṣa' is to be adequately explained.

In Vijñānabhikṣu, however, we come to a virtual desertion of the original position of the transcendental isolation of the Puruṣa, for the latter, not only throws reflection on the 'Sattva' but also receives a reflection in turn. It is thus, no better than an empirical self, and has no other 'svarūpa' but that of a 'draṣṭā' and a 'Bhoktṛ', for the relationship between the two is eternal. What becomes then, one may ask, of the eternally 'kevalin' nature of the 'Puruṣa' ?

The theory of Vijñānbhikṣu is no doubt the most consistent explanation of the problem of the 'phenomenalising of the transcendental Puruṣa, but the consistency is evidently achieved at the cost of a sacrifice of the transcendental nature of the 'Puruṣa'. It appears, that while the original, transcendental

and the unexplained dualism of the 'sūtras' fails to consistently explain experience, the later consistency and explanations fail to retain the dualism as is evident from an examination of the consequences of Vijñānabhikṣu's account of it. Consistency in a logical account of experience and an absolute dualism of the 'transcendental' and the 'phenomenal' are not compatible. May it not be, that somehow, the transcendental and the empirical elements of experience both exist within the 'Puruṣa' himself, by virtue of which he is both free and bound, an experiencer and a 'kevalin' both at the same time. This change of emphasis from an uncompromising dualism to a some-sort-of monism, is not however, expected to materially effect the prospects of a logical solution of the problem of the 'original fall' of a transcendental principle to the level of experience ; for that remains unsolved on the intellectual and the logical level as much for the undual Vedānta as for the dual Sāṅkhya-Yoga.

The common use here of the same logically unexplained concept of 'Avidyā' on the part of both the Indian Monist and the Dualist, strongly suggests, that questions of absolute beginnings are beyond the pale of logic and reason which must be content to work within the intermediary sphere between the two extremities of absolute beginning and absolute end.

AGNI AND SOMA

THE SOMA, CELESTIAL AND TERRESTRIAL

(Fatah Singh)

(Continued from Vol. III No 3)

2. *The Madaṃ of Ṛbhus*

1. Ṛbhus seem to be connected with the descent of heavenly mead also. One hymn[1] attributes to some Ṛbhu the work of filling the kṛtvyaṃ madaṃ, and in that respect, compares with him Indra as filling the upward-pointed madaṃ. In RV. 10, 65, 10, the poet prays Ṛbhu for the Soma of Indra and for Indra, which is borne to Vāyu, to uṣas, to Brahaspati, to Vṛtra-slayer.

2. In addition to this, Ṛbhu is even identified with Soma, and with the Śyena who brings the celestial Soma. Thus Soma is Ṛbhu who knows the hidden name of cows (9, 87. 3). Soma like Ṛbhu puts up a movable banner (rathyam ketum) in the quarters (9, 21, 6). Ṛbhu is spoken of as identical with the one who is Śyena, the bull (Indra), suparṇa, the Svar etc. (Av. 6, 48 ; TS. 3, 2, 1, 1 ; KSS XIII. 1. 11 etc.).

3. Moreover, Mada is the usual name of Soma,[2] and the descent of Soma almost often occurs in liason with that of the fire with which Ṛbhus are greatly connected. The relation or identity of the celestial fire and Soma may be suggested from the fact that the madam of Ṛbhu is probably upward pointed and Agni is also called flaming-upward.[4]

4. Therefore, the interpretation of the myth of Soma, will be the same as that of myth of madaṃ of Ṛbhu.

5. Before, we go to examine the myth of Soma, we should be clear about the fact that Ṛgveda knows of two kinds of Somas, one heavenly, the other earthly ; and that the heavenly mead,

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1. RV. X. 144, 2.

2. Cf. Macdonell. Vedic. Myth 105 ; keith Rel. Phil. ved. up., 167 ; Hillebrandt : Ved-Myths 264 etc.

3. Cf. RV. I. 93, 6 ; 141, 3 ; IV. 46, 7, Cf. also the myths of Bṛhaspati, Trita, Mātariśvan etc.

4. Ūrdhva-śociṣaṃ (RV. 15, 2) Cf. Urdhva-jvalanaṃ havirbhujaṃ (Magha : Śiśupala Vadham 1, 2).

therefore, represents some natural phenomenon of heaven that resembles the terrestrial mead in appearance, colour, etc. As we proceed on, we shall find that the celestial Soma is, in fact the light, in its different colours and forms, conceived after the terrestrial Soma that assumed different forms and colours, as it was in its pure or mixed state. Just as the terrestrial Soma was tawny, yellow, white in its pure, barley-mixed and milk-mixed form respectively, the light also was of so many colours.

6. Once the identity having been established all the properties of the one were attributed to other.

7. Scholars have always neglected the myths attributed to Soma by simply saying that they have been associated with it because of its close connection with Indra, or by saying that the luminous nature of the God-Soma is the exaggeration of the brightness of the terrestrial Soma. But it is quite inconceivable that the mere brightness of the liquid could have become the basis of so-wonderful myths as to identify him with Indra.

I. Soma, as 'a god pressed for the gods' 9, 3. 6-7

8. Soma as the celestial thing or god resembles the light of dawnfire which, found, was brought by Mātariśvan and Ṛbhus, in various points. Soma also shines like or with the sun or clothes himself in its rays;[1] fills heaven and earth with rays like the sun;[2] the daughter of the sun—probably the rays of the sun—purifies or brings him;[3] he caused the sun to shine and produced the sun in the waters; he caused the sun to rise, impelled it, obtained and bestowed it.[4] He combats the darkness with light which he is said to create.[5]

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1. IX. 76, 4; 86, 32; 71, 9 etc. 2. IX. 1, 6; 72, 3; 113, 3.

3. Soma was probably regarded as eight even by Brāhmaṇas. In Śatapathi Brāhmaṇa, Amṛta, which as we shall see, was mythologically same as Soma (see para 82, 88), is spoken of as same as jyoti ज्योतिर्वा अमृतं (Ś. B. XII. V. 2 etc.). In the conception of immortality, we shall see that Soma was one of the means of immortality which itself meant attaining luminous and bright appearance viz. become bright rays of the Sun (All sect VI). Cf. संगच्छस्व तन्वा सुवर्चाः. The soul of the dead man was said to go after having at aitaja's body.

4. Hillebrandt N. Myth. 1, 388.

5. 9, 9, 7; 9, 86-22; 66, 24; 100, 8; 108, 12 etc.

9. Like Agni (twilight fire) he is called trisadhastha,[1] and has the three abodes that he occupies, when purified,[2] which probably refers to the spreading of light in the three worlds, when morning is a little advanced. Probably these very three abodes are the fore runners of the three tubs of the later ritual.[3] The three lakes which Indra drinks at his birth, and at the time of killing Vṛtra, must be the same,[4] for when hot milky sun-shine of North Pole comes to destroy the enveloping ice-giants, the tawny-coloured light goes off. Sometimes poet becomes more exact, when he says that Indra drank three tanks and also the well,[5] their source i. e. the tawny light of the Southern quarter; which all sun-eyed (svardṛṣaḥ) together sprinkled.[6] The epithet Triprstha does not refer to the three admixtures of Soma, as Macdonell following Sāyaṇa thinks, but is identical with trisadhasta, as the third Pṛṣṭha of Soma is called shining and existing in the heaven.[7]

10. Soma is the son of the sun (9, 93, 1) and Indra's weapon. Soma is very much associated with the daughter of demons. Soma is Indra's Vajra[8] which we have seen is the light of sun or lightning as Soma is the son of sun,[9] lightning.[10] It is thousand-winning bolt and Vṛtra-slaying ray of light.[11] Soma is the soul of Indra,[12] as is the light that of the sun. Soma is the friend of Indra, and strengthens or helps him in the slaying of Vṛtra or in fights,[13] and therefore is himself a slayer of Vṛtra. With Soma as companion, Indra caused the waters to flow and slew the dragon[14] as would Polar sun, with his hot light, melt the ice and release the waters.

11. The flash of the lightning being golden brown and an assailant of cloud demons, is also conceived as Soma. Thus Parjanya is the father of Soma,[15] and Amṛta which is, same as

1. 8, 83, 4. 2. 9, 103, 2.
3. TS. 3, 2, 1, 2; Kan. S. S. 9, 5, 17; 7, 4; RV. 8, 28; Cf. Bergaigne: RV. 1, 179. 4. 5, 29, 7-8; 6, 17, 11; 8, 7, 10; 9, 103, 2.
5. 8, 7, 10. 6. 2, 24, 3-4. 7. 9, 86, 26.
8. IX. 72, 7; 77, 1; 111, 31. 9. 9, 93, 1. 10. 9, 82, 3, Cf. 113, 3.
11. 6, 17, 11. 12. 9, 85, 3.
13. 10, 25, 9; 9, 76, 2; 8, 81. 7; 9, 1, 10; 6, 48, 1; 9, 88, 4 etc.
14. 4, 28, 1. 15. 82, 3, Cf. 113, 3.

Soma,[1] is called the bright seed of Parjanya.[2] Therefore on the analogy of the celestial Soma, the terrestrial Soma is often associated with the paraphernalia of lightning. Thus when stream of Soma is poured, there shines as it were a lightning in the heaven, and there is heard a noise like that of rain (Vṛstiva Svanḥ),[3] and at one place he is described as the Soma, that gets refined by its stream, the lightning, intoxicating Indra, the divine person.[4] He grows in the waters, is the embryo or the Gandharva of the waters 13. He is vaco agriya or agre (9, 7, 3; 62, 25-6 ; 86, 12 ; 106, 10) or vācaspati (9, 26, 4 ; 101, 5).

12. Both as the offspring of sun (9,93,1) or of cloud (dawn light or lighting), Soma is the releaser of waters from the ice or from the clouds, therefore his connexion with them is expressed in a variety of ways. The waters follow his ordinance, and he causes both heaven and earth to rain[5] or streams rain from heaven.[6] He is the leader or ruler, lord or king of rains or waters,[7] or he goes in front of the rivers.[8]

13. Soma is often compared with rain[9], because the light of heaven as overpowering as rains. That the rain of Soma is not the rain of water but of light will be clear from its description.[11] The Pavaman drops stream forth from heaven, from air, on the ridge of earth.[10] The Soma is said to flow down with a stream of honey like a raining cloud.[12] It is indeed the celestail Soma, as opposed to terrestrial, as in the same hymn he is said to make a noise like great Mitra and shine with the sun. Rivers, the waters come after him and he is the best possessor of brilliance (Dyumnvaltant). He is, elsewhere, prayed to ooze forth the resplendent rains (Dyumnam Vṛṣtim), from heaven on earth.[13] The drops being purified have been poured from heaven, from the air, on the surface of the earth.[14] Probably

1. RV. 5, 2, 3 ; 6 ; 37, 3 ; VS. 6, 34, 19, 72 ; SB. 9, 5, 1, 8, Cf. Kuhn Heravbhunft des. Feurs und des. Gottertranks 128f.; ZDA G. 32, 301.
2. AV. 8, 7, 21. 3. 9, 41, 3 ; 80, 1 ; 87, 8 etc. 4. IX. 34, 3.
5. IX. 82, 5 ; 9, 96, 3. 6. IX. 8, 8 ; 4, 9, 1 ; 97, 17 ; 108, 9-10.
7. 9, 74, 3 ; 9, 15, 5, 86, 33, 89, 2. 8. IX. 86, 12.
9. IX. 41, 3 ; 89, 1 ; 106, 9 Cf. Windisch : Festgrass on Roth. 140.
10. For the rays of day-light caused the ice melt and produced the water.
11. 9, 63, 27. 12. 9, 2, 9. Cf. the rain of white Haoma, below.
13. IX. 8, 7. 14. 9, 63, 27 Cf. Windisch : Festgrass on Roth. 140.

the same submerging nature of heavenly light-shower is alluded to, when he is called the traverser of space[1] and the supporter or sustainer of heaven.[2]

14. The moon and moon-light, being also brown and tawny like mild sunlight and lightning, were also regarded as Soma. The most important identification of Soma with moon which is generally admitted, is found in the Sūrya-hymn (IX. 85)[3] where Soma is said to be in the lap of the stars, which is parallel to the later conception that Prajāpati gave away in marriage his daughters, nakṣatras to Soma.[4] At one place as Keith thinks,[5] Soma is distinctly moon that died to-day and would be same to-morrow, and with which Indra sprinkled to kill the Vṛtra (the demon of darkness).[6] He stands above all worlds like god Sūrya (9, 53, 3). Hundred streams, desirous of waters, apparelled in glory, drop down the tawny one (Soma-light), and the fingers (lunar rays = hundred streams) rub him, covered with milk or light rays (gobhiḥ) on the third shining ridge, in heaven.[7] He is very often called indu, and the Soma which is the drapsa (drop) which goes to ocean, looking with the eye of a vulture,[8] is generally regarded to be moon. Therefore, the terrestrial Soma in the bowl is compared with the moon in the waters.[9]

15. Hillebrant's view, however, that the god Soma was exclusively the moon,[10] can hardly be accepted. For we have seen that Soma is also the offspring of the Sun, or of Parjanya, and his character as solar light is so evident. The king of all, the sun-eyed purifies him, and the Soma is rubbed by the sword of the Sun.[11] With Soma as moon we cannot explain his killing of Vṛtra and release of rivers of lights, the work of Indra.[12]

1. IV. 48, 4, 108, 7. 2. IX. 2, 5; 76, 1.

3. Weber, IS. 5, 178 ff; Vedisque Beitrage 1894, Page. 34; Muir: Original Samskrit Texts, 5, 237 ff.; EHNI, ZDMG 33, 176-8; Jacobi ib. 49, 227; Oldenberg, ib. 478; Macdonell: Ved. Myth. 112; Keith: Rel Phil Ved. up., Page. 170, who thinks it is late hymn.

4. TS. II, 2, 51; KS. XI. 3; MS. II, 2, 7.

5. Rel. Ved. Phil. up. 122 f4. 6. X. 55, 5-8.

7. Cf. T. S. II. IV. 12 where Tvaṣṭr sprinkles Vajra at Vṛtra., for its explanation see 'Tvaṣṭ, and Ṛbhus' above. (4) X. 36, 27.

8. IX. 86. 27. 9. 10, 123, 8. 10. RV. 8, 71. 8; Cf. 1, 105-1.

11. Vedisque Mythology: Pages. 274, 309, 326, 340, 450. 12. IX. 76, 3.

16. But how Soma became merely the name of moon later on? It seems, on the other hand, that in the beginning, when the Aryans were in the polar region, the more important form of celestial Soma was the hotlight of Sun that could destroy darkness and ice both. The lightning or moonlight, also, being more or less of the same colour were regarded as Soma, but they were next in importance, destroying only the darkness of winter-night. When they moved to the warmer and sunnier climes, the solar phenomenon was not so much wanted for; and therefore all the worship for Soma as sunlight began to be attributed to moon and its light. The change was quite natural, for apart from the solar heat which was not felt important now because of the absence of the marked contrast of Arctic cold, the lunar light was more pleasanter and more capable of deification than any of the other two. Not only the moon had the colour of the Soma-drink of human beings, but also it was seen drunk by and by till all was empty to be filled again.[1] Thus Soma is growingly identified with moon.[2] Moreover, of the three qualities heat, water and light, for which Soma as light was worshipped, the first two were almost out of question because of their constant presence, while the contrast of dark and bright nights was always present, and for this reason the absence of moon was keenly felt. This retained the deification of moon in the later mythology, and a most important development may be seen in the myth of Rāhu who is the constant enemy of moon, as Vṛtra was of Indra.

17. Keith's 'most serious objection'[3] to Soma's being the moon that the lunar nature of Soma in Rv., can only be restored by conjecture, is hardly tenable in view of the above facts, and is negated by Keith himself.[4] The remark[5] that this celestial Soma is known only to Brāhmaṇaḥ, read in its entirety is not at all conclusive of the lateness of the conception of moon

1. Cf. Ch. up. 5, 10, 1.

2. A. V. 7, 81, 3-4; 11, 6, 7 etc. M. S. II, 2, 7; KB. IV. 4; VII. 10; 4, 4, 5; TB. 7, 11; SB. 1, 6, 4, 3; Ch. up. 5, 10; Br. up.

3. Rel. Phil. Ved. up. p. 171. 4. ibid fn 4.

5. सोमं ब्रह्मयो विदुर्न तस्याश्नाति कश्चन ॥ ३ ॥
अच्छ द्विधानैर्गोपिगे बहितैः सोम रक्षितः
ग्राव्यामिच्छृन्वन्ति नते अश्नाति पार्थिवः ॥ ४ ॥

as Soma.[1] The next verse explains the first remark that the Soma is concealed and protected and therefore the earthly being can only hear of the rock, and never eat the Soma (produced hy it) : Here only ब्राह्मणः and पार्थिवः are contrasted. This clearly accords with the parallel assertion that the madhu-well is in the highest step of Viṣṇu which is beyond the ken of man. Therefore this is only a philosophical development of the secret source of light discussed above, and the Brāhmaṇaḥ (performer of prayer etc. hence virtuous) who obtains or knows this celestial Soma correspond to the people living in the third step of Viṣṇu, and enjoying madhu. Keith also remarks 'If we could show all extra that the Plant is also the moon, this would not be a fatal objection to the theory of Hillebrandt, but this cannot be done.[2] Unfortunately this can be done, and as we shall see, the ordinary Soma was never, originally a plant ; and the idea of plant has been attributed to it from the plant of the celestial Soma.

17. It is also wrong to say that god Soma is the personification of the terrestrial plant and its juice,[3] for we find in several hymns the god is described as one having the several forms as terrestrial or celestial. Thus the same Soma, the immortal which created all worlds, and who goes round them; who made the together-bound and the well-bound one (sky or earth) and who the Indu, the Sun ; sprinkles it as he does the uṣas ; who is purified by the lightning, the stream, and who causes Ocean to rise up : is prepared here.[4] The similar identity of the two Somas may be seen in a number of other passages.[5] Thus it seems that the terrestrial Soma after whom the celestial was named became almost the symbol of the god Soma who was the deification of the divine and human Soma in one.

II. The Soma that 'the wise milked out with hand's, 9–79–4.

18. Before we give any more account of the myths of the celestial Soma, it becomes necessary to find out the earthly Soma which was the prototype of the celestial drink. In doing

1. Macdonell : Ved. Myth. Pages 112–113 ; Keith : Rel. Ph. Fed. up. Page. 117. RV. X. 85, 3, 4 ; who think otherwise. 2. Ibid.

3. Whitney, PAOS, 1894, P. X. CIX f ; Oldenberg Die Religion des Ved. 5, 99-612-67. Hopkins : Religions of India 117.

4. RV. IX. 84. 2-4. 5. IX, 41 ; 72 ; 38 etc.

so, we shall have to avail ourselves of the scholars' investigations in the domain of comparative philology. The word Soma,[1] derived from 'Su' to press, meant anything "pressed at, extracted or produced" and was originally the mere epithet and could not have been the real name of the drink. Of the other names madhu and Mada deserves special notice; Mada is the usual name of Soma, and we can take it to be the original, or at least the oldest, madhu, being, as we shall see, a mere cognate of the first. The priority of mada to the other names of the drink is also suggested by the fact that drinking of Soma, is generally indicated by the cognate verb of 'mada', i. e. मद्न्ति etc.

19. Mada is decidedly the name of honey,[2] and in the same sense may be connected with the Indo-European root melit which scholars have found to be wide-spread; "Latin, mel 'honey'; Greek, Meli, 'honey', Meliooa, beet; Albanian, Mijal 'honey'; Gothic 'milip' 'honey'; Anglo-Saxon, milise 'honey-sweet'; mildeaw,[3] 'mildew' (literally honey-dew); Cornish, mel 'honey'; Old Irish mil 'honey'; Armenian metr 'honey".[4]

20. To this list may also be added Anglo-Saxon mele 'honey.'[5]

21. That all these words are the cognates of Sams. mada may be proved by the fact that Sams. d, l, b, and l, d are often interchangeable, as seen below:—

1. A. S. Eng. milk = Ger- Mitch = A. S. meolc; met olc = mele, honey and olc = Sams. udak or udan[6] = Latin. unda 'wave' (cf. L. undus, Sams, und 'to wet') = Gr. hydor[6].

2. Sams. Mṛdu 'soft, sweet' = Eng.; 'mellow' soft, ripe = A. S. mearu, soft = Dutch-murw.

3, Sams. Mṛlika = Dutch; mollig 'sweet' = A. S. milisc 'honey'? = Gr. malakos = Latin mollis.

4. Sams. Īdṛśa-kṣa-s 'like this' = A. S. ilc or ylc 'like this' = Eng. ilk 'like this'. same.

1. Nir. 11, 1.
2. See Apte: The Practical Samskrit-English Dictionary under 'mada'.
3. Cf. Th. Davidton: Ch. I. cent, Dict. E. Lang. P. 571 where the word is 'meledeaw'.
4. Bender: The Home of Indo-Europeans. 19.
5. The Davidson: ibid.
6. Cf. ibid Page Under 'water. 7. Nir. 10. 1. and Ṛka quoted therein.

5. Ved. Nilaḥ (नीळ:), Sams. Nidah = L. nidus = Fr. nid = Hindi Nīṛa = A. S. nest. cf. also A. S. nestlian, English nestle 'be close or *snug as* in nest', Sams. Niṣraṇṇaḥ.

6. Sams. Ṛbhu[1] = Pr. ibhu = L. Albhus = A. S. Albe = A. S. Aelf = Ice. Alfr = Sw. elf = Eng. elf = Norse-Alfr.

22. Scholars have, however, found one more Indo-European[2] root madhu, meaning 'honey' which is also distributed over the entire field. "Samskṛt madhu, 'honey, mead', madhukar 'bee'; Old Bulgarian medu 'honey', Lithuanian medus 'honey', midue 'mead'; Lettish medus 'honey, mead'; Old Prussan meddo 'honey'; Greek methu 'intoxicating drink', mede 'intoxication'; Old High German meto 'mead'; Old Icelandic miqdr 'mead'; Dutch 'mead'; Welsh medu 'mead'; English 'mead'."[2]

23. To this list may be added the German met or meth[3] 'mead'.

24. The above investigation can show why madhu was both milk and honey. It may be suggested that two mada and madhu-stems (melit and medhu) are originally one, because madhu is only the combination of mada = duh, meaning thereby honey-milk implying there by any beverage sweet as the mixture of honey and milk. Thus we find that all the cognates of madhu-stem mean 'mead', the mixture of honey and water. On the other hand milk, Ger, milch, A. S. meolc means as we have seen, the honey-water' and is parallel, therefore, with mead, the fermentation of milk and water, also named as hydromel (hydro = water, mel = honey). So the milk was so named because it was as sweet as the hydromel or mead. Thus madhu = mead and mead = milk. Therefore madhu = mead = milk. But there is a growing tendency to use madhu for pure mada which became identical with Surā for the reasons given hereafter.

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1. Cf. Kuhn's Zietschrift. 4, 103–20 Wacker, KZ, 24, 297; Néve essai Surle myth. des Ribhavas P. 263, Macdonell; op, cit, P. 134; Cornoy, Les Indo-Europeans, P. 219; Keith: Rel. Ved. up. 38; H. A. Guerber: Myths of Norse men 246.

2. Bender: Home of Indo-Europeans, 19.

3. Th. Davidson: Ch. T. Cen. Dict. Eng. lang. 560 gives 'Meth but in modern German we find 'met'.

24. This may be also concluded from the above analysis that honey was a familiar thing with Indo-Europeans, so much so that the sweetness of other things was compared with it. They also mixed honey with water or milk and drank it in its pure or mixed form. The stories like that of Philamen and Baucis show that honey and milk was a common food in the West. The same thing is proved by the existence of madhupark almost at every ritual and every hospitality, in ancient Indian life. European traditions show that mead was the drink of gods and pure honey with cakes and meat was also given to them. Even elves, who are the counterparts of our Ṛbhus were given the same.[1] In India also, mada as Soma, which is identical with honey, as we shall see, was given to gods pure or mixed with milk and water.[2] The unmixed honey (Soma) was given to Indra and vāyu who were called Suchipa.[3] When mixed with milk all gods drink it (IX. 109. 15).

25. Mada which is common name of wine in later literature, and Soma have often been identified with wine, but we must know that the wine or Surā has always been a disapproved drink throughout the Vedic age. Thus, in Ṛgveda Surā is classed with manyu (anger) accitti (senselessness) and dicing as the cause of committing sins to Varuṇa (7, 86, 6). The drinkers of Surā are condemned in Rv. 8, 2, 12, as the bad drinkers and the wine (Surā) in 8, 21, 14. The wine has been disapproved in later literature also (cf. MS. 1, 11, 6; 2, 4, 2; 3, 2. 1 etc.) and even put in the category of evils, sins along with meat (AV. 6, 70, 1, cf. Bloomefield 493), with dicing (RV. 7, 86, 6; AV. 14, 1, 35-36; 15, 9, 1, 2).

26. Surā is often distinguished from Soma. Opposed to Soma, it is a drink of low life (TB. 1, 3, 3, 2). It was the drink of people in Sabhās, which were probably like Samājas of Buddhist times which Aśoka stopped, and also gave broils (RV., 3, 2, 12; 21, 14; cf. Kath. S. 14, 6; SB. 1, 6, 3, 4; MS. 2, 4, 2 etc.).

(To be continued)

1. Alf-blot of elves: H. A. Guerber: Myths of Norsemen Page 249.
2. Macdonell: Ved. Myth. Page. 102. 3. Ibid Pages. 82, 102.

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3. His existence is inferred from the religious experience the sense of being in the presence of a Mighty Being different, from the aggregate mass of objects or human beings, which the poets, painters, musicians and philosophers are fortunate enough to have when their minds are attuned to that of the universe. The Platonic "Ideas" or the Kantian "Moral law" or Hartmann's "Eternal Values" or "the Great Being of Humanity-in-general" of the Comtist creed are according to him but imperfect explanations of that experience.

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4. It is not that the author has no regard for the views of the writers whom he has criticised. He has, on the contrary, fully admitted that a religion which can claim adherence from the educated class must be such as to be consistent in its teaching with the discoveries of modern science and the development of human reason during the last two centuries. He is nevertheless of the opinion that the criticisms levelled against Christianity by those free thinkers are not applicable to the "historical" or "classical" Christianity professed by Paul, Augustine, Dante, Luther, Pascal or Wesley, that the said type of Christianity embraced a belief in God who though personal was not anthropomorphic and who though the designer and moral governor of the world left the working of the laws of nature and the freedom of the individual to work out his own salvation in any manner he thinks best, undisturbed, that the explanations of the origin of a belief in God which is common to a vast multitude of mankind from the earliest times as an "anthropocentric megalomania" or a "father—surrogate" are far from satisfactory, that the right explanation thereof is that people believe that there is God because He really exists and that though one cannot see Him because He is not an object of sense-perception it is imprudence not to keep faith in the records left by those who have had communion with Him.

5. The conclusion reminds me of a paper "Can God Be Seen ?" read by me in December 1934 at the tenth session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Waltair. I had therein stated that the answer to the querry cannot be a categorical "Yes" or "No" as a cross-examining lawyer would expect of a witness in his hands and that it depended upon the conception which one had of God. The conception of the Christian Theists whom Mr. Webb criticises as much as Huxley and Hartmann, Leuba and Freud, is what I have there called "an imperfect monotheistic view" while that :of "the Classical Theists and of Mr. Webb himself is what I have there designated as "a perfect monotheistic view". There is yet a third view of God which I have therein named "the pantheistic view". Mr. Webb may be excused for not taking note of that purely Indian view as he had confined his attention to the

2

writings of the European thinkers only, but it must be noted with regret that he has avoided any consideration of the views of the German philosophers Hegel and Schopenheaur to which that view affords a close parallel and of the view of the modern scientists headed by Sir James Jeans and Prof. Eddington which is slowly but surely drifting towards it. That view has this advantage over the one advocated by Mr. Webb that while on the one hand a belief in the existence of the world including the human souls apart from God which delimits His perfectness in the latter is dispensed with the relativity of the ideas of time, space and causality, which were the basis of all the scientific investigations of the past is established and the absolute nature of God is emphasised, on the other all the things of this world including even the minerals cease to be inert matter and are permeated by and surcharged with the same principle of life which is apparent in the sentient beings in a greater degree of development towards the great goal as fixed by His mind. Success or failure in the effort of an individual to seek his salvation as conceived by him is, in this view, determined by the degree of its conformity to that goal. His first aim should, therefore, be so to purify his mind as to be in tune with the Universal Mind in order that the same may be comprehended by him.

P. C. DIVANJI.

The Origin and Development of Religion in Vedic Literature :—by Dr. P. S. Desamukh, M. A., D. Phil., Bar-at-law, with a Foreword by Dr. A. B. Keith, D. C. L., D. Litt.; Oxford University Press, 1933. pp. 370 + 8.

Though the title of the work seems to suggest that the whole of it has been occupied by a historical sketch of the religion of the Vedic age as appearing from its literature, it is not so as a matter of fact. The said sketch forms the subject-matter of only Parts III and IV of the work, while Part I, sub-divided into two chapters, contains discussions as to the definition of the term 'religion' and the probable origin of the institution connoted by it and Part II, sub-divided into five chapters, contains sketches of the religions as they can be inferred to have been professed by the Indo-European and Indo-Indian

tribes with whom the Vedic Aryans are believed to have blood-relations. These two parts, therefore, supply a back-Iranian for the pen-picture of the religion of the Vedic Aryans which has supplied the title of this work. That picture has been drawn in two parts, the first relating to the religion of the early Ṛgvedic age and the second to that of the Brāhmaṇas and the three other Vedas and the Sūtras.

2. The learned author tells us in his preface that the plan of the work as it was originally intended to be submitted for the doctorate of philosophy of the Oxford University was more ambitious, comprising as it did, the whole of the vast field of "The Origin and Development and Inter-relation of the Indigenous Indian Religions", but that he was constrained for several reasons to restrict its scope to its present limits and got his doctorate on it.

3. We have no reason to regret this restriction because in the work as originally planned, we could hardly have found such learned disquisitions, as we do in the first two parts of the present work, on the definition and the origin of religion in general and such an elaborate scientific investigation into the religions of the Indo-Europeans, the Indo-Iranians and the Vedic Aryans as we find recorded here. Of course we miss his views on the different phases of the Hindu religion as it is prevalent now and its relation with the Brahmanic religion, which forms the subject-matter of Part IV of the work. But let us hope that he will apply himself to the task of formulating them and putting them before the public whenever he gets time to do so. There are several well-equipped libraries at Bombay, Poona, Baroda, Calcutta, Madras etc., from where he can get the necessary works for his study towards that end.

4. Although one cannot help feeling on going through the work that he has gathered his materials mostly from secondary sources, which in case of the Brahmanic religion are scanty also, one can have nothing but admiration for his extensive and intensive study of the vast amounts of literatures in the European languages on the subject-matter of the first thirteen chapters, the deep reflection over each problem as it arose in the course of such study and the courage of conviction to make a frank and

emphatic expression of his individual opinion on each of them, regardless of the fact that it ran counter to that of any scholar or scholars of established repute in the field, his own master, Macdonell, not excepted, to which this work bears an eloquent testimony. His definition of religion as a social institution having fixed principles, doctrines, beliefs and practices and certain more or less imperative rules of conduct and aiming at furthering happiness, his theory that the origin of religion lay neither in fetishism, nor animism, nor ancestor-worship nor totemism nor magic but in a purely religious instinct born of feelings of awe and reverence and his views that magic among the Indo-Europeans did not precede the evolution of their religion, that the Atharvaveda did not precede the early hymns of the Ṛgveda, that prayer was not derived from charms, that the priests were not formerly magicians, that the original home of the Indo-Europeans was not in Asia or Europe but midway between the two continents, that the older parts of the Ṛgveda contain more reliable evidence of the Indo-Iranian religion than the Avesta, that the Avestan Ahura Mazda corresponds more to the Vedic Varuṇa than to the Indo-European Dyaus or Zeus, that the Vedic religion was not primitive though it did retain some of the primitive characteristics, that the names of tribes derived from those of animals and plants occurring in the Ṛgveda are not evidence of totemism being prevalent amongst the Vedic Indians, that the term 'Pantheon' in the strictly Greek sense cannot be applied to the group of Vedic gods, that the polytheistic pantheism apparent from the later hymns was the natural outcome of the nature of the Vedic worship, that the cosmogonic hymns form the tap-root from which the later Indian cosmogony and philosophy grew up, that there was a time in the history of the Vedic religion when the Aryans worshipped their deities only by addressing prayers in the same way in which the Brāhmaṇas perform Sandhyā to this day and that Brahmanism cannot mean the religion of a people who worshipped Brahman as the Supreme God but that it is a convenient term for designating the religion of the people living in the period of the composition of the Brāhmaṇas, the latter Śaṃhitās and the Sūtras, all bear evident marks of his personality.

5. What an immense gain would it have been to the prestige of the Indian nation if such a learned and thoughtful Indian author had shaken off some of his pre-conceived notions and examined the Vedic literature in the light of the Indian theory that the worldly phenomenon is a mixture of truth and falsehood, knowledge and ignorance, from the very beginning, and that therefore though in any particular age the one or the other may predominate in the greater part of the terrestrial globe, they have always existed side by side ? And do we not know from history also that even when the highly developed, Babylonean, Chaldean, Greek and Roman civilizations were at their zenith considerable portions of this earth were inhabited by persons steeped in ignorance and superstition ? Even now when the western civilization has spread its tantacles far and wide there are in all the five continents, tribes in the primitive state. The learned author has, at several places, discarded theories based on the observation of the beliefs, customs and practices of the primitive tribes in the present generation, but he has not been able to shake off the notion that the human mind was originally dominated by the animal instinct and that the divine in him emerged later, out of necessity. Why can it not be that when this earth became cool enough for human beings to live on it such beings of two distinct types, one dominated by the divine element and the other by the animal, emerged simultaneously and two different types of civilization, the spiritual and the material, grew up as the results of their independent efforts, and that clashes took place between them from time to time and sometimes the one and sometimes the other predominated ? If this view is correct, religion and magic must have been evolved independently of each other and not one from the other. The learned author has arrived at his conclusion recorded at page 36 by another line of reasoning but the above also deserved consideration by him because the legends as to the common parentage of the Devas and the Asuras and the frequent fights between them referred to in the scanty Vedic literature now to hand, which the author had several occasions to refer to, are, I believe, allegorical representations of the above occurrences. From the voluminous Epic and Paurāṇic works surely much more food for reflection would have been found, for,

though comparatively modern in their linguistic garb, they are literally paurāṇic (old) in their kernels. Hope, that if the learned author has occasion to write another volume on the same subject he will study that literature in the original before arriving at conclusions on several thorny problems of the history of religion, bearing in mind the fact that the twentieth century mathematics and physics have come very near to the Absolute Idealism of the Indian philosophers, that geology and anthropology have very nearly come to regard as truths several facts recorded in the Epic and Paurāṇic literatures of India and that there are many more therein which the ever progressive science has yet to conceive and explore because the former purport to record the courses of evolution not in the present Manwantara only but also in several previous ones.

P. C. DIVANJI.

History and the Self :—by Dr. H. D. Oakeley, M. A., D. Lit.; Williams and Norgate Ltd, 28—30 Little Russel Street, W. C. I., London (1934), pp. 275.

This work embodies an attempt of a philosophically-minded historian to investigate the principles underlying the totality of human experience and activity taking place in the temporal succession. It is not a philosophy of history in the sense of ' a final simple word ' corresponding to the true meaning of history ; nay, in this author's view that is not possible also because " an a *priori* view of the meaning of the universe has no place for historic valuations and judgments in regard to the permanent elements in civilization, on account of their relativity and because " the materials at our command are extremely inadequate for an empirical view of the actual course of past history ". This does not, however, exclude a consideration of the metaphysical aspect of the historic categories and this is what has been attempted in this work with a view to strike out a path for the making of history less tragic than in the known past.

2. Now, history in whichever of the lights cast upon it by the intellectual, emotional or moral nature of man, must have its *fons et origo* in the experience of the selves, the arcaṇa of individual consciousness. True, as ordinarily understood, it is

a record of events of value to society arranged in a chronological order but that is history only in a secondary sense, for no events of value happen without the active agency of some individuals as the central figures, the principal *dramatis persona* who can make and unmake history. The individual derives this power from his strong will and character, to his personality, as we call it, than to anything else. Hence the principal factor in all history is the personal principle in man, the individual self.

3. An examination of the historical records of several nations reveals the patent truth that this self has tried to assert itself and to realize the truth, the beauty or the good in nature as he conceived it, rising superior to adverse circumstances. It therefore follows that it must have complete freedom of thought and a creative energy enabling it to objectify itself in experience.

4. But though the individual is ideally free, there are certain limitations on his powers. The first and foremost is the temporal process which conditions all his outlook. Whatever the subject of his thoughts, it has some bearing or another on its existence either in the past or in the present or on its imaginary existence in the future. Similarly when the thoughts are objectified in experience, then too, the object of experience is similarly conditioned. Hence all the activities of the self are conditioned by the temporal process either as extended into the past by historic knowledge or projected into the future by imagination from the living present.

5. Again the very fact that the self of a hero is individualistic presupposes the existence of other selves and it is inevitable that he must come in contact with them when he attempts to:do something of historical value. In order to avoid conflict with them, which is otherwise inevitable, he must either so win them over as to induce them to co-operate with himself or vanquish them. He cannot even hope to vanquish those that are incapable of being won over without the co-operation of those, who though willing to extend it, insist upon the payment of a price in the shape of a concession to their views. He has, therefore, at times to modify his plans or even to abandon them if not approved by them. Some of the great failures in past

history have been due to the non-recognition of this one of the cardinal principles in history. A genius in art, science etc., has, also, so to mould his thoughts and expressions as to make them easily intelligible to his admirers and critics.

6. And just as on the one hand there are the other selves so on the other there are the circumstances which are the result of the forces of nature. An individual's knowledge of science, history etc., and the co-operation of his fellow-workers, may, to a great extent, help him in foreseeing difficulties and making provisions for tiding them over. Nevertheless great historians have always laid stress upon the principal character of this blind element in history as many a time it changes the course of history altogether and man finds himself powerless to overcome it. That is, however, no solid ground for believing that it is the manifestation of the Divine Will or of an uncontrollable force of nature. On the contrary a man with grit in him should, according to this author welcome such difficulties as are brought about by unforeseen circumstances because they are the tests of his strength of will and character.

7. All these factors are common to both the primitive and the civilized history. In addition to them the latter has to reckon with certain forces also which though originally brought into action with good motives by the creative energy of man have become so static as to act as clogs on individual freedom. These are the human institutions such as those of a church, a race, a clan, a caste, a nationality etc. The ideas at their roots are benevolent but their originators having passed away leaving institutions in the hands of less noble or even base individuals, they, instead of encouraging the individuals under their sway to attain to the noble ideal of their founders act in a mechanical way like dead weights on their free activity and become even engines for its suppression or annihilation. If managed in the right spirit, they are, as they were intended to do, likely to guide and help forward individuals along paths benevolently chalked out for the succeeding generations by their great founders with admirable foresight, in consideration of the sacrifice the individuals make of their liberty of thought and of action. They are the counterpart in history of the highest

ethical ideals, *the law of the aught*, as it is called, in ethics, which is willingly and freely accepted by the individual as the ideal of his own highest experience and, therefore, something in which he finds himself transcended.

8. This view of history is quite different from that of nineteenth century idealists who looked upon events themselves as the only factor of importance in history, traced the origin of institutions and looked upon their development towards an imaginary goal as the sure index of human progress. It has this advantage over the latter that the dignity of man in nature is enhanced and a surer way for the course of future history is laid out. It is true that the self is the source of evil as well as good thoughts and the histories of all countries are replete with instances of men of action having changed the course of history and considerably put back the hand of the clock of human progress. But the ever vigilant eyes of the other selves are quick to discern such a deviation and if they are sincere in their own pursuit of truth, goodness and beauty, they would at once seize an opportunity to set their erring leader right.

9. The author being a Christian it is not surprising that he should have rejected as metaphysically unsound and inconsistent with the highest ethical ideal the view that all the selves ultimately merge in an all-comprehensive mighty whole having a universal consciousness and a universal mind. He has also rejected as unworthy of acceptance Hegel's view that there can be any individuals, however great, who may be so privileged as not to be bound by the ordinary rules of morality. He does not deny that there are major events in history which are apparently brought about by human agents without strictly adhering to the ordinary code of morality. But on that ground the human agents should not be believed to be the organs of world-historic movements superior to ethics. On the contrary such persons must be looked upon, as, as it were, events themselves to whom the moral code does not apply or as comparable to natural forces. And as regards the effect on ethics of a study in which the subject is approached from the stand-point of history in all its concreteness, there is a necessity of an investigation into principles which would show the possibility of ethical

progress in the historical world. In such an investigation, the facts of relativity in all values and of the changing visions and stand-points of succeeding generations must be faced. The one great principle which does not succumb to relativity is that of personal freedom. But in the sphere of human relations certain universal laws tend to be re-affirmed. Such a universal law is that which results from an affirmation of the reality of other selves in all its implications. Thus the historical approach leads on the one hand to a more ample conception of the principle of freedom and on the other to certain ruling principles and forms drawn from the experience of other men in all times to which independent spiritual being is attributed in the Platonic and other types of idealism. In ethics the conduct of men is judged on the principle of personal freedom only. It inclines to concentrate attention on the problem of personal freedom in a narrow form, as one of the relation, of will in abstraction from the total personality, to motives viewed as casual in the scientific sense. The individual conceiving his activity under those formulæ appears to objectify himself and create a system under which the true self is sub-merged and a second, not a false, self arises which prevents the inflow of the free energy of the subject. In history, however, the human constructions of the instruments and forces of history act as limitations on the attainment of historic freedom. The human agent confronted by them ceases to be a free agent and has to succumb to them at times.

10. If these principles are borne in mind the future can be made less tragic that the past and the attainment of the highest gcod—the greatest good of the greatest number—can be secured.

11. This is a broad outline of the theory propounded in the course of 275 pages of the work. Though the author has not followed any particular philosopher throughout his exposition, it is like a bees' hive containing honey made of sweetness drawn from several fragrant flowers in the shape of the writings of several authors, ancient and modern. Thus, for instance, his view of the nature of the self is a modification and amplification of his own view put forth in his "Study in the Philosophy of Personality" in the light of that of Mc Taggart, Troeltsch has

supplied him with a method of approach to the problems of historic knowledge and the relativity of values, Rickert and Dilthey have initiated him into the method of dealing of with the problem of history, the relation between biography and history, the cultural sciences and the contribution of psychology etc., Plato, the English Nes-Hegelians and Hartmann have supplied him with the principles of metaphysics and go on. He had also closely studied the life of the living statesman, philosopher, poet and also a thorough man-of-the-world, Sir A. C. Lyall.

12. As containing a novel metaphysical view of the problem of the factors of history and as putting the individual above events and institutions, it is well worth a study by persons interested in history having an insight into metaphysics and ethics but to an ordinary student of history it is likely to prove very abstruse. It was probably because the author had realized that fact that he has appended to his work a comprehensive introduction and summed up all his conclusions in the final chapter, establishing a logical connection between the subject-matters of the intermediate ten chapters which appear at places to be overlapping one another. The usefulness of the book is enhanced by one General Index and one Subject Index. Its get up is also nice but the use of the small types throughout is likely to cause a strain on the eyes and minds of its readers.

—P. C. DIVANJI

Bhāratīya Vidyā : Journal of Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavana, Bombay. [Published twice a year]. Vol. I, Part I. November 1939. Editor: *Manilal Patel*, Ph. D., (Marburg). Published by Secretaries, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Andheri, Bombay.

We most hearlity welcome this Journal. Its first number which is before us contains 5 extension lectures and two articles. The extension lectures are—(1) Fundamentals of Aryan Culture by Mr. K. M. Munshi, (2) Interpretation of the Ṛgveda by Dr. Patel, the Editor, (3) Indian Costume from the earliest times by Dr. Motichandra, (4) the Achaemenians by Dr. Taraporewala, and (5) The Achievements and Failures of the Marathas by Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai. The

article "the Early Aryans in Gujarāta" is a summary of the Thakkar Vassanji Madhavji Lectures delivered by Mr. K. M. Munshi under the auspices of the University of Bombay; and the article "a Hari-Hara Image for North Gujarāt" is from the pen of Prof. M. R. Majumdar. There is not the least doubt that all the articles are first-rate, full of originality and replete with research. Without minimising the importance of any article, we would like to make a special mention (1) of the startling conclusions of Mr. Munshi about the Mahābhārata being a purely imaginary story (p. 84), although he himself admits further (p. 85)—"This is rather a bold inference, and I would not be sorry if further examination reveals that I am mistaken;" (2) of the masterly way in which Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai has characterised the mentality of the Muslim Conquerors of India (p. 70); in the light of this account one can easily understand why all efforts for Hindu-Muslim Unity are bound to fail; (3) of the most interesting account of Indian Costume from the earliest times (profusely illustrated) by Dr. Motichandra. The printing, paper and get-up leave nothing desirable. Besides these learned articles, the Journal contains Reviews, Notes of the Bhavan, etc. We congratulate the editor upon the excellence of the form and matter of the Journal and wish the latter a long and prosperous life.

EDITOR

The Journal of the Śri Śankaragurukulam, Srirangam. Vol. 1, April 1939, No. 1 and 2. Edited by Gurubhaktaśikhāmaṇi, Sastraprasarabhushana *T. K. Balasubrahmanya Aiyar*. Literary Adviser: Vidyāsāgara Vidyāvācaspati P. P. S. Sastri, B. A. (Oxon), M. A., Professor of Sanskrit, Presidency College, Madras.

This is a new journal which is mostly in Sanskrit and we accord a hearty welcome to it. We have received two numbers and are glad to find the promptness with which the second number has followed the first one. The first number contains three original articles in Sanskrit and the second number contains two. We, who are the staunch upholders of the view that the only language which deserves to be the *Rāṣṭrabhāṣā* of our mother-land is Sanskrit, this Journal is most welcome. Apart from the fact that the original articles are written in a

very lucid style and discuss the abstruse points of *advaita* philosophy, the important feature of the journal is that it is publishing for the first time 7 major works, viz. (1) पञ्चरत्नकारिका by सदाशिव, being a commentary on उपदेशसाहस्री of श्रीशङ्कराचार्य. Edited by the Editor of the Journal ; (2) नयमञ्जरी, a poetic commentary on the ब्रह्मसूत्रs, by अप्पय्यदीक्षित, edited by P. P. S. Sastri ; (3) शास्त्रदीपिका with मयूखावली by अप्पय्यदीक्षित, edited by P. P. S. Sastri ; (4) बालभारत of अगस्त्यपण्डित, with मनोहराटीका by साल्व तिम्मय दण्डनाथ, edited by P. P. S. Sastri ; (5) कुमारसंभवचम्पू by श्रीशरभोजि महाराज, edited by the Editor of the Journal ; (6) डमरुक of घनश्यामपण्डित, edited by P. P. S. Sastri , (7) and the most famous work of श्रीभोजदेव namely शृङ्गारप्रकाश. The first part of this work was published in 1926 by His Holiness श्रीयदुगिरि-यतिराज (chapters 22, 23 and 24). The publication had raised great expectations and the scholars were awaiting the 2nd part of this work, which unfortunately never came. We are very much obliged to Prof. P. P. S. Sastri for bringing out its edition. These works are followed by the following *stotras* श्रीराजराजेश्वरीमातृकामन्त्रस्तवः by श्रीशङ्करानन्द ; पार्वत्यष्टकम्, हरिस्तुतिः and हरस्तुतिः by श्रीनिवासकवि. The second number contains the following *stotras* ; हरिहरस्तुतिः and सप्रकारतारकावलिः by श्रीनिवासकवि, निग्रहाष्टकम् by अप्पय्यदीक्षित and कामाक्षीस्तोत्रम्. These are followed by reviews and notes.

We can confidently assert that this is one of the most important additions to the world of Journalism and we wish it all success.

EDITOR

The Ancient Indian Civilisation Series. We are glad to announce to our readers that the Adyar Library has undertaken a new serial publication under this title. The series will contain all aspects of Indian Culture up to 1000 A. D. treated in 30 volumes. The editors—K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, S. S. Suryanarayan Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja are scholars of international reputation and we are confident that this series will prove of immense value to the Scholars as well as the general public. For further details, enquiries should be addressed to the Director, Adyar Library, the Theosophical Society, Adyar, *Madras.*

EDITOR

Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute. Vol. I. No. 1. December 1939. Published quarterly in the months of December, March, June and September, every year. It is the official organ of the Deccan College Post-Graduate Research Institute. Annual Subscription Rs. 12.

The transformation of an Arts College (Deccan College) into a post-graduate research institute is no doubt a welcome change, after honourably leading a life of over half a century or so and especially so when every hope of its revival had been shattered. We must gratefully thank the Congress Government for its inception as well as its execution.

Scholars were anxious to know as to what was being done in the Institute. It is nearly six months when it was inaugurated. This anxiety is relieved by the publication of this Bulletin and we have before us the work done by the Scholars in the Institute.

The Bulletin under review, contains contributions from distinguished Scholars, like Messrs. R. P. Masani, V. S. Sukthankar, S. M. Katre, V. M. Apte, H. D. Sankalia, M. A. Mehendale, C. H. Shaikh, Irawatibai Karve, C. R. Sankaran, R. G. Harshe, T. S. Shejwalkar and they convey the ground from Vedic to Vernacular Subjects exploding old tradition (Indra and Hansa) and embodying new researches even in Vernacular and folk-lore which is attracting the attention of scholars only lately, though MaxMuller had emphasised the importance of the study of Mythology and Folk-lore long ago.

The inauguration of this institute was but a long felt want, and as it has been founded by Government, it would not be lacking in funds like its Sister Institution—we mean—the Bhandarkar O. R. I. of Poona. It is generally found that the Research Scholars are much handicapped by lack of up-to-date research material for their choice subject. No doubt research materials are increasing every day. This Institute fortunately does possess a very old library and provided all its old materials have been collected, it is in itself a valuable possession. But the output of modern research is very great and hence it behoves Government to spare no funds and supplying upto-date materials to these scholars and thus save them from getting stale and insipid.

What India wants for the present is—instead of such wordy researches there ought to be research expeditions in the far off regions as North Asia from Kashmir to the Arctic regions and from Mexico to Patagonia in South America. These are the regions abounding in relics of ancient civilization. So long research expeditions had been undertaken by European and American scholars and not by Indians well-versed in ancient civilization only. Consequently much of Buddhistic material has been explored and not Vedic one, which is lying North of Chinese-Turkstan including Siberia from Caukasus to Camaschataka. If Indian scholars well-versed in Vedic Philology and Vedic Literacy take to such research expeditions we are pretty sure that immense vistas would be open and many Oases of Vedic research would be explored. One day, sooner or later—most probably sooner—some research scholars would unearth a ms. Ṛgvedic hymns either in the depth of the heaps of Cuniform inscription or as an undecipherable mass lying in Devanagari Mss. just like those found in Tibet by the Rev. Rahula Sankrityayana or by the late lamented Dr. Levi in the island of Bali. Such finds are coming to light now-a-days in Siberia, Mangolia or in the Incas or Maya civilizations of America. Such discoveries are sure to be made in the near future if Indians Scholars start expeditions in different regions, equipped with the above sciences of Philology, Ritual, Geology etc. There are so many travelling scholarships in each University which are being expended in going to Europe only. We have now enough Europe returned Scholars well-versed in European Critical methods. Now the axis of research should be directed towards Asia and America ; if Government were to start an initiation in this line there would be no lack of funds from the public in general and wealthy persons in particular.

We conclude by wishing a long and prosperous life to this new Bulletin and request the Government to turn the direction of research to such lines as are suggested above.

N. G. SARDESAI.

PRATĪKA INDEX TO KAVĪNDRACANDRODAYA

N.B.—The references are to verse-numbers

PRATĪKA INDEX TO APPENDIX

सांशयिकः सति भावः। स्वगुणोऽप्सु द्रवत्वमुपलभ्यते, परगुणश्चोष्णता। तेनायं संशयः—किं शरीरगुणश्चेतना शरीरे गृह्यतेऽथ द्रव्यान्तरगुण इति? ॥ ४६ ॥

न[1] शरीरगुणश्चेतना। "कस्मात्?"—

यावच्छरीर[2]भावित्वाद्रूपादीनाम् ॥ ४७ ॥

न रूपादिहीनं शरीरं गृह्यते। चेतनाहीनं तु गृह्यते, यथोष्णताहीना आपः। तस्मान्न शरीरगुणश्चेतनेति।

"संस्कार[3]वदिति चेत्?"—न[4], कारणानुच्छेदात्। यथाविधे द्रव्ये संस्कारः तथाविध एवोपरमो न। तत्र कारणोच्छेदादत्यन्तं संस्कारा-

१ पूर्वपक्षं सांशयिकत्वेनापाकृत्य सिद्धान्तमुपस्थापयति—न शरीरेति।

२ तत्रोत्तरम्—यावच्छरीरेति सूत्रम्। इदं वैधर्म्येण दृष्टान्तसूत्रम्। रूपादिगुणेष्वेव शरीरेणान्वयव्यतिरेकी। रूपादय एव यावच्छरीरभाविनो न पुनश्चैतन्यम्

तथा चात्र प्रयोगः—न शरीरगुणश्चेतना, शरीरेऽपि तस्यानुपलब्धेः, जलस्यौष्ण्यवदिति। इदं सूत्रं तर्कोद्भावनपरमिति परिशुद्धिकृतः। तर्काकारश्च—'यदि बुद्ध्यादिकं शरीरगुणः स्याद्यावच्छरीरभावि स्यात्, रूपादिवदिति'। अनुमानोद्भावनपरमिति वृत्तिकृतः। तदुक्तमनुमानस्वरूपं च—'बुद्ध्यादिकं न शरीरविशेषगुणोऽयावद्द्रव्यभावित्वात्, शब्दवत्, रूपवद्वा (व्यतिरेके)।' अयावद्द्रव्यभावित्वं चाश्रयत्वाभिमतकालीननाशप्रतियोगित्वम्।

३ परः स्वपक्षसाधकं दृष्टान्तान्तरमाह—संस्कारवदिति। यथा संस्कारः शरीरगुणो न च यावच्छरीरं वर्त्तते तथा चेतनापीत्याशयः।

४ तत्परिहरति—न कारणेति।

उक्तवैषम्यपरिजिहीर्षया पर एवं ब्रूयात्—'यथैव संस्कारस्य कारणं तदाश्रयभूतद्रव्यादन्यदेव नोदनादि, यस्य सत्त्वेन तस्योत्पत्तिर्यस्य चोपरमेण तस्योपरमः, एवमेव शरीरगतचैतन्यस्यापि न शरीरमात्रं कारणमपि त्वन्यदेव किमपि तत्सन्निहितमिति'। एतदेव दूषयितुं विकल्पयति। इदमप्यत्रावधेयम्। यच्छरीरे चेतनोत्पत्तिकारणं तत् किं शरीरस्थमुत द्रव्यान्तरस्थम्। शरीरस्थमपि च यावद्द्रव्यभाव्युत नैमित्तिकम्। यदि यावद्द्रव्यभावि न कदाचिच्चेतनाहीनं शरीरमुपलभ्येत, निमित्तस्य सन्निहितत्वात्। अथ नैमित्तिकं, यच्छरीरे चेतनोत्पत्तेर्निमित्तस्य कारणं तत्रापि स एव प्रसङ्गः। अथ द्रव्यान्तरवृत्ति कारणं शरीरे चेतनां करोति न द्रव्यान्तरेष्वित्यत्रापि नियमहेतुर्वक्तव्यः। द्रव्यान्तरस्थं च तत्कारणं नित्यमनित्यं वा। अनित्यमपि कालान्तरावस्थायि प्रतिक्षणध्वंसि वेति स एव प्रसङ्गस्तदवस्थ इत्यादि वार्त्तिके स्पष्टम्।

नुपपत्तिर्भवति । यथाविधे शरीरे चेतना गृह्यते तथाविध एवात्यन्तोपरमश्चेतनाया गृह्यते । तस्मात् संस्कारवदित्यसमः समाधिः ।

"अथापि शरीरस्थं चेतनोत्पत्तिकारणं स्याद् द्रव्यान्तरस्थं वा उभयस्थं वा"। तन्न, नियमहेत्वभावात् । शरीरस्थेन कदाचिच्चेतनोत्पद्यते कदाचिन्नेति नियमे हेतुर्नास्तीति । द्रव्यान्तरस्थेन च शरीर एव चेतनोत्पद्यते न लोष्टादिष्वित्यत्र न नियमे हेतुरस्तीति । उभयस्थस्य निमित्तत्वे शरीरसमानजातीयद्रव्ये चेतना नोत्पद्यते शरीर एव चोत्पद्यत इति नियमे हेतुर्नास्तीति ॥ ४७ ॥

यच्च मन्येत—"सति श्यामादिगुणे द्रव्ये श्यामाद्युपरमो दृष्टः, एवं चेतनोपरमः स्यादिति"—

न[1], पाकजगुणान्तरोत्पत्तेः ॥ ४८ ॥

नात्यन्तं रूपोपरमो द्रव्यस्य—श्यामे रूपे निवृत्ते पाकजं गुणान्तरं रक्तं रूपमुत्पद्यते । शरीरे तु चेतनामात्रोपरमोऽत्यन्तमिति ॥ ४८ ॥

इतश्च[2]—

प्रतिद्वन्द्वि[3]सिद्धेः पाकजानामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४९ ॥

यावत्सु द्रव्येषु पूर्वगुणप्रतिद्वन्द्विसिद्धिस्तावत्सु पाकजोत्पत्तिर्दृश्यते, पूर्वगुणैः सह पाकजानामवस्थानस्याग्रहणात् । न च शरीरे चेतनाप्रतिद्वन्द्विसिद्धौ सहानवस्थायि गुणान्तरं गृह्यते येनानुमीयेत तेन चेतनाया विरोधः । तस्मादप्रतिषिद्धा चेतना यावच्छरीरं वर्तेत ? न तु वर्त्तते । तस्मान्न शरीरगुणश्चेतना इति ॥ ४९ ॥

इतश्च न शरीरगुणश्चेतना—

शरीर[4]व्यापित्वात् ॥ ५० ॥

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१ परिहरति—न पाकजेति सूत्रम् । वृत्तिकृतस्त्वेतत् सूत्रं पूर्वपक्षत्वेन वर्णितवन्तः । तदर्थश्च—द्रव्ये घटादौ सत्येव तत्र पाकानन्तरं गुणान्तरस्योत्पत्तेः 'न' समीचीनं सिद्धान्त्युक्तमिति । तन्मतेनास्यैव पूर्वपक्षस्य परिहारोऽग्रिमे सूत्रे ।

२ तदेवमात्यन्तिकानात्यन्तिकत्वं वैधर्म्यमुक्त्वा सप्रतिद्वन्द्वित्वासप्रतिद्वन्द्वित्वं वैधर्म्यान्तरमुद्भावयितुमाह—इतश्चेति ।

३ तद्वैधर्म्यमेवाह—प्रतिद्वन्द्वीतिसूत्रम् ।

४ तदेव हेत्वन्तरमाह—शरीरव्यापित्वादितिसूत्रम् । नैतत्साधनमपि तु शरीरे चेतनां ब्रुवतोऽनेकचेतनत्वप्रसङ्गोद्भावनमात्रमिति वार्तिककृतः । साधनमेवेति परिशुद्धि-

शरीरं शरीरावयवाश्च सर्वे चेतनोत्पत्त्या व्याप्ता इति न क्वचिदनुत्पत्तिश्चेतनायाः। शरीरवच्छरीरावयवाश्चेतना इति प्राप्तं चेतनबहुत्वम्। तत्र यथा प्रतिशरीरं चेतनबहुत्वे सुखदुःखज्ञानानां व्यवस्था लिङ्गम्, एवमेकशरीरेऽपि स्यात्? न तु भवति। तस्मान्न शरीरगुणश्चेतनेति ॥ ५० ॥

"यदुक्तं[1]—न क्वचिच्छरीरावयवे चेतनाया अनुत्पत्तिः—इति, सा—

न[2], केशनखादिष्वनुपलब्धेः ॥ ५१ ॥

केशेषु नखादिषु चानुत्पत्तिश्चेतनाया इति अनुपपन्नं शरीरव्यापित्वमिति" ॥ ५१ ॥

त्वक्पर्यन्तत्वाच्छरीरस्य केशनखादिष्वप्रसङ्गः ॥ ५२ ॥

इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वं शरीरलक्षणम्। त्वक्पर्यन्तं जीवमनःसुखदुःखसंवित्त्यायतनभूतं शरीरम्। तस्मान्न केशादिषु चेतनोत्पद्यते। अर्थकारितस्तु शरीरोपनिबन्धः केशादीनामिति ॥ ५२ ॥

इतश्च न शरीरगुणश्चेतना—

शरीरगुणवैधर्म्यात्[3] ॥ ५३ ॥

द्विविधः[4] शरीरगुणोऽप्रत्यक्षश्च गुरुत्वम्, इन्द्रियग्राह्यश्च रूपादिः। विधान्तरं[5]

कृतः। तत्र प्रयोगश्चोक्तः—चेतना न शरीरविशेषगुणः, अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वात्, शब्दवदिति भाष्यवार्त्तिकोक्तिस्त्वित्थं व्याख्याता तैः—एष चार्थः 'शरीरव्यापित्वा'दित्येतस्य सूत्रस्य स्पष्टत्वाद्भाष्यकारादिभिरुपेक्षितः। उत्तरसूत्रावतारपरैस्त्वेकस्मिन्नपि शरीरे चेतनबहुत्वप्रसङ्गतया सूत्रं व्याख्यातमिति मन्तव्यमिति।

१ आक्षेपसूत्रमवतारयन् सिद्धान्त्युक्तमनुवदति-यदुक्तमिति। एकस्मिन्नेव शरीरे प्रत्यवयवं चैतन्यं स्यादिति यदुक्तं सिद्धान्तिना तन्नेत्यग्रिमसूत्रस्थनकारेण सम्बन्धः।

२ आक्षेपसूत्रम्—न केशनखेति। दृष्टान्तसूत्रमिदम्।

३ हेतूद्भावनपरं सूत्रम्—शरीरगुणेति। शरीरे ये गुणा वर्तन्ते तेभ्यस्सर्वेभ्योऽपि विलक्षणमेव चैतन्यमित्यर्थः।

४ सूत्रार्थं विशदयति-द्विविध इति। शरीरगुणा द्विधा विभज्यन्ते। केचिदप्रत्यक्षा अनुमेयाः—यथा गुरुत्वम्। केचित्प्रत्यक्षा इन्द्रियग्राह्याः—यथा रूपम्।

५ द्विविधादपि वैलक्षण्यं चैतन्यस्य प्रदर्शयति—विधान्तरमिति। चैतन्यं नाप्रत्यक्षम्—संवेद्यत्वात्—स्वसंवेद्यत्वादेवेत्यर्थः। नापीन्द्रियग्राह्यम् 'मनोविषयत्वात्' मनोमात्रग्राह्यत्वादित्यर्थः। एवं च व्याख्याने मनसोऽनिन्द्रियत्वमभ्युपगतं भवतीति

तु चेतना-नाप्रत्यक्षा संवेद्यत्वात्, नेन्द्रियग्राह्या मनोविषयत्वात् । तस्माद्[1] द्रव्यान्तरगुण इति ॥ ५३ ॥

"न[2] रूपादीनामितरेतरवैधर्म्यात् ॥ ५४ ॥

यथेतरेतरविधर्माणो रूपादयो न शरीरगुणत्वं जहत्येवं रूपादिवैधर्म्याच्चेतना शरीरगुणत्वं न हास्यतीति" ॥ ५४ ॥

ऐन्द्रियकत्वाद्रूपादीनामप्रतिषेधः[3] ॥ ५५ ॥

अप्रत्यक्षत्वाच्चेति । यथेतरेतरविधर्माणो रूपादयो न द्वैविध्यमतिवर्तन्ते तथा रूपादिवैधर्म्याच्चेतना न द्वैविध्यमतिवर्त्तेत यदि शरीरगुणः स्यादिति । अतिवर्तते तु । तस्मान्न शरीरगुण इति ।

भूतेन्द्रियमनसां[4] ज्ञानप्रतिषेधात् सिद्धे सत्यारम्भो विशेषज्ञापनार्थः । बहुधा[5] परीक्ष्यमाणं तत्त्वं सुनिश्चिततरं भवतीति ॥ ५५ ॥

कृत्वा वार्त्तिककारेणान्यथा व्याख्यातमिदं वाक्यम् । तद्यथा-चेतना 'न प्रत्यक्षा न बाह्यकरणप्रत्यक्षा, स्वसंवेद्यत्वात्, 'नापि अप्रत्यक्षा' न अतीन्द्रिया, मनोविषयत्वादिति । एवं च व्याख्याने एवम्पाठोऽभिप्रेतः-'न प्रत्यक्षा संवेद्यत्वात्, नातीन्द्रियग्राह्या मनोविषयत्वादिति' ।

१ उपसंहरति-तस्मादिति । चेतना शरीरभिन्नद्रव्याश्रयेत्यर्थः ।

२ आक्षिपति-न रूपादीनामितिसूत्रेण । शरीरगुणवैधर्म्यमात्रान्न शरीरावृत्तित्वं चेतनायाः सिद्ध्यतीत्यर्थः ।

३ समाधत्ते-ऐन्द्रियकत्वादितिसूत्रेण । शरीरगतरूपादयः परस्परविधर्माणोऽपि मुख्येंऽशे सधर्माण एवेत्यर्थः । 'अप्रतिषेधः' शरीराश्रयत्वस्येति शेषः ।

४ 'यथोक्तहेतुत्वादि'त्यादि (३८) सूत्रोक्तेन बुद्धेर्भूतेन्द्रियमनोऽवृत्तित्वेनैतत्प्रकरणस्य पौनरुक्त्यमाशङ्कमानः समाधत्ते-भूतेन्द्रियमनसामिति । सिद्धेऽप्यर्थे विशेषज्ञापनार्थमेतत्प्रकरणम् । व्याख्यातमेतत्समाधानमेतत्प्रकरणारम्भे 'द्रव्य'इत्यादि (४६) सूत्रव्याख्याने ।

५ विशेषज्ञापनस्य फलमाह-बहुधेति ।

(६) मनःपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्।

परीक्षिता[2] बुद्धिः। मनस इदानीं परीक्षाक्रमः। तत्[3] किं प्रतिशरीरमेकमनेकमिति विचारे[4]—

ज्ञाना[5]यौगपद्यादेकं मनः ॥ ५६ ॥

अस्ति खलु वै ज्ञानायौगपद्यमेकैकस्येन्द्रियस्य यथाविषयम्—करणस्यैकप्रत्ययनिर्वृत्तौ सामर्थ्यात्। न तदेकत्वे मनसो लिङ्गम्। यत्तु खल्विदमिन्द्रियान्तराणां विषयान्तरेषु ज्ञानायौगपद्यमिति तल्लिङ्गम्। कस्मात्? सम्भवति खलु वै बहुषु मनःस्विन्द्रियमनःसंयोगयौगपद्यमिति ज्ञानयौगपद्यं स्यात्। न तु भवति। तस्माद्विषये प्रत्ययपर्यायादेकं मनः ॥ ५६ ॥

"न, युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः ॥ ५७ ॥

अयं खल्वध्यापकोऽधीते, व्रजति, कमण्डलुं धारयति, पन्थानं पश्यति, शृणोत्यरण्यजान् शब्दान्, बिभेति, व्याललिङ्गानि बुभुत्सते, स्मरति च गन्तव्यं स्थानीयमिति क्रमस्याग्रहणाद्युगपदेताः क्रिया इति प्राप्तं मनसो बहुत्वमिति" ॥ ५७ ॥

अलातचक्रदर्शनवत्तदुपलब्धिराशुसंचारात् ॥ ५८ ॥

आशुसञ्चारादलातस्य भ्रमतो विद्यमानः क्रमो न गृह्यते। क्रमस्याग्रहणादविच्छेदबुद्ध्या चक्रवद्बुद्धिर्भवति। तथा बुद्धीनां क्रियाणां चाशुवृत्ति-

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१ 'युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमि'ति मनोलक्षणम्। एतच्च मनसः एकस्मिन् शरीरे बहुत्वेनाशुसञ्चारित्वेन विभुत्वेन वा स्यात्। एवं चास्य विचारस्य साम्प्रत्ययिकव्यवहाराविरोधेन धारणायामेकाग्रतासिद्धिः प्रयोजनं स्यात्। अन्यथा त्वेकस्मिन् प्रत्याहृतेऽपि मनोन्तरविक्षेपादसञ्चारित्वे विभुत्वे वा प्रत्याहर्त्तुमशक्यत्वात् न प्रत्याहारादिसिद्धिः। तथा च निदिध्यासनासिद्धौ मननानुपयोगे न्यायविद्यावैयर्थ्यमापद्येत। अत एव प्रतिशरीरम्मन एकमनेकं वेति विचारस्यावश्यकता।

२ तस्य क्रममाह–परीक्षितेति। प्रथमाध्यायनवमसूत्रे प्रमेयाणामुद्देशे बुद्ध्यनन्तरम्मन एव पठितमत एव बुद्धिपरीक्षानन्तरम्मनसः परीक्षावसरः।

३ विचारविषयं प्रस्तौति–तत्किं प्रतिशरीरमिति।

४ विचार इति। अस्य विचारे सति अयं सूत्रोक्तः सिद्धान्त इति वाक्यशेषः।

५ तत्र सिद्धान्तेनोपक्रमते–ज्ञानायौगपद्यादितिसूत्रम्। यस्माज्ज्ञानानि न युगपदुत्पद्यन्ते तस्मान्मनः प्रतिशरीरमेकमेवेत्यर्थः।

त्वाद्विद्यमानः क्रमो न गृह्यते । क्रमस्याग्रहणाद्युगपत् क्रिया भवन्तीत्यभिमानो भवति ।

"किं पुनः[1] क्रमस्याग्रहणाद् युगपत् क्रियाभिमानः अथ युगपद्भावादेव युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धिरिति ? नात्र विशेषप्रतिपत्तेः कारणमुच्यत इति"।

उक्तम्[2]—इन्द्रियान्तराणां विषयान्तरेषु पर्यायेण बुद्धयो भवन्ति—इति । तच्चाप्रत्याख्येयमात्मप्रत्यक्षत्वात् । अथापि दृष्टश्रुतानर्थान् चिन्तयतः क्रमेण बुद्धयो वर्तन्ते न युगपदनेनानुमातव्यमिति । वर्णपदवाक्यबुद्धीनां तदर्थबुद्धीनां चाशुवृत्तित्वात् क्रमस्याग्रहणम् । कथम् ? वाक्यस्थेषु खलु वर्णेषूच्चरत्सु प्रतिवर्णं तावच्छ्रवणं भवति । श्रुतं वर्णमेकमनेकं वा पदभावेन प्रतिसन्धत्ते । प्रतिसन्धाय पदं व्यवस्यति । पदव्यवसायेन स्मृत्या पदार्थं प्रतिपद्यते । पदसमूहप्रतिसन्धानाच्च वाक्यं व्यवस्यति । सम्बद्धाँश्च पदार्थान् गृहीत्वा वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यते । न चासां क्रमेण वर्तमानानां बुद्धीनामाशुवृत्तित्वात् क्रमो गृह्यते । तदेतदनुमानमन्यत्र[3] बुद्धिक्रियायौगपद्याभिमानस्येति ।

न[4] चास्ति मुक्तसंशयं युगपदुत्पत्तिर्बुद्धीनां यया मनसां बहुत्वमेकशरीरेऽनुमीयेत इति ॥ ५८ ॥

यथोक्तहेतुत्वाच्चाणु ॥ ५९ ॥

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१ परिहारं सांशयिकत्वेन व्युदस्यति-किम्पुनरिति । अलातचक्रभ्रमिषु ज्ञानेषु च या यौगपद्यबुद्धिर्भवति लोकानां सा क्रमस्य सद्भावाद् भ्रान्तिरूपा आहोस्वित्क्रमस्यासद्भावात् प्रमैवेत्येकतरपक्षसाधकं किञ्चिन्नोच्यते सिद्धान्तिना येन भ्रान्तिपक्षः एकः प्रामाणिकत्वेन स्वीक्रियेत । तथा च ज्ञानायौगपद्यं संशयग्रस्तमेवेति भावः ।

२ तत्रोत्तरम्—उक्तमिति । नानाविषयाणि ज्ञानानि क्रमिकाण्येव भवन्तीत्युभयवादिसम्मतम्, प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयत्वादित्याह-अप्रत्याख्येयमिति ।

३ उपसंहरति—तदेतदिति । उक्तज्ञानेषु क्रमिकत्वदर्शनमेव हेतुर्भवति ज्ञानयौगपद्यबुद्धेर्भ्रान्तित्वसाधने—इत्यर्थः । 'यौगपद्याभिमानो' यौगपद्यभ्रान्तिरिति यावत् । तस्य अनुमानं साधनभूतं लिङ्गमित्यर्थः ।

४ परोद्भावितान् ज्ञानयौगपद्यसाधकान् दृष्टान्तान् व्युदस्य प्रकरणार्थमुपसंहरति—न चास्तीति । 'मुक्तसंशयम्' उभयवादिसम्मतमित्यर्थः । कुत्रापि दृष्टान्ते ज्ञानयौगपद्यमुभयवादिसम्मतन्नोपलभ्यते—एवं च ज्ञानानामयौगपद्यसिद्धौ प्रतिशरीरं मनसो बहुत्वञ्चैव सिद्ध्यतीत्यर्थः ।

अणु मन एकं चेति धर्मसमुच्चयो ज्ञानायौगपद्यात्। महत्त्वे मनसः सर्वेन्द्रियसंयोगाद्युगपद्विषयग्रहणं स्यादिति ॥ ५९ ॥

(७) शरीरस्यादृष्टनिष्पाद्यत्वप्रकरणम्।

मनसः[1] खलु भोः सेन्द्रियस्य[2] शरीरे वृत्तिलाभो नान्यत्र शरीरात्। ज्ञातुश्च[3] पुरुषस्य शरीरायतना बुद्ध्यादयो विषयोपभोगो जिहासितहानमीप्सितावाप्तिश्च सर्वे च शरीराश्रया व्यवहाराः। तत्र[4] खलु विप्रतिपत्तेः संशयः—किमयं पुरुषकर्मनिमित्तः शरीरसर्गः? आहो भूतमात्रादकर्मनिमित्त इति? श्रूयते[5] खल्वत्र विप्रतिपत्तिरिति।

तत्रेदं तत्त्वम्—

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः[6] ॥ ६० ॥

१ अत्राग्रिमप्रकरणस्य पूर्वापरसम्बन्धम्प्रदर्शयन्नाह—मनसः खल्विति। मन एवाधिकरणविचारेणापि परीक्ष्यत इति नासम्बन्धः शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तविचारस्य। 'परीक्षा' नाम 'परितः ईक्षा' सा च स्वरूपतः सम्बन्धितश्च। शरीरं च मनस आश्रयस्तस्मात् तत्सम्बन्धि। तस्मान्मनस एवेयं परीक्षा या शरीरस्येत्यर्थः। अत्र परिशुद्धिकृतः—प्रयोजनं चास्य प्रकरणस्य—विग्रहव्यवस्था संसारापवर्गव्यवस्था प्रायणव्यवस्था च। अदृष्टाख्यनिमित्तसम्भवे च वर्णाश्रमवृत्तयस्तदर्थालोचनशास्त्राणि च सार्थकानि स्युः। अन्यथा सर्वमेतदनुकारनृत्यमरण्यरुदितं च स्यात्। तदनेन प्रकरणेन सर्वाण्येवातीतानि प्रकरणान्युपक्रियन्ते उत्तराध्यायश्चेति। शरीरमेव पुरुषस्योपभोगायतनम्। मनसश्चेन्द्रियवच्छरीर एव वृत्तिः। एतदुभयमपि शरीरस्यादृष्टनिमित्तत्व एवोपपद्यते। अत एवैतत्परीक्षावश्यकत्तम्। शरीरपरीक्षानन्तरमेव तददृष्टनिमित्तत्वपरीक्षाया अवसर इति प्रतिभाति। किन्तु पुरुषोपभोगप्रधानकरणभूतस्य मनसः परीक्षानन्तरमेव तस्या सम्यगवसर इति ज्ञेयम्।

२ सेन्द्रियस्येति। इन्द्रियसहितस्य मनसः, इन्द्रियाणां मनसश्चेत्यर्थः।

३ मनस आश्रयत्वेन शरीरमुपवर्ण्योपभोगायतनत्वेन च तद्दर्शयति—ज्ञातुरिति।

४ प्रकरणप्रवर्तकसंशयम्प्रदर्शयति—तत्र खल्विति। अदृष्टोद्भावितभूतपरमाण्वारब्धं शरीरमितिप्रथमः कल्पः। अदृष्टनिरपेक्षैरेव भूतपरमाणुभिरारब्धमित्यपरः।

५ कथं ज्ञायतेऽस्तीयं विप्रतिपत्तिरित्याह—श्रूयत इति। नानादर्शनग्रन्थेषूपलभ्यत इत्यर्थः।

६ अत्र विप्रतिपत्तौ निषेधकोटिस्त्रेधा समुल्लसति—(१) अदृष्टाभावात्—(२) शरीरहेतुत्वाभावात्—(३) अदृष्टस्य पुरुषसमवायाभावाद्वेति। तत्र सिद्धान्तमुपक्रममाण आद्यां विप्रतिपत्तिकोटिन्निरस्यति—पूर्वकृतेतिसूत्रेण। 'पूर्वकृतस्य' पूर्वकृत-

पूर्वशरीरे या प्रवृत्तिर्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भलक्षणा तत्पूर्वकृतं कर्मोक्तम्। तस्य फलं तज्जनितौ धर्माधर्मौ। तत्फलस्यानुबन्ध आत्मसमवेतस्यावस्थानम्। तेन प्रयुक्तेभ्यो भूतेभ्यस्तस्योत्पत्तिः शरीरस्य, न स्वतन्त्रेभ्य इति। यदधिष्ठानोऽयमात्माऽयमहमिति मन्यमानो यत्राभियुक्तो यत्रोपभोगतृष्णया विषयाऽनुपलभमानो धर्माधर्मौ संस्करोति तदस्य शरीरम्। तेन संस्कारेण धर्माधर्मलक्षणेन भूतसहितेन पतितेऽस्मिन् शरीरे शरीरान्तरं निष्पद्यते। निष्पन्नस्य चास्यपूर्वशरीरवत्पुरुषार्थक्रिया। पुरुषस्य च पूर्वशरीरवत् प्रवृत्तिरिति। कर्मापेक्षेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः शरीरसर्गे सत्येतदुपपद्यत इति। दृष्टा च पुरुषगुणेन प्रयत्नेन प्रयुक्तेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः पुरुषार्थक्रियासमर्थानां द्रव्याणां रथप्रभृतीनामुत्पत्तिः। तथानुमातव्यं-शरीरमपि पुरुषार्थक्रियासमर्थमुत्पद्यमानं पुरुषस्य गुणान्तरापेक्षेभ्यो भूतेभ्य उत्पद्यत इति ॥ ६० ॥

अत्र[1] नास्तिक आह--

"भूतेभ्यो[2] मूर्त्युपादानवत्तदुपादानम्" ॥ ६१ ॥

"यथा कर्मनिरपेक्षेभ्यो भूतेभ्यो निर्वृत्ता मूर्तयः सिकताशर्करापाषाणगैरिकाञ्जनप्रभृतयः पुरुषार्थकारित्वादुपादीयन्ते तथा कर्मनिरपेक्षेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः शरीरमुत्पन्नं पुरुषार्थकारित्वादुपादीयत इति" ॥ ६१ ॥

न[3], साध्यसमत्वात् ॥ ६२ ॥

कर्मणो यागदानहिंसादेः 'फलस्य' धर्माधर्मरूपस्य 'अनुबन्धात्' आत्मनि समवायात् 'तस्य' शरीरस्य 'उत्पत्तिः' इति सम्बन्धः। धर्माधर्मप्रयुक्तेभ्य एव भूतेभ्यः शरीरस्योत्पत्तिर्न स्वतन्त्रेभ्य इत्यर्थः।

१ परकृतमाक्षेपं प्रस्तौति-अत्रेति। नास्ति परलोको न धर्माधर्माविति यस्याभ्युपगमः स एव नास्तिकपदवाच्यः।

२ नास्तिककृताक्षेपमाह-भूतेभ्य इतिसूत्रेण। पुरुषादृष्टकृतं शरीरम्, पुरुषार्थक्रियासामर्थ्यादिति हेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वोद्भावनपरमिदं सूत्रम्। 'भूतेभ्यः' परमाणुभ्यो 'मूर्तेः' 'सिकतादेः' 'उपादानं' आरम्भो यथा भवति-पुरुषादृष्टनिरपेक्षेभ्य एवेति शेषः-तथैव शरीरस्यापीत्यर्थो वृत्तिकारवर्णितः। 'भूतेभ्यः' कर्मनिरपेक्षेभ्यः परमाणुभ्यो निष्पन्नायाः 'मूर्तेः' सिकतादिमूर्तद्रव्याणाम् 'उपादानं' आसादनं यथा पुरुषेण क्रियते तथैव शरीरस्यापीति भाष्यकारीयं व्याख्यानम्।

३ आक्षेपं परिहरति—न साध्यसमत्वादितिसूत्रेण। पूर्वसूत्रे यदुद्भावितं तस्य दृष्टान्तमात्रत्वादसाधकत्वमेव। "अथ निरपेक्षाणि भूतानि शरीरमारभन्ते पुरुषार्थ-

यथा[1] शरीरोत्पत्तिरकर्मनिमित्ता साध्या तथा सिकताशर्करापाषाणगैरिकाञ्जनप्रभृतीनामप्यकर्मनिमित्तः सर्गः साध्यः। साध्यसमत्वादसाधनमिति ॥ ६ ॥

'भूतेभ्यो[2] मूर्त्युपादानवदि'ति चानेन साम्यम्—

नोत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वान्मातापित्रोः ॥ ६३ ॥

विषमश्चायमुपन्यासः। कस्मात्? निर्बीजा इमा मूर्तय उत्पद्यन्ते, बीजपूर्विका तु शरीरोत्पत्तिः। मातापितृशब्देन लोहितरेतसी बीजभूते गृह्येते। तत्र[3] सत्त्वस्य गर्भवासानुभवनीयं कर्म पित्रोश्च पुत्रफलानुभवनीये कर्मणी मातुर्गर्भाश्रये शरीरोत्पत्तिं भूतेभ्यः प्रयोजयन्तीत्युपपन्नं[4] बीजानुविधानमिति ॥ ६३ ॥

तथाऽऽहारस्य[5] ॥ ६४ ॥

क्रियासामर्थ्यात् सिकतादिवत्"—इत्यनुमानमाक्षेप्तुरभिमतम्। तत्रापि न सन् हेतुः, तस्याद्यत्वेऽप्यसिद्धत्वादेवेत्यर्थः।

१ सूत्रं व्याचष्टे—यथा शरीरेति। 'साध्या' नोभयवादिसम्मता। साध्यः उभयवाद्यनभ्युपगतत्वादसिद्ध एवेति। यच्च नोभयवादिसम्मतं तन्न दृष्टान्तत्वेन उपादातुं योग्यमित्यर्थः। सिकतादीनामपि पुरुषकर्मनिमित्तक एव सर्गोऽस्माकमभिमतस्तथा च न सिकतादिदृष्टान्तोऽपि तूभयवादिसम्मतो रथादिरेव दृष्टान्तस्स च पुरुषगुणविशेषप्रयत्नपूर्वक एव दृष्टः—न च तथाऽकर्मनिमित्तकसर्गस्य क्वचिद्दृष्टान्त उभयवादिसम्प्रतिपन्नो लभ्यत इति हृदयम्।

२ परोद्भावितं दृष्टान्तमसिद्धत्वेन निरस्य तस्य प्रकृते दृष्टान्तत्वमेव न भवतीत्याह—भूतेभ्य इति। 'भूतेभ्यो मूर्त्युपादानवदिति' यदुक्तमाक्षेप्त्रा तस्य 'अनेन' प्रकृतेन शरीरसर्गेण 'साम्यम्' 'न' भवतीति सूत्रस्थेन नकारेण सम्बन्धः।

३ उक्तमर्थं प्रकृते योजयन् शरीरोत्पत्तिप्रक्रियां वर्णयन् तत्र पुरुषकर्मसापेक्षतां दर्शयति—तत्र सत्त्वस्येति। मातुर्गर्भाशयगतलोहितेन यदा पितृरेतस्संयुज्यते तदाऽस्य संयोगस्य कारणं पुरुषकर्मैव भवति—तदेतत् कर्म जनिष्यमाणस्यात्मनः गर्भवाससुखदुःखाद्यनुभावकमित्येकम्—पित्रोश्च पुत्रजन्मसुखाद्यनुभावकमित्यपरम्। 'अनुभवनीये' इत्यत्र कर्तरि कृत्यप्रत्ययः।

४ उपपन्नमिति—उक्तप्रकारेण सिद्धम्भवति यच्छरीरोत्पत्तौ लोहितरेतोरूपं बीजमेव साक्षात्कारणम्—पुरुषकर्म च तत्कारणप्रयोजकतयैव निमित्तमिति भावः।

५ शरीरोत्पत्तौ निमित्तान्तरं प्रदर्शयति—तथेतिसूत्रेण।

'[1]उत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वादि'ति प्रकृतम्। भुक्तं पीतमाहारस्तस्य पक्तिनिर्वृत्तं रसद्रव्यं मातृशरीरे चोपचिते बीजे गर्भाशयस्थे बीजसमानपाकं, मात्रया चोपचयो बीजे यावद् व्यूहसमर्थः सञ्चय इति। सञ्चितं च कललार्बुदमांसपेशीकण्डरशिरःपाण्यादिना च व्यूहेनेन्द्रियाधिष्ठानभेदेन व्यूह्यते। व्यूहे च गर्भनाड्यावतारितं रसद्रव्यमुपचीयते यावत्प्रसवसमर्थमिति। न चायमन्नपानस्य स्थाल्यादिगतस्य कल्पत इति। एतस्मात्कारणात्कर्मनिमित्तत्वं शरीरस्य विज्ञायत इति ॥ ६४ ॥

प्राप्तौ चानियमात् ॥ ६५ ॥

न सर्वो दम्पत्योः संयोगो गर्भाधानहेतुर्दृश्यते। तत्रासति कर्मणि न भवति सति च भवतीत्यनुपपन्नो नियमाभाव इति। कर्मनिरपेक्षेषु भूतेषु शरीरोत्पत्तिहेतुषु नियमः स्यात्। न ह्यत्र कारणाभाव इति ॥ ६५ ॥

[2]अथापि—

शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत्[3]संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्म ॥ ६६ ॥

यथा खल्विदं शरीरं धातुप्राणसंवाहिनीनां नाडीनां शुक्रान्तानां धातूनां च स्नायुत्वगस्थिशिरापेशिकललकण्डराणां च शिरोबाहूदराणां सक्थ्नाञ्च कोष्ठगानां वातपित्तकफानां च मुखकण्ठहृदयामाशयपक्वाशयाधःस्रोतसां च परमदुःखसम्पादनीयेन सन्निवेशेन व्यूहनमशक्यं पृथिव्यादिभिः कर्मनिरपेक्षैरुत्पादयितुमिति कर्मनिमित्ता शरीरोत्पत्तिरिति विज्ञायते। ए[4]वञ्च प्रत्यात्मनि-

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१ सौत्रं वाक्यं पूरयितुमाह—उत्पत्तीति। एवं च तथाऽऽहारस्योत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वादिति सूत्रस्वरूपं पर्यवसितम्।

२ सम्भाव्यमानदोषपरिहारपरं सूत्रमवतारयति—अथापीति।

३ नन्वात्मनां विभुत्वात् सकलशरीरैः समं सम्बन्धात् 'इदं शरीरमस्यैवैकस्यात्मन' इत्यत्र किन्नियामकमित्यस्योत्तरम्—शरीरोत्पत्तीति सूत्रम्। यथा प्रत्यात्मशरीरस्योत्पत्तौ तत्तदात्मनोऽदृष्टं निमित्तम्भवति तथैव आत्मविशेषस्य शरीरविशेषेण संयोगस्य सम्बन्धस्याप्यदृष्टमेव कारणमिति सूत्रार्थः।

केचित्तु सूत्रमिदमेवं व्याचक्षते—ननु प्रत्यात्मशरीरोत्पत्तौ भवत्वदृष्टं निमित्तं मातापित्रोस्तु संयोगे किन्निमित्तमित्यत आह—शरीरोत्पत्तीति सूत्रम्। यथा शरीरोत्पत्तावदृष्टं कारणं तथैव मातापित्रोस्संयोगेऽप्यदृष्टमेव निमित्तमित्यर्थ इति।

४ पूर्वनिर्णीतसिद्धान्तमनूद्य परोद्भावितदोषमनुवदति—एवञ्च प्रत्यात्मेति। सर्वे आत्मानो विभवः—अतः सर्वेषामात्मनां शरीरारम्भकपृथिव्यादिभिस्समाने सम्बन्धे प्रत्येकमात्मनः प्रत्येकशरीरे प्रतिनियमने कारणाभावः।

यतस्य निमित्तस्याभावान्निरतिशयैरात्मभिः सम्बन्धात्सर्वात्मनां च समानैः पृथिव्यादिभिरुत्पादितं शरीरं पृथिव्यादिगतस्य च नियमहेतोरभावात् सर्वात्मनां[1] सुखदुःखसंवित्त्यायतनं समानं प्राप्तम्। यत्तु[2] प्रत्यात्मं व्यवतिष्ठते तत्र शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्मव्यवस्थाहेतुरिति विज्ञायते। परिपच्यमानो हि प्रत्यात्मनियतः कर्माशयो यस्मिन्नात्मनि वर्तते तस्यैवोपभोगायतनं शरीरमुत्पाद्य व्यवस्थापयति। तदेवं 'शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत्संयोगनिमित्तं कर्म' इति विज्ञायते। प्रत्यात्मव्यवस्थानं[3] तु शरीरस्यात्मना संयोगं प्रचक्ष्मह इति ॥ ६६ ॥

एतेनानियमः[4] प्रत्युक्तः ॥ ६७ ॥

योऽयमकर्मनिमित्ते शरीरसर्गे सत्यनियम इत्युच्यते अयं शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत् संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्मेत्यनेन प्रत्युक्तः। कस्तावदयं नियमः? यथैकस्यात्मनः शरीरं तथा सर्वेषामिति नियमः। अन्यस्यान्यथान्यस्यान्यथेत्यनियमो भेदो व्यावृत्तिर्विशेष इति। दृष्टा च जन्मव्यावृत्तिः उच्चाभिजनो

१ आत्मगतनियमहेत्वभावमनूद्य पृथिव्यादिगतोऽपि नियमहेतुर्नास्तीत्याह—पृथिव्यादिगतस्य चेति। एवञ्च नियमहेतोरभावात् सर्वेषामात्मनामुपभोगायतनमेकमेव शरीरमिति प्राप्तम्।

२ एवं परोद्भावितं दोषमनूद्य तत्परिहारमुपन्यस्यति—यत्तु प्रत्यात्ममिति। प्रत्येकमात्मना सम्बद्धमेकमेव शरीरमिति प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयमेतत्। तत्र विभोरप्यात्मन एकशरीरमात्रनियामको हेतुस्तस्यादृष्टमेव।

३ यच्च सूत्रे संयोगपदेनोक्तं तदेतदेव यत्प्रत्यात्ममेकस्य शरीरस्य नियमनमित्याह—प्रत्यात्मव्यवस्थानमिति।

४ तदेवमात्मगुणनिबन्धने शरीरसर्गे व्यवस्था दर्शिता। अत्र सांख्या मन्यन्ते—" न कर्मनिबन्धनः शरीरसर्गोऽपि तु प्रकृत्यादिनिबन्धनः। प्रकृतयो हि स्वयमेव धर्माधर्मरूपनिमित्तानपेक्षाः सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपतया प्रवृत्तिशीलाः स्वं स्वं विकारमारभन्ते—प्रतिबन्धापगममात्रे तु धर्माधर्मावपेक्षन्ते " इति। तान्प्रत्याह—एतेनानियम इति सूत्रम्। तस्यार्थः—'एतेन' कर्मसापेक्षैरेव भूतैः शरीरनिष्पत्तिरिति व्यवस्थापनेन 'अनियमः' प्रत्यात्मं शरीरभेदः कस्यचिदात्मनः किञ्चिदेव शरीरं कस्यचित् किंचिदन्यदेवेत्येवंरूपः— प्रत्युक्तः' व्यतिरेकमुखेनेति शेषः—साङ्ख्यमतेऽनुपपद्यमानतया प्रदर्शित इति भावः।

एतदेव सूत्रव्याख्यानभाष्यवार्त्तिकतात्पर्यवृत्त्यादिसम्मतम्। केचित्त्वन्यथैव व्याख्यानमभिप्रयन्ति। तद्यथा—'एतेन' शरीरोत्पत्तेरदृष्टनिष्पाद्यत्वेन 'अनियमः' सर्वेषामात्मनां सर्वाण्येव शरीराणीत्येवंरूपः परोद्भावितः 'प्रत्युक्तः' परिहृत इत्यर्थः।

निकृष्टाभिजन इति, प्रशस्तं निन्दितमिति, व्याधिबहुलमरोगमिति, समग्रं विकलमिति, पीडाबहुलं सुखबहुलमिति, पुरुषातिशयलक्षणोपपन्नं विपरीतमिति, प्रशस्तलक्षणं निन्दितलक्षणमिति, पट्विन्द्रियं मृद्विन्द्रियमिति । सूक्ष्मश्च भेदोऽपरिमेयः । सोऽयं जन्मभेदः प्रत्यात्मनियतात्कर्मभेदादुपपद्यते । असति कर्मभेदे प्रत्यात्मनियते निरतिशयित्वादात्मनां समानत्वाच्च पृथिव्यादीनां पृथिव्यादिगतस्य नियमहेतोरभावात्सर्वं सर्वात्मनां प्रसज्येत । न त्विदमित्थम्भूतं जन्म । तस्मान्नाकर्मनिमित्ता शरीरोत्पत्तिरिति ।

उपपन्नश्च[1] तद्वियोगः कर्मक्षयोपपत्तेः । कर्मनिमित्ते[2] शरीरसर्गे तेन शरीरेणात्मनो वियोग उपपन्नः । कस्मात्? कर्मक्षयोपपत्तेः । उपपद्यते खलु कर्मक्षयः । सम्यग्दर्शनात् प्रक्षीणे मोहे वीतरागः पुनर्भवहेतु कर्म कायवाङ्मनोभिर्न करोति इत्युत्तरस्यानुपचयः । पूर्वोपचितस्य विपाकप्रतिसंवेदनात्प्रक्षयः । एवं प्रसवहेतोरभावात् पतितेऽस्मिन् शरीरे पुनः शरीरान्तरानुपपत्तेरप्रतिसन्धिः । अकर्मनिमित्ते तु शरीरसर्गे भूतक्षयानुपपत्तेस्तद्वियोगानुपपत्तिरिति ॥ ६७ ॥

" तददृष्टकारितमिति[3] चेत् " पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे ॥ ६८ ॥

" अदर्शनं खल्वदृष्टमित्युच्यते । अदृष्टकारिता भूतेभ्यः शरीरोत्पत्तिः । न जात्वनुत्पन्ने शरीरे द्रष्टा निरायतनो दृश्यं पश्यति । तच्चास्य दृश्यं द्विविधं— विषयश्च नानात्वं चाव्यक्तात्मनोः । तदर्थः शरीरसर्गः । तस्मिन्नवसिते चरितार्थानि भूतानि न शरीरमुत्पादयन्तीत्युपपन्नः शरीरवियोग इति " ।

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१ शरीरोत्पत्तेरदृष्टनिमित्तत्वे हेत्वन्तरमाह-उपपन्न इति । एतद्वाक्यं केचित्सूत्रत्वेनाभिप्रयन्ति । तत्र प्रमाणाभावाद्भाष्यमेवेति निर्धारितम् । शरीरस्य पुरुषादृष्टनिमित्तत्व एव तस्य कर्मक्षयाच्छरीरवियोगोऽप्युपपद्यते नान्यथेत्यर्थः ।

२ उक्तमेव विशदयति—कर्मनिमित्त इति ।

३ साङ्ख्योद्भावितशरीरवियोगोपपत्तिं प्रदर्श्य दूषयति—तददृष्टेतिसूत्रेण । चेदन्तम्पराभिमतोपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्पुनरित्यादि तद्दूषणम् । अदृष्टमित्यस्य क्तप्रत्ययस्य भावार्थत्वे ' अदृष्टम् ' अदर्शनम् । तच्चादर्शनमुपभोग्यशब्दादेर्विषयस्य प्रकृतिपुरुषभेदस्य चाभिप्रेतम् । तत्कारित एव शरीरवियोग इति पराभिमतम् । तस्य दूषणम्— पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्ग इति । एवं हि अपवर्गे सत्यपि पुनः शरीरोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः ।

एवं चेन्मन्यसे[1] ? पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे । पुनः[2] शरीरोत्पत्तिः प्रसज्यत इति । या[3] चानुत्पन्ने शरीरे दर्शनानुत्पत्तिरदर्शनाभिमता—या चापवर्गे शरीरनिवृत्तौ दर्शनानुत्पत्तिरदर्शनभूता—नैतयोरदर्शनयोः क्वचिद्विशेष इत्यदर्शनस्यानिवृत्तेरपवर्गे पुनः शरीरोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति ।

"चरितार्थता[4] विशेष इति चेत्"—न[5], करणाकरणयोरारम्भदर्शनात् । "चरितार्थानि[6] भूतानि दर्शनावसानान्न[7] शरीरान्तरमारभन्ते इत्ययं विशेष" एवं चेदुच्यते ? न[8], करणाकरणयोरारम्भदर्शनात् । चरितार्थानां[9] भूतानां विषयोपलब्धिकरणात्पुनः पुनः शरीरारम्भो दृश्यते, प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्नानात्वदर्शनस्याकरणान्निरर्थकः शरीरारम्भः पुनः पुनर्दृश्यते । तस्मादकर्मनिमित्तायां भूतसृष्टौ न दर्शनार्था शरीरोत्पत्तिर्युक्ता । युक्ता तु कर्मनिमित्ते सर्गे दर्शनार्था शरीरोत्पत्तिः । कर्मविपाकसंवेदनं दर्शनमिति ।

"तददृष्टकारितमिति[10] चेत्" कस्यचिद्दर्शनम्—"अदृष्टं[11] नाम परमाणूनां

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१ एवं परोद्भावितदर्शनमनूद्य तद्दूषणपरं 'पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोपवर्गे' इति सूत्रांशं व्याख्यातुमुपक्रमते—एवं चेन्मन्यस इति ।

२ तदेव विवृणोति—पुनः शरीरोत्पत्तिरिति ।

३ तद्विशदयति—या चेति ।

४ शरीरोत्पत्तेः प्राक् यददर्शनं यच्चापवर्गानन्तरमदर्शनं तदेतयोरदर्शनयोर्महान् भेदोऽस्तीति नापवर्गानन्तरं शरीरोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति मनसि कृत्वा परस्तयोरदर्शनयोर्भेदमाविष्करोति-चरितार्थतेति ।

५ परिहरति—न करणाकरणयोरारम्भदर्शनादिति । केचिदेतद्वाक्यं सूत्रत्वेनाभिप्रयन्ति । प्रमाणाभावात् तदुपेक्षितम् ।

६ परोक्तस्याशयं विवृणोति—चरितार्थानीति ।

७ दर्शनावसानादिति । 'दर्शनस्य' शब्दाद्युपभोगस्य व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानस्य चेत्युभयरूपस्य 'अवसानात्' सम्पत्तेः हेतोरित्यर्थः । शिष्टं व्याख्यातम् ।

८ स्वोक्तपरिहारस्याशयं व्याचक्षाणस्तमनुवदति—न करणेति ।

९ तस्याशयं वर्णयति—चरितार्थानामिति । 'विषयोपलब्धिकरणात् चरितार्थानामपि भूतानां पुनः पुनः शरीरारम्भो दृश्यते' इति सम्बन्धः ।

१० आर्हतमतनिरसनपरं सूत्रस्य व्याख्यानान्तरमुपन्यस्यन् परोद्भावितपक्षमुत्थापयति-तददृष्टकारितमिति चेदिति ।

११ परमतमनुवदति—अदृष्टं नामेति । आर्हतास्तावददृष्टं परमाणुगुणं वर्णयन्ति । पार्थिवादीनामणूनां मनसश्च गुणोऽदृष्टम् । तत्र पार्थिवाद्या अणवः स्वादृष्टप्रयुक्ताः

गुणविशेषः क्रियाहेतुः। तेन प्रेरिताः परमाणवः सम्मूर्च्छिताः शरीरमुत्पादयन्तीति–तन्मनः समाविशति स्वगुणेनादृष्टेन प्रेरितम्। समनस्के शरीरे द्रष्टुरुपलब्धिर्भवतीति "।

एतस्मिन्[1] वै दर्शने गुणानुच्छेदात्पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे। अपवर्गे[2] शरीरोत्पत्तिः, परमाणुगुणस्यादृष्टस्यानुच्छेद्यत्वादिति ॥ ६८ ॥

मनःकर्मनिमित्तत्वाच्च संयोगाद्यनुच्छेदः ॥ ६९ ॥

मनोगुणेनादृष्टेन समावेशिते मनसि संयोगाद्युच्छेदो न स्यात्। तत्र किंकृतं शरीरादपसर्पणं मनस इति। कर्माशयक्षये तु कर्माशयान्तराद्विपच्यमानादपसर्पणोपपत्तिरिति।

" अदृष्टादेवापसर्पणमिति " चेत्—" योऽदृष्टः शरीरोपसर्पणहेतुः स एवापसर्पणहेतुरपीति "। न, एकस्य जीवनप्रायणहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः। एवं च सति एकमदृष्टं जीवनप्रायणयोर्हेतुरिति प्राप्तं–नैतदुपपद्यते ॥ ६९ ॥

नित्यत्व[3]प्रसङ्गश्च प्रायणानुपपत्तेः ॥ ७० ॥

विपाकसंवेदनात् कर्माशयक्षये शरीरपातः ' प्रायणम् ', कर्माशयान्तराच्च पुनर्जन्म। भूतमात्रात्तु कर्मनिरपेक्षाच्छरीरोत्पत्तौ कस्य क्षयाच्छरीरपातः प्रायणमिति–प्रायणानुपपत्तेः खलु वै नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गं विद्मः। यादृच्छिके तु प्रायणे प्रायणभेदानुपपत्तिरिति ॥ ७० ॥

' पुनस्तत्[4]प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे ' इत्येतत्समाधित्सुराह—

शरीरमारभन्ते। मनश्च स्वगुणप्रयुक्तं शरीरमाविशति। तच्च स्वकादेवादृष्टात् पुद्गलस्य (जीवस्य) सुखदुःखोपभोगं साधयति। न तु पुद्गलस्य धर्मोऽदृष्टमिति तेषाम्मतम्।

१ तद्दूषयति-एतस्मिन्निति। अत्रापि पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे। तत्र हेतुः गुणानुच्छेदादिति।

२ उक्तं प्रसङ्गं विशदयति-अपवर्ग इति। परमाणुगुणस्यादृष्टस्य नित्यत्वादात्मन अपवर्गानन्तरमपि तस्य सत्त्वात् पुनः शरीरोत्पत्तिर्दुर्वारेत्याशयः।

३ ननु यः संयोगानुच्छेदः पूर्वसूत्र उद्भावितः सोऽत्यन्तमप्रसिद्धः। यत् सदकारणं च तदेव नित्यं दृष्टं–शरीरं च सत् सकरणं चातः कथं तत् नित्यं भवेदित्यत आह–नित्यत्वेति सूत्रम्। मनसः शरीरादपसर्पणासम्भवे जीवस्य मरणानुपपत्तेर्भवत्येव नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः शरीरस्येत्यर्थः।

४ 'पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे' इति यत्सिद्धान्तिनोद्भावितन्तस्य परेण कृतं समाधानं प्रस्तावयति-पुनस्तदिति।

" अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववदेतत्स्यात् " ॥ ७१ ॥[1]

" यथा अणोः श्यामता नित्या अग्निसंयोगेन प्रतिबद्धा न पुनरुत्पद्यते, एवमदृष्टकारितं शरीरमपवर्गे पुनर्नोत्पद्यत इति " ॥ ७१ ॥

नाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ७२ ॥[2]

नायमस्ति दृष्टान्तः । कस्मात्? अकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् । अकृतं प्रमाणतोऽनुपपन्नं—तस्याभ्यागमोऽभ्युपपत्तिर्व्यवसायः । एतच्छ्रद्दधानेन प्रमाणतोऽनुपपन्नं मन्तव्यम् । तस्मान्नायं दृष्टान्तः । न प्रत्यक्षं न चानुमानं किञ्चिदुच्यत इति । तदिदं दृष्टान्तस्य साध्यसमत्वमभिधीयत इति ।

अथ वा[3] ' नाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् ' । अणुश्यामतादृष्टान्तेनाकर्मनिमित्तां[4] शरीरोत्पत्तिं समादधानस्याकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गः । अकृते सुखदुःखहेतौ कर्मणि पुरुषस्य सुखं दुःखमभ्यागच्छतीति प्रसज्येत । ओमिति[5] ब्रुवतः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमविरोधः ।

प्रत्यक्षविरोधस्तावत्—भिन्नमिदं सुखदुःखं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयत्वात् प्रत्यक्षं सर्वशरीरिणाम् । को भेदः? तीव्रं मन्दं, चिरमाशु, नानाप्रकारमेकप्रकारमित्येवमादिर्विशेषः । न चास्ति प्रत्यात्मनियतः सुखदुःखहेतुविशेषः । न चासति हेतुविशेषे फलविशेषो दृश्यते । कर्मनिमित्ते तु सुखदुःखयोगे कर्मणां तीव्रमन्दतोपपत्तेः कर्मसञ्चयानां चोत्कर्षापकर्षभावान्नानाविधैकविधभावाच्च

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१ परकृते समाधानमाह—अणुश्यामतेति सूत्रम् । यथाऽणूनां नित्यत्वेऽपि तेषां श्यामतादिगुणा अनित्या एव तथैव तेषां गुणोऽदृष्टमप्यनित्यमेवेत्यर्थः ।

२ परकृतसमाधानमपाकरोति—नाकृताभ्यागमेति सूत्रम् । ' अकृतम् ' प्रमाणेन अविषयीकृतम् प्रत्युत प्रत्यक्षागमविरुद्धमिति यावत्—तस्य ' अभ्यागमः ' अभ्युपगमः—तत्प्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः ।

३ सूत्रस्य यथाश्रुति व्याख्यानान्तरमाह-अथवेति । अकृतस्य कर्मणः 'अभ्यागमः' फलोपभोगः तत्प्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः । यदा खलु परमाणुगुण एव नित्यः शरीराद्यारम्भकः तदासौ नित्यत्वान्न केनचित् क्रियते । तस्याकृतस्यैव फलं पुरुषैरुपभुज्यते । ततश्चायमास्तिकानां विहितनिषिद्धप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिनिचयोऽनर्थकः शास्त्रप्रणयनं चानर्थकं भवेदिति भावः ।

४ सूत्राक्षरं व्याचष्टे—अणुश्यामतेति ।

५ ननु भवत्वेवमकृताभ्यागमः का नो हानिरित्यत आह—ओमिति ब्रुवत इति । एतादृशोऽकृताभ्यागमः प्रत्यक्षादिसकलप्रमाणविरुद्ध इत्यर्थः ।

कर्मणां सुखदुःखभेदोपपत्तिः। सोऽयं हेतुभेदाभावाद् दृष्टः सुखदुःखभेदो न स्यादिति प्रत्यक्षविरोधः।

तथाऽनुमानविरोधः—दृष्टं हि पुरुषगुणव्यवस्थानात्सुखदुःखव्यवस्थानम्। यः खलु चेतनावान् साधननिर्वर्तनीयं सुखं बुद्ध्वा तदीप्सन् साधनावाप्तये प्रयतते स सुखेन युज्यते, न विपरीतः। यश्च साधननिर्वर्तनीयं दुःखं बुद्ध्वा तज्जिहासुः साधनपरिवर्जनाय यतते स च दुःखेन त्यज्यते, न विपरीतः। अस्ति चेदं यत्नमन्तरेण चेतनानां सुखदुःखव्यवस्थानम्। तेनापि चेतनगुणान्तरव्यवस्थाकृतेन भवितव्यमित्यनुमानम्। तदेतदकर्मनिमित्ते सुखदुःखयोगे विरुध्यत इति। तच्च गुणान्तरमसंवेद्यत्वाददृष्टं विपाककालानियमाच्चाव्यवस्थितम्। बुद्ध्यादयस्तु संवेद्याश्चापवर्गिणश्चेति।

अथागमविरोधः[1]—बहु खल्विदमार्षमृषीणामुपदेशजातमनुष्ठानपरिवर्जनाश्रयमुपदेशफलं च शरीरिणां वर्णाश्रमविभागेनानुष्ठानलक्षणा प्रवृत्तिः, परिवर्जनलक्षणा निवृत्तिः। तच्चोभयमेतस्यां दृष्टौ—नास्ति कर्म सुचरितं दुश्चरितं वाऽकर्मनिमित्तः पुरुषाणां सुखदुःखयोग—इति विरुध्यते।

सेयं पापिष्ठानां मिथ्यादृष्टिरकर्मनिमित्ता शरीरसृष्टिरकर्मनिमित्तः सुखदुःखयोग इति ॥ ७२ ॥

इति श्रीवात्स्यायनीये न्यायभाष्ये तृतीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ॥२॥

समाप्तश्चायं तृतीयोऽध्यायः।

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१ परपक्ष आगमविरोधं दर्शयति-आगमविरोध इति। 'एतस्यां दृष्टौ' परकीये दर्शने। यदि न कर्मनिमित्तः शरीरसर्गः सुखदुःखादि वा तदा शास्त्रविहितकर्तव्यानुष्ठानेन धर्मस्ततः सुखम् शास्त्रनिषिद्धाचरणेनाधर्मस्ततो दुःखमित्यादिव्यवस्था न स्यात्। अयं च व्यवस्थाभावः सकलागमविरुद्ध एव।

Section (4)

Examination of the nature of Words and their Potencies.

Sūtra 58

These same (Letters), when ending in an affix, are called 'Word'.

BHĀṢYA

Letters, transformed according to law and reason (*i.e.*, by *substitution*, and not by *modification*), when ending in an affix, come to be called 'Word'. Affixes are of two kinds—*Noun-affixes* and *Verb-affixes* ; '*brāhmaṇaḥ*' is an example (of a *Word* ending in a noun-affix) and '*pacati*' is an example (of a *Word* ending in a verb-affix).

"According to this definition Prepositions and Indeclinables could not be called 'Word'. Hence it is necessary to propound some other definition of 'Word'."

But it is with a view to make the term 'Word' (according to the said definition) applicable to Prepositions and Indeclinables that it has been ruled that Indeclinables drop their affixes—[by Pāṇini's Sūtra 2-4-82] ;—and the reason for this convention lies in the fact that it is only *Words* that can signify (bring about the cognition of) anything [and it is admitted that Prepositions and Indeclinables do signify things].*

* This Sūtra is aimed against the '*Sphoṭa*' theory of the Grammarians. This theory is thus outlined in the *Tātparya*.—

"Things are not signified by *Letters*; as Letters cannot have any connection with anything, either singly or collectively. Nor can things be held to be signified by the last letter as aided by the impressions left by the preceding letters ; because Impressions can pertain to their own objects, and not to other things ; hence the impression of Letters could bring about the cognition of Letters only, and not of *things*. And yet it cannot be denied that when the Letters '*gha-ṭaḥ*' are pronounced, there comes about the cognition of the Jar. Hence the conclusion is that the letters concerned bring about the manifestation of a peculiar entity in the shape of '*Sphoṭa*'—a kind of conglomerate Sound—which in its turn brings about the cognition of the Jar. That several Letters should give rise to one *Sphoṭa* is just like several Words forming a Sentence. Hence there is no such thing as 'Word,' denoting things."

In answer to this view, we have the Sūtra laying down that the 'Word'—by which things are denoted—consists of the Letters themselvss,—and *not* of any such thing as '*Sphoṭa*'. As a matter of fact, when a thing is spoken

The discussion that follows is in regard to Nouns; and we take for our example the particular word '*gauḥ*', 'Cow.'

Now, in connection with this—*

Sūtra 59

There arises a doubt; because the Word is used in reference to the Individual, the Configuration and the Universal, as inseparable from one another.

BHĀṢYA

The term '*sannidhi*' signifies '*inseparable existence*', i. e. invariable concomitance. As a matter of fact, the word 'Cow' is used in connection with the Individual, the Configuration and the Universal,—as inseparable from one another; and it is not definitely known whether what is denoted by the Word is any *one* of these three, or all of them.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

What forms the real denotation of a word can be ascertained only from the force of usage. And from this it is clear that—

Sūtra 60

(A)—"It is the Individual (that should be regarded as denoted by the Word); because all usage—in the form of (*a*) the term 'that which,' (*b*) grouping, (*c*) giving, (*d*) possession, (*e*) number, (*f*) enlargement, (*g*) contraction,† (*h*) colour, (*i*) compounding and (*j* procreation—appertains to the Individual."

of by means of a verbal expression, we do not perceive anything except certain *Letters*. Hence we conclude that the name 'Word' must apply to the Letters; though it may not apply directly to them, these being *many*, and the word being *one* only,—yet the name may be applied to them indirectly, on the basis of the fact that though many, they bring about the cognition of a single thing. And so long as we can explain the phenomenon of verbal expression on the basis of the directly perceptible Letters, there can be no justification for the assuming of a superphysical and purely hypothetical entity in the shape of '*Sphoṭa*'.

* तदर्थे is usually printed as part of Sūtra 58, but the न्यायसूचीनिबन्ध and the Puri Sū. Ms. both read the Sū. without तदर्थे which therefore we take as part of the Introductory Bhāṣya. The *Bhāṣyacandra* makes it part of the *Sūtra*.

† The viz. text reads उपचय; the right reading is अपचय as found in the Puri Mss.

(*A*)—[*The Individualistic Theory is first put forward*]—

"It is the Individual that is denoted by the word. How so? Because such usage as is represented by the use of the term '*that which*' and the rest applies to the *Individual*.'

'*Upacāra*,' 'appertaining,' here stands for *application*.

"(*a*) Such sentences as '*that which* stands', '*that which* is sitting' can never signify the *Universal*, as in the *Universal* there is no diversity* (which would require specialisation by means of such qualifying terms as *that which stands* and so forth); and inasmuch as what *is* diverse is the *Individual* substance, the said sentence should be taken as referring to this latter. (*b*) The expression '*group* of Cows' presupposes diversity, and as such must refer to the *Individual things*, and not to the *Universal*, which is one only.† (*c*) In the expression 'he *gives* the Cow to the *Vaidya*,' the *giving* must be of an *Individual* Cow, and not of the *Universal*; as this latter has no body, and as such cannot be transferred from one person to another. (*d*) '*Possession*' consists in becoming related to proprietory right; it is expressed by such words as 'Kauṇḍinya's cow,' 'the Brāhmaṇa's cow' and so forth; and these latter must refer to the *individual* things, as it is only these that are diverse, and as such can belong to, be possessed by, different persons; while the *Universal* is one only (and as such cannot belong to several persons). (*e*) '*Number*'. We have such expressions as 'ten cows', 'twenty cows' etc., and these must refer to the *Individual* things—as these alone are diverse,—and not to the *Universal* which is *one* only. (*f*) '*Enlargement*'—It is only an *Individual* thing, which is a product brought about by (constituent) causes, that can undergo 'enlargement', which consists in the accretion of more and more component particles; as we find expressed in the words 'the cow has grown large', which cannot refer to the *Universal*, which is not made up of component particles (and as such can have no accretions to it). (*g*) The same remarks apply to '*contraction*'. (*h*) '*Colour*'—The expressions 'the white cow', 'the tawny cow' and the like must be taken as

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains *abhedāt* as 'because the agent of *standing* and *sitting* is one and the same'. But this is not compatible with the context.

† The Viz. text omits the words गवां समूह इति भेदाद् द्रव्याभिधानं नैव जातेरभेदात् which are found in all Mss.

referring to the presence of the particular quality of Colour in the *individual* thing, and not to the *Universal*. (*i*) '*Compounding*'-such compounds as '*gohita*' (*welfare of the cow*), '*gosukha*' (*comfort of the cow*) *must refer to the connection** of *welfare and comfort* with the *individual* thing, and not with the *Universal*. (*j*) '*Procreation*'—*i. e.* reproduction of likes; the expression 'the cow produces cows' must refer to *individuals*, as it is these that are *produced*, and not to the *Universal*, which (being eternal) is never produced. Throughout this context the word '*dravya*' is synonymous with '*vyakti*'."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The next *Sūtra* puts forward the refutation of the above described Individualistic Theory—

Sūtra 61

This is not right; as there could be no restriction.—

BHĀṢYA

The *Individual* cannot be denoted by the Word. Why? *Because there could be no restriction.*—As a matter of fact, the word 'Cow' denotes that which is qualified by the terms 'that whieh' and the rest (mentioned in Sū. 57). That is to say, in such expressions as '*that cow* which is standing', '*that cow* which is seated', what is denoted by the word 'Cow' is not the mere *Individual* by itself, without any qualifications, and as apart from the *Universal* (to which it belongs),—but the Individual *as qualified by* (*and along with*) *the Universal*. Hence it is not right to say that the Words denote *Individuals*. Similarly in the case of the terms 'group etc., (mentioned in Sū. 57).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[*The Individualist objects*]—"If the Individual is not denoted by the Word, how is it that the Word is applied to it?"

Our answer is that we find in actual usage that for certain reasons one thing is spoken of as another, even though it is not usually the same as the latter. [For instance]—

Sūtra 62

In the case of—(*a*) 'brāhmaṇa', (*b*) 'manca' ('platform'), (*c*) 'kaṭa' ('mat'), (*d*) 'rājan' ('king'), (*e*) 'saktu' ('flour'), (*f*) 'can-

* सयोगो is the right reading as in the Puri Mss.

dana' ('sandal'), (*g*) 'gangā', (*h*) 'ṣāṭaka' ('cloth'), (*i*) 'anna', ('food'), (*j*) 'puruṣa' ('man'),—there is secondary (indirect) application, due respectively to—(*a*) association, (*b*) location, (*c*) purpose, (*d*) behaviour, (*e*) measure, (*f*) containing, (*g*) proximity, (*h*) connection, (*i*) cause and (*j*) sovereignty.*

What is meant by 'one thing being spoken of as another which is not the same as that ' is that a thing is spoken of by means of a word which is not directly expressive of it.† For example—(*a*) In the expression '*yaṣṭikām bhojaya*', 'feed the stick', the word '*yaṣṭikā*,' 'stick', is applied to the *Brāhmaṇa* accompanied by (carrying) the stick, by reason of 'association';—(*b*) in the expression '*mañcāḥ krośanti*' 'the *platforms* are shouting', the word '*mañca*', 'platform', is applied to the *men* upon the platform, by reason of 'location' ; (*c*) when *grass* is being collected for the making of the mat, the man is said to be *making the mat*, [where the word 'mat' is applied to the *grass*] on account of the 'purpose' (for which the grass is collected) ;—(*d*) the expressions '*yamo-rājā*, 'this king is the Death-Deity', '*kuvero rājā*', 'this king is the Wealth-Deity', the words 'Yama', 'Death-Deity' and 'Kuvera', 'Deity of wealth', are applied to the *King*, by reason of his 'behaviour' (resembling that of the Deities) ;—(*e*) when the *flour* is weighed by means of the particular measure of 'five pounds', we use the expression 'five-pound-flour,' [where the word 'flour' is applied to the *five pounds*] by reason of its being the 'measure' (of weight) ;—(*f*) when sandal is held in the balance, it is called the 'balance-sandal,' [where the word 'sandal' is applied to the

* In connection with this Sūtra it may be noted that among the words enumerated, the first, '*Brāhmaṇa*' is that *to* which the figurative term '*yaṣṭi*' is applied, while all the rest are those that are figuratively applied to things other than those directly denoted by them.

But this remark applies to the Sūtra only, in view of the way in which the *Bhāṣya* explains the case and the example it has chosen to cite. We may however cite the instance of the case where a man, who is not a Brāhmaṇa, if he is found to be always in the company of Brāhmaṇas, comes to be regarded as a *Brāhmaṇa*. In view of this example, the Sūtra becomes quite relevant.

† The reading of the Viz. text is corrupt. The right reading is इत्येतच्छब्दस्य तेन शब्देनाभिधानमिति, as found in the Puri Mss. and also in the *Vārtika* and the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

balance] by reason of 'containing' ;—(*g*) in the expression 'the cows are grazing in the Gaṅgā,' the word 'Gaṅgā' is applied to the *adjoining lands*, by reason of 'proximity' ;—(*h*) when the *cloth* coloured black is called 'black', we have the word 'black' applied to the *cloth*, by reason of 'connection' ;—(*i*) in the expression 'food is life', (the word 'life' is applied to the *food*) by reason of its being the 'cause' (of life) ;—(*j*) in the expressions 'this man is the dynasty', 'this man is the race', (the words 'dynasty' and 'race' are applied to the *man*), by reason of his 'sovereignty or predominance'.

Now, in the case in question (i.e. of the ordinary noun, 'cow' e.g.) what happens is that the word really denotative of the *Universal* is applied to the *Individual*, by reason of either 'association' or 'connection'.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(B) [*The 'Configuration' theory is next put forward.*]—If the Individual cannot form the denotation of the word 'Cow', then—

Sūtra 63

"It may be the 'Ākṛti', 'Configuration', [that is denoted by the Word] ; as the determining of the exact nature of a thing is dependent upon that."—

BHĀṢYA

"*The Configuration of a thing must be what is denoted by the word* ('Cow'). Why ? *Because the determining of the exact nature of a thing is dependent upon that.* The 'Configuration' of a thing consists in the particular disposition (or arrangement) of its component parts and of the component particles of those parts ; and it is only when this has been duly recognised that the exact nature of the thing becomes determined, as to its being a *cow* or a *horse* ;—this determining not being possible until the Configuration of the thing has been duly recognised ; and the Word can be taken as denotative of only that the recognition whereof leads to the determining of the exact nature of the thing spoken of."

[*The answer to this 'Configuration' theory is as follows]—This is not possible ; because as a matter of fact, what happens is that a thing is spoken of as the 'cow', as being qualified by the

* This answer, the *Bhāṣyacandra* remarks, is from the standpoint of the Individualist.

Universal 'cow', only when it is really related to that *Universal*; and certainly the 'disposition of component parts' is *not* related to the *Universal.**

"What then is it that *is* related to the *Universal*?" What is related to the *Universal* is the substance (or object) composed of definitely arranged component particles. For these reasons we conclude that the 'Configuration' cannot be denoted by the word.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(C) [*The 'Universal' theory is next put forward.*]—

" In that case, it must be the *Universal* that is denoted by the word 'cow'. "

Sūtra 64

"Inasmuch as the 'washing' &c. (laid down as to be done to the 'Cow') cannot be done to the 'cow' of clay, even though it is endowed with Individuality and Configuration,—it must be the *Universal* (that is denoted by the word)."

BHĀṢYA

"It must be the *Universal* that is denoted by the word ('Cow').—Why so?—Because, even though the 'Cow made of clay' is endowed with the Individuality and the Configuration of the Cow, it is not possible to do to it the 'washing' or any such act. That is to say, we meet with such expressions as 'wash the cow', 'bring the cow', 'give the cow' and so forth; and certainly none of these can refer to the cow made of clay. And why? Simply because it is not endowed with the *Universal* 'cow'; and yet the Individuality and the Configuration are there. So that, that by reason of whose absence the said actions are not applicable to the cow of clay, must be what forms the denotation of the word 'cow'."

[*Refutation of the* 'Universal' *theory.*†]

Sūtra 65

This also cannot be accepted; because (as a matter of fact) the manifestation (or recognition) of the 'Universal' is dependent upon 'Configuration' and 'Individuality'.

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* As the postulating of such relation would involve an unnecessary multiplication of assumptions,—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† This, says the *Bhāṣyacandra*, is from the standpoint of the Philosopher according to whom the 'Individual qualified by the Universal' is what is denoted by the Word.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the manifestation (or recognition) of the Universal depends upon Configuration and Individuality. That is, unless the Individuality and the Configuration have been apprehended, there is no apprehension of the Universal, purely by itself. Hence the Universal (by itself) cannot constitute the denotation of a Word.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

*But with all this, it is not possible that the Word has no denotation at all; so the question arises—what *is* the denotation of the Word? [The answer is given in the next Sūtra].

[(D) *The Final Siddhanta View of 'Composite' Denotation.*]

Sūtra 66

In reality, the Individual, the Configuration and the Universal-(all three) constitute the denotation of the Word.

BHĀṢYA

The term '*tu*', 'in reality', serves the purpose of emphasis. "What is it that is emphasised?" What is meant to be emphasised is that all the three are denoted by words,—there being no hard and fast rule as to which one is the predominant and which the subordinate factor. For instance, when there is (on the part of the person pronouncing the word) a desire to lay stress upon the difference (of a thing from others)—and when the cognition brought about is also one pertaining to the distinctive features of that thing—then the 'Individual' forms the predominant factor (in the denotation of that word), and the 'Universal' and the 'Configuration' are subordinate factors;† when, on the other hand, the difference is not meant to the emphasised,—and the resultant cognition also pertains to the commonalities,—then the 'Universal' is the predominant factor,§ and the 'Individual' and the 'Configuration' are subordinate factors. Many instances (of such varying predominance and subservience) may be found in

* This serves to introduce the final *Siddhānta*,—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† When, for instance, we say 'the cow is standing.'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ When, for instance, we say 'the cow is eternal'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

actual usage. An example of the predominance of 'Configuration' may also be found.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

"How is it known that the Individual, the Configuration and the Universal are distinct entities?"

We know this from the fact that each has a distinctive character of its own. For instance—

Sūtra 67

The 'Individual' is that composite material body which is the receptacle of distinctive qualities.

[Or, *according to the Vārtika,*—**The Individual consists of the specific Qualities, Actions and the Substance containing these.]**

BHĀṢYA

The Individual is called '*vyakti*' because it is manifested, rendered perceptible (*vyajyate*), by the external organs of perception. Every substance is not an 'individual'; that substance alone is called 'Individual' which is a '*mūrti*'—a *material body*, so called because it is '*mūrchitāvayava*,' *composed of parts*—and which, according to circumstances, is the receptacle of the *distinctive particular qualities* of [Odour, Taste, Colour and] Touch [as enumerated in Sūtra 3-1-61], Gravity, Solidity, Fluidity and Faculty, and of the non-pervasive (limited) Dimension.†

Sūtra 68

'Configuration' is that which indicates the Universal and its Characteristics.

* When, for instance, one says 'make Cow of flour'—where the configuration of the cow is what is meant by the word 'cow'.

The *Tātparya* has a long note against the view that—of the Universal and the Individual, only one is directly denoted, the other is only indirectly indicated.

† The *Tātparya* remarks that this definition of Individual is meant for those things that combine all these—Individuality, Configuration and Universal. Hence there is no harm if the definition given does not apply to such substances as *Ākāśa*; for *Ākāśa* has no Configuration. This is what the Bhāsya means when it says that *Every Substance is not an 'individual'*.

It is interesting to note that the *Vārtika* is not satisfied with the *Bhāṣya* interpretation of the *Sūtra*, and therefore puts forward another explanation.

BHĀṢYA

That should be known as 'Configuration' which serves to indicate the Universal and the characteristic features of the Universal. This 'Configuration' is nothing apart* from the particular arrangement of the parts of an object and the components of those parts. As a matter of fact, the Universal is indicated by the particles of the composite substance arranged in a definite manner; e.g., that a certain animal belongs to the genus 'Cow' people infer from the particular kind of head and feet that it possesses; so that it is only when the particles of the body of Cows are disposed in a definite manner, that the Universal 'Cow' can be made known. In cases where the Universal is not indicated by *Configuration*,—e.g., in the case of such things as 'Clay', 'Gold', and the like—there is, in fact, no *Configuration* at all; and hence in the case of the words denoting such things, the Configuration does not form a factor in the denotation.

Sūtra 69

The 'Universal' is the cause (or basis) of Comprehensive Cognition.

BHĀṢYA

That which brings about equal or similar cognition in regard to a number of diverse things,—and which never serves the purpose of differentiating several things from one another,—and which (thus) forms the basis of the comprehensive cognition of several things,—is the 'Universal' pure and simple; while that which includes some and excludes others is a Universal partaking of the (mixed) character of both Individual and Universal.

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* The *Vārtika* reads नान्या; so also Puri Ms. A. This gives better sense than नाना, which is the reading adopted by the *Bhāṣyacandra, and Puri Ms. B*; and it is also in keeping with what the Bhāṣya has said before under Sū. 63.

DISCOURSE III

DAILY LESSON I

SECTION 1

Sūtras 1-3

The *Soul is something distinct from the Sense-organs.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Instruments of Cognition have been examined; we now proceed to examine the Objects of Cognition. And the Soul being the foremost among the Objects of Cognition,† it is the Soul that we proceed to examine now.

The question to be considered is—Is the Soul (which is spoken of as 'I') only an aggregate of the Body, the Sense-organs, the Mind, the Intellect, and Sensations? or is it something different from these? "Whence does such a doubt arise?" *It arises from the fact that Designation is found to be of both kinds.*§ By 'Designation' here is meant the expressing of the relationship of the Agent with the Action and with the Instrument of that Action. This Designation is found to be of two kinds—(1) In one we have the Composite Whole designated by its component parts—*i.e.*, 'the tree stands by the roots', 'the house stands by

* It is doubtful whether or not the connotation of the term 'Soul' is the same as that of the term 'Ātman'. But we retain the ordinary term 'Soul', as it is more intelligible to the English reader, who applies the term 'when reference is made to continuity of Being beyond the present', in such ordinary expressions as 'the Immortality of the Soul'. 'Spirit' or 'Self' would perhaps be a more apt rendering of '*Ātman*'.

† The Soul is foremost, because it is the most important, and also because it is the most loved by man; 'it is for the sake of the Soul that all things are dear'—says the Upaniṣad; and lastly because in the Enumeration also (in Sū. 1-1-9), it is Soul that is mentioned first; hence in the Examination also it is taken up first.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

The *Tātparya* remarks—'Though it is stated here that the Soul is going to be examined, it is the *definition* or differentiating characteristics of the Soul that is going to be examined. This will be clear as we proceed.'

§ That this sentence was regarded, by some people, as a Sūtra is indicated by the *Pariśuddhi*, which remarks that this sentence is *Bhāṣya*, *not Sūtra*.

the pillars' [where what is spoken of as the Instrument, *i.e.*, the *Roots* or the *Pillars*, is a component part of the Agent, the Tree or the House]; and (2) in the other, we have a thing designated by something totally different from it ; *i.e.*, 'one cuts the tree with the axe', 'he sees with the lamp' [where the instrument, Axe or Lamp, is something entirely different from the Cutter or the Seer] ;—now with regard to the Soul there are such designations as, 'he sees with the eye', 'he cognises with the mind', 'he ponders with the intellect', 'he experiences pleasure and pain with the body'; and in connection with this, it is uncertain whether in these we have the designation of the Aggregate or Composite of Body, Intellect &c. by means of its components [*i.e.*, the Body &c. spoken of as Instruments are only the component parts of the *Experiencer*, *Seer* &c., which is thus only an Aggregate of the Body &c.], or the designation of one thing (the *Seer* &c.), by means of things different from it [*i.e.*, the Body &c., spoken of as Instruments are different from the Experiencer, Seer, &c.]

Our opinion is that in these expressions we have the designation (of the Agent) by something different from itself [*i.e.*, the Soul is different from the Body &c.].

"Why so ?"

[The answer is supplied by the Sūtra (1)].

Sūtra 1

Because the same thing is apprehended by Sight and by Touch.

BHĀṢYA

[As a matter of fact, we find that it often happens that] one thing having been apprehended by Sight, that same thing is apprehended by Touch also ; [the idea in the mind of the perceiver being] 'that thing which I saw with my eyes I now touch with the organ of touch', or 'that which I touched with the organ of touch I now see with my eyes'; which means that the latter idea recognises, or recalls, the two perceptions as apprehending one and the same object and having (belonging to) one and the same Agent ;—and this one agent cannot be either the *Composite* or *Aggregate* [composed of the Body and the Sense-organs] or the

Sense-organ].* Hence that Agent,—who is the apprehender (perceiver) of the said one thing by Sight and by Touch, and who (in the manner shown above) recognises the two perceptions as apprehending the same object, as having an Agent and as brought about by different Instruments,—is something† entirely different (from the Composite or the Sense-organ); and this is the *Soul.*

"Why cannot the two perceptions be regarded as having their 'one Agent' in the shape of the *Sense-organ* ?"

A Sense-organ can recognise or recall only that apprehension which has been brought about by itself, and not the apprehension of another thing, brought about by another Sense-organ.

"Why cannot the two perceptions be regarded as having their 'one agent' in the *Composite* or *Aggregate* ?"

As a matter of fact, the Agent must be one who remains the same, while cognising (recalling) two such perceptions as have been brought about by two different Instruments (i.e. Sense-organs), and belong to (i.e., have been accomplished by the Agency of) that same Agent himself; and certainly the *Aggregate* cannot be such an Agent.

"Why ?"

Because what we urged above in connection with Sense-organs—that 'one Sense-organ cannot recall the apprehension brought about by another Sense-organ'—does not cease to apply, with equal force, to the case of the *Aggregate* also.

Sūtra 2

[Says the Opponent]—"What has been put forward in the preceding Sūtra is not right ; for there is restriction as to objects."§

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* Because the Agent must be different from the Instrument'—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*. That is to say, the Sense-organ, being the Instrument in the perception, cannot be the Agent of that perception ; nor can the Composite or Aggregate be the Agent ; as the Sense-organ, which is the Instrument, forms a component of that Composite, and the Instrument must be quite different from the Agent.

† 'Something', '*bhūta*', here stands for a *real thing*, something vouched for by Valid means of cognition.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ 'Sū. (1) has put forward the fact of 'Recognition' as proving the conclusion that the perceiver is the Soul, something different from the Body and the Sense-organs &c. In this second Sūtra, the Opponent, while admitting the

"The intelligent Perceiver need not be something different from the Composite of the Body etc.—'Why?'—*Because there is restriction as to objects*. That is, the Sense-organs are restricted in the scope of things (perceived by their instrumentality); e.g., Colour is not perceived without the Visual Organ, while it is perceived when the Visual Organ is there; and when between two things it is found that one appears while the other exists, and does not appear when the other does not exist—it follows that one is of (belongs to) the other;* hence the perception of Colour must be regarded as belonging to the Visual Organ; that is, *it is the Visual Organ that perceives the Colour*. Similarly in the case of the Olfactory and other organs. Thus then, inasmuch as it is the Sense-organs that perceive their respective objects, these (and not anything else) should be regarded as the *Intelligent Perceiver*; for the simple reason that the presence and absence of the Perception of objects is found to be in strict accordance with the presence and absence of the Sense-organs. Such being the case, what is the use of postulating a distinct Intelligent Being (in the shape of 'Soul')?"

† The answer to the above is that the premiss put forward being doubtful, the reasoning becomes fallacious. What has been put forward is the fact of the presence and absence of Perceptions being in accordance with the presence and absence of the Sense-organs; but it is open to doubt whether this fact is due to the

fact of Recognition, demurs to the conclusion; the sense being that, Recognition does not necessarily prove the existence of something different from the Sense-organs; for even if such a Soul were there, it would not be omniscient, it could perceive only a few things, not all; and as such it would be limited in its scope in the same manner as the Sense-organs are. What advantage then can be gained by postulating a distinct entity in the shape of 'Soul,'—*Pariśuddhi*.

This is somewhat different from the explanation in the *Bhāṣya*.

* So that in the case in question when it is found that Perception appears while the Sense-organ exists, and does not appear while the organ does not exist,—it follows that the Perception belongs to the Sense-organ; *i. e.*, the Sense-organ is the *perceiver*.—*Tātparya*.

† The *Pariśuddhi* remarks that this answer is to the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument presented in the *Bhāṣya*; the answer to the argument in Sū. 2 is given in Sū. 3. The *Bhāṣyacandra* says that this is the Bhāṣyakāra's own answer to the Pūrvapakṣa argument.

Sense-organs being the intelligent perceivers, or to their being mere instruments belonging to another Intelligent Perceiver, and thus being the causes of the said Perceptions; the said fact can certainly be accounted for also as being due to the Sense-organs being *causes* of Perceptions, even though only as *Instruments* belonging to an Intelligent perceiver.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the argument urged (in Sū. 2)—"because there is restriction as to objects"—the answer is—

Sūtra 3

It is because there is restriction as to objects that there must be a Soul; hence this cannot be denied.†

If there were no 'restriction' in regard to the objects perceived by any single Sense-organ [and that alone were to perceive all objects], this would mean that that Sense-organ apprehending all objects is the omniscient and intelligent Perceiver; and (under the circumstances) who could ever infer the existence of any intelligence apart from the said organ? So that, it is because there is restriction as to objects apprehended by the several Sense-organs that we are led to infer the existence of an intelligent Agent, distinct from the Sense-organs, who is free from the said 'restriction as to objects', and (hence) omniscient, (i.e. capable of perceiving the objects perceptible by *all* Sense-organs). We now put forward instances representing the functioning of the Intelligent Agent, which irresistibly point to the said conclusion (that the Intelligent Agent is distinct from the

* All that the fact of the presence and absence of one thing being in accordance with the presence and absence of another thing, proves is that the latter is the *cause* of the former; and it cannot prove any such conclusion as that the latter is the *intelligent agent* of the former, or that there can be no other intelligent agent.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† There is restriction as to objects:—one organ brings about the perception of only a few objects, not of all:—this shows that the organs must be *non-intelligent*; this therefore renders it necessary to postulate the existence of the Soul as the intelligent agent, operating on the organs. Hence what has been urged by the Opponent in proof of the Organs being the intelligent agents, points to a conclusion entirely to the contrary.—*Tātparya and Bhāṣyacandra*.

Sense-organs).*—(*a*) The Intelligent Agent, on perceiving Colour (of a certain fruit for instance) infers the Odour and Taste which he has perceived in the past ; or on perceiving its Odour, he infers its Colour and Taste ; and so on in regard to other objects; —(*b*) then again, having (at one moment) seen the Colour, he smells (at another moment) the Odour ; or having smelt the Odour, he sees the Colour ; all which goes to show that the Perceiver recalls (and reviews) the perception of all objects, without any fixed order of sequence ; and all this Perception subsists in (belongs to) one Intelligent Agent,† and not to anything else (in the shape of the Body or the Sense-organs &c.) ; and this is so not only in connection with perception through the senses, but the same Perceiver also recalls and recognises various such cognitions as *Perceptional*, *Inferential*, *Verbal* and *Doubtful*, bearing upon several objects ; *e.g.*, (1) he hears the Scriptures, which bear upon all things,—and apprehends the meaning (of the Scriptures), which is not perceptible by the Auditory Organ (by which he hears the syllables pronounced in a certain order),—(2) he reviews and recognises the syllables as forming words and sentences,—(3) and he recalls the laws bearing upon the denotation of the words ;—which shows that the single Perceiver cognises a number of several objects which are not capable of being apprehended by any single Sense-organ. Now this 'absence of restriction as to the objects apprehended', which points to a single Perceiver of all things, cannot be turned aside (to prove the intelligence of Sense-organs).§ Thus it is found that the assertion—'the Sense-organs being the intelligent Agents, what is the use of postulating a distinct intelligent Agent ?'—is not right.

* The Viz., text reads प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्, which does not suit the context ; the *Tātparya* and the *Bhāṣyacandra* both read, अभिज्ञानम्. The *Tātparya* construes the two clauses तत्रेदमभिज्ञानमप्रत्याख्येयम् and चेतनवृत्तमुदाह्रियते as one sentence ; this is what we have followed in the translation. The *Bhāṣyacandra* takes the two separately ; according to this, the translation would run thus : 'What has been just said irresistibly points to the conclusion that the Soul is something quite distinct ; *and* we now proceed to cite an instance of the functioning of the Intelligent Agent.'

† As is shown by such well-recognised notions as—"I, who had seen the Colour, now smell the Odour".—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* reads व्यवस्था for अव्यवस्था and explains it as 'distinctive feature' ; the passage in that case would mean that the aforesaid distinctive feature of the all-perceiving Agent cannot be attributed to the Sense-organs.

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BHARTṚHARI NOT A BUDDHIST: EVIDENCE FROM NEARER HOME

(K. Madhava Krishna Sarma)

Vācaspatimiśra in his Tattvabindu quotes and assigns to Bāhyas the Kārikā.

परेषामनुपाख्येयमभ्यासादेव जायते ।
मणिरूप्यादिषु ज्ञानं तद्विदामानुमानिकम् ॥

(P. 14, Pandit Series).

This (with some difference in reading) is found in the Brahmakāṇḍa (35) of the Vākyapadīya. Pathak read in the term 'bāhya' a reference to Buddhists and concluded that the great grammatical philosopher was a Buddhist (JBRAS. Vol. 18. p. 341 ff). Bhartṛhari was a Kāśmirian; any information on him coming from Kāśmirian sources has, therefore, to be considered highly authoritative. That Kāśmirian authors are unanimous in regarding him as a great representative of the Pre-Śaṅkara phase of Advaitic thought is clearly shown by the following extracts from works on Śaivaism.

Somānanda and Utpala. In the course of his criticism of the Sphoṭa in the Śivadṛṣṭi Somānanda says:

विज्ञानाभासनं यावत्समीक्षायामुदाहृतम् ।

(P. 83, Kashmir Series.)

On this Utpala quotes as from Bhartṛhari's Śabdadhātu-samīkṣā[1] two verses of which the following strongly savours of Advaita.

1. In my paper—Śabdadhātusamīkṣā: A lost work of Bhartṛhari (in the course of publication in the Annals of the Sri Venkateśvara Oriental Institute) I have drawn attention to this work of Bhartṛhari which is lost to us. I have also shown there that the anthology cannot be the work of the great grammarian.

दिक्कालाद्यनवच्छिन्नानन्तचिन्मात्रमूर्तये ।
स्वानुभूत्येकमानाय नमः शान्ताय तेजसे ॥

(P. 84)

Cf. also—

तानि दृष्ट्वानुसृजति सृष्ट्वा वानुप्रपश्यति ।
पश्यन्त्याः सत्यरूपायास्तत्सत्यत्वे न दर्शनम् ॥
असत्ये सत्यदृष्ट्यैव पश्यन्त्यां मलिनात्मता ।
असत्यान्सत्यरूपान्वा कथं सृजति कल्प्यताम् ॥

Utpala: तानि तानि वस्तूनि दृष्ट्वा ज्ञात्वा वा सृजति । सृष्ट्वा वा प्रपश्यति इत्येतद्यथास्तु ।.........पश्यन्तीत्वमेव न युक्तम् । तथा हि सत्यरूपा सा; तद्दृश्यानां च सत्यत्वे न दर्शनं नाभ्युपगमो द्वैतप्रसङ्गात् ।......... (P. 52)

अविद्यास्याः स्वधर्मः किं परधर्मोऽथवा भवेत् ।
स्वधर्मत्वेऽस्या मालिन्यं परधर्मेऽपि कस्य सा ॥

Utpala: नह्यद्वयवादे ब्रह्मणः कश्चिदर्थः परोऽस्तीति शास्त्रेऽभीष्टः ॥ (P.53)

नहि तस्या निमित्तं वा कारणं समवायि वा ।

Utpala: निमित्तमात्रत्वे द्वैतापत्तिः । (P. 61)

पृथक्त्वे बह्व्यः पश्यन्त्यः स्युः । ततश्च नाद्वैतम् । (P. 64)

अद्वयवादः स्थितः । पश्यन्तीविचारादनन्तरं स्वयूथ्यानद्वयवादिनः प्रतीदानीं प्रारम्भः । (P. 94)

Abhinava—

सर्वस्य हि मन्त्र एव हृदयम् । मन्त्रश्च विमर्शनात्मा । विमर्शनं च परावाक्छक्तिमयम् । तत एवोक्तम्—

न तैर्विना भवेच्छब्दो नार्थो नापि चितेर्गतिः । इति ।
तत्र तावत्समापन्ना मातृभावम्..................।
इत्यादि च । इत्यागमेषु ।

तत्रभवद्भर्तृहरिणापि—

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन गम्यते ॥
वाग्रूपता चेदुत्क्रामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।
न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥ इति ।
सैषा संसारिणां संज्ञा बहिरन्तश्च वर्तते ।
यदुत्क्रान्तौ विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत् ॥
इत्यादि च । तदेतेन विदुरित्यनेन निर्वाहितम् ।

बौद्धैरपि अध्यवसायापेक्षं प्रकाशस्य प्रामाण्यं वदद्भिरुपगतप्राय एवायमर्थः ।

(Iśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, pp. 212–13, Kashmir Series)

Here Abhinava clearly points out that Bhartṛhari is not a Buddhist.

Yogarāja.

तदेतत्सत्तामात्रात्मकं सर्वं बृहत्त्वाद्ब्रह्म । यदाहुः श्रुत्यन्तविदः सदेवेदं सोम्य अग्र आसीत् । इति । पूर्णत्वात्परम् । हेयोपादेयाभावाच्छुद्धम् । पृथक्त्वोपशमाच्छान्तम् । अत एवाभेदात्मकम् । प्रकर्षापकर्षाभावात्समम् ।

प्रदेशोऽपि ब्रह्मणः सार्वरूप्यमनतिक्रान्तश्चाविकल्प्यश्च ।

इति स्थित्या सकलम् । अत एवामृतमविनाशि ।

सत्यासत्यौ तु यौ भागौ प्रतिभावं व्यवस्थितौ ।
सत्यं यत्तत्र सा जातिरसत्या व्यक्तयः स्थिताः ॥ इति ।

यदादौ च यदन्ते च यन्मध्ये तस्य सत्यता । इति तत्र भवद्भर्तृहरिनिरूपितनीत्या 'सत्यं' तदेव सत्तामात्रात्मकमेतत्सर्वं भास्वरूपायामिच्छाज्ञानक्रियारूपशक्तिसामरस्यात्मिकायां परस्यां शक्तौ विश्राम्यति ।

(Paramārthasāravivṛti, pp. 91–92, Kashmir Series).

Rāmakaṇṭha

यः सर्वदा सर्वानुभवेषु धातुः सर्वेश्वरस्य स्वस्वभावस्य तल्लीनत्वलक्षणं प्रणयं स्वसामर्थ्यसिद्धं प्रतिक्षणप्रत्यवमर्शावहितत्वान्नातिक्रामति, तस्यासौ धाता जागरवत्स्वप्नेऽपि अभिमतानेवार्थान् प्रकाशयति न तस्य स्वप्नपदार्थाः स्वातन्त्र्येण वर्तमानाः सर्वकर्तृत्वलक्षणस्वशक्तिप्रतिबन्धमुद्भावयन्त्यसंसारित्वात् । किंतु स्वतन्त्रः स्वशक्त्या यथेष्टं तान् सृजति । यथाह भर्तृहरिः

प्रविभज्यात्मनात्मानं सृष्ट्वा भावान्पृथग्विधान् ।
सर्वेश्वरः सर्वशक्तिः स्वप्ने भोक्ता प्रपद्यते ॥ इति ।

(Spandakārikāvivṛti, p. 102, Kashmir Series).

शब्दाद्वयवादिभिरपि विवृत्तिवाचोयुक्त्या तत्प्रसरं प्रतिपादयद्भिः स्वमार्गस्थत्वमेवास्याः प्रदर्शितम् । यदाहुः—

वाग्रूपता चेदुत्क्रामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।
न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥...............

....

(P. 148 et. seq.)

Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇakaṇṭha

वेदान्तेष्वेक एवात्मा चिदचिद्व्यक्तिलक्षितः ।

(Mṛgendratantra).

'आत्मैवेदं जगत्सर्वं नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' तथा 'एको वशी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा एकं विश्वं बहुधा यः करोति' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः परमात्मैव सकलचिदचिद्भावाविर्भावतिरोभावप्रकृतिभूतः परिपूर्णषाड्गुण्यवैभवस्वतन्त्र एकोऽपि सन् संसृत्यर्थं तत्तद्विविधमनोलक्षणोपाधिभेदेन स्वभावान्तरानुविधायी यथावदवगतोऽभ्युदयाय भवतीति वेदान्तविदः प्रतिपन्नाः। स एव हि सत्वात्मनि शान्त उपाधौ शान्त इव, रजोबहुले तु भगवानिव, अज्ञानात्मके च तमसि मुग्ध इवास्ते। न तु ततोऽन्यत् पृथक् किञ्चिदवतिष्ठते। तस्यैव तथा तथा वैचित्र्येणावस्थितेः सत्यत्वात्। द्वैतप्रतिभासस्य द्विचन्द्रादिज्ञानवद्भ्रान्तत्वात्। तथाचाह तत्र भवान् भर्तृहरिः.

यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः।
संकीर्णमिव मात्राभिश्चित्राभिरभिमन्यते॥
तथेदममृतं ब्रह्म निर्विकारमविद्यया।
कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपे प्रवर्तते॥

इति। एवं चाभिन्नमेवेदं परं ब्रह्म परमात्मलक्षणम्।

(Pp. 64-65, Kashmir Series).

These verses have been quoted by Kamalaśīla also in his Pañcikā on the Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita (P. 72, Gaekwad Series) to elucidate Bhartṛhari's Śabdādvaita.

The evidence of these authors whose authority is indisputable, is sufficient to prove that Bhartṛhari was not a Buddhist.

I now return to Vācaspati's ascription of the Vākyapadīya verse to Bāhyas. If by this term Vācaspati refers to Bhartṛhari we may explain it in two ways: In the first place, it must be noted that in Adhikaraṇas 2. 1. 3. 12 and 2. 2. 7. 38 of the Brahmasūtra (see the Śāṅkarabhāṣya and Bhāmatī) all the Darśanas except the Brahmādvaita are said to be Vedabāhyas; it is perhaps according to these Adhikaraṇas that Vācaspati regards Bhartṛhari or his Darśana as Bāhya. Secondly, there is the fact that Bhartṛhari does not accept an Īśvara apart from Śabda: his philosophy has no compromise with religion. On this we have the authority of Utpala. Referring to Śabdabrahmavādins he says:

पश्यन्ती च नेश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञोक्तन्यायेन शब्दनात्मिका परमेश्वरशक्तिरिष्यते भवद्भिरीश्वरोपगमप्रसङ्गात्.

(Śivadṛṣṭivivṛti p. 58).

This might have made Vācaspati regard him as outside the pale of orthodoxy.

There is difference in reading between the verse quoted by Vācaspati and that found in the Vākyapadīya, and it is not impossible that Bhartṛhari has taken it from some Buddhist work and incorporated in his work with some modifications and that Vācaspati is quoting it from the original source.[1]

It is wrong to say that neglect has been accorded to Vākyapadīya as a work of a Buddhist. M. Ramakrishna Kavi rightly observes :—

"Even Vākyapadīya owing to its unusual extent and criticism of hundreds of philosophical theories as held in his days and remarkably aphoristic terseness of his language, whether in prose or in poetry, contributed to its disappearance as a text-book for the study of philosophy and grammar. But a careful study of the Indian philosophy reveals that most of the authors on Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Vaiśēṣika, Vēdānta, and Vyākaraṇa have *simply worked out on the arguments advanced by Bhartṛhari* in their contributions. It is not too much to say the final shape that Advaita took in the hands of great Śaṅkara had all the germs of development in Vākyapadīya itself though he identifies Brahman with Śabda or with Sabdabrahman...The evolution of Indian philosophy shall lose an important link if study and appreciation of Vākyapadīya is ignored."

(Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society, Vol. IV, pp. 239–40).

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1. It must also be noted that if Bhartṛhari were a Buddhist, orthodox Śaiva philosophers like Abhinavagupta would not have referred to him with the honorific तत्र भवान्; See also Locana, p. 47, Kāvyamālā Series, 1891. The Vākyapadīya contains overwhelming doctrinal evidence for Bhartṛhari's having been a great Advaitin : this I wish to deal with elsewhere.

DATES OF THE WORKS OF KĀYASTHA CĀMUṆḌA

(P. K. Gode)

I — *Date of Rasasaṅketakalikā of Kāyastha Cāmuṇḍa and his reference to an anecdote about King Siṁhaṇa.*

Vaidya Jadavaji Trikamji Acharya, whose efforts in the cause of the publication of ancient works on Indian Medicine are really praiseworthy, has published in the *Āyurvedīyagrantha-mālā*[1] a work on *rasas* or Medical preparations called the *Rasasaṅketakalikā*.[1] In the preface to this work the Editor makes the following remarks regarding the author and the importance of his work :—

" स चायं चामुण्डः कस्मिन् समये कतमे वा जनपदे समजनीति निर्णेतुं न किञ्चिदपि साधनमुपलभ्यते। ग्रंथश्चायं लघुरपि अतिसरलत्वात् विशदार्थत्वात् दृष्टप्रत्ययाल्पप्रयत्नसाध्यप्रयोगवत्वाच्च रसचिकित्साग्रन्थेषु मूर्धन्यः। पुत्रप्रदरस-प्रभृतयः केचन अपूर्वप्रयोगा अप्यत्रोपलभ्यन्ते। "

In the above remarks, I am here concerned with the date of the author of the *Rasasaṅketakalikā* and not with the medical value of the treatise which an editor of Vaidya Jadavaji's status and reputation is most competent to judge.

When the above book was published Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum* was in existence. It appears, however, that this Catalogue has not been used by the Editor in making the remarks quoted above to the effect that there are no means for determining the place and time of Cāmuṇḍa, the author of this *Rasasaṅketakalikā*. The following entry[2] in Aufrecht's Catalogue would certainly have helped the Editor to study the question more carefully :—

" **चामुण्ड**[3] or **चण्ड कायस्थ** wrote at Medapāṭa under King Rājamalla (1489) : **ज्वरतिमिरभास्कर** *med.* Bik. 643. Lahore 22 ; **रससंकेत-**

1. Edited along with *Rasasāra* of Govindacharya, 1915, Bombay.
2. *Cata Catalo.* Part I, p. 185.
3. Aufrecht, III, 40 mentions a चामुण्ड as the author of a work called वर्णनिघण्टु (Peters 6, 399) which is identical with No. 399 of 1895-98 in the Govt. MSS Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona. The identity of this चामुण्ड with the author of the *Rasasaṅketakalikā* will be examined in a separate note. Aufrecht also records (Part III, 130) a work on *jyotiṣa* called वर्णनिघण्टु but its author is not mentioned. It appears to be a different work from the वर्णनिघण्टु of चामुंड referred to above.

कलिका *med.* L. 910. K. 216, Oudh 1877, 62." In an article contributed by me to the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute* (Vol. XII, pp. 294–296) I have proved that Cāmuṇḍa Kāyastha wrote his *Jvaratimirabhāskara* in Saṁvat 1546 (=A. D. 1490) during the reign of King Rājamalla of Mewād (1474 to 1509). I shall, therefore, try in this paper to prove the identity of the Author of the *Jvaratimirabhāskara* with the author of the *Rasasaṅketakalikā*.

In the first verse of the *Rasasaṅketakalikā* the author states that he composed the work and that his name is " चामुण्डः कायस्थ-वंशभूः ". In the last verse of the *Jvaratimirabhāskara* (v. 63 on folio 116 of MS. No. 920[1] of 1884–87) the author calls himself " कायस्थश्चंडनामा ". This identity of names is not sufficient to prove the identity of authorship for the two works under reference because in the *Rasasaṅketakalikā* no chronological and historical data are available. I have, therefore, tried to find if any verses are common to both the works. Fortunately my cursory perusal of both the works has enabled me to detect the following lines in the *Rasasaṅketakalikā* which are found alse in the *Jvaratimirabhāskara* :—

Page 15—(विषमज्वरे शीतभञ्जीरसः)

" पारदं रसकं तालं तुल्यं गन्धकटङ्कणम् ।
सर्वमेतत्समं शुद्धं कारवेल्या रसैर्दिनम् ॥ २ ॥
मर्दयेत्तेन द्विह्याञ्च ताम्रपात्रोदरं घनम् ।
अङ्गुलार्धार्धमानेन तत्पचेत्सिकताह्वये ॥ ३ ॥
यन्त्रे यावत्स्फुटन्त्येव व्रीहयस्तस्य पृष्ठतः ।
ततः सुशीतले ग्राह्यस्ताम्रपात्रोदराद्बुधैः ॥ ४ ॥
तत्समं मरिचं दत्वा सर्वमेकत्र चूर्णयेत् ।
द्विगुञ्जं पर्णखण्डेन वातिके, पैत्तिके ज्वरे ॥ ५ ॥ "

1. This MS is dated *Saṁvat 1689* (=A.D. 1633). It was copied at Ajmere and contains two impressions of a seal on the last folio. The seals are in Persian script. Mr. G. H. Khare of the Bharata Itihasa Mandal has given me a tentative deciphering of these seal-impressions, according to which the Seal contains the words "*Keśav Ibn Ganesh Kher*". If this reading is correct it would mean that the Seal belongs to some owner of the MS subsequent to the date of the Copy viz. A.D. 1633. *Keshav Ganesh Kher* is a Maharashtra Brahmin name while the copy was made at Ajmere in Rajputana and the MS was acquired by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar from Gujarat.

The above verses in the *Rasasaṅketakalikā* are also found on folio 22 of MS No. 920 of 1884–87 of *Jvaratimirabhāskara* with slight variations :—

" पारदं रसकं तालं तुत्थं टङ्कणगंधकम् ।
सर्वमेतत्समं शुद्धं कारवेल्या द्रवैर्दिनम् ॥ ५४ ॥
मर्दयेत्तेन लिह्याच्च ताम्रपात्रोदरं घनं ।
अङ्गुलाध्यर्द्धमानेन तं पचेत्सिकताह्वये ॥ ५५ ॥
यंत्रे यावत्स्फुटंत्येव व्रीहयस्तस्य पृष्टतः ।
ततः सुशीतलं ग्राह्यं ताम्रपात्रोदराबुधैः ॥ ५६ ॥
तत्समं मरिचं दद्यात् सर्वमेकत्र चूर्णयेत् ॥ ५७ ॥
शीतभञ्जी रसोनाम द्विगुञ्जः वातके ज्वरे ।
दातव्यः पर्णखंडेन क्षणान्नाशयते ज्वरम् ॥ ५८ ॥ "

The above matter common to both the works proves beyond doubt the identity of authorship especially in view of the identity of names of the authors referred to already. In spite of the common matter the relative chronology of the two works cannot be determined unless either of the two works is found mentioning the other work by name.

The work *Rasasaṅketakalikā* composed, therefore, during the reign of King Rājamalla of Mewad (1474–1509 A. D.) is very important as pointed out by Vaidya Jadavaji Trikamji Acharya in his Preface. Among the several *rasas* mentioned in this manual we find one called " क्रव्यादरस " prescribed against the lethargic condition of the bowels and want of appetite (*agnimāndya*). Verses 67 to 72 of the Fourth *Ullāsa* of the work describe the method of its preparation, which is concluded with the following verses narrating its marvellous effects and miraculous properties :—

" भोजयेत्कण्ठपर्यन्तं गुरुमामिषभोजनम् ।
क्षिप्रं तज्जीर्यते भुक्तं पुनः काङ्क्षति भोजनम् ॥ ७३ ॥
घटश्रवाकुम्भयोनिवृकोदरशनैश्वरैः ।
सहस्रदृक्पञ्चचतुर्मुखैरासेवितोऽग्नये ॥ ७४ ॥
अस्य संसेवनादेते सर्वे जाता महाशनाः ।
अतः संसेव्यते भूपैर्महदग्निविवृद्धये ॥ ७५ ॥
कुर्याद्दीपनमद्भुतं च पचनं दुष्टाय योच्छेदनं
तुन्दस्थौल्यनिबर्हणं, गरहरः शूलार्तिमूलापहः ।

गुल्मप्लीहविनाशनो बहुरुजां विध्वंसनः स्रंसनो
वातग्रन्थिमहोदरापहरणः क्रव्यादनामा रसः ॥ ७६ ॥
सिंहणक्षोणिपालाय भूरिभोज्यप्रिये रसम् ।
दत्तवान् भैरवानन्दो भूयो ग्रामाष्टकं ददौ ॥ ७७ ॥

The above extract gives us an impression that ancient Indian kings were addicted to over-eating and required special medicines to enable them to digest everything they swallowed. " अग्निविवृद्धि " or stimulation of appetite was more a matter of concern for the well-fed kings than for the famished peasants. Verily this miserable condition of the kings afforded a nice opportunity for the ancient physicians to make a fortune and hence in verse 77 of the above extract we get an anecdote about King सिंहण who is stated to have been ' भूरिभोज्यप्रिय ', excessively fond of eating or rather a glutton. A physician by name भैरवानन्द administered the क्रव्यादरस to this King and the King was so much pleased by its marvellous effects that he gave the physician no less than *eight* villages as a reward.

Students of history proper may perhaps be able to verify the above anecdote and its historical content. The anecdote is amusing enough as it is cited by Kāyastha Cāmuṇḍa as an illustration from history to prove his point contained in the line " अतः संसेव्यते भूपैर्महदग्निविवृद्धये । " i. e. the क्रव्यादरस should be taken by kings to effect a good appetite.

Vincent Smith[1] mentions a Yadava king of the name Singhaṇa (= सिंहण) (A. D. 1210) " who invaded Gujarat and other countries and established a short-lived kingdom almost rivalling in extent the realms of the Chālukyas and Rāshtrakūṭas ". Inscriptional references to this Singhaṇa describe him as under :–

" अस्ति ध्वस्तसमस्तवैरिविसरप्रौढप्रतापानलः
कुंदश्वेतदिगंतकीर्त्तिरमलः श्रीसिंघणः क्षोणिपः ।
येनाहारि हरीभसंभृतमतिस्फीतं समस्तं क्षणा—
द्राज्यं प्राज्यमथा जनस्य दलिताधाराधराभूषणम् ।। २ ॥[2]

1. *Early History of India*, Oxford, 1924, pp. 451-452.

2. G. H. Khare : *Sources of the Medieval History of the Deccan*, Vol. I (1930) p. 71—The verse about Singhaṇa quoted above is repeated in both the inscriptions recorded by Mr. Khare (pp. 62 and 71). One of these inscriptions is dated " शक संवत् ॥ ११५० ॥ सर्वधारिणि संवत्सरे " = A.D. 1228 (vide p. 66).

Singhaṇa ruled from Śaka 1132 (= A. D. 1210) to Śaka 1169 (= A. D. 1247)[1] i. e. for a period of 37 years. Whether he gave any village to any physician of the name of भैरवानन्द as stated in the *Rasasaṅketakalikā* of Kāyastha Cāmuṇḍa is a matter for investigation. That he did entertain court physicians is proved by the fact of one of the inscriptions mentioned above being composed by an eminent physician who was at the same time noted for his poetic talents. The name of this *poet physician* was Mādhava, son of Dhaneśvarabhaṭṭa of the Viṣṇuvṛddha *gotra* and belonging to the *Taittirīya S'ākhā*. The pertinent verse[2] supplying this information reads as follows :—

" सद्वैद्यो भिषगग्रणी कविवरश्रीमाधवो विप्रराट्
(–) क्षे विक्रमसं(शं)ककेलिविपुलां चक्रे प्रशस्तिं शुभां ॥
पुत्रौ भट्टधनेश्वरस्य सुमतेः श्रीविष्णुवृद्धस्य यो
वंशेजायत शाखया विमलया यस्तैत्तिरीयः कृती ॥ ४२ ॥ "

In inscriptions, devoted more to the praise of kings than to their criticism, it would be difficult to find anything to justify the adjective 'भूरिभोज्यप्रिय' with reference to King Sighaṇa of the inscriptions. In the *Kīrtikaumudī*[3] of Someśvara a good description of the prowess of King Singhaṇa in his invasion of Gujarat is given, but no reference to his personal habits could be traced in such poetic descriptions. Besides there are two more namesakes of king Singhaṇa. One of these was called *Siṁha-rāja* or King *Siṁha*, though his full name was *Singhaṇa* and wko was probably the brother of Parammadeva, the successor of Seuṇa Candra (1069 A. D.) of the early Yādava Dynasty.[4] The other namesake of King Singhaṇa is Singhaṇadeva[5] the last prince of the Kalacuri Dynasty whose grant dated Śaka 1105 (= A. D. 1183) was brought to notice by Dr. Fleet in 1875 and published in the *Indian Antiquary*. Singhaṇadeva was the brother of King Soma. It was at the instance of a woman that King

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1. Vide *Life of Hemādri* (1931) by K. A. Padhya, p. 100.

2. *Sources of the Medieval History of the Deccan* Vol. I, p. 75.

3. Canto IV, verses 43–46 and 49–53 (quoted by Mr. K. A. Padhye in his *Life of Hemādri*, pp. 102–104.

4. Vīde p. 146 of the *Early History of the Deccan* (R. G. B. Works Vol. III 1927—B. O. R. Institute) where the genealogy of the Early Yādavas or the Yādavas of the Seuṇadeśa is given.

5. Ibid, p. 342.

Soma made a grant in the year Śaka 1096 (= A. D. 1174). Her name was Sāvaladevī who is represented to have been dearer to the King than his own wife. "Her brother was *Bhairava* by name who had exercised himself on the musical instruments especially on the Brahmavīṇā and was skilled in beating time ".[1] *Bhairava* and his sister *Sāvaladevi* had, therefore, great influence at the court of King Soma of the Kalacuri dynasty, the brother of Singhaṇadeva. Is it possible to suggest that this *Bhairava* had anything to do with *Bhairavānanda* of the Rasasaṇketakalikā, who administered क्रव्यादरस to सिंहण क्षोणिप and got eight villages as a reward ?

The above anecdote about the fondness of king *Siṁhaṇa* for excessive eating (भूरिभोज्यप्रियत्व) reminds me of a similar tradition current in the Maratha country about Peshwa Bajirao II. Whatever be the truth of this tradition with regard to this last of the Peshwas and his personal habits the fact remains that he was instrumental in indirectly encouraging gluttony to a certain extent. Making due allowance for the charitable motives which prompted him to feed the Brahmins on an enormous scale and pay them *dakṣiṇās* in addition we are constrained to admit that the system engendered indolence instead of encouraging learning, which was the original object of the system.

It appears that the system of feeding Brahmins on a grand scale and paying them dakṣiṇās began early in the Peshwa period. For instance, in an entry in the *Peshwas*[2] *Diaries* for 28th July 1736 we read the following entry :—

" Panta Pradhan performed the ceremony of feeding the Brahmins from Śrāvaṇa Śuddha Pratipadā. On the *Nāgapañcamī* day dakṣiṇā was distributed at the rate of 1 to 2 rupees per head. 4000 to 5000 Brahmins had gathered for the purpose ".

Now compare with the above account the following account of a similar feast to the Brahmins given by Bajirao II at the close of the Peshwa period :—

1. R. G. B. Works, Vol. III, p. 346—
   " यद्भ्राता भैरवो नाम यंत्रे गात्रे कृतश्रमः ।
   विशेषाद्ब्रह्मवीणायाम् तालमानविचक्षणः ॥ "
2. *Peshwa Daftar Selection* No. 22, p. 176.

" The ceremony in the month of *S'rāvaṇa* (was duly celebrated) and *dakṣiṇā* was distributed as usual (to Brahmins). This year the number of Brahmins was less by *ten* to *twelve* thousand. *Khicaḍī* was served for five days as in the previous years. On Monday at 17 *ghāṭikās* in the day (at about 2 P. M.) the distribution of dakṣiṇā to the Brahmins assembled began. Owing to some showers of rain on that day the Brahmins did not attend the feast in large numbers. On the following day it was arranged that *dakṣiṇā* should be distributed simultaneously at all the four gates. This arrangement resulted in the admission of the entire number of Brāhmins inside (the enclosure). Shrimant Rājaśrī Dādā (=Raghunathrao Kurundvadkar) had been appointed as one of the distributors of *dakṣiṇā* and he worked in that capacity. On Tuesday afternoon Sindia (=Mahadji Sindia) was personally present at the ceremony. On that occasion he distributed rupees in handfuls to certain meritorious or austere Brahmins from Poona. (Out of this number) some *ten* to *twelve* persons received as *dakṣiṇā* Rs. 800, 400, 150, 200 each and so on. The total number of Brahmins recorded at the four gates (of the enclosure) was 32,231. Total amount of money distributed was Rs. 1,13,281. Three Brahmins of weak constitution expired on this occasion "[1].

It would, therefore, appear that the modest number of 4000 to 5000 of Brahmins fed in A. D. 1736 had increased to more than 30000 by A. D. 1793. These figures tell their own tale and need no comment.[2]

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1. Vide Letter No. 3523 dated *15th August 1793* from Visāji Narayan Vaḍdekar to Balasaheb (pp. 4656-7 of Khare's *Aitihāsik Lekha Saṁgraha*, Vol. IX, (Poona 1916).

2. Vide remarks of Dr. Sen in his *Administrative System of the Marathas*, Calcutta, 1925, p. 471—Originally the Dakshina System was instituted by Dabhades but was continued by the Peshwas after the fall of that family. It was originally meant for scholars but was extended to Brahmins in general. "Bajirao II spent about 4 lacs of rupees annually in Dakshina grants". Mr. Elphinstone maintained a Pathashala at Poona out of the Dakshana grant.

Feeding of Brahmins to their heart's content and giving them daksiṇas at religious Sacrifices was practised in the Peshwa period. Raja Savai Jaisingh of Jaipur (1699-1743 A.D.) who performed an *Aśvamedha* Sacrifice gave plenty of daksiṇās and feasts to Brahmins on that occasion. The following verses from *Isvara Vilāsa Kāvya*, a poem dealing with the Jaipur dynasty describes this Sacrifice in chapters IV and V of the same. In chapter V we get the following verses :—

" अस्मिन्यज्ञे जायमाने यावद्यद्येन याचितं ।
तावत्तेन विप्रेण क्षिप्रमस्मादलभ्यत ॥ २९ ॥ "
" एवं स दक्षिणाभारं सभूरिब्रह्मभोजनैः ।
सांगं स वाजिमेधानां चक्रे पंचोत्तरं शतं ॥ ५२ ॥ "

(These verses are quoted from MS. No. 273 of 1884-86 in the Govt. MSS. Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona. This is the only MS. of this poem discovered so far and hence important.)

II — *Date of Varṇanighaṇṭa of Kāyastha Cāmuṇḍa—A. D. 1482 (Saṁvat 1538).*

Aufrecht[1] records only one MS of a work called *Varṇanighaṇṭa* by Cāmuṇḍa. This MS is identical with No. 399 of 1895-98 in the Govt. MS Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona, and consists of 2 folios only. It appears to be a vocabulary of *tāntric* terms. It begins as follows :—

" आराध्याखिलनायकं पशुपतिं तद्वल्लभामंबिका–
मानम्य स्वगुरुं विलोक्य मुनिभिस्तंत्राण्यनेकानि च ।
श्रीमत्कुंभतनूद्भवः प्रकुरुते चामुंड नामा कृती
कायस्थार्णनिघंटशास्त्ररचनां सन्मंत्रसंसिद्धये ॥ १ ॥
अभिवंद्य जगद्धात्रीं श्रीमत्त्रिपुरसुंदरीं ।
चंडः प्रकुरुते वर्णनिघंटं करुणाग्रणीः ॥ २ ॥
हुंकारो वर्तुलस्तारो बिंदुशक्तिस्त्रिदैवतः ।
प्रणवो मंत्रगव्यस्यात्पंचेद्रेवो ध्रुवस्त्रिकः ॥ ३ ॥
मंत्राद्यः परमं बीजं मूलवेदाद्यतारकः ।
शेषादिर्व्यापको व्यक्तः परंज्योतिश्च संविदोः ॥ ४ ॥ "

The author's name as given in verses 1 and 2 is चंड or चामुंड कायस्थ and not mere चामुंड as stated by Aufrechet. He is identical with कायस्थ चामुंड the author of ज्वरतिमिरभास्कर, a treatise on fevers and रससंकेतकलिका or a treatise dealing with *rasas* or certain medical preparations. We have shown elsewhere[2] that the work ज्वरतिमिरभास्कर was composed in A. D. 1489-90 (*Saṁvat* 1546) though the exact date of the रससंकेतकलिका cannot be determined[3]. However, we are sure that it was composed during the reign of King Rājamalla of Mewad (1474 to 1509 A. D.).

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1. *Cata. Catalogorum*, Part III, p. 40.
2. *Annals* (B. O. R. I.) Vol. XII, p. 294-96.
3. See my note on the Date of *Rasasaṅketakalikā* published above.

The work *Rasasanketakalikā* begins with the words "शिवं नत्वा" corresponding to the first line of *Varṇanighanṭa* viz. "आराध्याखिलनायकं पशुपतिं" showing thereby that Kāyastha Cāmuṇḍa was a devotee of God Śiva. His father's name as recorded in the Varṇanighanṭa (verse 1, line 3) was Kumbha (श्रीमत्कुंभतनूद्भव:). In the *Jvaratimirabhāskara* also he is called कुंभसूनुः in the following verse :—

"देसे श्रीमेदपाटे रसयुगसरभूमानवष दसम्यां
शुक्लायामश्विनस्य त्रिदसगुरुदिने योगिनीपत्र(त्त ?)नस्थः ।
भूपे श्रीराजमल्ले निवसति वसुधामंडले कुंभसूनुः
कायस्थश्चंडनामा ज्वरतिमिरहरं भास्करं संविधत्ते ॥"

The above verse occurs in MS No. 920 of 1884–87. In the Bikaner MS of the *Jvaratimirabhāskara* instead of "कुंभसूनुः" in the above quotation we have the reading "कुंभसूनौ" which becomes applicable to "राजमल्ले" and in fact राजमल्ल was the son of King *Kumbha* but the reading "कुंभसूनौ" of the Bikaner MS is wrong as in the वर्णनिघंट, कायस्थ चामुंड is clearly stated to be "कुंभतनूद्भव" and hence "कुंभसूनुः" is the correct reading. The composition of the present vocabulary, *Varṇanighanṭa* shows that the author was a follower of *tantras* and *mantras* for the proper application of which the vocabulary viz. the *Varṇanighanṭa* was composed. The MS *ends* as follows :—

"श्रीशिवाद्यागमाचार्यमनुर्यो गोपितः पुरा ।
तत्स्फुटीकरणायैतदुद्यमं कृतवानहं ॥
वर्षे श्रीविक्रमार्कस्य गजाग्निष्विंदुसंयुते
ज्येष्ठे मासे सिते पक्षे मूलार्के प्रतिपद्दिने
राज्ञः श्रीराजमल्लस्य राज्ये श्री योगिनीपुरे
चामुंडेनागमज्ञानं ग्रंथोऽयं प्रकटीकृतः
इतिश्रीचामुंडकृतो वर्णनिघंटः समाप्तिमफाणीत् ॥

The work was composed in the *Saṁvat* year 1538 represented by the chronogram ("गज, अग्नि, इषु, इंदु) = A. D. 1482 i. e. eight years before the date of composition of the work *Jvaratimirabhāskara* (composed in A. D. 1490). King Rajamalla was

reigning at the time. The work was composed at Yoginīpura.[1] Rajamalla of Mewad ruled from A, D. 1474 to 1509 and the dates 1482 and 1490 for the composition of the *Varṇanighaṇṭa* and the *Jvaratimirabhāskara* respectively harmonize with the period of Rājamalla's reign viz. 1474 to 1590 A. D.



1. Kayastha Cāmuṇḍa's *Jvaratimirabhāskara* was also composed at योगिनीपुर (= योगिनीपत्तन of the verse quoted in this note from the *Jvaratimirabhāskara*). As Rājamalla was the King of Medapāṭa (= Mewar) योगिनीपुर or योगिनीपत्तन must have been in the old province of Mewar. Its exact location and identification needs more evidence for being determined with accuracy.

योगिनीपुर has been identified with modern Delhi (see *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. II by H. C. Ray, Pp. 801, 1095, 1145). See also J. A. S. B. Vol. XLIII, Part I, Pp. 106–109 and E. I. XXI, 281).

योगिनीपुर had nothing to do with *Jogipura* settlement mentioned by Badaoni in the following passage regarding Akbar's interest in Yogies :—

"It was this craving for unravelling the mysteries of the universe and exploring the nature of things which led him to found the settlement of *Jogipura* where he called 'Yogies' for private interview at night and made inquiries into their practices and usages, alchemy, physiognomy and the power of omnipresence of soul. Badaoni alleges that with the help of Yogies Akbar learnt alchemy and showed in public some of the gold made." [Vide p. 100 of *Muslim University Journal* Vol. III (April, 1936) containing Abdul Ghafoor's article on "*A sidelight an Akbar's genius.*"]

ABHINAVAGĪTAGOVINDA

(E. P. Radhakrishnan)

Dr. Aufrecht in his Catalogus Catalogorum III p. 6a notices one *Abhinavagītagovinda* by Puruṣottamadeva, a Gajapati King of Orissa, on the authority of the information given in MM Haraprasada Shastri's Report on Search for Sanskit Manuscripts 1895–1900, p. 18. Again on p. 144 of Vol. VII of the Des. Cat. of Mss. in the Asiatic Society of Bengal is found a work named *Abhinavagītagovinda*[1] attributed to a Gajapati Puruṣottamadeva, the second king of the Gajapati dynasty of Orissa at the end of the 15th century A. D.[2] The authority for fathering this work on the King is obviously derived from the colophon[3] of the work and on an imperfect stanza found at the beginning of the same :

राधामुरारिरमणीयरहस्यलीला सद्यो हि......ममन्दपुराभिरामम् ।
साहित्यसारसमुदायबुधः प्रबन्धमेतं करोति पुरुषोत्तमभूमिभर्ता ॥

Apparently and taken independently, the ascription of the work to Puruṣottamadeva is correct. But there is a conflicting evidence to this.

In his *Bhāratāmṛtakāvya* (ASB. Des. Cat. VII, p. 145), an epic poem in 30 cantos describing the kings of the lunar dynasty, Divākara mentions that he wrote a poem called *Abhinavagīta-govinda*. The latter half of the concluding verse of the 27th Canto of the Bhāratāmṛta runs :—

काव्ये तस्य सहोदरात् अभिनवश्रीगीतगोविन्दतोऽ-
प्योजःशालिनि सप्तविंशतितमः सर्गः समाप्तोऽभवत् ॥

From this it is quite clear that Divākara composed an *Abhinavagītagovinda* and also the *Bhāratāmṛta*, which is more significant in point of 'Ojas' than its brother, i. e., *Abhinava-gītagovinda*. Is it not then quite probable to suppose that

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1. This work is to be differentiated from one Gītagovinda, probably called Abhinavagītagovinda, by a king of Nīlācala. According to the Bhaktamālā a king of Nīlācala composed one Gītagovinda and tried to pass it off as Jayadeva's work. (90 Cat. Eggeling p. 1480 f.n.)

2. Mr. Manomohan Chakravarti seems to identify this Puruṣottama-deva with the Utkala king of the same name, who lived during 1470–97. (JASB. 1906 p. 164). But evidences are lacking.

3. इति श्रीपुरुषोत्तमदेवगजपतिमहाराजकृते अभिनवगीतगोविन्दे महाकाव्ये etc.

Divākara, after composing the *Abhinavagītagovinda*, dedicated it to his patron, King Puruṣottamadeva? As time passed by, the real author was missed and the work came to be associated with the name of the King.

This habit of a poet composing a poem and fathering it on his patron or some other renowned scholar of his time is not quite uncommon in India. See for instance, the stanza in *Alaṅkāraśekhara* :—

प्राक्प्रत्यक्पृथिवीभृतोः परिषदि प्रख्यातसंख्यावतां
अह्नायाद्भुततर्ककर्कशतया विच्छिद्य विद्यामदम् ।
ये केऽप्युत्कलभूपते तव सभासंभाविताः पण्डिताः
पत्रं श्रीजयदेवपण्डितकविः तन्मूर्ध्नि विन्यस्यति ॥

This clearly shows that a poet Jayadeva at the time of the Utkala King passed off his work or works on some renowned scholars of his time. In the light of this fact there is nothing improbable assuming that Divākara attributed the authorship of his work to his patron, Puruṣottamadeva.

Another point with respect to the authorship of the *Abhinavagītagovinda* is this: In Catalogus Catalogorum I. p. 254a one Divākara Puruṣottama is given as the patron of Kṛṣṇadatta Maithila, author of a drama entitled *Purañjanacarita* (Mitra Notices 2000). The same Kṛṣṇadatta wrote a commentary[1] called *Gaṅgā* on Jayadeva's Gītagovinda. Aufrecht[2] attributes to him the following works also, viz., *Kuvalayāśvīyanāṭaka* (L. 2035), *Caṇḍīcaritacandrikākāvya* (L. 2008). The play, *Purañjanacarita* in five acts, was first staged in the court of Puruṣottamdeva of Orissa. For in the prastāvanā he mentions,

परमरमणीयाकारस्य श्रीदिवाकरपुरुषोत्तमस्य सभायां etc.

which seems to contain a reference to Divākara also. Perhaps Maithila Kṛṣṇadatta, a court-poet of Puruṣottamadeva composed his *Gaṅgā* on Jayadeva's *Gītagovinda*, and envious of this, it is probable that Divākara, another court-poet of Puruṣottama wrote an independent work called *Abhinavagītagovinda* and fathered it on his patron, fearing that his jealousy would be detected. The new composition seems to have pleased the King much.

1. 90. 3875; Mithila MSS. II, pp. 46-7.
2. Cat. Cat. I, 120 b.

Perhaps there is also a veiled reference to the favour enjoyed by Divākara at the Royal hands, when in his prastāvanā Kṛṣṇadatta says 'दिवाकरपुरुषोत्तमस्थ सभायां' which means in the assembly in which Divākara and Puruṣottama are present.

The possibility of Kṛṣṇadatta's writing his *Gaṅgā* on Jayadeva's *Gītagovinda*, being inspired by Divākara's *Abhinavagītagovinda* also should not be lost sight of here. But the contrary seems to be nearer the fact, when we think of Bhartṛhari's tag : बोद्धारो मत्सरग्रस्ताः ।

Again the phrase—दिवाकरपुरुषोत्तम—admits of still another explanation. Divākara need not necessarily be different from Puruṣottama. Divākara might have been the real name of the King and Puruṣottama merely a qualification. But this possibility seems to be far-fetched and I leave it for scholars to decide.

Then how to explain the colophon found at the end of the *Abhinavagītagovinda* which gives Puruṣottama as its author? The explanation has already been offered, i. e., Divākara passed off his work in the name of the King.

Let us now see what information can be had of Divākara. A glance at the colophons or more correctly the concluding verses of the Cantos of the *Bhāratāmṛtakāvya* induces one strongly to think that Divākara was a close follower of Śrī Harṣa, author of the *Naiṣadha*. For, both are similar in giving some personal details in their concluding verses. About Divākara we know the following particulars. He was a Brahmin belonging to ths Bhāradvājagotra and the Vājasaneyi Śākhā. His father was one Vaidyeśvara and his mother Muktā.[1] His paternal uncle was called Nārāyaṇa Kaviratna,[2] under whom he studied Sāhityaśāstra. He had two brothers, Govinda (cousin) and Madhu-

1. यं प्रासूत पतिव्रता गुणवती मुक्ता विमुक्तात्मनः
श्रीवैद्येश्वरतो विभूषितभरद्वाजान्वयादात्मजम् ।

His mother was not called Pativratā as supposed by Mm. Haraprasada Shastri and Dr. Aufrecht (Cat. Cat. III, p. 55 a). Her name was Muktā, pativratā being only an adjective. Otherwise the term Muktā goes without explanation.

2. काव्ये तस्य पितृव्यतः कविनृपात् साहित्यशिक्षाभृतः
श्रीनारायणनामतो रसमयः सर्गस्तृतीयो गतः ।

sūdana.[1] Divākara was much honoured for his erudition in the court of Kṛṣṇarāya, Raja of Karṇāṭa :—

कर्णाटाधिपकृष्णरायसदसि ख्यातस्य विद्वत्तया

Here is a striking similarity between Divākara and Harṣa, who obtained,

ताम्बूलद्वयमासनं च लभते यः कान्यकुब्जेश्वरात्

Divākara was also the author of the following works :—(1) A bhāṇa called *Dhūrtacaritra*,[2] (2) a hymn to Devī in 100 verses[3], and (3) *Rasamañjarī*[4], a collection of charming verses, probably an anthology known also by the name *Padyāvali* which is to be differentiated from a similar work of the same name by Rūpagosvāmin.

In his paternal uncle, Nārāyaṇa, Divākara had a cousin brother named Govinda, who was an intimate friend of Divākara and probably of the same age, and who seems to have collaborated with Divākara in his poetical compositions. See the words 'kavipathe hastāvalambaḥ' in the following :

गोविन्दः कविशेखरः कविपथे हस्तावलम्बः पितु-
र्भ्रातुर्योऽजनि यस्य तस्य सुकृतौ द्वाविंशसर्गो गतः ।

Divākara got[5] the title 'Kavicandrarāya' from a King Rudra. Who this Rudra was is unknown. Divākara's ancestors were well-skilled in Vedāṅgas and all the systems of philosophy[6]. That Śrī Harṣa influenced Divākara much can also be seen when he adopts the same metre, Vaṁśastha as in the *Naiṣadha*, in opening his *Bhāratāmṛtakāvya* :—

प्रणेतुमाम्नायविधिमनेकधा etc.

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1. यद्भ्राता मधुसूदनो मधुरया कां कां अनानन्दयत् ।
2. भाणोऽभण्यत येन धूर्तचरितं चेतश्चमत्कारकृत्.
3. यो देव्याः स्तुतिमद्रिराजदुहितुः श्लोकैः शतेनाकरोत्.
4. यश्चक्रे रसमञ्जरीति रसिकाह्लादाय पद्यावलिम्.
5. यश्चापत्कविचन्द्ररायपदवीं श्रीरुद्रभूमीभुजः.
6. गोत्रेऽजायत यः षडङ्गि (ङ्ग ?) विदुषां षड्दर्शनीदर्शिनाम्.

AN UPANIṢADIC INTERPRETATION

(Gaṅgārāma Śarmā)

It is unfortunate that the existing commentaries and translations of the Upaniṣads do not give a connected and a consistent idea of what the authors of the Upaniṣads sought to say for the instruction and benefit of their readers or listeners.

The western scholars being baffled in their attempts to understand the true meaning of the Upaniṣads have made some very disparaging remarks about what has been written in these sacred books of the Hindus. They have tried to account for the apparent or so-called inconsistencies in them by putting forward a number of imaginary and fantastic theories. Max Müller, for instance, in his introduction to the first volume of his translation of the Upaniṣads writes as follows :—

" I confess that it has been for many years a problem to me and to a great extent is so still, how the sacred books of the east should, by the side of so much that is fresh, natural, simple, beautiful and true, contain so much that is not only unmeaning, artificial and silly, but even hideous and repellent. This is a fact and must be accounted for, in some way or the other. I can account for it to a certain extent, though not entirely to my own satisfaction. Most of the ancient sacred books have been handed down by oral tradition for many generations before they were consigned to writing. In an age when there was nothing corresponding to what we call literature, every saying, every proverb, every story, handed down from father to son, received very soon a hallowed character. They became sacred heirlooms, sacred, because they came from an unkown source, from a distant age. There was a stage in the development of human thought, when the distance that separated the living generation from their grandfathers or great-grandfathers, was as yet the nearest approach to a conception of eternity and when the name of grandfather or great-grandfather seemed the nearest expression of God. Hence what had been said by those half-human, half divine ancestors, if it was preserved at all, was soon looked upon as a more than human utterance. It was received with

reverence, it waa never questioned and criticised." This is what Maxmuller has said.

But we hold that by a careful and comparative study of these sacred books with due regard to the context, and in the light of what has been written in the Bhagavadgītā on the same subject it is possible to explain all the seeming inconsistencies in a rational manner.

One of the reasons why no attempt appears to have been made by the ancient scholars of India to give a consistent and rational explanation of what is embodied in the Upaniṣads is that Śaṅkara, a scholar of great reputation, acumen, and masterly grasp of many branches of ancient learning, strongly supported the 'Māyā' theory of the universe and took great pains to explain exhaustively all the Vendantic literature of ancient India on the basis of this theory. Scholars who came after him either amplified and strengthened his views or vehemently controverted them. Moreover, during the period which followed the decline of Buddhism and extended upto the time when scientific knowledge found its way from the west, not only there was little or no progress in the study of various sciences in India, but such study was sadly neglected, and that is why the Upanisadic literature could not be explained as it should have been.

A close study of the Upaniṣads, on the other hand, reveals that at the time when these works were produced considerable advance in the study of the various sciences had been made, and the conception of God and the universe, which has been given in the Upaniṣads, was based on an exhaustive study of the fundamental principles of all the sciences.

The definition of God i. e. Brahma as given in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad is as follows :—सर्वँ खल्विदं ब्रह्म, तज्जलानिति, शान्तः उपासीत। Its translation or very brief explanation is

" All this, perceptible or imperceptible, conceivable or even inconceivable, known or unknown, taken as a whole, is Brahma. It evolves out of Brahma, is maintained and sustained in Brahma, and is dissolved into Brahma." Moreover, the whole of this Brahmanda is but one part of Brahma, and the other three parts are beyond all comprehension and description. One trying to know ब्रह्म should meditate upon it, with perfect serenity and calmness.

This definition is not only natural and logical, but also correct and comprehensive. Taking it, in the light of the explanation we have offered, as the basis, the whole literature of the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā can be shown to be consistent and relevent. The description of the two 'prakṛtis' of God given in the seventh chapter of the Gita as

(1) भूमिरापोऽनलो वायुः, खं मनो बुद्धिरेव च ।
अहङ्कार इतीयं मे, भिन्ना प्रकृतिरष्टधा ॥
(2) अपरेयमितस्त्वन्यां, प्रकृतिं विद्धि मे पराम् ।
जीवभूतां महाबाहो, ययेदं धार्यते जगत् ॥
(3) एतद्योनीनि भूतानि, सर्वाणीत्युपधारय ।
अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः, प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा ॥

becomes clear in the light of this definition only. The following text from the Ṛg Veda also points in the same direction.

एतावानस्य महिमा, तो ज्यायांश्च पूरुषः ।
पादोऽस्य विश्वाभूतानि, त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि ॥

The quotation from the Gita given above, also shows that the universe is conceived of as consisting of both animate and inanimate entities and that all animate entities depend for their existence on the 'parā prakṛti' of God, which becomes the 'jīva' by association with the bodies of all that have life. The living bodies gradually develop, on account of their association with the 'parā prakṛti', from the primitive to the highest forms of life a process which has been briefly described in the fourth 'brāhmaṇa' of the first chapter of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. From the same 'brāhmaṇa' it does also appear that along with the development of the physical body of the animate creation the mental, moral, and spiritual development also goes on, till the highest stage of perfection is reached.

As regards the development of 'man', the major portion of the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā is devoted to setting forth all the various means which are calculated to lead to an all round development not only with reference to an individual self but also in regard to the proper performance of his duty towards all his fellow beings culminating in perfection, individual and social.

While laying stress on the spiritual development of 'man', a good deal has been said about his physical and mental development also which is absolutely essential for his spiritual development. Perfection, it is believed, lies in a harmonious development of body, mind, and spirituality.

As against this conception of Brahma, Brahmāṇḍa, and 'jīva', the conception, which has been accepted by most of the orthodox Indian scholars, is on the basis of Śaṅkara's theory of Māyā which may be briefly stated as follows :—

Brahma is conceived to be '*saccidānanda*' which means ब्रह्म is one conscious Bliss, perfectly homogeneous, without division or difference of any kind, the only true Existence. All the rest is illusion. This illusion is due to Māyā which is defined as, that which is and which is not at one and the same time, and therefore is quite inexplicable. On account of this Māyā all the conscious beings, though they are nothing but '*saccidānanda*', Himself, do somehow or other conceive themselves to be really existent individually and separately. So long as they remain under the influence of this illusion they function and believe themselves to be living beings different from one another and to be going through all the worldly affairs of their life. But when their dream ends they feel disgusted with all the temporal pleasures and interests of this life, which are ephemeral; they wake up from their dream to a consciousness of their being one and the same with 'saccidānanda' which is the only reality, and all animate and inanimate creations are nothing else but illusory misconceptions foisted on ब्रह्म Himself, in some inexplicable way.

Though in this small paper it is not possible to discuss all the weak points of Śankara's theory of Māyā, yet, it may at least be pointed out here that its acceptance renders the task of explaining rationally certain important texts of the Gītā and also certain passages in the Upaniṣads not only difficult but almost impossible. For instance, the reading of verse 4 in the 7th chapter of the Gītā viz.

भूमिरापोऽनलो वायुः, खं मनो बुद्धिरेव च ।
अहङ्कार इतीयं मे भिन्ना प्रकृतिरष्टधा ॥

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after verse 2 viz.

ज्ञानं तेऽहं सविज्ञानमिदं वक्ष्याम्यशेषतः ।
यज्ज्ञात्वा नेह भूयोऽन्य ज्ज्ञातव्यमवशिष्यते ॥

is quite inexplicable on the basis of Śaṅkara's theory. Similarly, the text of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad

(1) द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्य इति ह स्म, यद् ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति परा चैवापरा च ।

(2) तत्रापरा ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्ववेदः शिक्षाकल्पो व्याकरणं निरुक्तं छन्दो ज्योतिषमिति, अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते ।

cannot be satisfactorily explained if we accept Śaṅkara's theory of Māyā.

Against this, if we adopt the definition of Brahma and its explanation already given by us above, and apply it to these texts they can be easily explained. As an illustration of the feasibility of this definition we give below a Brāhmaṇa-wise summary of the first chapter of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.

In the first 'brāhmaṇa' this universe has been described as it is seen at the time of dawn by one sitting is an open space, and it has been likened to a horse in order to indicate the true significance and purpose of the Aśvamedha sacrifice. In the concluding portion of this 'brāhmaṇa' it has been suggested that the universe is a subject of study not only for men on this earth but also for beings higher than and superior to men living in other worlds than ours.

The question naturally arises how and whence has this universe come into existence. A reply to this question has been given in the second 'brāhmaṇa'. Here we have first a picture of the condition of the universe at the time of 'pralaya', and then the stages through which it has evolved to its present condition. Further, this 'brāhmaṇa' goes on to indicate the lines along which, and the way by which, living beings can first develop into human beings who in their progress continue to develop their mental and spiritual faculties till perfection is achieved.

After giving a brief resume of this gradual process of development from the very beginning, and before discussing the development of life on this earth in detail, the necessary means of preparation required for a thorough study of this universe

have been set forth in the third 'brāhmaṇa'. It describes the way in which man could best train and develop his senses as well his mind and other faculties for an all-round development and progress to make himself best fitted for doing selfless service others.

In the fourth 'brāhmaṇa' the development of life is indicated to be entirely dependent on its association with the Universal Self by partaking of the attribute of consciousness alone therefrom. The development of life from the very first stage has been shown to be taking place on the same lines of physical and mental evolution as expounded by modern scientists. Besides this, this 'brāhmaṇa' after briefly setting forth the law of organic evolution culminating in man, clearly indicates that the chief and essential agent in this evolution is the association of life with the Universal Soul. The process in man's development not only physical, but also mental, moral, and spiritual is also discussed. By introducing the subject of Brahma and his essential characteristic of being All-in-All, it is shown that whosoever acquires the knowledge of the All is capable of becoming one with Brahma.

This 'brāhmaṇa', like the third 'brāhmaṇa', does also point out that one must, in his onward development, not only reform his own individual self, but should also perform the essential duty of doing the greatest good of the greatest number.

The fifth 'brāhmaṇa' deals with the important subject of setting forth various means and measures which one should adopt for his gradual development and onward progress. These means are known as the seven 'foods'. The word 'food' has been taken in the sense of whatever contributes to one's development, physical, mental, moral, and spiritual. In addition to one 'food' which is necessary for developing and maintaining the physical body and the liquid food which is necessary for the maintenance of all life, five other 'foods' have been mentioned. Two of these consist of the ways and methods of scientific investigation and research and the other three consist of the development, on right lines, of the vital energy, speech, including all languages and literatures, and the mind including all the mental faculties of man.

The sixth 'brāhmaṇa' indicates that there are two aspects of every entity : One which is recognised by the senses, and the other which is the real essence and lies at the bottom of all entities, and which is one and unchangeable.

AGNI AND SOMA

THE SOMA, CELESTIAL AND TERRESTRIAL

(Fatah Singh)

(Continued from Vol. IV, No. 4)

27. Keith thinks that Surā was also favoured sometimes, but the passages which he cites hardly go to prove his view. Of the two passage Rigvedic passages quoted by him, one (10, 31, 4-5) speaks of Aśvins as drinking Surā with Asuras, thereby stating in clear terms that Surā was a condemned thing associated with demons only. The other passage (1, 116, 7) again relates one of the Aśvin's myth that ascribes to Aśvins the sprinkling of hundred jars (kumbān) of Surā. This myth does not suggest any favour towards wine, for the myth only symbolizes the hundreds of red rays of the rising sun, and they are compared with wine only because of the red colour. A. V. mentions Surôdaka (4, 34, 6) which can hardly mean wine. In one passage (10, 6, 5) Av. while praying to some low spirit or god (which abound in AV.) the poet says that he would feed him Ghṛta as Surā and Madhuanna as annam. Samething can be said of TS. (1, 3, 3) and ŚB. 12, 7, 3, 8, for Sautra-maṇi sacrifice was probably originated by some sects of the low level of society.

28. That madhu or mada was identical with the Soma at least in its popularity, may be seen from the close association of madhu or mada with the Indo-European life. Thus anything sweet and pleasing was madhu. The doctrine leading to highest pleasure was called madhu-vidyā or madhu-Brāhmaṇa,[1] and the highest world, the place of bliss was overflowing with madhu,[2] and the people living there enjoyed with honey.[3] The beneficient gods were named as madhu-kaśa[4] or Premetheus or Epemetheus. A good poet or Ṛṣi could be called madhu-

1. ŚB. IV 1. 5. 18; XIV. 1, 4, 13;. Br. up. II. 5, 16 Cf. Weber: Indische studien 1, 290.

2. RV. 1, 154, 5-6 and often in later literature.

3. RV. 1, 154, 4 ; III. 69, 7 etc.

4. Name of Aśvins in RV. 1, 22, 3 ; 157, 4 ; मधोकशा AV. X. 7, 79 ; Panchaviṃśa Br. XXI. 10, 12 Cf. Roth : St. Petersberg Dictionary for a genious conjecture about 'honey-whip'.

chandas,[1] a plant having the (purple) colour of or the sweetness of juice might be styled as madūgha, medic or medick (Eng.), medica (Latin) and medike (Greek)[2] or madavati. The favour or mercy of gods was as pleasing as honey,[3] and enjoyment, heavenly or worldly was like that of honey,[4] hence mada itself began to mean 'to enjoy'. The milk was the honey-water, and a bird, probably of sweet tone or of tawny colour, could be named as madgu and on the analogy of sun-bird might be prescribed for the Aśvamēdha sacrifice.[5]

29. The exact manner of obtaining honey (Soma) from the rock may be seen in the following passage ;

अश्नाऽपिनद्धं मधुपर्यपश्यन्मत्स्यं न दीन उदनि क्षियन्तम् ।
निष्टज्जभार चमसं न वृक्षाद् बृहस्पतिर्विरवेण विकृत्य ॥

R. V. 10-68-8.

of course the madhu obtained here is the celestial one but the metaphor is taken from the obtaining of terrestrial madhu, the honey. Here the point to be noted is that madhu was in a cleft of the rock or under it ; that Bṛhaspati saw it in such a great density and abundance as the fish in the dried-up water ; that he brought it out, not with the speed of lightning, but slowly and gradually, cutting it cautiously with the Virava instrument, as a carpenter does while making a cup out of the log of wood. The metaphor becomes clear when we know that in the hills of India, even now, people tame the bees in some cavity of the rock, and cut only a small portion of the honey, leaving something to lure the bees into living permanently there.

1. The author of first ten hymns of RVI ARISU in Kau. Br. XXVIII, 2 ; AB. 2. 1, 1, 2.

2. For मदुघ or मदवती RV. VI. 70, 1, 5 ; AV. 1, 34, 4 ; VI. 102, 3 Cf. Weber Indische studien 5, 386, n ; 404. Whiten Tr. Atharvaveda 34, 35, 355 Blomefield AV. 275 ; Zimmer. A. D. L. 69, for others see. Th. Davidsons. Cf. T. Den. Dict. Eng. lang, under 'medick'.

3. मृळीस, मृळय seem to have their origin in मृदु which may be the parent of mada.

4. Cf. मादयस्व मदन्ति etc. which occur often in RV, and also Cf. मदन the god of love.

5. TS. V. 5, 20, 1 ; M. S. III. 14, 3 ; VS. XXIV. 22, 34, chh. up. VI. 8, 1, 2.

30. The same practice was probably in vogue in Indo-European time as may be seen from a prehistoric drawing[1] discovered in Spain in 1921. In this sketch a man is climbing, to take out some honey, on a rope ladder which is hanging on the side of the rock, lest bees may not be frightened and attack. The hole is always kept closed and is opened only when some honey is to be taken out. In that picture we also see that the man is half-naked; the whole swarm of the bees is undisturbed; and only five or six bees are flying in and out. This shows that the usual method of obtaining honey by driving the bees by smoke followed in plains was not practised then. This is also clear from the fact that the man is not wrapped in blanket like modern Indians of plains, but has only a loin cloth.

31. That the Soma was honey may be inferred from the ritual of the purchase of Soma. The ritual is the combination of buying and robbing because Soma, in its celestial nature, e. g. light, was bought as it were from the Gandharvas by offering prayer (Vāk) as the price, while in its terrestrial character e.g. honey was robbed from the bees. About the significance of the former element in Soma purchase we shall discuss a little later. The robbing of honey is certainly preserved there inasmuch as the Soma-selling Shudra is given (probably a pretended) beating and he is even said to go away wailing like the bees whose honey has been looted.

32. Ṛgveda itself, unmistakably identified madhu, obtained by Sāragha (honey bee) with Soma in one hymn.[2] There Indra is asked to come and drink milk (Dhenava Dravah) mixed with the Sāragha honey; and the same drink is again called as Soma which is the Indra's food of which Indra is thirsty. The identity of the honey of bees with the celestial Soma may be inferred from another passage[3] where, again, the metaphor is taken from the honey produced in the clefts of the rocks. There Bṛhaspati is said to protect the stream of madhu, with the stone placed at its mouth, and then cut it asunder. The metaphor becomes clear when we know how the hill tribes

1. See. 'The Literary Digest', September, 1921 where the drawing is given. 2. ŚB. iii. 3. 3.

2. RV. VIII. 5, 8-11. 3. RV. II. 2, 24, 3.

tame the swarm of honey. As mentioned above they keep the Swarm in a cleft having two passages on the two sides. The bigger one of these is covered with a stone; allowing the bees to come in and go by the smaller passage. When they want to take out the honey they open the big passage, and cut a little of honey and close it again.

33. The birth-place of both the Somas is also said to be in the mountains, terrestrial or celestial in the respective cases. Thus Soma is several times described as dwelling in the mountains (Giristha)[1] or maturing in the mountains (Parvatavṛdh).[2] Both the epithets in the case of honey (terrestrial Soma) are quite clear, as it really lives in the mountains or grows there. In the case of the celestial Soma the mountains are, however, clouds[3] as well as Southern or Eastern direction itself where sun or moon rise and which is, indeed, in later literature called udayācala (the mount of rising). This becomes quite clear when we find that giristha is also the epithet twice of Viṣṇu[4] the sun-god, and once of Maruts[7], the god, clouds, Aurora borealis and winds. Atharvaveda mentions the Soma-Pṛṣṭhaḥ Parvataḥ,[5] which may refer to the clouds adorned by lighting-Soma (Soma is also called maujavata or growing on the Mujavat mount).[6] The frequent falling of lightning on the mountains, gave rise to the idea that cloud the father of the lightning Soma put the same (Soma as honey) in the rock.[7] Probably the same thing is intended, when eagle is said to carry off the Soma from the rock.[8]

III. The Tree of the Celestial Soma

33. Apart from the rock-cloud origin of the Soma, it was also thought to be the product of a plant. But this notion was originally quite different from what we find in the later ritual. In the beginning, it was seen that honey was found in the rocks

1. IX. 85, 10 and often.
2. RV. IX. 46, 1 ; Cf. 'Bergfroh', Hillebrandt, Veda-interpretation 15.
3. Cf. Oldenberg Die Rel. des ved. 230, note 2 Macdonell JRAS. 27, page. 174, note 2. 4. I. 154, 2–3. 5. AV. 3, 21, 10.
6. RV. 10, 34, 1 ; VS. 3, 61, and comm, Ap. SS. 12, 5, 11 ; Nir. 9, 8 ; Cf. Zimmer's Altindisches Leben. 29; Hille-brandt : Ved. Myth. 1, 163 ff.
7. IX. 82, 3. 8. V. 85, 2.

as well as in the trees. Therefore they attributed the same thing to the celestial Soma also. The nocturnal sky beset with stars presented a good resemblance to the bee-hive constituted of honey-filled cells. This suggested to the poets that the sky was the branch of some tree, having beautiful hive on it. Now, the tree on whose branch sky could be conceived as a bee-hive, ought naturally to have been very huge.

(a) *The Asa-Yaggdrasil of the Norsemen*

34. Norsemen, therefore, found the asa[1] yaggdrasil which was so huge as to fill the whole world, existing not only in the remotest depths of Nift-heim, but also in Midgard and Asa-gard. Its topmost bough, called Lerad (the peace-giver) overshadowed Odin's (sky-god's) hall, while the other wide-spreading branches tower over the other worlds. An eagle was perched on the bough Lerad and between his eyes sat the falcon Vedfolnir, sending his piercing glances down into heaven, earth, and Niftheim, and reporting all that he saw. The combined action of the eagle and the falcon correspond to that of Helios, and lead us to identify the eagle with the sun and the falcon having his piercing glances with the collection of rays emanating from the sun.

35. This tree was the source of the heavenly drink (mead). The stars were conceived to be the stags of the gods, grazing on the never-withering, ever-green leaves of the tree and yielding honey-dew. The chief source of celestial mead as in India, was considered to be the moon. Therefore, this tree was also the pasture of the Odin's goat Heidron (moon) that supplied the heavenly mead.

36. The tree was however not safe, though with it was bound the prosperity of gods. In the canadron of Hvergelinir of Nift-heim, a horrible dragon, Nidhung (demon of darkness) continually gnawed the roots, with the help of countless worms,

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1. Mark that asa is same as asa, the power of good, and is derived from root as which we found in asur, ahur, aesir, asa, asha, Ṛta–etc. Naturally, the tree must have been the source Soma light (asa-light), and that (asa-light), and that is why the fall of the tree meant the down-fall of gods and the asa-light (the verse quoted on the next page).

See H. A. Guerber: Myth. Norsenem: Pp. 12, 13, 14, 31, 33, 60, 109, 146, 148, 166, 183, 331, 336, 353 where full details of Yaggdrasil are given.

knowing that its death would be the signal for the downfall of the gods, on account of the loss of asa-light.

" Through all our life a temper prowls malignant,
The cruel Nidhung from the world below.
He hates asa-light whose rays benignant
On th' hero's brow and glittering sword bright glow."
(Viking Tales of the North.)
(R. B. Anderson).

37. The Squirrel Ratatosk (branch-borer), the typical busybody and tale-bearer, going up and down the branches and the trunk of the tree, and repeating to the dragon below the remarks of the eagle above and vice versa, was probably the polar Sun of the shorter days, preceding and following the long day, who was seen daily going to the darkness below and coming again to go round the sky.

38. The heavenly mead of this tree was connected as in Veda, with the terrestrial honey. Thus the holy waters with which the tree was sprinkled daily by Norns, trickled down to earth through branches and leaves and supplied the bees with honey. Again the divine stags (stars) dropped the honey-dew on earth. These droppings probably refer to the morning dew or daily lights that come on the earth and may be conceived to produce honey in bee-hives. This conception can be compared with the placing of Soma on the rock by Varuṇa or with the sending of it by Parjanya, as shown above.

39. The asa-yaggdrasil seems to represent the universal luminous atmosphere. Its roots reach to all the three worlds. Asgard (heaven), Midgard (earth) and Niftheim (nether world), It shows that the southern quarter, where all the three worlds unite, and which could be conceived as the source of Polar light for all the world, was the location of the foot of the huge tree. It was from this root in the Southern quarter that the branches (light-vapours) of the tree went to all the three worlds. The existence of Sun, Moon, and stars as noted above also prove that the tree was the tree of light.

40. To corroborate this hypothesis we may adduce other evidence also. On the foot of this tree is daily held the assembly of gods, as we know that dawn land is the meeting place of all

gods and corresponds to the Devaloka of Upanishads. At this foot again, is there the Mimir's well which Odin (sky-god) drinks. This certainly is the well of light and is identical with the utsam udrinama[1] which Indra drinks with other three lakes. This well again can be equated with the Kha ṛtasya,[2] asahe Khao,[3] (spring of ऋत) or the 'well of honey',[4] existing in the third step of Viṣṇu. That this well was the same chief source of all lights may again be proved by the fact that in it, Odin (as the sky of polar day) kept his other eye, the moon :

"Through our whole lives we strive towards the sun ;
The burning forehead is the eye of Odin,
His second eye, the moon, shines not so bright ;
It has to be placed in pledge in Mimir's fountain,
That he may fetch the healink waters thence,
Each morning, for the strengthening of this eye."

(Oehlenschbager. Howitt's tr.)

41. From this tree again, is got the spear Gunquir with which Odin smites down the frost giants. It is said that Odin broke off the branch of Yaggtrasil overshadowing the Mimir's well and made spear out of it. In other words the dawn, overshadowing the southern source of light, was shattered and then came thence the beam of sun, the destructive spear, identical with Indra's bolt. This exploit of Odin may be compared with the Indra's shattering of the chariot of Uṣas consequent drinking of Soma and releasing of rivers.[5]

"A dauntless god
Drew for drink to its gleam
Where he left in endless
Payment the light of an eye,
From the world-ash
Ere Wotan went, he broke a bough ;
For spear the staff
He split with strength from the stem."

Dusk of the gods.
Wagner (For man's tree).

1. RV. 8, 7, 10. 2. RV. II. 28, 5. 3. Yasna X.

4. Cf. Bloomfield RV. 126, 4 RV, 154-5 for identification cf. utsam in RV. V. 45, 8 ; VI. 44, 2 ; VIII. 7, 17 ; III. 26, 9.

5. RV. 2, 15, 6 ; IV. 29, 10, 11, 12 ; X. 138, 6.

42. On the branch of Yaggdrasil is also hung Heimdall's horn Gallar which is sometimes sunk in the Mimir's well. This is rightly identified by the scholars with the moon,[1] for this horn heralds the destruction of gods at Ragnarok, as does the moon-shine at Polar evening twilight, just after the departure of the Sun,[2] signify the end of the day and of the gods.

43. Idu, the immortal goddess of twilight also, falls from this very branch of the tree and then it is covered with the wolf-skin (darkness), sent by Odin i.e., the sky.

44. The destruction of the tree also supports that this tree must be the symbol of light surrounding the whole world in long Polar day.

(*b*) *Gaokerena, the tree of white Haoma*

45. In Iran also we find the tree of ' White Haoma ' which is the celestial Haoma, as opposed to yellow Haoma of this earth. The name of this tree is Gaokerena, and it resembles Ash Yaggdrasil in various details.

46. Like Ash Yaggdrasil it is necessary for the rennovation of the universe and the immortality that will follow. Like Norse Nidhug, a lizard the creation of Angra Manyu tries to gnaw up the tree. But Ahura Mazda had created Karfish that would fight with the lizard till the rennovation of the universe.

47. Gaokerena stands in the sea Vauru kasha which is identical with Mimir's well that lies at the foot of Yaggdrasil, under the hanging bow of the great tree. This sea is also in southern direction and is said to contain the waters of a thousand lakes. Certainly the waters of this sea as of Mimir's well is only the infinite store of light which never exhausts even after the daily distribution of its contents. That these waters are really the warm lights coming from the southern source, may also be proved by the fact that there are hundred thousand golden channels (Sun-rays) of warm and clear water pouring into the sea from the final source Ardvi Sura.

48. As in Indian and Norse mythology, so in Iran a connection of this heavenly light was established with the earth.

1. H. A. Guerber : Myths of Norsemen : Pages 148–149.
2. Fridtz Nansen : 'Farthest North :' Pages 178–180.

Thus at the height of the thousand men, opens a golden branch from that affluent of warm water (light) coming through Vaurukasha, to the earth giving health to the creation of Ahura Mazda, making the dry atmosphere moist. This exactly agrees with the coming of Soma and release of waters and restoration of vitality by the warm light.

The rain of Haoma

49. The rain of Haoma from Tishtrya's shower also signifies that the Haoma must be the warm light of Sun. Tishtrya's shower was supposed to be in the primeval times before the appearance of man on the earth, in order to destroy the evil creatures produced by Angra Mainyu. It must be recalled that almost in all the Aryan mythologies, and especially in the Norse-mythology the world comes into existence by the victory of the forces of light and heat over the forces of darkness and cold. Haoma rained ten days and ten nights in each one of the three forms. The result was a flood of waters in which all the noxious animals perished. Similarly on the death of giant Ymir caused by Borr (the Sun-god) the blood of Ymir drowned all the frost giants; and then the creation was started. In other words, the rain of Polar day-light destroys the darkness and cold and the ice-water floods the earth.

50. The terrestrial Haoma, however, is different from what rained or from the 'white Haoma or Gaokerena. It grows on mount Allurz (Hara Bere Zaiti) to which the divine birds brought down from heaven. The similar notion we have seen in the Parjanya's creating of honey in the mountains, Varunas placing of Soma in the rock or Norn's causing of honey of bees by the water sprinkled on Ash-Yaggdrasi.

(c) *The plant 'of birth'.*

51. The Babylonian epic also knows of a marvellous plant. It was called the plant 'of birth,' and it belonged to shamash, the. Sun-god, as did Soma or Haoma to Surya or Tishtrya. As through this tree of light alone the birth of the Sun is effected, so the tree was attributed the quality of facilitating the child-delivery. Thus Etna's wife is helped in child-delivery through it. The similar notions may be found attached to Hoama or

Somas inasmuch as both are invoked to get offsprings and Haoma is prayed for granting husband also.[1]

(d) The tree whose branch is red.[2]

52. In Ṛg-veda also, we find the similar celestial tree of luminous atmosphere. The tree is called aruna (red). It was found that the southern quarter where this celestial plant took its root was seen clothed in the glowing twilights of North Pole. Thus there arose the idea that the tree or its stem of which sky was the branch was red. As the rays of light always go downward from the sky, therefore the tree was called to have its branches downward also.

53. That this red tree was same celestial tree as Yaggdrasil and its branch is the sky will be clear from analysis of the hymn[3] which mentions it. There are grāvaṇaḥ eating up this branch. These grāvanah are, indeed, the clouds and their eating up of the branch means the complete enveloping the luminous sky. They cannot be pressing stones, for the plural number is used. They are pervading विष्ट्वी, Soma-possessing (lightning-bearing) and making roar like that of hundred or thousand (men).[4] They are the black, swift moving, well winged ones that make noise and dance about (ib. 5). They are Soma-eaters, that overpower the horses of Indra and exist in the heaven milking the bright ansu (lightning); Indra drinks the Soma-like Madhu, milked by them, waxes and acts like a bull. (ib. 9). They scatter out as a gift the Soma, like one sowing the seed; they do not kill it (Soma-lightning), though eating it (ib. 13). They are also called having no Viṣṇu (avesnavaḥ) (ib. 11), for the Sun-god is hidden under the clouds.

1. अरुणास्य शाखा Rv. 10, 94. I.

2. This tree of light is also the tree Varuṇa, having its branches (rays) downward and the foot upward. In it are also fixed the vanners i.e. dawns नाचीन स्युरुपरि बुध्न एवास्मे अन्तर्निहिता: केतवा: स्युः Cf. also नैचाशाखं, the epithet of Soma.

3. RV. 10, 94.

4. Cf. नैचाशाखं iii. 53. 14 according to Sāyana the word means 'of low origin'. According to Lātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra (X. 19. 13) it is the 'name of place' Grassman, Ludwig and Zimmer agree to the former, while Hillebrandt thinks that the word is suggestive of the hanging branches of the tree (Ved. Myth. 1, 14, 18; 2, 2, 41–245).

54. The above description clearly shows that the grāvaṇaḥ are the clouds and not the pressing stones, and consequently the branch of the red tree that they eat is the bright sky. Scholars have been misled by the number used in several compound epithets of these mountain clouds. Thus they have ten earths, ten sides, ten yokers, ten yojanas, ten reins and carry ten yokes. The ten number must be taken to mean any indefinite number, and thus all the epithets refer respectively to their different locations, their shapes, their controlling deities, their motions and their colours and their substance (rains) which they contain in them. Otherwise if we take the number ten to refer to the ten fingers, we are unable to explain the ten avants, ten sides and ten Yojanas which they are said to possess. Again in the very next verse (ib. 8) they are the mountains having ten yantras (दशान्त्रास :),[1] swift, and moving round in their one desired receptacle (adhanam). The mountains (adrayaḥ) are in plural, so all of them cannot move in the same receptacle, unless they are taken to mean the clouds moving in the sky. Their going round in their receptacle cannot be taken even as their resting in it after the completion of Soma pressing, for the latter half of the verse and the next verse describe them active in milking aṃśu in the sky etc. The ten (daughters) of Vivasvān (sky) making the Soma to flow cannot be taken to mean fingers. They are evidently Uṣasas that purify the heavenly Soma.

55. This association of number ten with heavenly phenomenon is found elsewhere also.[2] Describing the Agni produced by Mātariśvan, the poet speaks of ten sisters, the Virgins (agruvaḥ), who going together enjoy all at once with the man (Agni) when born. It cannot refer to the fingers for they cannot enjoy it for the fear of burning while on the other hand the ten (indefinite number) Uṣasas may naturally be said to enjoy the dawn fire which Mātariśvan produced. Moreover the fire, in question, is

1. III. 29, 11.

2. दशयन्त्रास: is used to complete the metaphor: each cloud is the terrestrial अंधस् which is the hive of honey as we shall see. So because अंदस् being pressed with ten figures, the cloud should also have the same. There the number ten, they might have found in the ten quarters (दशदिशा:) which figure so frequently in the later literature.

said to be shining in the lap of mother, in its udder (source), which is impossible in the case, if we take araṇis as mothers. The description only indicates the dawn fire burning in the lap of Uṣas, in the southern (or in India, eastern) direction which is the udder of the celestial fire and all lights. This fire is also said to come out on every day, from the belly of the Asura (Probably Varuṇa, the sky-god). Therefore the association of the number ten with the celestial phenomenon is unquestioned, though it is most probable that the metaphor was taken from the terrestrial fact.

iv. Andhas, the so-called terrestrial Soma-plant.

56. Andhas is often said to be the name of the terrestrial Soma plant,[1] but in fact it is not so, Andhas has been cognated with Greek anthos.[2] Let us find out the meaning of the word in Greek, and then arrive at some definite conclusion about the meaning of Samskrit Andhas.

57. In Greek, the word is used in the following senses :[3]

1. blossom or flower,
2. bloom or flowering time,
3. In metaphor : the bloom or flower of life. The bloom of complexion, its youthful bloom ; flower of an army.
4. brightness or brilliancy as of gold.

hence 5. (plural) of gay colours, bright dyes esp. of purple.

6. a bird.

58. In the Greek word therefore the sense of brilliance is most predominant and this we find retained in Ṛgveda also. Thus sparkling rivers are called andhasi[4] and most often it is the name of celestial Soma. Andhas often served as the Indra's bolt which we have seen is the warm light of the Sun. With andhas, Indra killed the river-blockading Vṛtra, (ice of North Pole) and with it he smote down the fellie of Vala.[5] Probably the moon-light is meant, when Soma as moon is said to go to the

1. Macdonell : Ved. Myth. 104 ; Meith. Rel. Phil. Ved. up. P.
2. Apte ; Practical Samskrit Dictionary, under andhas ; Henry George Liddell Robert Scott : Greek-English Lexicon VIII ed. Page 128.
3. Greek-Eng.-Lexicon ibid. 4. RV. VII. 96, 2. 5. RV. I. 52, 2, 5

vītim (motion or light) of the great gods,[1] or when the gods are described as eating the andhasah of the Madhu of Indu.[2] The dew must be meant when Maruts are said to wet the earth noiselessly with the andhas of Madhu,[3] for as we have seen parjanya thereby was thought to produce terrestrial Soma i.e. honey. It seems to refer to the sunlight Soma, when the amdas (juice) of Soma is said to be born in high heaven, and when Soma is asked to flow with his best andhas for killing of Vritra, enveloping the great waters.[4] Andhas[5] or red andhas is also said to be brought from heaven by Śyena, which as we shall see is the same as bringing of light or fire from heaven.

59. Apart from its use for celestial liquid of Soma, andhas in also used for terrestrial Soma viz., honey which has the yellowish brilliance like that of light, the celestial Soma. Moreover honey being the essence of flowers, this name was quite in keeping with the meaning of the Greek anthos. Thus Indra is asked to rejoice by the andhas of the Madhu along with Pṛṣthi[6] which means either Pṛṣthi Sāma or the three admixtures as Sāyana suggests or suggests to the angular shape[7] of the plant, as Hillebrandt thinks.[8] Soma is often said to flow with and get purified with andhas[9] and corresponds to its purification with a

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1.
2. IX. 51, 5: X. 115, 3. 3. RV. V. 52, 8.
4. RV. IX. 61, 10 ; 19, 20, 22. Cf. plants of mead above Heavenly mead is always, in some way or other, said to generate the honey in bees Cf. also Aśvins.
5. IX. 9, 86, 6, X. 144, 45. Cf. V. 45, 9, IX. 61, 10.
6. IV. 20, 5.
7. Preference may be given to this view, for a cell of bee-hive containing honey is really angular ( ) Indra's drinking Soma (honey) along with its angular crust is but natural, as he is called ऋजीषी. The one who desires for (इष्) ऋजी (note that ऋजी is same as लिक्रो a word of dialect of Rohilkhand division at least. लिक्री is any sediment-like substance that remains after filtering any liquid esp. honey, (hemp.) शर्वत of भाँग and सौझँ etc. pounded together. In the dialect of Ballia and Benares districts, I am told, the word used is सिट्टी. The epithet विगतपृष्ठ: is also once applied to Soma (5-45 Aic) which undoubtedly support the above view (see footnote p. 30).
8. Hillebrandt : Ved. Myth. 1, 54, 55, cf. 5, 45, 9-10, Para 77 below.
9. IX. 55, 1, 3 ; 61, 19 cf. IX. 16, 2 ; 51, 1 ; 67, 2.

stream (धारण)[1] suggesting thereby that Soma was poured from one pot to the other in order to be well-mixed. Sometimes andhas clearly means honey, going from, probably, the pressed hive which is called tvach.[2] Thus it is wrong to believe with Macdonell that andhas was ever a plant. It is either the name of heavenly Soma (light), or of the terrestrial Soma honey, both having yellowish brilliance.

60. The husk which is left after pressing is not the bark of the tree, but the thin crust of wax constituting the honey pores. It is called the skin (tvak) which andhas (honey) leaves off like snake his old skin.[3] This crust, being the cover of honey is called Vavri[4] which may be the cognate of Vernacular Papari (any thin crust). When honey was conceived as a soul, this crust was called its body (Śarira).[5] The name tanva is also appropriate and denotes only thinness, as it is the cognate o Sans. tanul, French tenu, Eng. thin, A. S. thyme, Ice. thunnr, Ger. Dunn.

61. The whole hive containing honey was also known as andhas,[6] which is quite proper as in Greek also anthos means 'a thin crust' like that on the surface of old wines. Scholars thought it to be the name of the plant.[7]

62. Scholars[8] also think that in one passage Parvam was the stem of Plant.[9] The passage only speaks of the andhas (honey) obtained from all the Soma-parvas, meaning thereby from all the pores (cells) of the hive. The word Parva originally meant a small cell, a pore as its cognates in other Indo-European languages show Gr. Poros, Eng. Pore, Latin Porus.[10] In the Taittiriya Brahman the word Paru is used in the same sense.[11]

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1. IX. 3, 1 ; 9, 10 ; 79, 1 ; 7 ; iii. 3, 36, 7 etc.
2. RV. IX 88, 44 ; cf. 107, 2 ; 16, 2.
3. IX. 86, 44. 4. TB. iii. 7, 13, 1. 5. Ibid.
6. सद्यो इ जातो व्रृषभः कनीनः प्रमतुमविदन्धसः सुतस्य ।
साद्योः पिव प्रतिकार्म यथाते रसा शिरः प्रथमं सोमस्य ।
7. Macd. Keith Vedic Index Page 476.
8. Macd. Keith : Vedic Index : Page 476.
9. इन्द्रेहि सत्स्यन्धसा विश्वेभिः सामपर्वभिः RV 1, 9, 1.
10. Cf. also Paru, TB. iii. 7, 13.
11. iii. 7, 13.

63. Aṁśu which has been suggested to mean the shoots of plant is only the streak of honey in the case of terrestrial Soma and the ray of light with the celestial Soma.[1] Thus they are generally called moon, brilliant (shukra)[2] and once the wave of aṁśu is also mentioned.[3] Rivers that Indra releases are also said to be aṃśumatyāh, referring thereby to the rippling waves of the waters under the rays of the Sun.[4] Keith and Macdonell think that Vaksana and Vana are the names of the Soma-shoot,[5] but it is hardly acceptable. Vaksana only means breasts or sides, and the Soma issuing from them only means the honey coming out of the hive.[6] Vana also has been variously interpreted by the scholars[7], and here in this sense can only mean the streak of light or honey (celestial or terrestial Soma).[8] Ksip (finger) also, when associated with celestial Soma stands for the ray of light.

64. Therefore we conclude that originally there was no earthly Soma–plant and that it was introduced in the ritual only as a symbol of the celestial plant, that is why no traces of tree is found. The sacrifice of men was certainly the symbol of the twilight-sacrifice of gods (see Sections II (A), IV).

65. So even the Brahmans prescribe their substitutes. It seems, however, at one time some Pūtika plant was used as the symbol and in its absence other arjunani. (मं. वि. ब्राह्मण्शा IX. 5, 3). The substitues were always of the colour of light (see Ś. B.W. 5, 10) अंशु, अंधस् referred to in RV. 11, 98, 1 ; 101, 44, 5 ; IX. 92, 1, are not the shoots of plant but the ray of light or streak of honey. Stones are also associated with Soma 65. In the ritual of Brahmanas, stones are also in the majority of cases in R. V. The Phrase 'adribhih Sutah' means the Soma as honey or light produced by hills,[9] or clouds and sometimes avibhih adribhih

1. RV. 1, 168, 3 ; iii. 48 1 ; IX. 67, 28 etc.
2. V. 43, 4:where thundering clouds milk out the bright ray of lightning.
3. IX, 96, 8.
4. VIII. 96, 96, 13, 1, 4.
5. Vedic Index Page 476.
6. VIII 1, 17.
7. RV. Hopkins JHOS., 17, 67 : M. Max Muller : Sac. B. E. 32, 138 cf. Zimmer Alt. L. 281.
8. RV. IV. 24, 9 ; IX. 501.
RV. IX. 79, 5. cf. Pischel Vedisque studien 1, 70.
9. RV. ix. 11, 5 ; 24, 5 ; 26, 5, 30, 5 ; 32, 2 ; 38, 2 ; 31, 6 ; 50, 3 ; 68, 9 ; 71, 3 ; 86, 23 ; 79, 4 etc.

Sutah madhu (madhu produced by the goats and mountains) refers to the mixture of milk of goats with the honey[1] of hills. The grāvaṇaḥ is mostly used with the celestial Soma, and there it means clouds. There grāvaṇaḥ are said to have filled the Vedi[2] which is same as sky as we shall see hereafter. Bharitra with which men purify Soma by a stream (धारया)[3] is not stone but a pot and can be cognated with Bharuka or Bharaka of modern dialect. When ten Kṣipas are said to have yoked the two arms to a grāvān[4] and milk the bright amsu, the (मध्व: रस) with noise, it should not be taken to mean literally. It is only metaphorical description of the arms of the lightning flash uniting the cloud and producing the light. The verb 'chan' to thunder used here is always used with lightning Soma. Moreover, such expressions often occur with celestial Soma, and once it is said to be produced by seven sisters, which might be the seven streaks of rainbow colours.[5] Sometimes mountains and waters both are said to make the Soma, thereby referring to the mixture of milk and honey (the product of hills) and water (the product of Apah).[6]

66. Thus we have seen that there is hardly any mention of pressing stones. The very fact that the stones are always mentioned in the singular or plural show that the pressing stones of later ritual are not meant by them, for pressing requires a pair of stones. Of course, when ten fingers or two arms are said to unite one adri in the celestial sense, it presupposes the existence of one stone in the terrestrial ritual which is its prototype. This single stone is the big pestle which was used for pressing.

The use of stones in the later ritual might be, in the beginning the symbol of mountains (both celestial and earthly, which produced both Somas.

67. The existence of mortar in the sacrifice is proved in one hymn,[7] but it is wrong to say that pestle and mortar were used for the pressing of Soma. The hymn is describing various activities of a sacrificial Mandap. Thus, the mountain of Soma

1. RV. 2, 36, 1. 2. RV. 5, 31, 12. 3. III. 36-7.
4. V. 43, 4; IX. 86, 36.
5. Cf. Bifrost, the rainbow bridge and its connection with Ash yaggdrasil in Norse Mythology. 6. III. 35, 8.
7. 1, 28. (I) RV. V, 27, 5; Hillebrandt Ved. Myth. 1, 219-222.

(honey-hives) is being piled up for pressing Adhisavanya, having a deep groove edged by two bulging borders, is there for the pressing of Soma. Then some woman is pounding by upward and downward motion. The churning stick is well bound. In this passage Soma is described as being piled up only, while the upward and downward motion of pestle is quite separate from it and might be in connection with the pounding of Yava etc., which were certainly mixed with Soma. It is also possible that, in course of time, the plants used as the symbol of the celestial Soma-tree, also possessed some drinkable juice, and thus they began to be pounded with mortar and pestle or crushed with the stones. Some such thing must have happened to make Indians[1] as well as Iranians[2] use the pestle and mortar.

68. The mention of the pounding of a tree in Ṛgveda[3] is not that of terrestrial tree at all. There the poet is describing the celestial Soma will be clear if we examine the contents of one or two verses :

(2) " By Soma is Aditya strong ; By Soma is the earth great. That Soma is placed in the lap of these stars."

[4](3) "When they (demons)[5] pulverize the tree (of celestial light), the Soma is thought to be drunk." Then, as all the kinds of Somas were thought to be one, the poet goes to speak of lightning Soma and describes it as 'well concealed and well protected by the winged (clouds)', and an earthly being can only hear the clouds, and not eat the Soma.

Besides this the pressing of Soma by hands is frequently mentioned, and it shows that it could be extracted by hands. Thus wise men milk Soma with hands.[6] Singers rub it[7] or ten maidens rub it like a horse.[8] (The men) having hands

1. AV. IX. 6, 15 ; SB. 1. 1. 4, 6.
2. Yasma XXIV. 7 ; XXV. 2. For the modern usage, see J. J. Modi's article 'Haoma' in Hasting's Eneyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Edinburgh. VI. (1914).
3. IX. 85, 3.
4. Cf. Macdonell : Ved. Myth. P. 105 and Keith : Rel. Ved. up. P. 171, whose explanation of these passages is wrong.
5. Cf. the eating up of the tree by the demon of darkness in Norse and Iranian mythology.
6. IX. 7, 9, 4. 7. IX. 86, 26. 8. IX. 9, 86, 14.

milk out the aṃśu of madhu (streak of honey). Soma is said to be purified with the hands, by the ten fingers,[1] by ten fingers[2] or by ten maidens who are sisters.[3]

That the Soma could be pressed by hands is itself sufficient to allow the use of the hard stones.

69. Therefore it seems that stones would have been used, if at all, if their hands were not sufficient to squeeze out the honey from the wax, while in the usual cases the hands were employed for the purpose.

V. The Myths connected with Soma.

70. There are various myths connected with the celestial Soma. We shall take up only the most important of them.

a. The myth of Soma and Surya.

71. Surya has been variously identified by the scholars,[4] but most probably it represents[5] the goddess of twilight[6] which is of the same type in the evening and morning of North Pole (if the big sun period be conceived as a big day). She is the daughter of the sun, for sun, when sinking, is supposed to have generated her.

72. She is espoused by several deities in succession.[7] Her first husband is the moon, the Soma, stationed in the lap of the stars.[8] At this time she is borne by the Asvin's three wheeled car[9] which we know, is the light of twilight going round the sky. At this time Asvins (the rays of rising or setting sun)[10] are the groomsman, the mere instrument in the union of twilight and moon[11] and not the husband as elsewhere[12] for the rays of Sun

1. IX, 9, 86, 14. 2. IX. 8, 4, 15, 8 etc. 3. IX. 1, 7; 6, 5.

4. E. H. Meyer: Indog, Myth. ii. 673, the goddess of clouds; Oldenberg: Rel. des. Veda. p. 213: Sun-maiden; Von Schroeder: p. ii. 414, n. 3; young sun who is reversed yearly.

5 See Br. Dt. quoted in the foot-note of para 71 of section I.

6. Cf. Mannbardt: Op. cit, p. 295; AB. IV. 71.

7. सोम प्रथमे विविधे गन्धर्वो विविध उत्तर: । तृतीयो अग्निष्टे पतिस्तुरीयस्ते मनुष्यज । सोमो ददद्गन्धर्वाण ददद्मग्ने । X. 85, 40–41. (*a*) ibid 2.

8. Ibid. 2.

9. See section III Aśvian's car.

10. See Section 3 Aswins.

11. Ibid 9. 12. 4, 45, 6 cf. 1; 119, 5.

vanish as moon unites with twilight. That Sūrya, the wife of Soma is the twilight is also supported by the fact that he is elsewhere described as marrying Uṣas,[1] the daughter of Prajāpati.[2] Uṣas is also once said to have been associated with moon.[3] The Soma gives Surya to the Gandharva who represents, aa we shall see, the sky the possessor of all lights, and who holds it (Surya) in the form of the Aurora borealis and gives it in the form of dawn to Agni in the morning (after wintry night). It is then that Puṣan, the Sun-god can also be said to marry the Sūrya. It is only when we take the two twilights as one[4] that we can explain all the myths connected with her. When Asvins[5] are said to go or to have done (wen) the race with the car drawn by asses at the marriage of Soma and Sūrya, the evening twilight must be meant, for it is at this time that the rays of dawn and sun may be said to move slowly with the speed of donkeys. The other's identification of Sūrya with the goddess of the clouds[6] or with sun[7] itself, are hardly plausible, especially when she is married with Sun-god Pusan and is called even the daughter of the Sun. Only evening twilight can be said to be the daughter of Sun, for dawn is, in fact, his mother.

b. The Myth of Soma and eagle.

72. Soma is brought from heaven[8] by the eagle the bird or the swift eagle.[9] The fullest account of the myth in Ṛgveda is found in RV. IV. 26 and 27. But, these hymns have been so variously interpreted by the scholars[10] that it is not possible to

1. J. B. 213; AB. ix. 7; KB. XVIII. 1; Bloomfield I. A. O. S. XV. 181.

2. Uṣas is the designation of both the twilights is proved by the Rgved itself. 3. Keith. Rel. Phil. Ved. up 120.

4 The two twilights are, indeed, called उषा in RV. cf X. 127, 3 where night drives out uṣas (निसस्वसा मुस्कृतोषसं देव्यामर्ता) cf. RV. 1, 113, 2; S.V. 2, 1100 where उषस and night are said to follow each other; (see also sec. I. para 38).

5. AB. 4, 7–92. 6. E. H. Meyer Indog. Myth. ii. 673.

7. Oldenberg Rel. des veda. P. 213; Van Schroeder Op. cit. ii. 414. n. 3 (Surya young Sun renewed yearly). 8. RV. IX. 63, 27; 66, 30 etc.

9. RV. 1. 180. 2; 3. 43. 7; 4. 18. 13; 20. 6; 26, 6; 27. 1; 5, 45, 9; 8, 71, 9; 89, 8; 9, 68 6; 77. 2; 86, 24; 10. 11. 4; 99. 8; 144, 4.

10. Roth. ZDMG. 36, 353–60. 384; Ludwig: Methode 30, 66; Koilikouski: Revue de linguistique 18, 1–9; Bergaigne Rel. Ved. 3, 322, ff. Pischel Vedic Studien: 1. 207–16; Hillebrandt: Ved. Myth. 1.

deal with all of the theories here. Let us analyse the myth and arrive at a definite conclusion which the myth itself suggests.

73. Before taking up the myth proper, it is necessary to note that most of the gods of light have been conceived as a bird or eagle. Thus immortal Soma flies like a bird towards the vats[1] by which the directions or sky must be meant,[2] for the whole hymn deals with the heavenly Soma. Again the soma, which is rubbed by the sun-rays and which goes to the dear daughter (dawn) of Sun, surpassing the cows, enters the two camūs (heaven and earth) like a bird.[3] Soma is called even a Śyena in Samaveda[4] and a divyah Suparṇaḥ in RV. 9, 71, 9. Sūrya is a bird[5] or a ruddy bird,[6] and is represented as flying,[7] is likened to a flying eagle[8] even once called an eagle,[9] and twice grantmat[10] Indra seated at Soma-offering is also called an eagle,[11] and once even he brings Soma assuming the form of Śyena.[12]

74. The Śyena par excellence is Agni[13] who, in the celestial form, represents the light of dawn, as we have seen. He is winged,[14] he flies[15] and darts with rapid flight to the gods.[16] He is also distinctly called the eagle of the sky (Divaḥ Śyenaya),[17] a divine bird[18] or is said to grow, in the waters like haṃsa.[19] As celestial fire is Divaḥ Śyena, so the Ṛbhus are said to rest like Śyena in the sky (Divi)[20] and are even equated with them.[21] Aśvins are compared with eagle,[22] and their car is drawn by swans, eagles, or birds.[23] The epithet 'Divaḥ Śyēna' is also used for the Agni Vaidyuta[24] in TB.

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1. IX. 3. 1.
2. Cf. द्यौर्भूमिः कोम आसीत् X. 85. 7 and also IX. 72, 5 etc.
3. IX. 72, 2, 3, 5. 4. Benfey : S. V. glossary. 5. X. 177. 1-2.
6. V. 47, 5 ; 7. I. 191, 9. 8. 7, 63, 5.
9. 9, 5, 45, 9. cf. ZDMG. 10. X. 99, 8.
11. Grassman Worterbuch ; Hopkins : Religions of India, 45.
12. काठक सं. XXXII. 14., Weber Ind. Stud. iii. 466.
13. Bloomfied. Fagestuss on Roth, 152. 14. I. 58, 5 ; 2. 2. 4 etc.
15. VI. 3. 7 ; 4. 6. etc. 16. X. 6. 4. 17. VII. 5. 4. 18. 4. 35. 8
19. 1, 65. 9. 20. I. 164, 52. 21. AV. VI. 48.
22. 5, 78, 4. श्येनस्य चिज्जवसा नूतनेन.
23. 6, 63, 6 ; 10. 14. 3. 5 ; 4, 45-4 ; 1, 118, 4 ; 6, 63, 7 ; 8, 5, 7.
24. 3, 10. 51 ; 12. 13.

75. From the above association of the idea of Śyena with the light-gods, it is certain that the Śyena, the bringer of the heavenly Soma (light) must be some of the above-mentioned gods. To be more definite, it is necessary to examine the most accepted views of the scholars.

76. Bloomfield's[1] interpretation of Soma-bringing as the descent of lightning, though plausible, is not supported by the several aspects of the myth which he had overlooked. The most important things that lightning theory fails to explain is that the Soma which Śyena brought was not a faint and thin streak of lightning flash, but it was so abundant that it could suffice even for thousand and tens of thousand libations at one and the same time (Sākam).[2] The Śyena is therefore called the giver of plenty in the same hymn. In AB the Soma thus brought becomes the three libations of the day.[3] The white Śyena, the young and foresighted (kavi), going amongst the cows (goṣu), dropped (patayat) off the andhas (Soma-juice); when the Soma, tawny, bright, unmixed and freed from husk (Vigatapṛṣtha),[4] was brought the Sun ascended (rose).[5] Could the descent of lightning flash or of water cause the ascent of the Sun ?

77. The association of the descent of the dawn-fire with the descent of Soma does not support the above theory. When these beneficient dawns (Uṣas) glorious and luminous, produced by the hotā Agni for Manu, for sacrifice, thereafter (adha) the Śyena brought that brilliant drop in the sacrifice.[6] Agni and Soma are praised as dual divinities ;[5] the two guards, the unstolen cows (light of twilight) from Pani, established the lights in the heaven, and released the rivers which were held up. The one was brought by the Mātariśvan from heaven, the other by Śyena from the mountain ; Agni Soma, growing by the prayers made light for the sacrifice.

78. Thus we have seen that Śyena brought the Soma at the sacrifice of Manu—the sacrifice done in the glowing dawn-fire

1. J. A. O. S. 16, 1-24. 2. IV. 26, 7. 3. 5, 45, 9-10.
4. X. 11. 3, 4. 5. I. 93.

6. In honey we have the angular wall round every honey-cell ; so the vigatpṛṣṭḥ honey would mean well purified. In the case of heavenly Soma, it only means 'pure light' having no covering of darkness of 4, 20, 5, Hillebṛandt: Vedic Mythologie, 1. 54-55 also Para 59 above.

when Uṣas had produced the Agni by which the dawn-fire must be meant. After the descent of Soma also, as we have seen, the Sun rises; the light and rivers both are released and the cows are protected against the Pani who is the darkness, the stealer of the light-cows. Moreover the Soma which the Śyena brings is so abundant like the light of the morning that tens of thousand libations cannot exhaust it, and the path by which Śyen flew is also red (aruṇa)—dawn-light.

78. Taking these things into consideration, it becomes certain that the Soma brought by eagle is the light of the day; the Śyena therefore is the first red beam of light seen in Dawn period of Arctic region that remains captured in the hundred citadels of darkness of the Winter night, and flies swiftly at the day-break. We have seen that they are four or five needle-like streaks of red light (coming one after another).[1] The one may be taken as the eagle, the others as the arrows thrown by the Kṛśānu.

Kṛśānu and S'yena

79. The first beam of light, at first, goes in the sky, streaming foremost in the interior of heaven, and other streams following it are supposed to be the arrows shot at it by Kṛśānu (a name of fire in later lit.) which may be the hidden mass of light still in the womb of the southern or eastern quarter. In the meanwhile the rays of light that was coursing through the heaven, seem to split up into the branches and come to the earth also. The light so arrived on earth assumed the form of the red dawn. This agrees quite well with the Brahmaṇic version of the story,[2] where the light so dropped from the heavenly beam is mythologically called the feather or the talon of the eagle dropped down at the result of the shot discharged from the bow of the archer; and the ruddy dawn into which the so arrived light is transformed is said to be the palāsh-tree (probably conceived as laden with red flowers[3]) into which the fallen

1. See Saucika fire above 71 A Section I Indra's birth para 60.

2. ŚB. 1, 7, 11 cf. Mahīdhar on VS. 1, 1; TS. iii. 4, 711; TB. 1, 1, 3 10; 2, 1, 6; 47, 5; iii. 21, 1; AB. iii. 25-27.

3. A flowery palāśa tree has firy appearance, and poets are very fond of comparing with a fire.

feather of the eagle grows up. Therefore the tree is thought to be of very sacred character in the ritual.[1]

80. Brāhmaṇas have attempted, in a variety of ways, to account for the unrestricted seizure of Soma by the eagle. Thus A.B. III. 27 says that the bird frightened the guardians of the Soma while Ś. B. 1. 7, 1, 1, describes the guardian Kṛśānu as footless (apadia), thereby suggesting probably that the guardians could not hinder the bird from seizing the Soma for the above reasons by running after it, and that therefore he (Kṛśānu) threw an arrow at him.

Soma = S'yena = Indras

81. The original myth of Śyena contained in IV. 26 and 27 has given rise to a great deal of discussion among the scholars. Thus the eagle that is described in 427[1] as having fled away from the hundred iron citadels is identified, by A. A. II. 5, 13 ff. and Sāyaṇa with the author Vāmadēva. Ludwig[2] and Roth[3] think that it was Soma himself, and:the latter changes Niradīyam of the text to the Niradīyat to suit his thesis, Hillebrandt[4] defends the emendation of Roth, but Eggleng[5] and Regnand[6] subject them along with others, to a searching criticism. A. Kuhn[7] thinks that the eagle must be the Indra ; and the Grassman, though introduces Śyena in the stanza, retains the identity of Soma with eagle as suggested by Ludwig and Roth. Pischel considers that the whole hymn (27th) is a dialogue between Indra, Eagle and Soma, and maintains that the eagle mentioned in IV. 27. 1 is the Śyena himself, and not any one in his disguise.

82. The most natural interpretation seems to be suggested by the native tradition itself. Thus while tradition holds that the two hymns (26th and 27th of IV. mandal) are addressed to

1. Cf. Kuhn, Heraubkunft des Feuers und des Gotter-tranks, 159 f, 170, 209 ; Weber : Vedische Beitrage : 1894, 1. 5. cf. the staff of palash is given to the Brahmacāri at thread-ceremony cf. also Ś. B. III. 3. 2. for the use of Palash-twig in the ritual.

2. Ṛgveda tr. II. 592 ff, commentary V. 467 ff, 468.

3. ZDMG. 353 ff. 4. Ved. Myth (erster Band) p. 227 ff.

5. Sac. b. East XXVI. P. 20 ff.

6. Regnand : Le Rigveda et las origina de la mythologies Indo-Europeonne. pp. 298 ff.

7. Die Heraub des Feurs Gotter. 1. 146. 8. Rig. Tr. 1. 134 ff.

Indra, according to anukramaṇi they contain the praise of Śyena in continuation (though they are not one as Oldenberg concludes[1] from it). In fact in these hymns, the poet is trying to find out like Upaniṣads unity in the variety of these light phenomenon, as is clear from the opening stanza of the 26th.[2] Here the poet seems to realize that Soma and Śyena etc., are the part of the same universal phenomenon of light and heat of which Indra is the god. This tendency of finding unity in diversity may be found in many other hymns of Ṛgveda, especially in those addressed to Indra Baikuṇṭha, and Saucika fire. This alone can explain (the text as it is) why in 1st stanza of 27th, Indra calls himself Śyena, while in the next two stanzas he speaks as if he were the Soma whom eagle brings followed by the shot from the Kṛśānu. Though wounded he does not stop, and the fourth stanza continues the narration of his flight : "having gone straight (into the sky) the Śyena brought (also) the Bujjyu the sunken sun restored by Aśvins on the summit from the wide (distance), like this (Soma) from (the place) associated with Indra." Thus we find that, in this hymn Śyena, Soma, Indra and Aśvins are identified with each other.

83. This tendency is quite clear in the later literature. Śatpath[3] Brāhmaṇa seems to have no difference between the Śyena and the Soma, for they indeed, are both the phenomena of light :

यत्र वै गायत्री सोममपापयत तद् अस्या आहरन्त्या अपाद् अस्ताऽभ्यायत्य पर्णं प्रचिच्छेद् । गायत्र्या सोमस्य वा राजस्तत पतित्वा पर्णोऽभवत् ।

"When gayatri flew towards the Soma, a footless archer, aiming at her, while she was carrying him off, severed one of his feathers (Parṇa) either of gayatri or of the king Soma, this falling down became a parṇa tree." The passage of TS. iii. 5, 7, 1 (cf. also TB. AV. VI. 80. 1. 1. 3. 10 ; 2, 1, 6 ; 4, 7, 5 ; 3, 2, 11) clearly mentions that the feather belonged to Soma.

1. Ṛgveda Notes on 4. 26.

3. Uśana mentioned in this connection must be the liberated sage living now in luminous forms (cf. Pitṛs in Sect. 5-6) for he is credited with bringing light, dawn etc. and is associated with light-phenomenon (see Macdonell Vedic Mythology). All others identified with Indra in this verse are certainly the light-phenomena. 2. Ś.B. 1, 7, 11.

The S'yena = Ṛbhu = Indra.

84. In AV. VI. 48, we find the Śyena, the gāyatracchandā, Ṛbhus, the jaggacchandā and the bull (vṛṣa), the tristupacchandā equated together. The same passage occurs in T.S. iii. 2, 1, 1, Suparṇa and Sakha are substituted respectively for Ṛbhu and the bull.

Put all the variants of the I passage in 2 the following table:

1. AV. VI 48 श्येनोऽसि गायत्रच्छन्दा, ऋभुरसिज० वृषोऽसि त्रिष्टुपच्छंदा

2. TSS. XIII. 2, 11, 1 ,, ,, ,, सुपर्णोऽसि त्रि०
3. KŚS. XIII, 1. 11 ,, ,, ,, ऋभुरसि
4. GB. 1. 5. 12–14 ,, सम्राऽसि स्वरोऽसि, गयोऽसि
5. ŚŚS. VI. 8, 10–12 ,, सुपर्णोऽसि सखाऽसि
[1]6. PB. 1, 3, 8 ; 5, 12, 15 ,, वृषकोऽसि स्वरोऽसि गयोऽसि

85. Here we find a clear identification of Śyena, Suparṇa, Ṛbhu and the Bull (Vṛṣa), and what is most important is that ऋभु could be substituted by Suparṇa in TS., and for bull in the KŚS. The three passages cannot be regarded, with Bloomfield,[2] as intended for Srauta purposes, as the original texts (AV. and TS.) have nothing to say as regards their use in any ritual, and it is only, in the Sūtras that we know that they were used at the three libations. The order of Atharvan Stanzas, (VI. 48. 1–3) in the same way, is of little importance for a poet who finds the unity between the trinity, though it may be a good point for the Sūtras like Vaitan Sutra[3] to accept or reject the Gāyatri-Jagati—Triṣṭubh order of AV. on the ground that in the ritual[4] the gāyatri, Triṣṭubh and Jagati were assigned to the three libations respectively.

86. Nevertheless, the ritual[2] later has preserved for us the early tradition with which we can find out the individual deities that have been equated together in the above passages. Thus Ṛbhus having jagati metre is quite evident, and we shall see that

1 Cf. L. Ś. S. i. 12. 13 ; ii. 1. 5 ; 5. 5. 12. 13 ; ii. 1. 5 ; 5. 5.
2. J. A. O. S. 16, 3–5. 3. 17. 10 ; 12, 17.
4. ŚB. IV. 2. 5. 20 ; TS. ii. 2, 9, 5, 6 ; TB. 1. 8. 8. 3 ; ŚB. IV. 3. 2. 9 ; AB. iii. 12. 3–5 ; PB. VI. 3. 11 ; Vait. S. 19, 16, 17 ; 17. 10 ; 21, 7 ; ŚŚS. XIII. 5. 4–6 ; XIV. 33, 7, 10, 13 ; KŚS. XV. 14, 16, 17 ; Chānd. up. iii. 16, 1, 35 ; Sāyaṇa to RV. 1, 164, 23 ; Agni Svamin on LŚS. ii. 5. 5.

third Savan for which jagati is assigned belongs to Ṛbhus. The bull, with the triṣṭubh metre, mentioned in the stanzas that ritual text prescribe for the mid-day libation must, therefore, be Indra to whom belong exclusively the mid-day libation[1] and also the triṣṭubh metre,[2] and who is the bull par excellence in Ṛgveda.[3]

87. The identification of Indra with Śyena is already present in Ṛgveda X. 99. 8, besides that disputed hymn (IV. 27); and Kaṭhaka saṃhita,[4] knows one myth where Indra in the form of Śyena brings the Amṛta. The gods and asuras were engaged in strife; the amṛta was, at that time with Asuras, with the demon Śuṣṇa. Śuṣṇa carried it in his mouth. Those of the gods who died remained just so; those of the Asuras (who died), Śuṣṇa breathed upon with Amṛta, they revived. Indra perceived, "with the Asuras, with the demon Śuṣṇa is the amrta." He having changed himself into a lump of honey, lay upon the way; this Śuṣṇa swallowed, and Indra changing into an eagle snatched the amṛta from his mouth. Hence this one is the strongest of birds, for he is one of the form of Indra."

88. Here we have a clear mention of Indra as Śyena who brought down Soma. Bloomfield's objection that 'in this passage we have Amṛta and not Soma' is hardly plausible, for already in Ṛgveda Soma is called Amṛta and Piyūṣa.[5]

89. This interpretation of Śyena and the Kṛśnanu-myth may be supported by the Norse-mythology also.[6] There Odin steals the mead from the cave of the suttung who, like Vedic Kṛśānu, does not shoot any arrow at him, but pursues him himself in the shape of an eagle. There also we have the dawn, but

1. RV. IV. 35. 7. माध्यं दिनं केवलं ते ; also III. 32, 1; V. 40, 4; VI. 47, 6; VII. 13, 13; 37, 1; X. 179, 3; VS. XIX. 26; SB. ii. 4. 4. 12; AB. ii. 32, 1; GB. ii. 2. 21.

2. RV. X. 130, 5; TS. iii. 7. 3; Kath. XXIII. 10; SB. IX. 4. 3. 7; 5. 1. 33; X. 3. 2. 5; TA. IV. 6. 1; KB. iii. 2. cf. TS. VI. 1. 6. 2. SB. IV. 3. 2. 8; (त्रिष्टुभ) the metre of mid-day (सवन) and Nir. 10.

3. Cf. Conn. on P. B. 1. 5. 12 and Sayana AV. VI. 48. 3. who render Vṛsa as bull.

4. XXXII. 14. Weber Ind. Stud. iii. 466.

5. RV. 5. 2. 3; 3. 48; VS. 6, 34; SB. 9, 5. A. 8; VS. 19. 72.

6. H. A. Guerber: Myths of Norsemen. Pages 21–22; cf. Oldenberg, Rel. des Veda, 176.

that is not called the palash-tree. It is there the huge fire lit up by the gods in order to destroy the Cuttung who is really destroyed, as is lost the first trailing beam of light in the dazzling light of the dawn. Like the feather of the Vedic Śyena, Odin also drops, while disgorging the mead in asgard (the aerial region), some drops of mead on earth.

The S'yena and gāyatri.

90. Gāyatri is also described in Brahmanas as assuming the form of eagle and bringing down the Soma. The development is quite natural and there is no need of searching for any far-fetched explanation for it. The germs of this story may be found in Ṛg-veda itself ; as we shall see.

91. The Prayer is often said to purify or cause the Soma celestial i.e. light to flow with a stream,[1] because it was after a great deal of sacrificing and praying that the lost light of heaven was restored after the Polar wintry night. With a similar point of view the prayer is said to strengthen Indra or some other god for destroying demons. Prayer and Sacrifice could even compel the gods to come and grant the request of the deities. It was this idea that found expression in the form of metres (in which the prayer were sung) as bringers of Soma.

92. In fact, Brāhmaṇas themselves seem to suggest that Gāyatri was not the actual bearer of Soma but this work was attributed to her later on. Thus Ś. B. IV. 3, 9, 4, 10 :

श्वेनाम त्वा सोनममृत इति, तद्गायःयै मिमीते, अग्नाय त्वा स्थस्योषद इत्यग्निर्वै गायत्री तद्‌गागत्र्याम मिमीते । सा यद्‌ग्रायत्री श्येनो भूत्वा दिवः सोमं अमरत तेन सः श्येनः सोमयमृत ।

By this it seems that the expression ' Gāyatri becoming a Śyena brought the Soma ' only means that Śyēna himself brought the Soma. Moreover the author clearly says that Gāyatri is not the metre, but, in fact, it is Agni itself. This means that there should be no doubt as to how a metre can bring Soma, because Gāyatri is the Agni, (in the celestial sense) the Syena who brings the Soma ; and Agni that brings Soma and is often called the eagle of the sky is, as shown in the last chapter,

1. IX. 2. IX. 73, 4 ; 96, 13 ; 113. 5.

is the dawn-fire which when first comes, appears to be thin stream of light coursing into the sky.

93. The identification of Gāyatri with Agni and with the bringing of Soma (the light) has its cause in the ritualistic practice. The metres, Gāyatri, Triṣṭubh, and Jagati were associated with the three libations respectively, as is said in SB. IV. 2, 5, 20:

गायत्री वै प्रातः सवने वहति, त्रिष्टुप माध्यंदिन सवनं जगती तृतीय सवनं ।

Very much the same things have been said elsewhere.[1] Such distribution of metres among the three libations existed even in Ṛg-veda, as Bargaigne has shown in his 'Researches Sur l'historie de la liturgie Vedique.'[2]

94. The association of Gāyatri with morning pressing as well as with Agni is also recognized both of Yaju Samhitas and in the Brāhmaṇas. Thus Gāyatri metre belongs to Agni[3] (Gayatram agneschandaḥ). Gāyatri is said to be associated with Agni at many places.[4] Agni and Gāyatri or either of them are invoked at the morning libation in Samhitas.[5] Gāyatri and the Prātaḥ Savan are also co-related with each other.[6]

95. All this evidence, combined with the fact that already, in Ṛgved, Gāyatri is associated with the Soma-Pavan, confirms that the morning libation, the Gayatri, Agni (originally dawn-fire) and the bringing of Soma were closely associated and that it was because of Gāyatri's association with Agni, the Śyena of sky at the morning libation that gāyatri was thought to bring the

1 TS. ii. 2. 9. 56 ; TB. 1. 8. 8. 3 ; ŚB. IV. 3. 2. 9 ; AB. iii. 12. 2. 5 ; P. B. VI. 3, 11 ; Vait. S. 19, 16, 17 ; ŚŚS. VIII. 5, 4, 6 ; XIV. 33. 7. 10, 13 ; KŚS ; XIV. 33. 7. 10. 13 ; KŚS. XXV. 14, 16, 17 ; Chand. up. iii. 16, 1, 3, 5. Sāyaṇa to Ṛgveda 1. 164, 23 ; Agnisvamin to LSS. iii. 5. 5. cf. Bloomfield : J. A. O. S. 16. p. 4. 2. Journal Asiatique Vol. XIII. 1889, chap. IV. Page 166 ff.

3. MS. 1. 6. 10 (102. 3); ii. 8. 11 (115. 9) ; ŚB. ii. 2, 1, 17 ; Ab. 1. 1. 8 ; IV. 12, 1 ; VI. 5, 2. 7.

4. TS. 1. 8. 13. 1 ; VII. 1. 1. 4 ; VS; VIII. 47 ; XXIX. 60 ; G. B. ii. 6. 6; PB. VIII. 8. 4. VIII. 8. 3 ; ŚB. 1. 3. 4-6. IV. 3. 2. 10 ; X. 3. 21 ; ŚŚS. VI. 4. 11 ; TA. IV. 6. 1 ; Mait. up. VII. 1. Nir. VII. 8.

5. RV. iii. 28. 1. AV. 47. 1 TS. III. 1. 9. 1. MS. 1. 3. 36 ; ŚB. ii. 4. 4. 12 ; AB. ii. 3. 2. 1.

6. AB. iii. 27. 1 ; PB. VII. 4. 6 ; VIII. 4. 2 ; ŚB. IV. 3. 2. 8. KŚS. XXV. 14. 16 ; ŚŚS. XIII. 5. 4. cf. Weber Ind. Stud. VIII. 24. 32 ff.

Soma from the sky. This stands against the lightning-theory of Bloomfield and others, as the connexion of Gāyatri and Agni with morning is not sufficiently explained thereby. Their relation with morning libation of Soma, if we accept Bloomfield's appears all the more inconsistent, when we learn that Agni hymns are used in the making of the altar[1] which as we shall see in the next chapter is constructed after the symbol of the altar of the dawn-fire discussed in the previous chapter.

The Myths of Gāyatri-S'yena

96. The above conclusion will be more corroborated if we discuss the myths of the Gāyatrī-Śyēna. But before we explain them it is necessary to have all of them before us. Let us, therefore, mention the chief myths connected with Gayatri-Syena.

97. 1. Aitarēya Brahmana[2] gives the story of Soma-descent thus. On the instigation of Ṛṣīs and the gods the metres assumed the forms of the birds (suparṇa) and flew to bring the Soma-king who was in heaven. Jagati went first; but she was tired at half way. Then Triṣṭubha went; and he was tired, after going a little farther than the half-way. Then Gāyatri went and returned with success. She, while flying, frightened the guardians of Soma, and with her feet and bill, she seized king Soma...Kṛśānu, a guardian of the Soma, discharging (an arrow) after her cut off a talon of her left foot. What she seized with her right foot, that became the morning pressure; what she seized with her left foot became the noon pressure; what she seized (with bill) became the third Savan.

98. 2. Śatpath Brāhmaṇa[3] has a different version of the same story in brief. "In the, beginning metre consisted of four syllables. Then the Jagati flew up for Soma and came back leaving behind three syllables. Then Triṣṭubh flew for Soma, and came back leaving behind one syllable. Then Gāyatri flew up for Soma, and she came back bringing with her those syllables as well as Soma."

99. 3. In another version, Kadru and Suparṇī are introduced[4]. Kadru and Suparṇi fought for their own persons. Kadru

1. TB. iii. 12. 1-2.
2. iii. 25-27.
3. IV. 3. 2. 7.
4. TS. VI. 1. 6.

overcame Suparni. She (Kadru) said: " In the third heaven from here is Soma, steal him and ransom yourself with him. The Jagati consisting of fourteen syllables flew up. She returned without having obtained him ; and of her, two syllables were wanting. The Triṣṭubh, consisting of thirteen syllables, flew up; she returned without having obtained him ; of her two syllables were wanting. The Gāyatrī consisting of four syllables, flew up. She took the the Soma and the four syllables. She became octosyllabic. "

100. 4. Kadru and Suparni-legend is related in a slightly different way also :[1] ' Kadru is this (earth). Suparni is Vaka. The metres Gāyatrī, triṣṭubh, and Jagatī are the children of Suparṇī. Kadru conquered Suparṇī, her person.' She said " Bring the Soma ; with him ransom yourself. She sent the metres saying ' bring the Soma from yonder,' with him ransom me." Then Jagati flew up ; she came with cattle and the dīkṣā. Then Triṣṭubh flew up ; she came with dakṣiṇa and Tapas. Then the Gāyatrī flew up ; she brought the Soma.

101. 5. A version containing the leading features of both of the two stories of Kadrū and Suparṇī occurs in Kathaka Samhita[2] XXXIII. 10. With this version at the base, are also the stories found in Suparṇākhyāna,[3] Mahābhārat[4] and Rāmāyaṇa[5] and Puraṇas.

102. 6. Śatpath Brāhmaṇa[6], however, had added some new feature to it. There, gods desirous of bringing Soma from heaven, created two māyās Kadrū and Saparṇī, the latter being the speech (vāk). Those two contending for superiority said to each other, " whichever of us two would see farther (Parā Paśyat) than the other, she will win, of us two davīyas, the body of the other." Then Kadrū said, " look as far as you can." Suparṇī said, " I see the ocean beyond that a white horse attending at a post. I see him. Are you able to see that horse ? " Kadrū was able to see something more also, so she replied, "His tail is hanging down, and the wind is causing it to shake. I see

1. MS. III. 7. 3. 2. Weber Ind. Stud. VIII. 31 ff.
3. ed. by E. Grube in Ind. Stud. XIV. 1-31.
4. 1. 10. 73 ff. 5. Rāmāyaṇa III. 162 ff. 6. III. VI. 2. 2. 8.

it." Then Kadru, trusting the honesty of Suparṇī asks her to go and see who of the two was right. Suparṇī flew up, and came back with the news that Kadru was victorious, and that consequently Suparni's body was to be under the control of Kadru. Kadru, however, asks her to ransom herself with the Soma, after bringing it from heaven. So she produced the metres of whom Gāyatri went and brought down the Soma.

103. 7. While in the above two legends we found that Suparṇi, the Vak, sent her child Gāyatri for the bringing down of the Soma, in Kaṭhaka Samhita,[1] Vak itself appears to be the Gāyatri : " Vak, indeed, is the (cow), the price of the Soma (Soma-Krayani-metres, indeed brought the Soma from yonder loka, namely, Gāyatri becoming a Śyena. Gandharvas again stole it away. Then gods again desired it. They (Gandharvas) said "We won't give it to them again." "We purchase with the cow" said the gods. They (Gandharvas) thought, "(We) shall be selling it with the sacrifice, when purchased with cow." They (gods) said, " Gandharvas are desirous of women." (They created māyā by making Vak into a woman. (Then the Gandharvas) thought to themselves " We shall be selling with Progeny if we sell it with Vak (the speech in woman form)." Then the story goes that Vāk also comes back to the gods.

104. 8. In addition to these stories, the myth of Gāyatrī as the Soma-bringing eagle is alluded to at many places in the Brāhmaṇas.[2] None of them add any new feature to the story, except the two Śatpatha passages (1. 7. 11 ; iii. 9. 4. 10) which speak of the footless archer cutting the feather of Soma or of the king Soma and of the Agni being same as Gāyatrī (agnir vagāyatrī).

105. From these stories we can infer following things which are to be explained :—

(1) Gāyatri, Triṣṭubh and Jagati, the offsprings of Suparṇi, the Vak went to bring Soma.

(2) The first two either got weary or lost their some syllables and returned unsuccessful, or taking with them cattle,

1. XXIV. 1.

2. SB. 1. 8. 2. 10 ; III. 4. 1. 12 ; 9. 4. 10 ; 1. 7. 1. 1 ; XI. 7. 2. 8 ; TS. III. 5. 71 ; TB. 1. 1. 3. 10 ; 2. 1. 6 ; 4. 7. 5 ; III. 2. 1. 1 ; PB. VIII. 4. 1-4 ; IX. 5. 4 ; AP. Sr. S. 1. 6, 8.

dīkṣā and dakṣiṇā, tapas respectively; and Gāyatri alone could bring Soma.

(3) The expedition is undertaken by the metre, when at the defeat of their mother Suparnī at the hand of Kadru: and Kadru, though far seeing does not fly like Vāk.

(4) In Kāṭhaka samhitā Gāyatrī as Śyena, and the Vāk as woman and the cow, the price of Soma, are identified.

106. We shall take the first and the third first. The Suparṇi Vak is rightly called the mother of the metres, for metres and songs are only the embodiment of speech or voice. The Suparṇi is also identified with the yonder (sky) in the third story. This equation might be due to the sky being associated with sound as a quality, but there is no evidence to corroborate that T. S. knew the conception of Śabda guṇam ākāśam. It seems, therefore, that when Gayatri, the Suparṇa or Śyena was identified with the Divah Śyēna, or the Soma-bearing Suparṇa of sky, the two mothers Vāk and sky who were probably called Suparṇi's because of their offspring were Suparṇas, were also identified.

107. It is, however, quite proper to call Vāk a bird (Suparṇī) and attribute to it flight, for Vāk can really fly (spread) to the directions. Kadru, the earth as conceived is fixed, does not move, but it can see more even from its very place for as we have seen, the beyond from which all light, Soma, Ṛta, Sun etc., came is below the southern horizon upto which the earth seems to extend, and is thus able to see what is there. The white horse, with his hair which she sees is probably the splendid Sun with his rays thought to be present below the horizon before Sunrise, and the Sthāṇu at which he rests is most possibly the stem of the tree of light which as seen before is cut down by the demons of darkness at the Sun-set twilight or Rangnakrok. It must be recalled that Bhujjyu,[1] the sun of winter before he was rescued, was also clinging to the same stem.

108. In the second issue, we find the success of Gāyatri and the failure of the other two metres. The Gāyatri was associated with the morning libation the time of the arrival of light (Soma). Therefore, Gāyatri alone could be said to bring the Soma. The other two metres, being respectively connected with

1. See section 3.

the mid-day and evening Savans and not with the morning could not be said to bring the Soma from heaven. The loss of their syllables etc., only shows their unability and is alluded to in the story to eulogize the power of Gāyatri by presenting a suitable contrast. In Jagati one and version of the story Jagati and Triṣṭubh are said to bring cattle, dikṣa, and triṣṭubh tapas dakṣiṇa (दक्षिणा) respectlvely. In these two pairs, the second of each (दीक्षा व दक्षिणा) are, evidently, the priestly additions, but the rest must be belonging to the original story. Thus the bringing of cattle is quite suitable to Jagati, the metre of the evening libation when cattle come home from the forest. The connection of the tapas the heat with triṣṭubh, the metre of the mid-day libation, when the heat predominates, is also reasonable. The bringing together of these two metres with the Gāyatri, the associate of Soma descent and morning does not mean that the three functions of the three times happen together. This has been done only to present a contrast in order to eulogize the Gāyatri and its success.

109. The last issue refers to the seventh story. There we find the two different elements blended together. The bringing of Soma by Gāyatri as Śyena belongs to the celestial Soma, as we have seen in so many other stories. The purchase of the Soma with a cow from the Gandharvas seems to be borrowed from the terrestrial Soma which was purchased from Shūdra as we learn from the ŚB. III. 3. 3. Because on the analogy of the honey which was robbed from the bees, the Shūdra was, in a way, at last robbed of the Soma, therefore the Vāk, the woman with which the Soma is purchased from Gandharvas also comes back to the gods. When the Soma-descent and the purchase of Soma were combined in one myth it was thought proper that instead of the terrestrial cow of flesh and bone, the Vāk which as Gāyatrī Śyena brought the Soma from heaven, could alone be transformed into cow or the woman, the price of the cow. But the Gandharva's traditional cupidity suggested that the transaction should not settle at cow as the price but at woman as the price.

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अथ चतुर्थाध्यायस्याद्यमाह्निकम्[1] ।

(१) प्रवृत्तिदोषसामान्यपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

मनसोऽनन्तरा[2] प्रवृत्तिः परीक्षितव्या । तत्र[3] खलु यावद्धर्माधर्माश्रयशरीरादि परीक्षितं सर्वा सा प्रवृत्तेः परीक्षेत्याह—

प्रवृत्तिर्यथोक्ता[4] ॥ १ ॥

तथा[5] परीक्षितेति ॥ १ ॥

प्रवृत्त्यनन्तरास्तर्हि दोषाः परीक्ष्यन्तामित्यत आह—

तथा दोषाः ॥ २ ॥

तथा परीक्षिता इति । बुद्धिसमानाश्रयत्वादात्मगुणाः प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वात्[6] पुन-

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१ चतुर्थेऽध्याये आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनोरूपकारणस्वरूपप्रमेयषट्कं क्रमप्राप्तं परीक्ष्यते । स एवाध्यायार्थः । तत्र प्रथमाह्निके प्रवृत्त्यादयो विधर्मिणो विषयाश्चिन्तनीयाः । द्वितीये त्ववसरतः सर्वप्रमेयाणां विषयी धर्मस्तत्वबोधो निरूपणीयः ।

२ अध्यायक्रमं निरूपयन्नाह-मनसोनन्तरेति । प्रथमाध्यायगतोद्देशसूत्रे नवमे मनोनन्तरं प्रवृत्तेरेवोद्दिष्टत्वात् मनःपरीक्षानन्तरम्प्रवृत्तेरेव परीक्षावसर इत्यर्थः ।

३ पूर्वकृतपरीक्षानिदेशनपरं सूत्रमवतारयन्नाह—तत्र खल्विति । सकलायाः प्रवृत्तेर्धर्मान्तःपातित्वात्तत्परीक्षणेन साऽपि परीक्षिता वेदितव्येत्यर्थः ।

४ उक्तातिदेशपरं सूत्रम्—प्रवृत्तिर्यथोक्तेति ।

५ सूत्रार्थं व्याचक्षाणस्तस्य शेषं पूरयति-तथेति । एवं च 'प्रवृत्तिः यथा उक्ता तथा परीक्षिता' इति सूत्रस्वरूपं पर्यवसितम् । यथा लक्षिता तथा परीक्षिता । अस्या लक्षणेनैव परीक्षाऽपि सम्पन्नेत्यर्थः ।

एतत्सूत्रपूरणं वृत्तिकृतोऽनभिमतम् । तथाचोक्तं तैः—अत्र तथैवेति शेषं पूरयन्ति । तदयुक्तम् । तथा सत्यत्रैव यथाशब्दस्याकांक्षाशान्तावग्रिमसूत्रस्थतथाशब्देपि यथाशब्दान्तरस्य पूरणीयतया प्रकरणभेदापत्तेः । तस्मादग्रिमसूत्रस्थतथाशब्देनान्वयो युक्तः । प्रवृत्तिर्यथोक्तलक्षणवती तथा दोषा अप्युक्तलक्षणवन्त इत्यग्रिमसूत्रसम्वलितोऽर्थ इति ।

६ दोषाणां परीक्षा कथं वृत्तेति प्रदर्शयन् तद्विषये यत्किञ्चित् प्रागुक्तं तत्संक्षेपेण स्मारयति-प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वादिति । दोषाणां प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणत्वात् तेषां प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वं, तस्माच्च पुनर्जन्मकारणान्यपि तेऽत एव संसारहेतवोऽपि । संसारश्चानादिस्तत्कारण-

भवप्रतिसन्धानसामर्थ्याच्च संसारहेतवः, संसारस्यानादित्वादनादिना प्रबन्धेन प्रवर्तन्ते। मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तिस्तत्त्वज्ञानात्, तन्निवृत्तौ रागद्वेषप्रबन्धोच्छेदेऽपवर्ग इति प्रादुर्भावतिरोधानधर्मकाः। इत्येवमाद्युक्तं दोषाणामिति ॥ २ ॥

(२) दोषत्रैराश्यप्रकरणम्[1]।

'प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणा[2] दोषा' इत्युक्तम्। तथा चेमे मानेर्ष्यासूयाविचिकित्सामत्सरादयः, ते कस्मान्नोपसङ्ख्यायन्ते? इत्यत आह—

तत्त्रैराश्यं रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तरभावात् ॥ ३ ॥

तेषां[3] दोषाणां त्रयो राशयस्त्रयः पक्षाः। रागपक्षः—कामो मत्सरः स्पृहा

भूता दोषा अप्यनादिसन्तानरूपेण वर्त्तन्ते। तथा च तत्त्वज्ञानान्मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तिस्तन्निवृत्तो रागद्वेषादिदोषनिवारणम्, ततश्चापवर्गः। एवं च सन्तानवृत्तित्वात्तेषामुत्पत्तिनाशवत्त्वमपि। एवमादिदोषानां प्रसङ्गेनोक्तमेव प्राक्सूत्रेषु (१।१।२, १।१।१८, ३।१।२५)। इदमेव च तेषां परीक्षात्वेन मन्तव्यमित्याशयः।

१ अत्र प्रकरणविभागविषये केषाञ्चिद्विप्रतिपत्तिः। आद्यसूत्रात्मकमेकम्प्रकरणम्प्रवृत्तिपरीक्षात्मकम्—द्वितीयं तु सूत्रमारभ्य नवमसूत्रपर्यन्तम्परमेकमेव प्रकरणं दोषपरीक्षापरमित्येव विभागः समीचीनः प्रतिभातीति तेषाम्मतम्। तत्समाधानं यथा—उक्तेन विभागेनाद्यं प्रकरणमेकसूत्रात्मकमेव स्यात्। न च तत्सम्यक्, अनेकसूत्रसमूहस्यैव प्रकरणपदवाच्यत्वात्। अतः प्राचीन एव विभागः सम्यक्—येन आद्यसूत्रद्वयात्मकमेकं प्रकरणं—प्रवृत्तिदोषोभयसामान्यपरीक्षापरं, तृतीयसूत्रामारभ्य नवमसूत्रपर्यन्तन्त्वपरं—दोषविशेषपरीक्षापरमिति वर्द्धमानोपाध्यायाः।

२ तदेवं बहु परीक्षितं दोषाणाम्। यत्तु किञ्चित्तेषामपरीक्षितं तत्परीक्षितुं प्रश्नेनोपक्रमते-प्रवर्तनेति। दोषाणां प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणत्वमुक्तम्प्राक्। मानेर्ष्यादयोऽपि प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणाः। तत एतेऽपि दोषपरिगणने कथन्नोच्यन्ते इति प्रश्नार्थः।

३ सूत्रं व्याचक्षाणो रागादिषु सर्वेषां दोषाणामन्तर्भावं प्रदर्शयति-तेषामिति। काममत्सरस्पृहातृष्णालोभानां रागस्वरूपत्वाद् राग एवान्तर्भावः। एवं क्रोधेर्ष्यासूयाद्रोहामर्षाणां द्वेषस्वरूपत्वाद् द्वेष एवान्तर्भावः। तथा च मिथ्याज्ञानविचिकित्सामानप्रमादानाम्मोहस्वरूपत्वान्मोह एवान्तर्भावः। एवमेव त्रिष्वेव दोषेषु सर्वेषां दोषाणामन्तर्भावः। तत्र स्त्रीगतोऽभिलाषः 'कामः', अक्षीयमाणवस्त्वपरित्यागेच्छा 'मत्सरः', अस्वपरस्वादानेच्छा 'स्पृहा', पुनर्भवप्रतिसन्धानहेतुभूता 'तृष्णा', प्रमाणविरुद्धपरद्रव्यापहारेच्छा 'लोभः'। शरीरेन्द्रियाधिष्ठानवैकृत्यहेतुः 'क्रोधः', साधारणे वस्तुनि पराभिनिवेशप्रतिषेधेच्छा 'ईर्ष्या', परगुणाक्षमता'ऽसूया', परापकारेच्छा 'द्रोहः', कृतापकाराक्षमता'ऽमर्षः'। विचिकित्सा 'संशयः', विद्यमानाविद्यमानगुणाध्यारोपेणात्मोत्कर्षप्रत्ययो 'मानः', कर्तव्याकरणं 'प्रमादः'।

तृष्णा लोभ इति। द्वेषपक्षः—क्रोध ईर्ष्योऽसूया द्रोहोऽमर्ष इति। मोहपक्षो—मिथ्याज्ञानं विचिकित्सा मानः प्रमाद इति। त्रैराश्यान्नोपसङ्ख्यायन्त इति।[1]

"लक्षणस्य तद्व्यभेदात्त्रित्वमनुपपन्नम्"। नानुपपन्नम्—'रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तरभावात्'। आसक्तिलक्षणो रागः, अमर्षलक्षणो द्वेषः, मिथ्याप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणो मोह इत्येतत्प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं सर्वशरीरिणाम्। विजानात्ययं शरीरी रागमुत्पन्नम्—अस्ति मेऽध्यात्मं रागधर्म-इति। विरागं च विजानाति—नास्ति मेऽध्यात्मं रागधर्म इति। एवमितरयोरपीति। मानेर्ष्यासूयाप्रभृतयस्तु त्रैराश्यमनुपतिता इति नोपसङ्ख्यायन्ते ॥ ३ ॥

"नैकप्रत्यनीकभावात्" ॥ ४ ॥

"नार्थान्तरं रागादयः। कस्मात्? एकप्रत्यनीकभावात्। तत्त्वज्ञानं सम्यङ्मतिरार्यप्रज्ञा सम्बोध[2] इत्येकमिदं प्रत्यनीकं त्रयाणामिति" ॥ ४ ॥

व्यभिचारादहेतुः ॥ ५ ॥

एकप्रत्यनीकाः पृथिव्यां श्यामादयोऽग्निसंयोगेनैकेन, एकयोनयश्च पाकजा इति ॥ ५ ॥

सति चार्थान्तरभावे[3]—

तेषां[4] मोहः पापीयान्नामूढस्येतरोत्पत्तेः ॥ ६ ॥

मोहः पापः पापतरो वा द्वावभिप्रेत्योक्तम्। कस्मात्? नामूढस्येतरोत्पत्तेः। अमूढस्य रागद्वेषौ नोत्पद्येते। मूढस्य तु यथासङ्कल्पमुत्पत्तिः। विषयेषु

१ उपसंहरति—त्रैराश्यादिति। यस्मात् त्रिष्वेव वर्गेषु सर्वे दोषा अन्तर्गतास्तस्मात् तेषां परिगणनं न क्रियते इत्यर्थः।

२ सम्यक्बोधः 'सम्बोधः'। यस्मादेकमेव तत्त्वज्ञानं रागादीनां त्रयाणां 'विरोधि' नाशकम् तस्मात्तेषामप्येकत्वमेव युक्तं न पृथङ्निर्देश इति भावः।

३ केषांचिन्मते 'सति चार्थान्तरभाव' इति पूर्वान्वय्येव। तथा चायं सम्बन्धः—'अर्थान्तरभावे सत्यपि (चोऽप्यर्थः) श्यामादयः अग्निसंयोगेन एकप्रत्यनीका इति-यद्यप्येते गुणा भिन्ना एव तथाप्येकप्रत्यनीका इत्यर्थः।

वार्त्तिककृतस्तात्पर्यकृतस्तु मते 'सति चार्थान्तरभावे' इति वाक्यस्याग्रिमसूत्रेणैवान्वयः। 'अर्थान्तरभावेऽपि मोहस्तेषां पापीयान्' इति सम्बन्धः।

४ दोषोच्छेदं वर्णयितुकामः कारणोच्छेद एव कार्योच्छेद इति मनसि कृत्वा मोहस्यैव सकलदोषमूलत्वं प्रदर्शयितुं त्रिष्वपि रागद्वेषमोहेषु तारतम्यं वर्णयति-तेषामिति सूत्रम्। 'तेषाम्' रागद्वेषमोहानाम्मध्ये 'मोहः पापीयान्—' अनर्थमूलं 'न अमूढस्य इतरोत्पत्तेः'। 'अमूढस्य' मोहरहितस्य 'इतरयोः' रागद्वेषयोः 'उत्पत्तिः' न भवति यस्मात् तस्मात् मोह एव सर्वप्रधानमिति भावः।

रञ्जनीयाः सङ्कल्पा रागहेतवः, कोपनीयाः सङ्कल्पा द्वेषहेतवः। उभये च सङ्कल्पा न मिथ्याप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणत्वान्मोहादन्ये। ताविमौ मोहयोनी रागद्वेषाविति। तत्त्वज्ञानाच्च मोहनिवृत्तौ रागद्वेषानुत्पत्तिरित्येकप्रत्यनीकभावोपपत्तिः।

एवं च कृत्वा तत्त्वज्ञानात्–"दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तराभावादपवर्ग" इति व्याख्यातमिति ॥ ६ ॥

"प्राप्त[1]स्तर्हि—

निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावादर्थान्तरभावो दोषेभ्यः" ॥ ७ ॥

"अन्यद्धि निमित्तमन्यच्च नैमित्तिकमिति दोषनिमित्तत्वाददोषो मोह इति"॥७॥

न, दोषलक्षणावरोधान्मोहस्य ॥ ८ ॥

'प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणा दोषा' इत्यनेन दोषलक्षणेनावरुध्यते दोषेषु मोह इति ॥८॥

निमित्तनैमित्तिकोपपत्तेश्च तुल्यजातीयानामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ९ ॥

द्रव्याणां गुणानां वाऽनेकविधविकल्पो निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावे तुल्यजातीयानां दृष्ट इति ॥ ९ ॥

(३) प्रेत्यभावपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्।

दोषा[2]नन्तरं प्रेत्यभावः। "तस्या[3]सिद्धिः–आत्मनो[4] नित्यत्वात्। न

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१ शङ्कते–प्राप्तस्तर्हीति भाष्यवाक्यमारभ्य दोषेभ्य इति सूत्रान्त्यपदपर्यन्तम्। तर्हि दोषेभ्योऽर्थान्तरभावः प्राप्त इति सम्बन्धः।

२ क्रमप्राप्तं प्रेत्यभावं परीक्षयिष्यमाणस्तत्र क्रमं प्रदर्शयति–दोषानन्तरमिति। प्रमेयोद्देशे दोषादनन्तरं प्रेत्यभाव एवोक्तस्ततः परीक्षायामपि दोषानन्तरं स एव परीक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः। प्रेत्यभाव इत्यत्र 'ल्यब्'मुखं व्यादाय स्वपितीतिवद् द्रष्टव्यः। तथा च भूत्वा प्रायणमिति भवनप्रायणयोः समानकर्तृकत्वं अभ्युपपन्नम्। एतद्विषये च संशयः–अयं प्रेत्यभावः शरीरस्योत बुद्धेरुतात्मन इति। तत्र केषांचिदाक्षेपः–'पुनरुत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभाव' इत्यत्र सूत्रे (१।१।१९) प्रेत्यभाव आत्मन एवेत्यस्य सिद्धत्वादुक्तसंशयस्यावकाशो नास्तीति। तत्र च परिहारः—प्रेत्यभावस्योत्पत्तिनाशरूपत्वात्तस्य च नित्य आत्मन्यसम्भवादुपपद्यत एव संशयः, एवं चास्य संशयस्य परीक्षावसरः प्रेत्यभावपरीक्षावसर एवेति।

३ प्रेत्यभावस्योत्पत्तिनाशरूपत्वपक्षं सिद्धान्तिनि समासज्य परोक्तं संशयमुज्झाव्य तत्रात्मपक्षे दोषमुपन्यसितुमाह—तस्यासिद्धिरिति। प्रेत्यभावस्य सर्वथाऽभाव एवेत्यर्थः।

४ तत्र हेतुः—आत्मन इति।

खलु[1] नित्यं किं चिज्जायते म्रियते वेति जन्ममरणयोर्नित्यत्वादात्मनोऽनुपपत्तिः । उभयं च प्रेत्यभाव " इति ।

तत्रायं[2] सिद्धानुवादः—

आत्मनित्यत्वे प्रेत्यभावसिद्धिः ॥ १० ॥

नित्योऽयमात्मा प्रैति-पूर्वशरीरं जहाति-म्रियत इति. प्रेत्य च पूर्वशरीरं हित्वा भवति-जायते शरीरान्तरमुपादत्त इति। तच्चैतदुभयं 'पुनरुत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभाव' इत्यत्रोक्तं–पूर्वशरीरं हित्वा शरीरान्तरोपादानं प्रेत्यभाव इति । तच्चैतन्नित्यत्वे सम्भवतीति ।

यस्य[3] तु सत्त्वोत्पादः सत्त्वनिरोधः प्रेत्यभावः तस्य कृतहानमकृताभ्यागमश्च दोषः । उच्छेदहेतुवादे[4] ऋष्युपदेशाश्चानर्थका इति ॥ १० ॥

" कथमुत्पत्तिरिति " चेत्–

व्यक्ताद्[5] व्यक्तानां प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात् ॥ ११ ॥

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१ तदेव स्पष्टयति–न खल्विति । उत्पत्तिनाशरूप एव प्रेत्यभावः, स च सिद्धान्ते नित्यस्यानुत्पत्तिनाशशीलस्यात्मनो नोपपद्यते । वैनाशिकानान्तु नित्यमात्मानमनभ्युपगच्छतां सत्त्वमात्रस्योत्पादनिरोधाभ्यां युक्त एव प्रेत्यभाव इत्याशयः ।

२ उक्ताक्षेपपरिहाररूपेण सिद्धान्तमुपक्रमते—तत्रायमिति । सिद्धस्य सिद्धान्तस्य अनुवादो वर्णनम् ।

३ विपक्षे बाधकमाह–यस्य त्विति । वैनाशिकमते आत्मनो मरणे तस्य नितान्तमेव सत्त्वस्योच्छेदः जन्मनि च पुनः सत्त्वस्योत्पत्तिरित्येवंरूप एव प्रेत्यभावः। एवं च यस्य मरणं जातं तस्यात्यन्तं नष्टत्वात् यस्य च जन्म तस्य प्रथममेव जातत्वादुभयोरेकान्ततो भेद एव–तथा चोत्तरशरीरे य उपभोगा आत्मन आपतन्ति न ते सर्वे तस्य स्वप्राक्तनकर्मकृताः, यानि च तस्य पूर्वशरीरे स्वकृतानि कर्माणि तज्जन्याश्चोपभोगास्तस्य नैवापतन्तीति महान् दोषः । एवं सत्यभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसार्थं प्रवृत्त्यभावः प्रसज्यत इत्यर्थः ।

४ पुनर्विपक्षे बाधकमाह–उच्छेदेति । यद्यात्मोच्छेदविनाशशीलस्तर्हि यस्यात्मन उपदेशः कृतस्तस्योत्तरक्षणे प्रणष्टत्वादुपदेशानुष्ठानासम्भवे सकलोपदेशानर्थक्यप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः । नित्यात्मपक्षे तु स्वदेहेन्द्रियबुद्धिसंवेदनासम्बन्धोत्पादविनाशौ नित्यस्यात्मनो जन्मप्रायणे—तथा चोपपन्नः प्रेत्यभाव इति सिद्धान्तः ।

५ अत्र च प्रावादुकानां नानाविधा विप्रतिपत्तयः सन्ति। तत्राभिमतं पक्षं गृह्णन्नुत्तरम्प्रस्तौति–व्यक्तादिति सूत्रम् । 'व्यक्तं' नामोपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तं रूपादिमद्-

"केन प्रकारेण किन्धर्मकात् कारणाद्व्यक्तं शरीराद्युत्पद्यत इति"

व्यक्ताद् भूतसमाख्यातात्पृथिव्यादितः परमसूक्ष्मान्नित्याद्व्यक्तं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयोपकरणाधारं प्रज्ञातं द्रव्यमुत्पद्यते। व्यक्तं च खल्विन्द्रियग्राह्यम्। तत्सामान्यात्कारणमपि व्यक्तम्।

"किं सामान्यम्"।

रूपादिगुणयोगः। रूपादिगुणयुक्तेभ्यः पृथिव्यादिभ्यो नित्येभ्यो रूपादिगुणयुक्तं शरीराद्युत्पद्यते।

प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात्। दृष्टो हि रूपादिगुणयुक्तेभ्यो मृत्प्रभृतिभ्यस्तथाभूतस्य द्रव्यस्योत्पादः, तेन चादृष्टस्यानुमानमिति। रूपादीनामन्वयदर्शनात् प्रकृतिविकारयोः पृथिव्यादीनां नित्यानामतीन्द्रियाणां कारणभावोऽनुमीयत इति॥ ११॥

"न[1], घटाद् घटानिष्पत्तेः"॥ १२॥

"इदमपि प्रत्यक्षं—न खलु व्यक्ताद् घटाद्व्यक्तो घट उत्पद्यमानो दृश्यते—इति व्यक्ताद् व्यक्तस्यानुत्पत्तिदर्शनान्न व्यक्तं कारणमिति"॥ १२॥

व्यक्ताद्घटनिष्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधः॥ १३॥

न ब्रूमः-सर्वं सर्वस्य कारणमिति, किन्तु यदुत्पद्यते व्यक्तं द्रव्यं तत्तथाभूतादेवोत्पद्यत इति। व्यक्तं च तन्मृद्द्रव्यं कपालसंज्ञकं यतो घट उत्पद्यते। न चैतन्निह्नुवानः क्वचिदभ्यनुज्ञां लब्धुमर्हतीति। तदेतत्तत्त्वम्॥१३॥

(४) शून्यतोपादानप्रकरणम्[2]।

अतः[3] परं प्रावादुकानां दृष्टयः प्रदर्श्यन्ते—

द्रव्यम्, तस्योत्पत्तिर्व्यक्तात् परमाणोः भवतीत्यर्थः। अत्राप्रत्यक्षोऽपि परमाणू रूपवत्त्वादिसामान्याद् 'व्यक्तम्' उच्यते। तदेव पृथिव्यादेः कारणमिति।

१ सिद्धान्ताशयमबुद्ध्वा परः शङ्कते—न घटादिति सूत्रम्।

२ व्यक्तादेव व्यक्तमुत्पद्यत इति मतमुपोद्बलयितुं पृथिव्याद्युत्पत्तिविषये यानि मतान्तराणि दार्शनिकैरुपन्यस्तानि तन्निराकरणपरं प्रकरणाष्टकम्। तत्रादौ शून्यतोपादानप्रकरणम्।

३ एतदेवावतारयति—अतःपरमिति। 'प्रावादुकानाम्' दार्शनिकानाम्। 'दृष्टयः' मतानि 'प्रदर्श्यन्ते'—कानिचित्प्रतिषेद्धुं—यथा शून्यतोपादानदर्शनं कानिचिदभ्यनुज्ञातुं—यथेश्वरकारणतावादः। ईश्वरकारणतावादमभिलक्ष्यैवैष यत्नो

" अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात् " ॥ १४ ॥

" असतः सदुत्पद्यत इत्ययं पक्षः । कस्मात्? उपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात् । उपमृद्य बीजमङ्कुर उत्पद्यते नानुपमृद्य । न चेद्बीजोपमर्दोऽङ्कुरकारणम्—अनुपमर्देऽपि बीजस्याङ्कुरोत्पत्तिः स्यादिति " ॥ १४ ॥

अत्राभिधीयते—

व्याघातादप्रयोगः ॥ १५ ॥

उपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावादित्ययुक्तः प्रयोगो—व्याघातात् । यदुपमृद्नाति न तदुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भवितुमर्हति—विद्यमानत्वात् । यच्च प्रादुर्भवति न तेनाप्रादुर्भूतेनाविद्यमानेनोपमर्द इति ॥ १५ ॥

" नातीतानागतयोः कारकशब्दप्रयोगात् " ॥ १६ ॥

" अतीते चानागते चाविद्यमाने कारकशब्दाः प्रयुज्यन्ते । पुत्रो जनि-

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वार्त्तिककृतः । अत्र तु यदीश्वरकारणतार्शदनमुपन्यस्तमग्रे तद्वेदान्त्यभिमतेश्वरस्योपादानकारणत्वमेव समर्थयतेऽतस्तदपि सिद्धान्तिनः प्रतिषेध्यकोटावेवान्तःपततीति नावसरो वार्त्तिककृदभिमतविवेकस्येत्यादि तात्पर्यादवगम्यते । विशदं निरूपयिष्यत एतदग्रिमे ईश्वरोपादानताप्रकरणे ।

१ तत्र प्रथममसत एव सदुत्पद्यत इति शून्यतोपादानतादर्शनमुपन्यस्यति—अभावादिति सूत्रम् । एके प्राहुः ' अभावादेव भावानां कार्याणामुत्पत्तिः । कुतः? यतो नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावः कस्य चिदपि भावस्य भवति—यथा बीजमुपमृद्यैवाङ्कुरो जायते इत्यर्थः ' ।

२ सूत्रं व्याचष्टे—असत इति । इदमत्राकूतम्—विश्वं हि शून्यताया एव जायते । एवं किल श्रूयते—असदेवेदमग्र आसीदिति । अत एवाद्याप्यसत एव जन्म दृश्यते न सतः । तत्कस्य हेतोः? अभावस्तस्य कारणमिति । ' अनुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावादिति ' उपलक्षणमेतत् । असत उत्पादादित्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् । तस्मादसदुपादानं विश्वमिति सिद्धम् ।

३ यच्च प्रादुर्भवति तत्प्रादुर्भावात् प्रागसदेव, यच्चासदेव तत् कथमुपमर्दं करिष्यतीत्यर्थः ।

४ सिद्धान्त्यभिसन्धिमविद्वान् पूर्वपक्षी दूषयति—नातीतेति सूत्रम् । यदुक्तं सिद्धान्तिना पूर्वस्मिन् सूत्रे तन्न, यतो ह्यविद्यमानेऽप्यर्थे कारकशब्दः प्रयुज्यत इत्यर्थः ।

५ सूत्रार्थं व्याचष्टे—अतीत इति । अविद्यमान इति यद्यपि सूत्रे नोक्तं तथाऽपि भाष्यकारेण योजितं वेदितव्यम् ।

ष्यते—जनिष्यमाणं पुत्रमभिनन्दति—पुत्रस्य जनिष्यमाणस्य नाम करोति—अभूत्कुम्भो भिन्नं कुम्भमनुशोचति—भिन्नस्य कुम्भस्य कपालानि—अजाताः पुत्राः पितरं तापयन्तीति—बहुलं भाक्ताः प्रयोगा दृश्यन्ते । का[1] पुनरियं भक्तिः ? आनन्तर्यं[2] भक्तिः । आनन्तर्यसामर्थ्यादुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावार्थः—प्रादुर्भविष्यन्नङ्कुर उपमृद्नातीति भाक्तं कर्तृत्वमिति" ॥ १६ ॥

न[3] विनष्टेभ्योऽनिष्पत्तेः ॥ १७ ॥

न विनष्टाद्बीजादङ्कुर उत्पद्यत इति। तस्मान्नाभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिरिति ॥ १७ ॥

क्रम[4]निर्देशादप्रतिषेधः ॥ १८ ॥

उपमर्द[5]प्रादुर्भावयोः पौर्वा[6]पर्यनियमः क्रमः । स खल्वभावाद्भावोत्पत्तेर्हेतुर्निर्दिश्यते । स च न प्रतिषिध्यत इति । व्याहत[7]व्यूहानामवयवानां पूर्वव्यूहनिवृत्तौ व्यूहान्तराद् द्रव्यनिष्पत्तिर्नाभावात्। बीजावयवाः कुतश्चिन्निमित्ता-

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१ ननु भाक्तप्रयोगे सर्वत्र सादृश्यादि किञ्चिन्मूलमपेक्ष्यते। प्रकृते किन्तन्मूलमिति पृच्छति-का पुनरिति।

२ तत्रोत्तरम्—आनन्तर्यमिति । तदेव विशदयति—आनन्तर्यसामर्थ्यादिति । अङ्कुरमुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भवतीत्यस्यायमेवर्थो यत् प्रादुर्भविष्यन्नङ्कुरो बीजमुपमृद्नातीति—अत्र चाविद्यमानस्याप्यङ्कुरस्य कर्तृत्वं भाक्तमेव। तत्र च मूलं बीजनाशादनन्तरमेवाङ्कुर उत्पद्यत इत्यानन्तर्यमेवेति भावः ।

३ परोक्तं परिहरति—न विनष्टेभ्य इति सूत्रम् । यदुक्तमभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिरिति, तन्न । कुतः ? यतो विनष्टेभ्यो बीजेभ्यो नैवोत्पद्यतेऽङ्कुरमित्यर्थः ।

४ परोक्तौ यत्किञ्चिदभ्युपगमार्हं तदभ्युपगच्छन्नाह—क्रमनिर्देशादिति सूत्रम् । 'अप्रतिषेधः' तावन्मात्रस्य परोक्तस्येति शेषः ।

५ सूत्रार्थं व्याचष्टे—उपमर्देति ।

६ सूत्रस्थक्रमपदस्यार्थमाह—पौर्वेति । निर्दिश्यत इति परेणेति शेषः ।

७ ननु यद्ययं क्रमो न प्रतिषिध्यते स एव च क्रमोऽस्माभिरभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिसाधकतयोपन्यस्तः । ततः किमिति साधनं स्वीकृत्य तत्साध्यन्न स्वीकरोषीत्यत आह—व्याहतेति । बीजोपमर्दाङ्कुरोत्पत्त्योर्यः पौर्वापर्यक्रमः स न प्रतिषिध्यते किन्तु तस्य क्रमस्याभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिसाधनत्वम्प्रतिषिध्यत एव । यतोऽत्र बीजस्यानुवृत्तिर्भवत्येव केवलं तस्यैकमवयवव्यूहं नश्यति, अपरं च व्यूहमुत्पद्यते । अस्मादेव च व्यूहान्तरादङ्कुरमुत्पद्यते । एवं च सत एव बीजादङ्कुरोत्पत्तिर्नासत इत्याशयः । अनन्यप्रयुक्तं ह्यानन्तर्यं कार्यकारणभावसाधनम् । इह त्वानन्तर्यं व्यूहान्तरप्रयुक्तमेवेति न तदभावस्य कारणत्वं गमयितुमर्हतीति हृदयम् ।

त्प्रादुर्भूतक्रियाः पूर्वव्यूहं जहति व्यूहान्तरं चापद्यन्ते । व्यूहान्तरादङ्कुर उत्पद्यते । दृश्यन्ते खल्ववयवास्तत्संयोगाश्चाङ्कुरोत्पत्तिहेतवः । न चानिवृत्ते पूर्वव्यूहे बीजावयवानां शक्यं व्यूहान्तरेण भवितुमित्युपमर्दप्रादुर्भावयोः पौर्वापर्यनियमः क्रमः । तस्मान्नाभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिरिति । न चान्यबीजावयवेभ्योऽङ्कुरोत्पत्तिकारणमित्युपपद्यते बीजोपादाननियम इति ॥ १८ ॥

(५) ईश्वरोपादानताप्रकरणम्[1] ।

अथापर[2] आह—

१ अत्र ईश्वरोपादानताप्रकरणे वार्त्तिकतात्पर्ययोर्मतभेदो दृश्यते । जगत ईश्वरकर्त्तृकत्वसाधनपरमिदमिति वार्त्तिकम्—वेदान्त्यभिमतेश्वरोपादानकारणत्वनिराकरणपरमिति तात्पर्यम् । 'प्रावादुकानां दृष्टयः प्रदर्श्यन्त' इति भाष्यावतरणिकां विभाव्य तात्पर्यव्याख्यानमेव सम्यक् प्रतिभाति, न्यायदर्शनप्राणभूतस्येश्वरकर्त्तृकत्वस्य प्रावादुकदृष्टयभिधानासम्भवात् ।

किन्तु कुत्राप्यन्यत्र सूत्रकारेणेश्वरकर्त्तृकत्वं जगतो नैवोपपादितमिति विभाव्यैव वार्त्तिककृत उक्तावतरणिकाभाष्यव्याख्यानावसर उक्तवन्तः—'अत्र कानिचिद् दर्शनानि प्रतिषिध्यन्ते कानिचिदभ्युपगम्यन्ते' इति । अभ्युपगम्यते त्विदमेवेश्वरकर्तृकत्वदर्शनं तन्मतेनेति विचारणीयम् । ईश्वरकर्त्तृकत्वस्य न्यायदर्शनप्राणभूतत्वाद्वार्त्तिककारीयमेव व्याख्यानमत्र प्रधानतयोपन्यस्यते । किन्तु तात्पर्यकृतो व्याख्यानमेव सूत्रभाष्याक्षरानुकूलमिति तदपि नोपेक्षणीयमिति तदपि लिख्यते । एवं च ईश्वरः कारणमिति सूत्रे (१९) सिद्धान्तस्यैवोपक्रमः—तत्राक्षेपः, न पुरुषकर्मेति सूत्रे (२०) । तत्परिहारस्तत्कारित्वादिति सूत्रे (२१) इति वार्तिकव्याख्यानम् ।

ईश्वरः कारणमित्यत्र सूत्रे (१६) वेदान्तिकृतेश्वरोपादानकारणत्वपूर्वपक्षः—न पुरुषकर्मेति सूत्रे (२०) पूर्वपक्षभूतवेदान्त्यभिमतोपादानकारणत्वानपेक्षनिमित्तकारणत्वनिरासः—तत्कारितत्वादिति सूत्रे (२१) ईश्वरस्य निमित्तकारणत्वसिद्धान्तोपन्यासः इति तात्पर्यव्याख्यानमिति विवेचनीयम् ।

अत्र प्रसङ्गे ईश्वरस्य निमित्तकारणत्वं प्राचीनतमन्यायाचार्याणामभिमतं न वेत्येतदपि विचारमर्हति । तृतीयाध्यायद्वितीयाह्निकगत—(६६)—सूत्रवार्त्तिके सर्गादेरनभ्युपगमादित्युक्तम्—तदेवपुनरत्रत्य (२१) सूत्रवार्त्तिके । एवं सर्गादेरनभ्युपगमात् सर्गस्य निमित्तकारणस्य क्वोपयोगः । तथा चेश्वरः केवलं नियन्तैवेति न्यायमतं प्रतिभाति । भाष्यकारोऽप्यग्रे ईश्वरो द्रष्टा बोद्धा सर्वज्ञातेत्येवोक्तवान्, न पुनः कर्ता स्रष्टा वेति ।

२ ईश्वरकर्त्तृकत्वसिद्धान्तोपन्यासमवतारयति—अथापर इति । न परः 'अपरः' स्वयूथ्यो नैयायिक इति यावदिति वार्त्तिकाभिमतं व्याख्यानम् । तात्पर्यव्याख्याने त्वीश्वरोपादानवादी वेदान्त्येव 'अपरः' ।

ईश्वरः[1] कारणं पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात्[2] ॥ १९ ॥

पुरुषो[3]ऽयं समीहमानो नावश्यं समीहाफलं प्राप्नोति। तेनानुमीयते-पराधीनं पुरुषस्य कर्मफलाराधनमिति। यदधीनं स ईश्वरः। तस्मादीश्वरः कारणमिति ॥ १९ ॥

"न[4], पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः ॥ २० ॥

"ईश्वराधीना[5] चेत्फलनिष्पत्तिः स्यादपि तर्हि पुरुषस्य समीहामन्तरेण फलं निष्पद्येतेति" ॥ २० ॥

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१ सिद्धान्तेनैवोपक्रमते-ईश्वर इति। ईश्वर एव निरपेक्षः शरीरादेः निमित्तकारणम्। कुतः? पुरुषकर्मणां प्रयत्नानां बहुधा नैष्फल्यदर्शनात्।

२ ननु जीवा एव चेतनास्तत्कर्मनिबन्धनो नामरूपप्रपञ्चो भविष्यति—कृतमत्र भगवतेश्वरेणेत्यत आह-पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात्। पुरुषश्चेच्चेतयते नैवं निष्फलं कर्मारभेत। निष्फलं विद्वान् प्रवर्त्तमानः कथं चेतनो नाम। तस्मात्पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनादीश्वर एवोपादानमिति सर्वमवदातम्-इति पूर्वपक्षः।

३ सूत्रं व्याचष्टे-पुरुषोऽयमिति। 'समीहा' प्रयत्नः।

तात्पर्यपरिशुद्धिप्रकाशकाराणां तु मतेऽत्र सूत्रे वेदान्तिनाम्पूर्वपक्ष एवोद्भावितः। स चैवमुल्लसति-माभूदयं नामरूपप्रपञ्चः शून्यतोपादानोऽपि तु ब्रह्मोपादानो भविष्यति। ब्रह्मैव प्रपञ्चरूपेण परिणमते-मृत्तिकेव घटशरावादिभावेन। न चैवं नित्यत्वव्याघातः, परिणामेऽपि तत्त्वानपायात्, तल्लक्षणत्वाच्च नित्यतायाः। एतदेकं दर्शनम्परिणामवादिनाम्।

अपरं च विवर्त्तवादिनाम्-यथा-ब्रह्मैवानाद्यविद्योपधानभेदान्नामरूपप्रपञ्चभेदेन विवर्त्तते-मुखमिवैकमनेकमणिकृपाणादर्शभेदान्नैकविधप्रतिबिम्बभेदेनेति। तदेतद्दर्शनद्वयमनेन सूत्रेण सूचितम्।

'ईश्वरो' ब्रह्म, ईशनायोगात्। 'ईशना' च चेतनाशक्तिः, क्रियाशक्तिश्च। सा चास्ति ब्रह्मणीति ब्रह्म 'ईश्वरः'। स एव 'कारणं' जगतः। न चाभावो वा प्रधान वा परमाणवो वा चेतयन्ते।

४ (वार्त्तिकव्याख्यानेन) सिद्धान्तमाक्षिपति-न पुरुषकर्मेति-ईश्वरस्य निमित्तकारणत्वं 'न', कुतः? यतः पुरुषप्रयत्नाभावे किमपि फलं न निष्पद्यत इत्यर्थः।

५ सूत्रं व्याचष्टे-ईश्वरेति। यदि निरपेक्ष एवेश्वरः कारणं तर्हि पुरुषप्रयत्नमन्तरेणापि कर्मनिष्पत्तिसम्भवः। ततश्च कर्मलोपोऽनिर्मोक्षश्च-ईश्वरस्यैकरूपस्यैकरूपाया एव क्रियायाः सम्भवात्। अथेश्वरः कारणभेदानुविधानेन कार्यं निर्वर्त्तयति-यदपेक्षते तच्च करोतीति प्राप्तम्। एवं कर्मापेक्षश्चेदीश्वरो जगदुत्पत्तिकारणं स्यात् कर्मणीश्वरो नेश्वरः स्यादित्याक्षेपाशयः।

तत्कारितत्वादहेतुः[1] ॥ २१ ॥

पुरुषकारमीश्वरोऽनुगृह्णाति[2][3] । फलाय[4] पुरुषस्य यतमानस्येश्वरः फलं सम्पादयतीति । यदा[5] न सम्पादयति तदा पुरुषकर्माफलं भवतीति । तस्मादी[6]श्वरकारितत्वादहेतुः—'पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्ते'रिति ।

तात्पर्यव्याख्यानं यथा—न तावन्मृत्तिकेव नामरूपप्रपञ्चरूपेण ब्रह्म परिणमते । तद्धि सर्वात्मना वा परिणमते एकदेशेन वा । तत्र सर्वात्मना परिणामे तत्त्वविघातादनित्यत्वम् । एकदेशेन परिणामे सावयवत्वात्तदेवानित्यत्वम् । न च निरंशे स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षे ब्रह्मणि तत्स्वरूपाग्रहः सामान्यग्रहो वा भवति । तस्मादीश्वरो जगद्भेदेन परिणमते विवर्त्तते वेत्ययुक्तम् । निमित्तं तु स्यादीश्वरो जगतः । स चेदनपेक्ष एव जगत्कारणमित्युच्येत तत्रेदमुपतिष्ठते—न पुरुषकर्माभाव इति सूत्रम् ।

१ आक्षेपं परिहरति (वार्त्तिकव्याख्याने)—तदेवमीश्वरोपादानत्वं ब्रह्मविवर्त्तत्वं च निरपेक्षेश्वरनिमित्तत्वं च प्रत्याख्यायाभिमतं पक्षं गृह्णाति (तात्पर्यव्याख्याने)—तत्कारितत्वादिति सूत्रम् । सिद्धान्तोपवर्णनपरमिदमित्यत्र सर्वेषां सम्मतिः । 'ईश्वरकारितत्वात् पुरुषकारस्य तत्सहाय एवेश्वरो जगतो निमित्तकारणम्'—इत्यस्य पक्षस्य निराकरणे 'पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः' इति 'अहेतुः' असाधनमिति सूत्रार्थः ।

२ सूत्रं व्याचष्टे—पुरुषकारमिति । 'पुरुषकारमिति' पुरुषस्य प्रयत्नमिति यावत् ।

३ अनुगृह्णातीति—यत्कर्म यथाभूतं यस्य कर्मणो यदा विपाककालस्तत् तथा तदा विनियुङ्क्त इत्यर्थः ।

४ तदेव स्पष्टयति—फलायेति ।

५ कथं तर्हि पुरुषकर्माफल्यमित्यत आह—यदेति । ईश्वरानुग्रहाभाव एव कर्मनैष्फल्ये हेतुरित्यर्थः ।

६ सूत्रार्थमुपसंहरति—तस्मादिति । परमाणूपादानस्य जगतः पुरुषकर्मापेक्ष ईश्वरो निमित्तम् । यच्च तेनापेक्षणीयं पुरुषकर्म तदपीश्वरनिमित्तकमेव । न च यदपेक्षते तत्तस्यानिमित्तम्—वास्यादेस्तक्षसहकारिणस्तक्षनिमित्तकत्वदर्शनात् । तस्मादीश्वरकारितत्वात्पुरुषकारस्य तत्सहाय ईश्वरो निमित्तकारणं जगत इत्यस्य पक्षस्य निराकरणे 'पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्ते' रित्यहेतुः । निरपेक्षेश्वरनिमित्तत्वनिराकरणे तु भवेदेवायं हेतुरिति निर्गलितोऽर्थः ।

गुण[1]विशिष्टमात्मान्तरमीश्वरः । तस्या[2]त्मकल्पात् कल्पान्तरानुपपत्तिः । [3]अधर्ममिथ्याज्ञानप्रमादहान्या धर्मज्ञानसमाधिसम्पदा च विशिष्टमात्मान्तरमीश्वरः । तस्य[4] च धर्मसमाधिफलमणिमाद्यष्टविधमैश्वर्यम् । सङ्कल्पानु[5]विधायी चास्य धर्मः । प्रत्या[6]त्मवृत्तीन् धर्माधर्मसञ्चयान् पृथिव्यादीनि च भूतानि प्रवर्तयति । एवं च स्वकृताभ्यागमस्यालोपेन निर्माण[7]प्राकाम्यमीश्वरस्य स्वकृतकर्मफलं वेदितव्यम् ।

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१ ईश्वरनिमित्तकत्वं जगतो विचार्याधुना 'ईश्वर एव क' इत्यपेक्षायामीश्वरं परिचाययति—गुणविशिष्टमिति । जीवात्मभ्योऽन्य इत्यात्मान्तरम परमात्मेति यावत् । स च गुणैर्विशिष्टः । ते च गुणाः—सङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागबुद्धय एवेति वार्त्तिकम् । तत्र तात्पर्यम्—बुद्धिवदिच्छाप्रयत्नावप्यस्य नित्यौ तत्कर्तृत्वसाधनान्तर्गतौ मन्तव्यौ, ज्ञानचिकीर्षाप्रयत्नसमवायलक्षणत्वात्कर्तृत्वस्येति ।

२ नन्वात्मानः सर्वेऽनित्यज्ञानयोगिन एव दृष्टास्तद्वैलक्षण्येन नित्यज्ञानयोगी परमात्मा नात्मजातीयो भवितुमर्हतीत्यत आह—तस्यात्मेति । 'आत्मकल्पात्' आत्मजातीयादिति यावत् । इदमत्राकूतम् । यद्यप्यात्मान्तराण्यनित्यज्ञानयोगीनि—अयं च नित्यबुद्ध्यादियुक्तः—तथाऽप्यात्मजातीय एव बुद्ध्यादिगुणयोगित्वात् । अन्यथा तोयादिपरमाणूनामतोयादिप्रसङ्गो नित्यरूपादियोगात् ।

३ ननु सामान्यत आत्मकोटावेव किमित्ययं न निवेश्यते—किमर्थं चास्यात्मभ्योऽन्यत्वं वर्ण्यत इत्यत आह—अधर्मेति । आत्मत्वसामान्येऽपि ईश्वरस्य महान् भेदो लक्ष्यतेऽस्य गुणानामात्मान्तरगुणेभ्यः । तथा हि जीवात्मनः स्वधर्मोऽज्ञानं प्रमादश्च—एतेषां तु परमात्मनीश्वरे 'हानिः' अभावः प्रत्युतास्मिन् धर्मो ज्ञानं समाधिश्चेत्येतेषां गुणानां सम्पत्तिर्लक्ष्यते । एतदेव च वैशिष्ट्यम्—वैलक्षण्यम्—अस्य जीवात्मभ्य इत्यर्थः ।

४ ईश्वरे धर्मादिगुणयोगम्प्रदर्शयति—तस्य चेति । अणिमा—महिमा—लघिमा—गरिमा—प्राकाम्यम्—ईशित्वम्—प्राप्तिः—वशित्वमिति सिद्ध्यष्टकमीश्वरस्य तत्कारणीभूतधर्मस्यास्तित्वं सूचयतीत्यर्थः । अभ्युपेत्येश्वरे धर्ममेतदुक्तं भाष्यकृता—परमार्थतस्त्वीश्वरस्य धर्मसद्भावे प्रमाणं नास्ति—नित्याभ्यामेव ईश्वरीयज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिभ्यां सकलकार्योत्पत्तिसिद्धेरिति वार्त्तिकतात्पर्ययोः स्पष्टम् ।

५ नन्वीश्वरस्य कर्मानुष्ठानाभावात् कुतोऽस्य धर्मः—तथा चाणिमादिकमस्यैश्वर्यं कार्यरूपं विनैव कर्मणेत्यकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्ग इत्यत आह—सङ्कल्पेति ।

६ तदेव विशदयति—प्रत्यात्मेति ।

७ मा भूद्बाह्यानुष्ठानमीश्वरस्य, सङ्कल्पलक्षणं जीवात्मपृथिव्यादिप्रवर्त्तनरूपं चानुष्ठानं तस्य भवत्येव, तज्जनितस्यैव धर्मस्य फलमस्यैश्वर्यादिकम्भवतीति नाकृता-

आप्तकल्पश्चायम् । यथा पिताऽपत्यानां तथा पितृभूत ईश्वरो भूतानाम् । न चात्मकल्पादन्यः कल्पः सम्भवति । न तावदस्य बुद्धिं विना कश्चिद्धर्मो लिङ्गभूतः शक्य उपपादयितुम् । आगमाच्च द्रष्टा बोद्धा सर्वज्ञाता–ईश्वर इति । बुद्ध्यादिभिश्चात्मलिङ्गैर्निरुपाख्यमीश्वरं प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमविषयातीतं कः शक्त उपपादयितुम् ।

स्वकृताभ्यागमलोपेन च प्रवर्तमानस्यास्य यदुक्तं–प्रतिषेधजातमकर्मनिमित्ते शरीरसर्गे–तत्सर्वं प्रसज्यत इति ॥ २१ ॥

भ्यागमप्रसङ्गः । किमायातमनेनेश्वरस्य जगत्कर्तृत्व इत्यत आह–निर्माणप्राकाम्यमिति । जगन्निर्माणशक्तिरप्यस्य धर्मफलमेवेत्यर्थः । ईश्वरस्य ज्ञानक्रियाशक्ती नित्ये इत्यैश्वर्यं नित्यमणिमादिकं त्वनित्यम् । तदभिप्रायं च भाष्यस्य धर्मफलत्वाभिधानम् । अत एवैश्वर्यनित्यत्वे धर्मवैयर्थ्यन्तदनित्यत्वे तत्कारणकल्पनयाऽनवस्थेति चोद्यस्य नावकाशः । प्रत्यात्मवृत्तिधर्माधर्मसन्निचयाधिष्ठानं सङ्कल्पानुविधायिन ईश्वरधर्मस्य प्रयोजनम् ।

१ ननु प्रयोजनं विना प्रेक्षावतां न प्रवृत्तिः । न च प्राप्तसकलप्राप्तव्यस्यास्ति प्रापणीयं किञ्चिदीश्वरस्य । तस्मात् कृतमस्य जगन्निर्माणेनेत्यत आह–आप्तकल्प इति । मा भूदस्य भगवतः स्वार्थः परानुग्रहार्थमेव जगन्निर्माणे प्रवर्त्तत इत्यर्थः ।

२ पूर्वमुक्तमेवेश्वरस्यात्मजातीयत्वं पुनर्द्रढयति–न चात्मेति । आत्मजातीय एवेश्वरो नान्यजातीय इत्यर्थः ।

३ कथमेतदित्यत आह–न तावदिति ।

४ स्यादेतत् यदि कारुण्यादीश्वरो जगन्निर्माणे प्रवर्तेत सुखिनमेव सृजेन्न दुःखिनम् । न च क्षेत्रज्ञगतधर्माधर्मसहकारितया निर्माणवैचित्र्यं वाच्यम्, धर्मस्य तदनधिष्ठितस्य स्वकार्याकरणेन कारुणिकेन तदधिष्ठानायोगात् । अतः सुखिदुःख्यादिभेदेन जगद्वैचित्र्यदर्शनान्नानुकम्पाप्रयुक्त ईश्वरः करोतीत्यत आह–स्वकृताभ्यागमेति । अयमभिसन्धिः–कारुणिकोऽप्ययमात्मान्तरातिशयितमहिमाऽपि न वस्तूनां सामर्थ्यमन्यथाकर्तुं पारयति । तस्मादधर्मेणोत्पत्तिमतापि नेश्वरप्रभावादपि नित्येन भवितुं युक्तम् । न च स्वफलविरोधिना फलमप्रदाय विनष्टमपि शक्यम् । अतः क्षेत्रज्ञानां नियतिमलङ्घयतेश्वरेण नाधर्मः शक्योऽनधिष्ठातुम् । तस्मात् कारुणिकोऽप्ययं वस्तुस्वभावमनुविधीयमानो धर्माधर्मसहकारी जगद्वैचित्र्यं विधत्ते इति सर्वमधिकृत्याह– स्वकृताभ्यागमलोपेन च प्रवर्त्तमानस्येति । पुरुषैर्यत् कृतं तत्फलाभ्यागमलोपेन प्रवर्त्तमानस्येत्यर्थः । यदि तथाप्रवृत्तिरीश्वरः स्यात्तर्हि अकर्मनिमित्तसर्गपक्षे ये दोषा उक्तास्तृतीयाध्यायाद्याह्निकस्यान्ते ते सर्व एव प्रसज्येरन्नित्यर्थः ।

(६) आकस्मिकत्वप्रकरणम्[1] ।

अपर[2] इदानीमाह—

" अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात् ॥२२॥

" अनिमित्ता शरीराद्युत्पत्तिः । कस्मात्? कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात् । यथा कण्टकस्य तैक्ष्ण्यम्, पर्वतधातूनां चित्रता, ग्राव्णां श्लक्ष्णता, निर्निमित्तं चोपादानवच्च दृष्टं तथा शरीरादिसर्गोऽपीति " ॥ २२ ॥

अनिमित्तनि[3]मित्तत्वान्नानिमित्ततः ॥ २३ ॥

अनिमित्ततो[4] भावोत्पत्तिरित्युच्यते । यतश्चोत्पद्यते तन्निमित्तम् । अनिमित्तस्य निमित्तत्वान्नानिमित्ता भावोत्पत्तिरिति ॥ २३ ॥

निमित्तानिमित्तयोरर्थान्तरभावादप्रतिषेधः[5] ॥ २४ ॥

अन्यद्धि[6] निमित्तमन्यच्च निमित्तप्रत्याख्यानम् । न च प्रत्याख्यानमेव प्रत्याख्येयम् । यथाऽनुदकः कमण्डलुरिति नोदकप्रतिषेध उदकं भवतीति । स[7]

१ इदानीं व्यक्ताद् व्यक्तनिष्पत्तिं निराकर्त्तुमाकस्मिकवादं गुडजिह्विकया शरीरादौ निमित्तकारणनिराकरणमुखेन चार्वाक उपतिष्ठत इति परिशुद्धिकृतः। अत्र कारणमात्रनिरासे तात्पर्यमिति वर्धमानोपाध्यायाः। यदि कार्याणामाकस्मिकत्वं तदा न परमाण्वादीनामुपादानत्वं न वेश्वरस्य निमित्तत्वम्। अत आकस्मिकत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणमारभते इति वृत्तिकृतः।

२ आकस्मिकवादमवतारयति—अपर इति। अपरोऽत्र चार्वाकः।

३ भ्रान्त एकदेशी पूर्वपक्षं दूषयति—अनिमित्तनिमित्तत्वादिति सूत्रम्। अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिरित्यभ्युपगच्छन् भवान् अनिमित्तस्यैव तदुत्पत्तिनिमित्ततामभ्युपगच्छति। तथा चानिमित्ता भावोत्पत्तिरिति रिक्तं वच इत्यर्थः।

४ सूत्रार्थं विवृणोति—अनिमित्तत इति। व्याख्यातार्थमेतत्।

५ एकदेशिदूषणं दूषयति—निमित्तानिमित्तयोरिति सूत्रम्।

६ तदर्थं विवृणोति—अन्यद्धीति। अनिमित्तमेव निमित्तन्न भवितुमर्हतीत्यर्थः।

७ आकस्मिकवादस्य दूषणं स्वयमेव भाष्यकार आह—स खल्वयमिति। तृतीयाध्यायान्तिमप्रकरणे योऽकर्मनिमित्तकशरीरसर्गवादो निराकृतस्तत्समानक्षेमत्वादाकस्मिकवादस्य तन्निरासेनैवायमपि निरस्तो मन्तव्य इत्यर्थः। अस्मादेव कारणात्सूत्रकारेणास्याकस्मिकवादस्य निरासे पृथक् प्रयत्नो न कृत इत्यपि सूचितम्।

त्रयोविंशचतुर्विंशसूत्रयोर्व्याख्यानान्तरमप्युपन्यस्तं वृत्तिकृता। तद्यथा—नव्यास्तु सूत्रद्वयीमेवं व्याचक्षते। द्वाविंशसूत्रगतमाक्षेपं समाधत्ते—अनिमित्तेति (सू० २३)।

खल्वयं वादोऽकर्मनिमित्तः शरीरादिसर्ग इत्येतस्मान्न भिद्यते । अभेदात्तत्प्रतिषेधेनैव प्रतिषिद्धो वेदितव्य इति ॥ २४ ॥

(७) सर्वानित्यत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणम् ।

अन्ये तु मन्यन्ते—

" सर्वमनित्यमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वात् " ॥ २५ ॥

" किमनित्यं नाम ? यस्य कदाचिद्भावस्तदनित्यम् । उत्पत्तिधर्मकमनुत्पन्नं नास्ति, विनाशधर्मकं च विनष्टं नास्ति । किं पुनः सर्वम् ? भौतिकं च शरीरादि अभौतिकं च बुद्ध्यादि । तदुभयमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकं विज्ञायते । तस्मात्तत्सर्वमनित्यमिति " ॥ २५ ॥

नानित्यतानित्यत्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

यदि तावत्सर्वस्यानित्यता नित्या ?—तन्नित्यत्वान्न सर्वमनित्यम् । अथानित्या ?—तस्यामविद्यमानायां सर्वं नित्यमिति ॥ २६ ॥

' अनिमित्तस्य ' अनिमित्तत्वसाधकस्य 'निमित्तत्वात्' अनिमित्तत्वानुमितिजनकत्वात् ' अनिमित्तत ' इति व्याहतम् । अनिमित्तत्वानुमितिजनकत्वानभ्युपगमेऽनिमित्तत्वं न सिध्येदिति कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिकम् नानिमित्तकम्—अदृष्टविशेषसहकृतैरणुभिस्तदुत्पादनादिति हृदयम् । दोषान्तरमाह–निमित्तेति (सू० २४)। इदमत्र निमित्तमिदमनिमित्तमिति प्रतीत्या तयोर्भेदसिद्धेर्निमित्तप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः । इतरथा च सार्वलौकिकी प्रतीतिर्नोपपद्येतेति भावः ।

१ कारणसामग्री किमनित्यानामेव पदार्थानां समुच्चयोऽथवा नित्यानामुत नित्यानित्यानामितीदानीं विचारणा । प्रथमद्वितीयपक्षयोरभिमतः प्रेत्यभावो न सिद्ध्यति । ततस्तौ निराकरणीयौ । तत्र प्रथमं निराकर्तुमिदं प्रकरणम् । न च क्षणभङ्गनिराकरणेनैवैतद्गतम्—स्थैर्यमाश्रित्य पुनरारम्भादिति परिशुद्धिकृतः । सर्वस्यैवानित्यत्वे आत्मादेरपि नित्यत्वं न स्यादतः सर्वानित्यत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणमिति वृत्तिकृतः ।

एवं च पृथिव्यादिपरमाणवोऽनित्याः भौतिकत्वात् , शरीरवत्–आत्मा चानित्योऽभौतिकत्वात् , बुद्धिवदिति पूर्वपक्षहृदयम् ।

२ पूर्वपक्षमेकदेशिमतेन परिहरति–नानित्यतेति । यदुक्तं सर्वमनित्यमिति, तन्न, कुतः ? अनित्यताया एव नित्यत्वादित्यर्थः ।

उत्पत्तिमत्त्वं न विनाशित्वसाधकम्–ध्वंसस्य नित्यत्वात्तत्र व्यभिचारादिति हृदयम् ।

तदनित्यत्वमग्नेर्दाह्यं विनाश्यानुविनाशवत् ॥ २७ ॥[1]

तस्या अनित्यताया अप्यनित्यत्वम्। कथम्? यथा अग्निर्दाह्यं विनाश्यानुविनश्यति एवं सर्वस्यानित्यता सर्वं विनाश्यानुविनश्यतीति ॥ २७ ॥

नित्यस्याप्रत्याख्यानं यथोपलब्धिव्यवस्थानात् ॥ २८ ॥[2]

अयं खलु वादो नित्यं प्रत्याचष्टे। नित्यस्य च प्रत्याख्यानमनुपपन्नम्। कस्मात्? यथोपलब्धिव्यवस्थानात्। यस्योत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वमुपलभ्यते प्रमाणतस्तदनित्यं, यस्य नोपलभ्यते तद्विपरीतम्। न च परमसूक्ष्माणां भूतानामाकाशकालदिगात्ममनसां तद्गुणानां च केषाञ्चित्सामान्यविशेषसमवायानां चोत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वं प्रमाणत उपलभ्यते। तस्मान्नित्यान्येतानीति ॥ २८ ॥

(८) सर्वनित्यत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणम्।[3]

अयमन्य[4] एकान्तः[5]—

" सर्वं नित्यं पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात् " ॥ २९ ॥

" भूतमात्रमिदं सर्वम्। तानि च नित्यानि–भूतोच्छेदानुपपत्तेरिति। ॥ २९ ॥

नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः ॥ ३० ॥[6]

उत्पत्तिकारणं चोपलभ्यते विनाशकारणं च। तत् सर्वनित्यत्वे व्याहन्यत इति ॥ ३० ॥

" तल्लक्षणावरोधादप्रतिषेधः " ॥ ३१ ॥[7]

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१ एकदेशिमतं दूषयति–तदनित्यत्वमिति सूत्रम्।

२ एकदेशिमतं निरस्य परमसिद्धान्तमुपक्रमते–नित्यस्येति सूत्रम्। नित्यत्वस्य सर्वथा प्रत्याख्यानं न युक्तम्, कुतः? यथा यदुपलभ्यते तथैव तस्य नित्यत्वमनित्यत्वं व्यवस्थापनीयमित्यर्थः।

३ सर्वनित्यत्वेऽपि न प्रेत्यभावसिद्धिरिति तन्निराकरणप्रकरणारम्भः।

४ सर्वनित्यतावादमवतारयति–अयमिति।

५ एकान्त इति–सर्वपदार्थपक्षकप्रतिज्ञावाक्यमित्यर्थः।

६ सिद्धान्तमाह–नोत्पत्तीति सूत्रम्। यदुक्तं तन्न, कुतः? यतो बहूनां भूतानामुत्पत्तिविनाशकारणान्युपलभ्यन्त इत्यर्थः।

७ भूतसारूप्येण तादात्म्यम्मन्यमानः पुनरपि पूर्वपक्षवाद्याह–तल्लक्षणेति सूत्रम्। 'तल्लक्षणावरोधात्' भूतलक्षणाक्रान्तत्वाद् गोघटादीनाम्–'भूतानां च' नित्यत्वात्–'अप्रतिषेधः' गोघटादिनित्यत्वस्येत्यर्थः।

SECTION (2)

[Sūtras 4–6]

The Soul is distinct from the Body.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

*For the following reason also the Aggregate of Body &c., cannot be the Soul ; the Soul is something different from these :—

Sūtra 4

[If the Body were the Soul, then] there would be no sin accruing from the burning (killing) of a living Body.†

* The *Pariśuddi* introduces this section as follows :- The first *section* having established the conclusion that the Soul is something distinct from the Sense-organs, some people might urge the following argument. "We admit that, being restricted as to their Objects, the Sense-organs cannot be regarded as *intelligent* ; but the Body could very well be regarded as the intelligent Agent ; because there is no such restriction in regard to the Body ; as is vouched for by such notions as 'I, *who am fat and fair*, am, now in my old age, teaching what I had seen in my youth' [where *fatness, fairness, oldness* and *youth*, all belong to the *Body*], which shows that the Siddhānta argument put forward in Sū. (1) is applicable to the Body."

It is with a view to meet these people that the Author proceeds with this second *section*.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* construes the Sūtra thus - (*a*) The term *Śarīradāhe* may be taken to mean *the burner of body*, *Śarīradāhakē* ; or as *Śarīradāhe sati tatkartari*, 'on the burning of the body, to the person doing the *burning*'.

The *Parisuddhi* remarks that 'burning' here stands for *destroying, killing* ; and 'sin' for all such qualities as would be capable of producing their results in the future ; the sense of the argument being that if the Body were the Soul, then there could be no such things as *Merit* and *Demerit*, qualities which are believed to subsist in the Soul, only with a view to account for the experiences of our present life, which are believed to be the results of the *Merit* and *Demerit* accumulated by us during our previous existences ; if the Body were the Soul, it must perish at death ; hence it could have no such qualities attaching to it as would continue in future lives, when the time for the retribution of those qualities would come ; and thus the theory that the Body is the Soul would do away with all notions of *Dharma* and *Adharma*.

The *Tātparya* remarks that this argument can have no force against the thorough-going Materialist, who admits of no *Dharma* and *Adharma* ; but it will be effective against the Bauddhas, who, while denying the Soul, do admit of *Dharma* and *Adharma*.

That the above is the sense of the arguments propounded in the Sūtra is clear from what follows in Sū. 5 *et. seq.* If Sū. 4 had stood alone, it

Sūtra 5

[*The Opponent says*]—**"Even on the burning of that [aggregate of Body etc.,] which is accompanied by the Soul, there could be no sin ; as the Soul is something eternal."**

BHĀṢYA

"Even for him, according to whom what is burnt is the Body endowed with a Soul, no sin could accrue, from the act of burning, to the burner. 'Why?' Because the Soul (postulated by him) is eternal ; and certainly no one can ever kill what is eternal. If it could be killed, it would not be eternal. So that, while according to one theory (that there is no such thing as Soul) the *killing* (not being sinful) does not lead to anything,—according to the other (that there is such a thing as Soul, and it is eternal), *killing* is impossible."

Sūtra 6

[*The answer of the Siddhāntin to the Opponents' arguments in Sū. 5.*]—**Not so ; (A) because the 'killing' is of the receptacle of effects and of that which brings about those effects.—[(B) Or because the 'killing' is of the receptacle of effects, which is what brings about those effects].***

(A) What we say is, not that 'Killing' consists in destroying the eternal entity, but that it consists in the destroying of the

* The *Bhāṣya* has supplied two explanations of the Sūtra, the difference being due to the different ways of construing the compound कार्याश्रयकर्तृ. Under (A) it is treated as a Dvandva, which gives the meaning *'the receptacle of effects'—i.e.*, the Body—*and that which brings about the effects*—*i. e.*, the Sense-organs ; while under (B) the compound is treated as *Karmadhāraya*, the sense being—'the receptacle of effects, *which* is what brings about those effects.'—the Body.

The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* reads the Sūtra as कार्याश्रयकर्तृबाधात्—and explains it to mean that the killing of the body does not do away with the Unseen Force ; 'effect' in the Sūtra standing for the 'Unseen Force of Merit and Demerit';-the 'receptacle' आश्रय and 'bringer about' कर्तृ of that Force is the Soul ; and there is बाध—*i. e., non-destruction* of that Soul. It adds that the Sūtra cannot mean that 'It is not right to say that there can be no sin even on the 'Killing of the Body' with a Soul ; as there is Destruction of the Soul, which is the bringer about, कर्तृ, of the connection, आश्रय, of the Body, कार्य."

Viśvanātha accepts the second (B) explanation given in the *Bhāṣya*.

'receptacle of effects'—i.e., *Body*—and of 'that which brings about those effects', in the shape of the apprehension of their respective objects—i.e., the *Sense-organs*,—both of these (Body and Sense-organs) belonging to a living entity which, by its very nature, is indestructible ; and this 'destroying' takes the form of *striking* or *causing pain*, i.e., *disorganising*, by *bringing death* or by *tearing out of its bearings*.* 'Effect' here stands for the *feeling of pleasure and pain* ; and of this the Body is the 'receptacle,' i.e., the abode, the substratum;—and the Sense-organs are 'those that bring about' the apprehension of their objects ;—and it is the destroying of both these (as belonging to the Soul) that constitutes 'Killing'; and not that of the eternal Soul itself. Consequently what has been urged by the opponent in Sūtra 5—that "there could be no sin even on the burning of that which is accompanied by the Soul, as the Soul is something eternal"—is not right.

It is only the person holding the view that 'Killing' consists in destroying the entity itself that is open to the charge that his theory involves the absurdity of an act being destroyed (ineffective) for him who did it, and falling upon him who did not do it (as urged in the *Bhāṣya* above).

In regard to the point at issue there are two alternative theories—viz. (*a*) the 'Killing' consists in the total destroying of the entity itself, or (*b*) that it consists in the destroying of the 'receptacle of effects and that which brings about the effects',—these two belonging to the entity which is itself indestructible ;—there can be no third alternative. Of these the view that there is destruction of the entity itself has been negatived ; what remains is the other view, which has been found to be true (in ordinary experience).

(B) [The Bhāṣya puts forward a second explanation of the Sūtra] We can also construe the term '*Kāryāśrayakartṛvadhāt*' as follows—'*Kāryāśraya*', 'the receptacle of effects', is *the aggregate made up of the Body, the Sense-organs and Intellect*'—

* 'Bringing death' refers to the Body ; and 'tearing out of its bearings' to the Sense-organ. '*Prabandhocchedaḥ*' is explained by the *Bhāṣyacandra* as 'destroying its connections', *sambandhocchittiḥ* ; and the *Tātparya* adds that one causes pain by striking the Body, as also by tearing the Eye out of its sockets.

because it is in this aggregate that the eternal Soul feels pleasure and pain ; it forms its *abode* 'receptacle', because it is only in the said Aggregate, and in nothing else, that the feeling appears ;—this same aggregate is also regarded as the '*Kartṛ*', the 'bringer about', of the feeling ; as it is by reason of, through, the said Aggregate,—and never without it—that the feeling comes about ;—and it is the striking or causing pain or disorganising of this Aggregate that constitutes 'Killing', and not the destroying of the eternal Soul. Hence what has been urged in Sūtra 5—that "there could be no sin even on the killing of the body accompanied by the Soul, because the Soul is eternal"—is not true.*

Section 3

Sūtras 7–14

[*Refutation of the View that the Visual Organ is one only.*]†

* The Aggregate of Body &c., is called the 'receptable' in the sense that it is as favourable to the appearing of the feeling as the very container of the feeling. It is called '*Kartṛ*' the bringer about, of the feeling, in the sense that it forms an agency in the bringing about of the feeling.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† There is much confusion in regard to this section. As a matter of fact, up to Sū. 27 we have the same *prakaraṇa*, dealing with the Soul, and proving, by a number of reasonings, that the Soul cannot be the same as either the Body, or the Sense-organs, or the Mind, or a mere aggregate of all these. But Commentators have made sub-divisions of the *prakaraṇa*, in view of the nature of the arguments put forward. Hence the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* makes one *prakaraṇa* of Sūtras 7–14, wherein it is shown that the Visual Organ is not *one*, but *two*, and hence the Soul, which is *one*, cannot be this or any other organ. So also the *Tātparya* and the *Bhāṣyacandra*; though the latter is not very precise as to its *prakaraṇa*-divisions, and deals with the whole subject of the Soul being distinct from the Body &c. as under a single *prakaraṇa* ; but in its explanations it accepts the same stages as the *Nyayasūcinibandha* and the *Tātparya*.

The footnote in the Viz. Bhāsya-text asserts that the *Vārtika* does not accept the *Bhāṣya* interpretation of this *prakaraṇa* ; it says that the fact of the Soul being something different from the Sense-organs having been already established, there would be no point in introducing the same subject over again ; hence it offers another explanation—taking Sūtras 7 to 11 as embodying the view that *the Visual Organ is one only.*

The *Bhāṣya* proceeds on the basis of the assumption that the organs are two ; while the *Vārtika* denies this at the very outset. It is clear that the *Bhāṣya* has been led to proceed on the said assumption, by reason of the ease with which it supports the argument in favour of a single Soul operating hrough several organs. According to this view, Sū. 7 embodies the argu-

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For the following reason also the Soul must be regarded as something different from the Body etc. :—

ment that when we see a thing with one eye on the first occasion, and then subsequently with the other eye, we have the *recognition* of the thing as being the same as that seen on the previous occasion ; which shows that there has been a common *perceiver*, and this is Soul.—This is answered by the Opponent in Sū. 8 by the argument that the Eye is one and the same in the two sockets ; hence on both occasions perception being by the same Eye, it is only natural that there is *Recognition*.—This is answered in Sū. 9, which tries to show that the fact urged in Sū. 7 cannot be explained otherwise than on the basis of a single intelligent Soul.—Sū. 10 contains the Opponent's rejoinder.—This is finally disposed of in Sū. 11, where it is concluded that the Eyes are *two*, not one, hence the argument of *Recognition* remains unshaken.

The *Vārtika* and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* take Sū. 7 as embodying only the argument based upon Recognition in general, and then object to its introduction on the ground that this matter has already been dealt with in the foregoing Adhikaraṇa.

The *Vārtika* and the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha, take Sūtra 7–11 as put in for the purpose of demolishing the view that the existence of Soul is proved by the fact (urged in Sū. 7) that there is recognition by the right eye of what has been seen with the left eye ; and in course of the refutation of this view there comes in the subject of the Visual organ being one or two. Sūtra 7 is explained, by the *Bhāṣya*, as also by the *Vārtika*, as embodying the argument that the existence of Soul is proved by the Recognition urged in Sū. 7 ; but while the *Bhāṣya* and the *Tātparya* and the *Bhāṣyacandra*, accept it as Siddhānta, and so carry on the Prakaraṇa to Sū. 15 [and this appears to be the rational interpretation of the Sūtras as they stand],—the *Vārtika*, holding to the view that the Visual organ is one only, could not accept this interpretation of Sū. 7–11. Hence it regards the argument propounded in Sū. 7 as put forward simply for being refuted. The *Vārtika* propounds this refutation from P. 362, L. 7 onwards (Bib. Ind. Edition). In course of this refutation, the unity of the Visual organ being put forward, the opponent asks (P. 363, L. 5) what explanation there is of the ordinary idea that there are *two eyes*.—In Sū. 8, the *Siddhāntin* explains this.—This explanation is objected to in Sū. 9.—The real answer to this objection is given by the *Vārtika* in P. 363, L. 161 *et. seq.*—Sū. 10 is explained as the answer given by 'some people' to the objection urged in Sū. 9 ; and then Sū. 11 is explained as refuting this answer of 'some people' as also the original *Pūrvapakṣa*.

The weak points in this interpretation of Sūtras 7–11 by the *Vārtika* and the *Vṛitti* are as follow—(1) Nowhere else do we find the Sūṭra starting a section with a gratuitous argument in support of the Siddhānta view,—simply for refuting it ; and (2) according to this explanation, the author of the Sūtra fails to answer the Opponent's argument in Sū. 9 ; and the only answer that he puts forward (in Sū. 10),—he himself refutes in Sū. 11.

Sūtra 7

Because there is recognition with the other Eye of what has been seen with the left Eye.*

BHĀṢYA

When one applies to, or connects with, the same objects, two Cognitions, which appear at different times (one appearing after the other),—there is what is called 'Recognition'; this 'recognition' appearing in the form 'I *see* now what I had cognised (seen) previously', 'this is that same object'; and there is such 'recognition' in a case where the former cognition was with the left eye and the subsequent one with the right eye,—the cognition being in the form 'that same thing which I saw on the previous occasion (with the left eye) I am now seeing (with the right eye)'. Now if the Sense-organ itself were the intelligent perceiver, no such 'recognition' would be possible, for what is seen by one cannot be recognised (or remembered) by another. There is no doubt however that there is such 'Recognition'. Hence it follows that the intelligent perceiver is something different from the Sense-organs.

Sūtra 8

[Says the Opponent]—"The above reasoning is not right; for the Organ (in reality) is one only, and the notion of duality arises from the one Organ being divided by the nasal bone".†

BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—"As a matter of fact the Visual Organ is one only; it is divided by the nasal bone, and when the two ends (parts) of the organ, thus divided, are perceived, it gives rise

* The conclusion derived from this 'because &c.' is that there is a Soul who is the agent of the *seeing* and the *recognising*. But according to the *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* the conclusion deduced is that the Visual Organ is one only. See preceding *note*.

† The *Tātparya* says—'This Sūtra objects to the reasoning of Sū. 7, on the basis of the view that 'the Visual Organ is one only'.—The *Bhāṣyacandra* says—'What the Opponent means to urge in Sū. 8 is as follows—'What has been urged in Sū. 7 would be right if there were two distinct visual organs; but according to our view it is not so; for the visual organ is one only.'

to the notion that there are two organs ; just as it happens in the case of any long object (like the Bamboo, for instance).

Sūtra 9

[Answer]—The Organ cannot be regarded as one only ; as (we find that) when one (Eye) is destroyed, the other is not destroyed.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, we find that even when one eye is destroyed, or taken out of its socket, the other eye remains intact, as is clearly indicated by the perception of things (with the remaining eye).* From this it is clear that it is not right to say that a single organ is divided (by the nasal bone).

Sūtra 10

[The Opponent's rejoinder.]—"The argument put forward has no force ; as even on the destruction of a part the whole is still found (effective)."

BHĀṢYA

"The reasoning,—that 'because one eye is not destroyed on the destruction of the other eye (therefore the two eyes must be distinct)',—is not right ; because, as a matter of fact, we find that even when some branches of the tree are cut off, the tree itself is actually found standing. [Similarly, on the theory that the Visual Organ is one only, even when one part of it, in the shape of the one eye, is destroyed, the Organ itself will remain intact and effective]."

Sūtra 11

[Answer]—Inasmuch as the example cited is not true [or, inasmuch as the Opponent's view is contrary to perceived facts], the denial (in Sū. 10) cannot be right.

BHĀṢYA

[The *Bhāṣya* supplies two interpretations of the Sūtra]—(A) [The Opponent has urged, in Sū. 10, that the fact of the Visual Organ continuing to be operative even on the destruction of one

* All Mss. read विषयग्रहणलिङ्गम्, which has been adopted in the translation. The Vārtika reads विषयग्रहण लिङ्गम्, which means that the remaining Eye is the लिङ्ग the instrument, of the perception of things.

Eye may be regarded as analogous to the case of the whole tree continuing to remain even when one of its parts, a branch, has been cut off.]—As a matter of fact, however, it is not true that the Composite Product continues to exist even when there is disruption of its component particles ; for if it did, then it would have to be regarded as eternal (which is absurd). [What really happens in the case of the *Tree*, cited in Sū. 10, is that] in a case where there are several *composite wholes* (making up a composite object), those wholes are destroyed whose component particles are destroyed, while those continue to exist among whose component particles there is no disruption.*

(B) Or, we may explain the term '*dṛṣṭāntavirodhaḥ*' of the Sūtra to mean *being contrary to* (*incompatible with*) *a perceived fact*: that is to say,—(a) in the case of the dead man's skull we find that there are two holes, separated from each other by the nasal bone, in the places where the eyes existed ; and quite distinct from each other ; this should not be so if there were a single eye simply bifurcated by the nasal bone ; (b) *secondly*, as a matter of fact, as it is found that there is no certainty as to the destruction of one eye (necessarily leading, or not leading, to the destruction of the other), the two must be regarded as entirely distinct ; and inasmuch as the two eyes have their own distinct obstruction and destruction (and the obstruction and destruction of one does not necessarily mean the obstruction and destruction of the other), it follows that they are distinct things ;—(c) *thirdly*, when one eye is pressed with the finger there is a divarication or aberration in the contact of the perceived object with the rays of light emanating from the eyes, and (as a consequence) we perceive a diversity in the object ; this could not be the case if there were only one Visual Organ ; specially as on the cessation

* Several composite wholes go to make up the Tree ; when a branch is cut off, there is disruption of the component parts of this Tree ; hence the Tree cannot but be regarded as destroyed ; what remains behind is only a part of the Tree—one of the several composites that made up the Tree ; it is recognised as the same Tree, and not only as its part, because of its similarity to the original tree.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

Hence the case of the Tree does not meet the *Siddhānta* argument put orward in Sū. 9.

of the finger-pressure the object is again perceived as one only.* From all these well-known facts it follows that it is not right to regard the organ as one only, simply bifurcated (by the nasal bone).

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That the Intelligent Agent is something distinct from the Aggregate of the Body etc. is also inferred—

* The meaning of this passage, according to the *Bhāṣyacandra* is as follows—'When we close one eye and press the other with our finger, we see the object, the lamp, as *two*; and when the pressure is removed, we perceive the object as one only, or we have the recognition in the form 'what I saw as two is one only'.

But the case meant to be cited appears to have nothing to do with the closing of any eye. It refers to the well-known phenomenon that when we look upon a thing with both eyes open in the usual way, we perceive it as *one*, but when we press one eye with the finger, we perceive the thing as *two*; this is due to the fact that in normal vision the rays of light emanating from the eyes coalesce when they fall upon the perceived thing, and this provides a single image of the thing, which comes to be perceived as *one*; but when one eye is pressed with the finger, the rays of light from that eye become diverted from their natural course, and hence fail to coalesce with the rays proceeding from the other eye; so that the light from the eyes not coalescing, there are two images of the thing, and it is perceived as *two*. All this cannot be explained except on the basis of the theory that the two eyes constitute two distinct Visual Organs.

† According to the *Bhāṣya*, *Vārtika*, *Tātparya* and *Bhāṣyacandra*, the Sūtra resumes now the subject-matter of proofs for regarding the Soul as something different from the Body &c. The *Tātparya* goes on to remark–'Having proved, on the strength of Recognition, the soundness of the notion of Soul as something distinct (and also having, by the way, refuted the theory that the said Recognition can be explained on the basis of the conception that there is only one Visual Organ operating through the two sockets), the Author now proceeds to put forward inferential reasonings in support of the same theory. It should be borne in mind that the Author has, in Sū. 7-11, put forward the phenomenon of recognition in support of his view simply for the purpose of convincing the opponent; in reality the existence of Soul is proved by ordinary cognitions through Inference &c.

The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa*, which took Sū. 7-11 as putting forward the view that the Visual Organ is one only, takes Sūtras 8-15 also as dealing with the same subject; and according to this the present Sū. (12) means that "what happens in the case of men who have lost one eye, is that his former Visual Organ, which operated through two physical outlets, is destroyed and another organ is produced, operating through a single opening."

Sūtra 12

from the excitation appearing in another Sense-organ (than the one that brought about the preceding perception).

BHĀṢYA

When a person has tasted a sour fruit and found that its taste is concomitant with a certain colour and smell,—if, at some future time he happens to perceive its colour or smell, by means of a sense-organ (of vision or odour,) there appears an 'excitation' in the *organ of Taste*, which is totally different (from the organ that has apprehended the colour or smell): that is to say, there is remembrance (through association) of the Taste of the fruit, which gives rise to a longing for that taste, which brings about the flow of the liquid (saliva) from the roots of the teeth. This phenomenon would not be possible if the Sense-organs themselves were the Intelligent Agent; as an agent can never remember (or recall) what has been perceived by another.*

Sūtra 13

[Objection]—" The above reasoning is not right: Remembrance has for its object that which is remembered."

BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—" Remembrance is a quality and proceeds from a certain cause;† and its object is *that which is remembered*; and the 'excitation of the other organ' (put forward in Sūtra 12) is due to the said *remembered thing*, and not to any such thing as the Soul."§

* The whole process of Inference involved here is thus explained by the *Tātparya*—

The man perceives the colour and smell,—he remembers the Taste which he has associated with such colour and smell—he then desires to experience the Taste thus remembered—this desire excites the organ of Taste,—this excitation appearing in the form of the flow of saliva; on seeing this excitation appearing in the mouth of a certain person, we infer from this that the man has been moved by a desire;—and, from this desire we infer that the man has had a remembrance (of the Taste). This remembrance would not be possible, unless there were a single Agent, perceiving things through the several sense-organs.

† This cause consists in the *remembered things*—adds the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ 'We do not admit of the Soul as that in which the Cognition or Remembrance subsists; for us the Soul is none other than *Cognition* itself'—such is the sense of the Opponent.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

Sūtra 14

[Answer]—Inasmuch as Remembrance is a quality of the Soul, the denial (of Soul) is not right.

BHĀṢYA

Inasmuch as the act of Remembering is found to be such as appears only as a quality subsisting in the Soul, the existence of the Soul cannot be denied. As a matter of fact, Remembrance is possible only as a quality subsisting in the Soul ; and certainly one does not *remember* what has been perceived by another.* If then, Intelligence belonged to the Sense-organs,—inasmuch as the several apprehensions of things would be by diverse agents (in the shape of the Sense-organs), either there could be no *Recognition* at all, or even if Recognition were possible (even when Perception and Remembrance belonged to diverse agents), there could be no restriction as to objects (perceived through the Sense-organs);† [there is no such incongruity under the view that there is a single intelligent Agent for all cognitions and remembrance ; for] the fact of the matter is that there is one intelligent agent (in whom the cognitions subsist), perceiving the several things, through the diverse instrumentality (of the several Sense-organs)§

Remembrance could be regarded as indicating the *Soul,* either as its *cause* or as its *object;* the Soul could not be regarded as the *cause,* as the cause of Remembrance is the impression left by its previous cognition ; nor could the Soul be regarded as the *object,* as the object of Remembrance is the remembered thing. And further, since the 'excitation of the sense-organ' may be explained as due to the *remembered thing,* it can not prove the existence of the Soul.—*Tātparya.*

The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* explains the Sūtra to mean that all that Remembrance points to is the thing remembered, and not to the fact of its being due to the same sense-organ that had brought the original cognition.

* Any mere momentary 'Soul', or the mere object 'Jar', cannot bring about a remembrance in itself ; for perception and remembrance cannot appear at the same moment of time.—*Bhāṣyacandra.*

† There could be no such restriction as that the Eye should apprehend *Colour only,* and not *Taste* ; and yet such restriction is accepted by both parties—*Bhāṣyacandra.*

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains '*bhinnanimittah*' *as* meaning 'subsisting in several bodies (during the several lives on Earth)'. But it appears simpler to take it as above—'through the diverse instrumentality of the several sense-organs', which the *Bhāṣyacandra* takes as implied in '*Anekārthadarśi*'.

—who *remembers* the things *perceived* on some past occasion ; so that the existence of Remembrance is possible only as a quality subsisting in the Soul, when perception and recognition both belong to the same Agent, who is capable of perceiving several things ; and it is not possible under the contrary theory (of there being no such single Agent). And the entire business of living beings, which is based upon Remembrance, indicates the existence of the Soul ; the 'excitation of another sense-organ' being cited only by way of illustration.

'Further [the assertion of the Opponent cannot be accepted], *because it does not take into account the real object of Remembrance.** As a matter of fact, the assertion in Sū. 13, that "Remembrance has for its object the remembered thing,"—has been made without due consideration of what forms the real object of Remembrance.† As a matter of fact, *Remembrance*, which appears at the time when the thing (remembered) is not actually apprehended, and which appears in the form—'I knew *that* thing', or 'I had cognized *that* thing', or '*that* thing had been cognised by me', or 'I had a cognition in regard to *that* thing',—has for its object, not merely the *thing* alone by itself, but the thing *as previously cognised* and *as along with the notion of the cogniser*; the above fourfold statement, which indicates the exact nature of the object of Remembrance, serves one and the same purpose ; all of them comprehend the *cogniser* ('I'), the previous *cognition* ('knew before') and the *thing* ('this').§

* The Viz. ed. prints this as Sū. 15. But there is no such Sūtra in the *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, nor in the Sū. Mss. The *Bhāṣyacandra* also does not treat it as Sūtra ; and the *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa calls it Bhāṣyakārīyam Sūtram.* It is only Viśvanātha who reads it as Sūtra.

† Having shown above that without Soul there can be no Remembrance the *Bhāṣya* now proceeds to refute the Opponent's assertion that "Remembrance has for its object the remembered thing, and not the Soul."—*Tātparya.*

§ Of the four statements, in the second—*jñatavānahamamumarthaṃ*, the Cogniser is expressed by the verbal affix in '*Jñātavān ;*'—in the third '*ayamartho mayā jñātaḥ*' the thing cognised is expressed by the verbal affix in '*Jñātaḥ*' ;—in the fourth '*āsminnarthē mama jñānamabhūt*' the act of cognising is expressed by the verbal affix in '*jñānam* ; ' and in the first, the *cogniser* is expressed by the conjugational affix in '*ajñāsiṣam.*' The Bhāṣya

Then again, as a matter of fact, the Remembrance (or Recognition) that appears in regard to a perceived thing comprehends three cognitions in connection with the same thing, and all these cognitions have the same cognising agent; they do not have several agents; nor are they without agents; they all have one and the same Agent;* [the Recognition of a thing is always in the form] 'What I see now I had seen before'; in this the term 'I had seen before' implies *seeing* (in the past), as also the *recalled conception of that seeing*; so that the statement 'I have seen this before' could not be made if the *seeing* referred to were not by that same person (who makes the statement); the statement 'I have seen this before' involves (as we have seen) two conceptions (the *seeing* and the recalled notion of it), and the statement 'what I see now' represents a third conception; thus the single act of Recognition, involving as it does three conceptions, cannot but belong to a single Agent; it could not belong to several Agents; not could it be entirely without an Agent.

Thus we find that when the Opponent makes the statement—'there is no Soul, because Remembrance has for its object the remembered thing', (Sū. 13)—he denies a well-known fact, and loses sight of the real object of Remembrance (as just explained). As we have seen above, the Recognition (expressed by the sentence 'I have seen this before') is not mere 'Remembrance'; nor has it for its object the 'remembered thing' only;† in fact it involves a recognition or

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uses the singular number in *etadvākyam*. in view of the fact that the agent in all is one and the same.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

All serve the same purpose of indicating the *cogniser*, the *cognition* and the *cognised—Tātparya*.

* The preceding passage having shown that the Pūrvapakṣa view is against verbal usage, the Author now shows that it is against a perceptible fact also. Here 'Remembrance' '*Smṛti*' stands for *Recognition*; the name being applied to this latter on the ground of its resemblance to Remembrance.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains this sentence to mean that 'the recognition is not mere Remembrance *without an object*, nor has it the remembered thing alone for its object'. But from what follows, it appears better to take the sentence as translated. *The Bhāṣyacandra* has itself pointed out that in the present context the term '*Smṛti*' 'Remembrance' generally stands for '*Recognition*'. "स्मर्तव्यमात्रविषयं वा" the reading of three Mss. and of the *Bhāṣyacandra*, gives better sense.

recalling of the direct *cognition* (the present *seeing*) as also of the *remembrance* (of the past *seeing*),—all this belonging to a single cogniser; that is to say, a single cogniser, being cognisant of all the factors (involved in the conception under consideration), recalls the several cognitions as belonging to (and subsisting in) himself; for instance, he it is who has such notions as—'I shall cognise such and such a thing.' 'I am cognising the thing', 'I have cognised the thing'; and lastly, not having cognised for a long time and having an intense desire for cognising it, he comes to have the notion 'I have discovered the real character of the thing' [So far in regard to the recognition of the cognition which has been shown to be pertaining to all three points of time]. Similarly, the same Agent also recognises or recalls the Remembrance, which also pertains to all three points of time and is accompanied by *the desire to remember.*

Now if the Being (who is the Agent in all these several cognitions and recognitions) were a mere 'series of impressions' (as the Opponent holds),—inasmuch as every 'Impression' would (by its nature) disappear as soon as it has come into existence, there could not be a single 'Impression' which could do the apprehending of the Cognition and the Remembrance,—which apprehending has been shown to pertain to all three points of time; and without such comprehending (by a single Agent) there could be no Recognition (or Recalling) of Cognition or of Remembrance; and there would be no such conception as 'I' (*see, shall see* and *have seen*) or 'My' (*cognition is, was* and *shall be*); just in the same way as we have no such conceptions (as 'I' and 'Mine') with regard to the bodies of other persons.*

From the above reasons we conclude that there is a single Agent cognising all things and subsisting in all the bodies (with which a person is endowed during his numerous lives on Earth), who recalls, numerous cognitions and remembrances; and by reason of whose absence in the bodies of other persons, there is no recalling (of the cognitions and remembrances of other persons).

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains '*dehantaravat*' differently;—'It should not be forgotton that in the past and present bodies (of an individual) there runs the same Soul.' But it appears much simpler to take the phrase as in the translation.

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KUMARILA'S CONTRIBUTION TO PHILOLOGY AND MYTHOLOGY*

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The statement is familiar that the sister-sciences, Comparative Philology and Comparative Mythology are of recent origin, and that these two attained full development after European Scholars took to the study of the Veda. Before Sanskrit was known to the west, the many investigations carried on in the sphere of language could not strictly be called scientific. There were merely 'hasty generalisations, baseless hypotheses, and inconclusive deductions.' The real birth of the Science of Comparative Philology dates with the discovery and study of Sanskrit. "No single circumstance," said WHITNEY,[1] "more powerfully aided the onward movement, than the introduction to western scholars of Sanskrit, the ancient and sacred dialect of India." SAYCE observes[2] : "What has been termed the discovery of Sanskrit by western scholars, put an end to all this fanciful playing with words and created the Science of Language." Scholars like JESPERSEN may not be inclined to give so much of praise to Sanskrit, but even they seem to admit that the influence exerted by Sanskrit over Linguistic Studies has been lasting and cannot be neglected.[3] With the birth of Comparative Philology, there came into being the Science of Comparative Mythology, and the influence of Sanskrit over this Science also has been as considerable.

* Paper read at the Tenth All-India Oriental Conference, Tirupati, 1940.

1. W. D. Whitney—'Language and Study'—Page 4.

2. A. H. Sayce—'Introduction to the Science of Language'—Vol. I—Page 38.

3. O. Jespersen—'Language, Its Nature, Development and Origin'—p. 33.

The study of the Veda has enabled the scholars of the west, as admitted by themselves, to create the new Sciences of Philology and Mythology. While Philology deals with Linguistic laws, like Assimilation, Dissimilation, and the Laws concerning Phonetic Changes, Mythology treats of stories which have originated from the anthropomorphic description of natural phenomena, found in ancient literary records, especially the Vedas. Yāska (6th or 7th Centuary B. C.) and Kumārila (between 650 and 700 A. D.[1]) have both clearly anticipated our modern experts in the fields of Philology and Mythology.

In estimating the value of Yāska's contribution to Philology, nothing would be more important than to take note of what MAX-MÜLLER himself has said : " What all we can do is to maintain like Yāska that all nouns have their derivation, and that this is a matter of belief rather than of proof. We must also admit with Yāska that every noun was originally an appellative, and, in strict logic, we are bound to admit that Language knows neither of homonyms nor of synonyms. But granting that there are such words in the history of every Language, granting that several objects, sharing in the same predicate, may be called by the same name, and that the same object, possessing various predicates, may be called by different names, we shall find it as impossible as Yāska to lay down any rule why one of the many appellatives became fixed in every dialect as the proper name of the Sun, the Moon, or any other object ; or why generic words were founded on one predicate rather than another. All we can say is what Yāska says, it was so *Svabhāvataḥ* by itself, from accident, through the influence of individuals, of poets or lawgivers. It is the very point in the history of Language, where Languages are not amenable to organic laws, where the Science of Language ceases to be a strict Science, and enters into the domain of history."[2]

It is also interesting for us to note that, as early as the 6th or 7th Century B. C., Yāska was already familiar[3] with such phonetic phenomena as Syncope, Metathesis, Anaptyxis, Haplology, and Assimilation.

1. A. B. Keith—'Karma-Mīmāṁsa'—p. 11.
2. Max-Muller—'History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature'—p. 86.
3. *Nirukta* of Yāska—II. (1-2).

Yāska's contribution to Mythology is still more clearly admitted by MAX-MÜLLER who points out[1] that, in order to explain the disappearance of Saraṇyu, Tvaṣṭṛ's daughter, wedded to the Sun, from whom she is stated in the Vedas to have fled away, Yāska remarks that the night vanishes when the Sun rises, implying thereby that the disappearance of the night consequent on the arrival of day is anthropomorphically described as the disappearance of the Night-wife from her Sun-husband. Examples may be multiplied, but for want of space I have to stop short.

Not much notice, however, seems to have been taken by Western Scholars, of Kumārila's views on Philology and Mythology. It is, therefore, proposed to consider in the present paper, the contribution made by this great Indian Scholar in the province of these two important Sciences. With astute wisdom and consummate skill, the great Kumārila, whose opinions on various subjects have been indisputably accepted to be of the highest authority, attempts to explain the many Indian myths which have either been misunderstood or remained incomprehensible. His contribution, likewise, to Philology is such as is deserving of the closest attention.

In the course of his disquisition on the meaning of words, Kumārila raises up an interesting question. It happens that, even in the Veda, there are to be found a good number of words, the precise meaning of which is not known, and which are used in a definite sense in foreign Languages which he calls the Mleccha Languages. The point, that is consequently to be considered, says Kumārila, is whether we should accept the meaning in which these words are used by people called the Mlecchas. In this connection, Kumārila holds that it deserves consideration whether greater authority is to be given to Etymological derivation, or to usage among the Mlecchas.

Kumārila's own reply to this question is simple. In cases where the meaning of the word is not definitely known, we can safely, says Kumārila, accept the sense in which it is used by the Mlecchas, provided that the Vedic word is exactly identical in form with the Mleccha-word. Words like *Pika* and *Nema* are to be found both in Vedic Literature and in the Mleccha-

1. Max-Müller—'Science of Language'—p. 528.

dialect. The Mlecchas use these words in a definite sense. Since these words are not given any specific meaning in the Veda, Kumārila holds that we can authoritatively accept, even in the Veda, the sense given to them by the Mlecchas. In this connection, Kumārila cites the instances of some pseudo-philologists of his time who, in their attempt to find traces of their own words in what they select from the Mleccha-dialect, added to or omitted a syllable from the Mleccha word, with a view to arrive at their own pet conclusions. Similar in nature, says Kumārila, is their attempt at deriving the Dravidian Language from Sanskrit, by adding such affixes and suffixes to Dravidian words as would make them appear like Sanskrit words. This is what Kumārila says:[1] "There is not a single Sanskrit word in the corrupt dialect of the Mlecchas. Those words in their Language, that resemble Sanskrit words are found to be used in senses other than those recognised by us; and as the form (of even these) is not properly expressive they cannot indeed be held to have any denotation.

In their attempt at finding traces of their own (Sanskrit) words in the dialects of the Mlecchas, the Āryas sometimes either add a syllable (belonging to) an adjoining word or delete one additional syllable. For instance, as regards the words in the Drāviḍa language, which all end in consonants, the Āryas are found to assume case-endings and feminine-suffixes which properly belong to words ending in vowels, so that the Dravidian words may yield a sense in accordance with their own language (Sanskrit). For instance, when the Drāviḍas call 'rice' *Cor*, the Ārya reads in it his own word *Cora* (thief), and comprehends the meaning accordingly. And when the Drāvidas call 'the road' *Atar*, he reads it as '*Ataraḥ*', and declares that, as the road is difficult to cross, it is '*Atara*' (uncrossable). Similarly, when 'the snake' is called *Pāp*, the Aryas take it as *Pāpa* (evil), and argue that 'the snake' is really an evil animal. So, too, the word *Māḷ* which, to the former, means 'a woman', is taken as *Mālā* by the latter. The word *Vair* used by the Drāviḍas in the sense of the 'stomach', is taken by the Āryas as *Vaira* (enemy), and the use is justified on the ground of the

1. *Tantravārtika* of Kumārila—p. 157 (Chowkamba Sanskrit series.)

hungry man being capable of doing many sinful deeds, which fact proves that 'the stomach' is an enemy of man."

These attempts of the Āryas seem to Kumārila to be based on 'groundless assumptions' (*Svacchanda-Kalpanā*)[1]. He would hence ask, when the Ārya is obliged to take recourse to groundless assumptions, even when he is to derive Dravidian words from the roots of his own Sanskrit Language, could it ever be possible to deduce, in a reasonable fashion, Sanskrit words from those current among such distant peoples as the *Parsis*, the *Barbaras*, the *Yavanas* (Greeks), and the *Raumakas* (Romans)? [2]

Dr. P. C. CHAKRAVARTI uses the above passage to support his contention that 'Sanskrit is highly indebted to the Dravidian language for many of its words and expressions.'[3] The passage in question does not give this meaning.[4] Kumārila has only pointed out that there were, in his time, a set of pseudo-philologists who, in their attempts at establishing their dogma that Sanskrit is the original source of all languages, made fantastic efforts to derive the words in the Dravidian Language from Sanskrit. To support this assertion of his, Kumārila has given some instances of the foolish attempts of some such Philologists who have attempted to derive some Tamil words from Sanskrit. Moreover, we see that Kumārila has openly condemned such practices when he says that they are based on 'groundless assumptions' (*Svacchanda-Kalpanā*). The real import, therefore, of Kumārila's statement is that it is a gross mistake to think that Sanskrit is the common source of all Languages, not that

1. Loc. cit.

2. 'Tad yadā draviḍādibhāṣāyām īdṛśī svacchandakalpanā tadā pārasī-barbara—Yavana-raumakādi bhāṣāsu kim vikalpya kim pratipatsyanta iti na vidmaḥ'—Op. cit.—p. 157.

3. P. C. Chakravarti—'Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus'—pp. 309–10.

4. Cp. G. A. Grierson—J. R. A. S. (1923)—p. 619. In his article "Kumārila's acquaintance with Tamil" (*Indian Antiquary*—Vol. 42, pp. 200–201) Mr. P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar takes note of the passage, but he does not consider its philological significance. Nor has this been attempted by *Buhler* who notices this passage much earlier (*Indian Antiquary*—Vol. I—p. 310 f.).

Sanskit has many words in it that have been borrowed from other Languages.

Such has been the contribution of Kumārila towards Philology, and it must be admitted that it is of no mean significance. That languages can be grouped in 'Families', that their similarity consists in their resemblance both in root and in sense, and that, before deriving the words of one Language from the roots of another, one must be prepared to account for the mutation of vowels and consonants, are conceptions with which Kumārila is already familiar. If we see Kumārila condemn the pseudo-philologists of his time, we only find him anticipating the work of the Philologists of our time. We hear that in the early stages of the Science of Philology, there was, for a long time, a general tendency to consider that Latin was the common source from which all other languages were derived.[1] It fell to the lot of the leading philologists of the west to point out such tendencies to be unscientific and consequently condemnable. And it was only with strenuous efforts that these people could succeed in stamping out such baseless conceptions. Kumārila also was engaged in a similar campaign. If the western philologists strove hard to stamp out the theory that Latin was the common source of all languages, Kumārila felt himself bound to point out that it was fantastic to consider that every other language could be derived from Sanskrit.

We will turn our attention to Mythology, and see what contributions Kumārila has to make towards that Science. It is expressly ordained that, besides what is enjoyed by the Scriptures and Smṛtis, the practice of the great must serve as a model for our actions. It is quite possible that, even among the great, there may be some who behave contrary to the law, like doctors leading unhealthy lives. It would be paying but little attention to the morality of the entire nation, if its youth were asked to cultivate even the most execrable vices of their elders. Scholars like Kumārila were conscious of this and hence considered that it was their duty to explain the apparent misconduct of the many gods and saints who, they felt, were undeservedly condemned.

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1. O. Jespersen—'Language, Its Nature, Development and Origin—p. 32.

It may be held that the conduct of gods and saints like Prajāpati, Indra, Vasiṣṭha, Viśvāmitra, Yudhiṣṭhira and others is tantalizing, and that some of these are to be condemned not merely for their transgression of Dharma, but even for 'certain extremely bold excesses' (*Sāhasa*).[1] Prajāpati fell in an incestuous love with his own daughter, Uṣā; Indra, as also Nahuṣa in his place, is said to have committed adultery; Vasiṣṭha, when stricken down with the grief on the death of his hundred sons, is said to have contemplated a terrible excess in the shape of suicide; Viśvāmitra helped a *Caṇḍāla* (Tṛśanku) to perform a sacrifice; Purūravas thought of committing suicide, when Ūrvaśī left him; Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, who was under the vow of life-long celibacy, brought forth children from the wives of his younger brother, Vicitravīrya; Bhīṣma led a life contrary to all caste-regulations, and did an irregularity in performing sacrifices even though he was unmarried; Dhṛtarāṣṭra, though blind, performed many sacrifices, and that too with the wealth amassed by his brother Pāṇḍu; Yudhiṣṭhira married a wife that had been won by his younger brother (Arjuna), and told a base lie with the sole motive of causing the death of his own Brāhmaṇa-preceptor; Vāsudeva and Arjuna are said to have been drunk to excess.

Kumārila replies that our condemnation of these gods and saints proceeds only from our ignorance of the anthropomorphical nature of the stories connected with them. It may be, he says,[2] that the passages in the Purāṇas and Vedas that are interpreted thus may only be a 'fortuitous coincidence of words and expressions'; or secondly, the prohibition of such actions may be confined to men only; or thirdly, the actions may be justified on the ground of the persons concerned being very powerful and super-human in character, (and hence not subject to the same limitations as the weaklier human beings); or fourthly, the texts can be interpreted in such a way as to exonerate them from the least trace of immorality (*Viruddhatvam*).[3]

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1. *Tantravārtika* on Jaimini's Sutra—I. 3. 7–pp. 127–28 (Benares Edn.)

2. Śrutisāmānyamātrād vā na doṣo tra bhaviṣyati । manuṣyapratiṣedhād vā tejobalavaśena vā । Yathā vā na viruddhatvam tathā tad gamayiṣyati *Tantravārtika*—p. 133 (Benares Edn.)

3. Dr. Ganganatha Jha's rendering of the phrase '*yathā vā na viruddha-*

We will now see how Kumārila interprets the various myths which, he feels, have been grossly misunderstood.

The word *Prajāpati*, Kumārila would say,[1] means 'one who protects all creatures', and as such it must be taken as a name of the Sun (*Āditya*). It is well-known that at day-break the Sun reaches the early Dawn (*Uṣā*). As the early Dawn is brought about by the approach of the Sun, it is called his daughter (*Duhitā*); and the fact that the Sun lets his rays fall on Dawn, has been figuratively spoken of as intercourse of a man with a woman.[2]

The word *Indra*, proceeding from *Idi* 'great glory' signifies one possessed of resplendent glory, and it is hence another name of the Sun (*Savitṛ*); and he is the destroyer (*Jāraḥ*) of the night (*Ahalyā*),[3] as it is only when the Sun rises that the darkness of night is destroyed. It is only in this sense that the phrase *Ahalyā-jāraḥ* deserves to be taken, and it would be wrong to understand it in its ordinary sense of an illicit connection with a woman.[4]

Nahuṣa did make advances to *S'acī* when he became Indra; but through his unlawful act, he only fell from his place and became a big snake. As for *S'acī*, her greatness and effulgence were enhanced because she proved chaste and constant in her devotion to her husband. This shows that faithfulness of this description is an act of Dharma.[5]

In *Vasiṣṭha*, it is clear that his action was due to excessive grief, and it cannot be taken as Dharma for others.[6]

It might be that *Viśvāmitra* transgressed the law many a time when he was under the influence of passion or anger.

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tvam' into 'to deprive them of all repulsive significations' (*Tantravārtika*-trans. by Dr. G. Jha—p. 189), does not seem to be able to bring out the real meaning in this context.

1. *Tantravārtika*—p. 133 (Benares Edn.).
2. Ibid—pp. 133–34.
3. The words *Jāraḥ* and *Ahalyā* are here taken to be *Bahuvrīhi* compounds; the former is dissolved into *Jarati Nāśayati Yaḥ Saḥ*, and the second into *Ahani Līyāte Yā Sā* 'that which disappears during the day i. e., Night.
4. Loc. cit. 5. Ibid.
6. *Kumārila*—Op. Cit.—P. 134.

But these crimes of his deserve to be passed unnoticed in accordance with the maxim that 'For a strong man everything is healthy' (*Sarvam balavataḥ pathyam*); or we may absolve him from blame on the ground that he would destroy all such sins by means of excessive penances.[1] If *Viśvāmitra* tried to absolve a Caṇḍāla (i.e., *Tṛśanku*), he only destroyed convention, not morality. It shows that even in ancient times there were men like *Viśvāmitra* who had the courage to rise above the prejudices of their times.

If *Dvaipāyana* got children from the wife of his brother, it was an act which was in accordance not merely with maternal command, but also with scriptural injunction.[2]

The great love that Rāma had for Sita, and the great reverence that Bhīṣma felt towards his father, did not allow these two men to take wives. But both were free from their debt to the fathers (*Pitṛ-ṛṇa*), the one by his direct off-spring, and the other by the children of his brother.[3] Hence it is wrong to think that these two had no right to perform sacrifice.

Dhṛtarāṣṭra, it is related in the Mahābhārata, got his sight, through Vyāsa's favour, for looking upon his sons, and we may infer that, through the same agency, he was able to see when the sacrifice was being performed; or, it may be that in the passages where *Dhṛtarāṣṭra* is described as performing sacrifices, the word *Yajña* may be taken to mean 'charity, gifts' (*Dāna*), as the root *Yaj* is equally expressive both of 'sacrifice' and of 'giving'.[4] It is quite possible that the 'giving of charities' may have been figuratively spoken of as the 'performance of sacrifices'.[5]

In three ways, Kumārila attempts to explain the oft-discussed myth of Draupadī and her five husbands. He first cites the

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Bhīṣma, though a celibate for life, can be considered to be as good as a parent, because his brother Vicitravīrya had off-spring. Kumārila cites Manu in this respect: '*Bhrātṛṇām ekajātānām ekaś cet putravān bhavet sarve tenaiva putreṇa putriṇo manur abravīt*—op. cit. p. 135; *Manusmṛti*—IX. 182.
4. *Siddhānta-Kaumudī* on *Pāṇini*—III. 1. 47.
5. *Tantra-Vārtikā*—p. 135.

explanation of Vyāsa himself. Inasmuch as Draupadī appeared, in the full bloom of youth, out of the sacrificial altar, she is no other than Lakṣmī herself, and consequently, she does not become tainted even by her intercourse with many owners.[1] The same purpose is served by the following statement: 'The Brahmarṣi pointed out her wonderfully beautiful form to be super-human ; inasmuch as the great-souled beautiful one became younger day by day.'[2] All this shows that Draupadī was no ordinary human being, and hence it is not just to judge her actions by human standards. It is for the very same reason that Kṛṣṇa himself promised Karṇa that Draupadī would go to him on the sixth day, after having been with the five Pāṇḍavas for five days. If it were not on account of the super-human character of the woman, we could never expect an authoritative person like Kṛṣṇa to allow, nay even encourage, such a transgression.[3]

Another explanation that has been offered is that there were actually five distinct Draupadīs, and that, since they were all alike, they have been spoken of as one.[4] The chief aim of this ingenious explanation seems to be to vindicate the attitude of Yudhiṣṭhira and his brothers.

Or, it might be that she was the wife of Arjuna alone, and that she is spoken of as the wife of all them, simply with a view to show, by a hyperbolical representation, that there was not the slightest point of disagreement among the five brothers.[5]

No doubt, says Kumārila, Yudhiṣṭhira is guilty when he uttered a false-hood which killed Droṇa, his preceptor ; but since we know that he later expiated this crime by performing the Aśvamedha sacrifice, we have no right to consider this action of Yudhiṣṭhira as Dharma.[6]

If Vāsudeva and Arjuna were once found to be inebriate, Kumārila would have us understand, that they had drunk

1. Loc. Cit.
2. Ibid.
3. Op. Cit.—pp. 135-36.
4. *Taṁtravārtika*—p. 136.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

Madhu not *Surā*. *Surā* is forbidden to all, and it is only a brahmin that is prohibited from partaking of *Madhu*.[1] Vāsudeva and Arjuna were Kṣatriyas, and so they did not violate Dharma when they drank *Madhu*.

It is clear from what Kumārila has stated above, that the Vedic poets have compared the behaviour of the Solar and Storm-phenomena to the immoral and inebriate proceedings of human beings. If this interpretation be scientific and acceptable, there cannot be the least trace of immorality in the proceedings of the Storm-God, and of the Light and Dark-phenomena. It is difficult to understand what led BLOOMFIELD and Prof. KEITH to ascribe immorality to the Vedic Gods. BLOOMFIELD says[2] that *Indra* 'embodies so completely the human qualities of brag and bluster, gluttony, drunkenness and lust, as to make him the peg upon which to hang scepticism.' And Prof. KEITH goes on to the extent of saying.[3] 'Despite the importance which legitimately attaches to it, the moral element in the Ṛgveda and the subsequent literature is of comparatively small extent, and the vast majority of the Vedic hymns are not concerned in the remotest degree with questions of morals.' Such condemnations are justifiable only if the various myths connected with Gods are taken in their literal sense. But this would not be the right method in understanding the meaning of a myth. In Greek Mythology, a number of human weaknesses are attributed to *Zeus*. He is said to have 'dashed the gods about his mansion',[4] to have 'caught his son by the foot and hurled him from the heavenly threshold',[5] and to have 'hung his wife from on high, and from her feet suspended two anvils, and round her hands fastened a golden bond that might not be broken',[6] suggesting that she 'would like to devour Priam raw and Priam's sons and all the trojans'.[7] If these

1. Op. Cit.—pp. 136-37.
2. M. Bloomfield—'Religion of the Veda'—p. 174.
3. A. B. Keith.—'Religion and Philosophy of the Veda'—part I—p. 249.
4. Homer's *Iliad* (trans. by A. Lang, W. Leaf and E. Myers)-p. 281.
5. Ibid.—p. 20.
6. Ibid.—p. 290.
7. Ibid—p. 65.

statements should be taken in their literal sense, *Zeus*, as husband and father, would appear to us far baser than the many mortals over whom he sways.[1] He is infinitely inferior to *Indra* and other Vedic Gods who are considered to be immoral. But never has Greek Religion been condemned for its Gods, who are as immoral, if not more, than those of any other Religion. The conduct of *Zeus* and other Gods in Greek Mythology can be justified only if the myths connected with them are understood anthropomorphically. What applies to Greek Religion applies in an equal measure to Vedic Religion also, and *Indra* and other Vedic Gods remain no more condemnable than *Zeus* and other Gods, if, before attempting to understand the myths connected with them, we bear in mind their anthropomorphical nature. And from what we see of Kumārila's explanation of the myths, we find that his achievement deserves the highest admiration.

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1. For a similar and fuller estimate of *Zeus*, see 'Religion of Ancient Greece' by Jane E. Harrison—pp. (32–33).

SUBODHINĪ OF GANGĀLAHARĪ BY DALAPATIRĀMA

(N. V. Athaley)

This small poem of 52 verses, composed by Pandita Jagannātha in the attitude of worship before the sacred river-Gangā, has been commonly read as stotra and dealt with by many Pandits of Hindu religion since its compilation by the author. It is also known as Pīyūṣalaharī. Some call it a stotra while others suppose it a Khaṇḍa-Kāvya. Whichever of these may be true, there is no doubt that it is a wonderful and touching prayer that flew out of the vexed heart of the author when the public of Benares out-casted him and doubted his religion. Nothing can be added to the information of the various scholars who have thrown ample light on the history of Pandita Jagannātha. The poem has been translated in Marathi, Hindi and English and metrical versions in Hindi and Marathi were made. Copies of nearly all of these are also available in print. In the same way Sanskrit commentaries were also made by Sadaśiva and Dalapatirāma. The former was published in Bombay in Śakas 1782 and 1787 and also in Benares in A. D. 1923. But the latter has remained without publication till this date. Copies of this Ms. are found in the B. O. R. I. Poona and Govt. Or. Mss. Libr. Madras and as such it is not a rare Ms. It has been catalogued under R. No. 3337 page 4971-72 in the Triennial Cat. of Mss. of the Madras Library by M.M. S. Kupuu-swami Shastri in 1928 and is identical to that of the Ms. of this Prachya Grantha Sangrahalaya. But one of our complete Mss. also contains the Marathi metrical version of Raghava side by side with the text and commentary.

This Ms. is legibly written on straw paper, in bold type, in fine red and black ink and is of the size 13 × 6½ inches. The scribe has neither given his place of abode nor his time or name. It is a simple production of the text added with grammatical and other notes where necessary and is rather easier than that of Sadaśiva's commentary. Out of the 2 copies of this Ms. one is incomplete and old in appearance while the other is complete but seems to be scribed not later than half a century. Both the commentators observe the same system of खण्डान्वय in commenting the text but differ in explanation as shown below :—

Ver. 7. Sadaśiva :—इदानीं साक्षात्स्वयं स्नानमकुर्वतामपि त्वयि अन्यसंबंधित्वेन स्वावयपतने तेषामपि उत्तमलोकप्राप्तौ साक्षात्स्नायिनीं किं वक्तव्यमित्याह । प्रभात इति । भो भातः प्रभाते उपसि प्रत्यूपोहर्मुखंकल्यमुषः प्रत्युषसी अपि प्रभातं चेत्यमरः । स्नातीनामर्थात्तवजले स्नानं कुर्वतीनां नृपतिरमणीनां राजसुंदरीणां ब्राह्मणादि स्त्रीणां दारिद्र्यबाहुल्यात् मृगमदो न मिलति इति उक्तम् । नृपतिरमणीनामिति । तासां तु संपत्तिबाहुल्यात्सुलभमिति भावः । कुचतटीगतः । कुचानां तटयः प्रांताः तासु गतः विद्यमानः तटशब्दाज्ञाति लक्षणोङीप् । तटं त्रिषु इति कोषात् । स्त्रियामपि तटशब्दः रात्रौ रतिसमये लापितः । अत एव स्थित इत्यर्थः । एतादृशः मृयगदः । कस्तूरी मृगनाभिर्मृगपदः कस्तूरी चेत्यमरः । तव तोथैरंभोभिः सह युक्ते तृतीया । अंभोर्णस्तोयपानीयमित्यमरः । यावद्यस्मिन्नेव काले मिलति संबंद्धो भवति तावत्तस्मिन्नेव काले मृगाः मृगयन्ति उदरपोषणाय तृणादिकमन्वेषयन्ति ते मृगाः हरिणाः । मृगे कुरंग वातायु हरिणाजिनयोनय इत्यमरः । विमलवपुषः विमलं मलरहितं वपुर्येषांते एतादृशाः संतो नंदनवनं नंदपतीति नंदनम् । नंद्यादित्वाल्युः तच्च तद्वनं च । इंद्रोद्यानं नंदनवनं अस्योद्यानमित्यमरः । स्वच्छंदं यथास्यात्तथा विशंति गच्छन्तीत्यर्थः क्वचित्तु विमलमतय इति पाठः । कथं भूताः मृगाः वैमानिकशतसहस्रैः विमानैश्चरंति गच्छंतीति वैमानिकाः देवाः चरतीति ठक् । तेषां शतानि शतानां सहस्राणि तैः परिवृताः वेष्टिताः ॥ ७ ॥

Dalapatirāma :—प्रभात इति ॥ प्रभाते उपसि स्नातीनां मज्जंतीनां नृपतिरमणीनां राजदाराणां असूर्यं पश्या राजदाराः इति प्रभातपदेन व्यज्यते । कुचतटीस्तनपरिसरंगतः प्राप्तः अंगरागाय पुरिधृत इत्यर्थः । मृगपदः कस्तूरिका यावत् हे मातः जननि तव तोयैर्जलैर्मिलति तावन्मृगाः विमानैश्चरंति वैमानिका देवास्तेषां शतसहस्राणि तैः । परिवृता अनुगताः किं लक्षणाः । विगतो मलः पापं येभ्यस्तानि विमलानि निष्पापानि वपूंषि शरीराणि येषां ते विमलवपुषः दिव्यदेहास्संतः स्वच्छंदं स्वैरं यथा तथा नंदनवनं इन्द्रोपवनं विशंति प्राप्नुवंति । कस्मिंश्चित् काले-प्रमीतानां मृगाणां परंपरया तवतोयसंपर्कतो दिव्यदेहधारित्वं यदि तर्हि साक्षात्संपर्कवतां तु का कथेति भावः ।

At the end of the commentary Dalapatirāma has noted in a verse his time of completion of the work thus :—

संवद्वेदरसद्विदंतकुमिते वर्षे शुभेमाधवे
मासे कृष्णदले शशांकदिवसे श्रीद्वादशीसत्तिथौ ।
दुर्गारामतनूजनिर्दलपतिर्गंगालहर्यास्तुते-
ष्टीकां बालविबोधिनीं रानिरमाद्भागीरथी प्रीतये ॥

Dalapatirāma the son of Durgarāma completed the writing of this Ms. on Monday the 12th day of the dark fortnight of the Lunar month Vaiśākha in the year 1864 i.e. (in A. D. 1807) and therefore he flourished in the I quarters of the 19th century. On the eve, we get two verses in which the स्वरूप of Gangā, the names of his father, grand-father and preceptor with his father are found specially.

दुर्गारामम्हं प्रणम्य पितरं गोविंदरामात्मजं
साहित्यालय रंगनाथतनयं श्रीकृष्ण भट्टं गुरुं ॥

Here Śrīkṛṣṇabhaṭṭa the son of Rangnātha is mentioned as preceptor but it is impossible to write anything regarding this learned Paṇḍita as no reference has been yet traced by this Library.

The Marathi metrical version of Rāghava of which we have already told before, does not give us either the time of the author or scribe but informs that Rāghava was a devotee of the famous Ganeśa incarnation of Pali in the Konkan and that he, after preparing the garland of cordial flowers, sewn in the thread of trust, offered it to the feet of the holy river. The original verse reads thus :—

श्रीपल्लीशसुरेंद्र भार्गवकृताभूमीवरी नांदतो
तत्पादाब्जपराग राघव सदा अत्यादरें वंदितो
तेणे प्राकृतहृद्यपद्यसुमने निष्ठागुणी साधुनी
माला अर्पिलि जन्हुजेश म्हणुनी हे मानिजे साधुनी ॥

A symetrical version of this poem attributed to Vāmana Pandita has been published several times but that of Rāghava remains yet and to have a clear idea of the difference of language etc. it is necessary to quote the beginning stanza from both the Mss :—

श्रुतीचें सर्वस्व त्रिदशगणसत्कर्म सतनु
सुधेचे हे बंधू सकल वसुधा भाग्य अतनु
समूहें ऐश्वर्य त्रिजगजनिता काम रिपुचें
तुझें वारी ऐसे दुरि करु अकल्याण अमुचें ॥

(Rāghava)

अशेषां भूतींचें विपुलतर सौभाग्य मिरवी
जगातें लीलेनें करि शिव तया भूति पदवी
श्रुतींची तत्त्वोक्ती सुकृत विबुधांचेंचि अथवा
सुधा बंधू तूशें सलिव अमुच्या नासु अशिवा ॥

A Ms. bearing the same title is mentioned in Aufrecht II, Page 25. It is commented by one Nārāyaṇatirtha Swāmin but is altogether a different stotra compiled by Śankarācārya. Our Library has stored over 12 copies of Gangālaharī Ms. during the past 8 years of which 2 are printed. The number of Ślokas in almost all of these are the same as 52 × 1 but in an incomplete copy, there are 55. This copy is much older in appearance and the text begins with समृद्धं सौभाग्यं as usual but the following stanzas seem to be interpolated by some Paṇḍita as the composition does not in any way tally with the original text :—

Verse. 29 केचित्स्मरंत्यनु सरांति च केचिदन्ये
पश्यन्ति पुण्यपुरुषाः कतिचित्स्पृशन्ति ।
मातर्मुरारिचरणां मुजमब्धि गंगे
भाग्याधिका कति पये भवती पिबंति ॥

,, 30 कतिपयदिवसविशालं नित्यसुखासंग मंगल सवित्री
खर्वयति स्वर्वासं गीर्वाण धुतटिः स्थितिर्नितरां ॥

,, 32 आताम्रसिंधुकन्या धवचरणनखोल्लासि कांतिच्छटाभिः
ज्योत्स्ना ज्वाला जटानां त्रिपुरविजयिनो जातु जाम्बूनदः श्रीः।
स्वाभाव्यादच्छमुक्ता फलरचितलसत्गुच्छरुच्छाय काया
पायादायासिजालात्स्मरसरिदघ व्रातजाश्रमान्यः ॥

,, 33 हरिचरणनखरसंगादेकेहरमूर्ति सस्थितेरन्ये
त्वामाहुः पुण्यतपरेसु सुरतटिनि वस्तुमाहात्म्यात् ॥

,, 34 उत्संगे तव गंगे पायं पयोतिमधुरतरम् ।
श्रमिताखिलश्रमभरः कदाहं चिरायशाइहे ॥

THE ANCESTRY AND CASTE OF CANDRAGUPTA MAURYA ACCORDING TO THE MUDRĀRĀKṢASA

(Dasharatha Sharma)

In a paper contributed to the Indian Historical Quarterly,[1] Dr. H. C. Seth has tried to prove :—

(1) that the drama *Mudrārākṣasa* carefully looked into 'indicates beyond doubt that Candragupta was not related to the Nandas'.

(2) that the word 'Vṛṣala' used therein stands for a royal title like His Majesty, and does not mean Śūdra.

Dr. Seth pleads for a careful scrutiny of the drama, and so do we also. There should be no special pleading on the ground that 'if Candragupta were taken as born of the Nandas the whole plot' would fall flat, and the character of Rākṣasa would become inconsistent. All preconceived notions and pet theories must be set aside, and the drama should be allowed to speak for itself. I, too, personally feel that Candragupta's character would gain in nobility, if he were not related to the Nandas. But how is one to brush aside the following explicit statements regarding Candragupta's parentage ?

(*a*) मलयकेतुः—

मौर्योऽसौ स्वामिपुत्रः परपरिचरणो मित्रपुत्रस्तवाहं
दाता सोऽर्थस्य तुभ्यं स्वमतमनुगतस्त्वं तु मह्यं ददासि[2] ।

Here Malayaketu suspecting Rākṣasa of infidelity accuses him of baseness with the words: '*The Maurya is the son of your* (*former*) *master*, to whom you have to tender subservience ; and I am the son of your friend, who tenders extreme subservience to you ......[3]

(*b*) मलयकेतुः—(स्वगतम्) अहो राक्षसं प्रति विकल्पबाहुल्यादाकुला मे बुद्धिर्न निश्चयमधिगच्छति । कुतः

भक्त्या नन्दकुलानुरागदृढया नन्दान्वयालम्बिना
किं चाणक्यनिराकृतेन कृतिना मौर्येण संधास्यते[4] ।

1. Vol. XIII, pp. 641 ff.
2. *Mudrārārākṣasa*, V. 19.
3. The English translation of almost all the passages here is by Prof. K. H. Dhruva.
4. *Mudrārarākṣasa*, V. 5.

With his ears poisoned by Bhāgurāyaṇa, the clever agent of Cāṇakya, Malayaketu says to himself.

'Perplexed by many misgivings my mind does not come to any conclusion regarding Rākṣasa.

Will he in consequence of devotion deeply rooted in the Nanda family by reason of his affection for the family, make peace with clever *Maurya who is a scion of the family....*'

(*c*) राक्षसः—तास्तु नन्दकुलमनेन पितृकुलभूतं कृतघ्नेन घातितमित्यपरागामर्षाभ्यां विप्रकृताः सत्यः स्वाश्रयमलभमानाश्चन्द्रगुप्तमनुवर्तन्ते[1] ।

On Malayaketu's saying that Candragupta's subjects will love him all the more on the unpopular Cāṇakya being removed, Rākṣasa divides Candragupta's subjects into two classes, those rising to a high position along with their new ruler, and those devotedly attached to the Nanda family. Of the latter he says. 'As to these, they are affected by ill-feeling and anger against Candragupta, since he has ungratefully extirpated *the family of Nanda, that is the family of his father.*'

(*d*) भागुरायणः—एवमेतत् । किं त्वमात्यराक्षसश्चाणक्ये बद्धवरो न चन्द्रगुप्ते । तद्यदि कदाचिच्चाणक्यमतिजितकाशिनमसहमानः स साचिव्यादवरोपयेत् ततो नन्दान्वयाय एवायमिति नन्दकुलभक्त्या सुहृज्जनापेक्षया चामात्यराक्षसश्चन्द्रगुप्तेन सह संदधीत[2] ।

Here Bhāgurāyaṇa says that if Candragupta removed Cāṇakya from the minister's post 'Rākṣasa may then seek alliance with him out of his love for the Nanda family, *as he is a scion of that family*, and out of his regard for his friends'.

(*e*) राक्षसः—

इष्टात्मजः सपदि सान्वय एव देवः
शार्दूलपोतमिव यं परिपुष्यनष्टः ।
तस्यैष बुद्धिविशिखेन भिनद्मि मर्म
वर्मीभवेद्यदि न दैवमदृश्यमाणम्[3] ॥

Here Rākṣasa speaks of Candragupta having been brought up by king Nanda. That he regarded him as extremely ungrateful is shown by his comparing him to a young and tenderly brought up tiger's cub which destroys his own master and his family.

1. Ibid, Act V, verse 12, lines 27-28 (Dhruva's edition).
2. Ibid, Act IV, v. 7 lines 13-16 („ „).
3. Ibid, Act III, v. 8.

Thus we have at least five statements in the Mudrārākṣasa to the effect that Candragupta was the son of king Nanda. Of these two are by Rākṣasa, two by Malayaketu, and one by Bhāgurāyaṇa. Can any one after reading them say like Dr. Seth that the drama indicates beyond doubt that Candragupta was not related to the Nandas.'

Another thing that even a cursory reading of the drama makes obvious is that it does not regard Candragupta as high-born, even though he was a son of Nanda and this most probably because he was believed to be, as averred by tradition, the offspring of a woman of low caste. Nanda was *abhijana* or high-born,[8] Candragupta was *kulahīna*,[1] or low-born, and a Vṛṣala.[2] Nanda's family was his *pitṛkula*,[3] but not his own kula, because according to the *Dharmaśastras*, the son of a *S'udrā* cannot be classed as a kṣatriya. Such a person's family is regarded as different from his father's. So Rākṣasa's statements that :—

(*a*) Candragupta had extirpated the family of his father Nanda.[10]

(*b*) the goddess of sovereignty forsaking Nanda had chosen the base-born and wicked Maurya for her husband.[4]

(*c*) the goddess of sovereignty, getting nervous because deprived of her lord had sought another family.[5]

(*d*) like a shameless Vṛṣala woman, the goddess of sovereignty, abruptly leaving her (deceased) husband of a noble lineage, has taken to the Vṛṣala Candragupta and sticks fast to him.[6]

are one and all equally true. Dr. Seth's contention that 'it will be contrary to the oldest Hindu traditions to say that Rākṣasa did not regard Candragupta as the son of Nanda, because he was born of lowly Murā, has little value for the simple reason that Mauryan society does not seem to have been bound by any tradition of the type cited by the learned writer. If he consults the *Arthaśāstra* on the point, he will find Kauṭilya stating without any sort of ambiguity that a Brāhmaṇa's sons by Brāhmaṇa

1. Ibid, Act VI, v. 6.
2. Ibid, Act VI, v. 6.
3. See foot-note 5.
4. *Mudrārākṣasa*, Act III, v. 7.
5. Ibid, Act VI, v. 5.
6. Ibid, Act VI, v. 6.

and Kṣatriya wives were regarded as Brāhmaṇas. His son by a Vaiśya wife was an Ambaṣṭha, and by a Sūdrā a Pāraśava or Niṣāda. Similarly a Kṣatriya's sons by a Kṣatriya and Vaiśya wife were regarded as Kṣatriyas, *but his son by a S'ūdra was regarded as an Ugra.* The status of a Śūdra wife was in fact so very low that even her son by a Vaiśya was not regarded as a Vaiśya. He was classed as a Śudra.[1] Moreover, as regards the tradition of the Mahābhārata by which Dr. Seth sets so much store, we should like to remind him of the case of Vidura. On the paternal side he was as well descended as Dhṛtarāṣṭra or Pāṇḍu, but he was regarded, not as a Kṣatriya but as a Kṣatṛ, merely because he was not the son of a Kṣatriya but of a female slave. Candragupta Maurya too was traditionally believed to have had some such lineage. The two cases are in fact very similar. As Vidura could not claim to be a Kaurava, and had no rights to the throne of Hastināpura, so Candragupta Maurya too, though the son of Nanda, could not call himself a Nanda and had hence from a purely constitutional point of view no right to claim the throne of Magadha. His indifference to the death of Sarvārtha-siddhi, the last of the Nandas is, again, not to be wondered at, because as a disciple of Cāṇakya, he must be believed to have worked with the principle, 'kingship knows no kinship.'[2] Aurangzeb and Shah Jahan slew their relatives mercilessly, and Vanavīra of Mewār is known to have tried to murder Udayasiṁha, because he feared that as long as a legitimate representative of the line remained alive, he, as an illegitimate son of Rāṇa Sānga's brother, had no chance of being recognized as the rightful owner of Mewār. Such instances can be easily multiplied.

Now we turn to the word Vṛṣala. Dr. Seth regarding it as a Sanskritised form of 'basileus,' the Greek equivalent of 'Rajan' suggests that it has been used in this sense by Cāṇakya, and not in that of 'Śūdra', as suggested by some other scholars.[3] 'The word Vṛṣala' says the learned Doctor, 'as used by Cāṇakya is simply replaceable by the word *deva* or *rājan.*'[4]

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1. Section 61 (पुत्रविभाग:).
2. See sections 13, 14 & 15 of the *Arthaśāstra*.
3. Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. XIII, p. 649.
4. Ibid, p. 649.

We admit that this new suggestion has the merit of novelty. But for deciding for or against it, we must rely on a careful reading of the drama itself. If the word Vṛṣala meant actually 'His Majesty', everyone in the drama must have had the right to use it. But what we find, in fact, is that it is only three persons who have the courage to call Candragupta a Vṛṣala, namely Cānakya, the proud and unselfish Brāhmaṇa whose only object was to uproot the Nandas and fix Candragupta firmly on the throne of Magadha without trying or desiring to have anything for himself; Rākśasa, the opponent of Candragupta, and the old *Kancukin* who justifies the use of word Vṛṣala by Cāṇakya. Of these the last usage is the most important, because it decides definitely the character of the word 'Vṛṣala' as used by Cāṇakya. 'I wonder' says the *Kancukin* of Candragupta, 'at the possessions of the minister of kings of kings. Here is a piece of stone to pound cow-dung cakes; here lies a heap of Kuśa-grass brought by pupils; and the tenement there with its mouldering walls appears to bend down at the (lower) end of the roof under the load of those sacrificial sticks which are being dried. *To him His Majesty Candragupta is simply* Vṛṣala, *and rightly enough, for it is wholly the influence of the passion of desire subject to which even those persons who never tell a lie, talk glibly and ever unwearied, belaud meanly the king for virtues which he does not possess. Otherwise the king is as much an object of disregard* (तिरस्कार) *as a straw to those who are free from desire*".[1] This soliloquy of the old chamberlain answers amply the questions arising in Dr. Seth's mind to the following effect, 'If Cāṇakya uses the word Vṛṣala in the sense of Śūdra, or as other scholars have suggested, in the sense of one belonging to a heretical sect, one fails to understand why he should in private as well in public so insultingly refer to the great monarch, whom he had given his whole-hearted support. Even if Cāṇakya took a malicious delight, which-seems most unlikely in view of the very cordial relations shown throughout the whole drama between him and Candragupta in always making him feel his low birth, it should be highly impolitic (and hence undramatic) on the part of Cāṇakya to call Candragupta as Vṛṣala in the last scene when he introduced him to Rākṣasa and wanted to reconcile

1. *Mudrārākṣasa*, verses 14 & 15, Act III.

him to the new monarch."[1] Does not one reading this wish that the learned Doctor had read the Mudrārākṣasa a little more carefully before framing his new theories ? Cāṇakya could and did use the word Vṛṣala for Candragupta for the reasons given by the Kancukin, and as for Rākṣasa, he knew beforehand that Candragupta was a Vṛṣala and had bewailed the fact with the words,

(a) पृथिव्यां किं दग्धाः प्रथितकुलजाः भूमिपतयः
पतिं पापं मौर्यं यदसि कुलहीनं वृतवती।

(b) पतिं त्यक्त्वा देवं भुवनपतिमुच्चैरभिजनं
गता छिद्रेण श्रीर् वृषलमविनीतेव वृषली

of which the English translation has been already given above. The idea of (a) and (b) is identical, and in (b) the word *Vṛṣala* stands for the *kulahīna* of (a). Even then it might be conceded that it was undramatic on the part of the dramatist to have such a word used by Cāṇakya. But we are here concerned with facts as they are, and not as they ought to have been from a diplomatic or æsthetic point of view. The Sūtradhāra uses merely the word मौर्येन्दु. Again, when Cāṇakya requires whether the subjects are devoted to Vṛṣala, the spy, instead of saying, yes, they are devoted to Vṛṣala, as he should have done, if the word had stood for 'His Majesty,' has merely the courage to remark 'अथ किम्।......सुगृहीतनामधेये देवे चन्द्रगुप्ते दृढमनुरक्ताः प्रकृतयः।' Can Dr. Seth explain this substitution of सुगृहीतनामधेय चन्द्रगुप्त[2] for the Vṛṣala of Cāṇakya ? Cāṇakya says, 'उच्यतामस्मद्वचनात् कालपाशिको दण्डपाशिको यथा वृषलः समाज्ञापयति.[3] The *daṇḍapāśika* replies 'दण्डपाशिक उपाध्यायं विज्ञापयति, इदमनुष्ठीयते देवस्य चन्द्रगुप्तस्य शासनं'.[4] Such examples can be easily multiplied. I have gone through the whole drama very carefully and can say with certainty that none else but the three persons already mentioned above have used the word वृषल for Candragupta, and that simply for the reason that it connoted a man of low birth, Śudra or something of this very sort.

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1. Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. XIII, p. 650.
2. Mudrārākṣasa, Act I, p. 8 (Dhruva's edition).
3. Ibid, Act I, p. 11 ,, ,,
4. Ibid, Act 1, p. 13 ,, ,,

PSYCHO-ANALYTIC APPROACH TO INDIAN YOGA

(Kumar Pal)

. The word 'psycho-analysis' literally means in Indian terms as it has gained currency at present, a science of analysing mind Citta–Vikalana–Śāstra. We may traverse the whole Indian literature yet we shall not come across any thing like 'analysis'. But if the emphasis is laid upon the synthetic side, vast vistas of visions are opened to us and we find a panoramic landscape before us. Various systems of Yogas invite our interest and if we only dare to launch ourselves on to any line it directly leads to the same supreme goal of ultimate Communion of the finite with the Infinite, of the individual with the Absolute Whole, of the lower with the Higher, of the soul with God so on and so forth.

' Yoga ' is a very common word in India. It is, however, glibly used in the present-day intellectual parlour. It has been in vogue ever since the earliest times of the Ṛgveda. But the ancient Indian literature too employs the word ' Yoga ' with multifarious meanings. Derived from the root ' Yuj ' (Lat. jugare, to join, to yoke), it has come to gather numerous connotations. The *Amarakośa* gives five meanings; the *Medinī Kośa* gives eleven ; Pt. Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara in his *Samskrit–English Dictionary* gives thirty and Apte in his dictionary enumerates thirty eight. It would be a sheer waste of time and space, with a view to the limited scope of this treatise, to attempt an explanation of the different meanings and their significance. Yoga is a unique Hindu concept, which is extremely difficult to translate into English.

Broadly, if we take stock of the whole variety of usages, we find, that the "root idea of joining runs through them all". The one underlying central idea is unity of duality or plurality and the means to its realisation. In fact the term ' Yoga ' has been used in scientific and secular literature generally in a relative and a phenomenal sense, meaning any kind of union. In philosophical and religious texts it is generally used in an absolute sense and means either a realisation of the unity which already exists or in cases where unity has to be attained by voluntary exertions it may mean both the ideal to be realized and the systematic techniques for its realisation.

Yoga sums up all the aspirations and achievements of Indian thought. It is religion on the practical side and the epitome of philosophy on the intellectual side. It is both an intellectual system and a practical discipline. This has assumed many forms-the joining of mind to an object or concentration and meditation ; the union of the individual soul (jīva) with the Universal Soul (Paramātmā) ; unity of man with Brahman ; conjungation of Śiva and Śakti ; harmonisation of Prāṇa and Apāna—the two vital breaths ; combination of Sūrya and Candra : union of Kuṇḍalinī with Brahmarandhra ; connection of Bodhicitta and Śūnya ; so on and so forth.

Yoga alone is a word which can easily stand for all these forms of Hindu Sādhanā.

What is of utmost importance to note here is that the harnessing or disciplining of the mind is fundamental to all systems. Yoga indeed means yoga of the mind. This is clearly borne out by numerous authoritative statements as.

" Yoga is the restraint of mental fluctuations and modifications. "—Patañjali.

" Balance of mind is called Yoga."—Gītā.

" Yoga is the best adaptive activity. "—Gītā.

" Restraint of all other activities of the mind already riveted upon Me."—Śiva-Purāṇa.

" They are not philosophers, but fools who do not live a balanced active life demanded by the situation. "—Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha.

We must, however, sound a note of warning, lest the other side of the problem which is equally essential, should be totally ignored. As is evident from the very etymology, yoga or union always implies two or more factors to be united. But the problem is not so simple as it appears on its face. We are not given two units to be united. Yoga Śāstras insist that the Viyoga Mārga, analysis, or Viveka, discrimination always precedes true yoga. By Viveka we have to analyse the given manifold, multiplex Miśra-sattā into its constituents and then realise their transcendent unity. The Sāṁkhya enjoins a discrimination and separation of Puruṣa from Prakṛti. The Vedānta seeks to disillusion the Jīva from māyā or free him from the world, Saṁsāra·

The Śakti has to be distinguished from Śiva before their eventual embrace into Śiva.

The seeming multiplicity of the ideals, has at its basis a fundamental unity which was grasped long long ago. The Yoga-Śikhā Upaniṣad, emphatically asserts that Real Yoga is indeed only one, and that is known as the Mahāyoga or Pūrṇa–Yoga. According to the difference of standpoint and method of approach, this very Yoga is variously hailed as Rāja-Yoga, Haṭha-yoga, Mantra-yoga, Laya-yoga, Śabda-yoga etc.

Pātañjala or Aṣṭāṅga Yoga :—

Without taking into account the scattered references to Yoga in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, we can definitely say that the earliest systematic treatment of the subject is to be traced to the famous Aphorisms of Patañjali who lived approximately two thousand years ago. The priority and antiquity of the Yogic tradition is assigned by Patañjali himself to Hiraṇya-garbha who is regarded as one of the earliest Ṛṣis, when he speaks of mere Anuśāsana of Yoga meaning a restatement of the tradition. Later commentators attribute to Patañjali the authorship of the Mahābhāṣya on the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, the grammarian, and of Caraka-Saṁhitā. What they say is that Patañjali was an incarnation of the Ananta God and he came here with a definite plan of teaching to humanity these three arts whereby men could purify their mind, speech and body respectively. The authenticity of this traditional belief may or may not have any ground, but this much is certain that yogic therapy for curing diseases, mental and physical has been available ever since Patañjali.

In describing the distractions and possible disturbances which may obstruct the path to Yoga he mentions Vyādhi or disease along with many mental aberrations like langour, doubt or anxiety, carelessness, lethargy, passion, perceptual distortion, etc. and prescribes appropriate methods for removing them. Diseases are defined in terms of Duḥkha[1] (pains) and pains are of three kinds—Ādhyātmika (mental or functional), Ādhidaivika (caused by the action of super physical agents) and Ādhibhautika (physical or organic)[2]. It was for the removal of these that all the systems of Indian philosophy were preached. The above

classification of the diseases establishes beyond doubt that Pātañjala Yoga was quite an efficient therapeutic technique for all sorts of maladies.

For success in Yoga a long course of eight steps is recommended and this gave Pātañjala Yoga a descriptive appelation of the Eight-fold, Aṣṭāṅga-yoga. He first of all makes it compulsory for all practisers that they should observe certain social and moral rules which ensure a perfect adaptation to the social environment. The second step consists of five personal qualities which definitely turn his mind away from worldly attachments and facilitate his success. Then follows a code of exercises in postures and breathing. They enable the practitioner to completely relax his body and mind, so that he may carry on the mental concentration unperturbed.

Only after this fourfold preliminary practice, does the true mental Yoga begin. The Yoga student then has to withdraw his attention from other distracting subjects which go on repeatedly alluring him. It takes some time for him to stick to the object of concentration. After this has been done, he has to steady his mind and concentrate it upon one idea gradually by Dhāraṇā and Dhyāna, before he can reach the final stage of rapturous meditation or trance Samādhi, where all doubts are resolved and distractions completely dissolved, (Samādhāna) because there he knows the truth of all objects in its entirety (Sam = together, pra = completely, jñāta = is known) and he is face to face with Real Self as quite untouched, detached and free from all worldly misery and squalor (A = without, Samprajñāta, the knowledge of any object other than Self).

Thence after the Yogin lives at peace in the world. He is no more afflicted by any sorrow or anxiety. His attachment or fixation with worldly objects of love is removed. He becomes disppassionate and free from all complexes. His mind attains equilibrium which is no longer disturbed. He becomes a new man.

This is in brief, an outline of the chief discipline and the end which have been enjoined by Patañjali. He recommends

1. Yoga-Sūtra. I. 23.
2. Yoga-Bhāṣya. I. 31, III. 22.

several other alternative methods of approach besides this in I—23, 32, 40. They are, however, all secondary and subservient to this main plank of Yoga technique. Patañjali's method demanded a rigorous mental discipline over and above a hard physical culture. Most probably, it was to escape this two-fold rigour that later yogins attempted to find out easier methods. Some of them took to one of the above referred secondary devices and elaborated it into a complete technique by itself. Those who could not stand the physical strain devoted themselves solely to the several mental disciplines and developed independent schools with minor changes in technique or new combinations of the old ones.

Tri-Yoga or Gītā-Yoga :—

The Gītā is another manual devoted entirely to a full consideration of different kinds of Yoga. It is virtually a text-book of Yoga. The Gītā concept of Yoga is much fuller and richer than the Yoga-Darśana concept. But the term 'Yoga' as used in the Gītā is no doubt very perplexing and vague. Veda Vyāsa, the writer or compiler of the Gītā describes every chapter as a special type of Yoga in the colophon appended to it. Even the preliminary description of the battlefield and Arjuna's expression of despondency has been called Arjuna-Viṣāda-Yoga, and so too the purely narrative eleventh canto. It appears, for him 'Yoga' means only another word for a systematic treatise on any topic or subject. But even inside the discourses themselves there are numerous Yogas, each peculiar to Gītā. At many a place, the word 'yoga' unaccompanied by any conjunct, stands for an independent school of yoga which is not always the same. For example in II, 39, 50; IV, 12, 3, 42; V, 1, 4 etc. 'yoga' stands for 'Karma-Yoga'. In II. 53; VI. 12, 16, 17, 19, 23; XVIII. 33; it is used for Pātañjala Yoga, aiming at Samādhi. In VII. 25; IX. 56; X. 7; Yoga signifies a peculiar extraordinary feature of the Lord. In XII. 6, 11; it is only an equivalent for Bhakti-Yoga. At some other places, 'Yoga' is contra-distinguished from Sāṁkhya, at others from Sannyāsa, and is also coupled with both as Sāṁkhya-Yoga or Sannyāsa-Yoga, in scattered ślokas.

If we step into the jungle of old commentaries, and other writings connected with Gītā, a still darker region is opened to us. We feel to be nowhere or everywhere. Yet if we concentrate our attention upon the few definitions of Yoga given in the Gītā itself we at once detect a minute but unbroken thread running through the baffling variety of usages. There are four such statements in the Gītā. In II. 48, 'Yoga' is defined as 'Samatvam', equilibrium, undisturbed equanimity between pairs of opposites like pain and pleasure or success and failure. In II. 50, 'Yoga' is described as a particular skill in the performance of actions whereby one relinquishes the fruits of actions, and assumes a mental attitude by which he goes beyond both good and evil deeds. In VI. 2, Yoga is declared to be nothing but what is generally called Sannyāsa renunciation, because nobody becomes a Yogi without renouncing the formative self-assertive passionate will, desire for worldly objects. That state of absolute harmony which is not ruffled by the greatest sorrow (VI. 14, 18) whereby the bonds of action are shattered (VI. 23) is true Yoga. The word (Yuktatā = equilibrium), balance (VI. 17) conveys the real sense more effectively than any.

This harmony, according to the Gītā, is two-fold. Firstly there must be peace within the mind, between one's thoughts, aspirations and deeds; between thought, will and deed; or jñāna, icchā, kriyā; secondly having secured such mental equilibrium, generally with the aid of a guide (guru), the individual must endeavour to be at harmony with the society and its claims. The two are interdependent and mutually helpful. If there is discord anywhere the person becomes a wreck under mental troubles, worries and neuroses or he takes recourse into a flight, into or away from reality like Arjuna. Confronted with social obligations or some task, the neurotic who is feebleminded and is deficient in self-control shirks the responsibility thereof. He becomes Yogabhraṣṭa, unsteady, or paralysed, Sammūḍha. For all such mental misfits and unfits, or invalids and defectives, the arch-analyst of human nature Lord Kṛṣṇa prescribes the arch remedy of Yoga.

The Gītā-Yoga or Kṛṣna-Yoga combines the salient features of all the prevalent techniques employed by different psycho-

analysts of all shades and opinions. There are so many mental types, tendencies and temperaments in the world, and one method may not equally be suitable for all. The Gītā does not favour the stretching of each and every person upon the same Procrustean bed. The foremost step in analysis is the ascertainment, in the Jungian manner, of the temperamental type to which the patient belongs. Jung described eight types based on his two-fold classification of introvert and extrovert, further subdivided into four according to the four psychical functions.

(The Gītā, admits a three-fold classification of the psychical functions and hence for that matter three types of individuals with the predominance of any one. The three psychical functions are termed as jñāna, icchā and kriyā. Corresponding to these three there are three classes of Yoga recommended by the Gītā, namely, the Jñāna-Yoga, the Bhakti-Yoga and the Karma-Yoga. The Buddhists also believed that liberation could be attained by " Right knowledge, Right faith and Righteous actions"[1].

This Triyoga of jñāna-bhakti-karma is now very familiar to us. Its importance was first of all emphasised by Lord Krisṇa. This triad is based upon the triadic guṇas or aspects of nature viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.[2] Though generally held to be attributes of nature, they are really the characteristic properties of all in nature and beyond nature.[3] Even the absolute Reality, the Brahman itself is not immune in a way from this three-fold clutch, if looked at from the human stand-point. Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas appear in the Brahman as Cit, Sat and Ānanda respectively,[4] " which are the seeds, the principia, the possibilities, the potencies, the universal and abstract aspects of what in the individual jīva manifest as jñāna, kriyā and icchā."[5] This is corroborated by some texts from the Guptavati Ṭīkā on Durgā Sapta-Śatī

1. Mc Govern : Mahayāna Buddhism. p. 113.
2. Sāṁkhya Kārikā 12 ; Yoga Bhāṣya I. 1 ; II-18 ; Bhāgavata. Purāṇa XI. xxii ; Devī Bhāgavata III. vii etc.
3. Gītā. XVIII. 40 ; D. B. III. viii.
4. Devī Bhāgavata. VII. xxxii.
5. Dr. Bhagavāna Dāsa : The science of Peace. p. 123.

ज्ञानेच्छाक्रियाणां व्यष्टीनां महासरस्वती महाकाली महालक्ष्मीरितिनामान्तराणि । महासरस्वति चिते महालक्ष्मी सदात्मिके महाकाल्यकानन्दरूपे त्वत्तत्वज्ञानसिद्धये ॥

Now it should always be borne in mind that all classifications and divisions are mere convenient artificialities. Like the immutable, indivisible, partless Brahman the individual mind also is one individual whole. These three guṇas of Prakṛti, attibutes of the Self's nature, are so wholly inseparable, so inextricably mixed up, so avivekī, as the Sāṁkhya Kārikā calls them (verse 11), so perpetually passing into and suppressing and yet supporting and clinging on to and generating each other that it is hard even to distinguish them in the blend. All of them necessarily co-exist and interweave. They are not separable but distinguishable relatively by dint of the predominance of one over the others.

वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः ।[1]

The Western thought for long confined itself mainly to the relation of Jñāna–cognition and did not take much more than incidental account of desire and action. In old Greek philosophy and later European thought, down to about the middle of the 18th century a bi-partite classification of mental faculties into active and receptive was in vogue. Since Kant the tri-partite division has been speedily growing in recognition and with the further implication that the three represent not as many separate faculties but inseparable aspects, moods, or functions–Vṛttis. Very different names have been proposed for the three : intellect, feeling, volition ; thought, emotion, conation ; will, feeling, intelligence ; thinking, feeling, willing ; cognition, affection, conation ; wisdom, love, will ; wisdom, power, will etc. etc. Jung recognises four functions instead of three, i.e. thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition which is quite immaterial for empirical psychology.

Character and life too must accordingly be viewed from this angle. Just as one moment may be dominated by either cognition or emotion or action, so also one may, for most of the time during his life be led by any one of these. The predominant typical

1. Vedānta Sūtra, II. iv. 22.

mental function or attribute, guṇa, may make one's temperament intellectual, emotional or active; jñāna-pradhāna or sāttvika, iccha or bhāvanā-pradhāna or tāmasika, and kriyā-pradhāna or rājasika. Corresponding to these the whole Veda also has been partitioned into jñāna-kāṇḍa, upāsana-kāṇḍa and karma-kāṇḍa. Similarly three ways of life have been prescribed jñāna-yoga, bhakti-yoga and karma-yoga. Some add dhyāna-yoga as well, but this is subsumed under jñāna-yoga or at best is an auxiliary for all the three. An individual who is predominantly cognitional would be successful as and would like to be an intellectual, jñānī. The man of desire and emotion would be sensitive and devotional, bhakta. And the man of action would be active, actionist, karmī. These are the three attitudes one of which everyone is bound to assume in life, though there may be many undifferentiated or unclassifiable individuals.

Prof. G. D. Higginson writes, "Man very early developed towards the world in which he lived three somewhat different attitudes or frames of mind—the attitude of use or the hand, the attitude of appreciation, or the heart, the attitude of knowledge or the head; the practical, the feeling and the understanding moods, marking off the man of science with his intellectual inquisitiveness, from the practical man of affairs and the artist."[1] He further expressly employs the psychological phraseology of "doing, feeling and knowing" for these attitudes, which are the recognised equivalents for kriyā, icchā, and jñāna. Adlerian styles of life are somewhat complex and abstract.

Freud also apparently subscribes to the above three-fold distinction of temperaments, while discussing his philosophy of life in *Civilisation and Its Discontents.* He observes, "The mental constitution of the individual will play a decisive part, aside from any external considerations. The man who is predominantly erotic will choose emotional relationship with others before all else; the narcotic type, who is more self-sufficient, will seek his essential satisfaction in the inner workings of his own soul; the man of action will never abandon the external world in which he can essay his power.". [1]

1. D. G. Higginson : Fields of Psychology, p. 2.

But the distinctive contribution of the Gītā lies in the enunciation of the doctrine of Yoga, as we have already seen. Yoga means a mixture, a compound. The Gītā-kāra realised full well the advice of Freud[1] when he writes in continuation of the above "When any choice is pursued to an extreme it penalizes itself, in that it exposes the individual to the dangers accompanying any one exclusive life-interest which may always prove inadequate."[2] Wisdom would probably admonish us not to anticipate all our happiness from one quarter alone. The jñāna-yogī must necessarily perform his duties to guide and help others so as not to mislead them, with great faith and devotion, Śraddhā.[3] The bhakti-yogī may find it easy to make headway in his spiritual progress by devotion to the Lord, but he can attain success only when he has really known the Lord,[4] and works for the good of all.[5] The karma-yogī too must be wise (Vidvān. IV. 25, 26), knower of reality (Tatvavit. IV. 28), knower of the whole (Kritsnavit. IV. 25) and also perform his duties with zeal (Śraddhāvān VI. 47) though he is exhorted to act without attachment. The difference is merely of preponderance.

This Tri-yoga is a special legacy of the Bhagavadgītā to Indian thought.

Let us now revert to the technique proper which we are to follow according to the Bhagvadgītā. The first step, it would have been by now clear, consists in the determination of the temperamental type of the person. Next we are led to the Adlerian view. A normal person should select his ambitions and goals according to his mental and physical constitution as confronted by his special personal environment. But the neurotic fails to comprehend his abilites, his capacities and necessities. He fixes false ends (ṣta), imposes impossible obligations (dharma or kartavya) and strains his nerves in such pursuits for which he is totally unfit (paradharmān). Hence the second task of the analyst must be to find out the individual's

1, Freud : Civilisation and Its Discontents, p. 40.
2. Freud. Op. Cit. p. 41.
3. Gītā. III. 20, 25. IV. 39.
4. Ibid XVIII. 55.
5. Ibid XII. 4. V. 25.

"style of life" in Adler's words. This only lays bare the nature of the whole problem, the root of the maladjustment and forthwith indicates the solution as well.

In all cases, a fundamental unconscious conflict is revealed, which was unknown to the individual. The ideal or the task to which the individual sets himself is found to be antagonistic to his hidden real nature. His ideals are at logger heads with his desires and impulses. The Super-ego is at war with the Id. The poor Ego is at a loss to see what to do, and knows not its own good or bad. In despair the individual surrenders himself to one who can guide him. It is in such a distracted state of discomfort and helplessness that Arjuna seeks the help of Lord Kṛṣṇa and exclaims, "O Lord, my heart is weighed down by despair, my mind is confused as regards my duty. I am thy disciple and implore Thee to teach me and decisively state as to which is better for me."[1]

What, then, remains for the analyst is to resolve the conflicts and doubts (Samśaya, dharma sammoha), and recommend a course of life which may establish a compromise between the warring forces within the mind. The complexes and the fictitious ego ideals being made conscious the tension disappears and realising the inconsistency of the two the individual has to find a conscious solution in the given conditions. If the desires and passions are impossible and mental constitution out of date, that is, if the reality is far in advance of the individual's cravings, the patient must replace the unconscious repression by a conscious suppression of the primitive wishes (Mano-Nigraha and Nirodha). If, on the other hand, his desires are all too powerful for this, and he adopts an unsocial attitude, then his mode of life should be so changed as to provide some sort of satisfaction for his unconscious desires in keeping with the social needs and his ego-ideals. Or the ideals themselves may be incompatible with his personality and the social situation. In that case, they have to be abandoned and the individual is assigned his right role.

When Arjuna, fearing his responsibility, resorted to inactivity, Kṛṣṇa came for his help and held a free discussion

1. Gītā. II. 7.

with him on equal terms. Arjuna laid open his heart before him and talked at length about his difficulty. Lord Kṛṣṇa twigged at the real crux and assuming the role of a superior, first as a teacher and then as God Incarnate, exhorted Arjuna to carry out his duty unflinchingly without any tinge of attachment, and with firm faith in the Divine guidance.

मामनुस्मर युद्धय च।[1]

The discourse with Arjuna is, however, only a pretext for the enunciation of the truth. The Gītā, in fact, has served and will serve as a torchlight for the benighted travellers of all ages, groping in the dark. Therein Lord Kṛṣṇa suggested many advisable ways of life for different differently constituted individuals, according to their psycho-physical nature. He recommended Karma-yoga for a man of action like Arjuna and Tilak. He advised Jñāna-yoga for a man of knowledge like Śankara and his followers. And he appeared as emphasising the supreme importance of the bhakti for the renowned bhaktas like Rāmānuja, Vallabhācārya, etc. The Gītā delivers the message of Love (Premayoga) for the philanthropically emotional man like Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahamsa and Caitanya. For the weak, the man, of unspecified character the Gītā is only an exhortation for complete self-surrender and devotion (Śaraṇāgati yoga) as it is called by some. There are other easier methods of dhyāna-yoga and abhyāsa-yoga for others whom they may serve to lead on to the ultimate yoga. The adhyātma-yoga was enjoined for the philosophically minded alone.

It is chiefly due to this universal electicism that the Gītā has won admiration and applause on all sides. It gives solace to the disheartened, encourages the despondent, gives hope in despair, lifts the downcast and promises salvation and bliss to the misery-stricken and the sin-drowned.

Adhyātma-Yoga :—

The Indian philosophy has never been a mere intellectual pursuit after reality, divested of all practical bearings. It is not, verbal jugglery or an intellectual gymnastics. Theory and practice, science and art are always blended together.

1. Gītā. VIII. 7.

The theoretical side may be called Adhyātma-vidyā, It has as such, a double task. On the one hand, it seeks to study the Individual Self, the psycho-physical nature of the Jīva. On the other hand, it enters into paradoxical descriptions as it were, of the Indescribable Brahman, the Supreme Reality. I deliberately call it paradoxical, for by express declaration of all seers and sages, the Absolute, God or Paramātmā is inaccessible to and inexpressibly by thought or speech. It is perfect Silence. And whatever has been achieved in this line is based upon the knowledge derived from the individuals, Jīva-atoms or Jīvātmās, in whom the Supreme Self or Paramātmā pervades or exists or manifests.

The practical application of this science, or this very Adhyātma-vidyā when applied to practical problems is known as Adhyātma-Yoga. The Adhyātma-vidyā revealed a fundamental unity and identity of the Soul and God and Adhyātma-Yoga gives assurances that it is possible for all to realize that unity in practice if the prescribed method is followed. Having visualised the Ultimate Reality, the more important task of a philosopher is to find out how the ordinary human life in the world may be freed from suffering, pain and fears which characterise it. The Adhyātma-Yoga is the teachnique wherewith one strives to attain that Perfect, Blissful Divine state of perfect Freedom from all bonds of pain and misery from which there is no fall into the circuit of births and deaths.

For such a consummation nothing positive need be done. We have only to remove the obscuring veil of ignorance (Avidyā nāśa). The ignorance, it must be borne in mind, serves not only as a veil or covering (Āvaraṇa) upon the Absolute Reality, but also leads us to distort this Reality in knowledge (Vikṣepa). So for its destruction, we have in the first place, to practise a deep affirmation of the One Reality (Brahma-bhāvanā) and secondly we must strike at the very root of all individual limitations of the body, mind, and desires (Manonāśa or Vāsanā-kṣaya).[1] "By annihilating the mind the world process is annihilated. When the mind is given up, the Absolute Peace, the Pure and spotless one remains."[2] The Mukti Upaniṣad also

1. Mukti Upaniṣad. II. 10, 35, 36, 39.
2. Dr. B. L. Atreya : Deification of Man. p. 17.

has represented Mokṣa as the dissolution of mind and desire.[1] This dissolution of the individuating mind (Mano-vilaya)[2] is the sole burden of Adhyātma-Yoga, as taught in the Upaniṣads and the Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha.

For the removal of the world illusion the upaniṣads enjoin three means: (1) testimony of the preceptor (śravaṇa); (2) reflection upon the nature of truth and the source of the world (manana), and (3) practical realisation thereof (nididhyāsana). There is a popular saying, "If you see the illusion, the illusion disappears." Likewise the concentration upon the Self (Ātmā) the analysis of the individual mind (manas) and a clear view of the whole personality (puruṣa) with all the mechanisms and dynamisms implied therein and thereby bringing to light the hidden complexes responsible for attachment, ignorance and consequent misery, are prescribed by various texts of the Upaniṣads.[3]

For the control of mind and its dissolution into the Infinite Brahman, Vasiṣṭha too suggests many methods: (1) realisation of the unreality of the world through philosophical thinking; (2) avoidance of samkalpa ; (3) distaste for the objects of sense-pleasure; (4) renunciation of desires; (5) eradication of the feeling of the ego, (6) practice of non-attachment, (7) attainment of equanmity, (8) mental renunciation of possessions, (9) practice of constant Samādhī.

Thus we see that the search for Brahman or the supreme Reality, in India, as contrasted to the philosophical investigations of the West, turns out to be a purely psychological problem. Truly as observes Dr. G. Bose[4] the principal basis of Indian philosophical thought is a thorough psychological outlook. And as he remarked further certain psychological laboratory experiments point to the presence of Pure Consciousness or Ātman, as described by the Ṛṣis.[5]

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1. Mukti Upaniṣad. II. 10, 68.
2. Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha. III. 111, 15.
3. Chāndogya. III. xvii, 1: vii. iii. 1: v. 2. Bṛhadāraṇyaka; III. iv. 1. V. 1; III. 13 etc.
4., Philosophical Quarterly—April, 1931 p. 55.
5. Ibid, p. 67.

Though he eschews any concrete reference, he perhaps mean to indicate a similar approach to the same problem in the literature and experiments of psycho-analysis. George Santayana openly characterises the whole of Freudian psychology as " A long Way Round to Nirvāṇa." [1] We may indeed without exaggeration, pay our tribute to Freud as one of the seers (Draṣṭā) who are born at times in all climes.

Freud himself frankly acknowledges in his *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, " We have steered unawares into the heaven of Schopenhauer's philosophy for whom death (samsāra-vimukti) is the real result of life and therefore so far its aim."[2] All schools of pscho-analysis only seek to bring to the consciousness what was formerly unconscious, to dissolve the complexes, (Granthī-cheda), to restore equilibrium (samatvam) and to replace the phantasies of the neurotic by a true conception of his real self (Ātma-jñāna).

All the same, it should be clearly grasped that the real self for psycho-analysis is the empirical, social self Ātman as related to the world. The ignorance sought to be dispelled is the unawareness of the lower self within us. The freedom striven for is only a relative, limited freedom from only certain complexes. The harmony is not Absolute, the peace not perfect.

Rāja-Yoga :—

Rāja-Yoga is a name which has been given currency very recently especially by Swāmī Vivekananda. Though it is used in the Yoga-Śikhā Upaniṣad, we have no proof of the antiquity of the Upaniṣad itself. There are hundreds of Upaniṣads now known and published, all claiming a very old origin. But we find nothing but doubt in their genuineness. The Gītā of course devotes a full canto to the elaborate description of the Rāja-vidyā. This is totally different from what we understand by Rāja-Yoga. Haṭha-Yoga-Pradīpikā ascribes more than a dozen meanings to this word including among other Samādhi, Laya, Advaita, Nirālamba.

Really speaking the Rāja-Yoga lays greater stress upon the fourfold mental side of Pātañjala-Yoga combining some elements

1. Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy. Chap. IV.
2. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 63.

from the other two Yogas and advocates the supremacy of the mind over the body. If we concentrate our mind upon any object, the Prāṇas are automatically restrained, and the body becomes steady and calm. Āsanas and Prāṇāyāma only help us in prolonging the state of meditation and guarding us against intra-organic and external disturbances. The Rāja-Yoga seeks to attain liberation, and unity of consciousness with the supreme self, by physical quietude, equal behaviour with all and by mental equilibrium.

Mantra-Yoga :—

In books on Yoga "Mantra-Yoga" is used in several senses. It has been given more than one name, as Japa-Yoga, Śabda-Yoga, Vāk-Yoga etc. with slight variations of emphasis or technique. But the cardinal principle of all the forms is the attainment of ultimate mystic communion of the individual jīva with the Universal Self, with the help of continuous silent recitation or meditation upon some specific mantra, a mystical suggestive incantation or a sacred formula. The mantra may consist of a single syllable or more than one syllable, sometimes words and even sentences ; symbolising profound philosophical principles or standing for nothing but mere sounds. By believing and concentrating upon the meaning of the mantra the yogi actually becomes liberated from the shackles of the world and attains godhead.

In some mental hospitals in Europe psychiatrists make use of prolonged auto-suggestion and hetero-suggestion, to cure particular diseases and also to hypnotise a person. The patient is required to repeat some such sentence as "I am getting better", "My disease is disappearing", "I have got well" etc. etc. Higginson writes, "We recognize the therapeutic value of suggestion in many affairs. The injured child ceases to cry when told that he is all right. We often observe that the patient feels relief at the arrival of the physician or a friend."[1] Coueism is a well-known system of therapy which makes use of suggestion. It is claimed that even involuntary physiological, non-affective processes are also amenable to the influence of suggestion. Clifford Allen mentions some cases of Heilig and

1. Higginson : Fields of Psychology. p. 589.

Hoff who "affected the movements of the stomach also by suggestion." Even secretions of intestines were affected by suggesting that the patient was eating a medicine or drug when he was actually given butter or something else in his mouth. The importance of suggestion in hypnosis and many so-called spiritistic phenomena or better, supernormal psychic phenomena is recognised by Freud also.

The only difference between a suggestion in the Western sense and the Indian mantra is that suggestion is there utilised to alter the physiological or psychological condition of man, whereas the Mantra-Yoga, here, is a purely spiritual discipline. By suggestion man's faculties of perception, feeling and motor activity too can be accelerated or paralysed. Mantra, in Indian philosophy, is employed for the attainment of salvation or the union with God, by suggestions like these: "Thou art That" (तत्त्वमसि); "I am That" (सोऽहम्); "I am Brahman" (अहम् ब्रह्मास्मि); "I am not This" (अहम् एतत् न) etc. But there are some yogins of a lower standing who practise Mantra-Yoga for the acquisition of super-physical powers, siddhis or perfections. The Yoga-Sūtra writes that such siddhis are attainable by mantra, drugs, austerity and ecstasy.

The ordinary Indian, in the street, however, is acquainted with mantras only in the gross Western sense of suggestion. The quacks (Ojhās) are believed to employ incantations in driving away evil spirits from the possessed persons, as in the West, suggestion is most widely used to cure cases of multiple personality, somnambulism and other kinds of dissociation. Ernest Jones writes, "Of all therapeutic agents, suggestion, applied consciously or unconsciously, is perhaps the most widely used."[1] Until recently, and to a considerable extent even now, tābīz, gaṇḍā, jhāḍā, jantra etc. are regarded as effective by the generality in India and even by some of the intelligentsia, in cases of periodical fevers, some peculiar boils, typhoid, catalepsy, epilepsy and many other organic as well as functional maladies.

Another strange similarity between the modern psycho-analytic practice in Europe and the mantric healing in India is the emphasis on the role of the idea of the suggester or the

1. Ernest Jones: Papers on Psycho-analysis. p. 341.

physician making suggestion. The Guru or preceptor is regarded as indispensable for Mantra-Yoga, not only as an initiator (Dīkṣaka) but as a constant guide in later practice. In many a work on Yoga and Tantra, the Guru is extolled as God incarnate having infinite superphysical capacities. No mantra is possible without a Guru. Even those highly deserving yogins who are fit to receive the mantra but do not succeed to find a Guru for their initiation, are said, in the esoteric teachings of Indian saints and mystics to receive initiation directly from God in some shape or other. Ernest Jones observes, " Clinically every physician who teaches his patients how to use auto-suggestion knows how hard it is to estimate the importance of the part played by the idea of of the physician in the patient's mind ... ... Even in the cases of religious trances there is a close inter-relation between intense self-absorption and concentration on the idea of an external person."[1]

In a small article on the Mantric Healing, N. K. Natesan writes, " Mantras have been found effective, in my experience, in cases of tuberculosis, diabetes, insanity, abortion, piles, persistent rheumatism, nervous diseases etc."[2] But in all mantric healing also, the really curative influence is the idea of the mantra-śāstrī or an implicit faith in him. I have out of curiosity, examined many yantras or tābīz's as they are called. They were found to consist usually of any senseless object. Some, I found, contained a piece of hand-spun yarn, some others a small string of mill yarn. Many others had a little bit of stone, or a scrap of blank paper or with a few lines drawn upon it with coal or ink. The verbal mantras are nothing but prayers for recovery and suggestive of health. None of these if attempted by the laity brings about the desired effect. On the other hand those who have no faith are not cured.

Most of the famous mantra-yoga schools are out of favour and have almost always been disregarded by Indian philosophy as such. Albeit, an important section of Indian thought which is now only gradually rising to prominence in the form of Tantras or Śaiva and Śākta Āgamas was wholly occupied with

1. Ernest Jones : Papers on Psycho-analysis. Chap. XX.
2. The Kalpaka. Sept. 1929, p. 240.

this mystical and mysterious side of Yoga. The Buddhist Shingo school also adhered to some such thing. They held that all exoteric doctrines are but symbols of the hidden esoteric teachings which are revealed only to the initiated. This sect corresponds very closely to the Lāmāism of Tibet and Mongolia and was derived from the Yogācāra school of India in 600 A.D.

This theory of initiation if studied closely will be found to be a very complicated and peculiar type of a suggestive psychological concept. The disciple, as in the Christian Ceremonial of Confession has to relate all his story and surrender his true self to the preceptor.

Before closing our account of Mantra-Yoga, we must say a few words about the great unsolved mysteries which abound in this field till to-day. The efficacy of mantras in many authentically established cases baffles explanation in terms of suggestion. Cures of various, almost all diseases are reported, where there was no knowledge at all on the part of the patient about the use of the mantra or about the fact that something was being done to cure him. Radical emotional conversions, and even deaths have been occassioned by the employment of mantric rituals. All this passes our present means of comprehension. We cannot but admit our failure to account for them psychologically.

Baudouin mentions three kinds of suggestions : (1) spontaneous, (2) reflective and (3) induced.[1] They differ as regards the way and the source from which the idea is suggested. But " the subconscious realisation of an idea "[2] is essential to each. Though he admits that " the action of suggestion may take place, sometimes without any consciousness on the part of the subject ",[3] his hypothesis fails to account for effects of mantras at great distances upon strangers. Only a presumption of One Great Universal Subconscious mind alone can explain such incidents on the basis of suggestion or telepathy. Otherwise, as some of the Mantra Śāstrins claim, spiritistic agency has to be acknowledged as the real factor responsible for so many strange phenomena.

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1. Baudouin : Suggestion and Auto-suggestion. p. 28.
2. Ibid. p. 26.
3. Ibid. p. 25.

Haṭha-Yoga :—

Haṭha-Yoga is very intimately allied with Rāja-Yoga and in a broad sense with all yogas, but is also opposed fundamentally to them in its technique. The aim of Haṭha-Yoga, in agreement with others is the eventual attainment of Samādhi or trance where the individuality of the jīva disappears into the all blissful state of Godhead which is free from all afflictions (kleśas), the supreme light par excellence. Some Yoga practitioners (sādhakas) and Yoga-siddhas regard Haṭha-Yoga as a means to Rāja-Yoga.

It differs from others in its emphasis on the physical aspect in the yoga discipline. Haṭha-Yoga, in fact, is a rigorous physical discipline. It is generally regarded as a method of forced concentration by means of very hard physical exercises, austerities and penances, fasts and mortifications of very many varieties in diet, sleep etc. The word "Haṭha-Yoga" itself is very significant. It has been derived as the joining, yoga of Ha, and ṭha, also known as iḍā and pingalā, the two nerves into Suśumnā in the spinal column, by means of the stoppage of breath (Prāṇāyāma). In fact, the conception of Prāṇa is peculiar to India. All systems of Indian yoga and philosophy accept the close relation that obtains between Prāṇa and manas or breath and mind. 'Control the Prāṇa and the mind is brought under restraint' is an axiom for us. It may be said to imply in part the well-known dictum of William James that bodily states are the determinants of mental states. Body controls the mind. Purify the body and the mind is purified. Sound body must have a sound mind. Release the body completely and the mental tension disappears. It seems to be inevitable here to draw attention to the fact that manas in Indian philosophy is itself material. Our subtle body which is the mind in the Western sense, can be affected only through the gross body, because the mind is intangible and so beyond human control or manipulation except through the control and restraint of the grosser body.

There are numerous schools of Haṭha-Yoga. Nevertheless, dehaśuddhī, the purification of the body is the sole object of all. This is technically described by yogins as ghaṭa-śuddhī or ādhāra-śuddhī, or nādī-śuddhī. That is why Haṭha-Yoga is

also called " ghaṭastha-yoga.'"[1] According to most of the Haṭha-yogīns, ṣaṭ-karma, the six-fold practice of dhautī, vasti, neli, nauli (lauliki), trāṭaka and kapāla-bhāti, is essential for such purification.[2] The body becomes healthy and steady by practising different postures and exercises, āsanas and mudrās. After this is done some breathing and mental discipline is also recommended before the practitioner gets into ecstasy, when he becomes free (nirlepa).[3]

Besides, a host of minor Haṭha-yogācaryas, Matsyendranātha, Gorakhanātha, Carpaṭī, Jalandhara, Caturangī and Vicāranātha have been some of the famous exponents of this science. They have left behind plenty of their writings for our guidance. There is no doubt, that there were some schools of Haṭha-yoga even in the ancient times, as is stated in the Haṭh-Yoga-Pradīpikā.

द्विधा हठः स्यादेकास्तु गोरक्षादि सुसाधकैः ।
अन्यो मृकण्डपुत्राद्यैः साधितो हठसंज्ञकः ॥

Mārkanḍeya followed the aṣṭānga Haṭha-Yoga as elaborated in the Yoga Sūtras. The Yoga Tattva Upaniṣad also champions the school of Patañjali. Gorakhanātha, however, omitted yama and niyama from his Haṭha-Yoga.

Some yogīns claim that Haṭha-Yoga is a purely physical discipline. They recognise postures, breath-control, glandular and intestinal exercises of a complicated description, and the regulation of sound (nādānusandhāna) as the only four essentials of Haṭha-Yoga. Āsanas, they say, make the body healthy, steady and light. When the practicant becomes adept in steady āsanas it becomes much easier to restrain the breath. Prāṇāyāma removes all the dross and foreign matter (mala) from the Suśumnā, or nervous system. It is due to the accumulation of this mala that we suffer many ailments. Triśikhibrahma Upaniṣad contends that prāṇāyāma is impossible without the previous three stages of yama, niyama and āsana. It is also stated in unequivocal terms that the technique suits differently to different individuals. Only those who suffer from some

1. Gheranḍa Smhita. I. 2.
2. Gheranḍa Saṁhitā, I. 12.
3. Ibid. I. 9–12.

abnormalities and disturbances of the bodily humours, vāta, pitta and kapha, require the help of the above mentioned six-fold practice. Yājñavalkya maintains that prāṇāyāma is sufficient to destroy all impurities of the body.

All said, we cannot but regard Haṭha-Yoga as only a preliminary step for the successful accomplishment of each and every yoga. As a matter of fact, body is the basis of our mind. In order to achieve mental tranquility we must first relax and purify the body. Haṭha-Yoga undertakes to make the body fit for long, continued, and undisturbed meditation. A diseased and distracted physique is a huge hindrance equally for yoga and psycho-analysis. The analysed has to recline at ease on a sofa before all else that has to be done. Freud stressed time and again, the importance of physical, intellectual, and emotional relaxation for a successful analysis. The degree of success depends upon the extent to which the patient "lets go old automatisms of thought and feeling."[1] According to Pavlov also good physical health is one of the essential preliminary conditions for a ready and successful conditioning of behaviour patterns.'

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1. Coster : Yoga and Western Psychology. p. 32.
2. M. W. Curti : Child Psychology. p. 153.

AN UNPUBLISHED INSCRIPTION OF KING KUMĀRPĀLA OF GUJARĀT FROM JUNĀGADH MUSEUM

(Bhogilāl J. Sāndesarā)

Only a few inscriptions of the Caulukya dynasty of Gujarāt have remained upublished so far, the present one being one of them. It gives some information which will be of considerable importance for the history of Gujarāt as well as the local history of Prabhāsa Pāṭaṇa.

The inscription is on a slab of black marble. The slab is broken on all sides and hence the inscription is incomplete. It seems from the size of the slab that the inscription, in original, must be of about thirty lines, but in its present state we have only seventeen lines, of which only seven lines in all are complete.

The language of the inscription is Sanskrit and all the verses which are before us, in full or in fragments, are in the Śārdūlvikriḍita metre.

The later part of the inscription is not available, and hence we are not in a position to know its exact date. But the sixth and seventh verses note that, Gumadeva, the Governor of Prabhāsa Pāṭaṇa had built a temple in the vicinity of that city, when King Kumārpāla was the sovereign ruler at Aṇahilwāḍ. Now, King Kumārpāla ruled from V. S. 1199 to 1229, and it is clear that the date of the inscription also must be somewhere between these years.

In the beginning, the inscription gives a list of the Caulukya Kings of Aṇahilwād, right down from Mulrāja. But the lines describing the glory of Mulrāja are lost, and the third line of the broken inscription begins with the praise of Chāmuṇda, the son of Mulrāja. Then, we have the names of Vallabharāja, Durlabharāja, Bhīmdeva, Karṇadeva, Jaisiṁhadeva, and then of Kumārpāla.

There it is said that, Kumārpāla had appointed Gumadeva, the son of Kakkaka, as the Governor of Prabhās Pāṭaṇa, and Gumadeva had erected there a temple. As the lines which mention this are not complete, we cannot know at once as to which deity the temple was dedicated. A rubbing of this

inscription is preserved in the collection of the Junāgadh Archaeological Society, and according to the records of the said Society, the inscription was brought to Junāgadh from a place known as "Bhima num̐ Deval." (The temple of Bhima), which is about twelve miles north-east of Prabhās. According to the local tradition, the temple of Bhīma was at one time a Sūrya-Mandira (Sun-Temple). Now the fourteenth line of our inscription reads as

......निष्ठमनसाऽप्रांदोल्कं धीमता धर्मादित्यकृते विचित्ररचनं......

and so on. From the evidence mentioned above as well as from this reference we can safely infer that the temple built by Gumadeva was dedicated to the Sun-deity, called Dharmāditya. It is welknown that the name of sun-deity was generally followed by the suffix "Āditya". (Cf Sun-temple of Jayāditya mentioned in the Kāvi plate of the Rāṣṭrakuṭa King Govinda Prabhutavarṣa, that of Taruṇāditya mentioned in the Unā plates of Caulukya Balavarman etc.-Epi. Ind. Vol. V, P. 148; Vol IX, P. 4.) This shows that even in the thirteenth century of the Vikrama Era, new temples of Sun-deity were being erected at least in this part of Kāthiāwār, that is, in Sorath.

Moreover, in the thirteenth line of the inscription Gumadeva, the Governor of Prabhāsa, is referred to as the conqueror of the Ābhiras (...यत्खड्गाहतभौतिकस्पतरलैराभीरवीरैः स्थितम्।). The question is who these Ābhiras were? The Prabandhas tell us of only one Kāthiāwār expedition of Kumārpāla, that in which minister Udayana was fatally wounded fighting against King Sunsar or Saunsar (सुराष्ट्रदेशीयं सउंसरनामानं of the Prabandhacintāmaṇi). But this expedition is other than that which is referred to in the inscription. It is generally believed that Sunsar was some Mer chief ruling in Gohilwāḍ on the east coast of Kāthiāwār. Any way, he never ruled ovar Soraṭh, which was completely subjugated by Siddharāja Jaisiṁha. On the other hand, Rā Navaghaṇa of Junāgadh is referred to as "The King of the Ābhiras" (नवघणनामानमाभीरराणकम्) by the Prabandhacintāmaṇi. So these Ābhiras of Prabandhacintāmaṇi and our inscription—probably modern Āhiras—must be some warlike tribe of Soraṭh; and Gumadeva, the Governor of Prabhāsa, must have quelled some rebellion of theirs. But this conquest would

have been more or less a local affair, as it has not caught the attention of a single author of the historical Prabandhas, though thus pompously mentioned in the local inscription.

To summarise, we can gather following information from the inscription :—

(i) At one time during the reign of Kumārpāla (that is, between V S. 1199 and 1229), Gumadeva was the Governor of Prabhāsa Pātaṇa,

(ii) He had erected a temple of Sun-Deity called Dharmāditya, in the vicinity of Prabhāsa,

(iii) And he had quelled a rebellion of the Ābhiras, which was more or less a local affair.

The original inscription reads as follows :—

[१] जयः स...
[२] त्र जितारिपार्थिवबल...
[३] नश्चामुंडराजो नृपः । तस्माद्वल्लभ (राज)...
[४] नज्जातो दुर्लभराज इत्यवनिपः श्री (भी) मदेवस्तत...
[५] ष्टदुष्टदलनः प्रागल्भ्यसंभावितो रूपश्रीजितमन्मथः पृथुभु(जः श्री)—
[६] कर्णदेवो नृपः । तत्सूनुर्जयसिंहदेव इति च प्रत्यर्थिपृथ्वीभुजामु—
[७] द्धर्ता गुरुसाहसैकरसिको (ऽ) भूत्सिद्धचूडामणिः ॥ ४ एतस्मिन्पुरु—
[८] हूतपत्तनवधूनेत्रातिथौ सत्यभूच्छ्रीमानत्र कुमारपालनृपतिर्दु—
[९] र्वारवीरव्रतः । यत्सेनावरवाजिपुंगवखुरप्रोत्खातपृथ्वीरजःसं—
[१०] घातावृतविग्रहे दिनपतौ नक्तायते वासरः ॥ ५ तेन क्ष्मापतिना न्य—
[११] युज्यत मुदा निर्व्याजवीर्योर्जितस्फारप्रौढिविलासमन्दिरमसौ
[१२] श्रीकक्ककस्यात्मजः । श्रीसोमेश्वरपत्तनावनविधौ श्रीगूमदेवो ब—
[१३] ली यत्खड्गाहतभीतिकंपतरलैराभीरवीरैः स्थितं ॥ ६ तेनातन्य...
[१४] ...निष्ठमनसाऽप्रांदोलकं धीमता धर्मादित्यकृते विचित्ररच(नं)...
[१५] ...सो तत्पूजानिरतैः सदैव मनुजैः संप्राप्यते वां (छितं)...
[१६] ...द वसतः सत्यं मुहुर्ब्रूमहे ॥ ७ मूर्तिरे...
[१७] ...मेन कृष्णोपमा...*

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* This inscription has been published through the courtesy of Principal Ziauddin Ahmad, M.A., LL.B. Superintendent of the Junāgadh Museum, where it is now preserved.

KĀTYĀYANA

(K. Madhava Krishna Sarma)

" The[1] universe is in a state of ceaseless change. You could not step twice into the same river, for other and yet other waters are ever flowing on " said Heraclitus. Even languages fortified by the most scopeful grammar cannot escape this inexorable process. When numerous phonetic, semantic and syntactic changes carried the language beyond the reaches of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana whom the researches of Goldstücker[2] have credited also with the authorship of the Vājasaneyi Prātiśākhya, set himself to writing the Vārtikas on the Aṣṭādhyāyī which are in the form of supplements, emendations, refutations, explanations *et hoc genus omne*. Dr. Belvalkar thinks that the suggestion of subjecting Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī to a searching criticism dawned upon him probably in the course of his Prātiśākhya.

It is true that some of his Vārtikas which from some modern scholars have earned the remark that they are strictures on Pāṇini, are, from Patañjali's point of view, unnecessary ; but taking his whole work into consideration, we cannot ignore the fact that he has spanned the gulf which yawned between himself and Pāṇini, which otherwise would have perhaps been left unbridged ; and we are in need of no more justification to say that when the roll of those who have contributed to the history of Sanskrit comes to be called his rank is sure to be deemed of great importance.

Though there had been many Vārtikakāras on Pāṇini as we know through Patañjali's[3] quotations, Kātyāyana alone had the unique fortune of bequeathing to a distant grammatical posterity

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1. Thilly, History of Philosophy, p. 23.

2. Vide Goldstücker, Pāṇini, pp. 192 sq.; Belvalkar, Systems of Sanskrit Grammer, pp. 29 ff : This will be disproved by me in a separate paper.

3. In a number of cases where Kātyāyana gives first one view and then rejects it by giving another, we may infer that he is criticising some of his predecessors though he is not referring to them by name. I give a few examples illustrative of a host of others: P. 3. 2. 135, V. 3 ; 3. 3. 132, V. 2 and 4 ; 6. 1. 7, V. 2; 6. 1. 17, V. 2.

a work which was to survive and preserve the continuous chain of linguistic investigation in India.

Goldstücker in his Pāṇini[1] says :—

" A Vārtika of Kātyāyana is therefore not a commentary which explains, but an animadversion which completes. In proposing to himself to write Vārtikas on Pāṇini, Kātyāyana did not mean to justify and defend the rules of Pāṇini, but to find fault with them and whoever has gone through his work must avow that he has done so to his heart's content. He will even have to admit that Kātyāyana has frequently failed in justice to Pāṇini, by twisting the words of the Sūtras in a sense which they need not have or by upbraiding Pāṇini with failings he was not guilty of. On this score he is not unfrequently rebuked by Patañjali, who on such occasions severely rates him for his ungenerous treatment of Pāṇini and as we have seen in an instance above (p. 52) proves to him that he himself is wanting in proficiency and not Pāṇini. Kātyāyana, in short, does not leave the impression of an admirer or friend of Pāṇini, but that of an antagonist often, too, of an unfair antagonist. In consequence his remarks are attached to those Sūtras alone which are open to the censure of abstruseness or ambiguity and the contents of which were liable to being completed or modified : he is silent on those which do not admit of criticism or rebuke. "

Following in the wake of Goldstücker, Dr. Belvalkar also says that Kātyāyana's object is not to explain Pāṇini, but to find fault with his rules. He regards him as a follower of the Aindra school which was to Burnell the most ancient grammatical treasure-trove ever unearthed.

A closer study of the Vārtikas will show that there is no adequate reason to aim this slur at Kātyāyana. Conceding to a certain extent that a Vārtika of Kātyāyana is not a commentary which explains, it may be pointed out that a commentary on a grammatical work need not necessarily be only explanatory. The traditional definition of a Vārtika is

उक्तानुक्तदुरुक्तानां चिन्ता यत्र प्रवर्तते ।
तं ग्रन्थं वार्तिकं प्राहुर्वार्तिकज्ञा मनीषिणः ॥

1. Pp. 119-120.

and its object is quite different from that of an ordinary commentary, viz. Vyākhyāna. Śāstraic Vyākhyānas are very often seen transcending the regions of mere explanations of texts. If we render 'Vārtika' by 'commentary' it does not convey the full sense of that term. To say that "a Vārtika of Kātyāyana is therefore not a commentary which explains but an animadversion which completes" is to ignore the bulk of explanatory Vārtikas trying to render Pāṇini clearer. In the following instances Patañjali admits that Kātyāyana is actuated by a sincere motive of clearing all ambiguity for students and thereby acknowledges the indispensibility of those Vārtikas.[1]

P. 3. 3. 127, V. 2. कर्तृकर्मग्रहणं चोपपदसंज्ञार्थम् ।

Patañjali : कर्तृकर्मग्रहणं चोपपदसंज्ञार्थं द्रष्टव्यम् । द्वेष्यं विजानीयादभिधेययोरिति । तदाचार्यः सुहृद्भूत्वान्वाचष्टे कर्तृकर्मग्रहणं चोपपद.संज्ञार्थमिति ॥

P. 4. 3. 4, V. 2. दिक्पूर्वपदाद्यच्च ।

Patañjali : इदमद्यापूर्वं क्रियतेऽर्धाद्यद्विधाने सपूर्वाट्ठञिति । तद्द्वेष्यं विजानीयात्सर्वमेव विकल्पत इति । तदाचार्यः सुहृद्भूत्वान्वाचष्टे दिक्पूर्वपदादर्धाद्यथान्यासमेव भवतीति ॥

P. 5. 1. 31, V. 1 द्वित्रिभ्यां द्वैयोग्यम् ।

Patañjali : द्वेष्यं विजानीयादविशेषेणेत उत्तरं द्वित्रिभ्यामिति । तदाचार्यः सुहृद्भूत्वान्वाचष्टे द्वित्रिभ्यां द्वैयोग्यमिति ॥

"In proposing to himself to write Vārtikas on Pāṇini" Kātyāyana's duty as a commentator was not to justify or defend Pāṇini, but to introduce the necessary modifications in order to make Pāṇini keep abreast of later developments in the language. In fact he could not defend Pāṇini even embarking on a process which would have involved a good deal of tampering with the text. If a commentator starts with the determined object of defending an author whose work is really in need of some changes necessitated by the lapse of time, the work turned out by

1. See also P. 2. 4. 32, V. 2; 2. 4. 69, V. 1; 3. 1. 21, V. 1; 3. 1. 44, V. 7; 4. 3. 143, V. 2 : 5. 3. 8, V. 1 ; 6. 1. 30, V. 1; 6. 1. 90, V. 2–3 ; 7. 1. 89, V. 1, etc.; vide Patañjali who in the Mahābhāṣya on each of these says : तस्मात्सुष्ठूच्यते etc.

him will nowise be critical ; neither will it stand the test of time. A grammatical commentary especially has no value if it does not make the necessary emendations in its text. Let us turn towards Pantañjali and see what he has done. Though his avowed object according to the above view is to exploit all avenues of possibilities to defend Pāṇini, he could not but refute[1] some of his Sūtras ; he could not but add some supplements and emendations ;[2] he had to comment on a good number of Sūtras to make them clearer in their import ; and besides all this, he had to resort to Yogavibhāga[3] in a number of instances.

Instances are not wanting to show that Kātyāyana has some times defended (i.e. tried to find the desired meaning from the rules themselves without altering them) Pāṇini. The following are some among many others :

P. 1. 1. 12, V. 8.	न वा ग्रहणविशेषणत्वात् ।
1. 2. 43, V. 3.	न वा तादर्थ्यात्ताच्छब्द्यम् ।
1. 3. 3, V. 5.	एकशेषनिर्देशाद्वा ।
3. 1. 46, V. 4.	योगविभागात्सिद्धम् ।
7. 1. 2, V. 2.	नवा क्वचिच्चित्करणादुपदेशिवद्वचनानर्थक्यम् ।
7. 1. 2, V. 5.	प्रातिपदिकविज्ञानाच्च पाणिनेः सिद्धम् ।
8. 2. 23, V. 6.	[4]योगविभागात्सिद्धम् ।
8. 4. 68, V. 5.	एकशेषनिर्देशाद्वा स्वरभिन्नानां भगवतः पाणिनेः सिद्धम् ।

1. See Patañjali on P. 1. 1. 29, 1. 2. 60–63, 1. 2. 69, 1. 2. 73, 1. 4. 25–31, 4. 2. 11, 4. 2. 96, 4. 4. 23, 5. 1. 3, 6. 1. 70, 6. 1. 72, 6. 4. 45, 7. 1. 56 and 7. 3. 31.

2. An emendation consists in the omission, addition, replacement etc. of a word or words see Patañjali on P. 1. 4. 21–22, 4. 1. 22, 4. 1. 31, 4. 1. 75, 5. 1. 16, 5. 4. 73, 5. 4. 76, 6. 1. 130, 7. 1. 11, 7. 1. 62, 7, 2, 89, 7. 2. 90, 7. 3. 45, 7. 3. 70, 8. 2. 6, 8. 4. 28, etc.

3. For Yogavibhāgas see Patañjali on P. 1. 1. 30, 1. 4. 17, 2. 3. 17, 2. 3. 62, 2. 3. 71, 3. 1. 85, 5. 1. 24, 5. 1. 96, 5. 2. 40, 6. 1. 1, 6. 2. 42, 6. 4. 16 6. 4. 51, 6. 4. 74, 6. 4. 134, (see 133), 6. 4. 140, 7. 3. 108, 7. 4. 60, 8. 2. 4, 8. 2. 40, 8. 2. 92, 8. 3. 37 and 8. 4. 26 (see 8. 4. 1).

4. Yogavibhāga is also a defence of Pāṇini in so far as it tries to get the desired meaning from the Sūtra itself without introducing anything external as a supplement or emendation.

In a good many instances like these, Kātyāyana sees that he can avoid criticising, i.e. emending Pāṇini by adopting these devices (Yogavibhāga, etc.). Like Patañjali, the Vārtikakāra also introduces several important maxims, e. g.

[1]सन्निपातलक्षणो विधिरनिमित्तं तद्विघातस्य, [2]असिद्धं बहिरङ्गमान्तरङ्गे, [3]उच्चार्यमाणः शब्दः संप्रत्यायकः न संप्रतीयमानः, [4]तादर्थ्यात्ताच्छब्द्यम् , etc.

all of which are essential for the regulation of the application of the Sūtras of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Patañjali accepts these Nyāyas and uses them in a number of other instances. In short, the method[5] adopted by Patañjali in commenting on Pāṇini is used by Kātyāyana himself, the only difference between the two being that while the former uses it only in a limited number of instances the latter does so to a very large extent. That Patañjali's object in adopting these devices is not so much to criticise Kātyāyana as to expand the scope of the Aṣṭādhāyī may be known from the fact that he himself resorts to them in a large number of instances. For instance, compare the Mahābhaṣya on P. 7. 4. 47 where suggesting an emendation to the preceding rule, namely, दो दद्घोः Patañjali observes.

नासौ सूत्रभेदः। सूत्रभेदं कमुपाचरति? यत्र तदेवान्यत्सूत्रं क्रियते भूयो वा। यदि तदेवोपसंहृत्य क्रियते नासौ सूत्रभेदः॥

It is doubtlessly true that the consummate scholarship of Patañjali has "obviated the punctiliousness of the Vārtikas and has proved to Kātyāyana that he himself is wanting in proficiency, not Pāṇini". But from this we cannot deduce that "Kātyāyana has frequently failed in justice to Pāṇini, by twisting the words of the Sūtras into a sense which they need not have, or by upbraiding Pāṇini with failings he was not guilty of". It can only show that Patañjali's method is more organic and his devices are more ingenious than those of Kātyāyana.

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1. P. 1. 1. 39, V. 3.
2. P. 1. 1. 47, V. 7.
3. P. 1. 1. 68, V. 3.
4. P. 1. 2. 43, V. 3.
5. Finding the desired meaning in the Sūtras themselves by Yogavibhāga, Prasleṣa, etc.

The stand-points of these two commentators are quite different. Kātyāyana as a rule introduces a modification which is *per se* external, whenever he finds a Sūtra insufficient. Patañjali first sees whether the Aṣṭādhyāyī can be so construed as to yield the requisite meaning and proceeds to supplement or emend it only after being convinced that it cannot. His object is to make the Aṣṭādhyāyī as comprehensive and elastic as possible. Let me take the instance given by Goldstücker himself and prove what I consider to be a fundamental difference between the view-points of these two great critics.

गोस्त्रियोरुपसर्जनस्य (P. 1.2.48) : When 'go' or a word which has as its termination a feminine affix is regarded as Upasarjana, the final vowel of the Prātipadika ending with it is shortened.

Here Kātyāyana takes 'strī' to mean feminine words in general and in order to exclude tantrī, śrī, lakṣmī, etc., (Kṛt words ending with Uṇādi affixes) introduces this emendation : गोटाङ्ग्रहणं कृन्निवृत्त्यर्थम् । Patañjali assumes that the word 'strī' here is marked with Svarita which indicates that this term applies only to those feminine words which are formed by such affixes as have been enumerated under the Adhikāra स्त्रियाम् (P. 4.1.3). Uṇādi words are thus excluded. This assumption is based on his three-fold interpretation of स्वरितेनाधिकारः. (P. 1.3.11). In the Mahābhāṣya on that rule Patañjali observes as follows :—

> न तर्हीदानीमयं योगो वक्तव्यः । वक्तव्यश्च । किं प्रयोजनम् । स्वरितेनाधिकारगतिर्यथा विज्ञायेत । अधिकं कार्यम् । अधिकः कारः । अधिकारगतिः—गोस्त्रियोरुपसर्जनस्येत्यत्र गोटाङ्ग्रहणं चोदितम् । तन्न कर्तव्यं भवति । स्त्रीग्रहणं स्वरयिष्यते । स्वरितेनाधिकारगतिर्भवतीति "स्त्रियाम्" इत्येवं प्रकृत्य ये प्रत्ययाः विहिताः तेषां ग्रहणं विज्ञास्यते । तत्र स्वरितेनाधिकारगतिर्भवतीति न दोषो भवतीति ॥

He then goes on to illustrate 'अधिकं कार्यम्' and 'अधिकःकारः' । Whether this triplicity of intepretation is intended by Pāṇini is a matter on which there may be disagreement. Kātyāyana however does not know that it is capable of this three-fold interpretation ; nor does he attempt at construing Pāṇini in such a way as would solve the difficulty. He thinks (what Upādhyāya says by way of a. Pūrvapakṣāvataraṇikā to the Mahābhāṣya

on P. 1. 2. 48) : स्वरितत्वे (P. 1, 3. 11) [1] उत्तरतानुवृत्तिरेवस्यात्, न तु तदधिकारस्थलाभ: and suggests the above emendation which is quite necessary and reasonable from his point of view.

Instances of this kind cannot prove that "Kātyāyana has upbraided Pāṇini with feelings he was not guilty of". Patañjali's superb and unexampled scholarship has over shadowed Kātyāyana and we are apt to understand incorrectly the latter's position in respect to Pāṇini when we compare him with the former. It also deserves notice that Kātyāyana[2] regards the Aṣṭādhyāyī as a Dharmaśāstra, the study of which, according to him, is attended by religious felicity.

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1. Because that is the primary meaning of P. 1. 3. 11.

2. Cf. the Vārtika सिद्धेशब्दार्थसम्बन्धे लोकतोऽर्थप्रयुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे शास्त्रेण धर्मनियमो यथा लौकिकवैदिकेषु ; cf. also एकशेषनिर्देशाद्वा स्वरभिन्नानां भगवतः पाणिनेः सिद्धम् (8. 4. 68, V. 4) where the Vārtikakāra refers to Pāṇini honorifically Hannes Skold's theory that the Aṣṭādhyāyī originally ended with नोदात्तस्वरितोदयम् (8. 4. 67) will be refuted in its entirety in a separate paper.

विश्वेश्वरस्मृतिः ।

पण्डितविश्वेश्वरनाथरेउ-रचिता ।

प्रथमोऽधिकारः ।

संसारकारणीभूतोऽप्यज्ञेयः कोऽपि विश्वराट् ।
मायाशक्तिधरो देवो ब्रह्माण्डेऽस्मिन् विराजते ॥ १ ॥
तस्यैव माययोत्पन्ना सुतप्ता द्रवरूपिणी ।
चक्रवद्धि भ्रमत्येषा भूमिर्भास्करमण्डलात् ॥ २ ॥
तस्या बाह्यस्तरेणाथ काठिन्ये समुपाश्रिते ।
रावणेन यथा सीता रुद्धा शक्तिर्धरात्मजा ॥ ३ ॥
रामवद् मोक्तुकामेन प्राकृतेनाऽथ हेतुना ।
भूमिकम्पमयो बाणो मुक्तः सागरशोषकृत् ॥ ४ ॥
तस्माज्जाते मरौ देशे पुरं योधपुरं शुभम् ।
स्थापितं रावजोधेन राष्ट्रकूटवरेण तु ॥ ५ ॥
उम्मेदसिंहभूपाले तद्वंशाब्जदिवाकरे ।
तत्र शासति धर्मेण संतुष्टा मरुवासिनः ॥ ६ ॥
विद्वांसस्तत्रवास्तव्या एकदा गोष्ठिकास्थिताः ।
धर्मशास्त्ररहस्यं हि ज्ञातुं कौतुकिनोऽभवन् ॥ ७ ॥
तत्रैव च समासीनं मामूचुस्ते समन्ततः ।
शारदापीठनाम्ना तु काश्मीरः ख्यातिमागतः ॥ ८ ॥
यशस्तत्रत्यविदुषां सौरभं कुङ्कुमस्य च ।
सर्वलोकसुविख्यातं नास्ति तत्र विचारणा ॥ ९ ॥
तेषां काश्मीरजानां तु भवाञ्जातो यशस्करः ।
श्रीविश्वेश्वरनाथार्य रेउ-वंशे सुविश्रुते ॥ १० ॥
भवतानेकशास्त्राणि सम्यगालोचितान्यथ ।
समधीताश्च रचिता इतिहासास्त्वनेकशः ॥ ११ ॥
भारतस्य तु वर्षस्य पूर्वापरसमुद्रगाः ।
हिमाद्रिसेतुगाश्चैव यात्राः संपादिताः पुनः ॥ १२ ॥

श्रीमुकुन्दमुरारीणां भवत्पितृमहात्मनाम् ।
पाण्डित्ययशसा व्याप्तमद्यापि किल भारतम् ॥ १३ ॥
चाँदरानीति विख्याता भवतो जननी सती ।
धर्मप्राणा सुविदुषी स्त्रीसमाजविभूषणम् ॥ १४ ॥
तदेषा प्रार्थनाऽस्माकं व्याख्यातु कृपया भवान् ।
रहस्यं धर्मशास्त्राणां यत्तु कल्याणकृद् भवेत् ॥ १५ ॥
श्रुत्वा तेषां वचः सम्यग् मयोक्तं श्लक्ष्णया गिरा ।
भवन्तो मरुदेशस्य राजस्थानस्य भूषणाः ॥ १६ ॥
यत्र वीरा राजपुत्राः क्षत्रव्रतमुपाचरन् ।
तथाप्याज्ञा शिरोधार्या विदुषां संयतात्मनाम् ॥ १७ ॥
अतः श्रुतानुभूतानां स्मृत्या सारं निवेदये ।
विश्वेश्वरस्मृतिरियं लोके ख्याता भविष्यति ॥ १८ ॥
धर्मशास्त्राविरुद्धो यो लोके प्रचलितश्च यः ।
कुलाचारानुयातो यः स धर्मोऽत्र मयोच्यते ॥ १९ ॥
मानवं धर्ममाश्रित्य परिष्कृत्य पुनश्च तम् ।
युगानुरूपो व्याख्यातो नात्र काचिद् विचारणा ॥ २० ॥
ब्रह्मणस्तु समुत्पन्नं जगदुक्तं पुरातनैः ।
नव्या विद्युत्कणोत्पन्नं मन्यन्ते तदसंशयम् ॥ २१ ॥
सांख्ये पुरुषसान्निध्यात् प्रकृतिः सृष्टिकारणम् ।
तथा धनऋणाणूनां सान्निध्यं नूतने मते ॥ २२ ॥
अगोचरं ब्रह्म मतं मुनिभिस्तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ।
वैज्ञानिकैर्मता शक्तिर्मायेति परिगृह्यताम् ॥ २३ ॥
सैव तापे प्रकाशे च चुम्बके विद्युदादिषु ।
भुवि ग्रहेषु सूर्ये च सर्वत्रास्तीति निश्चितम् ॥ २४ ॥
संसारकारणं ब्रह्म माया शक्तिश्च ब्रह्मणः ।
वेदेषु यत् समाख्यातं ग्राह्यमस्यां स्मृतावपि ॥ २५ ॥
कारणं यद् व्यवस्थाया अस्याः शक्त्या निरन्तरम् ।
तदेव ब्रह्म जानीत यदि ग्राह्यमिदं वचः ॥ २६ ॥

ध्रियते येन लोकोऽयमिति धर्मः स कीर्तितः ।
असौ सनातनो धर्मः श्रेयो मूलमपि ह्ययम् ॥ २७ ॥
युगानुसारं व्याख्यातः स्मृतिकारैः पुरातनैः ।
बहुधा, युगधर्मः स विज्ञेय इति मे मतम् ॥ २८ ॥
संघर्षेण समाजानामव्यवस्था यदा भवेत् ।
तदा भूतं परीक्ष्याथ वर्तमानोपयोगिनीम् ॥ २९ ॥
भविष्ये सुखदां चैव व्याख्यां धर्मस्य कारयेत् ।
पण्डितैः सैव लोकेऽस्मिन् युगधर्मतया मता ॥ ३० ॥
—(युग्मम् ।)

यद्येवं न प्रक्रियेत मूलधर्मोऽपि नश्यति ।
देशकालविरोधेन न धर्मो भुवि वर्धते ॥ ३१ ॥
मनुः पराशराद्याश्च संचिन्त्येति महर्षयः ।
युगधर्मानुरूपां हि व्याख्यां चक्रुः स्मृतिष्विह ॥ ३२ ॥
विंशतिः स्मृतयः प्रोक्ता याज्ञवल्क्येन धीमता ।
अर्वाचीनास्तु बह्व ऋषिनाम्ना प्रवर्तिताः ॥ ३३ ॥
प्रक्षिप्तान्यथ चान्यासु मतानि विविधानि तु ।
रचनाहेतुरासां च युगधर्मप्रवर्तनम् ॥ ३४ ॥
प्राच्यपाश्चात्यभावानां संघर्षे समुपस्थिते ।
युगानुरूपिणीं व्याख्यां विना धर्मस्तु हीयते ॥ ३५ ॥
तडिद्-बाष्पादियानानां खभूजलविहारिणाम् ।
दूरश्रावणयन्त्राणां दूरदर्शनदायिनाम् ॥ ३६ ॥
आविष्कारेषु संजातेष्वार्यावर्तस्य प्राक्तनी ।
हिमविन्ध्यगता सीमा कथं मान्या भवेद् भुवि ॥ ३७ ॥
—(युग्मम् ।)

एवमेवाङ्गमगधकलिङ्गा दक्षिणापथः ।
अशुच्यनार्यवासाश्चेत्येतद् मान्यं कथं भवेत् ॥ ३८ ॥
हिमशैलशुभ्रमुकुटा रुचिरकुमारीप्रदेशशुचिचरणा ।
पूर्वापराब्धिपार्श्वा लङ्कामुकुलेऽस्ति भारती माता ॥ ३९ ॥

देशे देशे प्राकृतानि कृत्रिमाण्यथवा पुनः ।
तीर्थानि विलसन्त्यत्राऽखिलं पूज्यं हि भारतम् ॥ ४० ॥
गङ्गादीनि तु तीर्थानि प्राकृतानि विदुर्बुधाः ।
तडागमन्दिरादीनि कृत्रिमाणि तथा पुनः ॥ ४१ ॥
तीर्थयात्राप्रसङ्गेन देशा नानाविधास्तथा ।
मनुष्याश्चापि दृश्यन्ते ज्ञानवृद्धिकरं हि तत् ॥ ४२ ॥
समागमश्च साधूनां मनसः शान्तिदो मतः ।
स्वास्थ्यदौ जलवायू च देहारोग्यं प्रयच्छतः ॥ ४३ ॥
शान्तं पूतं च तत्रत्यं वातावरणमद्भुतम् ।
आध्यात्मिकीमुन्नतिं हि कुर्वते तीर्थसेविनः ॥ ४४ ॥

अथ सर्गक्रमः ।

ब्रह्माण्डस्थकटाहस्य व्यासो ज्ञातुं न शक्यते ।
यस्मिन् कणा इवासंख्या राजन्ते सौरमण्डलाः ॥ ४५ ॥
तदण्डसागरे शेषस्तप्तनीहाररूपतः ।
व्याप्याखिलं कुण्डलकैर्विरराज समन्ततः ॥ ४६ ॥
सुप्तो नारायणश्चासीत् केन्द्रशक्तिस्वरूपतः ।
प्रलये लीनमभवद् विश्वं तु सचराचरम् ॥ ४७ ॥
अथ काले समायाते बहुधा स्यामिति स्मरन् ।
शक्तिरूपस्तु भगवाञ्जजागार स्वयं तदा ॥ ४८ ॥
गतिराविर्बभूवाथ नीहारे चक्रवत्तदा ।
तत्त्वानि नवतिर्द्वे च प्रादुर्भूतानि वै ततः ॥ ४९ ॥
विष्णुकर्णमलोद्भूत-मधुकैटभ-युग्मवत् ।
नष्टं तत्त्वद्वयं तेभ्यो जगत्यां नोपलभ्यते ॥ ५० ॥
नीहारात् सर्वमुत्पन्नं ब्रह्माण्डे सचराचरम् ।
अतो नवतितत्त्वानि कारणानीह तस्य तु ॥ ५१ ॥
पञ्चतत्त्वमयी व्याख्या स्यात् संक्षेपकृता पुरा ।
यतो भूमौ जले वायौ संलीनान्येषु भूरिशः ॥ ५२ ॥

शक्तिस्वरूपं तेजोऽस्ति ह्याकाशस्तत्त्वतोऽपरः ।
मतमेतद्धि विज्ञानां संक्षेपेण मयोदितम् ॥ ५३ ॥
भ्रमीविकीर्णतापांशगाढनीहारनिर्मितम् ।
सूर्यस्य मण्डलमिदं जातं जीवनतापदम् ॥ ५४ ॥
तस्मात्तु निर्गतान्यन्ते नव पिण्डान्यथ क्रमात् ।
अष्ट ग्रहाश्च नवमं भूमिमण्डलमद्भुतम् ॥ ५५ ॥
पृथग्भूयाप्यमी पिण्डा गुरुत्वाकर्षणेन तु ।
नारायणस्य शक्त्येव कर्षन्तीह परस्परम् ॥ ५६ ॥
तेनैव नव पिण्डानि परिक्रामन्ति भास्करम् ।
चन्द्रस्तु भूमिजत्वेन परिक्रामति मातरम् ॥ ५७ ॥
द्वे गती स्तो भुवस्त्वत्र स्वाक्ष आवर्त्तनं पुनः ।
परिक्रमश्च सूर्यस्य परिधावण्डरूपिणि ॥ ५८ ॥
अहोरात्रं करोत्येका षड्तूनपरा तथा ।
अक्षो भूमेर्योऽनुमित ईषद्वक्रः स संमतः ॥ ५९ ॥
चतुर्विंशतिघण्टाभिः स्वाक्ष आवर्तते धरा ।
द्वौ यामौ पञ्चषष्टिश्च दिनानां च शतत्रयम् ॥ ६० ॥
परिक्रमणकालस्यावधिर्गणितनिश्चितः ।
सौरं वर्षमिमं वित्त हीनं हीनाधिमासतः ॥ ६१ ॥
—(युग्मम् ।)

प्रोक्ते भुवः स्थितिगती कुर्वाते अयनद्वयम् ।
ते एव लघुदीर्घस्याऽहोरात्रस्यापि कारणम् ॥ ६२ ॥
घण्टोक्ताऽत्र तु विज्ञेया सार्धद्विघटिकासमा ।
घण्टा षष्टिमिनट्का च षष्टिसैकण्डको मिनट् ॥ ६३ ॥
भूमण्डलेऽपि पूर्वोक्तं गुरुत्वाकर्षणं त्विदम् ।
सर्वत्रास्तेऽविकल्पेन न्यूटनेन प्रदर्शितम् ॥ ६४ ॥
निरन्तरभ्रमिक्षिप्ततापसूर्यविनिर्गतम् ।
ज्वलद् भूमण्डलमपि ह्यासीदङ्गारतोऽधिकम् ॥ ६५ ॥
असंख्येषु च वर्षेषु व्यतीतेषु ततः परम् ।
जीवसृष्टिर्जलेऽभूत् प्राक् कर्दमे तु ततः परम् ॥ ६६ ॥

भूमण्डलस्तरश्चाथ वासयोग्यो यदाऽभवत् ।
तदा विविधजीवानां सृष्टिस्तत्राप्यभूत् किल ॥ ६७ ॥
एककोषाः पुरा जीवाः प्रविभज्य विवर्धिनः ।
अनेककोषजा सृष्टिः प्रादुरासीत्ततः क्रमात् ॥ ६८ ॥
सूक्ष्मत्वगावृते कोषे भिन्नाकारे सबुद्बुदः ।
संभृतः पारदर्शी च मधुवज्जीवनो रसः ॥ ६९ ॥
मूलं च जीवनस्याऽऽस्ते कोषे केन्द्रितमेकतः ।
भिन्नत्वगावृतं चापि किंचिद् गाढतरं पुनः ॥ ७० ॥
मत्स्यकूर्मवराहाद्या अवतारा दशोदिताः ।
अमुमेव क्रमं सृष्टेर्दर्शयन्ति पुरोदितम् ॥ ७१ ॥
जलमिच्छति मत्स्यस्तु कूर्मश्च जलकर्दमौ ।
वराहः कर्दमभुवौ नृसिंहः स्थलमण्डलम् ॥ ७२ ॥
अवतारास्तु चत्वारः पूर्वमुक्ता विचक्षणैः ।
भूमण्डलस्य शैत्यं तु क्रमाज्जातं दिशन्त्यमी ॥ ७३ ॥
ततस्तु वामनः प्राभूदपुष्टाङ्गो नरो भुवि ।
पाश्चात्यास्तु वदन्त्येनं नरवानरमध्यगम् ॥ ७४ ॥
सुपुष्टाङ्गः परशुरामो वनवासी धनुर्धरः ।
युद्धप्रियोऽजितक्रोधो निःशान्तिः कलहप्रियः ॥ ७५ ॥
रामचन्द्रस्ततो जातो गम्भीरो रावणान्तकः ।
विशाला वानरचमूर्यस्मै साहाय्यकं ददौ ॥ ७६ ॥
ततः कृष्णस्तु संजातो राजनीतिविचक्षणः ।
गीतारत्नं हि यः प्रादादर्जुनाय विकल्पिने ॥ ७७ ॥
बुद्धस्तु ज्ञानवाञ्ज्ञे परमार्थप्रबोधकः ।
अवतारा अमी पञ्च निर्दिष्टाः शास्त्रवेदिभिः ॥ ७८ ॥
शारीरिकीं च मास्तिष्कीं सूचयन्ति क्रमोन्नतिम् ।
कल्किस्तु भविता काले युगधर्मप्रवर्तकः ॥ ७९ ॥
—(युग्मम् ।)

एवं सृष्टिक्रमो ज्ञेयः संक्षेपेण मयोदितः ।
पिण्डेष्वन्येषु सर्गश्चेत् क्रमोऽयमनुमीयताम् ॥ ८० ॥

चत्वारिंशत्कोटिमिताब्देभ्य आरभ्य पण्डितैः ।
सपञ्चदशकोट्यन्तं कालो निर्णीयते भुवः ॥ ८१ ॥
अस्मिन्नेवैकदा भ्रष्टं भ्रमिजन्यविकारतः ।
सूर्यमण्डलगर्भात्तु सुतप्तं भूमिमण्डलम् ॥ ८२ ॥
त्रिकोटिवर्षतः पूर्वं जीवसृष्टिरभूज्जले ।
दशलक्षाब्दतः पूर्वं मनुष्योत्पत्तिरुच्यते ॥ ८३ ॥
भूगर्भतस्तु यत् प्राप्तं चीनदेशे कपालकम् ।
दशलक्षाणि वर्षाणां तस्यायुरनुमीयते ॥ ८४ ॥
यवद्वीपोपलब्धस्य कपालस्यायुरुच्यते ।
लक्षपादादूनमथ वर्षाणां लक्षपञ्चकम् ॥ ८५ ॥
जर्मनीदेशलब्धस्य त्रिलक्षाब्दात्मकं मतम् ।
एवमेव परे लब्धाः कपालाः प्राक्तना भुवि ॥ ८६ ॥
भूगर्भाप्तकपालानामेषां रचनया तथा ।
प्राप्तिस्तरस्य दशया प्राचीन्यमनुमीयते ॥ ८७ ॥
जन्मभूमिर्मनुष्याणां जम्बूद्वीपोऽनुमीयते ।
खण्डस्य विषये तावद् मतैक्यं नोपलभ्यते ॥ ८८ ॥
केचिद् ध्रुवप्रदेशेषु काश्मीरेष्वपि केचन ।
कैस्पियन्-सिन्धुपार्श्वेऽन्ये वदन्ति मनुजोद्भवम् ॥ ८९ ॥
पुराणे काश्यपी सृष्टिः काश्मीरस्य च निर्मितिः ।
कास्पियन्नाम-साम्यं च किं व्यनक्तीति चिन्त्यताम् ॥९०॥
भूगर्भशास्त्रविदुषां पाश्चात्यानां त्विदं मतम् ।
मुनीनां तु पुराणानां मतसारः प्रवक्ष्यते ॥ ९१ ॥
नारायणभवाण्डात्तु प्रादुरासीत् पितामहः ।
तदण्डखण्डयुग्मेन द्यावाभूमी बभूवतुः ॥ ९२ ॥
संजज्ञे मनसः सृष्टिर्ब्रह्मणः स्रष्टुमिच्छतः ।
क्रमेण सृज्यमानायामाकाशश्चाभवत्ततः ॥ ९३ ॥
आकाशाद्धि ततो वायुर्वायोस्तेजो जलं ततः ।
जलात् पृथ्वी समुत्पन्ना प्राचीनोऽयं क्रमः स्मृतः ॥ ९४ ॥

आकाशस्य गुणः शब्दो वायोः स्पर्शस्तथा मतः ।
रूपं तु तेजसोऽपां तु रसो गन्धस्तथा भुवः ॥ ९५ ॥
वैज्ञानिकमते त्वद्य वायुः शब्दवहो मतः ।
निर्वातस्थानजः शब्दो यतो न श्रूयते जनैः ॥ ९६ ॥
कर्णत्वग्नेत्ररसनानासा ज्ञानेन्द्रियाण्यथ ।
शब्दं स्पर्शं च रूपं च रसं गन्धं च गृह्णते ॥ ९७ ॥
पञ्चतत्त्वमयः सर्गः स्थावरो जंगमोऽपि वा ।
जीवी जरायुजोद्भिज्जस्वेदजाण्डजभेदवान् ॥ ९८ ॥
सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति गुणास्तु प्रकृतेस्त्रयः ।
मिथो मिश्रा इमे सृष्टि-हेतवो रजसेरिताः ॥ ९९ ॥
नासीद् वर्णविभागः प्राग् मनुष्येषु ततः परम् ।
समाजस्य व्यवस्थार्थं कर्मभिस्तु व्यरच्यत ॥ १०० ॥
विद्वांसो धर्ममर्मज्ञा ब्राह्मणाः प्राग् विनिर्मिताः ।
रक्षाक्षमा नीतिपराः क्षत्रियास्तु ततः कृताः ॥ १०१ ॥
वैश्या व्यापारदक्षा ये पशुपालाः कृषिप्रियाः ।
शूद्रास्त्वन्ये समाजस्य सेवार्थं हि पृथक्कृताः ॥ १०२ ॥
एवमेव विभागोऽपि कर्मणां रचितः पुरा ।
चातुर्वर्ण्यस्य विबुधैर्जनसंघर्षनाशनः ॥ १०३ ॥
ब्रह्मणो मुखबाहूरुपादाद् योत्पत्तिरादितः ।
चातुर्वर्ण्यस्य कथिता सापि कर्मप्रबोधिनी ॥ १०४ ॥
दानादाने तु विद्याया ज्ञानधर्मप्रवर्तनम् ।
मुखस्य धर्म इत्याहुर्ब्राह्मणस्याप्यसौ मतः ॥ १०५ ॥
रक्षणं तु विनीतानां दुष्टानां दमनं तथा ।
धर्मो यो भुजयोः प्रोक्तः क्षत्राणां स विनिश्चितः ॥१०६॥
यथोरू वहतो देहं पुष्टौ व्यायामभोजनात् ।
समाजं हि तथा वैश्यः कृषिव्यापारपोषितः ॥ १०७ ॥
पादौ तु पद्यते याभ्यां शरीरं सर्वतस्तथा ।
शूद्रसेवाप्तावकाशाः पद्यन्ते कर्मणि द्विजाः ॥ १०८ ॥

यथा तु द्विजपादानामुपेक्षा हानिदा मता ।
समाजपादभूतानां शूद्राणामपि सा तथा ॥ १०९ ॥
उपेक्षया निर्बलाभ्यां पद्भ्यां देहस्य या दशा ।
भवेत्, सैव समाजस्य शूद्राणामप्युपेक्षया ॥ ११० ॥
नैव म्लेच्छोऽन्त्यजो वापि जन्मना किन्तु कर्मणा ।
भ्रष्टाचाराः सुबहवः कलौ तु द्विजमानिनः ॥ १११ ॥
भ्रष्टाचारा अदण्ड्याश्चेत् कारणैर्विविधैर्भुवि ।
कथं विघ्न उपस्थाप्यस्तर्ह्यन्यस्य क्रमोन्नतौ ॥ ११२ ॥
वेदशास्त्रपुराणेषु वर्णोन्नत्यास्त्वनेकशः
तथैवाप्यवनत्याश्च सन्त्युल्लेखा इतस्ततः ॥ ११३ ॥
विश्वामित्रस्तु राजर्षिर्ब्रह्मर्षिरभवत् पुरा ।
ज्यायांसस्तस्य पुत्रास्तु शूद्रत्वं कर्मतो गताः ॥ ११४ ॥
कुलान्यद्याप्यचिन्त्यानि धनिनां चाधिकारिणाम् ।
कालस्य हि व्यवस्थेयं जगत्यां केन वार्यते ॥ ११५ ॥
न कोऽपि सूर्यवंश्योऽस्ति चन्द्रवंश्योऽथवा भुवि ।
न कोऽपि चाग्निवंशीयो दिव्यवंश्योऽपि वा पुनः ॥११६॥
सौरमासानुगा आर्याः सौरा वा सूर्यवंशजाः ।
चान्द्रमासानुगाश्चान्द्राः सर्वे ते चन्द्रवंशजाः ॥ ११७ ॥
बौद्धजैनादिधर्मेषु दीक्षिता येऽभवन्नृपाः ।
यज्ञपूताः पुनस्तेऽथो अग्निवंश्या इहाऽभवन् ॥ ११८ ॥
वर्णानां स्वानि कर्माणि पुरा प्रोक्तानि यानि तु ।
संकरं तानि नीतानि कालेन बलिना स्वयम् ॥ ११९ ॥
लेखन्या विद्यया ये च बुद्ध्या धर्मेण जीविनः ।
विप्रकर्माण इति तान् प्राहुः कालविदो जनाः ॥ १२० ॥
युद्धेन रक्षया वापि भूस्वाम्येनाथ ये पुनः ।
जीवन्ति क्षत्रकर्माणस्तान् विदुः कुशला जनाः ॥ १२१ ॥
व्यापारेणाथ शिल्पेन कुसीदेन च जीविनः ।
कृषीवलांश्च कुत्रापि वैश्यकर्मकरान् विदुः ॥ १२२ ॥

श्रमसाध्येन कार्येण कृष्या च पशुभिः क्वचित् ।
निर्वाहं ये तु कुर्वन्ति शूद्रकर्माण एव ते ॥ १२३ ॥
अन्त्यजास्ते तु विज्ञेया हिंसयाऽशुचिकर्मभिः ।
जीवन्त्यथ च सांकर्यं कर्मणां चापि दृश्यते ॥ १२४ ॥
नियुतं सप्तलक्षं चायुते चाष्टसहस्रकम् ।
शास्त्रेषु निश्चितोऽब्दानामस्ति सत्ययुगाऽवधिः ॥ १२५ ॥
नियुतं चैव लक्षे द्वे नवाऽयुतयुतानि च ।
षट् सहस्राणि वर्षाणां त्रेतावधिरुदीरितः ॥ १२६ ॥
लक्षाण्यष्ट, सहस्राणि चतुःषष्टिं तथाऽवधिम् ।
द्वापरस्याहुरब्दानां कालमानविचक्षणाः ॥ १२७ ॥
द्वात्रिंशत्तु सहस्राणि लक्षाणां च चतुष्टयम् ।
कलेर्युगस्य वर्षाणां संख्या प्रोक्ता मनीषिभिः ॥ १२८ ॥
अथवा कलितो ज्ञेयं द्विगुणं द्वापरं युगम् ।
त्रेता तु त्रिगुणा बोध्या कृतं चाथ चतुर्गुणम् ॥ १२९ ॥
पञ्चवर्षसहस्राणि चत्वारिंशद्-युतानि तु ।
गतानि कलिवर्षाणां शेषो भोग्योऽवधिः क्रमात् ॥ १३० ॥
नवत्रिंशल्लक्षमथ हीनसप्तसहस्रकम् ।
चत्वारिंशत्समधिकं चतुर्युगसमा गताः ॥ १३१ ॥
निमेषो नेत्रनिस्पन्दः काष्ठाऽष्टादशभिस्तु तैः ।
त्रिंशत्काष्ठा कला ज्ञेया कलास्त्रिंशद् मुहूर्तकम् ॥ १३२ ॥
त्रिंशन्मुहूर्त्यहोरात्रो घटिकाषष्टिसंमितः ।
द्वौ पक्षौ कृष्णशुक्लाख्यौ पित्रहोरात्रसूचिनौ ॥ १३३ ॥
संवत्सरो मनुष्याणां दैवोऽहोरात्र उच्यते ।
उत्तरायणमर्कस्याऽहर्निशा दक्षिणायनम् ॥ १३४ ॥
दिव्यवर्षायुतेनाऽथ शतद्वययुतेन तु ।
ज्ञेयं दिव्यं युगं चात्र चतुर्भिर्वा युगैर्नृणाम् ॥ १३५ ॥
दिवो युगसहस्रेण ब्रह्मणो दिवसो मतः ।
तावत्येवास्य रात्री च सृष्टिर्ब्रह्मदिनात्मिका ॥ १३६ ॥

दैव्या युगैकसप्तत्या मन्वन्तरमुदाहृतम् ।
चतुर्दशाथ मनवो ब्रह्मणो दिवसे मताः ॥ १३७ ॥
मनोर्वैवस्वतस्याद्य सप्तमस्य कलिस्त्वयम् ।
अष्टाविंशोऽस्ति पूर्वार्धे ब्रह्मणो दिवसस्य तु ॥ १३८ ॥
आयुः कलौ वर्षशतं द्वापरे द्विगुणं नृणाम् ।
त्रेतायां त्रिगुणं प्रोक्तं कृत आसीच्चतुर्गुणम् ॥ १३९ ॥
किन्तु वेदेषु ऋषयो ‘ जीवेम शरदः शतम् ’ ।
इत्येवं प्रार्थयन्ते स्म तस्मादायुः शतं समाः ॥ १४० ॥
कृते श्रेष्ठं तपः प्रोक्तं त्रेतायां ज्ञानसंग्रहः ।
द्वापरे यज्ञकर्माणि कलौ दानं तु केवलम् ॥ १४१ ॥

यो नन्दनोऽजनि मुकुन्दमुरारिसूरे-
विश्वेश्वरः किल सतीमणि-चाँदरान्याम् ।
सृष्टिक्रमप्रकटकोऽत्र समापि तेन
विश्वेश्वरस्मृतिगतः प्रथमोऽधिकारः ॥ १४२ ॥

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THE INDIAN BULLOCK-CART : ITS PRE-HISTORIC AND VEDIC ANCESTORS

(P. K. Gode)

Mr. W. L. Murrell, Superintending Engineer, Bihar, in his paper on "*Roads in India and Australia—Our Difficulties and some suggestions*," presented before the last Roads Congress Session makes the following remarks[1] about the Indian Bullock-Cart :—

" Even greater than the difficulty of funds is the intolerable dictatorship of the steel tyre of the *Indian Bullock-Cart*. This Survivor of the Dark Ages in India is chiefly responsible for the complete stagnation of the development of our road technique and it is the steel tyre[2] that (if allowed to persist) will throttle the development of Agriculture, education and whatever goes to make a nation great." Leaving Engineers to settle the question of betterment of Indian roads by means of their road technique and the replacement of steel tyres by pneumatic rubber tyres I shall record here some information about the bullock-cart in India and its antiquity in the light of literary and archaeological evidence.

According to the *Encyclopœdia Brittanica*[3] which has some remarks about the *Primitive Vehicle* " the earliest type of vehicle was the sledge, having no wheels and mounted on runners. From the sledge was evolved the rude cart with wheels made of wooden discs used for agricultural and other purposes for many centuries with few modifications. Such carts are still to be seen in Spain, Portugal and Mexico drawn by a pair of yoked oxen ". We are further told that the requirements of war[4] and

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1. Vide p. VI of *New Review* (Calcutta) August 1940 where these remarks are quoted.

2. I have not examined the possibility of Ancient Carts or Chariots, possessing *steel tyres* which now characterize the bullock-carts. If the existence of these tyres is proved by archaeological and literary evidence Mr. Muller's criticism about them would be justified. It appears to me that the ancient chariot in India, Egypt etc. was entirely at the mercy of bad roads and hence the Vedic poet invoked the aid of the Gods *Indra* and *Vanaspati* in the *Ṛgveda*, III, 53 (18–20). We must first prove that the steel tyre of the Indian bullock-cart of the present day is really a survivor of the so-called "Dark Ages in India" referred to by Mr. Muller.

3. Fourteenth Edition (Vol. IV) 1929, Page 928—article on *Carriage*. See also article on *Cart* (p. 935).

4. Compare the Epio war-chariot to which I have referred at the end of this paper.

hunting had a marked effect on the general design of the vehicle. About 1500 B. C. we find the Egyptian[1] two-wheeled chariot in a high state of perfection while the chariots of Assyrians, Greeks and Romans were the first carriages known to us.

In the above remarks about the earliest type of vehicle no reference is found to the evolution of the Indian bullock-cart from remote antiquity. Whether the theory of the evolution of the rude cart with wheels of wooden discs from the sledge is applicable to the Indian bullock-cart or not, is also a matter for investigation by experts in the field of ancient Indian history and civilization. In view, however, of the present popular interest in bullocks and their breeding for the betterment of Indian Agriculture it is our duty to collect all possible information about the different types of bulls[2] known to ancient India from literary and archaeological sources. We must also reconstruct from fragmentary data the history of the Indian bullock-cart which had so much to do with Indian Agriculture from the remotest antiquity.

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1. Vide *Egyptian Wall Paintings of the Tombs and Palaces of the XVIII and XIX Dynasties* (1600-1200 B.C.) by Ambrose Lansing, The Metropolitan Museum of Art,—Newyork, 1930.

Page 15—The Tomb of Ken-Amūn (*No. 93*) about *1430 B.C.*—Nos. 47, 48 —New year's Gifts scene "The Chariot is interesting for its inscription: "*The Chariot of his majesty, 'The Syrian by name'. Its wood was brought from To-nūter in the country of Naharīn.*" The Chariot was a novelty in Egypt and the Egyptians still made it of wood imported from Asia. A bow, a mace, and a poniard, a coat of scale armor, and elaborately decorated quivers were included among the gifts."

The Tomb of User-Ḥet (No. 56)—about *1430 B.C.*

51. *Hunting from a Chariot.* Egypt had not known horses or Chariots until the invasions of Hyksos and their early use by Egyptians was naturally in war. Here, however, *User-Ḥet* has gone out hunting in his Chariot and is creating havoc among the desert animals. The scene is unfinished, as may be seen not only by the omission of details but also by the blank columns where the inscription should be,

The Tomb of Ḥuy (No. 40—about *1355 B.C.*—No. 103—"Furniture, shields and a *Chariot.*"

2. Vide p. 28 of *Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Civilization* by Sir John Marshall, Vol. I, London, 1931—"From the abundant remains of the humped Indian bulls met with in every stratum of the site (most of them, be it said, of young animals) it is evident that the Indus valley must have been specially rich in this fine breed of cattle, which was closely allied to,

(*Continued on next page*)

As the Mohenjo-daro Civilization is pre-historic and as it is the oldest known civilization of all civilizations that were nurtured by the Indian peninsula, its evidence regarding the bullock-cart must be treated with some deference in all investigation about the antiquity of the Indian bullock-cart. Fortunately for us the clay-models of toys discovered at Mohenjo-daro include clay-models of carts also along with those of other toys in which birds etc. are represented. The remarks[1] of Sir John Marshall regarding these clay-models of toys and in particular about the toy-carts are as follows :—" Birds might be mounted on wheels and oxen might be yoked to toy-carts (Plate CLIII, No. 24). These little toy-carts are particularly interesting as being amongst the earliest representations of wheeled vehicles known to us, approximately contemporary, that is to say, with the Chariot[2] depicted on a stone slab at Ur (*about*

if not identical with the magnificent white and grey breed still common in Sind, Northern Gujarat and Rajputana, but wholly different from the small humped cattle of Central India and the Dekkan. To what a pitch these magnificent creatures had been bred at this remote period may be gauged from the life-like engravings of them on seals 329–40 one of which is reproduced on the front cover of this volume.—Besides the great humped cattle there was also a smaller short-horned and humpless species which is not infrequently represented among the terra-cotas of this period, both in the Indus valley and Balucistan but of which no actual bones or horns have yet been identified."

In *foot note 1*, Marshall states that the humped bull must have been common at this time in Balucistan and appears to have been known in West Persia and Mesopotamia (Cf. Ch. XVIII, p. 347) but whether the breed in these countries was the same as in Sind it is not possible to determine. He rejects Colonel Sewell's suggestion that these humped cattle were posterior to the sheep and buffalo as the seals and other objects depicting these animals are found indiscriminately at all levels.

1. Vide p. 39 of *Mohenjo-daro* etc., Vol. I, 1931.

2. Cf. a sculptured relief of an Assyrian *War-Chariot* of about 650 B.C. in the Louvre (p. 56 of Oxford *History of the World* by Davies, 1937). This Chariot has two wheels (with axle and spokes) and an open box in which we find four men, one of which is the driver holding the reins of the horse yoked to the Chariot. By the side of the driver we find a man shooting an arrow from the bow in his hand. The remaining two men are shown with shields of a circular type in their hands. *On p. 160* we find a photo of an Etruscan Chariot which is bronze-work (in the Metropolitan Museum, New York). This Chariot also has two wheels with axle and spokes, and a

(*See next page*)

3200 B. C. according to Mr. Wooley) and the model of a wagon from Anau (See infra Chap. XXVII, pp. 554–5)."

"The toy-carts from Mohenjo-daro are all of terra-cota and for the most part of the type shown by Mr. Mackay on Plate CLIV where they are compared with the modern farm-carts of Sind. There is a specimen however, from Harappā made of copper which seems as if it might rather have resembled the present-day *ekka.* No doubt many other children's toys were made of less durable materials than terra-cota and have perished in the course of ages."

The *Copper-cart* referred to by Marshall in the above remarks is described[1] as follows :—

"Among other objects found a peculiar interest attaches to a very fragmentary *two-wheeled miniature copper-cart* (Plate XXIII d). The *axle*, *wheels*, and *the animal*[2] which were originally attached to it are missing. The cart is open, front and back, provided with shafts and relieved on the gabled roof and side-walls with lozenge and cross-shaped patterns. The driver is seated in front on a raised seat."

The foregoing description about the two-wheeled carts represented by a clay-model and a miniature copper-model found at Mohenjo-daro and Harappā respectively establish beyond challenge the existence of two-wheeled vehicles in these two regions in pre-historic times. Whether these two-wheeled vehicles were evolved from sledges in earlier times on Indian soil as suggested by the writer in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* with respect to Europen civilization we cannot say at present.

Let us now record some evidence regarding the *two-wheeled vehicle* from some literary sources connected with the Aryan Civilization. In the *Ṛgveda*, the earliest record of the Aryan

long pole with yoke, the two ends of which are curved downwards to fit the necks of animals to be yoked to it. The Chariot is occupied by two persons. *On page 184* a picture of a Roman Chariot race from a Roman Mosaic in Britain is given. Here we find four two-wheeled Chariots in motion, each drawn by two horses. These races were very popular in ancient Rome.

1. Vide p. 105 of the *Report of the Arch. Survey of India for* 1926–27 —Exploration at Harappa.

2. Was this animal *a bullock* or a *horse* ?

race there are numerous references to *bulls*, *cows*, *buffaloes* as also to *cars* and *chariots*[1]. The best reference for our present purpose is furnished by *Sūkta 53* of the Third *Maṇḍala* of the *Ṛgveda*. This *Sūkta* or hymn contains practically a terminology for the different parts of the Chariot and its equipment as follows :—

(1) The *Chariot* is called स्यन्दन.

(2) It was made of the *timber* of the खदिर tree and the शिंशपा tree.

(3) It was a means of travel and hence is called याम.

(4) It was drawn by *two bulls* (गावौ) which are also called by the word अनडुत्.

(5) Its *axle* is called अक्ष.

(6) Its *pole* was called ईषा.

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1. Vide Index to the Translation of the Ṛgveda by Griffith, Vol. I, 1896, pp. 10, 13, 109, 261, 275, 144, 281, 287, 375, 612, 644 and Vol. II, (1897) pp. 228, 303, 351, 360, 558.

See also Mr. G. T. Date's *Art of War in Ancient India* (1929) Chapter V on War Animals and War Vehicles, (pp. 43-51), Mr. Date describes the Chariot of Vedic Aryans with following particulars :—

(1) Two wheels, (2) a rim (*pavi*), (3) a felly (*pradhi*), spokes (*arā*), nave (*nābhi*). The rim and felly constituted the *nemi*. The hole in the nave was called *Kha* into which the end of the axle was put. Solid wheels were sometimes used. The axle (*akṣa*) was made of *arāṭa* wood and the body of the Chariot (*Kośa*) was placed above it. There were seats for warriors (*vandhura* or *garta*. Ordinarily there was a pole, one end of which passed through the yoke, the other being attached to the axle. The pole and yoke were tied together. The yoke was placed on the necks of horses. *Raśmi* or *Raśanā* means reins and *Kāśa* denotes a whip. Two horses were commonly used. sometimes three or more were also employed. A poor man had to be content with one horse which then ran between two poles. The pole was a hundred and eighty eight *aṅguḷs* long, the axle a hundred and four and the yoke, eighty six. Besides horses, asses (*gardabha*) and mules (*aśvatarī*) were also used to draw the Chariot. (See *Vedic Index* by Keith and Macdonell, pp. 201 ff.)

Mr. Date states further that the Epic Chariot did not materially differ from the Vedic Car. He then describes the Epic Chariot on p. 47.

(Mr. Date does not refer to the *Syandana* or Chariot drawn by bulls described in Sūkta 53 of *Maṇḍal* III of Ṛgveda. Perhaps the *Horse Chariot* was used as a war-vehicle while the *bullock Chariot* was meant for ordinary travel.)

(7) Its *yoke* is termed युग.

(8) Its *fellies* are denoted by the word प्रधि.

(9) Its *yoke-pins* are called पातल्ये which Sāyaṇa explains as "पतनशीले कीलके" because they were liable to slip out.

The Vedic poet, the author of this hymn, invokes god Indra and Vanaspati or the "sovereign of the wood" to keep the Chariot and its parts in good trim so that the traveller may reach his home safely without any mishap on the way.[1]

The detailed information about the Chariot recorded above is found in verses or Ṛks[2] 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Hymn 53 of Maṇdal III of the Ṛgveda and it gives us a vivid idea of the two-wheeled vehicle current in the Vedic age. References to the

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1. The safety of travellers in the Vedic Chariot was of course greater than that now furnished by our motor lorries and aeroplanes and still the men of the Vedic age invoked the gods for their safety in travel. The prayer of modern travellers, if at all they think of safety, is that the driver is not in a drunken state or the pilot has the necessary license for his ability to pilot his passenger-plane safely.

2. I reproduce below the translation of these Ṛks as given by Griffith (p. 375 of Vol. I) :—

"17. Strong be the pair of *Oxen*, firm the axles, let not the *pole* slip nor the yoke be broken. May Indra keep the *yoke-pins* from decaying; attend us thou, whose fellies are un-injured.

18. O Indra, give our bodies strength, strength to the bulls who draw the wains.

Strength to our seed and progeny that they may live, for thou art he who giveth strength.

19. Enclose thee in the heart of Khayar timber, in the Car wrought of Ṣiṣapá put firmness.

Show thyself strong, O Axle, fixed and strengthened, throw us not from the Car whereon we travel.

20. Let not this Sovran of the wood leave us forlorn or injure us.

Safe may we be until we reach our homes, and rest us and unyoke."

We can imagine from the above description of a Chariot in motion the mental condition of persons travelling in it. The experience of those Vedic users of this bullock-chariot without springs or spring-cushions must have been practically the same as we get while travelling in a bullock-cart to villages not so much on P. W. D. roads as on Local Board roads. We now invoke the aid of the Engineers at *Indraprastha* (Delhi) to provide a pattern of the bullock-chariot which would ensure ease and comfort to the Indian villager.

Chariot in later[1] Sanskrit literature are too numerous to be recorded in this paper, which is confined to the Indian *bullock-cart* in its earliest form. In the Buddhist literature as also in the early Jain literature there are plenty of references to the vehicles which are worth studying with a view to see what types of vehicles and their equipment were in vogue in the post-Vedic period upto the beginning of the Christian era.

Mr. G. T. Date[2] refers to the oldest Indian war-car as represented in the paintings of a Sumerian King[3] who reigned in 1495 B. C. He observes that this chariot[4] closely resembles the

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1. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* which was composed before Buddha and Pāṇini (Winternitz : *History of Indian Literature* I, p. 236) refers to शकट or Car :—

" सोऽधस्तात् शकटस्य पामानं कषमाणम् etc."

(p. 184 of Anandashram Series No. 14 of 1890) छा. उ.—IV, 1, 8. The *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali contains numerous references to शकट (शकट, शकटसार्थ, शकटि, शकटिन्, शकटिबन्धु, शकटी—Vide p. 1009 of Index to *Mahābhāṣya* B. O. R. Institute, Poona).

The use of Chariots in the Mahābhārata war was very common. These chariots consisted of two wheels only (" द्वावश्विनौ द्वे रथस्यापि चक्रे "—*Vanaparvan*). Vide hage 510 to 524 of महाभारताचा उपसंहार by C. V. Vaidya, Poona, 1922, on p. 518. Mr. Vaidya gives description of Rathas (रथवर्णन) some points from which I note below :—

(1) The Epic Chariot was drawn by four horses.

(2) The Chariot as well as the horses were well decorated,

(3) The Chariot had a top (resembling a temple dome) which held a fluttering flag bearing characteristic colour and symbol of each warrior.

(4) The Chariot had a big drum on it. Some Chariots had two *mṛdaṅgas* which produced sound when the Chariot was in motion.

This is a typical war Chariot and it presents a vivid contrast to the Vedic bullock-drawn cart or Chariot referred to in *Ṛgveda*, I, 53 (18-20).

2. *Art of War* etc. 1929, p. 49.

3. This King is Thothmes III (1495 B. C.). Vide Plates XVI and XXIX of *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I.

4. This Chariot is said to have been presented by Indian Charioteers to the Sumerian Sovereign. It resembles the *Sanchi Chariot* with two wheels and an open box behind. It has one pole with a yoke at the end but the *Sanchi Chariot* has one long pole in the middle and two short shafts on the sides. The yoke is attached to the middle one. I think the Sanchi Chariot resembles in point of construction the bulock-carts used in Konkan and other parts of the Deccan.

two-wheeled car found in the Sanchi bas-reliefs drawn by two horses. On the railing of the Barhut[1] *Stūpa* also we find a four-horse Chariot. These are representations of cars drawn by horses and not by bullocks and hence do not enable us to visualise clearly the pattern of the ancient bullock-cart as such which may have been current in those days and used for agricultural purposes.[2]

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1. The *Barhut Car* has four horses yoked in one line. Mr. Date states that "Chariots are engraved on the terra-cota plaque from Bhita and the Copper *loṭa* from Katu (*Indo-Ary.* p. 339). Like the Sanchi Car they are open on all sides".

2. This study of the Indian bullock-cart and allied vehicles is by no means exhaustive. I have supplied a short summary of it to the Agricultural Engineer to the Government of Bombay in response to an inquiry from him in this matter in August 1940. I trust, however, it would be of some use to laymen, if not to the experts in the field of ancient Indian Culture and Civilization.

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Mahimnastotram (महिम्नस्तोत्रम्)—A poem in praise of Śiva and Vīṣṇu by Puṣpadanta, ed, with Paraphrase, Explanations and Trans. in Marāṭhi by D. G. Padhye. Poona, 1940. Cr. Pp. 20, 116. As. 12

POLITICS

Sovereignty in Ancient Indian Polity—A Study in the Evolution of Early Indian State (Thesis approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of London, 1935) by Dr. H. N. Sinha. Calcutta, 1938. Roy. Pp. XXII, 344. Rs. 9-0

VEDA

Rudrādhyāyaḥ (रुद्राध्यायः) with a new gloss by Viṣṇu Suri. Rudrādhyāya as interpreted by Sāyaṇācārya for the Standpoint of Karma is already published. While this commentary throws a fresh light on the work interpreting it from the point of Adhyātma. Poona, 1940. Roy. Pp. 75. As. 12

S'atapathabrāhmaṇam (**शतपथब्राह्मणम्**) of Mādhyāndina Śākhā, Pt. I contains first 6 Kāṇdas, ed. by Pandit Candradhara Śārma Caudhari and Pt. Vidyādhar Gauḍa. Kashi, 1938. Cloth. Roy. Pp. 38, 763. Rs. 3-8

Sāmaveda-Saṁhitā (**सामवेदसंहिता**) ed. with an Intro. in Sk. by Pt. S. D. Sātavalekar with the help of Vaidic Panditas and with readings from several old Manuscripts. Aundh, 1939. D. Demi, 16,300. Rs. 3-0

Received Too Late For Classification

Bhāsa—A Study by A. D. Pusalkar with a Forword by Dr. A. B. Keith. The most exhaustive and latest book on Bhāsa Problem. Lahore 1940. D. Roy. Cloth. Pp. V, 472 with 5 Appendices. Rs. 15

Upaniṣadvākya-Mahākos'a (**उपनिषद्वाक्य—महाकोश**) Pūrvārdha. Being an alphabetical register of 40,000 sentences culled out from 223 available and unavailable Upanisads, compiled by G. S. Sadhale Shastri. Col. Jacob's "Upanisadvakya Kosa", the only book of its kind, being long out of print, a long-felt want is removed by the publication of this work. Bombay, 1940. D. Roy. Cloth. Pp. 352. Rs. 7

(Uttarārdha to be out in six months or so).

DOCTORS & DOCTORS

One little doctor looks you thro' and thro'
Can't diagnose your case, and then there are two.
Two little doctors, failing to agree,
Call a consultation, then there are three.
Three little doctors, poke you over and over,
Send for a specialist, then there are four.
Four little doctors, wonder you are alive,
Another brings a stomach pump, then there are five.
Five little doctors, trying fancy tricks,
Order in the X-ray man, then there are six.
Six little doctors, preparing you for Heaven,
In comes a D. D. then there are seven.
Seven little doctors, decide to operate,
Call in a surgeon, then there are eight.
Eight little doctors, think it's on your spine,
Ask for a Neurologist, then there are nine.
Nine little doctors, all of them are men,
Send for a lady doctor, then there are ten.
Ten little doctors, standing by your bed,
Come to a decision : Find that you are dead.

"यस्योत्पत्तिविनाशकारणमुपलभ्यत इति मन्यसे,—न तद्भूतलक्षणहीनमर्थान्तरं गृह्यते। भूतलक्षणावरोधाद्भूतमात्रमिदमित्ययुक्तोऽयं प्रतिषेध इति" ॥ ३१ ॥

नोत्पत्तितत्कारणोपलब्धेः ॥ ३२ ॥[1]

कारणसमानगुणस्योत्पत्तिः कारणं चोपलभ्यते। न चैतदुभयं नित्यविषयम्। न चोत्पत्तितत्कारणोपलब्धिः शक्या प्रत्याख्यातुम्। न चाविषया काचिदुपलब्धिः। उपलब्धिसामर्थ्यात्कारणेन समानगुणं कार्यमुत्पद्यत इत्यनुमीयते। स खलूपलब्धेर्विषय इति। एवं च तल्लक्षणावरोधोपपत्तिरिति।

उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणप्रयुक्तस्य[2] ज्ञातुः प्रयत्नो दृष्ट इति। प्रसिद्धश्चावयवी[3] तद्धर्मा। उत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मा चावयवी सिद्ध इति।

शब्दकर्मबुद्ध्यादीनां[4] चाव्याप्तिः। 'पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात्', 'तल्लक्षणावरोधा'-च्चेत्यनेन शब्दकर्मबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्च न व्याप्ताः, तस्मादनेकान्तः।

"स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवन्मिथ्योपलब्धिरिति चेत्"—भूतोपलब्धौ तुल्यम्। "यथा स्वप्ने विषयाभिमान एवमुत्पत्तिविनाशकारणाभिमान इति"। एवं चैतद्भूतोपलब्धौ तुल्यं—पृथिव्याद्युपलब्धिरपि स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवत् प्रसज्यते।

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१ पूर्वपक्षिण उक्तिं परिहरति—नोत्पत्तीतिसूत्रेण। यदुक्तं तन्न—कुतः यतो गोघटादीनामुत्पत्तिस्तदुत्पत्तिकारणं चोपलभ्यते, तस्मादनित्यान्येवैतानीति मन्तव्यम्। गोघटादीनां भूतसारूप्यं भूतकार्यत्वेऽप्युपपद्यमानं न भूतात्मकत्वं भूतवन्नित्यत्वं वाऽवगमयतीत्याशयः।

२ स्वपक्षसाधकमनुभवान्तरमाह—उत्पत्तिविनाशेति। यदि भावानामुत्पत्तिविनाशौ न वस्तुसन्तौ तर्हि प्रेक्षावतामभिमतवस्तूत्पत्तिकारणासादनायानभिमतवस्तुविनाशकारणासादनाय च तदर्थिनां प्रवृत्तिर्नैव स्यादित्यर्थः।

३ उपपत्त्यन्तरमाह—प्रसिद्ध इति। यः कश्चिदवयवी स सर्व एवोत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मेति सार्वजनीनोऽनुभव इत्यर्थः।

४ परोक्तस्य हेतुद्वयस्याव्यापकत्वं प्रदर्शयति—शब्दकर्मेति।

अत्राव्यापक एवानैकान्त उक्तः। पक्षो हि सर्वं नित्यमिति—तस्मिन् पक्षे उक्तहेतुद्वयस्य सत्त्वमप्युपलभ्यते (पृथिव्यादौ), असत्त्वमप्युपलभ्यते (शब्दादौ)—तस्मादयं हेतुरनेकान्तः—'अनेकः' सत्त्वासत्त्वलक्षणः 'अन्तः' अवस्था यस्य स इत्यर्थः।

"पृथिव्याद्यभावे सर्वव्यवहारविलोप इति चेत्"–तदितरत्र समानम्। उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धिविषयस्याप्यभावे सर्वव्यवहारविलोप इति। सोऽयं नित्यानामतीन्द्रियत्वादविषयत्वाच्चोत्पत्तिविनाशयोः–स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवादिति–अहेतुरिति ॥ ३२ ॥

"अवस्थितस्[1]योपादानस्य धर्ममात्रं निवर्तते, धर्ममात्रमुपजायते। स खलूत्पत्तिविनाशयोर्विषयः। यच्चोपजायते तत्प्रागप्युपजननादस्ति, यच्च निवर्तते तन्निवृत्तमप्यस्तीति। एवं च सर्वस्य नित्यत्वमिति"।

न व्य[2]वस्थानुपपत्तेः ॥ ३३ ॥

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१ तदेवं साङ्ख्यानां मतमपास्य स्वायंभुवानां मतं दूषयिष्यन् तन्मतेन सिद्धान्त्युपन्यस्तोत्पत्तिविनाशयोरन्यथोपपत्तिं प्रदर्श्य तत्साधकत्वमाक्षिपति–अवस्थितस्येति। त्रिविधः खल्वयं धर्मिणः परिणामो धर्म–लक्षणा–ऽवस्थारूपः। तद्यथा–सुवर्णं धर्मि–तस्य वर्धमानरुचकादिर्धर्मपरिणामः। लक्षणपरिणामोऽनागतादिः। यदा खलु सुवर्णकारो वर्धमानकं भङ्क्त्वा रुचकमारचयति तदा वर्धमानको वर्तमानलक्षणं हित्वाऽतीतलक्षणमापद्यते, रुचकस्त्वनागतलक्षणं हित्वा वर्तमानतामापद्यते। वर्तमानतामापन्न एव च रुचको नवपुराणभावमापद्यमानोऽवस्थापरिणामवान् भवति। नवपुराणावस्थाश्च वर्तमानलक्षणाश्रया लक्षणपरिणामाः। सोऽयं त्रिविधः परिणामो धर्मिणः। धर्मलक्षणावस्थाश्च धर्मिणो भिन्नाश्चाभिन्नाश्च। धर्मिणोऽभिन्नाः सन्तो धर्मा अपि नित्याः। तस्माद्भिन्नाश्चोत्पत्तिनाशविषया अनित्याः। तथा च नानाविधेषु परिणामेष्वेक एव धर्म्यनुवर्तते–एवञ्चावर्तमानो नित्य एवेति। 'अवस्थितस्य' नित्यस्य 'उपादानस्य' समवायिकारणस्य धर्ममात्रमुत्पद्यते नश्यति च–एवं च धर्ममात्रमुत्पत्तिनाशयोर्विषयो न वस्तुभूतो धर्मी गोघटादिः। अभ्युपेत्य-वादोऽयम्। वस्तुतस्तु धर्माणामपि नोत्पत्तिविनाशौ–प्रागुत्पत्तेरर्वाक्च विनाशात् धर्मिरूपेण तेषां वर्तमानत्वादिति सर्वनित्यत्वं तदवस्थमेवेत्याक्षेपाशयः।

२ उक्तं स्वायम्भुवानामाक्षेपं परिहरति–न व्यवस्थेति सूत्रम्। उपजनापाययोः स्वरूपतः कालतो विशेषतश्च सम्बन्धितोऽनागतत्वादिव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेरित्यर्थः। एतदुक्तं भवति। न तावद् भेदाभेदौ परस्परपरिहार-व्यवस्थितधर्मावेकत्र समवेतौ। तस्मादुपजनापायव्यवस्थायै धर्मलक्षणावस्थानां धर्मिणो भेदमिच्छता तेषामनित्यत्वमप्यभ्युपेतव्यमिति।

वृत्तिकारमतेन तु उत्पादविनाशप्रत्ययस्य भ्रान्तत्वं स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह–न व्यवस्थेति सूत्रम्। सार्वलौकिकप्रमात्वेन सिद्धस्यापि भ्रमत्वशङ्कायां प्रमाभ्रम-व्यवहारविलोपः स्यादिति च तस्यार्थः।

अयमुपजनः, इयं निवृत्तिरिति व्यवस्था नोपपद्यते, उपजातनिवृत्तयोर्विद्यमानत्वात्। अयं धर्म उपजातोऽयं निवृत्त इति सद्भावाविशेषादव्यवस्था। इदानीमुपजननिवृत्ती, नेदानीमिति कालव्यवस्था नोपपद्यते, सर्वदा विद्यमानत्वात्। अस्य धर्मस्योपजननिवृत्ती,नास्येति व्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः,उभयोरविशेषात्। अनागतोऽतीत इति च कालव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः, वर्तमानस्य सद्भावलक्षणत्वात्। अविद्यमानस्यात्मलाभ[1] उपजनो विद्यमानस्यात्महानं निवृत्तिरित्येतस्मिन् सति नैते दोषाः। तस्माद्यदुक्तं–प्रागप्युपजनादस्ति, निवृत्तं चास्ति–तदयुक्तमिति ॥ ३३ ॥

(९) सर्वपृथक्त्वनिराकरणप्रकरणम्[2] ।

अयमन्य एकान्तः[3]—

" सर्वं[4][5] पृथक् भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात् " ॥ ३४ ॥

" सर्वं नाना। न कश्चिदेको भावो विद्यते। कस्मात्? भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात्। भावस्य लक्षणमभिधानम्। येन लक्ष्यते भावः स समाख्याशब्दः, तस्य पृथग्विषयत्वात्। सर्वो भावसमाख्याशब्दः समूहवाची। कुम्भ इति संज्ञा-

१ उक्ता व्यवस्थाः सर्वा अपि सिद्धान्त उपपद्यन्त इति स्वपक्षे साधकमाह–अविद्यमानस्येति।

२ एवं तावत् गुणगुणि–भावाभाव–चेतनाचेतन–दृष्टादृष्ट–नित्यानित्यसमुच्चयः सामग्रीति समर्थितम्। इदानीं समुच्चयविरुद्धोऽर्थो निराकर्तव्यः। स चैकत्वनिराकरणवादः (सू० ३४–३६), शून्यतावादः (सू० ३७–४०), सङ्ख्यैकान्तवादश्चेति (सू० ४१–४३) त्रिधा। एकाभावे हि कस्य कः समुच्चयः? एवमद्वैतवादेऽपि। तत्र सर्वाभावे शून्यतायां निरुपाख्ये जगति कः समुच्चयः?

३ प्रथममेकत्वनिराकरणवादमुत्थापयति–अयमन्य इति। अयं वादो बौद्धानामिति तात्पर्यकृतः।

४ सर्वपृथक्त्ववादमाह-सर्वं पृथगिति सूत्रम्। 'सर्वं पृथक्' घटादिकं स्वस्मादपि पृथक्–कस्मात्? 'भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात्' भावलक्षणानां गन्धरसादीनां च पृथक्त्वात्, घटादेश्च तदभेदात्। न रूपाद्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यं नाम किञ्चिदस्ति। नाप्यवयवातिरिक्तः कश्चिदवयवीति सौत्रान्तिका वैभाषिकाश्च प्रतिपन्नाः।

५ कुम्भपददृष्टान्तेनैतत् सिद्धं यदेकवाचि किमपि पदं नास्ति। ततश्च सिद्धं न किमप्येकमस्तीति पूर्वपक्षसङ्क्षेपः।

शब्दो गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शसमूहे बुध्नपार्श्वग्रीवादिसमूहे च वर्त्तते। निदर्शनमात्रं चेदमिति" ॥ ३४ ॥

[1]नानेकलक्षणैरेकभावनिष्पत्तेः ॥ ३५ ॥

अनेकविधलक्षणैरिति। मध्यमपदलोपी समासः। गन्धादिभिश्च गुणैर्बुध्नादिभिश्चावयवैः सम्बद्ध एको भावो निष्पद्यते। गुणव्यतिरिक्तं च द्रव्यमवयवातिरिक्तश्चावयवीति। [2]विभक्तन्यायं चैतदुभयमिति ॥ ३५ ॥

[3]अथापि—

लक्षणव्यवस्थानादेवाप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३६ ॥

न कश्चिदेको भाव इत्ययुक्तः प्रतिषेधः। कस्मात्? 'लक्षणव्यवस्थानादेव'। यदिह लक्षणं भावस्य संज्ञाशब्दभूतं तदेकस्मिन्व्यवस्थितं—यं कुम्भमद्राक्षं तं स्पृशामि, यमेवास्प्राक्षं तं पश्यामीति। नाणुसमूहो गृह्यत इति। अणुसमूहे चागृह्यमाणे यद्गृह्यते तदेकमेवेति।

[4]अथाप्येतदनु[5]क्तं—"[6]नास्त्येको भावो यस्मात्समुदायः"। [7]एकानुप-

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१ पूर्वपक्षं निरस्यन् सिद्धान्तमाह—नानेकेति सूत्रम्। यदुक्तं तन्न, कुतः? यतः अनेकैः 'लक्षणैः' भावैः एकस्यैव भावस्य तत्समष्ट्यात्मकस्य निष्पत्तिर्भवति, गुणानामाश्रयोऽवयवैरारब्ध एक एवावयवीति भावः।

तथा चोक्तं वृत्तिकृता—एकस्य धर्मिणः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात्, तस्य च चाक्षुषत्वरासनत्वादिविरुद्धधर्माध्यस्तरूपरसाद्यात्मकत्वाभावात्, अवयवानां च कारणत्वात्, कार्यकारणयोरभेदासम्भवाच्च न तत्तदात्मकत्वं घटादेः सम्भवतीति भावः।

२ ननु गुणातिरिक्तत्वमवयवातिरिक्तत्वं च किं तव वाङ्मात्रेण सिद्धं भवतीत्यत आह—विभक्तेति। उभयमप्येतत्—गुणातिरिक्तं गुणाश्रयो द्रव्यमवयवातिरिक्तोऽवयवीत्युभयमपि—'विभक्तन्यायम्'—'विभक्ताः' सुस्पष्टं व्युत्पादिता 'न्यायाः' हेतवो यस्य तत्तथाभूतम्। साधितावेवार्थाविमौ प्राक् द्वितीयाध्यायगतद्वितीयाह्निकस्थत्रयस्त्रिंशादिसूत्रैरतो नात्र पुनः प्रपञ्च्यते तत्साधनमित्याशयः।

३ पूर्वपक्षनिरासे हेत्वन्तरमवतारयति—अथापीति। अपि चेत्यर्थः।

४ दूषणान्तरमभिधास्यन् पूर्वपक्षतात्पर्यमनुवदति—अथाप्येतदिति।

५ अनुक्तमिति। भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वादिति हेतुमुक्त्वा पश्चादपरं हेत्वन्तरमुच्यत इत्यर्थः।

६ तदेव हेत्वन्तरमनुवदति—नास्त्येक इति। घटादिरेको भावो नास्ति किन्त्वनेकगुणानामनेकावयवानां च समुदायरूप एवासावित्यर्थः।

७. तन्निराकरोति—एकानुपपत्तेरिति। समुदायोऽपि बहुभिः प्रत्येकं भिन्नैरेव समुदायिभिः संपद्यतेऽतो यदि एकः कश्चिन्नास्ति तर्हि समुदायस्याप्यभाव एवेत्यर्थः।

पत्तेर्नास्त्येव समूहः । "नास्त्येको भावो यस्मात्समूहे भावशब्दप्रयोगः"। एकस्य चानुपपत्तेः समूहो नोपपद्यते–एकसमुच्चयो हि समूह इति व्याहतत्वादनुपपन्नं–नास्त्येको भाव–इति। यस्य प्रतिषेधः प्रतिज्ञायते–समूहे भावशब्दप्रयोगात्–इति हेतुं ब्रुवता स एवाभ्यनुज्ञायते, एकसमुच्चयो हि समूह इति। समूहे भावशब्दप्रयोगादिति च समूहमाश्रित्य प्रत्येकं समूहिप्रतिषेधो–नास्त्येको भाव–इति। सोऽयमुभयतो व्याघाताद्यत्किञ्चनवाद इति ॥ ३६ ॥

(१०) सर्वशून्यतानिराकरणप्रकरणम्।

अयमपर एकान्तः—

"सर्वमभावो भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः" ॥ ३७ ॥

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१ अनूक्तस्यैव पूर्वपक्षहेतोस्तात्पर्यं स्फोरयति–नास्तीति । यस्माद्घटादिसंज्ञाशब्दो गुणानामवयवानां च समूहमेव वक्त्यतो नास्ति कश्चिदेको भाव इत्यर्थः।

२ प्रागुक्तमेव दूषणं पुनराह–एकस्येति । उक्तार्थमेतत् ।

३ ततः किमित्यत आह–व्याहतत्वादिति–एको भावो नास्ति—समुदायश्चास्तीति मिथो व्याहतं वच इत्यर्थः ।

४ तदेव स्पष्टयति–यस्य प्रतिषेध इति । 'नास्त्येको भाव इति' यस्य भावस्यैकत्वप्रतिषेधः प्रतिज्ञायते स एवैको भावोऽभ्यनुज्ञायते 'समूहे भावशब्दप्रयोगात्' इति हेतुं ब्रुवतेत्यर्थः ।

५ कथमभ्यनुज्ञायत इत्यत आह–एकेति । समूहो हि बहुभिरनेकैरेव सम्पादितो भवतीत्यतः समूहं स्वीकुर्वता भावानां पृथक्त्वमेकत्वं च स्वीकृतं भवतीत्यर्थः ।

६ एवं प्रतिज्ञया हेतोर्व्याघातमुक्त्वाऽधुना हेतुना प्रतिज्ञाया व्याघातमाह–समूहे भावेति । 'समूहे भावशब्दप्रयोगादि'ति हेतुवाक्ये समूहोऽभ्युपगम्यते–अथ च नास्त्येको भाव इति प्रतिज्ञावाक्ये समूहगतसमूही प्रतिषिध्यते–प्रत्येकं सकलसमूहिप्रतिषेधश्च समूहस्यापि प्रतिषेधे पर्यवस्यतीत्यर्थः ।

७ उपसंहरति–सोऽयमिति । उक्तव्याघातद्वयेन पराहतत्वादेकप्रतिषेधवादः सर्वथाऽनादरणीय एवेत्यर्थः ।

८ सर्वशून्यतायां हि कार्यकारणभावासम्भव इति तन्निराकरणाय प्रकरणमारभमाणः सर्वशून्यतावादं प्रस्तौति–अयमपर इति ।

९ शून्यतावादमुत्थापयति–सर्वमभाव इति सूत्रेण । 'सर्वमभाव' इति प्रतिज्ञा, तत्र हेतुः 'भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः' सर्वेषां पदार्थानां परस्पराभावरूपतैव यत इत्यर्थः । प्रयोगश्च–सर्वे भावशब्दा असद्विषयाः, असत्प्रत्ययभावप्रतिषेधाभ्यां भावशब्दसामानाधिकरण्यात्, अनुत्पन्नप्रध्वस्तपटशब्दवदिति ।

" यावद्भावजातं तत्सर्वमभावः । कस्मात्? भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः । असन् गौरश्वात्मना–अनश्वो गौः; असन् अश्वो गवात्मना–अगौरश्वः, इत्यसत्प्रत्ययस्य प्रतिषेधस्य च भावशब्देन सामानाधिकरण्यात् सर्वमभाव इति " ॥

प्रतिज्ञावाक्ये[1] पदयोः प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोश्च व्याघातादयुक्तम् । अनेकस्या[2]शेषता सर्वशब्दस्यार्थो भावप्रतिषेधश्चाभावशब्दस्यार्थः । पूर्वं[3] सोपाख्यमुत्तरं निरुपाख्यम् । तत्र[4] समुपाख्यायमानं कथं निरुपाख्यमभावः स्यादिति । न जात्वभावो निरुपाख्योऽनेकतयाऽशेषतया शक्यः प्रतिज्ञातुमिति ।

शून्यतावादश्चेत्थं समुल्लपति– प्रमाणादयः खल्वमी परस्परानात्मतयाऽसदिति-प्रत्ययस्य नञश्च गोचरा इत्यनुभूयन्ते । अतस्तद्वाचिनां शब्दानां तत्सामानाधिकरण्यम् । ततः प्रमाणादयोऽसन्तोऽनुत्पन्नप्रध्वस्तपटवत् । अपि चामी भावा नित्या अनित्या वा । नित्यत्वे सर्वसामर्थ्यरहितस्यासत्त्वम् । न हि नित्यं क्वचित्कार्ये उपयुज्यते क्रमाक्रमानुपपत्तेरित्युक्तम् । अनित्यत्वे नु विनाशस्वभावाश्चेद् द्वितीयादिक्षणेष्विव प्रथमक्षणेऽपि न स्युः । सत्त्वे वा नामी विनाशस्वभावाः । अतत्स्वभावकत्वे वा क्षणान्तरेऽपि न नश्येयुः । नो खलु नीलं स्वकारणादुपजातं जातु कारणसहस्रैरपि पीतं कर्तुं शक्यमिति विनाशस्वभावकत्वमकामेनाप्यनित्यानामेषितव्यम् । तस्माद् भावानां शून्यतैव पारमार्थिकी । कल्पनया त्ववस्तुसत्या सन्त इव भासन्ते भावा इति ।

१ शून्यवादमनूद्योत्सूत्रमेव तावद् दूषयति–प्रतिज्ञावाक्य इति । पूर्वपक्षवाक्ये प्रतिज्ञापदयोः प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोश्चेति व्याघातद्वयम् ।

२ तत्र तावत् ' सर्वमभाव ' इति प्रतिज्ञावाक्ये तद्गतपदयोर्व्याघातं प्रदर्शयति-अनेकस्येति । ' सर्वम् '–' अभावः ' इति द्वे पदे–तत्र सर्वपदाभिधेयमनेकस्य भावस्याशेषतेति अभावपदस्य चाभिधेयो भावस्य प्रतिषेध इति ।

३ ततः किमित्यत आह–पूर्वमिति । अशेषा अनेके हि ' सोपाख्या ' यत्किञ्चित्स्वभाववन्तः भावप्रतिषेधस्वभावरूपो ' निरुपाख्यो ' निःस्वभाव एव ।

४ तयोः परस्परं सामानाधिकरण्यासम्भवं प्रदर्शयति–तत्रेति । यत् 'सोपाख्यं' तत् कदापि ' निरुपाख्यं ' न भवितुमर्हतीति सोपाख्यं ' सर्वं ' निरुपाख्याभावतया प्रतिज्ञातुं न शक्यते ।

५ ननु मा भूत्सोपाख्यस्य सर्वस्य निरुपाख्याभावतया प्रतिज्ञानं विपरीतं तु भवितुमर्हतीत्यत आह–न जात्विति । निरुपाख्योऽभावोऽपि सोपाख्यसर्वशब्दाभिधेयानेकाशेषतया प्रतिज्ञातुं न शक्यत इत्यर्थः । न ह्यत्यन्तासन्निरुपाख्यं ' सर्वमिति ' वा ' भाव इति ' वा ज्ञानस्य गोचरः—असद्वाऽनिर्वचनीयं वा न ख्यातिगोचरः– अपि तु सदेव सदन्तरात्मना । तथा च कुतोऽत्यन्तासतः कल्पनागोचरत्वमपीति तात्पर्यकृतः ।

" [1]सर्वमेतदभाव इति चेत्–यदिदं सर्वमिति मन्यसे तदभाव इति "। [2]एवं चेत्–अनिवृत्तो व्याघातः। अनेकमशेषं चेति नाभावे प्रत्ययेन शक्यं भवितुम्। अस्ति [3]चायं प्रत्ययः सर्वमिति। [4]तस्मान्नाभाव इति।

प्रतिज्ञा[5]हेत्वोश्च व्याघातः। सर्वमभाव–इति भावप्रतिषेधः प्रतिज्ञा, भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेरिति हेतुः। भावेष्वितरेतराभावमनुज्ञायाश्रित्य चेतरेतराभावसिद्धौ सर्वमभाव इत्युच्यते, यदि[6] सर्वमभावो भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेरिति नोपपद्यते, अथ भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धिः सर्वमभाव इति नोपपद्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

सूत्रेण[7] चाभिसम्बन्धः—

[8]न, स्वभावसिद्धेर्भावानाम् ॥ ३८ ॥

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१ व्याघातपरिजिहीर्षया परः प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्याभिप्रायं प्रकटयति–सर्वमेतदिति। सर्वमभाव इति प्रतिज्ञावाक्यस्यायमेवार्थो यत् ' यद्भवान् सर्वं इति व्यपदिशति स अभाव एवेति '—एवं च प्रतिज्ञातं सामानाधिकरण्यं सुसम्पादमेवेत्यर्थः।

२ तत्परिहरति–एवं चेदिति। ' अनेकमशेषं चेति प्रत्ययेन अभावे न भवितुं शक्यमिति ' सम्बन्धः। यद् वयं सर्वं इति व्यपदिशामस्तदभाव एवेति प्रतिज्ञावाक्यम्– अनेकस्याशेषतामेव च वयं सर्वं इति व्यपदिशामः–तथा च अनेकमशेषमभाव इति प्रतिज्ञार्थः पर्यवस्यति, सोऽपि व्याहत एवेति, तथा हि अभावविषये ' अनेकमशेषं चेति ' ज्ञानं न भवितुमर्हति।

३ ननु मा भूदेवं प्रत्ययः ततः किमित्यत आह–अस्ति चायमिति। अनेकमशेषमिति प्रत्ययः सर्वशब्देन जन्यत एव–तथा च सर्वमभाव इति वदतोऽनेकमशेषं चाभाव इत्येवार्थ उक्तो भवति–स च व्याहत एवेत्यर्थः।

४ उपसंहरति–तस्मादिति—' नाभावः ' सर्वमिति शेषः।

५ प्रतिज्ञापदयोर्व्याघातं प्रदर्श्य प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्व्याघातं प्रदर्शयति–प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोरिति। ' सर्वमभाव ' इति वाक्ये सर्वस्याभावत्वमुक्तम्–पुनश्च भावेष्विति हेतुवाक्ये भावेष्विति पदं प्रयुक्तं तेन च नानाभावानामस्तित्वमुररीकृतम्। तेष्वितरेतराभावरूपताऽऽरोपिता।

६ व्याघातं स्पष्टयति–यदीति।

७ उत्सूत्रं दूषणमुक्त्वा भाष्यकारः सौत्रं दूषणमुत्थापयति–सूत्रेण चेति। ' अभिसम्बन्धो '–दूषणस्येति शेषः।

८ शून्यवादं दूषयति–न स्वभावेति सूत्रम्। ' स्वो भावो ' धर्मो द्रव्यादीनां सदादिः–अथ वा ' स्वभाव ' स्वरूपं भावानाम्–येनामी भावाः स्वभावात्

न सर्वमभावः। कस्मात्? स्वेन भावेन सद्भावाद्भावानाम्। स्वेन धर्मेण भावा भवन्तीति प्रतिज्ञायते। कश्च स्वो धर्मो भावानाम्? द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां सदादि सामान्यम्। द्रव्याणां क्रियावदित्येवमादिर्विशेषः। स्पर्शपर्यन्ताः पृथिव्या इति च, प्रत्येकं चानन्तो भेदः। सामान्यविशेषसमवायानां च विशिष्टा धर्मा गृह्यन्ते। सोऽयमभावस्य निरुपाख्यत्वात् सम्प्रत्यायकोऽर्थभेदो न स्यात्। अस्ति त्वयम्। तस्मान्न[1] सर्वमभाव इति।

अथ वा[2] 'न स्वभावसिद्धेर्भावानामि'ति स्वरूपसिद्धेरिति। गौरिति[3] प्रयुज्यमाने शब्दे जातिविशिष्टं द्रव्यं गृह्यते, नाभावमात्रम्। यदि च सर्वमभावः गौरित्यभावः प्रतीयेत, गोशब्देन चाभाव उच्येत। कस्मान्न गोशब्देन चाभाव उच्यते? यस्मात्तु गोशब्दप्रयोगे द्रव्यविशेषः प्रतीयते नाभावः। तस्मादयुक्तमिति।

अथ वा[4] 'न स्वभावसिद्धेरि'ति। असन् गौरश्वात्मनेति, असन् गौर्गवात्मना इति कस्मान्नोच्यते? अवचनाद्गवात्मना गौरस्तीति स्वभावसिद्धिः। अनश्वोऽश्व इति वा गौरगौरिति वा कस्मान्नोच्यते? अवचनात्स्वेन रूपेण विद्यमानता द्रव्यस्येति विज्ञायते।

व्यावर्तन्ते तस्य 'सिद्धेः'। अथ वा असन्निति प्रत्ययस्य गवि 'अश्वात्मनेति' विशेषणात्-अगौरित्यस्य गां परिहृत्याश्वादिभिः सम्बन्धाद् गोभावसिद्धेः। एवमश्वादिष्वपीति-' स्वभावसिद्धेर्भावानां नाभाव ' इत्यर्थः।

१ एवं च 'न सर्वमभावः भावानां परस्परव्यवच्छेदकधर्माणां सत्त्वात् अभावस्य निरुपाख्यत्वात्तादृशधर्मासम्भवात्' इति पर्यवसितोऽर्थः।

२ स्वभावसिद्धेरित्यस्य सूत्रस्थपदस्य व्याख्यानान्तरमुपन्यस्यति-अथ वेति। 'स्वभावः' अस्मिन् पक्षे स्वरूपमेव, न स्वो धर्मः।

३ किन्तत् स्वरूपमिति स्पष्टयति-गौरितीति। गोत्वजातिविशिष्टो व्यक्तिविशेषः गोशब्दार्थः प्रतीयते-स च भावरूप एव नाभावरूप इत्यर्थः।

४ स्वभावसिद्धेरित्यस्य तृतीयव्याख्यानमाह-अथ वेति।

५ यदि सर्वं निरुपाख्यमेव तर्हि यत्र भवान् गामश्वात्मना असन्तं ब्रवीति-तत्र को हेतुरित्यपेक्षायामाह-गवात्मनेति। यत्तथा न ब्रवीति भवान् तत्रायमेव हेतुर्यद् यथा गौरश्वात्मनाऽसन् न तथा गवात्मना अपि तु गवात्मना स सन्नेव। एवं च गवादीनां सत्स्वभावसिद्धिरेव सूत्रस्थस्वभावसिद्धिपदेन विवक्षितेत्यर्थः।

अव्यतिरेकप्रतिषेधे[1] च (असंयोगादिसम्बन्धो व्यतिरेकोऽत्राव्यतिरेकोऽभेदाख्यसम्बन्धः, तत्प्रतिषेधे) भावेनासत्प्रत्ययस्य सामानाधिकरण्यम्। यथा—न सन्ति कुण्डे बदराणीति । असन् गौरश्वात्मना, अनश्वो गौरिति च गवाश्वयोरव्यतिरेकः प्रतिषिध्यते-गवाश्वयोरेकत्वं नास्तीति । तस्मिन्प्रतिषिध्यमाने भावे न गवा सामानाधिकरण्यमसत्प्रत्ययस्य—असन् गौरश्वात्मनेति यथा—न सन्ति कुण्डे बदराणीति—कुण्डे बदरसंयोगे प्रतिषिध्यमाने सद्भिरसत्प्रत्ययस्य सामानाधिकरण्यमिति ॥ ३८ ॥

"न[2] स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात्" ॥ ३९ ॥

" अपेक्षाकृतमापेक्षिकम् । ह्रस्वापेक्षाकृतं दीर्घं दीर्घापेक्षाकृतं ह्रस्वम् । न स्वेनात्मनावस्थितं किञ्चित् । कस्मात् ? अपेक्षासामर्थ्यात् । तस्मान्न स्वभावसिद्धिर्भावानामिति " ॥ ३९ ॥

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१ ननु यदि सर्वेषां भावानां भावरूपतैव—कथं तर्हि गोरनश्वत्वमश्वस्य वाऽगोत्वमित्यत आह—अव्यतिरेकेति । अत्रेत्थं वाक्यसम्बन्धः—अव्यतिरेकप्रतिषेधे च भावेनाप्यसत्प्रत्ययस्य सामानाधिकरण्यं दृश्यते, यथा—न सन्ति कुण्डे बदराणीति—'असंयोगादिसम्बन्धो व्यतिरेकोऽत्राव्यतिरेकोऽभेदाख्यसम्बन्ध' इति । यथा—कस्यचिद् भावस्य 'अव्यतिरेकप्रतिषेधे' तादात्म्यप्रतिषेधो भवति तदा भावोऽप्यसत्प्रत्ययसमानाधिकरणो भवति । यथा कुण्डे बदराणि न सन्तीत्यत्र भावानामपि बदराणामसत्प्रत्ययसामानाधिकरण्यम् भवत्येव । अव्यतिरेकप्रतिषेध इत्यत्राव्यतिरेकपदस्यार्थं विवृणोत्यवान्तरवाक्येना"संयोगादिसम्बन्ध" इत्यादिनाऽ"भेदाख्यसम्बन्ध" इत्यन्तेन । एवं च अव्यतिरेकोऽपृथक्त्वम् अभेदः तादात्म्यमिति पर्यायाः ।

सर्वमेतत् स्पष्टीकृतं तात्पर्यकृद्भिः तद्यथा—असच्छब्दः खलु अभावविशेषणं सदेवाभिधत्ते । एवमसत्प्रत्ययोऽपि अभावविशेषणं सदेवावलम्बते । यथा शुक्लशब्दः शुक्लगुणविशिष्टे पटे वर्तते । तथा चासत्प्रत्ययाभिधानयोरुपपन्नं भाववाचिना पदेन सामानाधिकरण्यमित्यर्थः । भावश्च कश्चिन्नित्यः कश्चिदनित्यः । तत्र नित्यस्य अर्थक्रियाकारित्वमुपपादितं क्षणभङ्गभङ्गे । अनित्योऽपि न विनाशस्वभावो भावः । कारणान्तरात्तु विनश्यति । यत्तूक्तं न शक्यं नीलं पीतं कर्तुमिति—तत्र ब्रूमः—शक्य एव नीलः पीतः कर्तुम् । आमश्यामः कुम्भो वह्निसंयोगाद्रक्त इति ।

२ स्वभावसिद्धेरिति सिद्धान्त्युक्तं हेतुमाक्षिपति शून्यवादी—न स्वभावेति सूत्रम् । भावानां स्वभावसिद्धिरेव नास्ति—कुतः—सर्वेषां भावानामापेक्षिकत्वात् । तथा च सिद्धान्तिनो हेतुरसिद्ध इति सूत्रार्थः ।

व्याहतत्वादयुक्तम् ॥ ४० ॥

यदि ह्रस्वापेक्षाकृतं दीर्घं, ह्रस्वमनापेक्षिकं, किमिदानीमपेक्ष्य ह्रस्वमिति गृह्यते । अथ दीर्घापेक्षाकृतं ह्रस्वं, दीर्घमनापेक्षिकं, किमिदानीमपेक्ष्य दीर्घमिति गृह्यते । एवमितरेतराश्रययोरेकाभावेऽन्यतराभावादुभयाभाव इत्यपेक्षाव्यवस्थाऽनुपपन्ना ।

स्वभावसिद्धावसत्यां समयोः परिमण्डलयोर्वा द्रव्ययोरापेक्षिके दीर्घत्व-ह्रस्वत्वे कस्मान्न भवतः ? अपेक्षायामनपेक्षायां च द्रव्ययोरभेदः । यावती द्रव्ये अपेक्षमाणे तावती एवानपेक्षमाणे । नान्यतरत्र भेदः । आपेक्षिकत्वे तु सत्य-न्यतरत्र विशेषोपजनः स्यादिति ।

" किमपेक्षा[1]सामर्थ्यमिति चेत् "—द्वयोर्ग्रहणेऽतिशयग्रहणोपपत्तिः । द्वे द्रव्ये पश्यन्नेकत्र विद्यमानमतिशयं गृह्णाति तद्दीर्घमिति व्यवस्यति । यच्च हीनं गृह्णाति तद्ध्रस्वमिति व्यवस्यतीति । एतच्चापेक्षासामर्थ्यमिति ॥ ४० ॥

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१ ननु किमापेक्षिकत्वं नाम? नैव किञ्चिदस्ति-यद्यस्ति तदा सा किं करोतीति पृच्छति–किमपेक्षेति । उत्तरम्–द्वयोरिति । उपपादितश्चायं विशदं तात्पर्यकृता । तद्यथा–परिमाणभेदो हि दीर्घत्वं ह्रस्वत्वं च । स च भावानामौत्पत्तिकः । केवलं तस्यातिशयानतिशयौ परस्परग्रहणाधीनौ । तथा हीक्षुयष्टेर्वेणुयष्टितो 'ह्रस्वत्वं' अल्पीयस्संख्यायोगिहस्तपरिमितत्वमेव 'अनतिशयः'–वेणुयष्टेस्तु दीर्घत्वमतिशयः, तच्च भूयस्संख्यायोगिहस्तपरिमितत्वम् । तच्चेदमतिशयानतिशयादिप्रतियोगिनिरूपणाधीन-निरूपणम् , न तु प्रतियोग्यधीनोत्पत्तीति, न वस्तुधर्मोऽयं परापरापेक्षः । भिन्नत्वं च भेदः । स च वस्तुविशेषनिरूपणे एव वस्त्वन्तरमपेक्षते, न चोत्पत्तौ । एवं पितृत्वमपि व्यवस्थिता जनकशक्तिरेव–सा जन्यनिरूपणाधीननिरूपणा, न तु तदधीनोत्पत्तिः । परत्वापरत्वादयस्त्वपेक्षाबुद्धिनिमित्ततया परापेक्षोत्पत्तिका अपि लोकयात्रां वहन्तो न शक्याः प्रत्याख्यातुम् । तावता 'तेषामधिकरणे निरपेक्षो भावो न भवतीति' न । इति सर्वमवदातमिति ।

व्याहतत्वादिति सूत्रे व्याघात एवोद्भावितः । स च व्याघातो व्याख्यातो वार्तिककृता । सर्वमभाव इति सर्वथा चायं वादो व्याहतः । कुतो व्याघातः ? (१) आदौ तावत् प्रमाणोपपत्त्यनुपपत्ती । " सर्वमभाव " इति ब्रुवाणः प्रमाणं पर्यनुयोज्यः । यदि ब्रूते–व्याहतं भवति । अथ नाभिधत्ते–अर्थोऽस्य न सिध्यति, प्रमाणाभावादेव । (२) पुनः "सर्वमभाव" इति वाक्यम्–तस्य यद्यभिधेयमर्थं प्रतिपद्यते, पूर्ववद्व्याघातः । अथ न प्रतिपद्यते–वर्णोच्चारणमात्रमनर्थकमिति । (३) पुनः "सर्वमभाव" इति च

(११) सङ्ख्यैकान्तवादनिराकरणप्रकरणम् ।

अथेमे सङ्ख्यैकान्ताः—

सर्वमेकं[1] सदविशेषात्[2] । सर्वं[3] द्वेधा नित्यानित्यभेदात् । सर्वं[6]

वाक्यस्य प्रतिपादयितारं प्रतिपत्तारं च यदि प्रतिपद्यते, पूर्ववद्व्याघातः। (४) पुनः 'सर्वमभावः' इति 'सर्वं भाव' इति च वाक्ये। यद्यनयोर्भेदं प्रतिपद्यते, व्याहतं भवति, अथ न प्रतिपद्यते, विशेषोपादानं व्यर्थम्। सोऽयं सर्वाभाववादो यावद्यावद् विचार्यते तावत्तावदुपपत्तिं न सहते—इति।

एकमेव तत्त्वम्—द्वे एव तत्त्वे—त्रीण्येव तत्त्वानि—चत्वार्येव तत्त्वानि—पञ्चैव तत्त्वानीत्येते सङ्ख्यैकान्तवादाः। सङ्ख्या 'एकान्ता' नियमिता येषु वादेषु ते तथोक्ताः, न्यायसिद्धान्तविरुद्धा अधुना शून्यवादानन्तरं परीक्ष्यन्ते। न च वाच्यम्—"तत्त्वद्वयादिवादाः किमर्थमुपन्यस्यन्ते—न हि तेषु न्यायाभिमतसमुच्चयविरोध" इति। एकान्तिके हि द्वैते (द्वे एव तत्त्वे इत्यस्मिन् वादे) द्वयोरपि सदातनत्वे कार्योपयोगे कादाचित्कसामग्र्यसम्भव एव। एवं त्रित्वादिवादेष्वपि द्रष्टव्यम्।

१ तत्र प्रथमः सङ्ख्यैकान्तवादो ब्रह्माद्वैतवादिनाम्। तं सङ्क्षेपेण सूचयति— सर्वमेकमिति। एकमेव तत्त्वम्—कुतः—सत्त्वेनानुगमात्सर्वेषामिति।

२ इदमस्याकूतम्। न तावदयं नामरूपप्रपञ्चः प्रकाशाद्भिन्नः सन् प्रकाशितुमर्हति—जडस्य स्वयं प्रकाशासम्भवात्। तथा च ज्ञानाद्भिन्नस्य नामरूपप्रपञ्चस्य प्रकाशासम्भवात् ज्ञानस्यैवैकस्येदं सर्वं विवर्त इति युक्तमभ्युपगन्तुम्। न च प्रकाशात्मनो घटादय एवोदयव्ययधर्मिणः परस्परव्यावृत्ताः सन्त्विति साम्प्रतम्—तद्व्यावृत्तिग्रहणे प्रमाणाभावात्। सा हि यद् यतो व्यावर्तते तदुभयग्रहे गृह्यते। न च विज्ञानानि विलक्षणानि स्वरूपमात्रावस्थितानि परस्परवार्तानभिज्ञानि ज्ञानान्तरमपि ग्रहीतुमुत्सहन्ते प्रागेव स्वस्माद् व्यावर्तयितुम्। न च निषेध्यनिषेधाधिकरणग्रहणकारणको व्यावृत्तिग्रहः स्वकारणेन समसमयोत्पादो भवितुमर्हति—तादृशोः सव्येतरविषाणयोरिव कार्यकारणभावाभावात्। न चैकं विज्ञानं क्षणिकं निषेध्यनिषेधाधिकरणे गृहीत्वा पश्चान्निषेधं गृह्णातीति युक्तम्—क्षणिकस्याक्रमस्य क्रमाक्रमवद्व्यापारायोगात्। न चैकं विज्ञानं निषेध्यनिषेधाधिकरणे गृह्णात्यथ ज्ञानान्तरं निषेधतीति युक्तम्-चैत्रगृहीतेऽपि तस्मिन् मैत्रस्य निषेधज्ञानप्रसङ्गात्। न च ज्ञानस्वरूपग्रह एवास्य निषेधग्रह इति साम्प्रतम्। एवं हि संभवेद्यदि स्वरूपतदन्यव्यावृत्त्योरेकत्वं स्यात्। तत्र व्यावृत्तिस्वभावो वा भावो—भावस्वरूपा वा व्यावृत्तिः। तत्र पूर्वस्मिन् कल्पे व्यावृत्तेस्तुच्छत्वात् तत्स्वभावाभावभेदास्तुच्छाः स्युः। ततश्च वचोभङ्ग्यन्तरेण शून्यवादप्रसङ्गः। इतरस्मिंस्तु कल्पे विधिरूपो भाव एव व्यावृत्तिरिति विधिरूपतया च ते व्यावर्तन्ते

त्रेधा[1]–ज्ञाता ज्ञानं ज्ञेयमिति । सर्वं चतुर्द्धा[2]–प्रमाता प्रमाणं प्रमेयं प्रमितिरिति । एवं[3] यथासम्भवमन्येऽपीति ।

तत्र परीक्षा[4]—

सङ्ख्यैकान्तासिद्धिः[5] कारणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम् ॥ ४१ ॥

यदि[6] साध्यसाधनयोर्नानात्वम्–एकान्तो न सिद्ध्यति, व्यतिरेकात् । अथ[7]

इति न व्यावृत्ता भावाः परस्परं परमार्थतः । सर्वमिदमभिप्रेत्योक्तम्–सदविशेषादिति । अनाद्यनिर्वचनीयाविद्यानिबन्धनं तु भावानां भेदं न व्यासेधामः । न च ज्ञातुरपि ज्ञानाद्भेदग्राहकमस्ति प्रमाणम्–उक्तादेवाविशेषात् । यस्मान्न ज्ञेयानां परस्परतश्च ज्ञानाच्च भेदो नापि ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानादस्ति भेदो नापि ज्ञानानामन्योन्यस्य तस्मात् प्रकाश एव प्रपञ्चो ब्रह्मेत्यद्वैतसिद्धिरिति ।

द्वितीयो वादः–सर्वं द्वेधेति । न हि नित्यानित्याभ्यामन्यो राशिरस्ति यमाश्रित्य पदार्थास्त्रित्वादिके व्यवतिष्ठेरन्नित्यर्थः ।

१ तृतीयो वादः–सर्वं त्रेधेति । ज्ञानपदमत्र ज्ञानकरणपरं ज्ञेयम्–'ज्ञप्तिरपि ज्ञायमानत्वात् ज्ञेयान्नातिरिच्यत इति भावः' इति तात्पर्योक्तिस्वरसात् ।

२ चतुर्थो वादः–सर्वं चतुर्धेति । यदि प्रमितिर्नाम तत्त्वं प्रमाणादिभ्यो भिन्नं नाश्रियते–प्रमायाः प्रधानक्रियाया अभावात् कथं प्रमात्रादयः । कथं च प्रधानक्रिया-मन्तरेणैकवाक्यता स्यात्, कारकवैचित्र्यं वा । प्रमायाः फलत्वावस्थाया उपरि प्रमेयव्यपदेशं न वारयामः । न चैतावता तत्त्वान्तरं न भवति ।

३ अन्येऽपि संख्यैकान्तवादाः सन्ति–तान् सूचयति–एवं यथेति । (१) प्रकृतिपुरुषाविति द्वे एव तत्त्वे इत्यपरो द्वैतवादः । (२) रूपसंज्ञासंस्कारवेदनानुभवाः पञ्च स्कन्धा इति पञ्चत्ववादः । (३) पशु–पाश–तदुच्छेदेश्वरा इति चतुष्ट्ववादोऽपरः ।

४ सर्वेषामेतेषां परीक्षां निराकरणपर्यन्तां प्रस्तौति–तत्र परीक्षेति ।

५ संख्यैकान्तवादनिराकरणमुपक्रमते–संख्यैकान्तासिद्धिरितिसूत्रम् । संख्यै-कान्ताः न सिध्यन्ति—कुतः–कारणस्य (साधनस्य प्रमाणस्य) अनुपपत्तौ (असत्त्वे) उपपत्तौ सत्त्वे वा तादृशैकान्तासम्भवात्—इत्यर्थः ।

६ सूत्रार्थं वर्णयति–यदीति । सूत्रस्थोपपत्तिपदार्थं वर्णयति–साध्येति । यदि 'साध्यसाधनयोः' ज्ञेयात् (सङ्ख्यैकान्ततारूपात्) तज्ज्ञानसाधनं प्रमाणं भिन्नं तर्हि तयोरानन्त्यात् संख्यैकान्तता न सिध्यति ।

७ सूत्रस्थानुपपत्तिपदार्थमाह–अथ साध्येति । यदि ज्ञेयाद् भिन्नं ज्ञानसाधनं प्रमाणं नास्ति तर्हि प्रमाणाभावादेव प्रमेयस्य न सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ।

साध्यसाधनयोरभेदः—एवमप्येकान्तो न सिद्ध्यति, साधनाभावात् । न हि तदन्तरेण कस्यचित्सिद्धिरिति ॥ ४१ ॥

"[1] न कारणावयवभावात्" ॥ ४२ ॥

विस्तरेण वर्णितः सिद्धान्ताशयोऽत्र तात्पर्यकृता । अनवयवेन सर्वं चेदेकं द्वेधा त्रेधा चतुर्धा वेति प्रतिज्ञार्थः । तदतिरिक्तं साधनं वाच्यम् । न हि साध्यमेव साधनं भवति । तथा च साधनस्य तदतिरेकान्न संख्यैकान्तसिद्धिः । न च किञ्चिदपि स्वसंवेदनमस्ति—ज्ञानप्रदीपादीनामपि परसंवेद्यत्वात् । यथा च ज्ञानातिरिक्तोऽप्यर्थो विषयस्तथा विज्ञानवादनिराकरणावसरे वक्ष्यते । न च विज्ञानादर्थभेदोऽशक्यग्रहः । तथा हि नीलमुपलभ इत्यनहङ्कारास्पदमश्वेतादिरूपं नीलं प्रत्यात्ममनुभवगोचरः। एवं नीलादीनामपि परस्परम् । अन्यथा घटमानयेति देशितो लोचने निमील्य शयीत—शयीथा इति देशितस्तोयमेवाहरेत्—कस्य चित्कथंचित् कुतश्चिद्विवेकाभावात् । न चानिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्यानिबन्धनोऽयं भेदव्यवहार इति साम्प्रतम् । अनिर्वचनीयख्यातेः पूर्वमेवापाकृतत्वात् । तस्मात्सर्वजनसंवेदनसिद्धोऽयं भेदप्रत्ययो न कारणमुखनिरीक्षणेन युक्तो निराकर्तुमपि तु स्पष्टदृष्टकार्यभेदप्रत्ययात्तादृशं तत्कारणं कल्पनीयं यादृशेन कारणेन प्रपञ्चप्रत्ययोऽप्रत्यूहमुत्पत्तुमर्हति । तच्च प्रत्यक्षमेव । तथा हि नीलं परिच्छिन्दन् पीतादिभ्योऽस्य भेदं परिच्छिनत्ति—संयुक्तविशेषणतालक्षणादिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् । नीलं हि नीलमित्यनुभवन्नयं पीतं च पीतमित्यनुभवन् स्मरन् वा शक्नोति निषेध्यनिषेधाधिकरणतया समाकलयितुं रूपमात्रेणागृहीतपरस्परभेदमपि । न हि तन्न भेदेन प्रथत इत्यभेदेन प्रथेत, येनानयोर्नीलपीतयोर्गृहीतस्वरूपयोरवध्यवधिमद्भावो न स्यात् । तथा च तौ गृहीत्वा प्रत्यक्षेण शक्नोत्ययमनयोर्भेदं ग्रहीतुमित्यसाम्प्रतमेतत् ।

अन्योन्यसंश्रयाद् भेदो न प्रमान्तरसाधनः ।
तस्मिन्निदं नायमिति वस्तुभेदं विना न धीः ॥

एतेन प्रमातुरपि प्रमाया भेदो व्याख्यातः । प्रमातारश्चानेकविधसुखदुःखोपभोगव्यवस्थानाद्बधिरान्धादिकोविदजालमुक्तसंसारिविभागोपपत्तेश्च भेदवन्तोऽनुमीयन्ते । एकस्मिन्नपर्यायेण विरुद्धधर्मसंसर्गासंभवात् । कल्पनया कथंचित्सम्भाव्यमानोऽप्ययं गोमयपायसीयन्यायमावहति । तदेवं प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधादनुपपन्नार्थाः श्रुतय 'एकमेवाद्वितीय'मित्याद्याः प्रथमां वृत्तिमुल्लङ्घ्य जघन्यामालम्बते— 'यजमानः प्रस्तर,' 'आदित्यो यूपवदि'ति । तस्मान्नाद्वैतमिति ।

साध्यात्साधनभेदेन सङ्ख्यान्तैरेकान्ता अप्यपाकृता मन्तव्या इति ।

१ पूर्वपक्षवाद्याक्षिपति—न कारणेति सूत्रम् । यदुक्तं कार्यकारणभेदेन नाद्वैतमिति तत् 'न,'—कुतः—कारणस्य अवयवभावात्, कार्यावयवरूपत्वादित्यर्थः ।

"न सङ्ख्यैकान्तानामसिद्धिः। कस्मात्? कारणस्यावयवभावात्। अवयवः कश्चित् साधनभूत इत्यव्यतिरेकः। एवं द्वैतादीनामपीति ॥ ४२ ॥

निरवयवत्वादहेतुः[1] ॥ ४३ ॥

कारणस्यावयवभावादित्यहेतुः। कस्मात्? सर्वमेकमित्यनपवर्गेण प्रतिज्ञाय कस्यचिदेकत्वमुच्यते। तत्र व्यपवृक्तोऽवयवः साधनभूतो नोपपद्यते। एवं[2] द्वैतादिष्वपीति।

ते खल्विमे सङ्ख्यैकान्ता यदि विशेषकारितस्यार्थभेदविस्तारस्य प्रत्याख्यानेन वर्तन्ते—प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमविरोधान्मिथ्यावादा भवन्ति। अथाभ्यनुज्ञानेन वर्तन्ते—समानधर्मकारितोऽर्थसङ्ग्रहो विशेषकारितश्चार्थभेद इति, एवमेकान्तत्वं जहतीति।

ते खल्वेते[3] तत्त्वज्ञानप्रविवेकार्थमेकान्ताः परीक्षिता इति ॥ ४३ ॥

(१२) फलपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्।

प्रेत्यभावानन्तरं[4] फलम्, तस्मिन्[5]—

"सद्यः कालान्तरे च फलनिष्पत्तेः संशयः" ॥ ४४ ॥

"पचति दोग्धीति सद्यः फलमोदनपयसी। कर्षति वपतीति कालान्तरे फलं शस्याधिगम इति। अस्ति चेयं क्रिया—अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम—इति। एतस्याः फले संशयः" ॥ ४४ ॥

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१ परिहरति सिद्धान्ती—निरवयवत्वादिति सूत्रम्।

२ उक्तमद्वैतवादपरिहारं सङ्ख्यैकान्तवादान्तरेष्वतिदिशति—एवमिति।

३ प्रकरणार्थमुपसंहरति—ते खल्वेत इति। अद्वैतादिष्वेकान्तेषु प्रेत्यभावो न तात्त्विको भवेदपि तु काल्पनिकः। न केवलं प्रेत्यभावोऽपि तु षोडशापि पदार्थाः। तस्मादेतेषां यत् तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्प्रविवेकार्थं ज्ञेयप्रविवेकेन ज्ञानप्रविवेक इति तदर्थमेते परीक्षिताः। यावच्चात्र विचारितं तावदप्रकृतमपि प्रकृतं प्रेत्यभावमुपकरोतीत्यर्थः। एवमेव किल पूर्वानुवृत्ताष्टप्रकरण्यप्रकृतार्थापि सङ्गच्छते सम्बध्यते चाग्रिमप्रकरणार्थेनेति।

४ अथोद्देशक्रमानुरोधेन फलस्य परीक्षां प्रस्तौति—प्रेत्यभावानन्तरमिति।

५ तद्विषये परीक्षाङ्गभूतसंशयमुपन्यस्यति 'तस्मिन्नि'ति भाष्यांशमारभ्य 'संशय' इति सूत्रांशपर्यन्तम्।

'एतस्याः फले संशय' इति भाष्योक्तावस्वरसः प्रदर्शितः परिशुद्धिकृता। फलसामान्यमादाय तत्कालान्तरभावि वा स्यात् सद्योभावि वेति सन्देहो नोपपद्यते—लोके पक्त्यादीनां फलत्वेऽनन्तरभावित्वस्य धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणनिर्णीतत्वात्। एवं

न सद्यः[1] कालान्तरोपभोग्यत्वात् ॥ ४५ ॥

स्वर्गः फलं श्रूयते । तच्च भिन्नेऽस्मिन्देहभेदादुत्पद्यत इति न सद्यः, ग्रामादिकामानामारम्भफलमपीति ॥ ४५ ॥

" कालान्तरेणा[2]निष्पत्तिर्हेतुविनाशात् ॥ ४६ ॥

" ध्वस्तायां प्रवृत्तौ प्रवृत्तेः फलं न कारणमन्तरेणोत्पत्तुमर्हति । न खलु वै विनष्टांत्कारणात्किञ्चिदुत्पद्यत इति " ॥ ४६ ॥

प्राङ् निष्पत्तेर्वृक्षफलवत्तत्स्यात् ॥ ४७ ॥

यथा फलार्थिना वृक्षमूले सेकादि परिकर्म क्रियते, तस्मिँश्च प्रध्वस्ते पृथिवीधातुरब्धातुना सङ्गृहीत आन्तरेण तेजसा पच्यमानो रसद्रव्यं निर्वर्तयति, स द्रव्यभूतो रसो वृक्षानुगतः पाकविशिष्टो व्यूहविशेषेण सन्निविशमानः पर्णादिफलं निर्वर्तयति, एवं परिषेकादि कर्म चार्थवत् । न च विनष्टात्फलनिष्पत्तिः। तथा प्रवृत्त्या[3] संस्कारो धर्माधर्मलक्षणो जन्यते । स जातो निमि-

स्वर्गस्यापि फलत्वे कालान्तरभावित्वस्योभयवादिसिद्धत्वात् । एवं सद्योभावि लोकपक्त्यादिफलं कालान्तरभावि स्वर्गादि वेत्येषोऽपि संशयोऽनुपपन्नो धर्मिभेदादिति । एवं च संशयस्य स्वरूपान्तरं प्रदर्शितं तेनैव । क्रियैव यागादिका संशयविषयः–क्रियात्वं च संशयकारणम् । चेतनप्रवृत्तिर्हि काचित् सद्यःफला भवति– यथा पचनदोहनानि, काचित्तु कालान्तरभाविफला भवति– यथा कर्षणसेवनादि । अतः साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावे सति प्रकृते संशय इति ।

१ संशयं प्रदर्श्य – तत्र ऐहिककीर्त्यकीर्त्यादीनामेव फलत्वसम्भवे नादृष्टस्वर्गादिकल्पनमित्युक्तसूत्रे पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तेनोपक्रमते– न सद्य इति सूत्रम्। यद्यप्येतत् सूत्रं न्यायसूचीनिबन्धे नोपलभ्यते तात्पर्यकृता चेदं भाष्यत्वेनैव परिगृहीतम्,–तथापि नानाप्राचीनसूत्रपुस्तकानामनुरोधात् सूत्रमेवेदमिति निर्धारितम् । वार्तिकस्वरसोऽप्येवमेव ।

२ परः शङ्कते–कालान्तरेणेति सूत्रम् । कालान्तरेण तत्कर्मणः फलं न सम्भवति–' हेतोः ' तत्फलकारणस्य कर्मणः ' विनाशात् ' विनष्टत्वादित्यर्थः ।

३ उक्तं दृष्टान्तं दार्ष्टान्तिके योजयति–तथा प्रवृत्त्येति । एवमेव कर्मणि निष्पन्ने तन्निष्पत्तितत्फलोत्पत्त्योरन्तराले तत्कर्मगतधर्माधर्मरूपः संस्कारोऽवान्तरकारणान्तरसहकृतः फलनिष्पत्तिद्वारभूत उत्पद्यते तेन च द्वारेणोत्पन्नं स्वर्गादिफलमुक्तकर्मण एवेति मन्यन्ते प्रेक्षावन्त इत्याशयः । एष तु संस्कारो न स्नानादिजन्य इव बोद्धव्योऽपि तु पुरुषधर्मतामात्रेण संस्कार इत्युच्यते । परमार्थतस्त्वयं धर्मः पुरुषाश्रयोऽपि कर्मणा फले जनयितव्ये तस्यावान्तरव्यापार इति तात्पर्यकृतः ।

त्तान्तरानुगृहीतः कालान्तरे फलं निष्पादयतीति। उक्तञ्चैतत्—'पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः'[1] इति ॥ ४७ ॥

"तदिदं[2] प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्निष्पद्यमानम्—

नासन्न सन्न सदसत्सदसतोर्वैधर्म्यात्" ॥ ४८ ॥

"प्राङ्[3] निष्पत्तेर्निष्पत्तिधर्मकं नासत्-उपादाननियमात्। कस्यचिदुत्पत्तये किञ्चिदुपादेयं न सर्वं सर्वस्येत्यसद्भावे नियमो नोपपद्यत इति। न सत्[4], प्रागुत्पत्तेर्विद्यमानस्योत्पत्तिरनुपपन्नेति। सदसत्[5] न-सदसतोर्वैधर्म्यात्[6]। सदित्यर्थाभ्यनुज्ञा। असदिति अर्थप्रतिषेधः। एतयोर्व्याघातो वैधर्म्यम्। व्याघातादव्यतिरेकानुपपत्तिरिति" ॥ ४८ ॥

प्रागुत्पत्तेरुत्पत्तिधर्मकमसदित्यद्धा[7], कस्मात्?—

उत्पादव्ययदर्शनात् ॥ ४९ ॥

यत्पुनरुक्तं-प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यं नासदुपादाननियमादिति ॥ ४९ ॥

बुद्धिसिद्धं तु तदसत् ॥ ५० ॥

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१ उक्तेऽर्थे पूर्वोक्तं स्मारयति-'पूर्वकृते'ति। तृतीयाध्यायगतद्वितीयाह्निकस्थषष्टितमं सूत्रमेतत्।

२ इदमिदानीं चिन्त्यते-किमेतत्फलमुत्पत्तेः प्रागसद्वा सद्वा सदसद्वाऽनुभयं वेति। तत्र समस्तपक्षाक्षेपेण फलाभावमभिधित्सुः पूर्वपक्षयति-'तदिदमि'ति भाष्याक्षराण्यारभ्य 'वैधर्म्यादि'ति सूत्राक्षरपर्यन्तम्। 'तदिदं निष्पद्यमानं' फलं 'निष्पत्तेः प्राक्' 'नासन्न सन्न सदसत्'—कस्मात्–'सदसतोर्वैधर्म्यात्'—इति सम्बन्धः। कार्यकारणभाव एव न विचारसह इति पूर्वपक्षहृदयम्।

यद्यप्यनुभयपक्षो न धृतः सूत्रकारेण भाष्यकारेण वा तथापि वार्तिककारोक्त्यनुरोधेन सोऽप्युक्तस्तात्पर्यकारेणेत्यवसेयम्।

३ सूत्रार्थं विवृण्वन् कार्यन्नासदिति प्रथमं कल्पं गृह्णाति-प्राङ् निष्पत्तेरिति।

४ प्राङ्निष्पत्तेः कार्यन्न सदिति द्वितीयं कल्पं गृह्णाति-न सदिति।

५ कार्यन्न सदसदित्युभयमिति तृतीयं कल्पं गृह्णाति-सदसदिति।

६ तत्र हेतुमाह-सदसतोरिति। सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरत्यन्तविरुद्धत्वान्नैकत्र समावेशः सम्भवतीत्यर्थः।

७ सिद्धान्तं प्रस्तौति-प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति। असदेव कार्यं प्रागुत्पत्तेरित्येव 'अद्धा' सत्यमित्यर्थः।

इदमस्योत्पत्तये समर्थं न सर्वमिति प्रागुत्पत्तेर्नियतकारणं कार्यं बुद्ध्या सिद्धमुत्पत्तिनियमदर्शनात् । तस्मादुपादाननियमस्योपपत्तिः । सति तु कार्ये प्रागुत्पत्तेरुत्पत्तिरेव नास्तीति ॥ ५० ॥

"आश्रयव्यतिरेकाद् वृक्षफलोत्पत्तिवदित्यहेतुः" ॥ ५१ ॥[1]

"मूलसेकादि परिकर्म फलं चोभयं वृक्षाश्रयम् । कर्म चेह शरीरे फलं चामुत्रेत्याश्रयव्यतिरेकादहेतुरिति" ॥ ५१ ॥

प्रीतेरात्माश्रयत्वादप्रतिषेधः[2] ॥ ५२ ॥

प्रीतिरात्मप्रत्यक्षत्वादात्माश्रया । तदाश्रयमेव कर्म धर्मसंज्ञितं–धर्मस्यात्मगुणत्वात् । तस्मादाश्रयव्यतिरेकानुपपत्तिरिति ॥ ५२ ॥

"न पुत्रस्त्रीपशुपरिच्छदहिरण्यान्नादिफलनिर्देशात्" ॥ ५३ ॥

"पुत्रादि फलं निर्दिश्यते न प्रीतिः–'ग्रामकामो यजेत' 'पुत्रकामो यजेते'ति । तत्र यदुक्तं–प्रीतिः फलम्–इत्येतदयुक्तमिति" ॥ ५३ ॥

तत्सम्बन्धात् फलनिष्पत्तेस्तेषु फलवदुपचारः ॥ ५४ ॥

पुत्रादिसम्बन्धात् फलं प्रीतिलक्षणमुत्पद्यत इति पुत्रादिषु फलवदुपचारः । यथाऽन्ने प्राणशब्दः–अन्नं वै प्राणा–इति ॥ ५४ ॥

(१३) दुःखपरीक्षा[3]प्रकरणम् ।

फलान[3]न्तरं दुःखमुद्दिष्टमुक्तं च–'बाधनालक्षणं दुःखम्'–इति ।

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१ देहाद्यतिरिक्तमात्मानं नित्यं परलोकिनमसन्तं मन्यमानः कश्चित् पारलौकिकफलमाक्षिपति–आश्रयेति सूत्रम् । 'वृक्षफलवदिति' यो दृष्टान्तः सिद्धान्तिनोद्भावितः स 'अहेतुः' असाधकः परलोकभाविफलस्य, कुतः–'आश्रयव्यतिरेकात्', सुखदुःखादिरूपफलाश्रयस्योभयलोकानुगतस्याभावादित्यर्थः ।

२ उक्तमाक्षेपं परिहरति–प्रीतेरिति सूत्रम् । अस्त्यात्मा स्वर्गोपभोगसमर्थः शरीरव्यतिरिक्त एव कर्मणां कर्तेत्युपपादितमेवास्माभिरित्युपपद्यत एवात्राप्येकाश्रयत्वमेव कर्मफलयोरित्याशयः ।

३ अस्यां परीक्षायामाक्षेपः–"ननु किमिह परीक्षणीयम् । न हि कश्चिद् दुःखस्वरूपे विप्रतिपद्यते–नापि तद्धेयमहेयं वेति सन्दिह्यते । नित्यमनित्यं वा दुःखमित्यत्र परीक्षा प्रकृतोपयोगिनी स्यात्–तन्नित्यत्वे हि शास्त्रानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः–अस्ति च संशयकारणं वादिविप्रतिपत्तिः–साङ्ख्या हि सर्वनित्यत्ववादिनो दुःखमपि नित्यमाहुः–तथाऽपि तन्मतनिरासादनन्तरं च सत्कार्यबाधनिषेधादियमपि निरव-

" तत्किमिदं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयस्य सर्वजन्तुप्रत्यक्षस्य सुखस्य प्रत्याख्यानम् । आहोस्विदन्यः कल्प इति ? "

अन्य इत्याह । कथम् ? न वै सर्वलोकसाक्षिकं सुखं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम् । अयं तु जन्ममरणप्रबन्धानुभवनिमित्ताद् दुःखान्निर्विण्णस्य दुःखं जिहासतो दुःखसंज्ञाभावनोपदेशो दुःखहानार्थ इति । कया युक्त्या ? सर्वे खलु सत्त्वनिकायाः सर्वाण्युत्पत्तिस्थानानि सर्वः पुनर्भवो बाधनानुषक्तो दुःखसाहचर्याद्‌बाधनालक्षणं दुःख'मित्युक्तमृषिभिः दुःखसंज्ञाभावनमुपदिश्यते[1] ।

अत्र[2] च हेतुरुपादीयते—

शेषिता । कारणं च दुःखस्य दृष्टरूपमहिकण्टकादि न विप्रतिपत्तिविषयः । अदृष्टरूपा च प्रवृत्तिः परीक्षितैव । तदवान्तरकार्यरूपं च जन्मादि परीक्षितमेव । कारणनिवृत्तौ च कार्यं निवर्तत इति प्रथमाध्यायद्वितीयसूत्रे परीक्षितम् । तत् किमपरमवशिष्यते यदर्थोऽयमारम्भ " इति ।

तत्परिहारश्चेत्थम्— 'बाधनालक्षणं दुःखमि'ति लक्षितं दुःखम् । तत्र बाधनाशब्देन बाधबुद्धिरुच्यते । अनेन च लक्षणेन दुःखायतनानि दुःखसाधनानि सुखं च व्याप्यते । अतो मुख्यां बाधनाबुद्धिमादाय पूर्वपक्षावकाश इति ।

दुःखपरीक्षायाः क्रमप्राप्तिं प्रदर्शयति—फलानन्तरमिति ।

१ तत्र पूर्वपक्षिणः प्रश्नः—तत्किमिति । भवतु बाधनालक्षणं दुःखमनुभूयमानम् । यत्पुनरिदं प्रत्यात्ममनुकूलवेदनीयं सुखं तत्कथं दुःखम्, अनुभवविरोधात् । शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धयश्च यदि दुःखहेतुतया 'दुःखं' कस्मात्सुखहेतुतया सुखमेव न भवन्ति । सेयमतिभीरुता सकललोकयात्राविरोधिनी । यथा मांसार्थी कण्टकानुद्धृत्य मांसमश्नन् कण्टकजन्यदुःखमाप्नोत्येवमेव प्रेक्षावान् दुःखमुद्धृत्येन्द्रियसाधनं सुखमेव भोक्ष्यते । सन्ति च विविधदुःखपरिवर्जनहेतवो दृष्टाः परिदृष्टसामर्थ्या अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामिति पूर्वपक्षप्रश्नाशयः ।

एतदुक्तं भवति । यदि दुःखपरिवर्जनेन शक्येत सुखमुपादातुं ततस्तादृशमनुकूलवेदनीयं कः प्रेक्षावान् प्रजह्यात् । न तु तादृशमस्ति सुखं क्वचिदपि—सर्वस्य दुःखाविनाभाविनः केवलस्य सुखस्योपादातुमशक्यत्वात् । न हि मधुविषसम्पृक्तमन्नं विषमपहृत्य शक्यं मधुमात्रमुपादातुम् । तस्मान्नेदं सुखस्यात्यन्तं प्रत्याख्यानमपि तु सुख एव दुःखभावनमात्रमुपदिश्यते ऋषिणेति ।

२ सूत्रमवतारयति—अत्रेति । 'अत्र' सुखे दुःखभावना कार्येत्यस्मिन्नुपदेशे, तत्समर्थनाय 'हेतुः उपादीयते' सूत्रकारेणेत्यर्थः ।

विविध[1]बाधनायोगाद् दुःखमेव जन्मोत्पत्तिः ॥ ५५ ॥

जन्म-जायत इति-शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धयः । शरीरादीनां संस्थानविशिष्टानां प्रादुर्भाव उत्पत्तिः । विविधा च बाधना-हीना मध्यमा उत्कृष्टा चेति । उत्कृष्टा नारकिणाम् । तिरश्चां तु मध्यमा । मनुष्याणां तु हीना । देवानां हीनतरा वीतरागाणां च । एवं सर्वमुत्पत्तिस्थानं विविधबाधनानुषक्तं पश्यतः सुखे तत्साधनेषु च शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिषु दुःखसंज्ञा व्यवतिष्ठते । दुःखसंज्ञाव्यवस्थानात्सर्वलोकेष्वनभिरतिसंज्ञा भवति । अनभिरतिसंज्ञामुपासीनस्य सर्वलोकविषया तृष्णा विच्छिद्यते । तृष्णाप्रहाणात्सर्वदुःखाद्विमुच्यत इति । यथा विषयोगात्पयो विषमिति बुध्यमानो नोपादत्ते । अनुपाददानो मरणदुःखं नाप्नोति ॥ ५५ ॥

दुःखोद्देश[2]स्तु न सुखस्य प्रत्याख्यानम् । कस्मात् ?

[3]न, सुखस्याप्यन्तरालनिष्पत्तेः ॥ ५६ ॥

न खल्वयं दुःखोद्देशः सुखस्य प्रत्याख्यानम् । कस्मात् ? सुखस्याप्यन्तरालनिष्पत्तेः । निष्पद्यते खलु बाधनान्तरालेषु सुखं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं शरीरिणाम् । तदशक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुमिति ॥ ५६ ॥

अथापि[4]—

बा[5]धनाऽनिवृत्तेर्वेदयतः पर्येषणदोषादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५७ ॥

सुखस्य दुःखोद्देशेनेति प्रकरणात् । पर्येषणं-प्रार्थना-विषयार्जनतृष्णा । पर्येषणस्य दोषो-यदयं वेदयमानः प्रार्थयते तस्य प्रार्थितं न सम्पद्यते, सम्पद्य

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१ सूचितं हेतुमाह-विविधेति सूत्रम् । ‘ जन्मनः ’ शरीरादेः ‘ उत्पत्तिः ’ सा ‘ दुःखम् ’ इत्येव भावयितव्या-कुतः-विविधबाधनायोगादिति योजना ।

२ सर्वं दुःखमिति भावनोपदेशस्य यथोक्तमेव तात्पर्यं न पुनः सुखस्यात्यन्तप्रत्याख्यानमित्येव द्रढयन् पुनराह-दुःखोद्देश इति ।

३ तत्रोत्तरम्-न सुखस्येति सूत्रम् । ‘ न ’ सुखस्यात्यन्तं प्रत्याख्यानम्-कुतः-सुखस्यापि दुःखानामन्तरालेषु ‘ निष्पत्तेः ’ इति योजना ।

४ सुखस्यात्यन्तं प्रत्याख्यानं न सम्भवतीत्येतस्मिन्नर्थे हेत्वन्तरमवतारयति-अथापीति ।

५ तदेव हेत्वन्तरमाह-बाधनाऽनिवृत्तेरिति सूत्रम् । ‘अप्रतिषेधः’ अप्रत्याख्यानं (सुखस्येति शेषः)-कुतः-(सुखं) ‘ वेदयतः ’ अनुभवतः-‘ पर्येषणदोषात् ’ तृष्णाया अनुवर्तनात्-‘ बाधनानिवृत्तेः ’ बाधनाबुद्धेः ‘ अनिवृत्तेः ’ इति योजना ।

वा विपद्यते, न्यूनं वा सम्पद्यते, बहु प्रत्यनीकं वा सम्पद्यते—इत्येतस्मात्पर्येषणदोषान्नानाविधो मानसः सन्तापो भवति। एवं वेदयतः पर्येषणदोषाद्बाधनाया अनिवृत्तिः। बाधनाऽनिवृत्तेर्दुःखसंज्ञाभावनमुपदिश्यते। अनेन कारणेन दुःखं जन्म, न तु सुखस्याभावादिति।

अथाप्येतदनूक्तम्—

कामं कामयमानस्य यदा कामः समृध्यति।
अथैनमपरः कामः क्षिप्रमेव प्रबाधते॥

'अपि चेदुदनेमि समन्ताद् भूमिमिमां लभते सगवाश्वां, न स तेन धनेन धनैषी तृप्यति किन्तु सुखं धनकाम' इति॥ ५७॥

दुःख[1]विकल्पे सुखाभिमानाच्च॥ ५८॥

दुःखसंज्ञाभावनोपदेशः क्रियते। अयं खलु सुखसंवेदने व्यवस्थितः सुखं परमपुरुषार्थं मन्यते--न सुखादन्यन्निःश्रेयसमस्ति। सुखे प्राप्ते चरितार्थः कृतकरणीयो भवति। मिथ्यासङ्कल्पात्सुखे तत्साधनेषु च विषयेषु संरज्यते। संरक्तः सुखाय घटते। घटमानस्यास्य जन्मजराव्याधिप्रायणानिष्टसंयोगेष्टवियोगप्रार्थितानुपपत्तिनिमित्तमनेकविधं यावद् दुःखमुत्पद्यते तं दुःखविकल्पं सुखमित्यभिमन्यते। सुखाङ्गभूतं दुःखम्। न दुःखमनासाद्य शक्यं सुखमवाप्तुम्। तादर्थ्यात्सुखमेवेदमिति सुखसंज्ञोपहतप्रज्ञो जायस्व म्रियस्व चेति सन्धावतीति संसारं नातिवर्तते। तदस्याः सुखसंज्ञायाः प्रतिपक्षो दुःखसंज्ञाभावनमुपदिश्यते--दुःखानुषङ्गाद् दुःखं जन्मेति, न सुखस्याभावात्।

"यद्येवं, कस्माद् दुःखं जन्मेति नोच्यते? सोऽयमेवं वाच्ये यदेवमाह दुःखमेव जन्मेति—तेन सुखाभावं ज्ञापयतीति"।

जन्मविनिग्रहार्थीयो वै खल्वयमेवशब्दः। कथम्? न दुःखं जन्मस्वरूपतः, किन्तु दुःखोपचारात्। एवं सुखमपीति। एतदनेनैव निर्वर्त्यते न तु दुःखमेव जन्मेति॥ ५८॥

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१ नन्वयं यद्यप्यन्तराले सुखान्यनुभवति तथापि दुःखसम्भेदमाकलयन्ननुपदिष्टोऽपि स्वयमेव निवर्त्स्यति—कृतमस्य दुःखभावनोपदेशेनेत्यत आह—दुःखविकल्प इति सूत्रम्। दुःखस्य विविधे कल्पे (निषिद्धहिंसाभोजनादिरूपे) सुखाभिमानो दृश्यत एवाविवेकिनाम्। अत एवोपदेशस्यावसर इत्याशयः।

(२४) अपवर्गपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

[१]दुःखोद्देशानन्तरमपवर्गः[२] । स प्रत्याख्यायते[३]–

"[४]ऋणक्लेशप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गाभावः" ॥ ५९ ॥

"ऋणानुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्गः । 'जायमानो ह वै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिर्ऋणैर्ऋणवान् जायते–ब्रह्मचर्येण ऋषिभ्यो यज्ञेन देवेभ्यः प्रजया पितृभ्य'–इति ऋणानि । तेषामनुबन्धः स्वकर्मभिः सम्बन्धः । कर्मसम्बन्धवचनात्–'जरामर्यँ वा एतत्सत्रं यदग्निहोत्रं दर्शपूर्णमासौ चे'ति 'जरया ह वा एष तस्मात्सत्राद्विमुच्यत मृत्युना ह वेति' । ऋणानुबन्धादपवर्गानुष्ठानकालो नास्तीत्यपवर्गाभावः ।

"[५]क्लेशानुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्गः । क्लेशानुबद्ध एवायं म्रियते, क्लेशानुबद्धश्च जायते । नास्य क्लेशानुबन्धविच्छेदो गृह्यते" ।

"[६]प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्गः । जन्मप्रभृत्ययं यावत्प्रायणं वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भेणाविमुक्तो गृह्यते । तत्र यदुक्तं–'दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्ग'–इति तदनुपपन्नमिति" ॥ ५९ ॥

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१ क्रमप्राप्तामपवर्गपरीक्षामुपक्रमते– दुःखेति ।

२ अपवर्ग इति–उद्दिष्टो लक्षितश्चेति शेषः ।

३ तत्र तावत्पूर्वपक्षं प्रस्तौति–स प्रत्याख्यायत इति ।

४ नास्त्यपवर्ग इति पूर्वपक्षः । तत्र सूत्रम्–ऋणेति । नास्त्यपवर्ग इति प्रतिज्ञावाक्यम् । तत्र त्रयो हेतवः–ऋणानुबन्धात्–क्लेशानुबन्धात्–प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादिति ।

५ 'क्लेशानुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्ग' इति द्वितीयं सौत्रवाक्यम् । 'अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशा' इति योगसूत्रम् । आजन्मसमयादा च मरणात् पुरुषोऽविद्यादिभिः क्लेशैर्ग्रस्त एव वर्तते । एत एव च क्लेशा जीवस्य संसारनिदानभूताः । तथा चामरणं क्लेशैर्ग्रस्तत्वात्पुरुषस्यानुच्छिन्ननिदानः संसारो न शक्य उच्छेत्तुमित्यर्थः ।

६ 'प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्ग' इति तृतीयं सौत्रवाक्यम् । जन्मसमयमारभ्य मरणपर्यन्तं वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भरूपया प्रवृत्त्या पराक्रान्त एव जीवो वर्तते– न च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिमन्तरेणापवर्गसम्भव इति स्पष्टीकृतं प्रथमाध्यायस्थप्रथमाह्निके द्वितीयसूत्रे । एवं चापवर्गो न सम्भवत्येवेत्यर्थः ।

अत्राभिधीयते[1] । यत्तावदृणानुबन्धादिति[2] ऋणैरिव ऋणैरिति[3]—

प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेर्गुणशब्देनानुवादो[4] निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्तेः॥६०॥

ऋणैरिति नायं प्रधानशब्दः । यत्र खल्वेकः प्रत्यादेयं ददाति द्वितीयश्च प्रतिदेयं गृह्णाति तत्रास्य दृष्टत्वात् प्रधानमृणशब्दः । न चैतदिहोपपद्यते–प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेः । गुणशब्देनायमनुवाद ऋणैरिव ऋणैरिति । प्रयुक्तोपमं चैतद् यथाऽग्निर्माणवक इति । अन्यत्र दृष्टश्चायमृणशब्द इह प्रयुज्यते यथाऽग्निशब्दो माणवके । कथं गुणशब्देनानुवादः ? निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्तेः । कर्मलोपे ऋणीव ऋणदानान्निन्द्यते, कर्मानुष्ठाने च ऋणीव ऋणदानात्प्रशस्यते,स एवोपमार्थ इति ।

जायमान इति गुणशब्दो विपर्ययेऽनधिकारात् । 'जायमानो ह वै ब्राह्मण' इति च गुणशब्दो–गृहस्थः सम्पद्यमानो जायमान–इति । यदायं गृहस्थो जायते तदा कर्मभिरधिक्रियते । मातृतो जायमानस्यानधिकारात् । यदा तु मातृतो जायते कुमारो न तदा कर्मभिरधिक्रियते । अर्थिनः शक्तस्य चाधिकारात् । अर्थिनः कर्मभिरधिकारः, कर्मविधौ कामसंयोगस्मृतेः–'अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम' इत्येवमादि । शक्तस्य च प्रवृत्तिसम्भवात् । शक्तस्य कर्मभिरधिकारः– प्रवृत्तिसम्भवात् । शक्तः खलु विहिते कर्मणि प्रवर्तते नेतर इति । उभयाभावस्तु प्रधानशब्दार्थे । मातृतो जायमाने कुमारे उभयमर्थिता शक्तिश्च न भवतीति ।

न भिद्यते च लौकिकाद्वाक्याद्वैदिकं वाक्यं प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिपुरुषप्रणीतत्वेन । तत्र लौकिकस्तावदपरीक्षकोऽपि न जातमात्रं कुमारकमेवं ब्रूयात्–अधीष्व यजस्व ब्रह्मचर्यं चर-इति । कुत एष ऋषिरुपपन्नानवद्यवादी उपदेशार्थेन प्रयुक्त उपदिशति ? न खलु वै नर्तकोऽन्धेषु प्रवर्तते न गायनो बधिरेष्विति ।

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१ सिद्धान्तमुपक्रमते–अत्राभिधीयत इति ।

२ तत्रादौ पूर्वपक्षीयप्रथमवाक्यस्य तात्पर्यं सिद्धान्तानुगुणं वर्णयति–यत्तावदिति ।

३ यत्तावद्यावज्जीवमृणमनुवर्तत इति श्रुतिवाक्येषु वर्णितं तत्र ऋणशब्दो गौणार्थो न मुख्यार्थ इति सौत्रं सिद्धान्तं सङ्क्षेपेण सूचयति– ऋणैरिवेति ।

४ ऋणशब्दस्यौपचारिकत्वं साधयति–प्रधानेति सूत्रम् । यत्र यत्र शब्दस्य मुख्यार्थानुपपत्तिस्तत्र तत्र गौण एवार्थः परिगृह्यते–एवं चोदाहृतं ऋणवाक्यं निन्दाप्रशंसापरतया नेतव्यमित्यर्थः ।

उपदिष्टार्थविज्ञाता चोपदेशविषयः। यश्चोपदिष्टमर्थं विजानाति तं प्रत्युपदेशः क्रियते, न चैतदस्ति जायमानकुमारक इति।

गार्हस्थ्यलिङ्गं च मन्त्रब्राह्मणं कर्माभिवदति। यच्च मन्त्रब्राह्मणं कर्माभिवदति तत्पत्नीसम्बन्धादिना गार्हस्थ्यलिङ्गेनोपपन्नम्। तस्माद् गृहस्थोऽयं जायमानोऽभिधीयत इति।

आर्थित्व[1]स्य चाविपरिणामे जरामर्यवादोपपत्तिः। याव[2]च्चास्य फलेनार्थित्वं न विपरिणमते—न निवर्तते, तावदनेन कर्मानुष्ठेयमित्युपपद्यते जरामर्यवादस्तं प्रतीति।

'जरया ह वा' इत्यायुषस्तुरीयस्य चतुर्थस्य प्रव्रज्यायुक्तस्य वचनं—जरया ह वा एष एतस्माद्विमुच्यते—इति। आयुषस्तुरीयं चतुर्थं प्रव्रज्यायुक्तं जरेत्युच्यते। तत्र हि प्रव्रज्या विधीयते। अत्यन्तजरासंयोगे 'जरया ह वा' इत्यनर्थकम्। 'अशक्तो विमुच्यते' इत्येतदपि नोपपद्यते। स्वयमशक्तस्य बाह्यां शक्तिमाह—'अन्तेवासी वा जुहुयाद् ब्रह्मणा स परिक्रीतः, क्षीरहोता वा जुहुयाद्धनेन स परिक्रीत' इति।

अथापि विहितं वानूद्येत कामाद्वार्थः परिकल्प्येत। विहितानुवचनं न्याय्यमिति। ऋणवानिवास्वतन्त्रो गृहस्थः कर्मसु प्रवर्तत इत्युपपन्नं वाक्यस्य सामर्थ्यम्। फलस्य हि साधनानि प्रयत्नविषयो न फलम्। तानि सम्पन्नानि फलाय कल्पन्ते। विहितं च जायमानं विधीयते च जायमानम्। तेन य सम्बध्यते सोऽयं जायमान इति।

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१ तदनेन गार्हस्थ्यात् पूर्वावस्था ऋणानुबद्धा न भवतीत्युक्तम्। सम्प्रत्युत्तरावस्थाऽपि न ऋणानुबद्धेत्याह—अर्थित्वस्येति। यदा चार्थिन एव कर्मस्वधिकारस्तदाऽर्थित्वस्य 'अविपरिणामे' अनिवृत्तावेव 'जरामर्यवाद' उपपद्यते इत्यर्थः।

२ संक्षेपेणोक्तं विस्तरेणोपपादयति—यावच्चास्येति। यावत्कालपर्यन्तं पुरुषस्य फलेच्छा वर्तते तावत्कालपर्यन्तमेवास्य तत्तत्फलजनककर्मसु प्रवृत्तिस्तावत्कालपर्यन्तमेवैनं प्रति पूर्वपक्षोदाहृतस्य 'जरामर्यं वा एतत्सत्रं यदग्निहोत्रम्' इत्यादिवाक्यस्योपपत्तिरित्यर्थः। तेन फलवासनावत्त्वमेवोक्तकर्माधिकारहेतुर्न प्राणधारणमात्रमिति यदुक्तम् 'ऋणापाकरणेन वयःपर्यवसानान्नास्ति मोक्षावसर' इति तदपाकृतं भवतीत्याशयः।

अयमभिप्रायः। न तावज्जायमान इत्यादिवाक्ये विधिविभक्तिरस्ति। तेन अन्यत्र विहितस्यानुवाद एवायमिति स्वरसतः प्रतीयते। यदि तु तस्यार्थसिद्धि-

" तत्किमिदं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयस्य सर्वजन्तुप्रत्यक्षस्य सुखस्य प्रत्याख्यानम्। आहोस्विदन्यः कल्प इति ? "

अन्य इत्याह। कथम्? न वै सर्वलोकसाक्षिकं सुखं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम्। अयं तु जन्ममरणप्रबन्धानुभवनिमित्ताद् दुःखान्निर्विण्णस्य दुःखं जिहासतो दुःखसंज्ञाभावनोपदेशो दुःखहानार्थ इति। कया युक्त्या? सर्वे खलु सत्त्वनिकायाः सर्वाण्युत्पत्तिस्थानानि सर्वः पुनर्भवो बाधनानुषक्तो दुःखसाहचर्या'द्बाधनालक्षणं दुःख'मित्युक्तमृषिभिः दुःखसंज्ञाभावनमुपदिश्यते[1]।

अत्र[2] च हेतुरुपादीयते—

शेषिता। कारणं च दुःखस्य दृष्टरूपमहिकण्टकादि न विप्रतिपत्तिविषयः। अदृष्टरूपा च प्रवृत्तिः परीक्षितैव। तदवान्तरकार्यरूपं च जन्मादि परीक्षितमेव। कारणनिवृत्तौ च कार्यं निवर्तत इति प्रथमाध्यायद्वितीयसूत्रे परीक्षितम्। तत् किमपरमवशिष्यते यदर्थोऽयमारम्भ " इति।

तत्परिहारश्चेत्थम्– 'बाधनालक्षणं दुःखमि'ति लक्षितं दुःखम्। तत्र बाधनाशब्देन बाधबुद्धिरुच्यते। अनेन च लक्षणेन दुःखायतनानि दुःखसाधनानि सुखं च व्याप्यते। अतो मुख्यां बाधनाबुद्धिमादाय पूर्वपक्षावकाश इति।

दुःखपरीक्षायाः क्रमप्राप्तिं प्रदर्शयति– फलानन्तरमिति।

१ तत्र पूर्वपक्षिणः प्रश्नः– तत्किमिति। भवतु बाधनालक्षणं दुःखमनुभूयमानम्। यत्पुनरिदं प्रत्यात्ममनुकूलवेदनीयं सुखं तत्कथं दुःखम्, अनुभवविरोधात्। शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धयश्च यदि दुःखहेतुतया 'दुःखं' कस्मात्सुखहेतुतया सुखमेव न भवन्ति। सेयमतिभीरुता सकललोकयात्राविरोधिनी। यथा मांसार्थी कण्टकानुद्धृत्य मांसमश्नन् कण्टकजन्यदुःखमाप्नोत्येवमेव प्रेक्षावान् दुःखमुद्धृत्येन्द्रियसाधनं सुखमेव भोक्ष्यते। सन्ति च विविधदुःखपरिवर्जनहेतवो दृष्टाः परिदृष्टसामर्थ्या अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामिति पूर्वपक्षप्रश्नाशयः।

एतदुक्तं भवति। यदि दुःखपरिवर्जनेन शक्येत सुखमुपादातुं ततस्तादृशमनुकूलवेदनीयं कः प्रेक्षावान् प्रजह्यात्। न तु तादृशमस्ति सुखं क्वचिदपि–सर्वस्य दुःखाविनाभाविनः केवलस्य सुखस्योपादातुमशक्यत्वात्। न हि मधुविषसम्पृक्तमन्नं विषमपहृत्य शक्यं मधुमात्रमुपादातुम्। तस्मान्नेदं सुखस्यात्यन्तं प्रत्याख्यानमपि तु सुख एव दुःखभावनमात्रमुपदिश्यते ऋषिणेति।

२ सूत्रमवतारयति–अत्रेति। 'अत्र' सुखे दुःखभावना कार्येत्यस्मिन्नुपदेशे, तत्समर्थनाय 'हेतुः उपादीयते' सूत्रकारेणेत्यर्थः।

विविधबाधनायोगाद् दुःखमेव जन्मोत्पत्तिः ॥ ५५ ॥

जन्म–जायत इति–शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धयः। शरीरादीनां संस्थानविशिष्टानां प्रादुर्भाव उत्पत्तिः। विविधा च बाधना–हीना मध्यमा उत्कृष्टा चेति। उत्कृष्टा नारकिणाम्। तिरश्चां तु मध्यमा। मनुष्याणां तु हीना। देवानां हीनतरा वीतरागाणां च। एवं सर्वमुत्पत्तिस्थानं विविधबाधनानुषक्तं पश्यतः सुखे तत्साधनेषु च शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिषु दुःखसंज्ञा व्यवतिष्ठते। दुःखसंज्ञाव्यवस्थानात्सर्वलोकेष्वनभिरतिसंज्ञा भवति। अनभिरतिसंज्ञामुपासीनस्य सर्वलोकविषया तृष्णा विच्छिद्यते। तृष्णाप्रहाणात्सर्वदुःखाद्विमुच्यत इति। यथा विषयोगात्पयो विषमिति बुध्यमानो नोपादत्ते। अनुपाददानो मरणदुःखं नाप्नोति ॥ ५५ ॥

दुःखोद्देशस्तु न सुखस्य प्रत्याख्यानम्। कस्मात्?

न, सुखस्याप्यन्तरालनिष्पत्तेः ॥ ५६ ॥

न खल्वयं दुःखोद्देशः सुखस्य प्रत्याख्यानम्। कस्मात्? सुखस्याप्यन्तरालनिष्पत्तेः। निष्पद्यते खलु बाधनान्तरालेषु सुखं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं शरीरिणाम्। तदशक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुमिति ॥ ५६ ॥

अथापि—

बाधनाऽनिवृत्तेर्वेदयतः पर्येषणदोषादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५७ ॥

सुखस्य दुःखोद्देशेनेति प्रकरणात्। पर्येषणं–प्रार्थना–विषयार्जनतृष्णा। पर्येषणस्य दोषो–यदयं वेदयमानः प्रार्थयते तस्य प्रार्थितं न सम्पद्यते, सम्पद्य

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१ सूचितं हेतुमाह–विविधेति सूत्रम्। 'जन्मनः' शरीरादेः 'उत्पत्तिः' सा 'दुःखम्' इत्येव भावयितव्या–कुतः–विविधबाधनायोगादिति योजना।

२ सर्वं दुःखमिति भावनोपदेशस्य यथोक्तमेव तात्पर्यं न पुनः सुखस्यात्यन्तप्रत्याख्यानमित्येव द्रढयन् पुनराह–दुःखोद्देश इति।

३ तत्रोत्तरम्–न सुखस्येति सूत्रम्। 'न' सुखस्यात्यन्तं प्रत्याख्यानम्-कुतः–सुखस्यापि दुःखानामन्तरालेषु 'निष्पत्तेः' इति योजना।

४ सुखस्यात्यन्तं प्रत्याख्यानं न सम्भवतीत्येतस्मिन्नर्थे हेत्वन्तरमवतारयति–अथापीति।

५ तदेव हेत्वन्तरमाह–बाधनाऽनिवृत्तेरिति सूत्रम्। 'अप्रतिषेधः' अप्रत्याख्यानं (सुखस्येति शेषः)–कुतः–(सुखं) 'वेदयतः' अनुभवतः–'पर्येषणदोषात्' तृष्णाया अनुवर्तनात्–'बाधनानिवृत्तेः' बाधनाबुद्धेः 'अनिवृत्तेः' इति योजना।

वा विपद्यते, न्यूनं वा सम्पद्यते, बहु प्रत्यनीकं वा सम्पद्यते—इत्येतस्मात्पर्येषणदोषान्नानाविधो मानसः सन्तापो भवति। एवं वेदयतः पर्येषणदोषाद्बाधनाया अनिवृत्तिः। बाधनाऽनिवृत्तेर्दुःखसंज्ञाभावनमुपदिश्यते। अनेन कारणेन दुःखं जन्म, न तु सुखस्याभावादिति।

अथाप्येतदनूक्तम्—

कामं कामयमानस्य यदा कामः समृध्यति।
अथैनमपरः कामः क्षिप्रमेव प्रबाधते॥

'अपि चेदुदनेमि समन्ताद् भूमिमिमां लभते सगवाश्वां, न स तेन धनेन धनैषी तृप्यति किन्तु सुखं धनकाम' इति॥ ५७॥

दुःखविकल्पे[1] सुखाभिमानाच्च॥ ५८॥

दुःखसंज्ञाभावनोपदेशः क्रियते। अयं खलु सुखसंवेदने व्यवस्थितः सुखं परमपुरुषार्थं मन्यते--न सुखादन्यन्निःश्रेयसमस्ति। सुखे प्राप्ते चरितार्थः कृतकरणीयो भवति। मिथ्यासङ्कल्पात्सुखे तत्साधनेषु च विषयेषु संरज्यते। संरक्तः सुखाय घटते। घटमानस्यास्य जन्मजराव्याधिप्रायणानिष्टसंयोगेष्टवियोगप्रार्थितानुपपत्तिनिमित्तमनेकविधं यावद् दुःखमुत्पद्यते तं दुःखविकल्पं सुखमित्यभिमन्यते। सुखाङ्गभूतं दुःखम्। न दुःखमनासाद्य शक्यं सुखमवाप्तुम्। तादर्थ्यात्सुखमेवेदमिति सुखसंज्ञोपहतप्रज्ञो जायस्व म्रियस्व चेति सन्धावतीति संसारं नातिवर्तते। तदस्याः सुखसंज्ञायाः प्रतिपक्षो दुःखसंज्ञाभावनमुपदिश्यते--दुःखानुषङ्गाद् दुःखं जन्मेति, न सुखस्याभावात्।

"यद्येवं, कस्माद् दुःखं जन्मेति नोच्यते? सोऽयमेवं वाच्ये यदेवमाह दुःखमेव जन्मेति—तेन सुखाभावं ज्ञापयतीति"।

जन्मविनिग्रहार्थीयो वै खल्वयमेवशब्दः। कथम्? न दुःखं जन्मस्वरूपतः, किन्तु दुःखोपचारात्। एवं सुखमपीति। एतदनेनैव निवर्त्यते न तु दुःखमेव जन्मेति॥ ५८॥

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1 नन्वयं यद्यप्यन्तराले सुखान्यनुभवति तथापि दुःखसम्भेदमाकलयन्ननुपदिष्टोऽपि स्वयमेव निवर्त्स्यति—कृतमस्य दुःखभावनोपदेशेनेत्यत आह—दुःखविकल्प इति सूत्रम्। दुःखस्य विविधे कल्पे (निषिद्धहिंसाभोजनादिरूपे) सुखाभिमानो दृश्यत एवाविवेकिनाम्। अत एवोपदेशस्यावसर इत्याशयः।

(२४) अपवर्गपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

[1] दुःखोद्देशानन्तरमपवर्गः[2] । स प्रत्याख्यायते[3]–

" ऋण[4]क्लेशप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गाभावः " ॥ ५९ ॥

" ऋणानुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्गः । ' जायमानो ह वै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिर्ऋणैर्ऋणवान् जायते–ब्रह्मचर्येण ऋषिभ्यो यज्ञेन देवेभ्यः प्रजया पितृभ्य '–इति ऋणानि । तेषामनुबन्धः स्वकर्मभिः सम्बन्धः । कर्मसम्बन्धवचनात्–' जरामर्यं वा एतत्सत्रं यदग्निहोत्रं दर्शपूर्णमासौ चे'ति ' जरया ह वा एष तस्मात्सत्राद्विमुच्यत मृत्युना ह वेति ' । ऋणानुबन्धादपवर्गानुष्ठानकालो नास्तीत्यपवर्गाभावः ।

" क्लेशानु[5]बन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्गः । क्लेशानुबद्ध एवायं म्रियते, क्लेशानुबद्धश्च जायते । नास्य क्लेशानुबन्धविच्छेदो गृह्यते " ।

"प्रवृ[6]त्त्यनुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्गः । जन्मप्रभृत्ययं यावत्प्रायणं वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भेणाविमुक्तो गृह्यते । तत्र यदुक्तं–'दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्ग'–इति तदनुपपन्नमिति" ॥ ५९ ॥

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१ क्रमप्राप्तामपवर्गपरीक्षामुपक्रमते– दुःखेति ।

२ अपवर्ग इति–उद्दिष्टो लक्षितश्चेति शेषः ।

३ तत्र तावत्पूर्वपक्षं प्रस्तौति–स प्रत्याख्यायत इति ।

४ नास्त्यपवर्ग इति पूर्वपक्षः । तत्र सूत्रम्–ऋणेति । नास्त्यपवर्ग इति प्रतिज्ञावाक्यम् । तत्र त्रयो हेतवः–ऋणानुबन्धात्–क्लेशानुबन्धात्–प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादिति ।

५ ' क्लेशानुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्ग ' इति द्वितीयं सौत्रवाक्यम् । ' अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशा ' इति योगसूत्रम् । आजन्मसमयादा च मरणात् पुरुषोऽविद्यादिभिः क्लेशैर्ग्रस्त एव वर्तते । एत एव च क्लेशा जीवस्य संसारनिदानभूताः । तथा चामरणं क्लेशैर्ग्रस्तत्वात्पुरुषस्यानुच्छिन्ननिदानः संसारो न शक्य उच्छेत्तुमित्यर्थः ।

६ ' प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्ग ' इति तृतीयं सौत्रवाक्यम् । जन्मसमयमारभ्य मरणपर्यन्तं वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भरूपया प्रवृत्त्या पराक्रान्त एव जीवो वर्तते– न च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिमन्तरेणापवर्गसम्भव इति स्पष्टीकृतं प्रथमाध्यायस्थप्रथमाह्निके द्वितीयसूत्रे । एवं चापवर्गो न सम्भवत्येवेत्यर्थः ।

अत्राभिधीयते[1] । यत्तावदृणानुबन्धादिति[2] ऋणैरिव[3] ऋणैरिति—

प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेर्गुणशब्देनानुवादो[4] निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्तेः ॥६०॥

ऋणैरिति नायं प्रधानशब्दः । यत्र खल्वेकः प्रत्यादेयं ददाति द्वितीयश्च प्रतिदेयं गृह्णाति तत्रास्य दृष्टत्वात् प्रधानमृणशब्दः । न चैतदिहोपपद्यते–प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेः । गुणशब्देनायमनुवाद ऋणैरिव ऋणैरिति । प्रयुक्तोपमं चैतद् यथाऽग्निर्माणवक इति । अन्यत्र दृष्टश्चायमृणशब्द इह प्रयुज्यते यथाऽग्निशब्दो माणवके । कथं गुणशब्देनानुवादः ? निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्तेः । कर्मलोपे ऋणीव ऋणदानान्निन्द्यते, कर्मानुष्ठाने च ऋणीव ऋणदानात्प्रशस्यते,स एवोपमार्थ इति ।

जायमान इति गुणशब्दो विपर्ययेऽनधिकारात् । 'जायमानो ह वै ब्राह्मण' इति च गुणशब्दो–गृहस्थः सम्पद्यमानो जायमान–इति । यदायं गृहस्थो जायते तदा कर्मभिरधिक्रियते । मातृतो जायमानस्यानधिकारात् । यदा तु मातृतो जायते कुमारो न तदा कर्मभिरधिक्रियते । अर्थिनः शक्तस्य चाधिकारात् । अर्थिनः कर्मभिरधिकारः, कर्मविधौ कामसंयोगस्मृतेः–'अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम' इत्येवमादि । शक्तस्य च प्रवृत्तिसम्भवात् । शक्तस्य कर्मभिरधिकारः–प्रवृत्तिसम्भवात् । शक्तः खलु विहिते कर्मणि प्रवर्तते नेतर इति । उभयाभावस्तु प्रधानशब्दार्थे । मातृतो जायमाने कुमारे उभयमर्थिता शक्तिश्च न भवतीति ।

न भिद्यते च लौकिकाद्वाक्याद्वैदिकं वाक्यं प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिपुरुषप्रणीतत्वेन । तत्र लौकिकस्तावदपरीक्षकोऽपि न जातमात्रं कुमारकमेवं ब्रूयात्–अधीष्व यजस्व ब्रह्मचर्यं चर-इति । कुत एष ऋषिरुपपन्नानवद्यवादी उपदेशार्थेन प्रयुक्त उपदिशति ? न खलु वै नर्तकोऽन्धेषु प्रवर्तते न गायनो बधिरेष्विति ।

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१ सिद्धान्तमुपक्रमते–अत्राभिधीयत इति ।

२ तत्रादौ पूर्वपक्षीयप्रथमवाक्यस्य तात्पर्यं सिद्धान्तानुगुणं वर्णयति–यत्तावदिति ।

३ यत्तावद्यावज्जीवमृणमनुवर्तत इति श्रुतिवाक्येषु वर्णितं तत्र ऋणशब्दो गौणार्थो न मुख्यार्थ इति सौत्रं सिद्धान्तं सङ्क्षेपेण सूचयति– ऋणैरिवेति ।

४ ऋणशब्दस्यौपचारिकत्वं साधयति–प्रधानेति सूत्रम् । यत्र यत्र शब्दस्य मुख्यार्थानुपपत्तिस्तत्र तत्र गौण एवार्थः परिगृह्यते–एवं चोदाहृतं ऋणवाक्यं निन्दाप्रशंसापरतया नेतव्यमित्यर्थः ।

उपदिष्टार्थविज्ञाता चोपदेशविषयः । यश्चोपदिष्टमर्थं विजानाति तं प्रत्युपदेशः क्रियते, न चैतदस्ति जायमानकुमारक इति ।

गार्हस्थ्यलिङ्गं च मन्त्रब्राह्मणं कर्माभिवदति । यच्च मन्त्रब्राह्मणं कर्माभिवदति तत्पत्नीसम्बन्धादिना गार्हस्थ्यलिङ्गेनोपपन्नम् । तस्माद् गृहस्थोऽयं जायमानोऽभिधीयत इति ।

आर्थित्व[1]स्य चाविपरिणामे जरामर्यवादोपपत्तिः । याव[2]च्चास्य फलेनार्थित्वं न विपरिणमते—न निवर्तते, तावदनेन कर्मानुष्ठेयमित्युपपद्यते जरामर्यवादस्तं प्रतीति ।

' जरया ह वा ' इत्यायुषस्तुरीयस्य चतुर्थस्य प्रव्रज्यायुक्तस्य वचनं—जरया ह वा एष एतस्माद्विमुच्यते—इति । आयुषस्तुरीयं चतुर्थं प्रव्रज्यायुक्तं जरेत्युच्यते । तत्र हि प्रव्रज्या विधीयते । अत्यन्तजरासंयोगे ' जरया ह वा ' इत्यनर्थकम् । 'अशक्तो विमुच्यते' इत्येतदपि नोपपद्यते । स्वयमशक्तस्य बाह्यां शक्तिमाह—'अन्तेवासी वा जुहुयाद् ब्रह्मणा स परिक्रीतः, क्षीरहोता वा जुहुयाद्धनेन स परिक्रीत' इति ।

अथापि विहितं वानूद्येत कामाद्वार्थः परिकल्प्येत । विहितानुवचनं न्याय्यमिति । ऋणवानिवास्वतन्त्रो गृहस्थः कर्मसु प्रवर्तत इत्युपपन्नं वाक्यस्य सामर्थ्यम् । फलस्य हि साधनानि प्रयत्नविषयो न फलम् । तानि सम्पन्नानि फलाय कल्पन्ते । विहितं च जायमानं विधीयते च जायमानम् । तेन य सम्बद्ध्यते सोऽयं जायमान इति ।

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१ तदनेन गार्हस्थ्यात् पूर्वावस्था ऋणानुबद्धा न भवतीत्युक्तम् । सम्प्रत्युत्तरावस्थाऽपि न ऋणानुबद्धेत्याह—अर्थित्वस्येति । यदा चार्थिन एव कर्मस्वधिकारस्तदाऽर्थित्वस्य ' अविपरिणामे ' अनिवृत्तावेव ' जरामर्यवाद ' उपपद्यते इत्यर्थः ।

२ संक्षेपेणोक्तं विस्तरेणोपपादयति—यावच्चास्येति । यावत्कालपर्यन्तं पुरुषस्य फलेच्छा वर्तते तावत्कालपर्यन्तमेवास्य तत्तत्फलजनककर्मसु प्रवृत्तिस्तावत्कालपर्यन्तमेवैनं प्रति पूर्वपक्षोदाहृतस्य ' जरामर्यं वा एतत्सत्रं यदग्निहोत्रम् ' इत्यादिवाक्यस्योपपत्तिरित्यर्थः । तेन फलवासनावत्त्वमेवोक्तकर्माधिकारहेतुर्न प्राणधारणमात्रमिति यदुक्तम् ' ऋणापाकरणेन वयःपर्यवसानान्नास्ति मोक्षावसर ' इति तदपाकृतं भवतीत्याशयः ।

अयमभिप्रायः । न तावज्जायमान इत्यादिवाक्ये विधिविभक्तिरस्ति । तेन अन्यत्र विहितस्यानुवाद एवायमिति स्वरसतः प्रतीयते । यदि तु तस्यार्थसिद्धि-

"प्रत्यक्षविधानाभावादिति चेद्" [1] न, प्रतिषेधस्यापि [2] प्रत्यक्षविधानाभावादिति। "प्रत्यक्षतो [3] विधीयते गार्हस्थ्यं ब्राह्मणेन, यदि चाश्रमान्तरमभविष्यत्तदपि व्यधास्यत् प्रत्यक्षतः, प्रत्यक्षविधानाभावान्नास्त्याश्रमान्तरमिति"। न, प्रतिषेधस्यापि [4] प्रत्यक्षतो विधानाभावात्—न प्रतिषेधोऽपि वै ब्राह्मणेन प्रत्यक्षतो विधीयते। 'न सन्त्याश्रमान्तराणि एक एव गृहस्थाश्रम' इति प्रतिषेधस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽश्रवणादयुक्तमेतदिति। अधिकाराच्च विधानं विद्यान्तरवत्। यथा शास्त्रान्तराणि स्वे स्वेऽधिकारे प्रत्यक्षतो विधायकानि नार्थान्तराभावात्, एवमिदं ब्राह्मणं गृहस्थशास्त्रं स्वेऽधिकारे प्रत्यक्षतो विधायकं नाश्रमान्तराणामभावादिति।

ऋग्ब्राह्मणं चापवर्गाभिधाय्यभिधीयते। ऋचश्च ब्राह्मणानि चापवर्गाभिवादीनि भवन्ति। ऋचश्च तावत्—

कर्मभिर्मृत्युमृषयो निषेदुः प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमिच्छमानाः।
अथापरे ऋषयो मनीषिणः परं कर्मभ्योऽमृतत्वमानशुः॥
न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैके अमृतत्वमानशुः॥

वाक्यान्तराद्वा प्रमाणान्तराद्वा कथमपि न कल्पेत ततो 'वचनानि त्वपूर्वत्वादिति' न्यायेन विधित्वमस्य कल्प्येत। सन्ति तु शतशस्तदर्थविधायकानि वाक्यानि साक्षाद् विधिविभक्तिमन्तीति—को जात्विच्छामात्रेण विध्यर्थतां कल्पयेत्। तस्माद्विहितानुवाद एवेदमिति न्याय्यम्। एवञ्च जायमानशब्दो गौणार्थ एव नेय इति युक्तमुत्पश्याम इति।

१ यदुक्तमायुषश्चतुर्थे भागे प्रव्रज्या विधीयत इति—तदमृष्यमाणः शङ्कते—प्रत्यक्षेति।

२ शङ्कां परिहरति— न, प्रतिषेधस्येति।

३ शङ्कां विभजते—प्रत्यक्षत इति। तथाचोक्तं गौतमीये धर्मशास्त्रे— 'ऐकाश्रम्यं त्वाचार्याः प्रत्यक्षविधानाद्गार्हस्थ्यस्येति'— इति शङ्काशयः।

४ निराकरणं विभजते— न, प्रतिषेधस्येति। स्मृतीतिहासपुराणानि तावदविवादं विदधति चातुराश्रम्यं उपलभ्यन्ते। तत्र विहितानां प्रतिषेधो यदि प्रत्यक्षश्रुतौ कुत्राप्युपलभ्येत भवेयुस्तान्यप्रमाणानीति। न तु चातुराश्रम्यप्रतिषेधः कुत्रापि साक्षाच्छ्रुतावुपलभ्यते। तस्मात् स्मृत्यादिविहितं चातुराश्रम्यं श्रुत्याऽप्रतिषिद्धं न शक्यं परित्यक्तुमित्यर्थः।

परेण नाकं निहितं गुहायां विभ्राजते यद्यतयो विशन्ति ।
वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् ।
तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ।
(वाजसनेयिसंहिता ३१।१८। तैत्तिरीयारण्यक ३।१२।७)
अथ ब्राह्मणानि—

"[1]त्रयो धर्मस्कन्धा यज्ञोऽध्ययनं दानमिति प्रथमस्तप एव, द्वितीयो ब्रह्मचार्याचार्यकुलवासी, तृतीयोऽत्यन्तमात्मानमाचार्यकुलेऽवसादयन् सर्व एवैते पुण्यलोका भवन्ति । ब्रह्मसंस्थो[2]ऽमृतत्वमेति । (छान्दोग्योपनिषद् २।२३।१),"
"एतमेव प्रव्राजिनो लोकमभीप्सन्तः प्रव्रजन्तीति" (बृहदारण्यक ४।४।२२) ।
"अथो खल्वाहुः काममय एवायं पुरुष इति स यथाकामो भवति तत्क्रतु[3]र्भवति । यत्क्रतुर्भवति तत्कर्म कुरुते । यत्कर्म कुरुते तदभिसम्पद्यते[4]" (बृहदारण्यक ४।४।५) इति कर्मभिः संसरणमुक्त्वा प्रकृतमन्यदुपदिशन्ति "इति नु काम[5]यमानोऽथाकामयमानो योऽकामो निष्काम[6] आप्तकाम आत्म[7]कामो न तस्य प्राणा[8] उत्क्रामन्ति ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येती"ति ।

तत्र यदुक्तम्[9]–ऋणानुबन्धादपवर्गाभाव–इत्येतदयुक्तमिति । 'ये[10] चत्वारः पथयो देवयाना ' (तैत्तिरीयसंहिता ५।७।२।३) इति च चातुराश्रम्यश्रुतेरैकाश्रम्यानुपपत्तिः ॥ ६० ॥

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१ यज्ञ इत्यादिना गृहस्थाश्रमो दर्शितः। तप एवेति वानप्रस्थाश्रमः । ब्रह्मचारीति ब्रह्मचर्याश्रमः । एषामाश्रमाणामभ्युदयलक्षणं फलमाह- सर्व एवैत इति ।

२ चतुर्थाश्रममाह–ब्रह्मसंस्थ इति ।

३ तत्क्रतुरिति । 'क्रतुः ' सङ्कल्पः ।

४ तदभिसम्पद्यत इति । तत्कर्मानुसार्येवास्याग्रिमं जन्मेत्यर्थः ।

५ कामयमान इति । कामयमानो य आसीत् स एवाथाकामयमानो भवति ।

६ अकामयमानः कामं परिहरन् तत्परिहारसिद्धौ सोऽकामयमानः तस्य व्याख्यानं–निष्काम इति ।

७ आत्मकाम इति । कैवल्योपेतात्मकामस्तत्प्राप्त्या ' आप्तकामो ' भवति ।

८ न तस्य प्राणा इति । शाश्वतो भवतीत्यर्थः ।

९ प्रकृतमुपसंहरति–तत्र यदुक्तमिति ।

१० अपरामपि चातुराश्रम्याभिधायिनीं श्रुतिमाह–ये चत्वार इति । एवं च न गार्हस्थ्यमात्रैकाश्रम्यपक्षः साधुरिति निर्गलितोऽर्थः ।

फलार्थिनश्चेदं ब्राह्मणं-"जरामर्यं वा एतत्सत्रं यदग्निहोत्रं दर्शपूर्णमासौ च '–इति । कथम् ?

समारोपणादात्मन्यप्रतिषेधः ॥ ६१ ॥

'प्राजापत्यामिष्टिं निरूप्य तस्यां सर्ववेदसं हुत्वा आत्मन्यग्नीन्समारोप्य ब्राह्मणः प्रव्रजेत् 'इति श्रूयते । तेन विजानीमः–प्रजावित्तलोकैषणाभ्यो व्युत्थितस्य निवृत्ते फलार्थित्वे समारोपणं विधीयत–इति ।

एवं च ब्राह्मणानि–'सोऽन्यद् व्रतमुपाकरिष्यमाणो याज्ञवल्क्यो मैत्रेयीमिति होवाच–प्रव्रजिष्यन्वा अरे अहमस्मात्स्थानादस्मि हन्त तेऽनया कात्यायन्या सहान्तं करवाणि-इति । अथाप्युक्तानुशासनासि मैत्रेयि एतावदरे खल्वमृतत्वमिति होक्त्वा याज्ञवल्क्यः प्रवव्राज–इति' (बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्)॥ ६१॥

पात्रचयान्तानुपपत्तेश्च फलाभावः ॥ ६२ ॥

जरामर्ये च कर्मण्यविशेषेण कल्प्यमाने सर्वस्य पात्रचयान्तानि

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१ फलार्थिनो गृहस्थस्यैव ' जरा 'पर्यन्तमग्निहोत्राद्यनुष्ठानं जरामर्यवाक्येनोच्यत इति गतसूत्रस्य फलितार्थं हेत्वन्तरविधित्सया स्मारयति–फलार्थिन इति ।

२ तत्रोत्तरम्–समारोपणादिति सूत्रम् । आत्मन्यग्नीनां ' समारोपणात् ' ऋणानुबन्धेन अपवर्गस्य ' अप्रतिषेधः ' प्रतिषेधोऽयुक्त इत्यर्थः ।

३ सूत्रार्थमाह–प्राजापत्यामिति । साग्निकस्य चतुर्थाश्रमप्रवेशविधानमेतत् । मनुरप्याह—

" प्राजापत्यां निरूप्येष्टिं सार्ववेदसदक्षिणाम् ।

आत्मन्यग्नीन् समारोप्य ब्राह्मणः प्रव्रजेद् गृहात् । " इति । ६–३८

४ किमनेनेत्यत आह–तेनेति । उक्तायामिष्टौ सर्वस्वदानं तदैव सम्भवति यदा पुरुषः पुत्रधनलोकसम्बन्धिनीभ्य इच्छाभ्यो विनिर्मुक्तः फलार्थित्वादपैति, एवञ्च फलार्थिन एव गार्हस्थ्यं तत्सहचारिणो यागादिधर्माः, निवृत्ते च फलार्थित्वे गार्हस्थ्यमपैति–अपेते च गार्हस्थ्ये ते धर्मा अपियन्ति तदैव चाग्नीनामात्मनि समारोपणमित्युक्तवाक्यात्सिद्धमित्यर्थः ।

५ स्वपक्षे साधकान्तरमाह–पात्रचयेति सूत्रम् ।

६ सूत्रार्थमाह–जरामर्य इति । साग्निकस्य मरणे तदग्निहोत्रसंबन्धिसकलयज्ञीयपात्राणि तस्य शरीरेण सहैव दह्यन्त इति विधिः । एवं सति जरामर्यमग्निहोत्रमिति यदि सर्वपुरुषसाधारणं भवेन्न च फलार्थिगृहस्थमात्रपरम्–तदोक्तयज्ञीयसकलपात्रदहनस्य सर्वेषां प्राप्तौ चतुर्थाश्रमस्थस्यापि तत्प्रसङ्गः ।

कर्माणीति प्रसज्यते । तत्रैषणाव्युत्थानं[1] न श्रूयेत-'एतद्ध[2] स्म वै तत्पूर्वे ब्राह्मणा अनूचाना विद्वांसः प्रजां न कामयन्ते किं प्रजया करिष्यामो येषां नोऽयमात्मायं लोक-इति । ते ह स्म पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्तीति' (बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्) एषणाभ्यश्च व्युत्थितस्य पात्रचयान्तानि कर्माणि नोपपद्यन्त इति नाविशेषेण कर्त्तुः प्रयोजकं फलं भवतीति ।

चातुराश्रम्यविधानाच्चेतिहासपुराणधर्मशास्त्रेष्वैकाश्रम्यानुपपत्तिः। "तदप्रमाणमिति चेन्-" न, प्रमाणेन प्रामाण्याभ्यनुज्ञानात् । प्रमाणेन खलु ब्राह्मणेनेतिहासपुराणस्य प्रामाण्यमभ्यनुज्ञायते 'ते वा खल्वेते अथर्वाङ्गिरस एतदितिहासपुराणमभ्यवदन्नितिहासपुराणं पञ्चमं वेदानां वेद' इति । तस्मादयुक्तमेतदप्रामाण्यमिति । अप्रामाण्ये च धर्मशास्त्रस्य प्राणभृतां व्यवहारलोपाल्लोकोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । द्रष्टृप्रवक्तृसामान्याच्चाप्रामाण्यानुपपत्तिः । य एव मन्त्रब्राह्मणस्य द्रष्टारः प्रवक्तारश्च ते खल्वितिहासपुराणस्य धर्मशास्त्रस्य चेति ।

विषयव्यवस्थानाच्च यथाविषयं प्रामाण्यम् । अन्यो मन्त्रब्राह्मणस्य विषयोऽन्यश्चेतिहासपुराणधर्मशास्त्राणामिति । यज्ञो मन्त्रब्राह्मणस्य, लोकवृत्तमितिहासपुराणस्य, लोकव्यवहारव्यवस्थानं धर्मशास्त्रस्य विषयः । तत्रैकेन न सर्वं व्यवस्थाप्यत इति, यथाविषयमेतानि प्रमाणानीन्द्रियादिवदिति ॥ ६२ ॥

यत्पुनरेतत्[3] 'क्लेशानुबन्धस्याविच्छेदा'दिति—

सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नादर्शने क्लेशाभावादपवर्गः ॥ ६३ ॥

यथा सुषुप्तस्य खलु स्वप्नादर्शने रागानुबन्धः सुखदुःखानुबन्धश्च विच्छिद्यते तथापवर्गेऽपीति । एतच्च ब्रह्मविदो मुक्तस्यात्मनो रूपमुदाहरन्तीति ॥६३॥

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१ ननु भवत्वेवं का हानिरित्यत आह—तत्रैषणेति । प्रव्रजितस्य चतुर्थाश्रमस्थस्यापि शरीरेण सह यज्ञीयपात्रदहनं यद्यावश्यकं तर्ह्यामरणं तेनापि सकलानि यज्ञीयपात्रादीन्यात्मनः सकाशे रक्षणीयान्येव प्राप्नुवन्ति । एवं च सति कुतस्तस्य प्रव्रजनात् प्राक् विहितमेषणाभ्यो व्युत्थानं सर्वस्वप्रदानं वेत्येते सर्व एव विषयः प्रकुप्येरन्नित्याशयः ।

२ उक्तैषणाव्युत्थानविधायकं ब्राह्मणवाक्यमुदाहरति—एतद्ध स्मेति ।

३ पूर्वपक्षसूत्रोक्तमृणानुबन्धादपवर्गाभावमपाकृत्य क्लेशानुबन्धादपवर्गाभाव इति मतमपाकरिष्यन् तदनुवदति—यत्पुनरिति ।

यदपि[1] 'प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धा'दिति—

न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसन्धानाय हीनक्लेशस्य ॥ ६४ ॥

प्रक्षीणेषु रागद्वेषमोहेषु प्रवृत्तिर्न प्रतिसन्धानाय । प्रतिसन्धिस्तु पूर्वजन्मनिवृत्तौ पुनर्जन्म । तच्च तृष्णाकारितम् । तस्यां प्रहीणायां पूर्वजन्माभावे जन्मान्तराभावोऽप्रतिसन्धानमपवर्गः ।

"कर्म वैफल्यप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्"—न, कर्मविपाकप्रतिसंवेदनस्याप्रत्याख्यानात् । पूर्वजन्मनिवृत्तौ पुनर्जन्म न भवतीत्युच्यते, न तु कर्मविपाकप्रतिसंवेदनं प्रत्याख्यायते । सर्वाणि पूर्वकर्माणि ह्यन्ते जन्मनि विपच्यन्त इति ॥६४

"न क्लेशसन्ततेः[2] स्वाभाविकत्वात्" ॥ ६५ ॥

"नोपपद्यते क्लेशानुबन्धविच्छेदः । कस्मात्? क्लेशसन्ततेः स्वाभाविकत्वात् । अनादिरियं क्लेशसन्ततिः । न चानादिः शक्य उच्छेत्तुमिति" ॥६५॥

अत्र कश्चित्परीहारमाह—

प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावानित्यत्ववत्स्वाभाविकेऽप्यनित्यत्वम् ॥ ६६ ॥

यथाऽनादिः प्रागुत्पत्तेरभाव उत्पन्नेन भावेन निवर्त्यते एवं स्वाभाविकी क्लेशसन्ततिरनित्येति ॥ ६६ ॥

अपरं[3] आह—

अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववद्वा[4] ॥ ६७ ॥

यथाऽनादिरणुश्यामता अथ चाग्निसंयोगादनित्या तथा क्लेशसन्ततिरपीति । सतः[5] खलु धर्मो नित्यत्वमनित्यत्वं च । तत्त्वं भावेऽभावे भाक्तमिति ।

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१ प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गाभाव इति पूर्वपक्षोक्तं तृतीयं हेतुमपाकरिष्यन् अनुवदति—यदपीति ।

२ क्लेशाभावमसहमानः पूर्वपक्ष्याह—न क्लेशसन्ततेरिति सूत्रम् ।

३ अभावदृष्टान्तोपादानेऽतुष्यन् उक्तामेव शङ्कामपर एकदेशी भावमेव दृष्टान्तयित्वा परिहरति—तत्परिहारमवतारयति—अपर इति ।

४ परिहारमाह—अणुश्यामतेति सूत्रेण ।

५ सिद्धान्ती स्वमतेन शङ्कां परिहरिष्यन् प्रथमं तावदेकदेशिमतद्वयं दूषयितुमुपक्रमते । तत्रादौ प्रथममेकदेशिनं दूषयति—सतः खल्वीति । नित्यत्वानित्यत्वादयो धर्मा भावरूपस्यैव पदार्थस्य सम्भवन्ति नाभावरूपस्य । यत्र कुत्राप्युपलभ्यतेऽभावस्य नित्यत्वाद्युक्तिस्सा गौण्येवेति न युक्तमभावदृष्टान्तोपादानमित्यर्थः ।

अनादिरणुश्यामतेति[1] हेत्वभावादयुक्तम्। अनुत्पत्तिधर्मकमनित्यमिति[2] नात्र हेतुरस्तीति ॥ ६७ ॥

अयं तु समाधिः—

न, सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वाच्च[3] रागादीनाम् ॥ ६८ ॥

कर्मनिमित्तत्वादितरेतरनिमित्तत्वाच्चेति[4] समुच्चयः। मिथ्यासङ्कल्पेभ्यो[5] रञ्जनीयकोपनीयमोहनीयेभ्यो[6] रागद्वेषमोहा उत्पद्यन्ते। कर्म च[7] निकायनिर्वर्तकं नैयमिकान् रागद्वेषमोहान्निर्वर्तयति, नियमदर्शनात्। दृश्यते हि कश्चित्सत्त्वनिकायो रागबहुलः कश्चिद्द्वेषबहुलः कश्चिन्मोहबहुल इति। इतरेतरनिमित्ता

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१ द्वितीयमेकदेशिनं दूषयति-अनादिरिति। अणुश्यामता कार्या पृथिवीरूपत्वात् लोहितादिवदिति प्रत्युतानित्यत्वसाधनमेवाणुश्यामताया भवति-न भवति यथा कोऽपि हेतुस्तस्य नित्यत्वसाधनमित्यर्थः।

२ नन्वनुत्पत्तिमत्त्वादेव सिद्ध्यति नित्यत्वमणुश्यामताया इत्यत आह-अनुत्पत्तीति। यद्यदनुत्पत्तिधर्मकं तत्सर्वं नित्यमेवेत्येतादृशी व्याप्तिर्नास्तीत्यर्थः। अप्रयत्नपूर्वकत्वमात्रेण त्वणुश्यामतादावनादिताव्यवहारो न तन्नित्यतयेति हृदयम्।

३ परमं समाधिमाह-न सङ्कल्पेति सूत्रम्। उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादेव रागादीनां न नित्यत्वमित्यर्थः।

४ सूत्रं व्याचक्षाणः सूत्रस्थचकारेण समुच्चितं हेत्वन्तरद्वयं सूचयति-कर्मनिमित्तत्वादिति। 'समुच्चय' इति अनुक्तस्येति शेषः।

५ तत्राद्यं हेतुं सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वादिति विभजते-मिथ्यासङ्कल्पेभ्य इति। यद्यप्यनुभूतविषयप्रार्थना 'सङ्कल्पः' तथाऽपि तस्य पूर्वभागोऽनुभवो ग्राह्यः—प्रार्थनायाः रागत्वात्। तेन मिथ्यानुभव एवात्र सङ्कल्पपदेन विवक्षितः। एवं च मिथ्यानुभवादुत्पद्यन्ते रागादयो दोषा इत्यर्थः।

६ नन्वेकस्मान्मिथ्याज्ञानात्कुतो नानारागादिकार्यवैचित्र्यमित्यत आह-रञ्जनीयेति। भव्यगेयादिषु पाठात् कर्तरि कृत्यप्रत्ययः-तेन रञ्जककोपकविमोहकेभ्यो मिथ्याज्ञानेभ्यो यथाक्रमं रागद्वेषमोहा उत्पद्यन्त इत्यर्थः पर्यवसितः।

७ अयमभिप्रायः। कर्म च निकायनिर्वर्तकं तत्त्वज्ञानकृतान्मिथ्याज्ञानरूपसङ्कल्पविघाताच्च रागाद्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तं भवति। सर्वेषां रागादीनां मिथ्याज्ञानमेव निमित्तम्। कर्माणि तु निकायनियमेन रागादीन् प्रवर्तयन्तीति कर्मनिमित्तत्वमुक्तमिति।

च रागादीनामुत्पत्तिः। मूढो रज्यति, मूढः कुप्यति, रक्तो मुह्यति, कुपितो मुह्यति।

सर्वमिथ्यासङ्कल्पानां तत्त्वज्ञानादनुत्पत्तिः। कारणानुत्पत्तौ च कार्यानुत्पत्तेरिति,—रागादीनामत्यन्तमनुत्पत्तिरिति।

अनादिश्च क्लेशसन्ततिरित्यप्युक्तम्। सर्वे इमे खल्वाध्यात्मिका भावा अनादिना प्रबन्धेन प्रवर्तन्ते शरीरादयः। न जात्वत्र कश्चिदनुत्पन्नपूर्वः प्रथमत उत्पद्यतेऽन्यत्र तत्त्वज्ञानात्। न चैवं सत्यनुत्पत्तिधर्मकं किञ्चिन्नाशधर्मकं प्रतिज्ञायत इति। कर्म च सत्त्वनिकायनिर्वर्तकं तत्त्वज्ञानकृतान्मिथ्यासङ्कल्पविघातान्न रागाद्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तं भवति। सुखदुःखसंवित्तिः[1] फलं तु भवतीति ॥६८॥

इति श्रीवात्स्यायनीये न्यायभाष्ये चतुर्थाध्यायस्याऽऽद्यमाह्निकम्।

१ ननु यथा रागादयः सत्यपि कर्मणि मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्त्या निवर्तन्ते एवं सत्यपि कर्मणि मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्त्या फलमपि मा भूदित्यत आह—सुखदुःखेति। कर्माशयप्रपञ्चमुच्छेत्तुम् अमूढोऽप्यसक्तोऽप्यद्विष्टोऽपि—मूढ इव सक्त इव द्विष्ट इव—तत्फलं भुङ्क्त इति रागाद्यनपेक्षमेव कर्म स्वफलं जनयति। तेनासौ फलोपभोगो न बन्धहेतुः। मूढादीनां तु भवत्येव बन्धहेतुः फलोपभोगः। स च तादृशो रागादिसहायैः कर्मभिः क्रियते न रागादिनिरपेक्षैरित्यवदातम्।

अथ चतुर्थाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम्[1]।

" किं नु खलु भोः यावन्तो विषयास्तावत्सु प्रत्येकं तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते–अथ क्वचिदुत्पद्यत इति । कश्चात्र विशेषः ? न तावदेकैकत्र यावद्विषयमुत्पद्यते–ज्ञेयानामानन्त्यात् । नापि क्वचिदुत्पद्यते–यत्र नोत्पद्यते तत्रानिवृत्तो मोह इति मोहशेषप्रसङ्गः । न चान्यविषयेण तत्त्वज्ञानेनान्यविषयो मोहः शक्यः प्रतिषेद्धुमिति । "[2]

मिथ्याज्ञानं वै खलु मोहो न तत्त्वज्ञानस्यानुत्पत्तिमात्रम् । तच्च मिथ्याज्ञानं यत्र विषये प्रवर्तमानं संसारबीजं भवति स विषयस्तत्त्वतो ज्ञेय इति ।

" किं पुनस्तन्मिथ्याज्ञानम् ? "

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१ तदेवं संशयप्रमाणप्रमेयाणि परीक्षितानि, प्रयोजनादयोऽपि 'यत्र संशयस्तत्रैवमुत्तरोत्तरप्रसङ्ग' (सू० २।१।७) इत्यतिदेशेन परीक्षिता इति षोडशापि प्रमाणादयः परीक्षिताः । तेषां तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसाधिगमहेतुरित्युक्तम् (सू० १।१।१) । तत्रापि प्रमेयतत्त्वज्ञानं साक्षान्निःश्रेयसहेतुरितरेषां तु तत्त्वज्ञानाङ्गतयेत्युक्तम् । इदमिदानीं परीक्ष्यते– किं प्रत्येकमात्मादीनां तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसाधिगमहेतुरुत कस्यचिदेषामेकदेशस्येति तात्पर्यम् ।

तत्र परिशुद्धिः । एवं प्रथमाह्निके चतुर्दशभिः प्रकरणैः प्रमेयषट्कं निरूपितम् । इदानीं तस्य धर्मस्तत्त्वज्ञानं परीक्षणीयम्–किंलक्षणम्–किं विषयं–कथमुत्पद्यते–कथं परिपाल्यते–कथं विवर्धते चेति तत्त्वज्ञानपरीक्षैवाह्निकार्थः । तत्र यस्मिन्विषये यथोत्पद्यते तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्क्रमेण प्रतिपादनमिति ।

वर्धमानोपाध्यायाश्च न्यायनिबन्धप्रकाशे–तत्त्वज्ञानस्यानुद्दिष्टस्यालक्षितस्य कथं परीक्षा प्रवर्तते कथं चाह्निकद्वयस्य समानविषयत्वं येनैतयोरेकाध्यायावयवत्वमित्याशङ्क्य तत्त्वज्ञानमुद्दिष्टमाद्ये सूत्रे लक्षितं च द्वितीये सूत्रे– कार्यरूपप्रमेयपरीक्षैव चतुर्थाध्यायविषयस्तत्त्वज्ञानमपि कार्यरूपमेवेत्यस्येव समानविषयतेत्युक्तवन्तः । तथा च तत्त्वज्ञानस्यापवर्गहेतुत्वादपवर्गात्प्रागेव तस्य परीक्षोचितेत्याशङ्क्य – तत्त्वज्ञानस्य परीक्षणात्प्राक् येषां तत्त्वज्ञानमपेक्षितं तेषां सर्वेषां प्रमेयाणां परीक्षणमुचितमपवर्गश्च प्रमेयविशेष एवातो युक्तमेव तस्य परीक्षणं प्रमेयेष्विति समाहितवन्तः ।

२ पृच्छति – किं पुनरिति । सन्ति खल्वस्मिन् विषये वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तयः विधूतविविधनामरूपप्रपञ्चोपप्लवविशुद्धचिदानन्दघनाद्वैतब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारस्तत्त्वज्ञानं- तद्विरुद्धमेव मिथ्याज्ञानमिति वेदान्तिनः । सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिरेव तत्त्वज्ञानं- तद्विरोधि मिथ्याज्ञानमिति साङ्ख्याः । धर्मपुद्गलनैरात्म्यज्ञानमेव तत्त्वज्ञानं तद्विरुद्धं मिथ्याज्ञानमिति केचिद्बौद्धाः । शरीरेन्द्रियाद्यनित्यव्यतिरिक्तनित्यात्मदर्शनं तत्त्वज्ञानं तद्विरुद्धं मिथ्याज्ञानमिति वृद्धाः । तदेवं विप्रतिपत्तेरेवायम्प्रश्न इत्यवधेयम् ।

अनात्मन्यात्मग्रहः[1]—अहमस्मीति मोहोऽहङ्कार इति। अनात्मानं खल्वहमस्मीति पश्यतो दृष्टिरहङ्कार इति।

" किं पुनस्तदर्थजातं यद्विषयोऽहङ्कारः ? "

शरीरेन्द्रियमनोवेदनाबुद्धयः।

" कथं तद्विषयोऽहङ्कारः संसारबीजं भवति ? "

अयं खलु शरीराद्यर्थजातमहमस्मीति व्यवसितः तदुच्छेदेनात्मोच्छेदं मन्यमानोऽनुच्छेदतृष्णापरिप्लुतः पुनः पुनस्तदुपादत्ते, तदुपाददानो जन्ममरणाय यतते, तेनावियोगान्नात्यन्तं दुःखाद्विमुच्यत इति। यस्तु दुःखं दुःखायतनं दुःखानुषक्तं सुखं च सर्वमिदं दुःखमिति पश्यति, स दुःखं परिजानाति। परिज्ञातं च दुःखं प्रहीणं भवत्यनुपादानात् सविषान्नवत्। एवं दोषान् कर्म च दुःखहेतुरिति पश्यति। न चाप्रहीणेषु दोषेषु दुःखप्रबन्धोच्छेदेन शक्यं भवितुमिति दोषान् जहाति। प्रहीणेषु च दोषेषु 'न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसन्धानाये'त्युक्तम्[2]।

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१ न्यायसिद्धान्तेनोत्तरम्—अनात्मनीति। इदमत्राकूतम्। न तावद् वेदान्ताभिमतमद्वैतानन्दघनात्मज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानम्, भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धस्यासति बाधकेऽपह्नोतुमशक्यत्वात्। न च प्रकाशानन्दावात्मधर्मातिरिक्तावात्मस्वभावौ भवितुमर्हतः। "सत्यं विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति" श्रुतिरानन्दचैतन्यशक्त्यभिप्राया भेद एव च तद्वत्तया कथंचित् सामानाधिकरण्यमुपपद्यते। अभेदे त्वानन्दविज्ञानयोस्तत्पदयोः पर्यायतया सह प्रयोगानुपपत्तिः। न च प्रकृष्टप्रकाशः सवितेत्यत्र प्रकृष्टप्रकाशयोरभेदोऽप्रकाशस्यापि प्रकर्षसम्भवात्, अप्रकृष्टस्यापि खद्योतादेः प्रकाशसम्भवात्।

नापि साङ्ख्यसिद्धान्तो युक्तिसहः। सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिर्हि सत्त्वस्य प्रकृतेरेवासम्भवादयुक्ता। सत्कार्यवादमूलत्वात्प्रकृतिसाधनस्य तद्वादनिराकरणेनैव सा निराकृता वेदितव्या।

धर्मपुद्गलनैरात्म्ये तु क्षणभङ्गभङ्गे नित्यात्मसद्भावकथनेनैव निराकृते। तस्मात्सुष्ठूक्तमनात्मन्यात्मग्रहोऽहमस्मीति मोहोऽहङ्कार एव मिथ्याज्ञानमिति। अस्मादेव च कारणात्सर्वस्यैवमात्माशीः कृमेरपि—'मा न भूवम् भूयासमिति'। सोऽयमीदृशोऽभिनिवेशः शरीरादीनामात्मत्वेनाध्यवस्यतो भवति नात्मतत्त्वविदुषः। स खल्वहिनिर्ल्वयिनीमिवाहिस्ततो व्यतिरिक्तं शरीरादि पश्यन्न तत्र स्निह्यति स्नेहविरहान्न तप्यते नाप्यनुशोचतीत्यादि तात्पर्यं स्पष्टम्।

२ उक्तमिति। चतुर्थाध्यायद्वितीयाह्निकस्य चतुःषष्ठितमसूत्र इति शेषः।

SECTION (4)

Sūtras 15–16

The Soul is something different from the Mind.

Sūtra 15

[*Says the Opponent*]—" **The Conclusion of the Siddhāntin cannot be accepted ; as the reasons adduced in support of the notion of ' Soul ' are all applicable to the Mind.**

BHĀṢYA

" There can be no such thing as Soul distinct from the *Aggregate* of Body, Mind and the Sense-organs, (severally or collectively).*—Why so ?—*Because the reasons adduced in support of the notion of ' Soul ' are all applicable to the Mind.* Inasmuch as the reasons that have been put forward in Sūtras 3–1–1, *et seq.*, in proof of the existence of the Soul, are applicable to the Mind;—and as a matter of fact, the Mind is actually found capable of apprehending all things,† it follows that the Soul is nothing different from the Aggregate of Body, Sense-organs, Mind and Sensation. "

Sūtra 16

[*Answer*] **Inasmuch as the instrument of cognition can belong only to the Cogniser, it is merely a difference in names.**

BHĀṢYA

[The Siddhāntin answers]—It is a well-known fact that the *Instruments of Cognition* belong to the *Cogniser*,—a fact which is vouched for by such expressions as ' he sees with the eye ', ' he smells with the nose ', ' he touches with the tactile organ '.— Similarly the Mind also is known to be only an ' Instrument ', by means of which the *Conceiver* (the Agent who does the *seeing* &c. with the Visual and other organs) does the *conceiving* of all things; and on that account this Instrument also operates naturally on all

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* The reading देहादिसंघात gives better sense, though the two Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyacandra* read simply संघात. 'Severally or collectively' has been added by way of explanation, by the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† 'Internal things' like Pleasure, Pain, &c., and 'external things,' like the Jar and the rest, are all found to be amenable to the cognitive action of the Mind ; without the action of Mind, no cognition of any kind is possible.

things; and it is *by means of this Mind* that the *Conceiver* does the *conceiving.** Such being the case, it appears to us that while admitting the existence of the *Cogniser*, you do not bear the idea of his being named 'Soul', and you give him the name 'Mind',—and though admitting that there is an *instrument of Cognising*, you cannot bear its being named 'Mind'. So that it turns out to be a mere question of names,—there being no difference of opinion as to the thing, the *conceiving Soul* itself.† If, however, you deny what has been said above, that would mean the dropping out of all Sense-organs; that is to say, if you deny that to the Conceiver of all things there belongs an instrument which brings about the *conceiving* of all things,—and hold that there is no such instrument,—then a similar denial may be made in regard to the instruments of the cognition of *Colour* &c. also, and this would mean the total denial of all Sense-organs.§

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* None of the readings given in the Viz. text is satisfactory. The best reading is supplied by the two Puri Mss.—एवम्मन्तुः सर्वविषयमतिसाधनम्मन्तःकरणभूतं सर्वविषयं विद्यते येनायम्मन्यत इति.

The *Tātparya* says—The term '*mati*', 'conceiving', stands here for *remembrance* and *Inferential Cognition*; and even though the immediate cause of these consists in the impressions left by previous Perceptions, yet being *cognitions* like the cognition of Colour, they must be brought about by the instrumentality of an organ; and as such cognitions are found to appear also while the Visual and other organs are in operation, it follows that the organ by which those cognitions are brought about is different from those organs.

The *Pariśuddhi* adds—Even though the term '*mati*' is synonymous with '*jñāna*' and '*buddhi*'—all three standing for *Cognition*—yet what is meant by '*mati*' in the present context is *direct cognition*, such as is preceded by a *desire to cognise*; and such a cognition cannot but be brought about by the instrumentality of some operative substance in contact with the body [and this substance is the Mind, the organ of conception].

The *Bhāṣyacandra* takes '*mati*', 'conceiving', as standing for the cognising of Pleasure and Pain, in which the Mind is the only organ concerned.

† For अर्थे, the Bhāṣyacandra and the two Mss. read आत्मनि.

§ The *organ of vision* is postulated for the explaining of colour-cognition; the organ of smell for that of smell-cognition; and similarly the Mind is postulated for the explaining of the conception of Pleasure and Pain. All these 'organs' thus standing on the same footing, if you deny one you must deny all.

Sūtra 17

There is no reason in support of any definition.

BHĀṢYA

[Between the organs of Vision etc. on the one hand and the organ of Conceiving on the other] the Opponent makes a distinction ; while he admits that for the *Cogniser* there are instruments or organs for the *cognising* of Colour etc., he denies that there is any instrument for the *conceiving* of all things. And there is no reason, or justification, for any such differentiation ; there is no reason on the strength of which we could accept any such differentiation (between the two sets of organs). As a matter of fact, Pleasure etc. are objects (of Cognition) different from such objects as Colour and the rest ; so that it follows that for their cognition there should be an organ different from the organs for the cognition of the latter ; the fact that Smell is not cognised by means of the Visual Organ leads us to conclude that there is a distinct organ in the shape of the Olfactory Organ ; the fact that Taste is not cognised by means of the Visual and Olfactory Organs leads us to conclude that there is a distinct organ in the shape of the Gestatory Organ ; and so on with the other organs of Perception ;—exactly in the same manner, the fact that Pleasure etc. are not cognised by means of the Visual and other organs, should lead us to conclude that there is a distinct organ (for the perceiving of Pleasure etc.) ; and this organ is the one whose existence is indicated by the non-simultaneity of Cognitions (see Sū. 1. 1. 16) ; that organ which serves as the instrument of the Cognition of Pleasure etc. is that one whose existence is proved by the fact that no two cognitions appear at the same point of time ; that is to say, it is only by reason of the fact that at one time the said organ is in contact with only one Sense-organ, and not with another, that no two cognitions are found to appear at the same point of time. From all this it is clear that what has been asserted in the foregoing *Sūtra*—that 'the reasons adduced in support of the Soul are applicable to Mind'—is not true.

SECTION (5)

The Soul is eternal.

(*Sūtras 18—26*)

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The question now arises]—The Soul, which has been proved to be something distinct from the Aggregate of the Body, &c.—is it eternal or non-eternal? "Why should there be a doubt on this point?" This doubt arises from the fact that both are seen; that is to say, things known to exist are found to be of both kinds,—some eternal and others non-eternal; so that it having been proved that the Soul exists, the doubt remains (as to its being eternal or non-eternal).

The answer to the above question is that those same arguments that have proved the Soul's existence also go to prove its previous existence (prior to its being endowed with the present body),—as is clear from the modifications undergone by this body (during all which the Soul's personality is recognised to be the same);*—and this Soul must exist also after the perishing of this body. "Why so?"

Sūtra 18

Because the new-born infant experiences joy, fear and sorrow,—which could follow only from the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before.

* '*Dehabhedāt*' has been explained by the *Tātparya* as follows:—The continuity of the Soul's previous existence we deduce from the fact that during present life, while the body is seen to be changed, from childhood to youth and from youth to old age, the ensouling personality is *recognised* to be the same; so that the 'Recognition,' which has been found to supply the principal argument in support of the Soul's existence, is also found to supply the argument for its existence prior to its being endowed with the present body.

The *Bhāṣyacandra* offers two explanations-(1) by one it makes *prāgdeha-bhedāt* as one compound, meaning 'because the present body (in youth) is different from the one that preceded it (in childhood)'; and (2) by the second it separates '*prāk*' and takes it as qualifying '*avasthanam*'. The sense of the reasoning is the same in both cases; which is in keeping with the explanation supplied by the *Tātparya*. The second *dehābhedāt* refers to the *perishing of the body*.

The *Pariśuddhi* suggests also another explanation of *dehābhedāt*:—'The fact of recognition proves the existence of the Recognising Agent; *because the Body is something different* from that Agent.'

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, it is found that when an infant is born, he actually experiences joy, fear and sorrow, even though during his present life he has not perceived anything that could give rise to joy, fear or sorrow ; and that he actually experiences these is inferred from certain clear indicatives ;*—these experiences could proceed only from the continuity of remembrance, and not from any other source ;†—this 'continuity of remembrance' again could not but be due to previous repeated experience, and the 'previous experience' could be possible only during a previous life ;—so that from all this it follows that the Personality continues to exist even after the perishing of the body.§

Sūtra 19

[*Objection*]—"**What has been put forward is only a variation (of the transient Soul), resembling the variations of opening and closing undergone by the Lotus and other flowers.**"

BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—" In the case of such transient things as the Lotus and the like, we find that they undergo such modifications as opening and closing ; in the same manner the *transient* Soul may be said to undergo variations in the form of experiencing joy and sorrow, [which therefore cannot prove the eternality of the Soul]."

This contention is not right ; as there is no Reason. That is to say, it cannot be shown that—"for such and such a Reason the experiencing of joy and sorrow by the Soul is to be regarded only as a variation of it, like the variations of opening and closing undergone by the Lotus and other flowers ; "—in support of such

* These 'indicatives' are in the form of 'smiling' and 'crying'. The inference is in the form—'the state of infancy belongs to a Soul experiencing joy, fear and sorrow,-because it is accompanied by smiles and cries.' —inferred from such indications as 'closing of the Eyes, throwing up of arms and legs, and crying'.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The infant's feeling of joy can only be accounted for as being due to his remembering the pleasant experiences of his previous life.

§ The facts adduced prove that the Soul in the infant's body is one that has had a previous life and body ; so that it is proved that after the perishing of that previous body, the Soul has continued to exist.

a conclusion there is no Reason based upon any kind of instance, analogous or otherwise.* So that, in the absence of a Reason, what has been urged can only be regarded as irrelevant and futile. Then again, the instance cited does not do away with what we have put forward as the cause of the Joy, &c.; that is to say, what has been pointed out is that in the case of every ordinary (grown-up) person it is found that in connection with objects already experienced in the past there are feelings of joy, &c., brought about by the continuity of remembrance;—and certainly this fact is not set aside by the mere citing of the case of the closing of the Lotus, &c.; and [when this cannot be set aside or denied in the case of ordinary grown-up men] it cannot be denied in the case of the new-born infant also.† Further, the 'opening and closing' of the Lotus consist only in certain 'conjunctions and disjunctions' of its petals, which are brought about by a certain action; § and Action must have a cause, as is clearly inferable from the fact that it is an *action* [similarly the action of the child's smiling, &c., must have a cause, and this cause can only be the remembering of past experiences.]‡ Such

* Under Sūtras 1, 1, 34–35 it has been shown that a Reason that can prove a conclusion must be based upon well-known corroborative instances —these instances being either *per* similarity or *per* dissimilarity, and as a matter of fact, in support of the assertion put forward in this Sūtra, by the Opponent, there can be no Reason of either of these two kinds; and the mere citing of the example (of Lotus) cannot prove anything. [An example is effective only as pointing to and corroborating a Reason or Premiss].—*Bhāṣyacandra.*

† This appears to be the simple meaning of this sentence. But according to the *Bhāṣyacandra* it means as follows:—'Just as it cannot be denied that the action of closing, &c. of the Lotus is due to a certain cause, so also it cannot be denied that the infant's action of smiling is due to a certain cause.' This argument, however, is clearly put in the next sentence of the *Bhāṣya*.

§ The reading of the Viz. text is unsatisfactory; the right reading is supplied by the two Puri Mss., which is also supported by the *Bhāṣyacandra* —क्रियाजाताश्च पर्णसंयोगविभागाः प्रबोधसम्मीलने ।

‡ This passage is a little obscure; all manuscripts, except Puri B, read क्रियाहेतुश्च क्रियानुमेयः as in the Viz. text; Puri Ms. B, reads क्रियाहेतुश्चजात्यानुमेयः which means—'that there is such cause in the shape of Action, (for the said conjunctions and disjunctions), is clearly inferred from the fact that these are actually brought about, [and nothing can be brought about except by the force of an action].'

being the case, what does the citing of the instance (of Lotus, &c.) serve to set aside? [Since it is found only to *support* the view of the *Siddhāntin*.]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

If it be held that what we mean is that the opening and closing of the Lotus are variations without any cause, and similarly the Soul's feeling of joy and sorrow also;—this

Sūtra 20

cannot* be right; because as a matter of fact, all variations of things constituted by the five rudimentary substances are due to such causes as cold, heat, and the rainy season.

BHĀṢYA

In the case of things made up of the combination† of the five rudimentary substances,—such as the Lotus etc.,—it is found that their variations appear when heat, etc., are present, and they do not appear when these are not present;§ and from this it follows that the said variations cannot be without cause (fortuitous). In the same manner, the variations of joy, sorrow etc., should follow only from a cause; they cannot appear without cause. And as a matter of fact, there can be no cause for these variations save *the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before.*

Nor will it be right to infer, on the basis of the instance cited (of Lotus etc.), that there must be causes for the producing and destroying of the Soul.‡

* Puri Mss. A and B, and the *Bhāṣyacandra* make this न part of the preceding *Bhāṣya*; while Sūtra Ms. D, Puri Sūtra Ms. the *Nyāya-sūcīni-bandha* and *Viśvanātha* make it part of the Sūtra.

† '*Anugraha*' of the substances, consists in the *combining* together of their component particles—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ The Lotus opens when touched by the heat of the Sun's rays; it closes when touched by the cold of the Moon's rays; and the *Kuṭaja* plant flowers when the rainy season is on.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

‡ Such an inference cannot be right; as the eternality of the Soul (and hence the impossibility of its being produced or destroyed) is proved by the phenomenon of Remembrance, which cannot be explained except on the basis of the eternal continuity of Soul.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

From the above it is clear that Joy and Sorrow etc., cannot appear without a cause; and it is not possible to attribute these to any such other causes as Heat, Cold etc., (except the Continuity of Remembrance etc.) So that the view set up by the Opponent cannot be right.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also the Soul should be regarded as eternal:—

Sūtra 21

[The Soul must be regarded as eternal] because of the desire for milk from the mother's breast, which is evinced (on birth) after death,* and which can only be due to repeated feeding (in the past).—

In the infant just born we perceive a desire for the mother's milk,—the presence of such desire being indicated by the child's activities (in the shape of the moving of its hands and mouth towards the mother's breasts). This desire could not arise except from repeated experience in the past. "For what reason (should this be accepted)?" In the case of all living persons we find that when they are afflicted by hunger, there appears in them desire for food, which desire arises from continuity of remembrance due to repeated experiences in the past; now in the case of the new-born infant, the appearance of such desire cannot but be explained as being due to repeated experiences in a previous body;—and from this it is inferred that the infant had a body previous to his present one, in which body it had gone through repeated experiences of feeding (which has given rise to its present desire for milk). From all this it follows that what happens is that the Soul, having (at death) departed from his previous body, has become endowed with a new body, and on

The *Bhāṣya* has added this in anticipation of the following argument—"You have proved that the variations of the Lotus, and also those of the Soul, proceed from a cause, and are not fortuitous; we accept that; but what do you say to this inference—'the Soul must be something produced and destroyed, because it undergoes variations,—like the Lotus'?"—This has been met by the *Bhāṣya* by pointing out that the citing of a mere example cannot prove anything at all, as already pointed out above.

* '*Pretya*'—after death; *i. e.*, in a person who, after having died, is just born again.'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

being afflicted with hunger, remembers his repeated feedings in the past, and (accordingly) desires the milk from the breast. Hence it cannot be true that there is a different soul to each of these bodies; it must be the same Soul that continues to exist, even after the perishing of its former body.

Sūtra 22

[*Objection*]—"**The action of the child is only like the moving of the iron to the magnet.**"

BHĀṢYĀ

"In the case of the Iron it is found that it moves towards the Magnet, even without any repeated experience in the past; and similarly the desire (and consequent activity) of the child for the mother's milk may come about without any repeated experience in the past [So that the activity of the new-born child does not necessarily prove past experience]."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[In answer to the Opponent's argument in the preceding *Sūtra*, the *Siddhāntin* asks]—Is this 'moving up of the Iron' (that you have put forward) without any cause? Or is it due to a definite cause? *Without a cause*—

Sūtra 23

it cannot be, because there is no such action in any other thing (except Iron, and that too in the proximity of no other thing except Magnets).

BHĀṢYA

If, in the case cited, the moving up of the Iron were without any cause (entirely fortuitous), then it would be possible for stone and other things also to move up to the Magnet, and there would be no ground for any such restriction (as that Iron alone, and no other substance, moves up to the Magnet).

If, on the other hand, the moving of the Iron be held to be due to a definite cause, then we ask—Who ever perceives any such cause? [All that is perceived is that the Iron moves up to the Magnet]. As a matter of fact, the sole indicative of the cause of an action is the action itself, and (consequently) any limitations in the Action indicates similar limitations in the cause. It is this that accounts for the absence of moving in the

case of other substances (than Iron).* [Hence from the limitation in the Effect,—that the moving appears only in Iron, and not in other substances,—we infer that this restriction must be due to some corresponding limitation in the cause of the Motion]. Now in the case of the child also the action (of moving the mouth &c.) is found to be restricted (in the sense that such actions appear in the child only, and that also only when near its mother, and so forth); [all parties being agreed as to this action of the child being due to the desire for mother's milk], the only cause that can be indicated by the child's desire for the mother's milk consists in the 'continuity of remembrance due to repeated feeding in the past',—and the instance cited by the Opponent (that of the moving of the Iron to the Magnet) cannot point to any other cause.† And no effect can appear unless its cause is present. Further, the instance§ cited by the Opponent cannot set aside what is actually perceived (by all sentient beings) to be the cause of the said desire [*e.g.*, everyone perceives in his own case that when he sees sugar, his desire for it is due to his remembering its sweetness tasted by him in the past.] From all this it is clear that the citing of the instance of the Iron moving to the Magnet is entirely futile.

[Another explanation of the expression *anyatra pravrittyabhāvāt*, in the Sūtra is suggested]—*The moving of the Iron also is found to appear in the proximity of no other thing*; that is, the Iron is never found to move up to *Stone* [nor does it move up to a magnet far removed from it];—now, to what is this restriction due? If it is due to the limitations of its cause, and

* What is the cause of the moving up of the Iron to the Magnet placed near it is its contact with the imperceptible rays of light emanating from the Magnet. If this were due to something in the nature of the Iron itself, then every bit of Iron in the world would be constantly moving towards the Magnet that lies buried under the Sea.—*Bhāṣyacandra.*

† The Viz. text with its wrong punctuation, is unintelligible. The passage should read thus—न च स्तन्याभिलाषलिङ्गमन्यदाहाराभ्यासकृतात्स्मरणानुबन्धान्निमित्तं दृष्टान्तेनोपपाद्यते; which is to be construed as follows-आहाराभ्यासकृतात् स्मरणानुबन्धात् अन्यत् स्तन्याभिलाषलिङ्गं (स्तन्याभिलाषो लिङ्गं यस्य तत्) निमित्तं दृष्टान्तेन (अयसो दृष्टान्तेन) न उपपाद्यते (उपपादयितुं शक्यते)।

§ The case of the opening and closing of the Lotus cited under Sū. 20—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

such limitations in the cause are indicated by the limitations in the action (due to that cause),—then, in the case of the Child also, the desire, appearing in regard to a restricted object (like the mother's milk, for instance), can be due only to some restrictions in connection with its cause ; and whether this cause consists in 'the remembering of repeated experiences of the past', or in something else, is settled by our actual experience : in our actual experience we have found that in the case of living beings the desire for food proceeds from the remembrance of past experience.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also the Soul should be regarded as eternal. "Why ?"

Sūtra 24

Because persons free from longings are never found to be born.*

BHĀṢYA

What is implied by the Sūtra is that *only persons beset with longings are born.*† As a mattar of fact, when a person is born, he is born as beset with longings ; this 'longing' could be due only to the recalling to mind of things previously experienced ; and this 'previous experience' of things in a preceding life could not be possible without a body ; hence what happens is that the Soul, remembering the things experienced (and found pleasant) by him in his previous body, comes to 'long' for them ; this is what forms the connecting link between his two lives ; there

* Viśvanātha, suspecting this Sūtra to be a mere repetition of what has been said in Sū. 22, in connection with the child's desire for milk, offers the following explanation.—In the former Sūtra the child's desire was put forward as brought about by the remembering of the milk having been found, in the previous life, to be the means of a desired end ; while what is put forward in the present Sūtra is the fact of the said desire being due to 'attachment', a condition that is applicable, not only to human beings, but to all kinds of animals.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* rightly remarks that this implication is due to the two negatives in the Sūtra—Persons *without attachments* are *not born* ; which means that persons that *are born* are only those in whom attachment *is present.* But it becomes over-refined when it goes on to explain the simple expression '*arthāt āpadyate*' to mean '*arthāpattyā anumīyate*'.

are similar links between his previous life and his life preceding that, and between that and a life preceding that, and so on and on (to infinity);—which shows that the connection of the Soul with bodies has been without beginning; and without beginning has also been his connection with longings; and from this (beginningless series of attachments and consequent bodies) it follows that the Soul is eternal.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent asks]—"How do you know that the Longing of the new-born child arises from the recalling of previously experienced things, and not

Sūtra 25

"that it is produced in the same manner as substances and their qualities?"

BHĀṢYA

"In the case of ordinary substances that are capable of being produced, their qualities are found to be produced by certain causes (in the shape of fire-contact and the like),—in the same manner, in the case of the Soul, *which is capable of being produced*, its quality in the form of *Longing* may be produced by certain causes (in the shape of Time and Place &c.)."*

The assertion put forward (in the present Sūtra) is only a repetition of what has already been said before.†

Sūtra 26

[*Answer*]—**It is not so; because Longing** (**and Aversion**) **are due to anticipation.**

BHĀṢYA

The Soul's longing cannot be said to be produced in the same manner as Substances and their Qualities.—"Why?"—

* Viśvanātha explains this Sūtra somewhat differently: 'Just as an ordinary substance, like the Jar, is produced along with certain qualities; so is the Soul also born, as along with the quality of attachment'.

† The argument here urged is the same as that urged in Sūtra 22; there the argument was based upon the instance of the Iron and Magnet; and in the present Sūtra, it is based upon the example of such ordinary things as the Jar and the like.

What the Bhāṣya means by this remark is that the answer to this argument is also the same as that offered to Sū. 22'.—*Tātparya*.

Because Attachment and Aversion are due to anticipation. As a matter of fact, in the case of living beings experiencing pleasures and pains from objects, Longing is found to arise from anticipation or conviction [that such and such an object is the source of pleasure, or of pain] ;—this 'anticipation' arises from the recalling to Mind of previously experienced objects ;—and from this fact it is inferred that in the case of the new-born child also, the Longing must arise from the recalling to Mind of the previously experienced object.* On the other hand, for †persons who hold the view that the Soul is produced (or brought into existence anew, at each birth), the appearance of Longing must be explained as proceeding from a cause other than the said 'anticipation' [as no such anticipation from past experience is possible under this theory] ;—just as the coming into existence of substances and their qualities [which is due to causes other than 'anticipation']. As a matter of fact, however, it is not yet proved that the Soul is actually *produced* ;§ nor do we find any other cause for 'Longing,' than the said 'anticipation'. From all this it follows that it is not right to say that—'the coming into existence of the Soul and its Longing is like the coming into existence of Substances and their Qualities."

Some people explain the appearance of 'Longing' as being due to a cause entirely different from 'anticipation',—such cause, according to them, being in the form of the 'Unseen Force' consisting of 'Merit—Demerit'. But even so (under this theory also) the Soul's connection with a previous body cannot be denied. For the said 'Unseen Force' (of 'Merit—Demerit') could have accrued to the Soul only during its connection with a previous body, not during its present life.‡ As a matter of fact, however,||

* The child recalls to mind the fact that the mother's milk was a source of pleasure ; and hence his longing for it.

† In place of अत्मोत्पादाधिकरणात्तु, read आत्मोत्पादाधिकरणानान्तु, which is the reading of the two Puri Mss.; and also of the *Bhāṣyacandra*, which explains the word as अत्मोत्पादः अधिकरणं पक्षः येषाम् तेषां वादिनान्तु मते.

§ The Viz. text wrongly puts a stop after आत्मोत्पादः.

‡ As in the present life the new-born person has done no acts that could bring to him *Dharma* or *Adharma*.

|| The author cites here a popular saying.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

it is well known that *Longing proceeds from complete absorption in the thing*; and this 'absorption' is no other than the *repeated experiencing of the object*, which leads to the conviction or anticipation (that such and such a thing is the source of pleasure). What particular kind of Longings will appear in a new-born Soul will depend upon the peculiarities of the particular kind of body into which it is born;* what determines the special kind of body in which the Soul is born is his past 'Karma' (good or bad acts of the past); and the personality comes to be known by the particular name (of an animal) by reason of the peculiar body with which it is equipped at the time.†

From all this it is clear that it is not possible for the said 'Longing' to be due to any other cause except 'anticipation'.

SECTION (6)

The Exact Nature of the Body

Sūtras 27-29§

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It has been explained that the connection of the intelligent Soul with the Body is without beginning; this Body has its

* This has been added in view of the following objection:—"If the Longings in the new-born child are the result of the remembrance of past experience, then this would mean that, even in a case where a Soul, that occupied a human body in its past life, happens to be born in an elephant's body, the desires of this elephant cub would be for such things as are sought after by human beings." The answer to this is that the character of the child's longings depends upon that of the body occupied by him at the time; and the longings in the elephant cub would be those in accordance with the experiences gone through by that Soul in some remote previous life in an elephant's body.—*Tātparya*.

† The new-born personality is known as 'man' or 'elephant', not because the Soul is *man* or *elephant*, but because the Soul happens to be equipped with a *human* or an *elephantine* body. This meaning, in the case of learned men, is *figurative*; while in the case of ignorant people, it is a misconception—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

The Vārtika reads तादर्थ्यात् ताच्छब्द्यं लभते which means that the Body comes to be known as the 'person' because it serves the purposes of the Soul.

§ The *Pariśuddhi* mentions Shrī-vatsa as raising the question why this section does not form part of the foregoing section,—inasmuch as this also explains the difference of the Soul from the Body. The answer given by the *Pariśuddhi* is that it is necessary to have the 'detailed examination'

source in the acts done by the Personality, and becomes the receptacle* of pleasure and pain. In regard to this Body, we proceed to examine whether, like the Olfactory and other organs, it is composed of a single substance, or of several substances. "Why should there be any doubt on this point?" The doubt arises from difference of opinion.† People have held the Earth and other material substances to be the components of the Body, in varying numbers;§ and the question naturally arises—What is the real truth? [The answer is supplied by the next *Sūtra*.]

Sūtra 27

The Body must be regarded as composed of the Earth; because we find in it the distinctive quality (of Earth).‡

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of everything that has been 'mentioned;' and since the distinction of the Soul from the Body has been already explained in the previous section, it now behoves us to examine in detail the exact nature of the Body. The real motive for this procedure has been explained by the *Tātparya*, which points out that when one knows the exact nature of the Body and its appurtenances, he loses all regard for it, and hence acquires the necessary degree of dispassion, which is necessary for Release.

* The Body is the 'receptacle' of pleasure and pain only in the sense that they serve the purpose of qualifying and differentiating it; it is the *Soul* that is the actual 'receptacle' of pleasure and pain; as a 'receptacle' of a thing, in the proper sense of the term, must be such as forms its substratum, that in which the thing subsists by inherence; (and not merely the *container*.)—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† Both Puri manuscripts have a '*ca*' here, and the *Bhāṣyacandra* remarks that this '*ca*', 'also', is meant to include the 'presence of diverse properties', which is one of the principal sources of doubt (*vide*—Sū. 1. 1. 23).

§ Some philosophers regard the Body as composed of a single material substance; others of two, others again, of three, others of four, and others of five substances.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

‡ The *Parishuddhi* reads '*tadiyaviśeṣaguṇopalabdheḥ*', which, not being found in any manuscript, we take as the paraphrase of the phrase '*guṇāntaropalabdheḥ*.' This 'peculiar quality' of the earth is 'Odour'—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*, which is in keeping with the *Pariśuddhi*; it is only Odour that forms the 'peculiar quality' of Earth. But *Viśvanātha* would include all such qualities as *dark colour*, *solidity* and so forth.

The *Pariśuddhi* raises the question—In reality the Body is the receptacle of the activities of the Soul; and it is on the basis of this character that its examination should proceed; what bearing has the composition of the Body got on its examination? What does it matter whether the Body is composed

BHĀṢYA

The human body must be regarded as composed of Earth;—Why?—*because we find in it the distinctive quality of Earth.* The Earth is endowed with Odour, and so is also the Body;—and inasmuch as Water and the other material substances are *odourless*, if the Body were composed of them it would be without odour. But as a matter of fact, the Body could not form the receptable of the Soul's activities, if it were built up of the Earth only, without being mixed with Water, etc.; hence the Body should be regarded as being built up by the mixture of all the five material substances; the Sūtra does not deny the mutual contact or mixture (in the Body) of the five substances.*

Bodies composed of Water, Fire and Air are found in other regions;† and in these also the presence (by contact) of the several material substances is in accordance with the character of the experiences to be undergone by the personality ensouling a particular body. In the case of all such ordinary things as the Dish and the like, it is found without the least doubt, that they

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of Earth or of Water? The answer given is that when it becomes ascertained that the Body is composed entirely of material substances, it becomes comparatively easy to prove that intelligence cannot belong to it; from which it would follow that—(*a*) it is the receptacle of the activities of which the contact of the existing Soul is the non-constituent cause,—(*b*) that it is the substratum of the Sense-organs, the developments whereof are due to the developments of the Body under the influence of food and drink,—and (*c*) that it forms the receptacle of the experiences of the Soul related to the Body.

* The Siddhānta says that the Body is composed of, constituted by, the Earth only; the Earth alone forms its component cause; though the presence, by contact, of the other four substances also is necessary in its formation; but this does not make these four the *constituent cause* of the Body. The Jar has for its constituent cause, only the Clay; and yet the presence of water is necessary. The *Bhāṣyacandra* takes the term '*bhūtasaṁyoga*' as a '*karmadhāraya*' compound, meaning 'well-recognised presence', the meaning being—'the mere presence by contact of the other four, which (contact) is *duly recognised* (*bhuta*), cannot be denied'—the *Bhāṣyacandra* explaining '*niṣiddaḥ*' as '*niṣeddhum śakyaḥ*'.

† The *aqueous* body is found in the regions of Varuṇa; the *fiery* body in the regions of the Sun, and the *aerial* body in the regions of Vāyu. *Ākāśa* does not form the component of any body; hence there is no *Ākāśic* or ethereal body,—according to the Nyāya.

are not built up without the contact of Water and other substances.*

Sūtra 28

"The Body is made up of Earth, Water and Fire. Because we find in it the distinctive qualities of these, [*i. e.*, Odour, Viscidity and Heat]." *A*

Sūtra 29

"It is made up of four substances (Earth, Water, Fire and Air), because we find in it in-breathing and out-breathing (in addition to the aforesaid qualities of Earth, etc.)." *B*

Sūtra 30

"It is made up of five substances, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ākās'a, because we find in it odour (of Earth), humidity (of Water), heat (of Fire), breathing (or circulation of the juices) (of Air) and cavities (of Ākās'a)."† *C*

BHĀṢYA

The reasons put forward in these Sūtras being inconclusive, the author of the Sūtra has taken no notice of them [*i. e.*, he has not taken the trouble to refute them].

Question :—" In what way are they inconclusive ? "

Answer :—As a matter of fact, the presence of the qualities of material substances in any object may be due, either to the fact of those substances forming the constituents of that object, or to the fact that the mere presence by contact of these substances in any object is possible—(a) when those substances form the

* The *Bhāṣyacandra*, along with nearly all manuscripts, reads *niḥsaṁśayaḥ* but *niḥsaṁśayā*, appears to be the right reading. The only way of construing the form '*niḥsaṁśayāḥ*' is to take it, as the *Bhāṣyacandra* does, along with '*bhūtasaṁyogaḥ*' of the preceding sentence ; otherwise (if we do not read *niḥsaṁśyayā*, and take it as qualifying '*niṣpattiḥ*'), the only form that could be admitted would be *niḥsaṁśayam*.

† All these three are *Sūtras*. They are found in the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, and also in the Puri Sūtra manuscript. *Viśvanātha* and the *Bhāṣyacandra* both explain them as propounding the different opinions in regard to the composition of the human body. The edititor of the Viz. text has been misled by the fact that these opinions have not been refuted by the Sūtra. But this omission has been satisfactorily explained by the *Bhāṣya*, which says that the Author of the Sūtra has taken no notice of these views, because the reasons put forward by them are of doubtful validity.

constituents of that object, and also (b) when they do not form the constituents, and are only present in it by contact; which presence is not denied (by any party);—for example in the case of the Dish we find that Water, Air, Fire and Ākāśa are all present by contact [even though the dish is composed of Earth only, and not of these four]. [Thus it being found that the mere fact of the qualities of a certain material substance being found in the Body does not necessarily prove that the Body is actually composed of that substance,—the reasons put forward in the three Sūtras must be regarded as *inconclusive.*]

If the human body were composed of several substances, then, by reason of the peculiar character of its (multiple) constitution, it would be without odour, without taste, without colour and without touch.* As a matter of fact, however, the Body is not so (Without Odour etc.). Hence the conclusion is that *it should be regarded as composed of Earth, because we find in it the distinctive quality of Earth.*

Sūtra 31

Also because of the authority of the Revealed Scripture.

BHĀṢYA

In the *mantra*†—'May thy Eye go to the Sun etc.' (*Ṛgveda*, 10-16-3), we find the words—'May thy Body go to the Earth'; and what is referred to here is the absorption of the product (the Body) into its constituent element. Again, we find another *mantra* (recited in the course of the rites of consecration performed in connection with child-conception) beginning with the words—'I create thy Eye out of the Sun'—and going on to say—'I create thy Body out of the Earth' (*S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, 11-8-4-6); and what is referred to is only the production of the product (Body) out of its constituent element. In the case of the Dish and such other things, we find that one product is produced out of one kind of constituents; and from this we infer that it is not possible for any single product to be produced out of several heterogeneous constituents.

* This has been explained in detail by the *Vārtika*.

† This mantra is recited over the dead body, in course of its consecration by fire.

SECTION (7)

Sūtras 32-50

The Sense-organs and their Material Character.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In accordance with the order in which the 'Objects of Cognition' have been *mentioned*, it it now the turn of the *Sense-organs* to be *examined*; and in regard to the Sense-organs we are going to consider whether they are the modifications of Primordial Matter (as held by the Sāṅkhyas), or they are made up of elemental substances (Earth &c.)*

"Whence does this doubt arise?"

[We have the answer in the following Sūtra]—

Sūtra 32

This doubt arises from the fact that there is perception (with the Eye) when the Pupil is there, and there is perception also when there is no contact with the Pupil.

On one hand, it is found that there is perception of colour only when the Pupil, which is a physical organ made up of elemental substances, remains intact, and there is no perception when the Pupil is destroyed [which would indicate that the Visual-organ consists of the Pupil only, which is made up of elemental substances]; while on the other hand, it is also found that when an object is before the observer, there is perception of it without its coming into direct contact with the Pupil, and it is not necessary for it to come into any such contact with the Pupil; and certainly Sense-organs cannot operate effectively without getting at, coming into direct contact with, the object perceived; and in

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* It is interesting to note that while the *Bhāṣya* confines the discussion between the Sāṅkhya and the Naiyāyika, the *Tātparya* brings in here the controversy between the Naiyāyika and the *Bauddha* who holds that the organ is nothing apart from the outer physical body; i.e., the Visual-organ consists only of the Pupil, and not of a Luminous Substance underlying the Pupil, as the Naiyāika holds. The *Tātparya* also adds that according to the Sāṅkhya also, the Sense-organ is not exactly a 'modification of Primordial Matter' itself; but it is the direct product of '*Ahaṅkāra*', 'Egoism', which is the product of Buddhi, which is the direct product of Primordial Matter. Even so, inasmuch as Primordial Matter is the root-cause of all manifested things, it is quite right to say that according to the Sāṅkhya, the Sense-organs are 'modifications of Primordial Matter'.

reality this latter fact (of an object being seen without coming into contact with the Pupil) can be explained only on the basis of the theory that the Organ is not made up of elemental substances and is all-pervading in its character [and it does not consist of the Pupil].* So that both characters being found to belong to the Organ, the aforesaid doubt arises.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[In refutation of the above-mentioned Bauddha-theory that the Visual Organ consists in the Pupil only, the *Sāṅkhya*] asserts as follows :—

" The Sense-organs are not made up of Elemental Substances ;—Why ?—

Sūtra 33

"Because there is perception of large and small things.'

BHĀṢYA

" The term ' large ' includes also the *larger* and the *largest* ; and what is meant is that as a matter of fact, all things of various degrees of magnitude are perceived ; *e.g.*, the (*large*) Banyan tree, as also the (*larger*) mountain, and so forth ;—similarly the term ' small ' includes also the *smaller* and the *smallest*; and the meaning is that as a matter of fact things of various degrees of smallness are perceived ; such as the Banyan-seed and so forth. This fact of both kinds of things being perceived sets aside the possibility of the Sense-organs being made up of Elemental Substances ; as a matter of fact, that which is made up of Elemental Substances can pervade over (and operate upon) only such things as are of the same magnitude as itself ; while

* The organ can be all-pervading in character only if it be the product of *Ahaṅkāra* which being all-pervading in its character, its products are alao such, and hence unimpeded by anything, can come into contact with anything and everything ; so that even though the object is not in physical contact with the physical Eye-pupil, it would not matter ; as the Visual-organ, being all-pervading in its character, would be in contact with it all the same ; and hence render it perceptible. If, on the other hand, the Visual-organ were made up of Elemental Substances, it could not get at things behind any physical obstruction whatsoever, even in the shape of transparent things.—*Tātparya.*

that which is not so made up is all-pervading, and as such can operate upon all things (of all magnitudes)."*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The *Bhāṣya* answers the *Sāṅkhya* argument of Sū. 33 as follows]—From the mere fact of there being apprehension of large and small things it cannot be inferred that the Sense-organs are *not made up of elemental substances*, or that they are *all-pervading*.

Sūtra 34

The said apprehension (of large and small things) is due to the peculiarity of the contact between the light-rays (emanating from the Visual Organ) and the object (perceived).

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the 'apprehension of large and small things' is brought about by the peculiarity of contact between the light-rays emanating from the Visual Organ and the object perceived;† just as there is by contact between the light-rays from the lamp and the object.

That there is such contact between the light-rays (from the Visual Organ) and the Object perceived is proved by the phenomenon of obstruction; that is, when the rays of light emanating from the Eye are obstructed by such things as the wall and the like intervening between the Eye and the Object,

* The *Sāṅkhya* argument is thus stated by Viśvanātha:—The Physical Eye-ball cannot be the organ of vision; for if it were, then it would mean that the organ is operative without getting at the Object; which is open to objection. Then, it might be held that if the Eye-ball is not the organ, it is something else made up of Elemental Substances which is the organ;—but this also would not be right; as the organ of vision apprehends things of large as well as small magnitudes; which would not be possible, if it were made up of Elemental Substances.

† The light-rays emanating from the Visual Organ which are devoid of any manifested colour, form the constituent parts of the organ, which according to the Naiyāyika, is made up of the Elemental substance of Light; the organ, consisting of the light-rays, issuing forth, comes into direct contact with the object; and whether it is a large or a small object perceived depends upon the exact nature and extent and force of the light-rays emanating from the organ. The example cited is that of the Lamp, because the light from the lamp also, like that from the Visual Organ, is devoid of manifested colour.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

they do not illumine (and render perceptible) that object; this being exactly what happens in the case of light emanating from a Lamp. [And this goes to prove that for the perception of objects, the direct contact of light from the Eye with the object is essential; for if this were not so, and if the organ were an all-pervading one, the perception would not be obstructed by an intervening object].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Siddhāntin having put forward the view that the fact of the Visual Organ consisting of light-rays can be inferred from the phenomenon of obstruction,—the Opponent urges the following objection :—

Sūtra 35

"Inasmuch as no such thing (as Visual light-rays) is ever perceived, what has been put forward cannot prove anything."

BHĀṢYA

"Inasmuch as by its very nature Light is endowed with colour and touch, the Light of the Visual Organ, if it existed, should be perceived,—just in the same manner as the Light of the Lamp is perceived,—according to the principle that 'the perception of a thing is due to its being possessed of large magnitude, being composed of several component particles, and being endowed with colour'.* [And since the Light from the Eye is never perceived, it follows that no such Light exists.]

Sūtra 36

[*Answer to the objection*]—**Mere non-Perception of that which can be deduced by inference is no proof of its non-existence.**

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* This principle is enunciated in the Vaiśesika-Sūtras, though the form of the Sūtra (4. 1. 6) is somewhat different from what is quoted here. The Sūtra is worded as महत्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वात् रूपवत्त्वाच्च उपलब्धिः.

The *Tātparya* explains the sense of the Opponent's objection thus:—"When a thing, which is capable of perception, is not perceived, the only right conclusion is that it does not exist; and it would not be right to assert its existenee on the ground of merely inferential reasons. If this were permitted, then it might be permissible to assert the existence of even such things as the horns of a man."

BHĀṢYA

The existence of the light-rays (of the Visual Organ) being deduced by Inference from the phenomenon of 'obstruction', which shuts off (makes impossible) the contact (of the object with the Visual organ,)—mere non-apprehension of them by Perception does not prove non-existence; just as in the case of the upper surface of the lunar disc and the lower strata of the Earth (both of which are deduced by Inference and not apprehended by Perception, and yet not regarded as non-existent).

Sūtra 37

There being no uniformity regarding the character (of perceptibility or imperceptibility) as belonging to Substances and Qualities, there can be no certainty in regard to any particular thing being actually perceived.*

BHĀṢYA

The said character (of Perceptibility or Imperceptibility) is diverse, inasmuch as it belongs (sometimes) to the Substance and (sometimes) to the Quality; for instance, while the *Substance*, in the shape of the molecule of Water (hanging in the atmosphere) with its constituent particles actually in contact (with our organs of perception), is not perceived (though the Visual organ),—its *quality* of *coolness* is perceived; and it is from the continuous presence (in the atmosphere) of such aqueous molecules that the two (Winter) seasons of *Hēmanṭa* and *S'is'ira* derive their character;—similarly while the Substance in the shape of the molecule of light (hanging in the atmosphere), with its colour unmanifested, fails to be seen, along with its colour,—its warmth is actually perceived; and it is from the presence of this substance that the two seasons of Spring and Summer derive their character. [All this goes to prove that the mere non-perception of a thing is not a proof of its non-existence.]

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* The Viz.-edition reads उपलब्धिनियमः so also the *Nyāyasūchinibandha*. But we find the reading उपलब्ध्यनियमः in the *Bhāṣyacandra*, in the Puri Sū. Ms., in Sūtra Ms. D; as also in the Puri Bhāsya Mss. A and B. The translation adopts this latter reading.

Sūtra 38

Where it does come about,—

Perception of Colour (and coloured Substance) is the result of the subsistence of several component substances, and of the presence of a particular character of Colour.*

BHĀṢYA

That is to say, it is so whenever Colour and the Substance in which it subsists are apprehended by Perception. The 'particular character of Colour'—by reason of whose presence colour (and coloured Substances) are perceived, and on account of whose absence, a Substance (as endowed with colour) is *not* perceived,—consists in what has been called its 'manifested character'.† It is for this reason (of perceptibility depending upon the *manifestation of colour*) that the Light-ray from the Eye, having its colour *unmanifested*, is not perceived with the Eye, [and certainly this non-perception does not prove that the ray is non-existent]. In connection with Light, we find that it possesses a diversity of character: *viz*: (*a*) sometimes it has both Colour and Touch manifested, as in the Sun's rays (which are perceived by the Visual and Tactile organs); (*b*) in some cases it has its Colour manifested but Touch unmanifested; as in the rays of light from the Lamp (which are perceived with the Visual organ); (c) in some cases it has its touch manifested and colour unmanifested, as light in contact with (heated) Water and such other things (which are perceived by the Tactile Organ only); and (*d*) in some cases it has both Colour and Touch unmanifested and is, as such, *not perceptible*, (either by the Visual or by the Tactile Organ)—*e. g.*, the light-rays emanating from the Eye.

Sūtra 39

The formation of the Sense-organs, being due to Merit and Demerit, is subservient to §the purposes of man.

* This *Sūtra* is not found in Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, nor in the *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa*, nor in Sūtra Ms. D., nor in Puri Sūtra Ms. But the *Vārtika*, the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Bhāṣyacandra* treat it as *Sūtra*.

† That is, Colour and Coloured object are perceived only when the colour is manifested.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः, as 'brought about by man's purpose'. But from the *Bhāṣya* it is clear that it means 'subservient to man's purpose'.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the Sense-organs are formed in accordance with the purposes of the sentient being served by them,—such 'purpose' consisting of the *perception of things* and the *experiencing of pleasure and pain*; so that the generation of the light-ray in the Eye is for the purpose of getting at (and operating upon) the object perceived ;* and the fact that the Colour and Touch (of this Light in the Visual Organ) are not manifested is deduced from (and assumed on the basis of) certain well-known usages [such, *e.g.*, as the dictum that 'the Sense-organs are themselves beyond the senses', and so forth].† Similarly it is from usage (and experience) that we deduce the fact that, in regard to certain objects, there is hindrance (to the operation of the Visual organ), which indicates the presence of obstruction. In fact, as the Sense-organs, so also the manifold and diverse formation of all things, is 'due to Merit and Demerit (of Men being born into the World)', and is 'subservient to the purposes of Man'.

The term '*Karma*' (in the Sūtra) stands for 'Merit and Demerit'; which serves to bring about the experiences of the sentient Person.

The said 'Obstruction' can belong only to a material substance, because there is unfailing concomitance.§ That is to

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* From the general principles enumerated in the Sūtra, it follows that, because objects are perceived with the Eye, and the Eye-socket or Pupil is unable to get at the object,—and Sense-organs cannot apprehend things without getting at them,—we conclude that the formation of the Eye must be such that it is able to get at the object; and hence we come to the conclusion that the Eye is composed of Light, and it is the ray of light, that issuing from the Eye, falls upon the object that is seen with it.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains '*Vyavahāra*' as *Vyavahāraviśeṣaḥ, Vicitrajñānaśabdaprayogarūpādiḥ, Atīndriyamindriyamityādiḥ*. There are certain well-known notions in connection with the Sense-organs; one of these being that the Sense-organs themselves cannot be perceived by the Senses; and in the case of the Eye, this would be true only if the Eye consisted of such Light as has its colour and touch unmanifested; if it consisted of the Pupil only, the Eye could not be *imperceptible*.

§ This sentence has been printed in the Viz.-edition as a Sūtra. But neither Sū. Ms. D., nor the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, nor the Puri Sū. Ms., nor Viśvanātha, nor the *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa*, nor the *Bhāṣyacandra* read any such Sūtra. We do not, therefore, treat it as a Sū.

say, the obstruction that we find as hindering the operation of the Sense-organ upon certain substances must be regarded as belonging to a material substance, for the simple reason that it never fails in its concomitance with material substances; for we have never found any *immaterial* substance (as *Ākās'a* and the like) appearing as an 'obstruction'. [It is true that *non-obstruction* is found in the case of certain *material* substances also, *e.g.*, glass, rock-crystal and the like, which do not hinder the operation of the Visual organ; but] as for *non-obstruction*, this is not *unfailing in its concomitance*, either with *material* or with *immaterial* substances,—being found, as it is, along with both. [Hence non-obstruction cannot prove either the *material* or the *non-material* character of the Sense-organs.]

Some people argue as follows:—" It comes to this that, because there is *obstruction*, the Sense-organs must be *material*, and because there is *non-obstruction*, they must be *non-material*; 'non-obstruction' (of the Sense-organ) also we find when things, hidden behind the glass, or mass of white clouds, or rock-crystal, are clearly perceived." But this is not right; because there is *non-obstruction* also in the case of *material substances*; *e.g.* (*a*) there is illumination, by lamp-light, of things hidden behind glass, clouds and rock-crystal; which shows that there is *no obstruction* of *Lamp-light* (which is admittedly *material*); and (*b*) there is no *obstruction* of the heat of the cooking fire operating upon things placed in the vessel (placed upon the oven) [and the cooking fire is also admittedly *material*].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the non-perception (of the Light-rays from the Eye), this may be due to special reasons. [For example]—

Sūtra 40

Its non-perception is similar to the non-perception of the light of the stars at midday.

BHĀṢYA

The general principle is that there is perception of a thing when there is 'inherence of several component substances' and also 'a particular colour'; and yet in the case of the light of the stars, we find that even though the said conditions of perception are present, it still fails to be perceived at midday, because it

is suppressed by the (stronger) light of the Sun ;—exactly in the same manner, in the case of the Light of the Visual Organ, even though the conditions of perception—in the shape of the presence of 'several component substances' and of 'a particular colour'—are present, it fails to be perceived, for certain special reasons. What this special reason is has been explained above (in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 38,), where it has been pointed out that there is no perceptional apprehension of the substance *which does not have its Colour and Touch manifested.* It is only when there is absolute non-perception, [*i.e.* when the thing is not perceived at all, and its non-perception is not due to any special causes], that it can be rightly regarded as proving the non-existence of the thing [and inasmuch as such is not the case with the Light of the Visual Organ, its merely accidental non-perception cannot justify the conclusion that it does not exist].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Some one might here argue that—"On the same analogy we may say that there is Light in the piece of stone also, and it is not perceived at midday because it is suppressed by the Light of the Sun." And in answer to this we have the following Sūtra—

Sūtra 41

The said assertion cannot be accepted ; because there is non-perception (of the Light of Stones) also at night ;—

BHĀṢYA

and also because there is no cognition of it by Inference either (which there *is* in the case of the Light of the Visual Organ). Thus then, there being absolute non-cognition (at all times, and by all means of Cognition) of the Light of the Stone-pieces, we conclude that no such light exists. Such however is not the case with the Light of the Visual Organ [which *is* apprehended by means of *Inference*].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The view propounded by us is supported by reason also.

Sūtra 42

The perception of things being brought about by the aid of external light, the non-perception (of the Visual Light) must be due to non-manifestation (of colour).

BHĀṢYA

It is only when the Visual Organ is aided by some external light that it becomes capable of apprehending things ; and in the absence of such light, there is no apprehension with the Visual Organ. [So that it is on account of the absence of an external light falling upon it that the Visual Light is not perceived.] As a matter of fact, even when the aid of (external) light is present, and there is perception also of Cool Touch, the object in which that touch subsists, (*i, e*., the particles of Water hanging in the atmosphere) fails to be perceived with the Eye ; for the simple reason that its Colour is not manifested ; this shows that there is non-perception of an object endowed with Colour by reason of its Colour being not manifested.* For these reasons we conclude that what the *Pūrvapakṣin* has said in Sū. 35—that " inasmuch as no such things (as the Visual Light-ray) is ever perceived, what has been put forward cannot prove any thing "—is not right.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question—" But why is *suppression* not put forward as the reason for the non-perception of the Visual Light ?† [The answer is given in the following Sūtra].

Sūtra 43

Because there can be suppression (of Colour) only when it is manifest also ;

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* In the case of the Water-particle hanging in the atmosphere, what happens is that its Colour not being manifested, it is not perceived with the Eye ; and that this is so we infer from the fact that in the perception of Water we require the aid of external light ; similarly, the Visual Light also requiring, for its perception, the aid of external light, it follows that the non-perception of this also must be due to the non-manifestation of its Colour. It is a generally recognised principle that a thing, which requires for its perception the aid of external light, fails to be perceived only when its Colour is not manifested ; so that the non-perception of such a thing must be attributed to the *non-manifestation of its colour*, and not to its *suppression by stronger light* ; as is found to be the case with the light of stars, which, not requiring the aid of any external light in its perception, has its non-perception at midday due to suppression by the light of the Sun.—*Vārtika and Tātparya*.

† This question emanates from those Logicians who hold that Visual Light has its Colour manifested, like any ordinary Light ; and it is not perceived because it is suppressed by the stronger light of the atmosphere.

BHĀṢYA

—and *also when it is not dependent for its perception upon external light* ; this is the implication of the particle ' *cha* ', ' also '. As a matter of fact, there is suppression of only such Light as is manifested—*i. e.* duly evolved— and does not depend upon the aid of external light [as we find in the case of Stars] ; when, on the other hand, such conditions are absent, (*e. g.*, in the case of the Light in such things as the Visual Organ), there can be no suppression; which leads us to conclude that when a certain Light, which is not perceived (with the Eye) by reason of its Colour being not manifested, becomes perceived when some external light falls upon it,—such Light cannot be said to be 'suppressed'.

From the above it follows that the Visual Light does exist (and is endowed with a particular form and character).

Sūtra 44

Also because we actually perceive the Light in the eyes of night-walkers.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, we actually see rays of light in the eyes of ' night-walkers '—*i. e.* the cat and other animals (of the feline species) ; and from this we infer the existence of light in the eyes of other living beings.

" But just as the genus (of the Cat) is different (from that of Man), so would their sense-organs also be of different characters [so that the mere fact of the Cat's Eye possessing rays of light cannot justify the inference of the existence of Light in the Eyes of Man]."

There is no justification for the assumption that there is such difference of character (between the Eye of the Cat and the Eye of the Man) ; specially in view of the fact that both are equally found to have their approach (upon visible objects) hindered by obstructions such as the wall and other things. [Which fact is what forms the main ground for the assumption that the Visual Organ consists of Light.]*

* The mere fact that while we see light-rays emanating from the Cat's Eye, and not those emanating from the Man's Eye, cannot justify the assumption that the two are not of the same kind of 'sense-organ'; in the case of the Sun and the Moon, though the former is felt to be hot and the latter cool, both are regarded as 'luminous'; hence mere difference in some detail of character does not prove diversity of 'genus'.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—" It is not right to regard *the Contact of the Sense-organ with the Object* as an instrument of Cognition. Why ?

Sūtra 45

" Because (as a matter of fact) there is perception without (the Organ) getting at (the Object) ; as (we find that) there is perception of things behind glass, vapour and rock-crystal."

BHĀṢYA

" As a matter of fact, we find that when a flying piece of straw strikes against glass or vapour, it is actually seen with the Eye ; and yet one thing can come into contact with another only when no third thing comes between them,—and whenever a third thing does come between two things, their contact is obstructed. Such being the case, if the contact of Light-rays (from the Eye) and the Object (the straw behind the glass) were the cause of its perception, then,—no contact being possible by reason of the obstruction (of the intervening glass),—there should be no perception at all. And yet we do perceive things hidden behind glass, vapour and rock-crystal ;—all which goes to prove that the Sense-organs are operative without actually getting at (and coming into contact with) the object. From this it follows that they are non-material in their character ; because all material things (such as the Arrow, the Axe and the like) have the character of being operative only by getting at their objects."

Sūtra 46

[*Answer to the above*]—**The above reasoning has no force against our doctrine, because there is no perception of things behind a wall.***

BHĀṢYA

If the Sense-organs were operative without getting at their objects, then there would be nothing to prevent the perception of things hidden behind a wall.

* In the Viz. text and in Puri A, the *Bhāṣya* has a '*na*' preceding he Sūtra. It is not in Puri B ; nor is it supported by the *Bhāṣyacandra*. tAnd as the denial is already contained in the *Sūtra* itself, in the term '*apratiṣedhaḥ*', an additional '*na*' would be superfluous.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent retorts]—" But if the Sense-organs were operative only by getting at the objects, then there would be no perception of things behind glass or vapour or rock-crystal."

[The answer to this is as follows]—

Sūtra 47

Inasmuch as there is no real obstruction (by such things as the Glass etc.), Contact does take place* (in the cases cited).

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, neither Glass nor Vapour obstructs the passage of Light-rays from the Eye; and not being obstructed, the rays do actually come into contact with the object.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

One who holds the view that "there can be no non-obstruction of what is purely material"†—is not right;—

Sūtra 48

Because (as a matter of fact) there is no obstruction of the Sun's rays,—in connection with the object behind a piece of rock-crystal,—and in connection with the object to be burnt,§

BHĀṢYA

The view that has been held cannot be accepted as right,—(*a*) because there is no obstruction of the Sun's rays,—(*b*) because there is no obstruction in regard to the object behind a piece of rock-crystal,—and (*c*) because there is no obstruction in regard to the object to be burnt;—the sentence in the Sūtra is to be split up into three clauses by construing the term 'because there is no obstruction', '*avighātāt*', with each of the other three terms;

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* The *Bhāṣyacandra* and Viśvanātha read उत्पत्तिः for उपपत्तिः.

† Puri Mss. A and B and the *Bhāṣyacandra* read यश्च न मन्यते &c. which may be construed to give the same sense thus:—'If one does not admit all this, and insists upon the view that there could be no absence of obstruction, if the Sense-organs were material in character'.

§ Such is the translation of the Sūtra as interpreted by the Bhāṣya, which (see below) analyses the Sūtra into three factors. The simple meaning of the Sūtra appears to be that 'there is no obstruction of the Sun's-rays even when the object burnt by it is behind a piece of rock-crystal'.

and the meaning assigned to the Sūtra is in accordance with this construction.

(*a*) The rays of the Sun are not hindered by the Jar and such things,—'as there is no obstruction' in this case; and the Water in the Jar becomes heated; such imbibing of the quality of warmth of one thing (Light) by another (*i. e.*, Water) is possible only when there is actual contact (between the two things); and the original coolness (of the Water) becomes suppressed by the warmth thus imbibed.

(*b*) When the object to be illumined is hidden behind rock-crystal, there is no obstruction to the lamp-rays falling upon it; and 'because there is no obstruction', the object is got at by the light, and becomes perceived.

(*c*) When the thing is placed in a frying pan over the fire it becomes burnt by the light of the fire; and here also 'because there is no obstruction' to the light-rays, the thing is got at by them, and because it is thus got at, it becomes burnt; and the heat (of the Light) is operative only by contact.

The term '*avighātāt*', 'because there is no obstruction', may also be taken by itself (as propounding a fourth argument); "What would be the meaning of '*avighāta*', 'non-obstruction' (in this case)?" It would mean that there is no hindrance on any side to the progress of the substance (Light) by any such intervening substance as has its component particles not ruptured and transformed (by the Light passing through them); * *i. e.*, there is no hindrance to its operation; *i. e.*, there is no obstacle to its contact (with the object). For instance, we find that water placed in an earthen jar imbibes the coolness of the outer atmosphere [in which case the hot light-rays go out of the Water through the intervening jar, without dismembering and transform-

* The term '*vyūhyamāna*' is used here in a peculiar sense; it has been explained by the *Tātparya* as meaning 'dismemberment'; the sense being that when the thing in the frying pan is burnt by the heat of the fire in the oven, the heat passing through the pan does not tend to the dismemberment of the pan's component particles; *i.e.*, it does not so happen that the pan is broken up and another pan appears in its place. And this permeating of the rays of light and heat—without dismembering and transforming the intervening substance,—is what is meant by 'non-obstruction'.

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ROHITA: A SURE TEST OF THE VEDIC ECLIPSE-CYCLE

(R. Shama Sastry)

Book XIII of the Atharvaveda contains four long hymns in praise of Rohita, apparently the sun. The first hymn consists of 60 verses, the second 46, the third 26, and the fourth 56. The main subject of the hymns is Rohita, who is, as will be presently seen, differentiated from the sun. In XIII, 3, 26 he is praised as one of the three forms, apparently of the sun. The first of the three forms is one who is born of the darksome mother, the second the whitely shining child (Arjuna) of night, and the third the Rohita, the subject of the hymns. In XIII, 1, 6 he is said to have held a cord from earth to heaven, on the latter of which Aja Ekapāda is said to repose. This implies that the other end of the cord lay on the Uttarāphalguni, the fourteenth constellation from Uttarābhādrapada, the presiding deity of which is Aja Ekapāda. He is a thousand-horned bull (1, 12). He was uplifted by the Vashaṭ-cry (Vāgvajra) (1, 15). He is prayed for putting down Malignities and Enemies (1, 24). He is superior to Agni and Sūrya (1, 24). On the appearance of Rohita Indra is said to drink Soma (1, 27). He casts away all foes (1, 32). The number of his births is 1007 (XIII, 1, 37). He is not the common Agni whom men kindle (1, 40) and him only the highest sages know. While looking at Rohita, the poet observes a shadow between himself and the sun and regards it as the cause of troubles (1, 55-56-58), and tries to sever its root. M. Victor Henry, a French Vedic scholar, took these lines as referring to a solar eclipse that might have once occurred on the occasion of reciting this hymn. In 2, 4 and 12 Atri is stated to have established Rohita in heaven. His wings soaring to heaven are spread over

a thousand days' continued journey (2, 38 and 3, 14). At evening he is Varuṇa and Agni and ascending in the morning he is Mitra (XIII, 3, 13 and 15). In 2, 8 he is said to be Śukra freed from darkness above the atmosphere (Amoci śukro rajasaḥ parastāt). He is the Deva, the bright one, who dispelling darkness climbed the heavens (Vidhūya devastamo divamāruhat—2,8). As time-maker he metes out the thirteenth month of 30 days (3, 8). His uplifted limbs heat the heavens and he shines with Suvarṇa and Paṭara when he is below the heavens (3, 16). The seven (Maruts) make the one-wheeled chariot ready, and bearing seven names the single courser draws it (180). The wheel of his chariot is three-naved; and eight times attached a powerful courser draws it (3, 18–19). His settings are three, his risings three and his zeniths are also three (3, 21). His birth is triple like the birth of all other gods (3, 21). Young ones joined (twins) stand close beside him, ten in number, with one single head (4, 6). His are the Marudgaṇas and they move gathered close like porter's thongs (4, 8). He is the monster and he is Rudra (4, 23–26).

Like the usual sun Rohita is mounted on one-wheeled or three-wheeled (A. V. 14, 14) chariot drawn by a single courser bearing seven names, the wheel being three-naved. The powerful courser drawing it is eight times attached again and again to the chariot. Marudgaṇas with Indra follow it (1, 3).

Reading between the lines one can easily observe that Rohita is the name of a cyclic solar eclipse dark red in colour. M. Henry's conjecture that there seems to have been a solar eclipse on the occasion of reciting the hymns in praise of Rohita, the sun, falls a little short of the truth. He could have gone further and identified Rohita itself as a cyclic solar eclipse to which the hymns in question are prayers, recited on the appearance of Rohita cycle after cycle. The unit of cycle is 1000 days on which the Rohita's wings are spread for a continuous journey. In this cycle Rohita has his triple birth (A. V. 13, 3, 21) like other gods. The three births are three solar eclipses of three different colours occurring in 1000 days. They are one of a black colour, one of whitish gray, and one of dark red, as mentioned in 13, 3, 26. The Tait. Samhitā says:—"Svarbhānu, the Asura, pierced the sun with darkness; the gods desired an

atonement for him ; the first darkness of his they struck off became a black sheep ; the second a bright-coloured (rohita or lohita) one ; and the third a white one.'' It is to be noted how the Samhitā names the three eclipses. Solar eclipses are called sheep while lunar eclipses are termed as goats, in VI, 5, 10. In A. V. V, 28, 9 the three births are called Harita (red) in heaven, Arjuna (white) in the middle sphere, and Ayasmaya, (as black as iron) on the earth. Of these Hiraṇya (red eclipse) is dear to Agni (V. 28, 6). These three are also called Devapuras, cities of gods. The Tait. Samhitā, however, calls them the citadels of Asuras (VI, 2, 3). It says that the Asuras had three citadels ; the lowest was of iron, then there was one of silver, and then one of gold. The Tait. Āraṇyaka, however, restricts the colour-distinction to lunar eclipses and says that gray (Paṭara), black (Viklidha), and red (Pinga) are the characteristics of Varuṇa (wrapper, moon), and that they appear in the course of a thousand days (1, 2, 6). Supporting this the Sūryasiddhānta says that if the eclipse is less than half, it is white ; if more than half it is black ; and if total it is red. The Pancasiddhāntikā of Varāhamihira says the same thing :—During a total eclipse dark yellow is to be declared the peculiar colour of the moon ; her colour is dusky in the case of eclipses taking place during the rising or setting of the moon ; and waterish in the case of partial eclipses.

The word "Paṭara" used in A. V. XIII, 3, 16 is a name of Paṭara eclipse in the Tait. Āraṇyaka. Accordingly coming with Paṭara, Arjuna and Rohita must also be eclipses.

In A. V. 13, 1, 3 the Maruts or Vāyus, strong and mighty sons of Priśni, having Indra for their ally, are requested to crush down foes and Rohita is called upon to hear the thrice-seven Maruts in his work. The Tait. Ārāṇyaka (1, 1) says that the luminaries have Vāyus for their horses (Vāyvaśvā raśmipatayah). Now Rohita has three births and accordingly he must have seven horses for each birth, that is, thrice-seven Maruts for his three incarnations. This means that for each incarnation there is a chariot with seven Vāyu-horses ready. This is the meaning of 13, 3, 18, which says that "seven make the one-wheeled chariot ready." This is the first attachment of horses to the chariot. Then there are seven Marudgaṇas or seven troops of seven

Maruts each, more. These seven groups will be attached seven times one after another. On the whole the number of yokings comes to eight. This is what is meant when 13, 3, 19 says "Eight times attached the potent courser or coursers draw the chariot."[1]

Tait. S. says (3, 4, 2) that Vāyus are seven and a thousand are their teams. The seven Vāyus identified with the sun's horses evidently represent one half of a Parva of 14 days. Seven Gaṇas or troops of seven Maruts each or forty-nine Maruts drive the sun's chariot with seven Vāyu-horses yoked to it three times in the course of a thousand days. In other words forty-nine half-Parvas or 49 × 7 or 343 days make one birth-period of Rohita. This is very nearly equal to modern eclipse-year of 346 days. Three-times 343 days make 1029 days. This excess of nearly 30 days is not lost sight of by the Vedic poets. Dividing the 30 days by three and adding ten days to each of the three eclipse-years evidently to arrive at a full-moon day in the case of lunar eclipses and a newmoon day in the case of solar eclipses, they say in Ṛg. 6, 44, 24, "The moon has developed of its own will a well with ten lifting machines." In Rig. 9, 1, 7-8 they say "Ten sisters (ten days) press the Soma on the skin (skin-like sky)." In Ṛg. 10, 4, 6 they say that "As two robbers lurking in a forest seize with ten cords, so the hands seize upon the touch-wood with ten fingers (to generate the fire)."

Or dividing a thousand days into three equal parts corresponding to the three birth-periods of Rohita in 1000 days, and adding ten days to each part we can also arrive at 343 as eclipse-year. The division of 1000 into three parts by Vasus, Rudras, and Ādityas in (Tait. S. 5, 5, 2) and by Soma, Indra and Yama (in Tait. S. 7, 1, 5) should not be considered as meaningless. Soma there means the moon, Indra, the sun, and Yama, the god of death, or eclipse-god. It is the moon, the sun and Agni, the eclipse-god, that play their part in the division of 1000 days into three eclipse-seasons. It is the addition of

1. Originally the Eclipse-cycle was Aṣṭācakra, of eight cycles of 2½ years each, making twenty years. Accordingly the yokings were also eight, later on it was reduced to seven cycles of 1000 days each making 19 years.

ten days to each of the three periods that is referred to in A. V. 13, 4, 6 where we are told that ten children stand close beside Rohita. The Ṛgveda also says (1, 164, 13 and 14) that there are ten on the upper part (Uttāna). The words "upper part" here seem to mean the closing time of each of the three parts of 1000 days, as verse 3 of Rig. 1, 95 says that youthful ten, assisted by wind (Vāyu), beget the embryo Agni and conduct him to all places. We shall presently see how the seven horses of the sun identified with seven Vāyus (Vāyvaśvāh raśmipatayah) driven by 49 Maruts reach the node. The words "Ten begetting Agni" is usually interpreted as meaning "ten fingers generating fire on the touch-wood, taking no notice of the corresponding celestial phenomena of the generation of eclipse-fire. It must be borne in mind that generating fire, Soma-pressing, and other acts done in the sacrificial hall are all an imitation of the natural phenomena observed or imagined as occurring in the sky on the occasion of solar and lunar eclipses. In the case of lunar eclipses ten days are personified as ten sisters engaged in pressing the moon towards the eclipse-point called the node or lifting up Soma from a well for ten days by ten ropes. Likewise in the case of solar eclipses ten robbers of the calves of the sun-cow-herd are said to drag the sun by ten ropes. The fire generated is the eclipse-fire in the sky. The east and west points personified as two trees are represented by the two pieces of touch-wood used in the sacrificial hall. Eclipses are variously described : it is a fight between two bulls for the possession of the sun-cow. Or it is Śipiviṣṭa or the sun covered by the private parts of bull-like Indra or Vṛtra ; or it is a chase after the thieves carrying off the calves (rays of light) of the sun-cow or sun-cowherd ; or it is serpent-like Vṛtra keeping waters (rays of light) pent up in his coils, and so on. The acquaintance of the Vedic poets with the nodal year or Agni's year of about 343-346 days, sometimes extended upto 350 days, is fully borne out by what is said both in the Vedas and in the Śrauta-sūtras about the play of 49 Maruts with the seven windhorses of the sun. The 49 Maruts drive each of the seven horses of the sun's chariot and bring the chariot to the dangerous point of Agni, the node. The seven horses represent half of a Parva of 14 days and 49 half-Parvas come to 49 × 7 = 343 days. This number is equal

to 333 plus 10 days. If the last day of this period or a day or two after this period coincides with a full moon, a lunar eclipse is certain; or if it coincides with a new moon, a solar eclipse is equally certain, there being other necessary conditions. If the playing Maruts or Krīḍins, as they are called, arrive at the goal on or about from 343 to 350 days, and if the number of those days is divisible by 4 with no remainder, then it is a Kṛta-game and eclipse will happen at the morning; if it leaves a remainder of 3, 2, or 1, it is Tretā, Dvāpara, or Kali; and the eclipse will happen at midday, or in the evening, or at midnight respectively. This idea is borne out by the verse of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa: it says that Kali is lying asleep; Dvāpara is returning home; Tretā is standing erect; and Kṛta is just moving. The method of calculation of the Parva-yugas is fully explained in my "Drapsa: the Vedic Cycle of Eclipses". The race of the forty-nine with seven days, which is nearly equal to threetimes (333 plus 10) days in the course of 1000 plus 30 days is the source of the Akṣadyūta or dice-play frequently referred to in the Vedas. The word "Akṣa" made by the combination of the first and last letters of the Devanāgari alphabet signifies 49, there being 16 Svaras, or vowels, 25 Sparśas, and 8 Antastha letters. The number of dice-pieces formed of Vibhītaka nuts taken for the play out of about one thousand such pieces is forty-nine, sometimes fifty also.

In the Rājasūya sacrifice which represents a lunar eclipse the seven Ratnins or officers of the king represent the seven horses or seven days of a half-Parva. The forty-nine or fifty dice-pieces stand for the 49 Maruts. As only two players can play at dice at a time, 21 sets of two players each seem to have been formed out of the seven Ratnins. Let us call the 7 Ratnins *a*, *b*, *e*, *d*, *e*, *f*, and *g* respectively. Now *a* with six other letters can form only six sets as, *ab*, *ac*, *ad*, *ae*, *af*, and *ag*; *b* with five other letters only five sets as, *bc*, *bd*, *be*, *bf*, and *bg*; *c* with four others four sets as, *cd*, *ce*, *cf*, and *cg*; *d* with three others only three sets as, *de*, *df*, and *dg*; *e* with two others only two sets as, *ef*, and *eg*; and *f* with the remaining one only one set as *fg*. Thus the total numher of playing sets of two each comes to be twenty-one only. They are split into three groups of seven sets of two each for the three eclipse-periods into which 1000

days are equally split. First seven sets play successively one set after another with the forty-nine or fifty dice-pieces for Kṛtā, Tretā, Dvāpara or Kali Parvas and one or the other of the two wins the stake of food-stuff representing the moon in solar or lunar eclipse. The total number of plays of the first seven sets comes to 7 × 49 or 7 × 50 equal to 343 or 350. Likewise with the second and third groups of seven pairs of players it comes to 343 or 350. The seven pairs here represent, I repeat, the seven days and nights of half of a Parva of 14 days, and 49 or 50 half-Parvas 24½ or 25 full Parvas of 28 days each forming a nodal year or Agni's year of 343 or 350 days. When the sun is at this point or day, the arrival of the moon at or exactly opposite to, this point causes a solar or lunar eclipse. So it is a dangerous spot and the journey of the sun and the moon, the two Kriḍins or sportive children, may then prove fatal.—In the Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra 2, 8 the number of dice-pieces is said to be 49 (Ekānnapancāśatah). In the same Sūtra 12, 15, however, the seven Ratnins are said to take three-times fifty dice-pieces made of gold (Tisrah pancāśatah sauvarṇakṣān). In A. V. 19, 34, 2 and Ṛg. 10, 34, 8 thrice fifty dice-pieces are also mentioned. Following Baudhāyana the word "tripancāśa" should be translated as "three-times fifty" and not as "fifty-three", as Griffith and others have done.

Division of the year into groups of seven days seems to have been in vogue in the Vedic and Sūtra periods. The Nidānasūtra of the Sāmavedins which is older than the astronomical Siddhānta works of the first or second century A. D. divides the intercalary year of 378 days into two halves of 189 days each and says that it is formed of "27 periods of seven each" (saptavimśatimevaisha saptāhānetidakshiṇā; tathodang saptavimśatimiti).—See my "Drapsa" p. 32.

From this it follows that Agni in the Vedas means not merely the fire generated by attrition, but also the eclipse-fire caused by the attrition of the east and west points personified as two trees. Agni regarded as an eclipse-fire is described as "Mṛtyu", "Death". (Tait. Ar. 6, 18). Agni or eclipse-fire is also described as a son of sun and moon, the parents. The three Agnis or eclipse-fires appearing in the three Agni-years of 343-350 days into which 1030 or 1060 days are split are described as three

brothers termed as Palita, Śitipṛṣṭha Ghṛta pṛṣṭha in Ṛg. 1, 164 and A. V. 9, 9 and 10. As it throws a flood of light on Vedic theme and chronology I next proceed to elucidate the first 19 verses of that grand hymn.

THE VĀMASŪKTA ON VEDIC THEME AND CHRONOLOGY

The Ṛgvedic hymn on the god described as "Vāma and Palita", and therefore known as "Vāmasūkta", "a hymn on Vāma", is the grandest of all Vedic hymns. Dīrghatamas is the name of the sage who has given expression to this most lucid hymn, hitherto held as most obscure. It consists of fifty-two verses on various gods and in a number of metres. The following is an English translation of each of the verses with explanatory notes :—

(1) "Of this fair and grey-haired (Palita) Hotar, the middle of the three brothers is a good eater (Aśna); the third is he whose back is (as yellow as) Ghi. I have beheld the lord of seven sons."

NOTES

Regarding the middle brother Ṛg. 111, 2, 9 says as follows :

"The three burners of undying and eternal Agni have purified the devout worshipper ; one of them is installed as an enjoyer (Bhuja) in this mortal world ; the other two have occupied the sister worlds." Here the word "Bhuj" is synonymous with "Aśna" in the above verse. In Ṛg. 111, 7, 1 and 3 he is called "Śitipṛṣṭha and Nīlapṛṣṭha," one whose back is black. Now it is clear that Nīlapṛṣṭha and Ghṛtapṛṣṭha are the second and third brothers. Evidently the first brother must be Palita white or grey-haired, as stated in the verse. In A. V. XIII, 3, 26 the three brothers are called Kṛṣṇa, White, and Rohita. The Tait. Āraṇyaka styles them as "Paṭara, Viklidha, and Piṅga" appearing as three forms of Varuṇa in 1000 days. As already pointed out in my "Eclipse-cult in the Vedas, Bible, and Koran" and also in my article on "Rohita", the three brothers of Agni mentioned in the verse are undoubtedly three solar eclipses occurring in a cycle of 1000 days. In other places the same

eclipses are called father, grand-father, and great-grand-father. The seven sons are the seven Ghṛtapṛṣṭha or Pinga eclipses occurring in seven cycles of 1000 days each. As the Pinga eclipse is of greater digits than the other two prominance is given only to it and no account is taken of the other two.*

(2) They yoke the seven horses to the one-wheeled car; a single horse draws it bearing seven names; the three-axled wheel is undecaying and never loosened, and in it all these regions of the universe abide."

NOTES

The seven horses are the seven Vāyus or winds: The Tait. Ar. says that "Vāyvaśvah raśmipatayah", "the luminaries have the winds for their horses". As Vāyu is uniform, the poet says that a single horse bearing seven names draws it. The reason for making the horses or Vāyus seven has been pointed out in my essay on "Rohita". The wheel, Cakra, is 1000 days. Its three naves or axles are its three divisions made up of 333 days plus 10 days as already pointed out in connection with Rohita. The universes or all the worlds are the three regions, earth, air, and sky.

(3) "The seven who preside over this seven-wheeled car are the seven horses who draw it; seven sisters sing their song of praise in unison. In it are also the names of the seven cows treasured up."

NOTES

The seven Cakras or wheels are the seven cycles of 1000 days each.

There being one horse bearing seven names to each cycle, the number of horses is seven. The seven sisters are the same as the seven sons, as will presently be seen in verse 16.

The same seven sisters are described as seven cows or seven times three or twenty-one cows in Ṛg. IV. 1, 16 and Sāma. V. 11. 1, 17, 3 and VI. 2, 2, 7.

(4) "Who has seen the primeval being at the time of his birth? Who has seen how the boneless one sustains the bony creation? Where is the blood, the life and the spirit of the earth? Who has approached the knower to enquire about it?"

* These seven or twenty-one eclipses are only on one node and on the two nodes together, they come to 7 × 3 × 2 = 42. See the "Drapsa".

(5) "Immature in understanding, undiscerning in mind I inquire about those places where the gods are established: Why have the sages spread their seven threads over the yearling calf to weave their web?"

NOTES

The poet asks about the highest god under whom the sun, moon and other minor gods carry on their work. The seven Tantus or threads are the seven sacrifices set up in correspondence to the seven Pinga eclipses of the seven cycles. The calf in the verse is the eclipse before him.

(6) "Ignorant, I inquire of the sages who know the truth; not as one knowing do I inquire, for the sake of gaining knowledge: What is that one alone, who has upheld these six spheres in the form of the unborn?"

NOTES

The One is the highest God. The six spheres are the six worlds one above the other, the seventh being the God's own world.

(7) "Let him who knows it declare it presently: the well-established station of this fair (white) one in motion (solar eclipse of grey colour). Straight from his head the cows (rays) draw milk (his own grey colour); and clad in his robes (of grey colour) they get the water (to wash off the colour) with their feet."

NOTES

The cows are those that are referred to in verse 3 above.

(8) "The mother (the sun) served the father (the moon) in Ṛta, the season of eclipses; she thought of this union before. As a shy maiden she bore the embryo (of eclipse) and the worshippers bowing down began their prayers.

(9) The mother (the sun) became united with the father (the moon) in Dakṣiṇā, south of the heaven; the embryo of foetus (eclipse) appeared in the cloudy regions; the calf (eclipse—Hotar) lowed after the mother and saw the omniform cow in three Yojanas."

NOTES

In Ṛg. X. 85 and A. V. XIV. 1 and 2 describing the marriage of Sūryā with the moon the places of eclipses are said to have

been at the Maghā constellation and the Bhādrapadā constellation which is the fourteenth from the former. Of these the first is the place of Dakṣiṇāyana and the second that of the Uttarāyaṇa. The three Yojanas are three Muhūratas equal to 2 hours and 24 minutes after sun-rise; for in Ṛg. 1. 123, 8 thirty Yojanas are said to intervene between any two dawns in their daily progress.

(10) "The one sole (eclipsed sun), having three mothers and three fathers (three suns and three moons of the previous cycle of 1000 days) stood on high; none ever over-weary him: the gods on the summit of the sky take counsel respecting him in language all-comprehending, but not known to all."

(11) "The twelve-spoked wheel of the sun in eclipse-season (Ṛta) revolves round the heavens, and never tends to decay: seven hundred and twenty children in pairs, Agni, abide in it."

NOTES

The sons referred to in all the above verses are eclipsed suns: The cycles (Cakras) are seven, originally eight (Aṣṭā cakrā navadvāra); each cycle of 1000 days has one big eclipse and one intercalary month, and two cycles two big eclipses and two intercalary months termed as the twin sons of Aditi. She is said to have borne eight sons, called Dhāta, Aryama, Mitra, Varuṇa, Amśa, Bhaga, Indra and Mārtāṇḍa, of whom the eighth was still-born and therefore cast off. Eight sons correspond to eight cycles and seven to seven cycles of 1000 days each. Accordingly a pair of sons correspond to two cycles of two thousand days. It is undoubtedly these pairs that are meant here. According to the Vedāngajyautiṣa a cycle of five years yields a pair of sons or intercalary months. Reduced to pairs, 720 children come to 360 pairs and 5 × 360 comes to 1800 years from the commencement of the era of eclipses and intercalary months. Counting two months or two big solar eclipses in 2000 days, we can get 360 pairs in 720000 days which, divided by 365 days, will have 1972 years and a fraction of 44/73 of a year. In A. V. XIII. 1, 37 the number of births of Rohita eclipse is stated to be 1007 (sahasram janmāni sapta cha). Since there is a Rohita eclipse in every cycle of 1000 days, 1007 Rohitas will yield 1000 × 1007 days equal to 2758 years and

66/73 of a year. I do not see how this conclusion can be disputed. The word "Mithunas" in the verse does not mean a pair of male and female beings, but merely a set of two sons. The word "Putrasah" means only male beings. Interpretation of "720" as 360 days and 360 nights would mean 360 males and 360 females. The word "Putras" does not support this interpretation. This point will be considered again in the Notes on verse 15.

(12) "They say that the five-footed father having twelve forms has a remnant or relic, when he is in the further hemisphere of the sky ; others say that it (part of the remnant) has been inserted in and along with the six spokes (six months) in the seven-wheeled car in the nether part of the sphere."

NOTES

The verse refers to the cycle of 33 years. Sapta-cakra means the cycle of 7000 days or 19 years ; the five Pādas are the remaining five cycles of 1000 days each covering 14 years or 13 years and five months, the remaining seven months having been added to the cycle of 7000 days. The twelve forms of the five-footed father are the twelve intercalary months forming an intercalary year in the cycle of 5000 days. The cycle of 7000 days is the nether half of the cycle of 33 years, and the cycle of 5000 days is the upper half of the same cycle. If the 7 intercalary months of the cycle of 7000 days or 19 years are inserted in that cycle, then the cycle of 5000 days in the upper half will have only five intercalary months, which is merely a remnant, "Purīṣa," of the twelve forms or twelve months. If it is not inserted there, then the later cycle of five thousand days will have twelve forms, or twelve months, a complete intercalary year. It should be noted how this interpretation of this verse is quite unlaboured and in perfect harmony with the subject-matter, the eclipse-cycle of 19 years with 7 intercalary months, anticipating the remaining 14 years with five intercalary months to form a complete intercalary year of 12 months.

(13) "All beings abide in this five-spoked revolving wheel ; the heavily-loaded axle (Akṣa) is never heated ; its sounding nave (sanāḍaiva) is never worn away.

NOTES

The five-spoked wheel is the cycle of 5000 days, continued from the previous verse. Akṣa means the last or final nodal year of the three nodal years of 333 plus 10 or 343 days each into which the final cycle of 1000 days is divided. The cycle of 33 years is no eclipse-cycle like the cycle of 19 years, where the Akṣas are heated and bring out the eclipse-fire or Agni. In the last cycle of 1000 days of the cycle of 5000 days there is no eclipse and therefore Agni does not perform the function of a Hotar, caller, warning the people of the season of eclipse. The Tait. Āraṇyaka says that one Ṛtu, eclipse-season, runs following another Ṛtu, crying aloud (nanāda). The word "Hotar" means the same thing.

(14) "The even-fellied, undecaying wheel, repeatedly revolves : ten, united on the upper surface, bear the world, the orb of the sun proceeds invested with dust and (Rajas), in it are all beings deposited."

NOTES

The ten are the ten days added to each of the three parts of 1000 days. The first three verses of Ṛg. 1, 95 throw a flood of light on the function of the ten in bringing out Agni. They are as follows :—

"Two periods, of different complexions, revolve for their own purposes, and each in succession severally nourishes a son ; in one, Hari is the receiver of oblations, in the other, the brilliant Agni is beheld."

"The vigilant and youthful Ten beget, through the wind (Vāyu) this embryo Agni, inherent (in all beings), sharp-visaged, universally renowned, shining among men ; him they conduct (to every dwelling)."

"They contemplate three places of his birth ; one in the earth, one in the heaven, one in the firmament ; and, dividing the seasons of the year for the benefit of earthly creatures, he formed, in regular succession, the eastern quarter."

NOTES

Here two periods are night and day ; Hari is the moon ; Agni is the sun ; lunar and solar eclipses are meant. The ten are the ten days added to each of the three parts of 1000 days,

forming 343 days. The wind is the wind-horse (Vāyvaśva) or seven horses of the sun's chariot run by 49 Marudgaṇas, as pointed out in my translation and notes on the Vedic hymn on the marriage of Sūryā with the moon (Ṛg. X, 85 and A. V. XIV. 1 and 2) and also the hymn on Rohita (A. V. XIII. 1–4). The three places are the three divisions of the cycle of 1000 days; they are the three worlds.

The word "Rajas" in the verse means the eclipse-shadow.

(15) "Of those that are born together, sages have called the seventh the single-born; for six are twins, and are moveable, and born of the gods: sacrifices for them are prescribed befitting their several stations; varied in their form they shine and move for the stationary (supreme lord)."

NOTES

The seven are the first seven of the eight sons of Aditi; they are, as already pointed out, the seven Pinga eclipses of the seven cycles as well as the seven presiding deities of the seven intercalary months of the seven cycles. There are no other sons that can be thought of in this context. The original cycles of 2½ years were eight amounting to 20 years. It was considered in time defective and was replaced by seven cycles of 1000 days each with three eclipses, Pinga being one of them, and with one intercalary month. The seven sacrifices called Agniṣṭoma and the like are laid down in honour of these seven eclipse-gods and gods of intercalary months. They come and go under the behest of the supreme god. Chambers has made an authoritative statement in his "Hand-book of Astronomy" on the prevalence of the cycles of 1000 days, 7000 days, and 12000 days in the days of Israelites.

(16) "They have called these virtuous females males; the sage having eyes sees this and no blind man (like us) can see it. The sage sun knows this and he who can discriminate it is the father's father or grand-father."

NOTES

It is the solar eclipses that are under consideration. Since the sun is regarded as female (Sūryā), the solar eclipses must necessarily be females. The poet considers it improper to call

them male sons, and terms them blind who call them males. In support of his own view he cites the father and grand-father (the first and middle brothers of Agni) as witnesses.

(17) " The cow, holding her last calf with her fore-feet and the first calf with her hind-feet rose up : Of what kind is she ? which way has she gone half ? Where does she bear the young ? Surely it is not amidst the usual herd."

NOTES

As I have pointed out in my " Eclipse-cult in the Vedas, Bible and Koran ", the order of the three eclipses in the cycle of 1000 days is not uniform. Very often the order changes, the Pinga appearing as the first or the second. It is this change of order of the eclipses which the poet has in his mind when he says that the cow arose holding the last calf with her fore-feet and the first calf with her hind-feet. He doubts whether there is any change in the herd of calves, that is, the band of sons.

(18) " Who can understand that it is the father of the calf (the son) that is held by the fore-feet and that the latter held by the hind-feet is the son ? Let him declare that he says it like a sage. How has he come to have such a mind, (view) ? "

(19) " They say that those that come later are earlier and that those who are earlier are later. It is you, O Indra and Soma, who caused it, as you bear them along the world like (oxen) yoked to a wain."

NOTES

The same query that is put in verse 17 is continued in these verses also. The poet finds it difficult to understand the appearance of the father later than the son. This change is due to the difference of a few degrees in the nearness of the sun to the node in the three divisions of the cycle of 1000 days. If the sun is at the node in the first division, the eclipse will be of the Rohita-type ; if he is a little farther, it will be either Kṛṣṇa or Arjuna. Lacking in this information, the poet finds it difficult to explain. The description of Indra and Soma as the cause of this disorder is very significant.

In the hymn on the marriage of Sūryā with the moon (Ṛg. X. 85) and (A. V. XIV. 1 and 2) the Maghās and the Phalgunis are clearly stated to be the house of the sun, Sūryā's father. From this it follows that the fourteenth constellation from the Phalgunis is the house of the moon, the bridegroom, where he appears full. This is clearly mentioned in the hymn on Rohita (A. V. XIII. 1, 6). Here Parameṣṭhin is stated to have held a cord extended from earth to heaven and that at one end of the cord Aja Ekapāda (the Uttarābhādrapada constellation) had its repose. From this it follows that the Bhādrapadas formed the locality of heaven and that the Phalgunis formed the earth. The reason for calling them so is not far to seek : when the sun is on the Phalgunis, he appeared very near the earth and when on the Bhādrapadas he appeared to be very far. They must, therefore, be the places of Dakṣiṇāyana, summer-solstice, and Uttarāyaṇa, winter-solstice, respectively. In the Vāma-sūkta (Rig. 1. 164) the union of the father and the mother is clearly stated to take place in the Dakṣiṇa productive of the embryo of the moon's rebirth and marriage. It has already been pointed out how these localities of earth and heaven are called the houses of Sūryā's father and husband and how reference to solar and lunar eclipses in those places are made in the Vedas. From this it follows that Prof. Jacobi's suggestion that the arrival of the sun at the Maghās and the Phalgunis marked the arrival of the rainy season and the commencement of the Vedic year during the Vedic period is not at all an imaginary conjecture.

Now what is most important and interesting for the Vedic chronology is the Vedic statement that the gods ran a race agreeing among themselves that he who reaches the goal first should wed Sūryā the sun's daughter. The goal of course was the region of Aja Ekapāda which is very near the place of the Aśvins, the modern signs of Pisis and Aries. Regarding the race this is what Griffith says in the Notes on his translation of A. V. XX. 143, quoting Wilson :—

"This is taken from Ṛg. IV. 44, 1-7; 57, 3; Valakhilyas 9. 3 (VIII. 57, 3).

We invocate this day your car, far spreading, O Aśvins, even the gathering of the sun-light,—

Car praised in hymns, most ample, rich in treasure, filled with seats, the car that beareth Sūryā."

NOTES

"The gathering of the sunlight" : Prof. Wilson translates after Sāyaṇa, "the associator of the solar ray" and observes, "Sangatim goh," is only explained, 'goh sangamayitāram', the bringer into union of 'go'. What the latter is intended for is not explained and the translation is purely conjectural, founded upon the connection of the Aśvins with light or the sun. Prof. Grassmann translates "der zur milch eilt", "which hasten to the milk". "Sūryā, the daughter of the sun, that is, the sun-light which the Aśvins introduce. Sūrya, it is related, was desirous of giving his daughter Sūryā to Soma, the moon ; but all the gods desired her as a wife. They agreed that he who should first reach the sun, as a goal, should wed the damsel. The Aśvins were victorious ; and Sūryā, well pleased by their success, rushed immediately into their chariot."—Wilson. See R. V. 1, 116, 17 ; 119, 5 ; 167, 3.

It is to be noted that the Vedic poets regarded the sun, moon, other planets known or unknown, the constellations, and the stars as gods. The race of gods must necessarily mean the movement of moving luminaries. The arrival of the Aśvins first and of the rest behind implies that the sign of the Aries with Aśvins appeared first in the east and the rest fell behind in the sign of Pisis before sun-rise or just at the moment of the rise of the sun in the east. According to the Hindu astronomical Siddhāntas confirmed by Burgess and Whitney (Introduction to the translation of Sūryasiddhānta by Burgess and Whitney), all the planets were in the house of Pisis at the commencement of the Kaliyuga. It follows therefore from the Vedic statement that all the gods fell behind the Aśvins in their race necessarily meaning that all the planets were in the Pisis, that this statement appearing both in the Vedas and the Siddhāntas is a traditional statement and that it is based on actual observation made at the commencement of the Era which they called Kaliyuga. Thus the beginning of Kali Era is too scientifically fixed and started to admit of any doubt and dispute.

Now according to the hymn on the marriage of Sūryā with the moon, the first day of the Kali Era began with a solar eclipse. This is also a fact and it can be verified as follows :—

All that we have to do now is to find out the eclipse-season and the distance of the sun from the node on the newmoon day in the season. This is easily done by making use of the Tables framed by C. Chikkana Siddhanti of Mysore. The given number of B. C. or A. D. years is divided by 20 to arrive at the number of cycles of 20 years each. In the following Table the number of remaining days is given for cycles of 20 years and for single years from 1 to 9 in decimals. If the cycles are 10, 100 or 1000 and so on, the decimal-point is shifted to the right by one figure for 10, two figures for 100, and so on. The same is the case for single years also. The Table (I) is as follows :—

No. of single years	Remaining days	No. of 20 years' cycle	Remaining days
1	18·6310	1	26·0010
2	37·2620	2	52·0020
3	55·8930	3	78·0030
4	74·5240	4	104·0040
5	93·1650	5	130·0050
6	111·7660	6	156·0060
7	130·4170	7	182·0070
8	149·0480	8	208·0080
9	167·6790	9	234·0090

The Kṣepaka quantity for both single years and cycles of 20 years is 10·2445 for A. D. 0 year or B. C. 1.

Rule 1.—Add the remaining days of any B. C. year to the Kṣepaka and deduct the same from the Kṣepaka in A. D. years.

Rule 2.—One revolution of combined movement of sun and node (Ravi-Rahu-antara) is 346·6190 days.

Table 2 showing the daily and yearly motion of Tithi :—

No. of days	Tithi	No. of years	Tithi
1	1·01589577	1	11·05593
2	2·03179154	2	22·11186
3	3·04768731	3	33·16779

4	4·06358308	4	44·22372
5	5·07947885	5	55·27965
6	6·09537462	6	66·33558
7	7·11127039	7	77·39151
8	8·127166193	8	88·44744
9	9·14366193	9	99·50337

Kṣepaka for Tithis for A. D. 0 year or B. C. 1 is 5·7013.

Rule 3.—In Leap-years deduct one day's velocity from the total and in odd years deduct ¼th, ½, ¾th of a day's velocity in 1, 2 and 3 years respectively.

Rule 4.—Deduct the total Tithis from the Kṣepaka in B. C. years and add the same to the Kṣepaka in A. D. years. The same Rules (3 and 4) apply to the next Table also.

Table 3 showing the daily and yearly motion of Ravi-Rahu-Antara :—

No. of days	Comb. Mov. of Sun and node	No. of years	Com. Mov.
1	1·0386026	1	19·34951
2	2·0772052	2	38·69902
3	3·1158078	3	58·04858
4	4·1544104	4	77·39804
5	5·1930130	5	96·74755
6	6·2316156	6	116·09706
7	7·2702192	7	135·44657
8	8·3088208	8	154·79608
9	9·3474238	9	174·14559

The Kṣepaka for B. C. 1 or A. D. 0 year is 349·3598562.

Rules 3 and 4 apply also here.

The first year of the Kali Era is 3102. Dividing it by 20 we get 155 cycles of 20 years each and two extra years. Now let us find the eclipse-season in B. C. 3102nd year.

For 100 cycles of 20 years each, the remaining days

forming the eclipse-season are		...	2600·10
for 50 cycles	...	...	1300·05
for 5 cycles	...	...	130·01
for 2 years	...	...	37·26
Total days	...	...	4067·42

Dividing this by 346·62 we get 11 revolutions and 254·60 as remaining days. Adding the Kṣepaka to it, we get 254·60 + 10·24 = 264·84, that is, 265th day as the last day of the season. Sometimes the eclipse-day may be about from 3 to 6 days earlier or later than the last of the remaining days thus obtained.

Now to find the Tithi on the 265th day of B. C. 3102nd year. Now by Table 2 Tithi for 3000 years ... 33167·79

for 100 years	...	1105·59
for 2 years	...	22·11
Total number of Tithis are	...	34295·49

Casting Tithi months by dividing it by 30, we get 1143 months and 5·49 Tithis as remaining. Deducting for two years. ·50 Tithis per Rule 3, we get 4·99 as rem. Tithis. Subtracting this from the Kṣepaka 5·7013, we get 0·7113. Now adding for 265 days, we get :—

		...	0·7113
for 200 days	...	...	203·1791
for 60 days	...	...	60·9537
for 5 days	...	...	5·0794
Total	...	...	269·9235

Casting out 8 rounds of 30 Tithis each we get 29·9235. That is, the 265th day is a newmoon day.

Now to find the Ravi-Antara on the day :—

R. R. A. for 3000 years by Table 3	...		58048·58
for 100 years	...	...	1934·95
for 2 years	...	...	38·69
Total	...	...	60022·22

Casting out from this revolutions of 360 degrees we get 166 revols. and 262·22 as remainder. Deducting this from the Kṣepaka 349·359 we get 87·193 as remainder. Now for 265 days R. R. A. is as follows :—

	...	...	87·139
for 200 days	...	...	207·720
for 60 days	...	...	62·316
for 5 days	...	...	5·193
Total	...	...	362·368

Casting out 360 degrees we get 2°·368 degrees for R. R. A. on the day. This indicates a total solar eclipse.

We are told in the hymn on the marriage of Sūryā that though she was released from the noose of Varuṇa in her father's house, she may get into the same noose in her husband's house, that is, the Bhādrapadas. Accordingly there was a lunar eclipse in the Bhādrapadas in Pisis in B. C. 3101. The next eclipse season from 265th day of B. C. 3102 will be about 346 days after. It may be about 3 days earlier. Now 265 plus 339 equals 604 days. Deducting from this a year of 365 days we get 239 days remaining for the eclipse season in B. C. 3101. Now to find Tithi on 239th day in B. C. 3101.—

Tithis for 3000 years by the Table	...	33167·79
,, 100 years ...	...	1105·59
, 1 year ...	...	11·05
Total number of Tithis	...	34284·43

Casting out 1142 rounds of 30 Tithis each from this, we get 24·43 for remainder. Subtracting this from Kṣepaka 35·7013 we get 11·2713. Adding to this Tithis for 239 days we get :—

			11·2713
For 200 days	...	...	203·1791
30 days	...	...	30·4768
9 days	...	...	9·1436
Total	...	...	254·0708

Casting out 8 rounds of 30 Tithis from this we get 14·0708 as the Tithi on 239th day of B. C. 3101. That is fullmoon day.

Now to find R. R. A. on the 239th day in B. C. 3101.—

R. R. A. for 3000 years	...	5808·58
,, 100 years	...	1934·95
1 year...	...	19·34
Total	... ...	60000·87

Now casting out 166 revolutions of 360 degrees from this we get 240·87 as remainder. Deducting this from the Kṣepaka 349·359, we get 349·359 − 240·87 = 108·489

Adding for 239 days we get as :—

			108·489
For 200 days	...	...	207·720
For 30 days	...	...	31·158
For 9 days	...	...	9·347
Total of R. R. A.	...	...	356·714

This indicates nearly a total lunar eclipse on 239th day of B. C. 3101.

From this scientific calculation we may rest assured that the Kali Era began in 3102 B. C. and that on the new year's day in the Dakṣiṇāyana in the Phalgunis there was a total solar eclipse and that a total lunar eclipse in the Uttarāyaṇa in the Bhādrapadas there was in B. C. 3101. Now the Dakṣiṇāyana has receded from the Phalgunis to Ārdrā by about 5¼ constellations in the course of about 5041 years from the commencement of the Era. This settles once for all the long-standing dispute and doubt about Vedic chronology.

Verses of A. V. XIII. 1, 2, 3 and 4 referreed to in the Article on "Rohita".

A. V. XIII. 1, 3.—Ye Maruts, strong and mighty, sons of pṛsṇi, with Indra for ally crush down our foemen.

Let Rohita, ye bounteous givers, hear you, Thrice-seven Maruts[1] who delight in sweetness.

A. V. XIII. 1, 6.—Rohita gave the earth and Heaven Their being.

There parameṣṭhin held the cord extended.

Thereon reposeth Aja Ekapāda[2]. He with his might hath established Earth and Heaven.

A. V. XIII 1, 12.—Thousand-horned bull, may Jātavedas, worshipped with butter, balmed with Soma, rich in heroes, Be sought, never quit me : May I never forsake thee. Give me abundant men and herds of cattle.

1. Thrice-seven Maruts are thrice-seven wind-horses (Vāyvaśvāh). The seven Marudgaṇas of seven each are 49 Maruts; they are different from the Vāyus, though of the same type.

2. Cord extending from Aja Ekapāda (Purvabhādrapadā and Uttarābhadrapadā) in Heaven to Maghas on earth (180°).

A. V. XIII. 1, 15.—The cry of Vaṣaṭ[1] with the voice uplifted, and Rohita with seed on thee hath mounted.

A. V. XIII. 1, 24.—Sūrya's bay steeds refulgent and immortal draw the light-rolling chariot on for ever.

A. V. XIII. 1, 27.—Prepare the Milky one who teams with fatness : She is the God's never reluctant milch-cow.

Indra, drink Soma : Ours be peace and safety : let Agni lead the laud, and chase our foemen.

A. V. XIII. 1, 32.—Ascending up on high, O God, O Sūrya, drive my foes away.

Yea, beat them backward with the stone : to deepest darkness let them go.

A. V. XIII. 1, 37.—Rohita, Conqueror of Cows and riches and gathered spoils, is heaven's and earth's upholder.

Over earth's greatness would I tell my Kinship with thee who past a thousand births and seven.

A. V. XIII. 1, 40.—Men Kindle Common Agni : him only the higher says know.

A. V. XIII. 1, 56.—If thou should kick a cow, or by indecent act offend the sun,

Thy root I sever : never more mayst thou cast shadow on the ground.

A. V. XIII. 1, 57.—Thou who, between the fire and me, passest across the line of shadow,

Thy root I sever : never more mayst thou cast shadow on the ground.

A. V. XIII. 1, 58.—Who ever he be who, Sūrya, God, comes between thee and me to-day,

On him we wipe away ill-dream, and troubles, and impurity.

A. V. XIII. 1, 59.—Let us not, Indra, leave the path, the Somapresser's sacrifice.

Let not malignities dwell with us.

A. V. XIII. 2, 4.—Victorious, inspired, and brightly shining, whom seven strong tawny-coloured courses carry,

Whom Atri lifted from the flood to heaven, thus men behold thee as thy course thou runnest.

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1. The priests' Vaṣaṭ-cry helps Rohita like Vajra weapon to drive eclipse-demons.

A. V. XIII. 2, 8.—Sūrya hath harnessed to his car to draw him seven stately bay steeds gay with golden housings.

The bright one started from the distant region : dispelling gloom the god hath climbed the heavens.

A. V. XIII. 2, 12.—Atri established thee in heaven, O Sūrya, to create the month.

So on thou goest, firmly held, heating, beholding all that is.

A. V. XIII. 2, 38.—This gold-hued Hansa's wings, souring to heaven spread over a thousand days' continued journey.

A. V. XIII. 3, 8.—He who metes out thirteenth month, constructed with days and nights, containing thirty members.

The god is wroth offended by the sinner etc.

A. V. XIII. 3, 13.—At evening he is Varuṇa and Agni, ascending in the morning he is Mitra.

A. V. XIII. 3, 14.—This gold-hued Hansa's wings soaring to heaven spread over thousand days' continued journey.

A. V. XIII. 3, 15.—This is the god who dwells within the waters, the thousand-rooted many-powered Atri.

A. V. XIII. 3, 16.—Whose limbs uplifted fire and heat the heavens hither he shines with beams of golden colour (suvarṇa patara).[1]

A. V. XIII. 3, 18.—The seven make the one-wheeled chariot ready bearing seven names the single courses draws it.

A. V. XIII. 3, 19.—The wheel three-naved is sound and undecaying.

Eight times attached the potent courser draws it.[2]

A. V. XIII. 3, 21.—Three are the settings, three the upward risings, three are the spaces, yea, and three the heavens.

We know thy triple place of birth, O Agni, we know the deities' triple generations.

A. V. XIII. 3, 26.—Born is the darksome mother's son, the whitely shining calf of Night.

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1. This means that when he is paṭara-eclipse, his heat and light are upward.

2. The eight yokings may correspond to the early counting of Aṣṭā-cakra, eight cycles.

He, Rohita, ascendeth up to heaven, hath mounted to the heights.[1]

A. V. XIII. 4, 6.—Calves,[2] joined, stand close beside him, ten in number, with one single head.

A. V. XIII. 4, 8.—His are these banded Maruts[3]; they move gathered close like porter's thongs.

A. V. XIII. 4, 25.—He is the monster, he is the fiend.



1. Kṛṣṇa, white and red eclipses are meant.
2. Calves are days.
3. Banded Maruts are 49 Maruts.

YOGAVĀSIṢṬHA ON THE ORIGIN OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY[1]

(Rao Bahadur P. C. Divanji)

I. Introductory Remarks

The sage Viśvāmitra goes to the Court of King Daśaratha and requests him to send his eldest son Rāma with him in order to guard his sacrificial ground against the attacks of Rākṣasas. In the first place the task of persuading the king to accede to his request does not prove to be a light one and secondly when at last the king consents and Rāma is brought into court in order to be asked to prepare himself for the journey to the sage's sacrificial ground, all present there are dumb-struck to find that Rāma had been overpowered by a spirit of despondency since his return from a tour of visit to sacred places and had not only been not attending to any pleasures but had also been averse to engaging himself in such activities as were absolutely necessary for continuing the same relations between himself and his relatives and associates and even that between his own soul and his physical body. Viśvāmitra was the first to surmise what had happened to the prince and put him a few questions. The latter who was till then maintaining complete silence as to the cause of his strange behaviour indulged in a long harangue on the evanescent nature of the objects of sense-perception and the absolute uselessness of striving to keep up the relation between the human body and soul and at the end of it disclosed his resolve to put an end to his physical existence by any means unless there was some remedy for making life worth-living.[2] After carrying on some discussion with him with a view to explain to him and to the king, his ministers and others that the spirit of despondency which had taken possession of his mind was an auspicious sign of his having become duly qualified to receive instructions in Adhyātmavidyā[3] the sage suggests

1. A paper accepted for being read at the Sixteenth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Madras in December 1940.

2. Y. V. I. 5. 32.

3. Literally the science relating to the self of man and as according to it the self is the same as Brahma, this is also the same as Brahmavidyā.

to Daśaratha's family priest the sage Vasiṣṭha to impart to the prince that knowledge relating to the self which Brahmā had imparted to them on a peak of the Naiṣadha Mt., in order to dissuade both of them from fighting with each other which they had been doing for a very long time and for the spiritual welfare of highly intelligent persons.[1] The other sages present in the assembly express their approval of this suggestion and Vasiṣṭha expresses his willingness to act upto it.[2]

2. His instructions consist of an exposition of the *Mokṣopāya*, literally meaning the remedy for the final release of the soul from the bandage which chains it down to the phenomenal world and is consequently the cause of miseries of diverse sorts. Before actually commencing them however the sage impresses on the mind of the pupil the mistaken character of the notion, which is widely prevalent even amongst many intelligent persons, that the whole course of a man's life is predetermined by Daiva (fate) and that therefore there is no scope for an independent human effort, and the necessity of entertaining a firm belief that the Daiva, which is only another name for the result of the actions done by oneself in previous births, is always capable of being supplanted by the result of more powerful actions done in the right manner in this birth.[3] He then says that in order to know what the remedy for final liberation was, he must listen to the *Mokṣopāya Saṁhitā* which he was going to recite to him. With a view to inspire confidence he adds that Brahmā himself had said in the beginning of the Kalpa that the knowledge contained in it was capable of putting an end to all miseries and of giving the highest solace. This gives Rāma an opportunity to ask him why Brahmā had said so and how he had come to know it and to him to narrate how the necessity for imparting philosophical teaching to the people of Bhāratavarṣa had arisen.

II. Vasiṣṭha's Account of the Origin of Adhyātmavidyā

3. This account is given in two parts in Y. V. II. 10. 11–44 and II. 11. 4–18. The gist of it is that Brahmā seeing that the

1. Y. V. II. 2. 13–22.
2. Cp. Cit. II. 2. 23–27.
3. Cf. Cit. II. 3–9.

beings created by him were subject to ailments of diverse sorts reflected as to what would be the remedy for freeing them and created Tapas, Dharma, Dāna, Satya and the Tīrthas.[1] He afterwards thought that mankind would not be free from their miseries by those means as they were not adequate for that purpose. He, therefore, reflected again over the proper remedy and came to the conclusion that the right remedy was knowledge which resulted in the highest bliss called Nirvāṇa.[2] And as some persons were required to impart the knowledge of the remedy he created Vasiṣṭha, Sanatkumāra, Nārada and several other sages and sent them out to Bhāratavarṣa in Jambudvīpa with instructions to teach the Kriyākāṇḍa consisting of Tapas etc. to those who had a liking for it and the Jñānakāṇḍa to those who were averse to actions and were intelligent and thoughtful.

4. Now, so long as the Kṛtayuga lasted, people were engaged in actions and performed them properly. They were free from ignorance, inordinate desires, greed, infatuation and such other infirmities and all persons lived in perfect amity discharging their respective duties without injury to others. But when that age passed away the purity of thought and action became diminished. So the sages divided the earth into parts and assigned a king to each of them in order that he may lay down a line of action and set down limits on the free activities of the individuals within his dominions. At the same time they composed and promulgated several Smṛtisāstras and Yajñaśāstras[3] in order that people may acquire Dharma, Kāma and Artha.[4] In course of time, however, the order thus established became eradicated and people being daily overpowered by a desire for enjoyment and the accumulation of wealth, the pairs of opposites such as attachment and hatred, greed and aversion etc. predominated and many became liable to be punished and the kings too being similarly overpowered by passions could not rule over the earth without fighting with one

1. Austerities, duties, pious gifts, truth and holy places.

2. The perfect peace on attaining which man is not reborn and is not enveloped by darkness as on death.

3. Treatises defining duties and those prescribing the modes of performing sacrifices.

4. Religious merit, love and wealth of all sorts.

another. As a consequence both the subjects and the kings became miserable. *It was in order to eradicate their miseries and to create a sense of proper perspective that Vasiṣṭha and others had taught important ways of looking at things.* The science relating to those ways is known as the Adhyātmavidyā.[1] Since that science was first expounded to the members of the princely order it became current in the world as Rājavidyā.[2] The kings on learning it became free from miseries i. e. to say they sloughed off their war-mongering propensity and became happy.

III. Points of Historical Interest in This Account

5. The points of historical interest that emerge from this account are—(1) that the Kriyākāṇḍa and Jñānakāṇḍa, the two Kāṇḍas into which the Veda has been divided and which related to the Pravṛtidharma and Nivṛthidharma referred to by Śankara in his introduction to the *Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā*, had been revealed to the sages Vasiṣṭha and others at the same time but that it was only the first which had been taught by them to the denizens of Bhāratavarṣa in the age in which human beings were so pious, truthful and charitable by nature that there was no necessity to protect or chastise any one and consquently none was required to rule over them ; (2) that even when monarchical government was required to be established owing to the people's lapse from virtue, the Śāstras which the sages promulgated were those relating to Dharma and Adharma and those relating to the ritual of sacrifices :[3] (3) that it was only when the human beings became so depraved as to think of nothing else but enjoyment of the objects of sense-perception and the accumulation of the means of sustenance and comforts, when in short they became unalloyed epicureans or followers of the so-called philosophy of Cārvāka, when miseries became rife and kings found it impossible to rule without chastising the offenders and fighting with their compeers, that the sages instructed the members of the princely order in the Adhyātmavidyā ; (4) that

1. See foot-note 2 *Supra*.

2. Ānandabodha the commentator of the work says that there is a reference here to the use by the sage Vyāsa of that term in the *Bhagavadgītā* and he is probably right.

3. Smṛtiśāstras and Yajñaśāstras.

it was not one doctrine only, whether of Advaitism or Dvaitism, which had they then propagated but several at the same time so that every one may accept whichever he thinks reasonable and convincing and anyhow cease to be quarrelsome except in the matter of the truth and reasonableness of this or that doctrine, and (5) that although at least since the time of Vyāsa the Adhyātma-Vidyā is otherwise designated as the *Rājavidyā Rājaguhyaṁ Jñānaṁ*, that is so, according to the author of this work, not because the Kṣatriyas were the originators of the philosophical outlook on life but because they having been overwhelmed with difficulties and grown incapable of discharging their duties as was expected of them, the superhuman sages, who were the repositories of that wisdom, had thought it prudent to impart it to them and through them to the philosophically—minded persons of all the subsequent ages. Of the way in which this could have been done we have a sample in the episode of Janaka Videhī in this very work.[1] It is, in short, this that the said king was behaving just like an ordinary king for several years after he ascended the throne. But after he listened to songs sung by some Siddhas (Siddhagītāḥ) in a grove of Tamāla trees in his artificial forest where he had gone for pleasure and learnt from them that life had a higher purpose than that of eating, drinking and making merry and that was to try to know and realise one's own self, the substratum of self consciousness, which can be done by training up one's intellect to think deeply and by cultivating a spirit of complete detachment, he began to ponder over and understand the meaning of what he had heard and changing his mode of life commenced thinking over the distinction between the self and the non-selfs and the nature of both, was ultimately convinced that the self was the only and the permanent reality, devoted all his spare time to thinking about it, remained mentally detached from the phenomenal world while continuing to discharge his royal duties and such was the impression created by him on the minds of the

1. Y. V., V. 8-12. Cf. also Mbh. XII. 3. 137 wherein there is a story of Vasumān Janaka having gone to a forest for hunting and having been there instructed by a sage of the Bhṛguvaṁśa. That narrated in the Y. V. seems to be a slightly different version of the same story.

contemporary and subsequent writers that he is held out as the best representative of the school of thought which advocated the view that one can by auto-suggestion create a favourable atmosphere around oneself and realise the highest ideal of a Jīvanmukta even though one may not break off one's family and social surroundings and lead a lonely life in a forest or on a mountain peak.

IV. Corroboration from Other Sources

6. Now interesting as it is, it is not necessary for the purpose of this paper to discuss whether there was a period in the history of the organized life of the Indo-Aryans in which the conscience of each individual was of such a morally high order that although the society was not of a communistic nature there was no necessity of a governing individual or body imposing his or its superior will upon the rest of the community. But it is necessary to emphasise here that the above account reiterates the tradition long current in this land that there are certain portions of the Vedas comprising the Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads, which enjoin the performance of certain rites and the avoidance of certain others while there are others which emphasise the mischievousness of a blind adherence to a course of active life and advise a recourse to a line of psychological reasoning and mental reflection leading to a realisation of the truth as expressed therein. While doing so however it lends support to the historical inference which has been drawn from reliable data by modern scholars that there was a considerable time in the history of the organized existence of the Indo-Aryans in which the people of Bhāratavarṣa did not indulge in any kind of philosophical speculation. That fact does not however exclude the possibility of the existence of a small number of philosophical thinkers in any other part of Jambudvīpa, in which Bhāratavarṣa was included, and in order to establish that as a fact this account says that the Jñānakāṇḍa of the Veda, which was then one only, was even in that age, in the possession of the sages who lived on mountain-peaks beyond the north-western mountainous outskirts of Bhāratavarṣa. As this Kāṇḍa consists of the Upaniṣad portion of the Brāhmaṇas or of the Āraṇyakas with one exception as we have them

to-day, I understand from this portion of the account that the Upaniṣad teaching consisting of the Brahmavidyā itself, not the Ākhyāyikās contained in some portions of some of the Upaniṣads, had remained during this age a zealously guarded secret here to be imparted only to a select few after a long period of probation. This inference is in perfect accord with the facts that can be gathered from some of the Upaniṣads themselves.[1]

7. Then came the second stage in the high Indo-Aryan polity. The earth, as it then was, was divided into 7 parts each called an island, of which Jambudvīpa which included Bhāratavarṣa was one, and each of them was assigned to a man with a preponderance of physical strength. These men were also provided with sets of rules of conduct based on the recollection of the traditions by the sages and also the codes of the principal methods to be observed in the performance of sacrifices which was the chief feature of their religion. This statement to my mind refers to the composition and promulgation of the Dharmasūtras and Śrautasūtras. Even in this age, neither the rulers nor the ruled were put in mind of a higher ideal of life than that of the attainment of happiness in this world and the next. None except those who were tired of a life of enjoyment and misery betook themselves to forests or mountain caves and spent the remaining portion of their lives in a singular devotion to the knowledge of the truth, had then any chance of acquiring the higher vision either intuitively or by contact with the saintly repositories of the secret lore. The *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas* have recorded numerous instances of the Brahmarṣis and Rājarṣis of that age who gave up their all and led a life of perfect self-abnegation for a glimpse of the truth about existence, individual self-consciousness etc. The *Yogavāsiṣṭha* too has recorded the instances of Gādhi, Uddālaka, and Vītahavya and even described in the minutest details the different stages of psychological evolution through which they had to pass and the lives of extreme detachment which they had to lead in order to be qualified for each stage.[2]

1. Chān. IV. 4-9, 10-17, VI. 1-16, VII. 1-26, VIII. 7-15; Muṇḍaka I. 1-2.

2. Y. V., V. 44-49; 58-60; 82-88.

8. These remedies to keep men within strictly inoffensive limits proved in course of time to be inadequate. Wars between rulers and disputes between the ruled which gave rise to too many occasions for the use of the iron rod by the former or their representatives, became very frequent as individuals allowed themselves to be swayed by lust, anger and greed. It was, according to this account as a remedy for such an evil, in other words it was for the moral and spiritual uplift of mankind that the guardian saints propounded important wise ways of looking at things, which turned the minds of the people away from the objects of enjoyment and made them think of the origin and essence of things, the origin and essence of human consciousness, the interrelation between them, the purpose of human life, the highest state to which the human soul could be elevated, the means for such elevation etc.

9. It is very significant that though this kind of knowledge was known as the Adhyātmavidyā meaning the science relating to the self, the thinking principle in man and the substratum of the consciousness, whether of himself or of the other selfs, and of the non-selfs around him, the sage says that they had propounded "Mahatyo jñānadṛṣṭayaḥ" i.e. to say not simply one philosophical doctrine such as that of unqualified Advaitism or of qualified Advaitism or even of Dvaitism but diverse doctrines each important in its own way as emphasising one particular aspect of human experience. In this part of the account I therefore find a statement of a fact or for the matter of that, of a belief that the different lines of thought, which later served as the basis of the different systems of philosophy, had been propounded not as rival doctrines like the later schools but in order to provide food for thought for men in diverse stages of mental development so that even if they differ in their views as to the ultimate reality and the ways for its realisation, they may have one common aspiration namely to shake off the materialistic outlook on life and to make a serious effort to develope the highest and best potentialities inherent in the human soul by rising above the temptations which its surroundings present. This view has been put forward by Puṣpadantācārya in verse 7 of the *Mahimnastotra* and elaborately expounded by Madhusūdana Saraswatī in the course of his

commentary on that verse, which is looked upon as a separate treaties by itself and given the distinctive name *Prasthānabheda*.

10. It is a question worth considering whether all these lines of reasoning were promulgated about the same time or at different times. It is difficult of solution in the light of the cryptic statement of the author above referred to. The only thing that one can do is to hazard a guess that he meant that the systems were all promulgated after mutual consultation about the same time as the reason for their promulgation is stated to be a desire on the part of the sages to provide a remedy for the miseries which the people had brought on themselves by yielding to the weaknesses inherent in the human flesh. The references to the views of Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini which we find in the Sūtras of both of them lend some support to this conjecture.

11. Lastly, the statement that the Adhyātmavidyā came to be known later on as Rājavidyā and Rājaguhyam jñānam because that Vidyā had originally been imparted to, not originated by, the members of the princely order with a strict injunction to keep it secret embodies one of the two kinds of interpretations which can be plausibly put on the said terms, the other being that this was the king of Vidyās and the king of secrets. It is well known that the title of the 9th chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā* is "Rājavidyā. Rājaguhya-Yoga" and that the terms "Rājavidyā" and "Rājaguhyaṁ jñānaṁ" occur in verses 1 and 2 of that chapter. Ānandabodha Yati, the commentator of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* therefore seems to be right when he says that it was Vyāsa who had coined and given currency to these terms and the author of that work must be deemed to subscribe to the view first mentioned. It would be interesting to know that Śankara in his *Bhāṣya on Bh. G.* IX. 2 explains the terms in the latter manner only while Rāmānuja says that though that is the usual interpretation the other one too is possible and plausible in this way that this was a kind of learning fit for men with considerable depth of mind and that such men generally are the members of the princely order.[1] But

1. *Bhagavadgītā* with 11 Commentaries, Vol. II. (Gujarati Press Edition, 1936), Pp. 131-32.

he too has not while commenting on these verses interpreted those terms as referring to an historical fact that it was the Kṣatriyas who had first acquired that science, whether by original thinking and intuition or by the favour of some divine sages. The credit of having first put forward this historical explanation must therefore be given to the author of this work. That this must be the meaning in the mind of Vyāsa also, appears from the fact that he has in *Bh. G.* IV. 1–2 stated that the doctrine of Karmayoga which has been expounded in Chapter III of that work was an old one, that the Almighty had first imparted it to Vivasvat, i. e. the sun, the latter to Manu, the first man, and the last to Ikṣvāku, the first king of the Solar race in a previous age, that it was being handed down traditionally but that in course of time the tradition became broken. This statement receives coroboration also from the fact that some of the Upaniṣads contain dialogues in which a ruling sovereign is the instructor, or the testor, which means that the tradition was current in their time.[1]

V. Conclusion

12. The above-mentioned two passages of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* are remarkable from the point of view of the History of Indian Philosophy in three material respects, namely (1) as putting forward the view that philosophical speculation from diverse view-points, out of which the diverse Systems of Indian Philosophy have grown up, was started in the third stage in the organised life of the Indo-Aryans as the remedy for diverting the minds of the members of the ruling race from the path of selfishness, treading on which they had been bringing miseries on themselves and their subjects, (2) as definitely stating that the Upaniṣadic knowledge was in the safe-keeping of the sages living outside Bhāratavarṣa in the north-eastern direction ever since the existence of human beings on earth but that the Smṛtiśāstras or Dharmaśāstras (in the form of Sūtras) and Yajñaśāstras or the Śrauta sūtras had been composed and promulgated in this land in the stage intermediate between that in which the men living

1. Praśna. VI, I; Chāndogya I. 8, IV. 1-3, V. 3-10, 11-24; Bṛhadāraṇyaka II. 1-5, III. 1-9, IV. 1-5, V. 14, VI. 2; Kauśītaki Brāhmaṇa I, III, IV; Jābāla 4-6.

in the plains had no other literature except that of the Vedic hymns and that in which they were taught or inspired to think of subjects of philosophical interest, and (3) as giving support to the view that the doctrine of the Cārvāka school namely Epicureanism preceded the rise of the orthodox philosophical thought in India and that it had acquired such a firm hold on the minds of the people and had been the cause of so much misery to them that the promulgation of the latter kind of speculation from diverse angles of vision was considered the fittest expedient for counter-acting its influence through the members of the ruling class. *Does not modern Europe which boasts of having evolved a higher and better civilization than ours stand in need of such saintly guidance which would sweep aside all the materialistic idealogies now prevalent and place before its rulers a " Rājavidyā " or " Rājaguhyaṁ jñanaṁ " and establish a reign of peace which would enable its inhabitants to strive for a higher ideal than that of nationalism ?*

THE CONTEMPORANEITY OF CANDRAGUPTA AND KANIṢKA

(Dhirendra Nath Mookerjee)

The Tibetan work 'Pag-Sam-Jon-Zang' being a history of the rise, progress and downfall of Buddhism in India was compiled by the Lama Sumpa Khanpo in A. D. 1745. Sumpa was very much respected for his learning by the then Emperor of China who occasionally used to call him to his presence. The Lean Skya who presided at the head of the Labrang Church, commanded that all the Tibetan books on Buddhism extant in China should be revised by Sumpa which he did, to the great satisfaction of all and was honoured with a title in consequence. Sumpa thus had ample opportunities to collect materials from ancient works for his history.

In this work 'Pag-Sam-Jon-Zang', edited by the late Sarat Chandra Dass, (p. 91) it is stated 'The king Candra Gupta built a monastery called Kusumālaṅkāra, and his brother's son Sri Candra, built a temple of Avalokiteśvara as well as 14 chapels in Nālandā and worshipped Ācārya Pitṛceta and Upādhyāya Rāhula the junior. Regarding Pitṛceta *alias* Mātṛceta, Maticitra, Aśvaghoṣa, Kṛṣṇa, etc., it is said that in a certain eastern city there was a merchant who had given his young daughter in marriage to the family of a Brāhmaṇa named Sargaguhya. Her off-spring called Kṛṣṇa was a *siddha* of Mahādeva and by his grace became a great master of the Tīrthika lores. Engaged in controversies with the Buddhist Paṇḍitas in Orissa, Gauḍa and the Tirhoot provinces, he defeated every one of them. His victories filled him with an overwhelming pride. But his mother told him that the Buddhists in those provinces were very few whilst those towards Magadha were numerous. He, therefore, set out for Magadha but was defeated thrice in three controversies by Ācārya Ārya Deva. He was thereupon converted to Buddhism.

According to the Chinese pilgrim Huen Tsiang also (Watters. On Yuan Chwang, Vol. II. pp. 101–02). Maticitra *alias* Aśvaghoṣa was a contemporary of Deva or Ārya Deva.

In the Pag-Sam we again read that at the time when the above Candraputa was ruling in the Eastern country (Prācya)

there was a king towards the West-Delhi and Mālwā—called Kanika who opened 28 mines of precious metals and worshipped more than 30,000 priests of the Mahāyāna sect. He invited the Buddhist monk Aśvaghoṣa who being too old could not go, but sent a letter through his disciple Jñānayaśas. 'Mahārāja-Kanika–Lekha' is the title of the letter, the Sanskrit original of which is now lost but a Tibetan version is embodied in the Tangyur, Mdo.gi. This version was prepared by the Tibetan Pandita Vidyākara Prabhā and the Tibetan Lāmā Rin-chen-mchog and was edited by the teacher Dpalbrtsegs.

As already pointed out by the late Mm. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, M.A., Ph.D. ('Mahārāja-Kanika-lekha,' J. A. S. B. 1910, pp. 477–481) there is a covert allusion to Āryadeva in the following lines of Maticitra's letter to Kanika :—' O Deva (king) having acquired talents use them really like Deva (a god or Ārya Deva); O Deva (king) having known all faults be really faultless like Deva (a god or Ārya Deva)'.

The king Candragupta contemporaneous with Maticitra *alias* Aśvaghoṣa, Āryadeva and king Kanika is, however, described in the Pag-Sam and by Lāmā Tārānātha as a contemporary of Cāṇakya.

The late Mm. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana draws two conclusions regarding Kanika as follows :

(*a*) "Kanika is stated in the letter to have belonged to the Kuśana family, which though foreign was by this time so far Hinduised that it was described as a section of the solar race. So we read : 'Trained by *pravrajita* monks and born in the race of Kuśana thou shoudst not defile the creed of the family whose ancestors descended from the noble line of the Sun.'"

(*b*) Kanika was not the founder of the Kuśana dynasty. That his ancestors reigned in India and professed Buddhism is evident from the following verse of the letter. "Do those like thy ancestors rule the earth by righteousness; and do thou advance the religious observances in temples like unto thy ancestors."

Then Mm. Vidyabhusana concludes that 'Kanika king of Delhi and Mālwā must be distinguished from Kanika who reigned in Jālandhara though both were descended from the Kusana race. It was during the reign of Kaniṣka that the third

Buddhist council was held in the Kuśana's monastery at Jālandhara. So we read; "Hearing that he held the Third Buddhist Council in Kundalavana Vihāra the Kashmirians tell this story. But the general belief is that there assembled in the monastery of Kuśana in Jālandhara 500 Arhats above the rank of Srotopanna and about 5000 ordinary monks. The teaching of the Buddha as prophesied in Kṛki's dream, were arranged. The last council was held. The Tripiṭakas, particularly the Vinaya which was formerly not put in writing, were now codified and such scriptures as were formerly in writing were now revised."

From the various Chinese accounts collected by the Late Sylvain Levi (Jour. Asiatique, 1896–97, ser, IX vol. VIII. pp. 449–89 also IX pp. 1–42) Dr. F. W. Thomas concludes ('Mahārāja-Kanikalekha; I. A. 1903 pp. 345–60) that they appear to agree in making Aśvaghoṣa a contemporary of king Kaniṣka and a predecessor of Nāgārjuna [Is it possible that the 'ki-ye-to', named in these accounts, (VIII pp. 462–73) = ceṭa?] Sylvain Levi, however, thinks that Kanika and Kaniṣka are identical. Dr. Thomas, however, doubts this and remarks 'Mr. Levi in the article before cited (see Vol. VIII, pp. 449–57), regards king Kanika as an invention of Tārānātha, at least so far as he is distinguished from Kaniṣka. Even this, however, is not free from difficulty. For the epistle of Mātṛceta is addressed to a young man, and certainly we cannot suppose the author already old and infirm, to have subsequently become a courtier of the king, as the stories relate concerning Aśvaghoṣa. Another of the difficulties, which we must raise, however reluctantly, concerns the stories of Kaniṣka related in the Sūtrālankāra by Aśvaghoṣa himself (Vol. VIII, pp. 452–53). Are we to understand that these are told by a contemporary of his patron king? The extracts given by M. Levi do not produce that impression; but of this only a Chinese scholar can judge.'

From the above it seems there were two kings Kaniṣka and Kanika both contemporaneous with Aśvaghoṣa—Kaniṣka during Aśvaghoṣa's early career and Kanika during his last days.

Now let us see if there is any reference in the 'Mahārāja Kanika-lekha' itself on the contemporaneity of Candragupta and Kanika as mentioned in the Pag-Sam.

Dr. F. W. Thomas in his article already referred to remarks, "The epistle contains one and perhaps two other indications which may some day aid in establishing the identity of this king (Kanika). In V. 47 he is clearly described as a northern king and advised to add dignity to that region by endowing the temples. In V. 83 the words 'since we cannot look upon the hurtful sun, act, O moon of kings, like the moon,' must to students of Indian poetry suggest a play of words, while another verse (No. 49) seems to speak of the king's family as 'the sun of the Ārya race.' As I am unable to unravel these allusions, I must for the present be content with calling attention to the facts."

From the play of words 'Act O moon of kings like the moon' Dr. Thomas in a footnote raises the following suspicion 'can Kanika have been named Candra Kanika or Caṇḍa Kanika?'.. It seems to me that the plain translation of the line is 'Act O moon of kings (rāja-candra) like the moon [Candra (Gupta)].' That is Kanika is advised to imitate the good qualities of king Candra Gupta (II Vikramāditya) his contemporary.

That this king Candra-gupta contemporaneous with king Kanika was not Cāṇakya's contemporary Candragupta (the Maurya Monarch) as described in the Pag-Sam and by Lāmā Tārānātha but the contemporary of the Gupta monarch Candragupta will be evident from a consideration of several other pieces of evidence which have already been cited in my articles on the epoch of the Gupta era.

We know from Buddhist sources that Āryadeva, the contemporary of Nāgārjuna was the rector of Nālandā during the reign of the Gupta monarch Candragupta (II Vikramāditya, Sam, 60–93). Kern on the assumption of the correctness of Fleet's epoch of the Gupta era threw doubts on this statement : 'It cannot be true that Deva or at least this Deva was rector of Nālandā during the reign of the Gupta Candragupta.' (Manual of Buddhism, p. 123 f.) Now as Aśvaghoṣa *alias* Maticitra was defeated by Āryadeva who again defeated Nāgārjuna, evidently Aśvaghoṣa, Āryadeva, Nāgārjuna and Candragupta were contemporaneous.

From Dr. Walleser's 'The life of Nāgārjuna from Tibetan and Chinese sources' (Reprint from 'Asia Major', Hirth Anniversary

Volume) and from the late Sarat Chandra Dass (J. A. S. B. Vol. 51, pt. 1. 1882, p. 115) we learn that according to the Tibetan historians who wrote on the authority of ancient Indian historians, Nāgārjuna was born *when the dynasty of Aśoka waned and gave place to that of the illustrious Candra, the first* of the Candra (Gupta) family. Nāgārjuna is also stated by them to have been born a century before Candragupta. The late Sarat Chandra Dass proposed to identify Candragupta with the Maurya king of that name and placed Nāgārjuna about a century after him (i. e. in the 2nd century B. C.). Hence Dr. Walleser rightly remarks that the late Sarat Chandra Dass thereby alters his own information. For, 'After the waning of Aśoka's dynasty during the reign of the illustrious Candra, the first of the Candra family' shows clearly that it was during the reign of Candragupta I, the first monarch of the Gupta family that Nāgārjuna was born. Dr. Walleser rightly identified Candragupta with Candragupta I, of the Gupta dynasty but as Nāgārjuna could not be placed so, late as c. A.D. 319 (on Fleet's epoch of the Gupta-era) he placed Nāgārjuna a century before in about A. D. 200.

According to the Buddhist tradition, the Third Buddhist Council under venerable Pārśva was held during Kaniṣka's rule, the very year in which Nāgārjuna was born. Wassilier also in his 'Der Buddhismus, etc., p. 211 calls Aśvaghoṣa a pupil of Pārśva. Itsing stated Nāgārjuna as a contemporary of Kaniṣka (Sam. 1–23). Another Indian Buddhist tradition places Nāgārjuna as a contemporary of Huviṣka (Sam. 31–60). Again, from Rev. S. Beal's 'Succession of Buddhist Patriarchs' (compiled chiefly from Tārānātha's History of Buddha and some Chinese fragments scattered through various books) Ind. Ant. Vol. IX. pp. 118–19, we know that Nāgārjuna was a contemporary of Vikramāditya evidently Candragupta Vikramāditya. There are numerous other pieces of literary and traditional evidence in support of the contemporaneity of the Gupta Vikramādityas and the Imperial Kuśanas. All this disposes of the suppositions of the contemporaneity of Aśvaghoṣa, Kaniṣka and Nāgārjuna with Candragupta Maurya. M. Foucher also holds independently from 'le temoignage des bas reliefs' that Aśvaghoṣa lived i he second century after Christ (L'Art Greco-Buddhique, i, 623). The late Mm. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana took Aśvaghoṣa and

Kanika to be contemporaneous with Candragupta I of the Gupta dynasty but unable to disbelieve Fleet's epoch of the Gupta era, he placed them about A. D. 319. An-Shik-kao (A. D. 148-170) translated into Chinese the Mārgabhūmi Sūtra. of Saṅgharakṣā, the Chaplain of Kaniṣka, showing clearly that Kaniṣka flourished long before A. D. 148. From the above it will be seen that such a late date for Aśvaghoṣa, Kaniṣka etc. and consequently of the Gupta monarchs is impossible.

As regards the palæographic and numismatic evidence in support of the contemporaneity of the Kuśanas and the Guptas enough has been said by Dr. R. C. Majumdar in his article on the Kuśana chronology in the Journal of the Department of Letters of the Calcutta University, Vol. I and also in his article on 'The Date of Kaniṣka' (I. A. 1917, Vol. XLVI pp. 261 ff). Here I quote a few lines from Dr. Majumdar's last article to show how even accepting the remarkable similarity on palaeographic and numismatic grounds numismats, plæographists and historians could not dare to reject Fleet's epoch of the Gupta era (A. D. 319).

'Thus Dr. Bühler fully noticed the remarkable similarity of the letters of the Kuśana and Gupta periods. But as he was not prepared for its logical consequence he had to maintain the identity of alphabets separated by more than two centuries. The theory I have advanced shows that the alphabets of the two periods were similar for the very natural reason that one of them closely followed upon the other.'

'Dr. Oldenbeg says "It is one of the earliest known and best established facts within the sphere of Indian numismatics that this (Kuśana coinage) is the place from which the very important coinage of the Gupta dynasty branches off." He further added that the vacant period between Vāsudeva and the Guptas is already (by placing Kaniṣka in A. D. 78) perhaps greater than might be expected.'

'Mr. V. A. Smith practically agrees to this when he says "the close relationship in weights, types and palaeography between the coins of the Imperial Gupta dynasty (A. D. 330-480) and those of the Kuśan kings Kaniṣka, Huviṣka and Vāsudeva, is obvious and has always been recognised."'

'The weight (about 123 grains) and assay of Kuśana gold coins closely agree with the Roman Imperial *aurci* before A.D. 64, when Emperor Nero reduced it which was still further reduced during Alexander Severus's reign (A.D. 222–235). Therefore the Kuśana and consequently the early Gupta gold coins originated before A.D. 64. Thus Kaniṣka, I and his contemporary Candragupta I must have reigned before that date. We should remember that from the time of Domitian (A.D. 81–96), the payment for Indian imports which rose to a very high figure, so long made in Roman coins, was rendered in merchandise. Thus the drain of Roman coins to India came to an end by A.D. 96. Again, Kaniṣka in the Ārā inscription is styled Kaisara (Caesar), a title of honour with the Roman Emperors of the 1st century B.C. and A.D.

We know that Samudragupta as a Crown Prince defeated the 'Daivaputra Sāhi Sāhānusāhi'. This title is characteristic only of the Kaniṣka group of Kings. This shows clearly the contemporaneity of the Imperial Guptas and the Kuśanas.

Now I return to the identification of Kanika and his contemporary Candragupta.

As already noticed by Dr. F. W. Thomas ' Mahārāja-Kanika-lekha, the epistle of Mātṛceta *alias* Aśvaghoṣa is addressed to a young king Kanika, and certainly one cannot believe that Aśvaghoṣa already old and infirm, subsequently became the courtier of Kaniṣka. Another of the difficulty already noticed by Dr. Thomas concerns the stories of Kaniṣka related in the Sūtrālaṅkāra by Aśvaghoṣa himself which were told by his patron Kaniṣka. As Aśvaghoṣa owing to his old age and consequent infirmity could not accept king Kanika's invitation but sent a letter through his disciple Jñānayaśas, this king Kanika is evidently distinct from Kaniṣka and seems to be Kaniṣka's grandson (i. e. Kaniṣka II).

Aśvaghoṣa in his youth was the courtier of Kaniṣka (Sam. 1–41). The story already related of Aśvaghoṣa in the Pag-Sam states that he was a *siddha* of Mahādeva. Regarding Mahādeva, the originator of this sect I quote the following from Kern's 'Manual of Buddhism' for clearness: 'A third apostle was Mahādeva, who conferred the Pravrajyā on Mahendra. It was he who afterwards delivered many from bondage in the kingdom

of Mysore. The name of this worthy is known to the North Buddhists also, but with them he appears in another light. He is remembered as a great sceptic, a kind of Mephistopheles who by his destructive criticism caused dissensions, in the brotherhood, much to the prejudice of the true faith. His party was especially powerful in Kashmir. The talents of this Mahādeva show a striking resemblance to the prominent qualities of the god Mahādeva, or Śiva, for, he had destructive tendencies, and was master in contemplation, just like Śiva, and knew the three Pitakas, like Śiva is Trividya. The fable of Mahādeva's pernicious activity may after all have an historical background *viz.* the fact that Śivaism has been detrimental to the spread of Buddhism in Kashmir.' We know that a modified Tantric variety of the Mahāyāna Buddhistic doctrine was allied so closely with the orthodox Hindu cult of Śiva as to be distinguishable from it with difficulty. Thus Aśvaghoṣa in his youth was a follower of this sect of Mahādeva. Later, he was defeated in controversies with Ācārya Āryadeva, a contemporary of Candragupta (II) and became the follower of the True (Buddhist) Faith. In his old age Aśvaghoṣa was contemporary of Candragupta II (Vikramāditya (Sam. 60-93). The last date of Huviṣka was Sam. 60 and the earliest date of Vāsudeva was Sam. 78. It seems king Kanika (or Kaniṣka II) the grandson of Kaniṣka I, reigned during the interval from Sam. 61 to 77, as such he was clearly a contemporary of Candragupta II (Sam. 60–93). Kaniṣka I, and Aśvaghoṣa in his early life were, therefore, contemporaneous with Candragupta I (Vikramāditya). The contemporaneity of Nāgārjuna with (Candragupta I, and II) Vikramāditya and also with Huviṣka (Sam. 31–60) as stated in the tradition comes out to be perfectly true. Kanika or Kaniṣka II seems, therefore, to me to have preceded Vāsudeva and not succeeded him immediately as suggested by the late R. D. Banerjee (Notes on Indo-SEythian coinage, J. and Proc. A. S. B. 1938, p. 81).

As the early great Kuśānas are, thus seen, to be contemporaneous with the early Imperial Gupta Vikramādityas, Kaniṣka and Candragupta I flourished about 58 B. C. the epoch of the (Gupta) Vikramāditya era.

THE JYOTIRVIDĀBHARAṆA AND THE NINE JEWELS

(K. Madhava Krishna Sarma)

The evidence of the Jyotirvidābharaṇa on the contemporaneity of the Nine Jewels including Kālidāsa and adorning the court of Vikrama, which was rejected by S. B Dikshit and others (Vide Bhāratīya-jyotiṣaśāstra, 2nd ed., pp. 212–13), is again brought in by Mr. S. K. Dikshit (Indian Culture, Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 191 et seq.) who argues in favour of the Vikrama Saṃvat beginning in A. D. 405 and being a commemoration of Candragupta II alias Sāhasāṅka. Kali 3045, the accepted beginning of the Vikrama era, which has hitherto been regarded by all as corresponding to B. C. 57, corresponds, according to this view, to A. D. 405; and the date of the Jyotirvidābharaṇa which at the end bears in Kali years the chronogram

वर्षैः सिन्धुरदर्शनाम्बरगुणै(३०६८)र्याते कलौ संमिते

is A. D. 428–29. The following verse from a work called Kutūhalamañjarī is quoted to corroborate the contemporaneity of Varāha, one of the Jewels, with the other eight.

स्वस्ति श्रीनृपसूर्यसूनुजशके याते द्विवेदाम्बर
त्रैमानाब्दमिते त्वनेहसि जये वर्षे वसन्तादिके।
चैत्रे श्वेतदले शुभे वसुतिथावादित्यदासादभू-
द्वेदाङ्गे निपुणो वराहमिहिरो विप्रो रवेराशिभिः॥

'Veda' is taken to denote three, and not four, and Kali 3032 is given as equivalent to द्विवेदाम्बरत्रै—date of Varāha's birth; for, says the writer, "in ancient times the Vedas were generally known to be three in number". The expression 'saptāśvivedasaṃkhyam śakakālam' in Varāha's Pañcasiddhāntikā is again interpreted to mean Śaka 327 i.e. A. D. 405, and not, as S. B. Dikshit and others would interpret it, to mean Śaka 427.

Let me point out here in brief that the interpretation of 'veda' to mean three and the assumption of Kali 3045 as corresponding to A.D. 405 are against all astronomical tradition and usage. In the whole of the extant Sanskṛit astrono-

mical literature there is not known a single instance where 'veda' or any one of its synonyms is used to mean three. Varāha, a great prophet that he was (cf. ग्रन्थस्य या प्रचरतोऽस्य विनाशमेति लेख्याद्बहुश्रुतमुखाधिगमक्रमेण। यद्वा मया कुकृतमल्पमिहाकृतं वा कार्यं तदत्र विदुषा परिहृत्य रागम्॥ Bṛhajjātaka 28. 8), saves himself from misinterpretation by using 'veda' in an instance where its numerical value is beyond doubt :

नवदिग्वसवस्त्रिकाग्निवेदगुणिता द्वित्रिविकल्पजाः स्युः।
यवनैस्त्रिगुणा हि षट्शती सा कथिता विस्तरतोऽत्र तत्समासः॥

(Bṛhajjātaka 12.1)

Here he says that the Nābhasa Yogas of which the Yavanas have given 1800 kinds can be summarized into 'veda multiplied by vasu'—a number explained by him further on as 20 Ākṛti Yogas + 7 Saṃkhyā Yogas + 3 Āśraya Yogas + 2 Dala Yogas = 32. 'Vasu' stands for eight; no doubt can therefore be entertained as to the value of 'Veda' being four. Nor is it reasonable to say that this is used sometimes to denote three and sometimes four. No astronomer can afford to be so inconsistent when dealing with figures. For other instances of Varāha's use of the word to express the number four, see Utpala on the Bṛhatsaṃhitā, Benares ed., Saṃvat 1952, pp. 49–50.

On Bṛhajjātaka 7.9 Utpala quotes from Jīvaśarman :

सप्तदशैको द्वियमौ वसवो वेदाग्नयो ग्रहेन्द्राणाम्।
वर्षाण्युच्चस्थानां नीचस्थानामतोऽर्धं स्यात्॥

Here also 'Veda' stands for four. It again occurs in the same commentator's quotations from Puliśa where also its value is admittedly four :

कृततुंशून्यवेदाश्विपक्षर्तुखनिशाकराः। (Bṛhatsaṃhitā, p. 53.)
वसुवसुशून्याब्धिद्विकवेदैरपि भार्गवोच्चस्य। (Ibid., p. 55.)

And from this we learn that the word is used in this sense even by astronomers earlier than Varāha. Instances in post-Varāha literature are numerous. Here are a few :

खचतुष्टयरदवेदा रविवर्षाणां चतुर्युगं भवति।

(Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta, Pandit ed., p. 3.)

नवभिर्भागैः सागरखशून्यवेदैश्च चन्द्रोच्चम्। (Ibid., p. 15.)

शनेर्भुजङ्गषट्पञ्चरसवेदनिशाकराः । .(Sūryasiddhānta 1.32.)

कौजस्य वेदखयमा बौधस्याष्टर्तुवह्नयः । (Ibid., 1.41.)

सहस्त्रनिघ्नी रविवदसंख्या (Sibdhāntaśekhara 1.16.)

नागेषुनागशरदिग्वसुदन्तिवदाः । (Ibid., 1.30.)

वेदवेदाङ्कचन्द्रा विलिप्ताः क्रमात् ।

(Siddhāntaśiromaṇi, Pandit ed., p. 171

स यस्तदा स्यात्क्षितिवेदरूपैरब्दैः । (Jyotirvidābharaṇa, 4.51.)

शाको वेदर्तुनन्दोनः । (Rājamṛgāṅka 1.3. Adyar Library ed.)

The view that A.D. 405 is the beginning of the era named Vikrama Saṃvat is also against all astronomical tradition which is unanimous in accepting an interval of 135 years between this and the Śālivāhana Śaka'

नन्दाग्न्यष्टिगुणै(३१७९)र्युक्तः शालिवाहनकः शकः ।

कलेर्गतेन हीनोऽसौ तेनाङ्केन शको भवेत् ॥

तथा च विक्रमः शाको वेदवेदाभ्रपावकैः (३०४४) ।

बाणराममही (१३५) तुल्यमन्तरं शक्योर्मतम् ॥

(Quoted from the Jyotiṣprakāśa in the Jyotirnibandha, Ānandāśrama ed., p. 25.)

कलौ भविष्यन्त्यथ भारतावनौ महीभुजो बाहुभुवोऽप्यनेकशः ।

शकास्तथैषामभिषेचनादिकं हितं सदोदीरितकालसाधितम् ॥

धराधिभूर्भिल्लशकादिजातिजस्तदासनस्थोऽभिजनैर्नमस्कृतः ।

स्तुतः स राजाधिजनैः प्रतिष्ठितो न मन्त्रभेदाद्यभिषेचनोचितः ॥

निहन्ति यो भूतलमण्डले शकान्स पञ्चकोट्यब्ददलप्रमान्कलौ ।

स राजपुत्रः शककारको भवेन्नृपाधिराजो ननु शाककर्तृहा ॥

युधिष्ठिरो विक्रमशालिवाहनौ नराधिनाथो विजयाभिनन्दनः ।

इमे नु नागार्जुनमेदिनीविभुर्वलीः क्रमात्षट्शककारकाः कलौ ॥

युधिष्ठिराद्वेदयुगाम्बराग्नयः (३०४४) कलंवविश्वे (१३५) ऽभ्रखाष्ट भूमयः (१८००) ।

ततो युतं लक्षचतुष्टयं क्रमाद्धराद्रिगष्टा(८२१)विति शाकवत्सराः ॥

(Jyotirvidābharaṇa 10–107 et. seq.)

It may be noted that the Jyotirvidābharaṇa supports this tradition and that this work which according to Mr. S. K. Dikshit was composed under the patronage of Candragupta II alias Sāhasāṅka, does not speak of an era commemorating that king!

Is it not ununderstandable that an author should ignore his own patron, while he speaks of such mythical kings as Vijayābhinandana and Nāgārjuna? If this were really a work written under the patronage of Candragupta II, this would have been a proper place for the author to refer to the era of his patron.

Nor is there among astronomers any difference of opinion regarding the beginning of the Śālivāhana era in A. D. 78. Compare

त्रीणि कृतादीनि कले
गोगैकगुणाः (३१७९) शकान्तेऽब्दाः ।

(Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta, p. 8.

याताः कलेर्नवनगेन्दुगुणाः (३१७९) शकान्ते ।

(Siddhāntaśekhara, 1. 25.)

नन्दाद्रीन्दुगुणास्तथा शकनृपस्यान्ते कलेर्वत्सराः ।

(Siddhāntaśiromaṇi, p. 89.).

The number of the Kali years expired at the beginning of the Śālivāhana Śaka is given here as 3179 according to Aryabhaṭṭa. If Kali is identical with the Yudhiṣṭhira era, Varāha must be known to hold a different view ; according to him the Śālivāhana Śaka began after the expiry of 2526 years of the Yudhiṣṭhira era. Compare

आसन्मघासु मुनयः शासति पृथ्वीं युधिष्ठिरे नृपतौ ।
षड्द्विकपञ्चद्वियुतः शककालस्तस्य राज्ञश्च ॥ (Bṛhatsaṃhitā, 13.3.)

No difference of view is however known between the two regarding the beginning of the Śālivāhana Śaka.

From what has been said above it is clear that whatever might have been the origin of the Vikrama Saṃvat, astronomers always understand by that name an era which began 135 years before the beginning of the Śālivāhana Śaka i.e. in 57 B. C.

The unreliability of the evidence of the Jyotirvidābharaṇa on the contemporaneity of the Nine Jewels is made obvious by the work itself which includes Satya and Maṇittha also among its contemporaries.

सत्यो वराहमिहिरः श्रुतसेननामा श्रीबादरायणमणित्थकुमारसिंहाः ।
श्रीविक्रमार्कनृपसंसदि सन्ति चैते श्रीकालतन्त्रकवयस्त्वपरे मदाद्याः ॥

These two are astronomers whom Varāha quotes as earlier authorities on the subject of Āyurdāya (Vide chapter 7 of the Bṛhajjātaka with Utpala; Introduction to V. Subrahmanya Sastri's Notes on Śrīpati Paddhati, Bangalore, 1919). The author's reference to Satya, says the celebrated commentator, is to show that he is following an old authoritative tradition :

इह सत्यमतोपन्यास आगमानुस्मृतिप्रदर्शनार्थः (7.3).

This would be meaningless if Satya were a contemporary of Varāha. The author of the Jyotirvidābharaṇa himself candidly admits that he is only a Kālatantra Kavi i.e. an astronomer which the great poet cannot be. The work speaks of the synchronization of the Krāntisāmya of Ravi and Candra with Ghaṭikās 21-60 of the Aindra Yoga, which S. B. Dikshit has calculated to have occurred circa 1242 A. D. It also refers to Dhārā, the city of Bhoja (20.14).[1] All this is proof of its late date. One really finds it difficult to think that Kālidāsa who in all humility says in the Raghuvaṃśa

मन्दः कवियशःप्रार्थी गमिष्याम्युपहास्यताम् ।
प्रांशुलभ्ये फले लोभादुद्वाहुरिव वामनः ॥

would call himself a jewel.

The grammatical inaccuracy of 'trai' and 'āśibhiḥ' and the repetition of 'māna' by 'mita' in the verse of the Kutūhalamañjarī show that its author is an incompetent and careless writer who cannot be relied upon. The Saṃvatsara Jaya corresponds neither to Kali 3032, 3042 nor to A.D. 392 ; and really by no method of calculation can the year mentioned in this verse be made to fit in with the date of Varāha, which is known otherwise (See S. B. Dikshit, op. cit., 2nd ed., pp. 210 et seq.) ; A. N. Upadhye, Indian Historical Quarterly, 1933, p. 984 et seq.).

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1. For this reference I am indebted to my Revered Professor Dr. C. Kunhan Raja who recently delivered under the auspices of the Madras University a course of lectures on Kālidāsa.

A NOTE ON A FEW WORKS ENTITLED TARKADĪPIKĀ

(E. P. Radhakrishnan)

In the course of my study of the works of Ānandānubhava, I had occasion to search for his works. Ānandānubhava is famous as the author of the *Nyāyaratnadīpāvali*, *Padārthatattva-nirṇaya*, *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*, etc. Among the works attributed to him, I found a work by name *Tarkadīpikā*.[1] A manuscript of this work is noticed in Bühler's Report on the search for Sanskrit manuscripts in Kāśmir, Rajaputana and Central India, p. xxv. As this is only a nominal reference without any extracts from the manuscript itself, I wanted to pursue the problem further. Thus with a view to identify the *Tarkadīpikā* attributed to Ānandānubhava, I worked on the works bearing the title, *Tarkadīpikā* in general, which made me arrive at the following results. To acquaint the reader with full details about this investigation, I shall note down all relevant details below.

1. *Tarkadīpikā* anonymous. Referred to by Aufrecht in the Catalogus Catalogorum, Vol. I, p. 224 b. Nothing further is known about this.

2. *Tarkadīpikā*, by Tarkarāja (?). Aufrecht gives Oppert's reference. Who this Tarkarāja is, is doubtful.

3. *Tarkadīpikā* by Ānandānubhava. Aufrecht gives only the reference from Bühler's Kasmir Report, p. xxv. Dr. S. R. Bhandarkar in his Second Report on search for manuscripts in Central India and Rajaputāna, p. 46 notices another manuscript of this work with a commentary thereon by Advayāraṇya muni, who was a pupil of one Advayāśrama pūjyapāda. In his Deccan College Catalogue also, p. 94, he mentions a manuscript of this *Tarkadīpikā*. This also contains the commentary by Advayāraṇya.

4. *Tarkadīpikā* by Viśvanāthāśrama. Two references are given by Aufrecht to this work. They are Mitra Notices, No. 3111 and R. G. Bhandarkar's Report 1882–83, No. 281. Another manuscript is found in the Madras Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library, R. No. 3092a.

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1. Cat. Catalogorum. I, p. 224 b.

There seems to be some confusion regarding the works of Ānandānubhava and Viśvanāthāśrama, which I shall deal with now. The Deccan College MS. of the *Tarkadīpikā* contains a commentary by Advayāraṇya. The commentator begins his work with the verse :

अभिवन्द्य महादेवं गरिष्ठं तर्कदीपिका ।
आनन्दानुभवाचार्यप्रणीता प्रविभज्यते ॥

This clearly tells us that Ānandānubhava is the author of the *Tarkadīpikā* on which Advayāraṇya comments. Continuing, we find that the pratīkas in the commentary of Advayāraṇya correspond with the text of the *Tarkadīpikā* noticed as R. 3092a in the Madras Mss. Library. The commentary of Advayāraṇya runs :

तर्कस्य स्वपक्षसाधनपरपक्षदूषणाङ्गत्वात् तत्प्रयोगकल्पे प्राणायामः प्रत्याहारो ध्यानं धारणा तर्कः समाधिः षडङ्गान्युच्यन्त इति विद्याङ्गतया श्रुतेश्च तन्निरूपणं मङ्गलाचरणछलेन प्रस्तावयति यत्पादाम्बुजेति । यत् यस्याः सौन्दर्यं सुरासुरा वितर्कयन्ति तं गिरिजायाः पार्वत्याः प्रियं पतिं वन्दे । कथं गगनाम्बरस्य सर्वदा पार्वतीसहचरस्य भगवतो निःशङ्कतया सौन्दर्यवितर्कः ? इत्यत्र उक्तं पादाम्बुज-भृङ्गालिछलात् इति पादाम्बुजयोः स्वभावतः सौरभ्यलोभा मता भृङ्गालिः श्रेणिः तस्याः छलात् मिषात् । एषा भृङ्गालिः न प्राकृता; किंतु अनेन मिषेण सुरासुरा इत्युत्प्रेक्षते । आह च दण्डी-अन्यथैव श्रिता वृत्तिः । etc.

On a comparison of the above extract with the text of the *Tarkadīpikā*, (Madras Ms.) it can be seen that Advayāraṇya's commentary is obviously on the *Tarkadīpikā*, of which a copy is in the Madras Library. The Madras manuscript begins with three verses of which the third reads :

यत्पादाम्बुजभृङ्गालीछलादिव सुरासुराः ।
वितर्कयन्ति सौन्दर्यं तं नमामि गजाननम् ॥

The correspondence of the text with what is found as explanation of this verse in Advayāraṇya's commentary, clearly leads one to infer that the mūla of the *Tarkadīpikā* in the Madras Library is by Ānandānubhava. Incidentally it may be noted that Advayāraṇya's reading of the last foot of the above verse is

तं वन्दे गिरिजापतिम् in the place of तं नमामि गजाननम् ।

But the above supposition of the author as Ānandānubhava is not without difficulty. The colophon at the end of the Madras Manuscript reads :

इति श्रीमयमहादेवाश्रमशिष्येण विश्वनाथाश्रमेण विरचिता तर्क-दीपिका समाप्ता ।

This speaks of one Viśvanāthāśrama, disciple of Mahādevāśrama, as the author of this *Tarkadīpikā*. But in the beginning of Advayāraṇya's commentary we are told that Ānandānubhava is the author of the *Tarkadīpikā*. Thus the difficulty is quite apparent.

Let us pursue the problem further. From the other works of Ānandānubhava, namely, the *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*,[1] *Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī*[2] and the *Padārthatattvanirṇaya*,[3] all advaitic works, we know that his guru was one Nārāyaṇa Jyotis, as mentioned in the colophons.

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यनारायणज्योतिःपूज्यपादशिष्यस्य भगवत आनन्दानुभवस्य कृतौ etc.

Again both Kielhorn and Prof. Hiralal mention a commentary on Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra* by Ānandānubhava, in their catalogues of mss. in Central Provinces. The frequent references to the views of Bhūṣaṇakāra in the *Padārthatattvanirṇaya* also show that Ānandānubhava had something to do with the *Nyāyasāra*. The commentary of Ānandānubhava on the *Nyāyasāra* is entitled *Nyāyakalānidhi*. Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar, in his Report on the search for Sanskrit manuscripts in the Bombay circle during years 1884–87 notices a work named *Nyāyakalānidhi* (No. 776). This, he says, is a commentary on the *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña by Viśvanāthāśrama, pupil of Mahādevāśrama. No extracts from this manuscript are given. This fact further complicates the relation of Ānandānubhava and Viśvanāthāśrama.

Fortunately, indeed, there exists in the Madras Mss. Library a copy of the *Nyāyakalānidhi* (R. 5747). An examination of this manuscript discloses the details recorded below. The manuscript is very defective being without any demarcation between the text of the *Nyāyasāra* and the commentary, *Nyāya-*

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1. Adyar MS. XXXIX—A—3.
2. R. 2981 of Mad. Library and 34 J 39 of Adyar Library.
3. R. 5505 of Mad. Library.

In the Adyar Library Catalogue this MS. is given under the Vaiśeṣika section, wrongly.

kalānidhi. Both the text and the commentary are jumbled together. In the beginning the commentary is written. Verse 4 of the commentary reads :

महादेवाश्रमं वन्दे गुरुं चिन्तामणिं नवम् ।
अचिन्त्यफलदं[1] नानाविद्याधरशिरोमणिम् ॥

Thus in the opening part, the author, whoever he might be, respects his guru, Mahādevāśrama. At the end of the manuscript the following colophon is found :

इत्यागमपरिच्छेदे न्यायसारटिप्पणे आनन्दानुभवाचार्यकृते न्यायकलानिधौ श्रीमन्महादेवाश्रमशिष्येण योगिना विश्वनाथाश्रमेणायं कृतन्यायकलानिधिः समाप्तः।

This is a double colophon and the latter part of it is quite ungrammatical also. Again on p. 89 of this manuscript of the *Nyāyakalānidhi* is found a colophon, at the end of the Anumānaparicccheda, which reads :

इत्यानन्दानुभवाचार्यकृते न्यायकलानिधौ अनुमानपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः ।

definitely telling us that the commentator is Ānandānubhava. But the beginning part of the commentary as well as the concluding colophon favour the ascription of the commentary to Viśvanāthāśrama.

This difficulty does not seem to admit of easy solution. The possible solutions are :

(1) May be that the *Nyāyakalānidhi* and the *Tarkadīpikā* are the joint works of Viśvanāthāśrama and Ānandānubhava, or

(2) it may be that Ānandānubhava and Viśvanāthāśrama are one and the same person, with two different names.

Let us examine which of these views is tenable. The first solution does not seem to be satisfactory. For both the *Nyāyakalānidhi* and the *Tarkadīpikā* which is a very small tract, are very ordinary in style and nature and they do not deserve any joint authorship. Especially when we know Ānandānubhava as an independent writer of the *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*, *Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī* and *Padārthatattvanirṇaya*.

The second solution also has its own difficulty. How can we explain the difference in their teachers ? This seems only

1. The MS. reads अनित्य, but अचिन्त्य seems to me as the correct reading.

a superficial objection. Nothing prevents one from studying different subjects under different teachers. We have instances of this in the case of the celebrated Ānandagiri, who studied both under Śuddhānanda and Anubhūtisvarūpa. In a similar manner Ānandānubhava in his younger years would have been a student of nyāya under Mahādevāśrama, when probably he might have been known by his name Viśvanātha. Later on, after his sannyāsa, he might have been better known by his sannyāsa name, Ānandānubhava, and also he might have taken lessons is Vedānta from Nārāyaṇa Jyotis. This partly explains why in his Nyāya works Mahādevāśrama is mentioned and in his later advaita works Nārāyaṇa Jyotis is respected.

Such an assumption seems to get some support from a fresh quarter also. Aufrecht ascribes to Ānandānubhava, a work on medicine, named *Rasadīpikā*. (Cat. Catalogorum Vol. I., p. 49b.) How far this ascription of a medical work to an advaitin is correct, is a matter not beyond dispute. A manuscript of the *Rasadīpika* is available in the Trivandrum Curator's Office Library (No. 517 B.). The third introductory verse of this manuscript reads :

महादेवाश्रमं वन्दे गुरुं कल्पतरुं सदा ।
विद्यां कीर्तिं चतुर्वर्गफलाफलविभूषितम् ॥

The latter half is incorrect. The next verse is

आनन्दानुभवेनेयं अल्पायासा महाफला ।
व्याधिवृन्दहरा रम्या रच्यते रसदीपिका ॥

These two verses show that the author of the *Rasadīpikā* was Ānandānubhava and that Ānandānubhava was a disciple of Mahādevāśrama. Thus we have in this manuscript an evidence to show that Ānandānubhava studied under Mahādevāśrama.

Incidentally another fact needs mention in this place. The colophon of this *Rasadīpikā* presents some trouble. The work is said to be written by one Ananta :

इति श्रीमन्महादेवाश्रमशिष्यानन्तेन[1] विरचिता श्रीमद्रसदीपिका समाप्ता ।

1. The editor of the Catalogue of the Trivandrum Curator's Office Mss., Mr. K. Mahādeva Sāstri, makes the situation still worse by reading the colophon wrongly and supposing Ānantadeva as the author.

The Ananta seems to be obviously a mistake for Ānandānubhava.

This conclusion, that Ānandānubhava had the name Viśvanātha in his previous āśrama etc. is also not quite satisfactory. To suppose that Ānandānubhava was known in his pūrvāśrama as *Viśvanātha* is probable, but not as *Viśvanāthāśrama.* For generally in the gṛhasthāśrama, we do not find the names of persons, appended with the word *āśrama.* On this ground the identification of Viśvanāthāśrama with Ānandānubhava is not quite sound. There still lurks some difficulty and it seems impossible to arrive at a correct solution with the data available to us at present.

5. *Tarkadīpikā* by Lakṣmīnṛsimha :

Dr. Burnell notices two manuscripts of this work. The same two are described in Prof. P. P. S. Sastri's descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss. in the Tanjore Sarasvatī Mahal Library, Nos. 6271–6272. Government Oriental Mss. Library, Madras has a copy of this Tarkadīpikā (R. No. 3875a) and the Adyar Library has an incomplete copy (10 J. 2) containing only the dravya parichheda.

This is a hand-book of the principles of nyāya and vaiśeṣika. The author is Lakṣmīnṛsimha Yajvan, Son of Rāmāmbā.

महीधरशिरोत्तंसो रामाम्बागर्भसंभवः ।
यज्वा लक्ष्मीनृसिंहाख्यः तनुते तर्कदीपिकाम् ।

His father was Koṇḍa bhaṭṭa, the famous grammarian. He was the disciple of one Nārāyaṇendra and lived towards the end of the 16th century A.D. The colophon supplies us with these facts :

इति श्रीमत् महीधरकुलजलधिकौस्तुभकोण्डुभट्टमहोपाध्यायतनूभवेन श्रीमन्नारायणेन्द्रगुरुचरणकटाक्षनिक्षेपकोशग्रहायमाणेन लक्ष्मीनृसिंहचरणारविन्दचञ्चरीकेण लक्ष्मीनृसिंहेन विरचितायां तर्कदीपिकायां गुणादिपरिच्छेदः संपूर्णः ।

This Lakṣmīnṛsimha is identical with the author of the *Ābhoga,*[1] a commentary on the *Bhāmatī Kalpataru* of Amalānanda.

6. *Tarkadīpikā* by Koṇḍa bhaṭṭa :

A manuscript of this work is said to have been consulted by Dr. Umesh Misra. In his book, 'Conception of matter according to the Nyāya vaiśeṣika' p. 423 he says that he had access to the

1. Published by the Vani Vilas Press, Srīraṅgam.

Tarkadīpikā by Koṇḍa bhaṭṭa. This, in every probability, seems to be a mistake for the *Tarkadīpikā* of Lakṣmīnṛsimha, son of Kṇoḍa bhaṭṭa, mentioned above. Koṇḍa bhaṭṭa is not known to have written any work entitled *Tarkadīpikā*. Prof. Hall in his Bibliographical Index, p. 79 mentions a vaiśeṣika work by Koṇḍa bhaṭṭa ; but it is named *Tarkapradāha*, written at the instance of a King named Vīrabhadra.

These are all the independent works bearing the name *Tarkadīpikā*. Annam bhaṭṭa's commentary on his *Tarkasaṅgraha* is also sometimes called *Tarkadīpikā* ; but strictly it ought to be designated as *Tarkasaṅgrahadīpikā*.

On the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśavamiśra, a commentary by one Keśava bhaṭṭa bears the name *Tarkadīpikā*. Burnell mentions an incomplete manuscript of this work. The Madras Oriental Library contains two Mss. ; but both are incomplete (R. Nos. 6307–6308). About this Keśava bhaṭṭa much is not known except what he himself gives in an introductory verse :

यच्छिष्यैः जगतां तलं परिवृतं यः तर्कविद्यानिधिः
श्रीलौगाक्षिकुलारविन्दतरणिः माध्यन्दिनी केशवः ।
यं प्रासूत सदाशिवांघ्रिकमलद्वन्द्वैकनिष्टं परं
भट्टानन्तमहं नमामि पितरं साम्बं कृपाम्भोनिमिम् ॥

Keśava was a son of one Bhaṭṭa Ananta of the Laugākṣi family. He was a follower of the Mādhyandina śākhā of the Yajūrveda. He was also a devotee of Lord Śiva.

NAÑJARĀJAYAŚOBHŪṢANA AND ITS AUTHOR

(M. P. L. Sastry, Mysore)

Nañjarājayaśobhūṣana is an Alankāra work published by the Oriental Institute, Baroda as No. XLVIII of the Gaekawad Oriental Series. This work like the Pratāparudrayaṣōbhūṣana deals with the rules of Rhetoric. The work describes the qualities of his patron Nañjarāja who played a prominent part in the history of Mysore during the eighteenth century. The author of the work is Narasimhakavi. In his works, he calls himself 'Abhinava Kalidāsa'.

Both the author and his patron lived during the time of Krishnaraja Wadeyar II. They were troubleous times indeed in Mysore. Conditions in Mysore were none too satisfactory at the period. The atmosphere at the court were full of intrigues. The kings were not powerful. The administration was usually in the hands of one or the other of king's relatives or favourites. At the time we are speaking of, the most powerful man in the country was Kalale Nañjarāja, father-in-law of the ruler, Krishnaraja Wadeyar II. Nañjarāja was an able administrator and a successful warrior. In addition to these, he was a great writer and a patron of poets and scholars.

In the introduction appended to the work Nañjarājayaśobhūṣaua, we find a very unsatisfactory account of the poet Narasimhakavi. He belonged to the Sanagara family of Mulakanadu Brahmins and his father was one Sivarāma. At the end of each Vilasa of the Nañjarājayaśobhūṣana we find the following :

इति श्रीपरमशिवावतार-शिवरामदेशिकचरणारविंदानुसंधानमहिम समासादित निःसहायदैनंदिनप्रबंधनिर्माणसाहसिक निखिलविद्वज्जनलालनीय सरससाहित्यसंप्रदायप्रवर्तक नरसिंहकविर्विरचिते.........

From the talk of the Paripārśvaka and Sūtradhāra, we learn that Narasimhakavi was an honoured poet in the court of Nañjarāja.

Sūtradhāra says.—

तत्कविसमक्षमेव कृतिनायकेन कलुलेकुल चिरंतन सुकृतपरिपाकेन स्वकपोलकल्पित संगीतगंगाधराद्यनेकप्रबंधाभिनयदर्शनजनितकौतुकेन कर्णाटकभाषा-विरचित

हालास्यचरित शिवभक्त विलासादि बहुविधप्रबंधसमुदयेनसकलविद्वज्जन-भागधेयेन नूतन भोजराजेन नंजराजेन सबहुमानमाहूतः, समादिष्टोस्मि सरसकवीनां पुरतो गणनीयस्यास्य सनगरकुलेंदोर्नरसिंहाभिधविदुषः कृतिरिय-मभिनीय दर्शनीयेति ।[1]

In the introduction he mentions that "he learnt the Śāstras under his own father, who was himself very pious and learned. The other Guru or the religious preceptor was a sanyasin by name Yōgānanda." He mentions as his friend a poet by name Tirumalakavi.

This Narasimhakavi seems to have written two other independant works. 1. Chandrakalākalyāṇa, and 2. Śivadayāsahasra.

Chandrakalākalyāṇa is a drama in five acts. It deals with the marriage of Chandrakalā. It is mentioned that this work was written at the command of his patron Nañjarāja.

" सरस कवीनां पुरतो गणनीयस्यास्य सनगरकुलेंदोः ।
नरसिंहाभिधविदुषः कृतिरियमभिनीयदर्शनीयेति ॥ "

The hero of the drama is Nañjaraja himself.

A copy of the work in Telugu characters (Palm leaf D. 12515) is found in the Manuscripts Library, of Madras.[2] The greater part of the drama is incorporated in the Nañjarājayaśōbhūṣana. The battles which Nañjarāja had fought, the forts he had captured, the places he had visited and the temples he had seen have been mentioned in the drama. In short, the drama describes the great qualities and work of Nañjarāja, incidentally throwing some light on the conditions of Mysore at the time.

Another work of the poet is a poem of 1000 verses called *S'ivadayāsahasra.* There are two copies of the work available at present. One is in the Oriental Library, Mysore and the other is with me. My copy is fuller and contains fewer mistakes.

The following are the introductory stanzas of Śivadayā-sahasra :

जयंति जगदानंद मंदारोदयहेतवः ।
शिवरामगुरोरंघ्रिनखेंदुकिरणांकुराः ॥

1. Nañjarājayaśōbhūṣana, P. P. 89.

2. Alphabetical index of Sanskrit manuscripts of the Government Oriental Library, Madras, page 227.

कवितार्किकचक्रवर्तितायाः कलनास्वादत कम्रपट्टबंधौ ।
चरणौ नखकैतवाच्छूयेतौ शिरसाहं शिवरामदेशिकंदोः ॥
वर्तन्ते हि महांत एव कवयो वल्मीकजन्मादय-
स्तेभ्यस्संप्रति चेतनैव रचयाम्येभ्यः प्रणामांजलिं ।
वाग्देवी पुरुषावतारयशसश्रीकालिदासस्य चेद्
वीटोचेट इति प्रतिक्षणमसौ वीधीष्वहं घोषये ॥
कमनीयवचोभिरर्थजातैः कवितासिद्धिमिमामवाप्तुकामः ।
करुणारसपौरुषं पुरारेः कविसंसत्कुल देशिकंतमीडे ॥
हेमप्रसूत कलिका इव यस्य वाचाः
व्योमस्थलीभुवि ववर्ष सुवर्णधाराः ।
सोमप्रभाकवयितारमहंतमीडे
कामच्छिदो भगवतः करुणावतारं ॥
खद्योतभावंगमयन्विपक्षान् प्रद्योतनश्रीपेरुमालुनामा ।
पद्यामनूनां प्रणयेन वाचां विद्यागुरुर्नौ विवरीवरीतु ॥
गुरुचरणकमलसेवां कृत्वा प्रह्वेन चेतसा सततम् ।
सार्थकितस्स्वात्मानं सुब्रह्मण्यं तमग्रजं वन्दे ॥
वाग्गुंभाशशिभिंढ शेखर जटावाटी नटज्जह्नुजा
वेगस्तंभनसंभ्रमव्यतिकरक्रीडारजः केलयः ।
द्राङ्निर्यांतु वियन्नदीधरदयाश्लाघाममोघामिमां
कर्तुं तच्छिवरामदिव्यकृपया वक्त्रादवक्रा मम ॥

At the end of each Śataka we get the following :

इति श्रीमत्सनगरकुलजलधि कौस्तुभ षड्दर्शिनीपारीण शिवरामसूरि तनूजेन नवकालिदासेन नृसिंहकविना विरचिते शिवदयासहस्रे.........

From the above it is evident that the author of the Nañjarājayaśōbhūṣana is also the author of Śivadayāsahasra. We get the following additional information about the author from Śivadayāsahasra.

1. He was the second son of Śivarama. His elder brother was Subrahmaṇya.
2. He had three tutors :
   (i) Śivarāma, his own father
   (ii) Yōgānanda, a Sanyāsin.
   (iii) Perumāl, a great scholar of the times in Mysore.

Śivadayāsahasra is composed in various metres. The style is charming. The work is divided into ten books each containing 100 verses. All the thousand stanzas describe the compassion of Lord Śiva, the favourite deity of Narasiṁhakavi and his patron. The foilowing are selected at random to give an idea to the reader of the smoothness with which the verses run.

तापत्रयं तनुभृतां तरसा निहन्तुं
शीतत्व-मांद्य-सुरभित्वगुणैर्गरीयान् ।
दोधूयते धुरि मरुच्छसितच्छलात्किं
वृष्ट्यै तवांब करुणे वृषकेतनस्य ॥ III. 39.

तप्त्वा तपः कृशतनोश्चतुरोपि मासान्
रागाच्छिवांक निहितस्य रघूद्वहस्य ॥
स्वैरं दये विगलितानयनांजलाभ्यां
धारास्तवैव शिशिराश्शिशिरोपचाराः ॥ III. 40.

उग्र इति भीम इति पुनराख्याभिस्त्रिपुरजिद्भुवि भवत्या ।
करुणेंतः खलु मधुरः कंटक फलवत्कठोर एव बहिः ॥ VII. 25.

पूर्णे वृष्टिभिरंतराय विरमे पूर्वं तटाकादिके
पुष्टांकैरपि तत्र तत्र फलदा भूमिर्भवित्री चिरं ।
निष्प्रत्यूह तथैव नीरज रिपूत्तंसाय कंपे बत
त्वद्वर्षावसरे मनोरथ मयंसस्यं फलत्यर्थिनाम् ॥ VII. 31.

कठिनं चेत्भव हृदयं कर्तुं शक्ता मृदुत्वमेवदये ।
कठिनं यदि तव हृदयं को वाम्रृदुलयति भुवि विनांबत्वाम् ॥ VII. 48.

शिवनाम सुधाशनं त्रिवारं वसनं शंभु दये तवाभिमर्शः
व्यसनं तु विमुक्तिसंगता यत्फलमेतत्तपसां चिरंतनानाम् ॥ VIII. 6.

बिल्वीदलैः प्रतिदिनं विहितार्चनस्य
चापांचले न शिरसि क्षति कारकस्य ।
मागस्त्वमेव फलदा करुणे शिवस्य
कोवापराध शिवपूजनयोः विशेषः ॥ IX. 2.

मनुजस्समवाप्ययेवतर्यां जलधिं तत्सहकारिणां व्यपाये ।
शशिमौलि-कृपे त्वयैव सोहं ससुखं संप्रति सागरं तरेयं ॥ X. 100.

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(R. N. Sardesai)

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results which throw a flood of light on some of the most obscure problems of the ancient History of Hindu India. I consider Mr. Rāya's work to be very valuable not only to the scholars and the research student but to the reading public in general.

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प्रेत्यभावफलदुःखानि च ज्ञेयानि व्यवस्थापयति कर्म च दोषांश्च प्रहेयान्। अपवर्गोऽधिगन्तव्यस्तस्याधिगमोपायस्तत्त्वज्ञानम्।

एवं चतसृभिर्विधाभिः प्रमेयं विभक्तमासेवमानस्याभ्यस्यतो भावयतः सम्यग्दर्शनं यथाभूतावबोधस्तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। एवं च—

दोषनिमित्तानां तत्त्वज्ञानादहङ्कारनिवृत्तिः ॥ १ ॥

शरीरादि दुःखान्तं प्रमेयं दोषनिमित्तं, तद्विषयत्वान्मिथ्याज्ञानस्य। तदिदं तत्त्वज्ञानं तद्विषयमुत्पन्नमहङ्कारं निवर्त्तयति, समानविषये तयोर्विरोधात्। एवं तत्त्वज्ञानाद् 'दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्ग' इति। स चायं शास्त्रार्थसङ्ग्रहोऽनूद्यते नापूर्वो विधीयत इति ॥ १ ॥

प्रसङ्ख्यानानुपूर्वी[1] तु खलु—

दोषनिमित्तं रूपादयो विषयाः सङ्कल्पकृताः ॥ २ ॥

कामविषया इन्द्रियार्था इति रूपादय उच्यन्ते। ते मिथ्या सङ्कल्प्यमाना रागद्वेषमोहान् प्रवर्त्तयन्ति। तान् पूर्वं प्रसञ्चक्षीत। तांश्च प्रसञ्चक्षाणस्य रूपादिविषयो मिथ्यासङ्कल्पो निवर्तते। तन्निवृत्तावध्यात्मं शरीरादि प्रसञ्चक्षीत। तत्प्रसङ्ख्यानादध्यात्मविषयोऽहङ्कारो निवर्त्तते। सोऽयमध्यात्मं बहिश्च विविक्तचित्तो विहरन्मुक्त इत्युच्यते ॥ २ ॥

अतः परं काचित्संज्ञा हेया काचिद्भावयितव्येत्युपदिश्यते, नार्थनिराकरणमर्थोपादानं वा।

कथमिति?—

तन्निमित्तं[2] त्ववयव्यभिमानः ॥ ३ ॥

तेषां[3] दोषाणां निमित्तं त्ववयव्यभिमानः। सा च[4] खलु स्त्रीसंज्ञा

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१ शरीरादिष्वनात्मस्वात्मबुद्धिर्निवर्तनीयेत्युक्तम्—तत्रादौ कस्मिन्नात्मबुद्धिर्निवर्तनीयेत्यपेक्षायां क्रमप्रदर्शनमवतारयति—प्रसङ्ख्यानेति। 'प्रसङ्ख्यानस्य' समाधिजस्य तत्त्वज्ञानस्य 'आनुपूर्वी' क्रमः—अधुना प्रदर्श्यत इति शेषः।

२ उत्तरम्—तन्निमित्तमिति सूत्रम्। 'अवयविनि' तारुण्यादिशरीरे यो-'ऽभिमानः' स एव दोषाणां निमित्तमित्यर्थः।

३ सूत्रार्थमाह—तेषामिति।

४ सूत्रार्थं दृष्टान्तेन स्पष्टयति—सा चेति।

सपरिष्कारा[1], पुरुषस्य पुरुषसंज्ञा[2] च स्त्रियाः सपरिष्कारा—निमित्तसंज्ञा[3] अनुव्यञ्जनसंज्ञा च। निमित्तसंज्ञा—रसनाश्रोत्रम्[4], दन्तौष्ठम्, चक्षुर्नासिकम्। अनुव्यञ्जनसंज्ञा—इत्थं[5] दन्ता इत्थमोष्ठाविति। सेयं[6] संज्ञा कामं वर्धयति तदनुषक्तांश्च दोषान् विवर्जनीयान्, वर्जनं[7] त्वस्याः। भेदेनावयवसंज्ञा—केशलो[8]-ममांसशोणितास्थिस्नायुशिराकफपित्तोच्चारादिसंज्ञा[9]। तामशुभसंज्ञेत्याचक्षते। तामस्य भावयतः कामरागः प्रहीयते।

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१ यथा स्त्रीविषये पुरुषस्य 'इयं स्त्री' इति भावना भवति—सा च भावना तस्य बन्धनकारणं भवतीत्याह—सपरिष्कारेति।

२ यथा स्त्रीविषये पुरुषस्य तथैव पुरुषविषयेऽपि स्त्रिया अपीत्याह—पुरुषसंज्ञेति।

३ न तु केवलमियं स्त्री—अयम्पुरुष इत्येतावन्मात्रमेव बन्धनकारणं भवत्यपि तु तत्तद्विषये स्वरूपान्तरभावनैवेति प्रदर्शयितुं कामुकविषये भावनाविशेषद्वयं सूचयति—निमित्तेति। 'निमित्तसंज्ञाऽनुव्यञ्जनसंज्ञा' (इत्युभयरूपा) स्त्रीसंज्ञा पुरुषस्य सपरिष्कारा' (भवति) 'पुरुषसंज्ञा च स्त्रियाः सपरिष्कारा' (भवति) इत्यन्वयः।

४ कामुकविषयां स्त्रीसंज्ञां विशिनष्टि—निमित्तसंज्ञा रसनेति। 'निमित्तं' दन्तत्वादि तद्विशिष्टाः 'संज्ञाः' विषयाः प्रियायाः कामुको रसनोष्ठनासिकादीनवयवान् केवलान् सम्मुग्ध इव भावयति। सैव भावनाभिप्रेता।

५ अनुव्यञ्जनसंज्ञां विशिनष्टि—अनुव्यञ्जनसंज्ञा इत्थमिति। 'व्यञ्जनानि' अवयविनोऽवयवाः (तैस्सहैव तस्योपलम्भात्) तेषां—'अनुव्यञ्जनम्' तत्सादृश्यम्—तेन तदारोपः—'इत्थं दन्ता इत्थमोष्ठौ' इति रूपकादिद्वारेण कामुकः प्रियाया अङ्गानि भावयति। सैव भावनाऽत्राभिप्रेता।

६ उक्तसंज्ञाद्वयस्य फलमाह—सेयमिति। प्रियाया दन्तोष्ठादीनवयवान् तत्तद्रूपेणैव भावयन्नथ च तानेव दाडिमीबीजबिम्बादिरूपेण भावयन् कामुकस्तस्यामासक्तो भवतीत्यर्थः।

७ स्त्रीविषये आसक्तिजनकं संज्ञाद्वयं प्रदर्श्य तस्यैव स्त्रियाः संज्ञान्तरेण भावनया तस्यां विरक्तिमपि जनयतीति प्रदर्शयितुं तदेव संज्ञान्तरमाह—वर्जनमिति। 'अस्याः' स्त्रियाः 'वर्जनम्'—वर्जयतीति वर्जनम्—परित्यागोपायः तस्या एव 'अवयवसंज्ञा' भवतीत्यर्थः।

८ का चेयमवयवसंज्ञेति विशदयति—केशेति।

९ उच्चार इति—उत्सर्गो मूत्रपुरीषादिः।

सत्येव च द्विविधे[1] विषये काचित्संज्ञा भावनीया काचित्परिवर्जनीयेत्युपदिश्यते । यथा विषसम्पृक्तेऽन्नेऽन्नसंज्ञोपादानाय विषसंज्ञा प्रहाणायेति ॥ ३ ॥

(२) प्रासङ्गिकमवयवावयविप्रकरणम् ।

अथेदानीमर्थं[2] निराकरिष्यताऽवयविनिराकरणमुपपाद्यते—

" विद्याऽविद्याद्वैविध्यात् संशयः " ॥ ४ ॥

" सदसतोरुपलम्भाद्विद्या द्विविधा । सदसतोरनुपलम्भादविद्यापि द्विविधा । उपलभ्यमानेऽवयविनि विद्याद्वैविध्यात्संशयः । अनुपलभ्यमाने चाविद्याद्वैविध्यात्संशयः । सोऽयमवयवी यद्युपलभ्यते, अथापि नोपलभ्यते, न कथञ्चन संशयान्मुच्यत इति " ॥ ४ ॥

तदसंशयः[3] पूर्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

तस्मिन्ननुपपन्नः संशयः । कस्मात्? पूर्वोक्तहेतूनामप्रतिषेधादस्ति द्रव्यान्तरारम्भ इति ॥ ५ ॥

" वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि[4] तर्हि न संशयः " ॥ ६ ॥

" वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि तर्हि संशयानुपपत्तिः । नास्त्यवयवीति " ॥ ६ ॥

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१ परिशुद्धिकृतस्त्वाहुः—वस्तुतस्तु मुमुक्षोः सर्वं हेयमेव (नोपादेयं किञ्चिदपि) —हेये चोपादेयबुद्धिर्विपर्यय एव—तथाऽपि द्विविध एवासाविति बुभुक्षुमुमुक्षुपुरुषभेदाभिप्रायेणोक्तमिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

२ तदेवं स्वमतेन प्रसंख्यानोपदेशमुपवर्ण्य पराभिमतं प्रसंख्यानं निराकर्तुमुपन्यस्यति—अथेदानीमिति । 'अर्थम् निराकरिष्यता' विज्ञानवादिना 'अवयविनिराकरणं उपपाद्यते' । निमित्तानुव्यञ्जनसंज्ञयोरवयव्येव विषयः—ते एते संज्ञे वर्जितुमशुभसंज्ञोपादेयेत्युपदेश इति व्यवस्थापितम्—तत्रार्थमात्रस्याभावात् कुतो निमित्तानुव्यञ्जनसंज्ञे—इति तन्निराकरणाय प्रथममवयवी निराक्रियते, पश्चात्परमाणुस्ततश्च ज्ञानमात्रमर्थरहितं सिद्धं भवतीत्यभिप्रायो विज्ञानवादिनः ।

३ तत्र सिद्धान्ती वक्ष्यमाणमवयविनिराकरणहेतुम्पश्चान्निराकरिष्यामीत्यादौ प्रौढिवादेन तावत्संशयमेव निराकरोति—तदसंशय इति सूत्रम् । 'तस्मिन्' अवयविनि 'असंशयः' नास्त्येव संशयः—कस्मात् 'पूर्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वात्' पूर्वोक्तैर्हेतुभिरवयविनः साधितत्वादित्यर्थः ।

४ पूर्वपक्षी स्वपक्षमिदानीं प्रतिबन्दिरूपेणाह—वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरिति । अवयविनि नास्त्येव संशयः इत्यत्रास्माकमप्यनुमतिः—अवयविनः 'वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः' यस्मात्तत्सत्त्वं नैवोपपद्यते तस्मात् तत्र 'न संशयः' इत्यर्थः ।

तद्विभजते—

"कृत्स्नैकदेशावृत्तित्वादवयवानामवयव्यभावः" ॥ ७ ॥

"एकैकोऽवयवो न तावत् कृत्स्नेऽवयविनि वर्त्तते। तयोः परिमाणभेदादवयवान्तरसम्बन्धाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च। नाप्यवयव्येकदेशेन, न ह्यस्यान्येऽवयवा एकदेशभूताः सन्तीति" ॥ ७ ॥

अथावयवेष्वेवावयवी वर्त्तते—

"तेषु चावृत्तेरवयव्यभावः" ॥ ८ ॥

"न तावत्प्रत्यवयवं वर्त्तते, तयोः परिमाणभेदात्, द्रव्यस्य चैकद्रव्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्। नाप्येकदेशेन, सर्वेष्वन्यावयवाभावात्। तदेवं न युक्तः संशयः नास्त्यवयवीति" ॥ ८ ॥

"पृथक्[1] चावयवेभ्योऽवृत्तेः" ॥ ९ ॥

"अवयव्यभाव इति वर्तते। न चायं पृथगवयवेभ्यो वर्तते, अग्रहणात् नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च। तस्मान्नास्त्यवयवीति" ॥ ९ ॥

"न[2] चावयव्यवयवाः" ॥ १० ॥

"न चावयवानां धर्मोऽवयवी, कस्मात्? धर्ममात्रस्य धर्मिभिरवयवैः पूर्ववत् सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः। पृथक् चावयवेभ्यो धर्मिभ्यो धर्मस्याग्रहणादिति समानम्" ॥ १० ॥

एकस्मिन्[3] भेदाभावाद्भेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्तेरप्रश्नः ॥ ११ ॥

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१ सूत्रस्यास्यार्थत्रयमुक्तं वृत्तिकृता। तद्यथा-(१) नन्वास्तामवृत्तिरेवावयवीति शङ्कायां पूर्वपक्षिसूत्रमिदम्-अवयवेभ्यः पृथगवयवी नास्त्येवेति शेषः। अवयव्यभाव इत्यष्टमसूत्रादनुवर्त्तते। अवयवेषु वृत्त्यभावेऽवयविनो नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। नास्ति तु नित्यः। अतो नास्त्यवयवीति। (२) कृत्स्नैकदेशाभ्यामवयवी न वर्त्तते किन्तु स्वरूपेणैवेति शङ्कायां पूर्वपक्षिसूत्रमेतत्। अवयवेभ्यः पृथक् अवयवी नास्ति, कुतः? अवृत्तेः, अवृत्तित्वप्रसङ्गात्। तथा सति नित्यं स्यादित्यर्थः। (३) कश्चित्तु अवयवातिरिक्तोऽवयवी वर्त्ततामित्यत्र पूर्वपक्षिणः सूत्रमिदम्। पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्याऽवयवेभ्यः पृथगप्यवृत्तेरित्यर्थः।

२ यस्तु मन्यते-'अवयवानां धर्ममात्रमवयवी' न त्ववयवेभ्योऽत्यन्तं भिन्नोऽभिन्नो वा इति—तम्प्रत्याह पूर्वपक्षी-न चेति सूत्रम्।

३ अत्र पूर्वपक्षस्य द्वौ भागौ-अवयवानामवयविनि वृत्त्यभाव इति प्रथमः। स

किं प्रत्यवयवं कृत्स्नोऽवयवी वर्त्तेत अथैकदेशेनेति, नोपपद्यते प्रश्नः, कस्मात्? 'एकस्मिन् भेदाभावाद् भेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्तेः'। कृत्स्नमित्यनेकस्याशेषाभिधानम्, एकदेश इति नानात्वे कस्यचिदभिधानम्। ताविमौ कृत्स्नैकदेशशब्दौ भेदविषयौ नैकस्मिन्नवयविन्युपपद्येते भेदाभावादिति ॥ ११ ॥

[1]अन्यावयवाभावान्नैकदेशेन वर्त्तेत इत्यहेतुः—

अवयवान्तरभावेऽप्यवृत्तेरहेतुः ॥ १२ ॥

अवयवान्तराभावादिति—यद्यप्येकदेशोऽवयवान्तरभूतः स्यात्तथाप्यवयवेऽवयवान्तरं वर्त्तेत नावयवीति। अन्योऽवयवीति अन्यावयवभावेऽप्यवृत्तेः, अवयविनो नैकदेशेन वृत्तिरन्यावयवाभावादित्यहेतुः।

"[2]वृत्तिः कथमिति" चेत्? एकस्यानेकत्राश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धलक्षणा प्राप्तिः। "आश्रयाश्रितभावः कथमिति" चेत्? यस्य यतोऽन्यत्रात्मलाभानुपपत्तिः स आश्रयः। न कारणद्रव्येभ्योऽन्यत्र कार्यद्रव्यमात्मानं लभते। विपर्ययस्तु कारणद्रव्येष्विति।

"नित्येषु कथमिति" चेत्? अनित्येषु दर्शनात्सिद्धम्। "नित्येषु द्रव्येषु कथमाश्रयाश्रितभाव इति" चेत्? अनित्येषु द्रव्यगुणेषु दर्शनादाश्रयाश्रितभावस्य नित्येषु सिद्धिरिति[3]।

चानभ्युपगमादेव निरस्तः। न कोऽपि नैयायिकः कारणस्यावयवस्य कार्येऽवयविनि समवायमभ्युपगच्छति। अवयविनोऽवयवेषु वृत्त्यभाव इत्यपरः। तमेवं द्वितीयं पूर्वपक्षभागमुपलक्ष्य सिद्धान्तवादी तन्निरस्यति—एकस्मिन्निति सूत्रम्। 'एकस्मिन्' अवयविनि 'भेदाभावात्' भेदघटितशब्दप्रयोगस्य अयुक्तत्वात् 'अप्रश्नः' पूर्वपक्षिणोपन्यस्तस्य प्रश्नस्य नावकाश इत्यर्थः।

१ अष्टमसूत्रभाष्ये यदुक्तम्—नाप्येकदेशे वर्ततेऽवयवी सर्वेष्वन्यावयवाभावादिति—तन्निरस्यति—अन्यावयवेति। एकदेशेन चावयवी न स्वावयवेषु वर्तते इत्यत्र प्रतिज्ञार्थे 'अवयवान्तराभावात्' इति अहेतुरित्यर्थः।

२ पृच्छति--वृत्तिरिति। यदि न कार्त्स्न्येन न वैकदेशेनावयविनोऽवयवेषु वृत्तिस्तर्हि किम्प्रकारिका तस्य तेषु वृत्तिरिति प्रश्नार्थः।

३ यत्र यल्लभ्यते तत्रैव तस्य वृत्तिस्तदेव तस्याश्रय इत्यनित्येषु द्रव्येषु गुणेषु च दृष्ट्वा नित्येष्वप्येवमेव भवतीत्यनुमीयत इत्याशयः।

तस्मादवयव्यभिमानः प्रतिषिध्यते निःश्रेयसकामस्य, नावयवी । यथा रूपादिषु मिथ्यासङ्कल्पो न रूपादय इति ॥ १२ ॥

'सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धे'रिति[२] प्रत्यवस्थितोऽप्येतदाह—

"केशसमूहे[३] तैमिरिकोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः" ॥ १३ ॥

"यथैकैकः केशस्तैमिरिकेण नोपलभ्यते, केशसमूहस्तूपलभ्यते तथैकैकोऽणुर्नोपलभ्यते । अणुसमूहस्तूपलभ्यते । तदिदमणुसमूहविषयं ग्रहणमिति" ॥ १३ ॥

स्वविषयानतिक्रमेणेन्द्रियस्य पटुमन्दभावाद्विषयग्रहणस्य तथाभावो नाविषये प्रवृत्तिः ॥ १४ ॥

यथाविषयमिन्द्रियाणां पटुमन्दभावाद्विषयग्रहणानां पटुमन्दभावो भवति । चक्षुः खलु प्रकृष्यमाणं नाविषयं गन्धं गृह्णाति, निकृष्यमाणं च न स्वविषयात् प्रच्यवते । सोऽयं तैमिरिकः कश्चिच्चक्षुर्विषयं केशं न गृह्णाति, गृह्णाति च केशसमूहम् । उभयं ह्यतैमिरिकेण चक्षुषा गृह्यते । परमाणवस्त्वतीन्द्रिया इन्द्रियाविषयभूता न केनचिदिन्द्रियेण गृह्यन्ते, समुदितास्तु गृह्यन्ते, इत्यविषये प्रवृत्तिरिन्द्रियस्य प्रसज्येत । न जात्वर्थान्तरमणुभ्यो गृह्यत इति । ते खल्विमे परमाणवः सन्निहिता गृह्यमाणा अतीन्द्रियत्वं जहति । वियुक्ताश्चागृह्यमाणा इन्द्रियविषयत्वं न लभन्त इति । सोऽयं द्रव्यान्तरानुत्पत्तावतिमहान् व्याघात इत्युपपद्यते द्रव्यान्तरं यद्ग्रहणस्य विषय इति ।

"सञ्चयमात्रं विषय इति चेत्?" । न । सञ्चयस्य संयोगभावात्तस्य चातीन्द्रियाश्रयस्याग्रहणादयुक्तम् । सञ्चयः खल्वनेकस्य संयोगः । स च गृह्य-

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१ प्रकरणार्थमुपसंहरति–तस्मादिति । यस्मादवयवी सर्वथा अस्त्येवेति सिद्धमतो यत्तृतीयसूत्रे प्रतिषिध्यते स 'अवयविष्वभिमानो' मिथ्याज्ञानमेव, न त्ववयव्येवेति ।

२ अवयविनिराकरणवादिनो हेत्वन्तरमवतारयति–सर्वाग्रहणेति । 'सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धे'रित्यस्मिन् सूत्रे द्वितीयाध्याये यद्यप्यवयविनिराकरणवादी प्रत्यवस्थितः परास्तस्तथाऽप्यत्रापि प्रकरणे पञ्चमसूत्रगतपूर्वहेतुपदेन द्वितीयाध्यायार्थं स्मारितः परः पुनस्तमेवार्थमाक्षिपतीत्यर्थः ।

३ अवयव्यसिद्धौ सर्वाग्रहणप्रसङ्गो यो द्वितीयाध्याये उद्भावितः सिद्धान्तिना तस्य प्रसङ्गस्य वारणमाह–केशसमूह इति सूत्रम् ।

माणाश्रयो गृह्यते, नातीन्द्रियाश्रयः। भवति हीदमनेन संयुक्तमिति। तस्माद्युक्तमेतदिति। गृह्यमाणस्य चेन्द्रियेण विषयस्याऽऽवरणाद्यनुपलब्धिकारणमुपलभ्यते। तस्मान्नेन्द्रियदौर्बल्यादनुपलब्धिरणूनाम्। यथा नेन्द्रियदौर्बल्याच्चक्षुषाऽनुपलब्धिर्गन्धादीनामिति ॥ १४ ॥

अवयवावयविप्रसङ्गश्चैवमा प्रलयात्[1] ॥ १५ ॥

यः खल्ववयविनोऽवयवेषु वृत्तिप्रतिषेधादभावः सोऽयमवयवस्यावयवेषु प्रसज्यमानः सर्वप्रलयाय वा कल्पेत, निरवयवाद्वा परमाणुतो निवर्त्तेत। उभयथा चोपलब्धिविषयस्याभावः। तदभावादुपलब्ध्यभावः। उपलब्ध्याश्रयश्चायं वृत्तिप्रतिषेधः। स आश्रयं व्याघ्नन्नात्मघाताय कल्पत इति ॥ १५ ॥

अथापि[2]—

न प्रलयोऽणुसद्भावात्[3] ॥ १६ ॥

अवयवविभागमाश्रित्य वृत्तिप्रतिषेधादभावः प्रसज्यमानो निरवयवात्परमाणोर्निवर्त्तते, न सर्वप्रलयाय कल्पते। निरवयवत्वं परमाणो-

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१ अवयव्यभावपक्षे दोषान्तरमाह—अवयवावयवीति सूत्रम्। अवयवावयविविषये योऽयं वृत्तिविकल्पः पूर्वपक्षिणोद्भावितस्तेन सर्वाभाव एव स्यात्तथा चाश्रयव्याघातादेव स विकल्पोऽयुक्त इत्यर्थः।

अत्र तात्पर्यकाराः—अत्र त्रयः पक्षाः सम्भवन्ति। योऽयमवयवेष्ववयविवृत्तिविकल्पानुपपत्त्याऽवयविनोऽभावप्रसङ्गः आपाद्यते स आ प्रलयाद्वा निवर्त्तते—परमाणोर्वा—न क्वचिदपि वा निवर्त्तते—इति। तत्र प्रथमद्वितीयविकल्पावाश्रित्येदं सूत्रम्। यथैष वृत्तिविकल्पः स्थूले घटादौ एवं तदवयवेषु तदवयवेष्विति तदभावात्प्रलये व्यवतिष्ठते। न च प्रलयः सर्वोपाख्याविरहितो दर्शनविषयः सम्भवतीति। दर्शनविषयाभावादनाश्रयो विकल्प आत्मानमेव न लभते। उपलक्षणं चेदं—आ प्रलयादिति। आ परमाणोरित्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्। परमाणूनामतीन्द्रियत्वेन दर्शनविषयत्वाभावादनाश्रयता विकल्पस्य तदवस्थैव। तदिदमुक्तम्—निरवयवाद्वा परमाणुतो निवर्त्तेतेति भाष्ये।

वृत्तिकृतस्तु एवमुक्तप्रकारेण वृत्तिविकल्पदोषोऽवयवेऽवयविनि च प्रसक्तः 'आ प्रलयात्'—प्रलयोऽभावस्तत्पर्यन्तं तथा च सर्वाभाव एव स्यात्। न कस्यापि ग्रहणम्। तस्मात् साधूक्तं—सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धेरिति।

२ पूर्वपक्षप्रतिषेधे हेत्वन्तरमवतारयति—अथापीति। अपि चेत्यर्थः।

३ प्रलयमभ्युपेत्येतदुक्तमा प्रलयादिति—वस्तुतस्तु 'प्रलयः'-सर्वाभावो—नास्त्येव अणोः सर्वदा सत्त्वादित्याह—न प्रलय इति सूत्रम्।

विभागैरल्पतरप्रसङ्गस्य यतो नाल्पीयस्तत्रावस्थानात्। लोष्टस्य खलु प्रविभज्यमानावयवस्याल्पतरमल्पतममुत्तरमुत्तरं भवति। स चायमल्पतरप्रसङ्गो यस्मान्नाल्पतरमस्ति यः परमोऽल्पस्तत्र निवर्त्तते। यतश्च नाल्पीयोऽस्ति तं परमाणुं प्रचक्ष्महे इति ॥ १६ ॥

परं[1] वा त्रुटेः ॥ १७ ॥

[2]अवयवविभागस्यानवस्थानाद्द्रव्याणामसङ्ख्येयत्वात् त्रुटित्वनिवृत्तिरिति ॥ १७ ॥

(३) निरवयवत्वप्रकरणम्[3]–औपोद्घातिकम्।

अथे[4]दानीमानुपलम्भिकः सर्वं[5] नास्तीति मन्यमान आह—

"[6]आकाशव्यतिभेदात् तदनुपपत्तिः" ॥ १८ ॥

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१ अथानन्तोऽयं विभागः कस्मान्न भवति कस्माच्च परमाणुपर्यन्त एवायमित्यत आह–परमिति सूत्रम्। त्रुटिस्त्रसरेणुरिति तात्पर्यकृतः। द्व्यणुक एवेत्यन्ये। त्रुटेः परं यदतिसूक्ष्मं स एव परमाणुरित्यर्थः।

२ सूत्रार्थमाह–अवयवविभागस्येति। त्रुटिस्त्रसरेणुरित्यनर्थान्तरमित्यत्र प्रमाणं-जालसूर्यमरीचिस्थं त्रसरेणुरजः स्मृतम्–यदि त्रुटेः परं द्वित्रिपदकेऽवयवविभागो न विरमेत ततोऽवयवविभागस्यानवस्थानात् सर्वद्रव्येष्ववयवानामसङ्ख्येयत्वात् त्रुटेस्त्रुटित्वमेवापेयात्, त्रुटिरपि च सुमेरुणा तुल्यपरिमाणः स्यात्–उभयोरनन्तावयववत्वात्।

३ एवमवयविप्रकरणं समाप्य तदुपोद्घातेन निरवयवमपि वस्त्वस्तीति साधयितुं निरवयवपरीक्षाप्रकरणमारभ्यत इति परिशुद्धिकृतः। अथ विश्वस्य शून्यत्वात् क्व परमाणुसम्भावनेति मतनिराकरणाय निरवयवप्रकरणमिति वृत्तिकृतः।

४ तत्र सर्व शून्यवादिनः पूर्वपक्षमवतारयति–अथेदानीमिति। आनुपलम्भिकोऽत्र पूर्वपक्षमाहेत्यर्थः।

५ कश्चासावानुपलम्भिक इत्यत आह–सर्वं नास्तीति। सर्वशून्यवादीति यावत्। चतुर्थाध्याये तावज्जगतः शून्यतोपादानता निराकृता–अधुना तु सर्वशून्यता निराक्रियत इति विवेकः।

६ तत्र पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम्-आकाशेति। सावयवत्वे च परमाणोः 'वृत्तिविकल्पात्तदभाव' इति पूर्वपक्षसूत्रोक्तदिशा तस्याभाव एवेति शून्यतैव तत्त्वं भावानाम्–अनाश्रितोऽपि विकल्पो लोकप्रतीत्यनुसारेण कल्पनामात्रनिर्मितस्तात्त्विकीं शून्यतां गमयति, मिथ्याज्ञानानामपि तत्त्वावगमहेतुत्वदर्शनात्। यथा रेखागवयो गवयत्वप्रतिपत्तेर्हेतुरित्यादि पूर्वपक्षहृदयम्।

"तस्याणोर्निरवयवस्य नित्यस्यानुपपत्तिः। कस्मात्? आकाशव्यतिभेदात्। अन्तर्बहिश्चाणुराकाशेन समाविष्टो व्यतिभिन्नः। व्यतिभेदात्सावयवः। सावयवत्वादनित्य इति॥ १८॥

"आकाशासर्वगतत्वं वा" ॥ १९॥

"अथैतन्नेष्यते—परमाणोरन्तर्नास्त्याकाशम्—इत्यसर्वगतत्वं प्रसज्यत इति" ॥ १९॥

अन्तर्बहिश्च कार्यद्रव्यस्य कारणान्तरवचनादकार्ये तदभावः ॥ २०॥[1]

'अन्त'रिति—पिहितं कारणान्तरैः कारणमुच्यते। 'बहि'रिति च—व्यवधायकमव्यवहितं कारणमेवोच्यते। तदेतत्कार्यद्रव्यस्य सम्भवति, नाणोरकार्यत्वात्। अकार्ये हि परमाणावन्तर्बहिरित्यस्याभावः। यत्र चास्य भावोऽणुकार्यं तत्, न परमाणुः। यतो हि नाल्पतरमस्ति स परमाणुरिति।।२०॥

शब्दसंयोगविभवाच्च सर्वगतम् ॥ २१॥[2]

यत्र क्वचिदुत्पन्नाः शब्दा विभवन्त्याकाशे तदाश्रया भवन्ति। मनोभिः परमाणुभिस्तत्कार्यैश्च संयोगा विभवन्त्याकाशे। नासंयुक्तमाकाशेन किञ्चिन्मूर्त्तद्रव्यमुपलभ्यते। तस्मान्नासर्वगतमिति ॥ २१॥

अव्यूहाविष्टम्भविभुत्वानि चाकाशधर्माः ॥ २२॥

संसर्पता प्रतिघातिना द्रव्येण न व्यूह्यते—यथा काष्ठेनोदकम्। कस्मात्? निरवयवत्वात्। संसर्पच्च प्रतिघाति द्रव्यं न विष्टभ्नाति—नास्य क्रियाहेतुं गुणं

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१ पूर्वपक्षं दूषयति सिद्धान्ती—अन्तर्बहिरिति सूत्रम्। 'अन्तः'शब्दो 'बहिः' शब्दश्चावयवाभिधायकौ। अतः 'कार्यद्रव्यस्य' अवयविनः 'कारणान्तरम्' कारणविशेषभूतम् अवयवमेवाभिदधाति—ततश्चाकार्ये परमाणौ न तयोः सम्भव इत्यर्थः।

२ शब्दसंयोगेति सूत्रम्। सर्वगतमाकाशम्—कस्मात्—'शब्दसंयोगविभवात्' शब्दश्च संयोगश्च तयोः विभवः विभुत्वं सार्वत्रिकत्वम्—तस्मादित्यर्थः। अथ वा आकाशगुणस्य शब्दस्य ये संयोगास्तेषां विभुत्वादाकाशं सर्वगतमित्यर्थः।

'सर्वसंयोगशब्दविभवाच्च सर्वगत'मिति सूत्रपाठोऽत्र वार्तिककारसम्मतः। तदर्थश्च यस्मात्सर्वमूर्त्तिमद्भिः संयोगा विभवन्त्याकाशे तदाश्रया भवन्ति—शब्दाः स्वकारणसन्निधानादुपजायमानाः सर्वे एवाकाशमाश्रयन्ते तस्मात् सर्वगतमाकाशमिति।

प्रतिबध्नाति। कस्मात्? अस्पर्शत्वात्। विपर्यये हि विष्टम्भो दृष्ट इति–स भवान् सावयवे स्पर्शवति द्रव्ये दृष्टं धर्मं विपरीते नाशङ्कितुमर्हति।

अण्ववयवस्याणुतरत्वप्रसङ्गादणुकार्यप्रतिषेधः। सावयवत्वे चाणोरण्ववयवोऽणुतर इति प्रसज्यते। कस्मात्? कार्यकारणद्रव्ययोः परिमाणभेददर्शनात्। तस्मादण्ववयवस्याणुतरत्वम्। यस्तु सावयवोऽणुकार्यं तदिति। तस्मादणुकार्यमिदं प्रतिषिध्यत इति।

कारणविभागाच्च[1] कार्यस्यानित्यत्वं नाकाशव्यतिभेदात्। लोष्टस्यावयवविभागादनित्यत्वं नाकाशसमावेशादिति ॥ २२ ॥

"मूर्त्तिमतां[2] च संस्थानोपपत्तेरवयवसद्भावः" ॥ २३ ॥

"परिच्छिन्नानां हि स्पर्शवतां संस्थानं त्रिकोणं चतुरस्रं समं परिमण्डलमित्युपपद्यते। यत्तत्संस्थानं सोऽवयवसन्निवेशः। परिमण्डलाश्चाणवस्तस्मात्सावयवा इति" ॥ २३ ॥

"संयोगोपपत्तेश्च[3]" ॥ २४ ॥

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१ आकाशव्यतिभेदादिति परोक्तं हेतुं दूषयति–कारणेति। कार्यस्य विनाशः कारणानां तदवयवानां विभागादेव भवति नाकाशव्यतिभेदात्। तथा च यदि परमाणोर्विनाशोऽनित्यत्वं वा स्यात् तदारम्भकावयवविभागादेव स्यात् नाकाशव्यतिभेदादित्यर्थः।

२ पुनः शून्यतावादी प्रत्यवतिष्ठते–मूर्तिमतामिति सूत्रम्। चशब्दस्त्वर्थः सिद्धान्तं निवर्तयति। परमाणोः 'अवयवसद्भावः'–कस्मात्–'मूर्त्तिमतां' (तेषां) 'संस्थानोपपत्तेः' इति सम्बन्धः। मूर्तिमतामिति पदं षष्ठ्यन्तमपि हेतुपदतया नेतव्यम्। तथा च सावयवाः परमाणवः मूर्त्तिमत्वात् 'संस्थानवत्त्वाच्च' इत्यर्थः पर्यवसितः। वृत्तिकृतस्तु मूर्त्तिमतामित्येतत् संस्थानवत्त्वे हेतुमभिप्रयन्ति–मूर्त्तिमत्त्वादेव संस्थानवत्त्वं परमाणूनामित्यर्थः।

३ परमाणोः सावयवत्वे हेत्वन्तरमाह परः–संयोगेति। सावयवाः परमाणवः–कस्मात्–संयोगोपपत्तेरिति सम्बन्धः।

अत्र वार्त्तिकम्–"नन्विदं सूत्रं संस्थानवत्त्वादित्यनेनैव चरितार्थम्–संयोगविशेषस्य संस्थानवत्त्वेनाभिधानात्"। न चरितार्थम्–अवयवसंयोगविशेषस्य संस्थानवत्त्वेनाभिधानात्–संयोगमात्रं च संयोगशब्देनाभिधीयत इति न दोषः (पौनरुक्त्यम्)। पौनरुक्त्यमेवापाकुर्वन्मूर्त्तिसंस्थानयोर्भेदं स्पष्टीकरोति। तत्र मूर्त्तिर्नामाव्यापिद्रव्यस्य षड्विधं परिमाणम्–अणु महद्दीर्घं ह्रस्वं परमह्रस्वं परमाण्विति। (संस्थानं) नाम प्रचयाख्यः संयोगः। 'संयोगो'ऽप्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्तिरिति

"मध्ये सन्नणुः पूर्वापराभ्यामणुभ्यां संयुक्तस्तयोर्व्यवधानं कुरुते। व्यवधानेनानुमीयते–पूर्वभागेन पूर्वेणाणुना संयुज्यते परभागेन परेणाणुना संयुज्यते। यौ तौ पूर्वापरौ भागौ तावस्यावयवौ। एवं सर्वतः संयुज्यमानस्य सर्वतो भागा अवयवा इति"।

यत्तावत्[1]–मूर्त्तिमतां संस्थानोपपत्तेरवयवसद्भाव–इति, अत्रोक्तम्[2], किमुक्तम्[3]? विभागे[4]ऽल्पतरप्रसङ्गस्य यतो नाल्पीयस्तत्र निवृत्तेः, अण्ववयवस्य चाणुतरत्वप्रसङ्गादणुकार्यप्रतिषेध इति।

यत्पुनरेतत्[5]–"संयोगोपपत्तेश्चेति" स्पर्शवत्त्वाद्[6]व्यवधानम्, आश्रयस्य चाव्याप्त्या भागभक्तिः, उक्तं[7] चात्र। स्पर्शवानणुः[8]–स्पर्शवतोरण्वोः प्रतिघाताद्व्यवधायको न सावयवत्वात्।

"स्पर्शवत्त्वाच्च[9] व्यवधाने सत्यणुसंयोगो नाश्रयं व्याप्नोतीति

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१ तदेवं सर्वशून्यतामतं प्रासङ्गिकमुपपाद्य तदपाकर्तुं उत्सूत्रमेवोपक्रमते भाष्यकारः–यत्तावदिति। त्रयोविंशसूत्रोक्तस्य परमाणुसावयवत्वसाधकहेतोरनुवादः।

२ तदपाकरिष्यन् पूर्वोक्तमेव स्मारयति- अत्रोक्तमिति।

३ विस्मरणशीलः परः पृच्छति–किमुक्तमिति।

४ यदुक्तं तत् स्मारयति–विभाग इति। अण्ववयवस्येति च। पूर्वं तावत् षोडशसूत्रभाष्यस्थमपरं च द्वाविंशसूत्रभाष्यस्थमिति।

अत्र वार्त्तिककारोऽपरमपि दूषणमाह। तद्यथा–'सावयवः परमाणुरिति प्रतिज्ञापदे व्याहते। सावयवत्वं नाम–समानजातीयारब्धं समानजातीयाश्रितमिति। अवयवश्च तस्याधार इति। एवं सावयवः परमाणुरिति ब्रुवता कार्यविशेषः परमाणुश्चेत्युक्तं भवति। कार्यविशेषश्च परमाणुरिति व्याहतम्'–इत्यादि तत एवानुसन्धेयम्।

५ चतुर्विंशसूत्रोक्तं पराभिमतं हेतुमनुवदति–यत् पुनरेतदिति।

६ तस्याशयं विवृणोति–स्पर्शवत्त्वादिति। यदा परमाणुत्रयेणैकमवयव्यारब्धं तदा मध्यवर्त्तिना परमाणुना पूर्वापरयोः परमाण्वोर्व्यवधानं परमाणोः स्पर्शवत्त्व एव सम्भवति। संयोगश्च स्वाश्रयं न व्याप्नोतीति संयोगवत्त्वादेव परमाणोर्भागाः सन्तीति सिद्धम्भवतीत्यर्थः।

७ एतत्परिहारमपि द्वाविंशसूत्रभाष्योक्तमेव स्मारयति। उक्तं चात्रेति।

८ परिहारस्याशयं विवृणोति–स्पर्शवानिति।

९ उक्तं परिहारं दूषयति परः–स्पर्शवत्त्वादिति।

भागभक्तिर्भवति[1] भागवानित्रायमिति"। उक्तं 'चात्र[2]–विभागेऽल्पतरप्रसङ्गस्य यतो नाल्पीयस्तत्रावस्थानात्'–'तदवयवस्य चाणुतरत्वप्रसङ्गादणुकार्यप्रतिषेध' इति ॥ २४ ॥

"मूर्त्तिमतां[3] च संस्थानोपपत्तेः", "संयोगोपपत्तेश्च" परमाणूनां सावयवत्वमिति हेत्वोः—

अनवस्थाकारित्वादनवस्थानुपपत्तेश्चाप्रतिषेधः[4] ॥ २५ ॥

यावन्मूर्त्तिमद्यावच्च संयुज्यते तत्सर्वं सावयवमित्यनवस्थाकारिणाविमौ हेतू। सा चानवस्था नोपपद्यते। सत्यामनवस्थायां सत्यौ हेतू स्याताम्। तस्मादप्रतिषेधोऽयं निरवयवत्वस्येति।

विभागस्य च विभज्यमानहानिर्नोपपद्यते तस्मात्प्रलयान्तता नोपपद्यत इति।

अनवस्थायां च प्रत्यधिकरणं द्रव्यावयवानामानन्त्यात् परिमाणभेदानां गुरुत्वस्य चाग्रहणं, समानपरिमाणत्वं चावयवावयविनोः परमाण्ववयवविभागादूर्ध्वमिति ॥ २५ ॥

(४) बाह्यार्थभङ्ग[5]निराकरणप्रकरणम्–प्रासङ्गिकम्।

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१ भागभक्तिरिति। पूर्वापरभागाभ्यां विभाग इत्यर्थः। पूर्वेण भागेन पूर्वपरमाणुना संयुज्यतेऽपरेण चापरपरमाणुनेति प्राप्तम्परमाणोस्सावयवत्वमित्याशयः।

२ परोद्भावितं दूषणमपाकुर्वन् पूर्वोक्तमेव स्मारयति–उक्तं चात्रेति। 'विभागेऽल्पतरेति' षोडशसूत्रभाष्यस्थं वाक्यं, 'तदवयवस्येति' द्वाविंशसूत्रभाष्यस्थम्।

३ एवं त्रयोविंशचतुर्विंशसूत्रोक्तस्योत्सूत्रमेव परिहारमुक्त्वा सौत्रं परिहारमुपक्रमयितुं परोक्तौ हेतू अनुवदति–मूर्त्तिमतामिति।

४ परमाणुसावयवत्वसाधकहेतुनिराकरणपरं सूत्रम्–अनवस्थेति। पूर्वपक्षयुक्त्या परमाणुनिरवयवत्वप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः–कस्मात्? यस्मादुक्तौ हेतू अनवस्थां प्रवर्तयतः–अनवस्था चानुपपन्नेत्यर्थः।

५ एवं तावद् द्वाभ्यां प्रकरणाभ्यां सावयवं निरवयवं चार्थं प्रसाध्य तत्प्रसङ्गागतं बाह्यार्थापह्नवनिराकरणार्थम्प्रकरणान्तरमिदमारब्धव्यम्भवति। यदि बाह्योऽर्थो नैवास्ति तर्हि नास्त्येवावकाशोऽवयवावयविव्यवस्थाया इत्यस्याः सामञ्जस्यार्थं बाह्यार्थनिराकरणमपाकरणीयम्।

"यदिदं भवान्बुद्धीराश्रित्य बुद्धिविषयाः सन्तीति मन्यते मिथ्याबुद्धय एताः। यदि हि तत्त्वबुद्धयः स्युर्बुद्ध्या विवेचने क्रियमाणे याथात्म्यं बुद्धिविषयाणामुपलभ्येत—

"बुद्ध्या विवेचनात्तु भावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिस्तन्त्वपकर्षणे पटसद्भावानुपलब्धिवत् तदनुपलब्धिः" ॥ २६ ॥

"यथाऽयं तन्तुरयं तन्तुरिति प्रत्येकं तन्तुषु विविच्यमानेषु नार्थान्तरं किञ्चिदुपलभ्यते यत्पटबुद्धेर्विषयः स्यात्। याथात्म्यानुपलब्धेरसति विषये पटबुद्धिर्भवन्ती मिथ्याबुद्धिर्भवति। एवं सर्वत्रेति" ॥ २६ ॥

व्याहतत्वादहेतुः ॥ २७ ॥

यदि बुद्ध्या विवेचनं भावानां, न सर्वभावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिः। अथ सर्वभावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिर्न बुद्ध्या विवेचनम्। भावानाम् बुद्ध्या विवेचनं याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिश्चेति व्याहन्यते। तदुक्तम्—'अवयवावयविप्रसङ्गश्चैवमा प्रलयात्'—इति ॥ २७ ॥

तदाश्रयत्वादपृथग्ग्रहणम् ॥ २८ ॥

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१ अत्र प्रमेयत्वं ज्ञानत्वव्याप्यन्न वेति संशये पूर्वपक्षमाह विज्ञानवादी—यदिदमिति। बुद्धीनां विषयाः सन्तीति मतं मिथ्येति भावः।

एवं क्रमेण परमाणुष्वपि बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानेषु याथात्म्यानुपलब्धेर्न बाह्यवस्तु स्थूलं वा क्षोदीयो वास्तीति सर्वा एव बुद्धयः स्वाकारमबाह्यं बाह्यतयाऽऽलम्बमाना मिथ्याभूता इति पूर्वपक्षहृदयम्। तथा चोक्तम्माध्यमिकैः—

बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते।
अतो निरभिलप्यास्ते निस्स्वभावाश्च देशिताः।

२ पूर्वपक्षहेतुं सिद्धान्ती दूषयति—व्याहतत्वादिति सूत्रम्।

३ प्रकृतविषयकं पूर्वमुक्तं स्मारयति—तदुक्तमिति। पञ्चदशसूत्रे प्रागित्यर्थः।

अत्र वार्त्तिककारो दूषणान्तरमप्याह—सर्वभावानामनुपपत्तिरिति ब्रुवाणः प्रमाणं पर्यनुयोज्यः। यदि प्रमाणं ब्रवीति व्याहतं भवति, प्रमाणस्यापि भावरूपत्वात्। अथ न ब्रवीति अर्थोऽस्य प्रमाणाभावादेव न सिध्यतीति।

४ यत् पुनरेतत्—"यदि व्यतिरिक्तं पटादि द्रव्यं स्यात् तन्तुषु बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानेषु पृथगुपलभ्येत"—इति तत्र समाधत्ते—तदाश्रयत्वादिति सूत्रम्। यत् पटस्तन्तुभ्यः पृथक् न गृह्यते तत्र कारणं तन्तुपटयोराश्रयाश्रितभाव एवेत्यर्थः।

कार्यद्रव्यं कारणद्रव्याश्रितं तत्कारणेभ्यः पृथङ् नोपलभ्यते। विपर्यये पृथग्ग्रहणात्। यत्राश्रयाश्रितभावो नास्ति तत्र पृथग्ग्रहणमिति। बुद्ध्या[1] विवेचनात्तु भावानां पृथग्ग्रहणमतीन्द्रियेष्वणुषु, यदिन्द्रियेण गृह्यते तदेतया बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानमन्यदिति ॥ २८ ॥

प्रमाणतश्चार्थप्रतिपत्तेः[2] ॥ २९ ॥

बुद्ध्या विवेचनाद्भावानां याथात्म्योपलब्धिः। यदस्ति यथा च, यन्नास्ति यथा च, तत्सर्वं प्रमाणत उपलब्ध्या सिध्यति। या च प्रमाणत उपलब्धिस्तद्बुद्ध्या विवेचनं भावानाम्। तेन सर्वशास्त्राणि सर्वकर्माणि सर्वे च शरीरिणां व्यवहारा व्याप्ताः। परीक्षमाणो हि बुद्ध्याऽध्यवस्यति—इदमस्तीदं नास्ति—इति।

तत्र न सर्वभावानुपपत्तिः ॥ २९ ॥

प्रमाणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम्[3] ॥ ३० ॥

एवं च सति सर्वं नास्तीति नोपपद्यते। "कस्मात्?" 'प्रमाणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम्'। यदि सर्वं नास्तीति प्रमाणमुपपद्यते, सर्वं नास्तीत्येतद्व्याहन्यते। अथ प्रमाणं नोपपद्यते सर्वं नास्तीत्यस्य कथं सिद्धिः। अथ प्रमाणमन्तरेण सिद्धिः सर्वमस्तीत्यस्य कथं न सिद्धिः ॥ ३० ॥

"स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवदयं[4] प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः" ॥ ३१ ॥

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१ बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानामर्थानामपृथग्भावोऽपि गृह्यत एवेत्याह—बुद्ध्येति। यत्र खल्ववयवावयविनावैन्द्रियकौ तत्र पृथग्ग्रहणमविवेचकानामस्फुटतरम्—अतीन्द्रियेभ्यस्त्वणुभ्य आनुमानिकेभ्यः प्रत्यक्षदृश्यानां तदाश्रितानामवयवानां पृथग्ग्रहणमतिस्फुटमित्याशयः।

२ अतीन्द्रियेष्ववयवेषु परमाणुष्वैन्द्रियकावयविभेदः स्पष्टो गृह्यत इति प्रदर्शितम्—अधुना ऐन्द्रियकेऽप्यवयवेऽवयविनो विविच्यमानस्य याथात्म्येन पृथग्ग्रहणम्प्रदर्शयति-प्रमाणत इति सूत्रम्। '*प्रमाणतः*' प्रमाणाधीनत्वात् '*अर्थस्य*' पटादेः '*प्रतिपत्तेः*' ज्ञानस्य प्रामाणिके चार्थे न बाधकस्य सम्भव इत्यर्थः।

३ पूर्वपक्षे दोषान्तरमाह—प्रमाणेति सूत्रम्। व्याघातान्न बाह्याभाव इति शेषः। 'बाह्यं नास्ति' इत्यत्र प्रतिज्ञायां यदि प्रमाणम् 'उपपद्यते' वर्तते तदा तत्प्रमाणस्य बाह्याभावज्ञानाद् 'बाह्यस्य' सत्त्वात् न बाह्याभावः। अथ तत्र प्रमाणं 'न उपपद्यते' तदा निष्प्रमाणकत्वादेव तत्प्रतिज्ञा न सिध्यतीत्यर्थः।

४ स्वप्नप्रत्ययदृष्टान्त एव भवता विषयासत्त्वसाधनायोपन्यस्तः, स चोक्तप्रकारेण

" मायागन्धर्वनगरमृगतृष्णिकावद्वा " ॥ ३२ ॥

" यथा स्वप्ने न विषयाः सन्त्यथ चाभिमानो भवति, एवं न प्रमाणानि प्रमेयाणि च सन्त्यथ च प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानो भवति "॥३१॥ ॥३२॥

हेत्वभावादसिद्धिः ॥ ३३ ॥

स्वप्नान्ते विषयाभिमानवत्प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानो न पुनर्जागरितान्ते विषयोपलब्धिवदित्यत्र हेतुर्नास्तीति 'हेत्वभावादसिद्धिः'। स्वप्नान्ते चासन्तो विषया उपलभ्यन्त इत्यत्रापि हेत्वभावः।

"प्रतिबोधेऽनुपलम्भादिति चेत्?" प्रतिबोधविषयोपलम्भादप्रतिषेधः। यदि प्रतिबोधेऽनुपलम्भात्स्वप्ने विषया न सन्तीति, तर्हि य इमे प्रतिबुद्धेन विषया उपलभ्यन्ते, उपलम्भात्सन्तीति।

विपर्यये हि हेतुसामर्थ्यम्। उपलम्भात् सद्भावे सत्यनुपलम्भादभावः सिद्ध्यति। उभयथा त्वभावे नानुपलम्भस्य सामर्थ्यमस्ति। यथा प्रदीपस्याभावाद्रूपस्यादर्शनमिति तत्र भावेनाभावः समर्थ्यत इति।

स्वप्नान्तविकल्पे[1] च हेतुवचनम्[2]। स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवदिति[3] ब्रुवता स्वप्नान्तविकल्पे हेतुर्वाच्यः। कश्चित्स्वप्नो भयोपसंहितः, कश्चित्प्रमोदोपसंहितः, कश्चिदुभयविपरीतः, कदाचित्स्वप्नमेव न पश्यतीति। निमित्तवतस्तु स्वप्नविषयाभिमानस्य निमित्तविकल्पाद्विकल्पोपपत्तिः ॥ ३३ ॥

स्मृतिसङ्कल्पवच्च[4] स्वप्नविषयाभिमानः ॥ ३४ ॥

जागरितप्रत्ययविषयाणां सत्त्वमेव भवदीयप्रतिज्ञाविरुद्धं साधयतीत्यर्थः। एतदुक्तम्भवति। स्वप्नज्ञानस्यायाथार्थ्यमिच्छता बाधकमन्तरेण तदनुपपत्तेर्जाग्रत्प्रत्यय एवास्य बाधको वक्तव्यः। न चासावसमीचीनस्तद्बाधितुमुत्सहत इति समीचीनत्वं जाग्रत्प्रत्ययस्याभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति। तथा च जागरितान्ते विषयोपलब्धिवदित्यनुपपन्नम्।

१ परोक्तौ दूषणान्तरमाह—स्वप्नान्तविकल्प इति।

२ हेतुवचनमिति। हेतुर्वाच्य इत्यर्थः।

३ स्वाशयं वर्णयति—स्वप्नविषयेति। स्वप्नज्ञानानि विचित्राणि भवन्ति। तत्र वैचित्र्ये को हेतुरिति वक्तव्यम्।

४ स्वप्नज्ञानस्यापि सद्विषयत्वमेवेत्यत्र साधकमाह—स्मृतिसङ्कल्पवदिति सूत्रम्।

पूर्वोपलब्धविषयः[1]। यथा स्मृतिश्च सङ्कल्पश्च पूर्वोपलब्धविषयौ न तस्य प्रत्याख्यानाय कल्पेते, तथा स्वप्ने विषयग्रहणं पूर्वोपलब्धविषयं न तस्य प्रत्याख्यानाय कल्पत इति। एवं दृष्टविषयश्च स्वप्नान्तो जागरितान्तेन। यः सुप्तः स्वप्नं पश्यति स एव जाग्रत्स्वप्नदर्शनानि प्रतिसन्धत्ते—इदमद्राक्षम्—इति। तत्र जाग्रद्बुद्धिवृत्तिवशात्स्वप्नविषयाभिमानो मिथ्येति व्यवसायः। सति च प्रतिसन्धाने या जाग्रतो बुद्धिवृत्तिस्तद्वशादयं व्यवसायः—स्वप्नविषयाभिमानो मिथ्येति।

उभयाविशेषे तु साधनानर्थक्यम्। यस्य स्वप्नान्तजागरितान्तयोरविशेषस्तस्य स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवदिति साधनमनर्थकं तदाश्रयप्रत्याख्यानात्।

अतस्मिँस्तदिति च व्यवसायः प्रधानाश्रयः। अपुरुषे स्थाणौ पुरुष इति व्यवसायः स प्रधानाश्रयः। न खलु पुरुषेऽनुपलब्धे पुरुष इत्यपुरुषे व्यवसायो भवति। एवं स्वप्नविषयस्य व्यवसायो—हस्तिनमद्राक्षं पर्वतमद्राक्षमिति—प्रधानाश्रयो भवितुमर्हति ॥ ३४ ॥

एवं[2] च सति—

मिथ्योपलब्धेर्विनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानात्स्वप्नविषयाभिमानप्रणाशवत्प्रतिबोधे ॥ ३५ ॥[3]

स्थाणौ[4] पुरुषोऽयमिति व्यवसायो मिथ्योपलब्धिः—अतस्मिँस्तदिति ज्ञानम्। स्थाणौ स्थाणुरिति व्यवसायस्तत्त्वज्ञानम्। तत्त्वज्ञानेन च मिथ्यो-

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१ सूत्रशेषं पूरयति—पूर्वेति। तथा च 'स्मृतिसङ्कल्पवत् स्वप्नविषयाभिमानोऽपि पूर्वोपलब्धविषय एवेति' सूत्रस्वरूपम्। विषयीकुरुत इत्युभयवादिसम्मतम्। ततश्चानयोर्विषयौ न प्रतिषेद्धुं शक्येते।

२ ननु भ्रमस्यापि सद्विषयकत्वे तत्प्रतिरोधः कथं स्यादित्याशङ्काया उत्तरमुपक्रमते—एवं चेति। मिथ्याज्ञानस्य सत्यज्ञानापेक्षत्वे सतीत्यर्थः।

३ भ्रमज्ञानस्य प्रतिरोधप्रकारमाह—मिथ्योपलब्धेरिति सूत्रम्।

४ सूत्रार्थमाह—स्थाणाविति। इदमत्राकूतम्—मिथ्योपलब्धीनां बाह्यानालम्बनत्वमास्थाय तत्त्वबुद्धीनां बाह्यानालम्बनत्वं साधनीयम्। तासां बाह्यानालम्बनत्वं च बाधकाधीनम्। बाधकं चात्र रजतादिभ्रमे समारोपितरजताद्यभिमानमेव निवर्तयति न तु पुरोऽवस्थितमर्थसामान्यमपि शुक्लभास्वरम्। तस्मान्न बाधकानुरोधादपि मिथ्याज्ञानं बाह्यानालम्बनमिति स्वप्नवदिति दृष्टान्तः साध्यविकल इति।

ing the latter].* And there can be no perception of the *touch* (warmth or coolness) of a thing unless it is got at by the Sense-organ ; and we also see (in the case of the Water in the Jar) that there is percolation, as also flowing out,† [which also shows that substances can pass through an intervening substance without dismembering or transforming it].

Thus then, it becomes established that in the case of things hidden behind glass or vapour or rock-crystal, perception duly comes about, 'because there is no obstruction' to the rays of Visual Light by the said glass, etc., and they get at the object by passing through the intervening glass, etc.

Sūtra 49

[*Objection*]—" **The view put forward is not right; because there is possibility of either of the two characters belonging to either of the two substances.**"

BHĀṢYA

" (*a*) Whether there is *non-obstruction* (of the Visual Light) by the Wall and such other things, just as there is by glass and vapour, etc., or (*b*) there is *obstruction* by glass and vapour, etc., just as there is by the wall ;—inasmuch as both these alternative views are equally possible, it behoves you to show cause which, and why, is the right view."§

Sūtra 50

[*Answer*]—**Just as there is perception of Colour in the Mirror and in Water,—by reason of these two being, by their nature, bright and white,—similarly there is perception of Colour (also in the case of such intervening substances as Glass etc., which are, by their nature, transparent).**

* This parenthetical explanation is according to the *Vārtika* and *Tātparya*.

† The *Vārtika* reads '*parispanda*' for '*praspanda*', and explains it as *lateral motion*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* reads '*praspanda*', and explains it as *percolating through the pores* ; '*parisrava*' standing for actual *flowing out*.

§ The Puri Mss. read *Niyamena* for *Niyame* ; the *Bhāṣyacandra* also notices this reading and explains it to mean that "it is absolutely necessary to state your reasons".

BHĀṢYA

The Mirror and Water are possessed of '*prasāda*'—*i. e.*, a particular colour (bright-white) ; which belongs to them by their very nature ; as is shown by the fact of their always possessing it ; and of this 'bright-white colour' also, it is the very nature that it reflects (and renders visible) the Colour (of things placed before it) ; and in the case of the Mirror, we find that when a man puts his face before it, the light-rays emanating from his eyes strike the Mirror and are turned back (reflected), and thereby they come into contact with the man's own face, whose colour and form thus become perceived ; this perception being called 'the perception of the reflected image' ; and it is brought about by the peculiar colour of the Mirror's surface ; that it is so is proved by the fact that any such reflection fails to appear whenever there is a deterioration in the brightness of the Mirror's surface. [Though such is the case with the Mirror, yet] There is no such 'perception of the reflected image' in the case of the Wall and such other things [and the only explanation possible is that these latter things are not endowed with that particular property which would enable them to reflect the light-rays from the Eye]. In the same manner, even though there is *non-obstruction* of the Visual Light by such things as the Glass and Vapour, etc., yet there is *obstruction* by such things as the Wall and the like ; and this is due to the very nature of the things concerned [which must be accepted as they are].

Sūtra 51

It is not right to question or deny things that are (rightly) perceived and inferred.*

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, every Instrument of Right Cognition apprehends things as they really exist ; so that when certain things are cognised by means of Perception or Inference, it is not right for you, in course of your inquiry, to *question* the reality of these things ;—nor is it right for you to *deny* their reality. It would, for instance, not be right to argue that 'Just

* Puri Sū. Ms. reads '*paryanuyoga*' for '*pratiṣedha* ; and Puri-Bhā. Ms. B. reads '*pratiyoga*'; it is clear from the *Bhāṣya* that *pratiṣedha* is the right reading.

as Colour is visible by the Eye, so should Odour also be visible', or that 'like Odour, Colour also should *not* be visible by the Eye'; or that 'like the cognition of Fire, the cognition of Water also should arise from that of Smoke'; or that 'like the cognition of Water, that of Fire also should *not* arise from that of Smoke'. And what is the reason for this? Simply this, that things are cognised by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition just as they really exist, exactly as endowed with their real nature, and as possessed of their own real properties; so that Instruments of Right Cognition always apprehend things as they really exist. You have put forward the following *question* and *denial*:—(*a*) 'there *should be non-obstruction* (of Visual Light) by the Wall, etc.; just as there is by Glass and such things'; and (*b*) 'there should not be non-obstruction by Glass, etc., just as there is none by the Wall, etc.' But it is not right to do so; because the things that we have described (in connection with the obstruction or non-obstruction of Visual Light by certain objects) are such as are actually cognised by means of Perception and Inference; whether there is *obstruction* or *non-obstruction* (of a certain thing by another thing) can be determined only by our perception or non-perception, (*i. e.* it depends upon our perceiving or not perceiving such obstruction); so that in the case (in question) from the fact that there is no perception of things behind the Wall and such things, it is *inferred* that there *is* obstruction by these things; and from the fact that there *is* perception of things behind glass and vapour, etc., it is inferred that there is non-obstruction by these latter.

Section (8)

Sūtra 52–61

(*The Sense-organs one or many?*)

BHĀṢYA

[Now the question arises]—Is there only one Sense-organ? or several Sense-organs?* "Why should this doubt arise?" [The Sūtra answers]—

* The sequence of this section is thus explained by the *Pariśuddhi*—'In the foregoing section, it having been established that the Sense-organs are made up of material substances, and that they are operative by contact, —it has next to be proved that there are several Sense-organs; and the

Sūtra 52

The doubt arises—because by reason of Subsistence in several places, there should be multiplicity ; and yet a single composite actually subsists in several places.*

determination of this point is necessary as preliminary to what has gone before. For, if the Sense-organs are one only—and not many—then they cannot be made up of material substances ; and if they are not material in their character, they cannot be operative by contact. Because if there is only one Sense-organ, there would be no force in such reasonings as—'the Visual organ must consist of Light, because from among Colour and other things it renders perceptible only Colour', and so forth ; and under the circumstances it could not be proved that the Organ operates by contact ; as it is only when the organ is proved to be material in its character that it can be held to be operative by contact. The real purpose served by the present discussion is that when it has been proved that there are several Sense-organs, then alone can there be any force in such reasons for the existence of the Soul as—'one and the same object is apprehended by the organs of Vision and Touch' and like.

* The Sūtra presents a difficulty. The words as they stand mean—'We find several things occupying several places and also a single thing occupying several places'.—But the *Vārtika* and *Tātparya* are dissatisfied with this. The grounds for dissatisfaction are explained by the *Vārtika*, and amplified by the *Tātparya* :—If we take the words of the *Sūtra* as they stand, it would mean—'we have seen that when there is diversity of place there is multiplicity, as when several Jars occupy diverse places ; and we also find a single thing occupying several places, as when a single composite resides in several of its components'. But such statement would be open to the following objections—in clause (*a*) 'diversity of place' स्थानान्यत्व denotes the quality of 'diversity' as subsisting in the *Place* ; and in clause (*b*) the term नानास्थानत्व, 'the character of occupying several places', denotes a quality subsisting in something else, other than *Place*. But Doubt can never arise from *two qualities* subsisting in two distinct things. For these reasons, the reasoning of the Sūtra could be resolved into one or other (not both) of the following ; and neither would be right. For if the reasoning is put in the form—(*a*) 'Doubt arises because we have seen multiplicity *and* unity when there is *diversity of place*'—then inasmuch as this quality of diversity would belong to the *place*, it would not belong to any *one* thing ; and hence it would not be common to both (*one* and *many*) ; specially as what the Sūtra has pointed out (in clause *b*) is only the fact of the *one thing* having the quality of occupying several places ; and it does not put forward the ***diversity as belonging to the Place*** ;—this latter has been put forward (in clause *a*) only in connection with ***multiplicity***. If, on the other hand, the reasoning is put in the form—(*b*)—'Doubt arises because we have found Unity and Multiplicity when things occupy several places'—

As a matter of fact, we find that when different places are occupied, there are several substances; and yet the Composite

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then the difficulty is that, as a matter of fact, there is no substance which occupies several places, each substance occupying only one place; so that in this also the character would not be a common one; specially as what the Sūtra declares in clause (*b*) is the fact that *the character of occupying several places* indicates *unity* of the thing. As for the contingency when several Jars occupy several places this has been spoken of, in clause (*a*) as indicating *diversity of place*, and not *the character of occupying several places.*

[For these reasons], the *Bhāṣya*, ignoring the literal meaning of the words of the Sūtra, which would be apparently irrelevant, has explained the Sūtra according to its sense—says the *Pariśuddhi*. And this sense is as rendered in the translation. The whole point of the difference is that the 'occupying of several places' should be taken as belonging to the *Sense-organs* specifically, and not to things in general,—and that of *occupying of several places* indicating *multiplicity* as well as *singleness.*

The *Bhāṣyacandra* offers the following explanation :—

स्थानानि अन्यानि यस्य तस्य तत्तथा तस्य भावः 'स्थानान्यत्वम्' अनेकस्थानस्थितैकत्वम् तेन नानात्वात् तज्ज्ञापितनानात्वात् [This explanation of the compound avoids the difficulty raised in the *Vārtika*]—'Because *multiplicity* of Sense-organs is indicated by the fact that it is found in several places'—and अवयविनः एकस्य नानास्थानत्वात् नानावयवाधारकत्वञ्च एकत्वम्; and yet inasmuch as a single composite resides in several of its components, it would seem that the Sense-organ is one only.'

The difficulty raised appears to be more verbal than real: What the Sūtra means is simply this—'we find that when things occupy several places, they are many; [*e.g.*, when the Jar and the Cloth occupy different places]; and we also find a single thing occupying several places; *e.g.*, the Composite is single and yet it resides in several components; so that when we find the Sense-organs occupying different places, there arises a Doubt as to whether they are several (like the Jar and the Cloth), or one (like the composite)'.—as Viśvanātha puts it. And all that the *Vārtika* insists upon is the fact that the Sūtra should be construed as simply putting forward *the character of occupying several places—as belonging to the Sense-organs*—as the property common to 'one' and 'several', and hence giving rise to doubt as to the Sense-organs being *one* or *many*. And even when we take the Sūtra as referring to things in general, the implication is exactly this.

Vardhamāna, in the *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, puts the difficulty in a somewhat different manner :—'As the words of the Sūtra stand, the first clause mentions *multiplicity due to diversity of place*, and it does not make any mention of *singleness* (the second factor of the Doubt); similarly, the second clause mentions *singleness during diversity of place*, and it does not make any mention of *multiplicity*; so that in either case, the Doubt remains unaccounted for.'

substance, though subsisting in several places, is one only. Hence *in regard to the sense-organs, which are found to occupy different places*, the said doubt arises.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[*Purvapakṣa*]—"The Sense-organ is *one*,—

Sūtra 53

"the Cutaneous (Tactile) only, because of non-absence."

BHĀṢYA

"The Cutaneous Organ is the only *one* organ",—says the Opponent. Why? "*Because of non-absence*; that is, there is no *substratum of sense-organ* which is not pervaded by the *Skin* (in which the skin is not present); so that in the absence of *Skin* there can be no perception of anything. Hence it follows that there is a single Sense-organ—the Cutaneous (Tactile) Organ—by which all sense-substrata are pervaded, and in whose presence alone the perception of things is possible."

[**Siddhānta*]—The above is not right; because there is no perception (by the Tactile Organ) of the objects of other Sense-organs.† The distinctive feature of the Cutaneous or Tactile Organ is that it is the instrument of the perception of Touch; and when by means of this Tactile Organ, the Touch (of a certain thing) is perceived, there is no perception of the objects of other Sense-organs, such for instance, as Colour etc.—by such persons as are blind (devoid of the Visual Organ, even though endowed with an efficient Tactile Organ). [According to the Pūrvapakṣa] there is no other Organ except that which apprehends Touch; so that (according to that theory) the blind man should perceive *Colour* etc., exactly as he perceives Touch;—as a matter of fact, however, Colour etc. are not perceived by the blind;—from which it follows that the Cutaneous Organ is not the only *one* Organ.

[The view that the Cutaneous Organ is the only sense-organ having been shown to be untenable, the *Pūrvapakṣin* next

* This is the Siddhānta put forward by the *Bhāṣya*; the Sūtrakāra propounds it in the next Sūtra.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* calls this '*Sūtra*'; The *Tātparya* regards it as Sūtra. It is interesting to note that the *Pariśuddhi* states and criticises the view that this is a *Sūtra*.

advances the view that the various Sense-organs are only parts of the one Cutaneous Organ]—" The perception of those things would be of the same kind as the perception of Smoke; that is, as a matter of fact, the touch of Smoke is perceived (felt) by means of that particular part of the Cutaneous Organ (skin) which is located in the Eye,—and not by means of any other part of skin; and similarly Colour, etc., also are perceived by particular parts of the skin; and it is on account of the destruction of such parts that the blind fail to perceive Colour, the deaf fail to perceive Sound, and so forth."*

Answer—What has been urged cannot be right; as it involves a self-contradiction. Having asserted that—" inasmuch as the Cutaneous Organ is not absent anywhere, there is only one Sense-organ,"—you now allege that " the perception of Colour etc., is obtained by means of particular parts of skin, just like the perception of Smoke;" if this latter allegation is true, then the instruments apprehending the several objects of perception (Colour, Touch etc.) must be regarded as *several*; for the simple reason that each of them apprehends a particular object of its own; as is proved by the fact that one particular object, (*e. g.* Colour) is perceived only when one particular instrument (the *Eye* or the *Skin in the Eye*) is present, and it is not perceived when the latter is destroyed. Thus your former assertion (that there is a single Sense-organ apprehending all things) becomes contradicted by the latter.

The 'non-absence' that you have put forward (in Sū. 53), as the reason (for the conclusion that there is only one 'Sense-organ') is also open to doubt. As a matter of fact, the substrata of the Sense-organs are pervaded by (*i. e.* composed of) the Earth and such other substances also; for in the absence of these substances there is no perception of things. From this it follows that there is no single Sense-organ—the Cutaneous or any other—which can bring about the perception of all things.

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* When the blind fail to perceive Colour, it is only because that particular part of skin which was in the Eye, and which was the means of colour-perception, has been destroyed.

Sūtra 54

[*Siddhānta*]—It is not true [that there is only one Sense-organ]; because (several) things are not perceived simultaneously.

BHĀṢYA

[According to the view that there is only one sense-organ apprehending all things, what would happen would be that] the Soul would come into contact with the Mind, the Mind with the single Sense-organ, and the single sense-organ with all objects (Colour, Odour, Touch, Taste and Sound); so that (in every act of Perception), the contact of the Soul, the Mind, the Sense-organ and the several objects being present, there would be perception, at one and the same time, of all these objects. As a matter of fact, however, Colour and such other objects are never perceived at one and the same time. Hence it follows that it is not true that there is a single sense-organ operating on all objects of perception.

Further, by reason of the non-concomitance of the perceptions of things, it cannot be accepted that there is a single sense-organ apprehending all things; if there were concomitance of perceptions of several things, then no blindness etc., would be possible.*

Sūtra 55

The Cutaneous Organ cannot be the only sense-organ; as this would involve inner contradictions.†

* The difference between 'non-simultaneity of perceptions' urged before and the 'non-concomitance of perceptions', urged now is not quite clear. The distinction, according to the *Vārtika* and the *Pariśuddhi*, is that 'non-simultaneity' is more general, referring principally to simultaneity of Perceptions; the sense being that several perceptions cannot appear at the same time; while 'non-concomitance' refers mainly *to the objects perceived*; the sense being that the several perceptions do not always appear together; *i. e.*, it is not necessary that the perception of Odour must always be accompanied by the perception of Colour; if that were so, then at the time that the blind man perceives Odour, he could have the perception of Colour also; and he would not be blind at all.

The *Pariśuddhi* remarks that what the *Sūtra* really means to urge here is, not exactly the '*non-simultaneity of cognitions*', but only the impossibility of *several things* being perceived at one and the same time.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains the term '*vipratiṣedha*' as '*vidhāya pratiṣedha*', 'denying after affirming'.—*i. e.*, contradicting oneself.

This *Sūtra* is not found in Viśvanātha; the *Bhāṣyacandra* appears to treat it as *Bhāṣya*; it is not found in Sūtra Ms. D, nor in the Puri Sūtra Ms. It is found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, and the *Vārtika* also treats it as *Sūtra*.

BHĀṢYA

The Cutaneous Organ cannot be regarded as the only Sense-organ ; as such a view involves inner contradictions: That is, it would mean that by that Organ, Colour etc., are perceived without being in contact with it ;—and if the organ is operative without contact (as it is *ex-hypothesi*, in the perception of Colour etc.), then it should be so in the perception of Touch also ; or if Touch etc., are apprehended by the organ by contact only, then Colour etc., also should be apprehended by contact only.* It might be urged that—" the Cutaneous Organ operates half and half." But, in that case, since no obstruction would be possible, any and every object would be equally perceived. That is to say, if you mean that—" Touch etc., are apprehended by the Cutaneous Organ only when they are in contact with it, while Colours are apprehended by it without being in contact with it,"—then (our answer is that), under such a theory (where apprehension is possible *without contact*) there would be no obstruction (to the operation of the Organ) ; and there being no obstruction, there would be perception of all colours, the hidden as well as the unhidden ; nor would there be any ground for the well-known phenomenon that there is perception of Colour near at hand, and no perception of Colour at a distance ; that is to say, if the Cutaneous Organ apprehends Colour without being in contact with it, then there would be no reason for the phenomenon that, while Colour is not perceived from a distance, it is perceived when near at hand.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The plurality (of sense-organs) having been proved (indirectly) by the denial of *singleness*, the *Sūtra* proceeds to propound direct positive arguments in support of the same.†

* The right reading प्राप्तानां ग्रहणम् is supplied by the Puri Mss. A. and B.

† This sentence has been construed in two ways, by the *Vārtika* :—(1) *Ēkatvapratiṣedhāt anantaram,*—'after having negatived singleness'—*nānātvasiddhāu sthāpanāhetuḥ upādīyate*—'the Sūtra propounds arguments in support of plurality';—or (2) '*Ēkatvapratiṣedhāt nānātvasiddhau*'—'the plurality of sense-organs having been proved (indirectly) by the denial of singleness, the Sūtra proceeds to propound direct arguments in support of the same.'

Sūtra 56

Because the objects of the Sense-organs are five-fold.

BHĀṢYA

The term '*artha*' stands for *prayojana*, 'object' or 'purpose'; and as a matter of fact, this 'object' of the sense-organs is five-fold; that is, when Touch is apprehended by the Tactile Organ, that same organ does not apprehend Colour; hence we infer the existence of another, the Visual organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Colour; similarly when Colour and Touch are apprehended (by the Tactile and the Visual organs respectively), these two organs do not apprehend Odour; which leads us to infer a third, the Olfactory Organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Odour;—in the same manner, when the three (Touch, Colour and Odour) are apprehended (by the Tactile, the Visual and Olfactory organs respectively), these same organs do not apprehend Taste; hence we infer the existence of the fourth, the Gestatory Organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Taste;—lastly, when the four (Touch, Colour, Odour and Taste) are apprehended (by the Tactile, the Visual, the Olfactory, and the Gestatory organs respectively) those same organs do not apprehend Sound; hence we infer the fifth, Auditory Organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Sound. Thus, from the fact that the purpose of one sense-organ is not served by another, it follows that there are *five* Sense-organs.

Sūtra 57

[*Objection*]—"**What is asserted cannot be accepted; because the 'objects' are many (and not 'five')**".

BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—"That there are '*five*' sense-organs cannot be regarded as rightly proved by the fact that *the objects of the sense-organs are fivefold*: Why?—*Because the said objects are many*. The 'objects' of the Sense-organs are several; *e. g.*, there are three kinds of Touch—the *cool*, the *hot* and *the neither-cool-nor-hot*; there are endless colours—in the shape of white, green and the rest; there are three odours—agreeable, disagreeable and indifferent; there are several tastes—the bitter and the rest; Sound is diverse; appearing in the form of letters as also in that of mere indistinct sound. In view of these facts,

the man who would hold the sense-organs to be *five* on the ground of the objects of the Sense-organs being five-fold, should also have to admit that there are many (more than five) Sense-orgns, beoause the objects of the sense-organs are many."

Sūtra 58

[*Answer*]—**Inasmuch as (the several kinds of Odour are) nothing more than 'odour,' there can be no denial of Odour or the rest (as constituting the 'five Sense-organs').**

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, Odour (Colour, Test, Touch and Sound) have their exact extension precisely determined through their respective Universals :—so that the perceptions of these can be rightly regarded as indicating the existence of distinct apprehending instruments, only when it is found that they (the perceptions) are such as are *not* brought about by the same (or similar) instruments.* Further, the argument that has been put forward (in Sū. 56) has for its subject the 'perceptible things' *as grouped under well-defined heads*, and not *individual things, severally*; while your denial (in Sū. 57) of the number 'five' as applied to 'perceptible things' refers to individual things regarded severally. Consequently the denial cannot be regarded as right and proper.†

"But how do you know that Odour and the rest have their extension precisely determined through their respective Universals?"

Well, as a matter of fact, the three kinds of Touch—the cool, the warm and the neither-warm-nor-cool—are all grouped

* The reading न प्रयोजयन्ति is wrong; the right reading is प्रयोजयन्ति as found in the two Puri Mss. and in the *Bhāṣyacandra*, and also supported by the *Bhāṣya* below.

† All Odours are apprehended by the same organ; hence they are grouped under one head, and regarded as 'one', similarly with Colour, Taste, Touch and Sound. Hence these five groups justify the assumption of five 'Sense-organs'. The Opponent takes each Odour as a distinct unit, and for each such unit he would have one organ; and hence he does not agree to restrict the number of organs to five only. But when all Odours are actually found to be apprehended by the same organ, there is nothing to justify the assumption of several organs for the apprehending of Odour.

(and unified) under the single *Universal* of 'Touch'; so that when we perceive the *cool* Touch (by the Tactile Organ), the perception of the other two kinds of Touch—the *warm* and the *neither-warm-nor-cool*—cannot indicate, or justify the assumption of, other instruments (distinct from the said Tactile Organ); for the simple reason that all the several kinds of Touch are as a matter of fact perceptible by the same instrument; that is the other two kinds of Touch also are actually perceived by means of the same organ as the *cool* Touch. Similarly, all kinds of Odour are included under the single group 'Odour', all kinds of Colour under 'Colour', all kinds of Taste under 'Taste' and all kinds of Sound under 'Sound'. As for the perceptions of Odour (Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound), on the other hand, each of these is found to be obtained by means of a different kind of instrument; and as such they indicate so many different organs. From all this it becomes established that 'because the objects of the Sense-organs are five-fold, there are five Sense-organs.'

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—"If things can be grouped under a *Universal*, then it follows that all the Sense-organs—

Sūtra 59

"should be regarded as 'one', their (several) objects being no more than 'object'.

BHĀṢYA

"That is to say, all objects being included under the single *Universal* of 'object' [the 'objects of the Sense-organs' are *one*, from which it follows that there is only one Sense-organ]."

Sūtra 60

[*Answer*]—**Not so; because of the fivefoldness—**(*a*) **of the signs (or indicatives) in the shape of Perceptions,** (*b*) **of the location,** (*c*) **of the process (operation),** (*d*) **of the shape (magnitude) and** (*e*) **of the constituents.**

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, objects are never found to have their extension determined through the Universal of 'Object'; and hence they cannot all be inferred as perceptible by any single organ, independently of other organs; in the case of Odour etc.,

on the other hand, we find that they do have their extension determined by their respective Universals 'Odour' and the rest; and as such they are inferred as perceptible—each by a distinct Sense-organ. Hence what is urged (in Su. 59) is entirely irrelevant.

This is what is described in detail in the Sutra :—

(A) *Because of the fivefoldness of the signs in the shape of Perceptions*; what indicate the existence of Sense-organs are our own perceptions, since the presence of Sense-organs is proved only by the perception that we have of certain things;—this has been already explained in the Bhāṣya on Sū. 56, which speaks of the 'fivefoldness of the objects of the Sense-organs';—thus then, inasmuch as the 'indicatives of Sense-organs', in the shape of perceptions, are fivefold, the Sense-organs must be five.

(B) The *location* also of the Sense-organs is *fivefold*: (1) The Tactile Organ, which is indicated by the perception of Touch, has its *location* throughout the body; (2) the Visual Organ, which, as issuing out of the body, is indicated by the perception of Colour, has its *location* in the pupil of the Eye; (3) the Olfactory organ has its *location* in the Nose; (4) the Gestatory organ has its *location* in the Tongue; (5) the Auditory Organ has its *location* in the cavity of the Ear;*—all this being proved by the fact that the five organs have their existence indicated by the perceptions of Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound.

(C) On account of the fivefoldness of the *processes* also there is diversity in the Sense-organs: *e. g.*, (in visual perception) the Visual Organ encased in the pupil issues outside and then gets at the objects possessed of Colour; the Organs of Touch (Taste and Odour) on the other hand are themselves got at by the objects, which latter reach the Organs by the movements of the

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* remarks that, inasmuch as the Auditory organ consists of *Ākāśa* it is not right to locate it in the Ear-cavity. To avoid this difficulty, it offers other explanations of the compound '*karṇachidrādhiṣṭhānam*': (1) '*chidram*', 'cavity', stands for a particular form of contact; and '*karṇa*' stands for an object made up of earth-particles: and '*adhiṣṭhāna*' stands for auxiliary; hence the whole compound means 'that which has for its auxiliary an object made up of earth-particles':—or (2) 'that which is the *adhisthāna*,—substratum,—of the contact of the Ear'.—Both these interpretations would apply to the *Ākāśa*.

body in which the Organs exist; while the contact of the Auditory Organ with the Sound (heard) is obtained by reason of this latter proceeding in a series.

(D) '*Ākṛti*, shape,' stands for the exact limit or extent of magnitude; and this is found to be fivefold. The Olfactory, the Gestatory and the Tactile Organs have their shape or magnitude restricted to their respective substrata (in the body; the shape of the Olfactory organ is the same as that of the Nose, and so forth),—and are inferred (as distinct from the perception of their objects);—while the Visual organ, though located in the pupil, moves out of the socket and pervades over the object;—while, lastly, the Auditory Organ is nothing other than Ākāśa itself, and like *Ākāśa*, is all-pervading,—being inferred only from the perception of Sound; and yet this Organ manifests or renders audible only certain particular sounds,—being restricted in its scope by the substratum (body) in which it subsists, by reason of the force of the peculiar faculties (of Merit and Demerit) belonging to the person concerned.*

(E) By *Jāti*, 'Constituent', is meant 'source'; the 'sources' or 'constituents' of the Sense-organs are five, in the shape of the rudimentary substances, Earth (Air, Water, Light and Ākāśa). It follows therefore that, because the 'constituents' are five, the Sense-organs also must be five.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(The *Sāṅkhya* asks)—"How do you know that the Sense-organs have their source in the *rudimentary substances*, and not in *Unmanifested Primordial Matter*?"

[The answer is given in the following Sūtra].

Sūtra 61

The Sense-organs are regarded as being of the same nature as the Rudimentary Substances, because there is perception (by their means) of the specific qualities of these substances.

* Though the Auditory organ is nothing more than the all-pervading Ākāśa, yet it cannot apprehend all Sounds in the world, because its scope is restricted by the disabilities of the body in which it subsists,—this connection of a particular organ with a particular object being determined by the merit and demerit of the man to whom it belongs.

BHĀṢYA

In the case of Air and the other rudimentary substances we find that there is a restriction as to the perception of particular qualities; e. g. Air serves to manifest Touch; Water serves to manifest Taste; Light serves to manifest Colour; as for Earth, one earthy thing (oil, *f. i.*,) serves to manifest the odour of another earthy thing (the *kuṅkuma*, *f. i.*,);—this restriction as to the perception of the specific qualities of rudimentary substances is found in the case of the Sense-organs also [*e. g.* the Olfactory Organ manifests *Odour* only, the Tactile Organ *Touch* only, and so forth]; hence from the fact that there is restriction as to the perception of the specific qualities of Rudimentary Substances, we conclude that the Sense-organs have their source in (are constituted by) those Substances, and not in Unmanifested Primordial Matter.*

SECTION (9)

(*Sūtra 62-73*)

Examinations of the 'Objects' of Sense-organs.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It has been mentioned† above (in Sū. 1-1-14) that Odour etc., are the qualities of Earth, and inasmuch as this assertion would be true if Earth etc., had each only one quality, as well as

* The *Tātparya* makes the following observation:—By the declaration that there are only five Sense-organs, it is implied, that the other five—Hands, Feet etc.—which also have been regarded as 'Sense-organs'—are not 'Sense-organs'; and the reason for this lies in the fact that they do not fulfill the conditions of the 'Sense-organ'; these conditions are—(1) that they should be connected with the Body, (2) they should be distinct from the defects of *saṁskāras* and (3) they should be the direct instruments of cognition; and these (specially the last) are not present in Hands, Feet, etc.

† What this refers to is not the mere 'mention', '*uddeśa*' of the Objects; it apparently refers to their 'definition', '*lakṣaṇa*'. The *Tātparya* says—'With a view to *examine* the nature of *objects*, the *Bhāṣyakāra* recalls the definition provided under Sū. 1-1-14'; the mere 'mention' of 'objects' has been made under 1-1-1. The *Pariśuddhi* adds that the purpose underlying the examination of the 'objects' is the proving of the main thesis that there are several sense-organs, as also the discarding of the objections against the definition of Earth etc.

if they had several qualities,* the author of the Sūtra adds the following Sūtras.—

Sūtras 62 and 63

From among Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound,—those ending with Touch belong to Earth (Sū. 62) ; **and [from among those ending with Touch] excluding from the beginning, one by one, they belong respectively to Water, Light and Water ; and to Ākās'a belongs the latter.** (Sū. 63).†

BHĀṢYA

'From among those ending with Touch'—this term, with its (former Nominative) case-ending changed (into the Genitive)—has to be construed along with Sū. 63.§

To Akāśa belongs the latter—*i. e.* Sound,—so called *in reference to those ending with Touch*.‡ "Why then is the comparative suffix '*tarap*' used [when the reference is to the *four* qualities of Odour etc., while '*tarap*' is used when one thing is referred to *one* other thing] ?" The word is an independent positive adjective (and not a comparative term ending with '*tarap*') and all that it signifies is 'that which comes after'; and in Sū.. 1-1-14,—where all five are mentioned—'Sound' comes after

* Here the author propounds the doubt that forms the basis of the present enquiry : As regards the assertion in Sū. 1-1-14, it may mean, either—(1) that each one of Odour, Colour etc , belongs to each one of Earth, Light etc.; or (2) that among Earth and the rest, some have one quality, some two ; or (3) that all belong to all.—*Vārtika*. On this the *Pariśuddhi* remarks—The question is—Is the assertion in Sū 1-1-14 meant to be *restrictive* (of one quality to one substance) ? or *alternative* (one possessing one quality, one several and so forth) ? or *cumulative* (all possessing all) ? Or the doubt may be in regard to Odour, Colour, etc.,—some qualities are common to all substances, some belong to only a few ;—to which of these categories do Odour &c. belong ?

† These are two *Sūtras*—according to the *Vārtika* and also according to the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ This term is necessary in Sū. 63 : and it can be brought only from the foregoing Sūtra ; there however it has the Nominative ending : hence when construed with Sū. 63, its case-ending has to be changed. The meaning is that Earth has Odour, Taste, Colour and Touch ; Water has Taste, Colour and Touch ; Light has Colour and Touch ; Air has only Touch.

‡ The term '*spārśaparyanth*' of the previous *Sūtra*', with the case-ending changed into the form '*Sparahaparyantēbhyoḥ*', being brought in from the preceding *Sūtra*.